

1 Deep Network Classifiers

In this project, we will be exploring the robustness of deep neural classifiers. In particular, we will see a technique developed by Wong and Kolter¹ that can prove that a given classifier is not easily fooled by small perturbations of its inputs.

Formally, we define a set of parameters Θ , and a family of classifiers $\mathcal{F} := \{f_\theta : \theta \in \Theta\}$, such that each classifier $f_\theta \in \mathcal{F}$ is a function $f_\theta : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$, where n is the dimension of the input and m is the number of classes. We wish to find f_θ such that, given an input $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and corresponding true label $\vec{y}_{\text{true}} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, the predicted label $\vec{y}_{\text{pred}} \doteq f_\theta(\vec{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is “close” to the true label \vec{y}_{true} in some way which is characterized by a loss function, which we will shortly make precise. We say that f_θ is correct on $(\vec{x}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}})$ if and only if

$$\operatorname{argmax}_{i \in \{1, \dots, m\}} (\vec{y}_{\text{pred}})_i = \operatorname{argmax}_{i \in \{1, \dots, m\}} (\vec{y}_{\text{true}})_i \quad (1)$$

For concreteness, we consider the MNIST classification task. The inputs $\vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ are vectorized representation of the handwritten digit images (n is usually the number of pixels in the image); $\vec{y}_{\text{pred}}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}} \in \mathbb{R}^{10}$. $\vec{y}_{\text{true}} = e_i$ where i is the index corresponding to the correct digit (e.g. $i = k + 1$ if k is the correct digit, because digits are 0–9 and indices are 1–10). See Figure 1. The optimal classifier minimizes the empirical risk function

$$\min_{\theta \in \Theta} \sum_{(\vec{x}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \in \mathcal{D}} L(f_\theta(\vec{x}), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \quad (2)$$

where $L : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a loss function that for each (data, label) tuple $(\vec{x}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \in \mathcal{D}$ compares the model’s prediction $f_\theta(\vec{x})$ to the true label \vec{y} . An example loss function L could be the zero-one loss

$$L(\vec{y}_{\text{pred}}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \doteq \begin{cases} 1 & \operatorname{argmax}_{i \in [n]} (\vec{y}_{\text{pred}})_i \neq \operatorname{argmax}_{i \in [n]} (\vec{y}_{\text{true}})_i \\ 0 & \operatorname{argmax}_{i \in [n]} (\vec{y}_{\text{pred}})_i = \operatorname{argmax}_{i \in [n]} (\vec{y}_{\text{true}})_i \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Then, the objective function in (2) simply counts the number of inputs $\vec{x} \in \mathcal{D}$ where the classifier’s most confident class is not correct. Unfortunately, this function does not have useful gradients, so it is not used for training classifiers in practice. For this project, we will be considering a three-layer feedforward neural network with ReLU nonlinearity; see Figure 2. That is, the network $f_\theta : \mathbb{R}^{n_1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{n_3}$ consists of the layers

$$\vec{z}_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_1}, \vec{z}_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_2}, \vec{z}_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_2}, \vec{z}_3 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_3}, \quad (4)$$

where $\vec{z}_1 = \vec{x}$ is the input for the network and \vec{z}_3 is the output of f_θ , and the parameters

$$W_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_2 \times n_1}, W_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_3 \times n_2}, \vec{b}_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_2}, \vec{b}_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{n_3}, \quad (5)$$

¹J. Z. Kolter and E. Wong. 2018. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer adversarial polytope. In *ICML*. 5283–5292.




Figure 1: Example MNIST input and classifier output \vec{y}_{pred} . In this case, the classifier correctly predicts that the image is of the digit seven.




Figure 2: The deep neural network f_{θ} .

which make up the affine transforms between layers. Explicitly, we define

$$\begin{aligned}
 \vec{z}_1 &\doteq \vec{x} \\
 \vec{\tilde{z}}_2 &\doteq W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1 \\
 \vec{z}_2 &\doteq \text{ReLU}(\vec{\tilde{z}}_2) \\
 \vec{\tilde{z}}_3 &\doteq W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2 \\
 f_\theta(\vec{x}) &\doteq \vec{\tilde{z}}_3.
 \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

ReLU (short for Rectified Linear Unit) is defined as

$$\text{ReLU}(\vec{z}) \doteq \max\{\vec{z}, \vec{0}\} \tag{7}$$

where the maximum is taken elementwise.

Note that without the ReLU nonlinearity, the classifier f_θ would simply be a linear function of its input.

In the optimization problem (2), we define the parameter as

$$\theta \doteq (W_1, W_2, \vec{b}_1, \vec{b}_2) \tag{8}$$

Hence, $\Theta \doteq \mathbb{R}^{n_2 \times n_1} \times \mathbb{R}^{n_3 \times n_2} \times \mathbb{R}^{n_2} \times \mathbb{R}^{n_3}$.

1.1 Notation

Throughout this document we will use the following notation:

- For a vector \vec{v} , the scalar v_j is the j th element of \vec{v} .
- For a matrix A , the vector A_j is the j th column of A . The scalar A_{jk} is the element of A at the j th column and k th row.

For example, $(W_2)_j$ is the j th column of the matrix W_2 .

2 Finding Adversarial Examples

In recent years, it has been found that classifier trained using standard methods are not very robust. That is, although a classifier may perform well when the inputs are sampled from real-world processes (e.g., images of real-world handwritten images), if they are artificially perturbed by even a small amount that is imperceptible to humans, they can easily be misled. For example, if we have trained a classifier for detecting handwritten digits, an adversary might be able to take an image of a four and slightly change some pixel values such that our classifier now thinks the image is of a two. See Figure 3 for another example of this.

More formally, the goal of an adversary is to find an example \vec{x}' that is close to a real input \vec{x} , but is classified incorrectly. (The classifier is assumed to have correct output on \vec{x} .) That is, the adversary wishes to solve the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max_{\vec{x}'} \quad & L(f_\theta(\vec{x}'), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\vec{x} - \vec{x}'\|_\infty \leq \epsilon
 \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where \vec{y}_{true} is the vector that is one on the true label for \vec{x}' , and zero elsewhere. The constraint $\|\vec{x} - \vec{x}'\|_\infty \leq \epsilon$ says that the adversarial input \vec{x}' must be close to \vec{x} ; each vector element, which corresponds to a pixel value, must be no more than ϵ away from the original.




Figure 3: In this example, the original image is of a pig. However, an adversary is able to apply an imperceptible amount of noise and fool the classifier into believing the image is of an airliner. Image credit gradientscience.com/intro_adversarial.

2.1 Fast Gradient Signed Method

One common way to approximate the solution to (9) is the Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM):

$$\vec{x}_{\text{FGSM}} \doteq \vec{x} + \epsilon \text{sgn}(\nabla_{\vec{x}} L(f_{\theta}(\vec{x}), \vec{y}_{\text{true}})). \quad (10)$$

Note that this is very similar to gradient ascent of the loss w/r/t the input, except we only take a single step, and we use the sign of the gradient instead of the gradient itself.

1. Show that the FGSM perturbation (10) is the solution to a first-order approximation of the adversarial optimization problem, i.e.

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{x}_{\text{FGSM}} = \underset{\vec{x}'}{\text{argmax}} \quad & L(f_{\theta}(\vec{x}), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) + (\nabla_{\vec{x}} L(f_{\theta}(\vec{x}), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}))^{\top} \vec{x}' \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\vec{x} - \vec{x}'\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon. \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

HINT: Consider setting $\vec{x}' = \vec{x} + \epsilon \vec{v}$ and expressing the optimization in terms of \vec{v} . Also, recall that the ℓ_1 and ℓ_{∞} norms are dual.

3 Convex relaxation of the adversarial optimization

Suppose now we are considering a specific adversary who wishes to fool the classifier into classifying a particular image \vec{x} as an incorrect class i_{targ} instead of the true class i_{true} by perturbing x slightly. (In the MNIST example, maybe the adversary wants to fool the classifier into thinking an image of a four is really an image of a two.)

Using the same network f_{θ} as defined in (6), we rewrite the adversarial problem (9) as

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\vec{z}} \quad & \vec{c}^{\top} \vec{z}_3 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\vec{z}_1 - \vec{x}\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon \\ & \vec{z}_2 = W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1 \\ & \vec{z}_2 = \text{ReLU}(\vec{z}_2) \\ & \vec{z}_3 = W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2 \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

where for the objective we define

$$\vec{c} = \vec{y}_{\text{true}} - \vec{y}_{\text{targ}}. \quad (13)$$

Recall that \vec{y}_{true} is defined as a vector that is one at the true class i_{true} and zero elsewhere. Similarly, \vec{y}_{targ} is a zero-one vector that is one only at the adversary's target class i_{targ} . (This can be any incorrect class.) Thus, the objective

$$\vec{c}^\top \vec{z}_3 = \vec{z}_{3i_{\text{true}}} - \vec{z}_{3i_{\text{targ}}} \quad (14)$$

is the difference between the classifier's score assigned on the true class and the target class—if the adversary can force this objective to be negative, then $\vec{y}_{\text{targ}} > \vec{y}_{\text{true}}$. That is, the classifier will no longer assign the input to the true class and, if $\vec{y}_{\text{targ}} > \vec{y}_i$ for all other $i \neq \text{targ}$, the classifier is fooled into assigning the input to the target class instead of the true class.

Also, notice the slight abuse of notation in (12); when we say $\min_{\vec{z}}$ we really mean $\min_{\hat{z}_1, \hat{z}_2, \hat{z}_3}$. We will keep this convention throughout this document in order to avoid clutter.

Note that because of the ReLU nonlinearity, the problem (12) is sometimes non-convex and thus difficult to find a solution to. However, if we knew upper and lower bounds u_j and l_j respectively for each \hat{z}_{2j} (the j th element of \vec{z}_2), we can instead relax the constraint $\vec{z}_2 = \text{ReLU}(\vec{z}_2)$ to $\forall j \in \{1, \dots, n_2\} : (z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathcal{Z}_j$, where \mathcal{Z}_j is the convex hull of the original constraint, i.e.

$$\mathcal{Z}_j \doteq \text{conv}(\hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j) = \text{conv}(\{(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \mid z_{2j} = \text{ReLU}(\hat{z}_{2j}) \wedge l_j \leq \hat{z}_{2j} \leq u_j\}). \quad (15)$$

To make this explicit, we consider three cases. If $l_j \leq u_j \leq 0$, then we know $\hat{z}_{2j} \leq 0$, so the ReLU constraint is equivalent to fixing $z_{2j} = 0$. Thus, $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j$ is already convex, and we can define

$$\mathcal{Z}_j = \hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j = \{(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \mid z_{2j} = 0\}. \quad (16)$$

Notice we ignore the $l_j \leq \hat{z}_{2j} \leq u_j$ constraint in the definition of $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j$ for simplicity. This does not affect the dual program, since we assume by definition of l_j and u_j that $l_j \leq \hat{z}_{2j} \leq u_j$ is already enforced by the other constraints. Similarly, if $0 \leq l_j \leq u_j$, we know $\hat{z}_{2j} \geq 0$ and thus $z_{2j} = \hat{z}_{2j}$, so

$$\mathcal{Z}_j = \hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j = \{(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \mid z_{2j} = \hat{z}_{2j}\}. \quad (17)$$

In the third case, $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j$ is no longer convex. Examining this set visually, it is clear that its convex hull is a




Figure 4: The convex relaxation of ReLU when $l_j \leq 0 \leq u_j$. Image credit [Wong & Kolter, 2018].

triangle, given by

$$\mathcal{Z}_j = \{(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \mid z_{2j} \geq 0 \wedge z_{2j} \geq \hat{z}_{2j} \wedge -u_j \hat{z}_{2j} + (u_j - l_j) z_{2j} \leq -u_j l_j\}. \quad (18)$$

Note that the inequality

$$-u_j \hat{z}_{2j} + (u_j - l_j) z_{2j} \leq -u_j l_j \quad (19)$$

defines the upper boundary of the triangle, i.e. the line going through $(l_j, 0)$ and (u_j, u_j) . See Figure 4.

Our relaxation of the problem in (12) is thus

$$\begin{aligned}
 p^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = \min_{\vec{z}} \quad & c^\top \vec{z}_3 \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\vec{z}_1 - \vec{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon \\
 & \vec{z}_2 = W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1 \\
 & (z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \in \mathcal{Z}_j \quad \forall j \in \{1, \dots, n_2\} \\
 & \vec{z}_3 = W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2
 \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$

Note that since the feasible set of the relaxation is a superset of the original, the relaxed optimum is a lower bound for the original optimum.

4 Fenchel Conjugates

We take a slight detour to define what will be a useful notion to us: Fenchel conjugates. For any function $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we define a Fenchel conjugate $f^* : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by

$$f^*(\vec{y}) = \sup_{\vec{x}} \{ \vec{y}^\top \vec{x} - f(\vec{x}) \mid \vec{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \}. \tag{21}$$

This allows us to define f^* as a pointwise supremum of affine functions $\vec{y} \mapsto \vec{y}^\top \vec{x} - f(\vec{x})$, which ensures that $f^*(\vec{y})$ is convex in \vec{y} . In particular, the Fenchel conjugate is useful when formulating dual problems.

2. Before proceeding to the next part, we will get some practice with taking Fenchel conjugates.

(a) Suppose $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and $f(x) = |x|$. Find $f^*(y)$.

HINT: Consider case-work on the cases $\{y < -1, y = -1, -1 < y < 1, y = 1, y > 1\}$

(b) Now, suppose $f : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $f(\vec{x}) = \|\vec{x}\|_1$. Find $f^*(\vec{y})$.

HINT: No need to reprove everything! Write the Fenchel conjugate of the ℓ_1 norm in terms of the Fenchel conjugate of the absolute value function, and apply the result proved in the previous part.

5 Using Lagrangian Duality

The relaxed optimization problem (20) is convex, so it can be solved efficiently w/r/t the size of the layers \vec{z}_i using standard tools. However, for many classification problems the input and intermediate layers can be large, so this may still be prohibitively slow. In this section, we will show that solving the dual problem instead is much easier.

For any set S , define the characteristic function $\mathbf{1}_S$ as

$$\mathbf{1}_S(x) \doteq \begin{cases} 0 & x \in S \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \tag{22}$$

We also define the ℓ_∞ ball

$$B_\epsilon(\vec{x}) \doteq \{ \vec{v} \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \|\vec{v} - \vec{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon \}. \tag{23}$$

3. Show that we can re-express the convex relaxation as

$$\begin{aligned}
 p^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = \min_{\vec{z}} \quad & \vec{c}^\top \vec{\tilde{z}}_3 + \mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}(\vec{z}_1) + \sum_{j=1}^{n_2} \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & \vec{\tilde{z}}_2 = W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1 \\
 & \vec{\tilde{z}}_3 = W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2
 \end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

4.

(a) Let $\vec{\nu}_3$ be the dual variable for the constraint $\vec{\tilde{z}}_3 = W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2$, and $\vec{\nu}_2$ be the dual variable for the constraint $\vec{\tilde{z}}_2 = W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1$. Show that the Lagrangian for the optimization problem (24) is

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{L}(\vec{z}, \vec{\nu}) = & \vec{c}^\top \vec{\tilde{z}}_3 + \vec{\nu}_3^\top \vec{\tilde{z}}_3 + \mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}(\vec{z}_1) - \vec{\nu}_2^\top W_1 \vec{z}_1 \\
 & + \left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_2} \mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) - \vec{\nu}_3^\top W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{\nu}_2^\top \vec{\tilde{z}}_2 \right) - \sum_{i=1}^2 \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i.
 \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

(b) Show that

$$\begin{aligned}
 g(\vec{\nu}_2, \vec{\nu}_3) & \doteq \min_{\vec{z}} \mathcal{L}(\vec{z}, \vec{\nu}) \\
 & = \min_{\vec{\tilde{z}}_3} ((\vec{c} + \vec{\nu}_3)^\top \vec{\tilde{z}}_3) + \min_{\vec{z}_1} (\mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}(\vec{z}_1) - \vec{\nu}_2^\top W_1 \vec{z}_1) \\
 & \quad + \left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_2} \min_{z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}} (\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}(z_{2j}, \hat{z}_{2j}) - \vec{\nu}_3^\top (W_2)_j z_{2j} + \nu_{2j} \hat{z}_{2j}) \right) - \sum_{i=1}^2 \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i
 \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

(c) Conclude that the Lagrangian dual to (24) is

$$\begin{aligned}
 d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = \max_{\vec{\nu}} \quad & -\mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}^*(W_1^\top \vec{\nu}_2) + \sum_{j=1}^{n_2} -\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\vec{\nu}_3^\top (W_2)_j, -\nu_{2j}) - \sum_{i=1}^2 \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & \vec{\nu}_3 = -\vec{c}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

Defining $\vec{\tilde{\nu}}_i = W_i^\top \vec{\nu}_{i+1}$, this becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = \max_{\vec{\nu}} \quad & -\mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}^*(\vec{\tilde{\nu}}_1) + \sum_{j=1}^{n_2} -\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}_{2j}, -\nu_{2j}) - \sum_{i=1}^2 \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & \vec{\nu}_3 = -\vec{c} \\
 & \vec{\tilde{\nu}}_2 = W_2^\top \vec{\nu}_3 \\
 & \vec{\tilde{\nu}}_1 = W_1^\top \vec{\nu}_2.
 \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

HINT: Each of the minimizations in (26) can be written as either a Fenchel conjugate or converted to a constraint. Also, see Section 5.1.6 of Boyd and Vandenberghe's textbook for more on how the Fenchel conjugate relates to the Lagrangian dual.

6 Finding the Fenchel Conjugates

In the previous section, we derived the dual optimization problem in terms of the Fenchel conjugates of the characteristic functions $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}$ and $\mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}$. Now, it only remains to find expressions for these conjugates.

5. Show that $\mathbf{1}_{B_\epsilon(\vec{x})}^*(\vec{\nu}) = \vec{\nu}^\top \vec{x} + \epsilon \|\vec{\nu}\|_1$.

The conjugate for $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}$ is a bit more complex, since it involves some casework and clever manipulations. Therefore we give the expressions here, but if interested see the last few exercises.

There are three cases to consider for $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}$:

- When $l_j \leq u_j \leq 0$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) \leq \begin{cases} 0 & \nu = 0 \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (29)$$

- When $0 \leq l_j \leq u_j$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) \leq \begin{cases} 0 & \nu = \hat{\nu} \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (30)$$

- When $l_j \leq 0 \leq u_j$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) \leq \begin{cases} \text{ReLU}(-l_j \nu) & \nu = \frac{\hat{\nu} u_j}{u_j - l_j} \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (31)$$

Since we are only interested in finding a lower bound to the primal objective, these inequalities suffice.

7 The Dual Network

We are now ready to write the final expression for the dual problem. For notational convenience, let us define the following index sets:

$$\begin{aligned} S &\doteq \{j \in [n_2] \mid l_j \leq 0 \leq u_j\} \\ S^- &\doteq \{j \in [n_2] \mid l_j \leq u_j \leq 0\} \\ S^+ &\doteq \{j \in [n_2] \mid 0 \leq l_j \leq u_j\}. \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

6. Deduce that the dual problem can be expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = \max_{\vec{\nu}} \quad & -\vec{\tilde{\nu}}_1^\top \vec{x} - \epsilon \|\vec{\tilde{\nu}}_1\|_1 - \sum_{i=1}^2 \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i + \sum_{j \in S} l_j \text{ReLU}(\nu_{2j}) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \vec{\nu}_3 = -\vec{c} \\ & \vec{\tilde{\nu}}_2 = W_2^\top \vec{\nu}_3 \\ & \nu_{2j} = 0 & \forall j \in S^- \\ & \nu_{2j} = \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S^+ \\ & \nu_{2j} = \frac{u_j}{u_j - l_j} \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S \\ & \vec{\tilde{\nu}}_1 = W_1^\top \vec{\nu}_2 \end{aligned} \quad (33)$$

Observe now that $\vec{\nu}_3 = -\vec{c}$, and, given each $\vec{\nu}_{i+1}$, we can determine what values $\vec{\nu}_i$ and $\vec{\nu}_i$ are forced by the constraints to take on. That is, it is easy to find the optimal dual value $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$, since there is only one feasible value for each of the dual variables $\vec{\nu}_3, \vec{\nu}_2, \vec{\nu}_2, \vec{\nu}_1$. We simply calculate what values each of these variables must take on, then compute the objective function. Once we have $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$, we know by weak duality that this is a lower bound to $p^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$, which is the relaxed primal problem (20) and again lower-bounds the primal adversarial problem (12) we are interested in. In fact, if we examine the constraints more carefully, we see that they exactly describe a backwards pass through the original network f_θ , albeit with a modified nonlinearity. In more detail, each constraint

$$\vec{\nu}_i = W_i^\top \vec{\nu}_{i+1} \quad (34)$$

can be thought of as the reverse of the affine layer

$$\vec{z}_{i+1} = W_i \vec{z}_i + \vec{b}_i \quad (35)$$

in the primal network, ignoring the bias term \vec{b}_i . Moreover, instead of the ReLU nonlinearity

$$\vec{z}_i = \text{ReLU}(\hat{\vec{z}}_i), \quad (36)$$

we have a different nonlinearity

$$\begin{aligned} \nu_{2j} &= 0 & \forall j \in S^- \\ \nu_{2j} &= \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S^+ \\ \nu_{2j} &= \frac{u_j}{u_j - l_j} \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

that depends on the bounds \vec{l} and \vec{u} .

With this in mind, we define the backwards network $g_\theta(\vec{c})$ with layers $\vec{\nu}_3, \vec{\nu}_2, \vec{\nu}_2, \vec{\nu}_1$ as

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{\nu}_3 &= -\vec{c} \\ \vec{\nu}_2 &= W_2^\top \vec{\nu}_3 \\ \nu_{2j} &= 0 & \forall j \in S^- \\ \nu_{2j} &= \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S^+ \\ \nu_{2j} &= \frac{u_j}{u_j - l_j} \hat{\nu}_{2j} & \forall j \in S \quad \vec{\nu}_1 = W_1^\top \vec{\nu}_2 \end{aligned} \quad (38)$$

and define a loss

$$J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{c})) = -\vec{\nu}_1^\top \vec{x} - \epsilon \left\| \vec{\nu}_1 \right\|_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \vec{\nu}_{i+1}^\top \vec{b}_i + \sum_{j \in S} l_j \text{ReLU}(\nu_{2j}) \quad (39)$$

where we think of $g_\theta(\vec{c})$ as returning all the layers $\vec{\nu}_i, \vec{\nu}_i$. Then, we can interpret the dual optimum $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$ as the loss incurred by the dual network g_θ on input \vec{c} , i.e.

$$d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}) = J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{c})). \quad (40)$$

8 Finding the bounds

Previously, we had written the dual assuming we knew the bounds l_j, u_j . Now it comes time to actually find these values.

7. For any matrix W with rows $\vec{w}_1^\top, \dots, \vec{w}_k^\top$, denote

$$\|W\|_{:,1} \doteq [\|\vec{w}_1\|_1, \dots, \|\vec{w}_k\|_1]^\top. \quad (41)$$

(Note that this is not a norm—the output is a vector, not a scalar.) Show that

$$\vec{u} = W_1 \vec{x} + \vec{b}_1 + \epsilon \|W_1\|_{:,1} \quad (42)$$

and

$$\vec{l} = W_1 \vec{x} + \vec{b}_1 - \epsilon \|W_1\|_{:,1} \quad (43)$$

are upper and lower bounds for \vec{z}_2 , respectively.

Using this, whenever we need to compute $g_\theta(\vec{c})$, we can first obtain u and l using the formulas (42) and (43).

9 A certificate for robustness

Let us take a moment to recall what we have accomplished so far. We have found a way to compute $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$, which is the optimum for the dual program (33). By weak duality, this is a lower bound for $p^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c})$, which is the optimum for the relaxed primal problem (20). This in turn is a lower bound for

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\vec{z}} \quad & \vec{c}^\top \vec{z}_3 \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \|\vec{z}_1 - \vec{x}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon \\ & \vec{z}_2 = W_1 \vec{z}_1 + \vec{b}_1 \\ & \vec{z}_2 = \text{ReLU}(\vec{z}_2) \\ & \vec{z}_3 = W_2 \vec{z}_2 + \vec{b}_2 \end{aligned} \quad (12 \text{ again})$$

which is the original adversarial problem. Recall that we choose

$$\vec{c} = \vec{y}_{\text{true}} - \vec{y}_{\text{targ}} \quad (44)$$

where \vec{y}_{true} is one on the true class and zero elsewhere, and \vec{y}_{targ} is one on the incorrect class i_{targ} and zero elsewhere. Then, the optimum for (12) is the worst-case difference between the classifier's confidence on the true class and class i_{targ} , assuming the input is fixed to an ϵ -ball around the original \vec{x} . Using the dual, we now have a guarantee on how badly the classifier will do in the worst case. As long as $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}} - \vec{y}_{\text{targ}})$ is positive, the classifier will have more confidence in i_{true} than in i_{targ} , for all ϵ -perturbations of the input \vec{x} .

More generally, we want to have a certificate that the classifier cannot be fooled into choosing any incorrect class $j \neq i_{\text{true}}$. This is simple to do using the tools we have developed; simply compute $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}_j)$ for each $j \neq i_{\text{true}}$, where

$$\vec{c}_j = \vec{y}_{\text{true}} - \vec{e}_j \quad (45)$$

and \vec{e}_j is one at index j and zero elsewhere.

By the same reasoning as above, if all of the $d^*(\vec{x}, \vec{c}_j)$ are positive, then the classifier is robust on input \vec{x} : there can be no perturbation \vec{x}' with $\|\vec{x} - \vec{x}'\|_\infty < \epsilon$ such that the classifier is incorrect on \vec{x}' .

10 Training a robust classifier

Using the dual network (33), we are able to check the robustness of the primal network f_θ on any input x (see Exercise 8). In fact, we can do more than this—we can train a robust model by constructing a new loss in terms of J_ϵ and minimizing this w/r/t θ . We first assume some properties of the original loss L .

Definition 1. A multi-class loss function $L : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is: *monotonic* if for all input \vec{y}, \vec{y}' such that $y_i \leq y'_i$ for indices i corresponding to incorrect classes (i.e. $i \neq i_{\text{true}}$), and $y_{i_{\text{true}}} \geq y'_{i_{\text{true}}}$, we have

$$L(\vec{y}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \leq L(\vec{y}', \vec{y}_{\text{true}}). \quad (46)$$

Definition 2. A multi-class loss function $L : \mathbb{R}^m \times \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is *translation-invariant* if for all $a \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$L(\vec{y}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) = L(\vec{y} - a\mathbf{1}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}). \quad (47)$$

8. Show that cross-entropy loss, defined as

$$L(\vec{y}, \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) = - \sum_{i=1}^m (\vec{y}_{\text{true}})_i \log \left(\frac{e^{y_i}}{\sum_{j=1}^m e^{y_j}} \right) \quad (48)$$

is monotonic and translation-invariant. The cross-entropy loss is commonly used to train and/or measure the performance of classification models.

Now, we wish to train a robust classifier through the following optimization problem:

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} \max_{\|x' - x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} L(f_\theta(x'), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}). \quad (49)$$

That is, we wish to find parameters that minimize the worst-case loss caused by an adversary limited to an ℓ_∞ ball around the original inputs $x \in \mathcal{D}$. Since this robust loss involves nested min and max terms, it is difficult to minimize it directly. Thus, we will instead minimize an upper bound.

Let us first extend our notation such that the dual network g_θ takes matrices $C \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$ as input. Then, if $\vec{c}_1, \dots, \vec{c}_d$ are the columns of C , we define

$$J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(C)) = [J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{c}_1)), \dots, J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{c}_d))]^\top. \quad (50)$$

9. For monotonic and translation-invariant loss L , show that

$$\max_{\|x - x'\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} L(f_\theta(x'), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}) \leq L(-J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{y}_{\text{true}}\mathbf{1}^\top - I)), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}). \quad (51)$$

This shows that by solving the optimization problem

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} L(-J_\epsilon(\vec{x}, g_\theta(\vec{y}_{\text{true}}\mathbf{1}^\top - I)), \vec{y}_{\text{true}}), \quad (52)$$

which can be minimized using standard gradient descent, we are minimizing the worst-case loss due to some ϵ -perturbation of the original training input. Therefore, a model successfully trained using this loss would be much more robust to adversarial perturbations than a model trained using the original loss L .

11 The Fenchel Conjugate of $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}$

The next two exercises guide you through finding the Fenchel conjugate of $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}$, which was skipped in the main section.

10. Show that when $l_j \leq u_j \leq 0$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) = \begin{cases} 0 & \nu = 0 \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (53)$$

On the other hand, show that when $0 \leq l_j \leq u_j$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) = \begin{cases} 0 & \nu = \hat{\nu} \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (54)$$

In the remaining case, u_j and l_j straddle the origin, and \mathcal{Z}_j is a non-degenerate triangle.

11. Show that when $l_j \leq 0 \leq u_j$,

$$\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^*(\hat{\nu}, -\nu) \leq \begin{cases} \text{ReLU}(-l_j \nu) & \nu = \frac{\hat{\nu} u_j}{u_j - l_j} \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (55)$$

HINT: You may use the fact that the optimum of a linear program can always be attained at one of the vertices of the feasible polytope—in particular, the optimization problem for $\mathbf{1}_{\mathcal{Z}_j}^$ attains the optimum at one of the three vertices of the triangle $\hat{\mathcal{Z}}_j$. Deduce that the optimal (y, \hat{y}) for the Fenchel conjugate maximization problem is either $(0, 0)$ or on the line*

$$-u_j \hat{y} + (u_j - l_j)y = -u_j l_j. \quad (56)$$

12 Rubric

Below we state the requirements required for each letter grade.

- To get a C, correctly solve problems 1 – 7 and make an honest attempt to solve all portions of the attached Jupyter notebook, except possibly for the section on robust training.
- To get a B, correctly solve problems 1 – 9 and successfully complete all portions of the attached Jupyter notebook, except possibly for the section on robust training.
- To get an A, correctly solve all problems (1 – 11), and successfully complete all portions of the attached Jupyter notebook. In particular, include (in your writeup) a performance comparison between the robust training method and the regular method. In addition, complete one of the following extensions below.

To get an A, your group should complete one of the following extensions, or something else of a similar level of interest and difficulty. You should include your extension(s) in a separate section in the project writeup. Lastly, we note that exceptional projects that go above and beyond may receive extra credit at our discretion.

- In this project we only considered the case of 3 layers, but it is possible (with some effort) to do the same analysis for k -layer networks, for $k \geq 3$. Do this analysis, i.e., problems 3–7, in the case that the network has k layers.
- Do a detailed empirical analysis of the robustness properties as a function of the *width* (that is, n_2) of the hidden layer of the network. How does the robustness of the regular network change as the width increases? How does the robustness of the robustly-trained network change as the width increases? Finally, how do the robustness certificates change as the width increases?
- Do a literature review on adversarial attacks and robust machine learning. That is, pick a paper or two in the area, and summarize them at the level that your peers can understand. A successful literature review will have: an introduction to the proposed method, a formal description of the proposed method, and discussion about why the method is good or useful. You may also want to implement each method and test it against the methods already presented in this project.

If you don't know where to start, you might want to consider the papers “[Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks](#),” Carlini and Wagner (2016), or “[Fighting Gradients with Gradients: Dynamic Defenses against Adversarial Attacks](#),” Wang et al. (2021).

Your submission should be in the form of **one** PDF with all of the following appended:

1. Your project writeup.
2. A PDF printout of the completed Jupyter notebook.
3. Any project extension you choose to complete (in the form of a writeup or Jupyter notebook).