Implicit Function Thm (Module 6, Prop. 22, but with "x" & "p" switched; i.e., instead of expressing x as an implicit function of P, I'm expressing P (which I denote as "y") as a function of X)

Let $F: U \subset \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^k \to \mathbb{R}^k$ be continuously differentiable. Consider a Pt $(x_0, y_0) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^k$ s.t.

- (1) $F(x_0, y_0) = 0$
- 2 Dy $F(x,y) |_{(x_0,y_0)}$ is invertible (i.e., $det[Dy f(x_0,y_0)] \neq 0$).

Then \exists a nbh $B_{\epsilon}(x_0)$ around x_0 and a C^1 function $h: B_{\epsilon}(x_0) \subset \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}^k$ s.t. $\forall x \in B_{\epsilon}(x_0)$

IFT gives sufficient cond. for which we can <u>locally</u> express the surface F(x,y) = 0 by h(x) = y for some C' funch.

Ex.1 Suppose $F(x,y): \mathbb{R} \times \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is C' and F(0,0) = 0. What conditions on the partials of F, F, & F_2 , will guarantee that F(F(x,y),y) = 0 has an implicit function h(x) = y near (0,0)?

Define $Z := F(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}$ => F(Z,y) is C' and F(Z=0,y=0) = 0. By IFT, we need $D_y F(Z,y)|_{(0,0)} \neq 0$

=) Dy F(
$$F(x,y)$$
, Y) | (0,0)
= $\frac{\partial F}{\partial z} \frac{\partial z}{\partial y} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial y}$ | (0,0) by Chain rule

$$= \frac{\partial F}{\partial x} \frac{\partial F}{\partial y} + \frac{\partial F}{\partial y} | (0,0)$$

$$= F_1 (F_2 + 1) | (0,0)$$

$$\neq 0$$

=) F, \$0 and F2 \$-1

Ex. 2 Suppose a firm uses 2 inputs x, & x2 w/ input costs w, & v2 to produce a product that's sold at unit price p>0.

The profit function is $f(x_1, x_2, \omega_1, \omega_2) = Px_1^a x_2^b - \omega_1 x_1 - \omega_2 x_2$ where a+b < 1, a,b > 0.

The FOC of firm's PMP:

$$f_1 \equiv \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_1} = Pax_1^{a-1} x_2^b - w_1 = 0$$

$$f_2 \equiv \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_2} = Pbx_1^a x_2^{b-1} - w_2 = 0$$

How does optimal x_i^* change w.r.t. $w_i & w_2$? (i.e., find $\frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial w_i} & \frac{\partial x_i^*}{\partial w_2}$) You can assume the firm always uses positive amount of $x_i & x_2$. and FOC fully charaterizes the optimal solution.

The idea is to treat the FOC as our F func and express (x_1, x_2) as an implicit function of the "parameters," (w_1, w_2) in some nbh of (x_1^*, x_2^*, w_1, w_2) .

Need to Check (F(x1, x2, w1, w2) = [f, f2] is c' (polynomials)

(2)
$$F(x_1^*, x_2^*, \omega_1, \omega_2) = 0$$

3
$$D_{(x_1,x_2)} F(x_1^*, x_2^*, \omega_1, \omega_2)$$
 invertible

$$D_{(x_{1}, x_{2})} F(x_{1}^{*}, x_{2}^{*}, \omega_{1}, \omega_{2}) = \begin{bmatrix} Pa(a-1)x_{1}^{a-2}x_{2}^{b} & Pabx_{1}^{a-1}x_{2}^{b-1} \\ Pabx_{1}^{a-1}x_{2}^{b-1} & Pb(b-1)x_{1}^{a}x_{2}^{b-2} \end{bmatrix} \equiv J$$

$$|J| = P^{2}abx_{1}^{*2(a-1)}x_{2}^{*2(b-1)} [1-a-b] > 0$$

By IFT, at $(x_1^*, x_2^*, \omega_1, \omega_2)$, there's locally a function $g: \mathbb{R}^2_{++} \to \mathbb{R}^2_{++}$ $g(\omega_1, \omega_2) = (x_1 \times_2)$ s.t. $F(g(\omega_1, \omega_2), \omega_1, \omega_2) = 0$ (which means $(x_1 \times_2)$ is optimal)

$$Dg(w_1, w_2) = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial w_1} & \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial w_2} \\ \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial w_1} & \frac{\partial x_2}{\partial w_2} \end{bmatrix} = -[D_x F]^{-1} D_w F$$

$$= -\frac{1}{|I|} \begin{bmatrix} Pb(b-1) \times_{1}^{a} \times_{2}^{b-2} - Pab \times_{1}^{a-1} \times_{2}^{b-1} \\ -Pab \times_{1}^{a-1} \times_{2}^{b-1} & Pa(a-1) \times_{1}^{a-2} \times_{2}^{b} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -1 & O \\ O & -1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\partial x_1}{\partial x_1} = \frac{bp(p-1)x_1^{y}x_2^{p-1}}{|\mathcal{I}|} < 0$$

$$\frac{\partial x_1}{\partial x_2} = \frac{|\mathcal{I}|}{|\mathcal{I}|} < 0 \quad (x_1 \otimes x_2 \text{ are complements})$$

Envelope Thm (Module 6, Prop. 25)

Let $f: \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^k \to \mathbb{R}$ and $g_i: \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^k \to \mathbb{R}$ $\forall i \in \{1, ..., m\}$. $f \& g_i$ are C!. Let $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ (choice variable) & $p \in \mathbb{R}^k$ (pavameter), $y_1, ..., y_m \in \mathbb{R}$.

Consider:
$$V(p) = \max_{x} f(x,p)$$
 s.t. $g_i(x,p) \leq y_i \forall i$.

Suppose for some open $A \times B \subset \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^k$, the solution to (x^*, p) is the graph of some C^1 function $h: B \to A.(((x^*, p) = (h(p), p)))$

Let I(h(p)) denote the set of binding constraints at the solution $x^* = h(p)$, and suppose KKT cond. hold at $x^* = h(p) \forall P \in B$ w/ λ_j denoting the associated multipliers for each $j \in I(h(p))$.

Then
$$\frac{\partial V(P)}{\partial P_i} = \frac{\partial f(h(P), P)}{\partial P_i} - \sum_{j \in I(h(P))} \frac{\partial g_j(h(P), P)}{\partial P_i}$$

The Envelope thm tells us how the optimal value of an objective function changes (e.g., indirect utility) when we change the parameters (e.g., price & wealth) by simply differentiating the associated Lagrangian with the param and evaluate at the solution.

Q: why do we focus on I(h(p)) only? CS!

Ex.3 Back to Ex.2, we have $F: \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$, where input $X^* = (X_1^*, X_2^*)$ is the choice var and input price $P = (w_1, w_2)$ is the param.

We've shown IFT applies, so $\exists C'$ func $h s.t. X^* = h(P)$ for some open $nbh A \times B \subset \mathbb{R}^2 \times \mathbb{R}^2$.

Since there's no constraint, the rest of the assumptions in the envelope thm are vacuously satisfied.

Hence envelope thm applies.

and
$$\frac{\partial V(w_1, w_2)}{\partial w_1} = \frac{\partial f(h_1(w_1, w_2), h_2(w_1, w_2), w_1, w_2)}{\partial w_1}$$

$$= \underbrace{f_1 \frac{\partial h_1}{\partial w_1}}_{=0} + \underbrace{f_2 \frac{\partial h_2}{\partial w_1}}_{=0} + f_3$$

$$= f_3$$

$$= -x_1^* \quad (you can solve x_1^* in terms of $w_1 \& w_2$ from the FOC, which involves lots of algebra...)$$

So when price of input 1 increases by \$1, firm's profit decreases by \$x*.

Note: Ex.3 is an example of Remark 26 (where the optimization prob. is not constrained)