

# Partisan Collaboration in Policy Adoption: A Preliminary Experimental Study with Local Government Officials

Yixin Liu

## Abstract

Partisanship plays a central role in the policy process, but its impact on the adoption of collaborative strategy by policymakers remains unknown. To fill this gap, I conducted a conjoint experiment involving municipal officials across the United States, examining the effect of co-partisanship on policy collaboration and its moderating impact on collaborative attributes such as resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and policy outcome. The findings reveal that a collaborating partner's co-partisanship status increases the likelihood of local policymakers adopting a program by 10 percentage points. Moreover, co-partisan program proposals generally enhance the favorability of collaborative attributes. Finally, the consistency of the co-partisanship effect across ideologies and various subgroups demonstrates that party identity is rooted in in-group loyalty and fundamentally affects the collaborative process.

**Keywords:** co-partisanship, policy collaboration, local government, conjoint experiment

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I thank Frances Berry, Daniel Butler, Daniel Fay, Huafang Li, Anastasia Semykina, Michael Siciliano, Tian Tang, Chengxin Xu, and Hongtao Yi for feedbacks during different stages of this project. I am also grateful to insightful comments from participants at the 2021 Public Management Research Conference. I also thank excellent research assistance from Binying Liu and Audrey Timmins in the data collection process.

# 1 Introduction

What motivates governments to adopt collaborative strategies? This question is central to understanding the policy process, as many inter-jurisdictional problems, such as environmental pollution and economic development, extend beyond the coordination ability of a single organization ([Ostrom 1990](#)). Therefore, forming collaborative partnerships in policy implementation should be a rational consideration for local and regional officials. It enables them to allocate resources, mitigate risks, and maximize positive outcomes within their jurisdictions. Despite of this importance, governments are not always inclined to collaborate with each other. The prospects of policy adoption often depend on policymakers' strategies for choosing collaborative partners. If policymakers systematically base policy decisions on their political identities, favoring (or dismissing) collaborative proposals from their in-party (or out-party) peers, irrespective of the specific attributes of the policy, they may fail to design rational and optimal solutions for local communities.

The prior work of collaborative strategies in policy process has two research gaps. First, few studies have investigated the impact of partisanship on collaborative strategies in policy adoption. This omission is surprising, given that party affiliation is a well-studied and institutionalized social identity that affects our political life in various ways ([Bisgaard 2019](#)). Recent empirical studies in policy process literature have explored its effects on policy adoption to understand the growing political polarization in the United States ([Brock and Mallinson 2023](#); [Butler et al. 2017](#); [Pereira 2022](#)). However, it remains unknown whether individuals and organizations prefer to form policy collaborations with those who share the same party affiliation rather than with those who differ.

Second, the existing literature on policy processes relies on aggregated patterns of policy choices to comprehend governments' collaborative strategies. This approach, however, fails to distinguish the individual-level role of partisanship in collaboration processes. Scholars have examined organizational and network-level indicators influencing collaboration forma-

tion. These include factors like resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and potential policy outcome (Angst and Hirschi 2017; Hileman and Bodin 2019; Liu et al. 2023). This stream of observational studies depends on aggregating survey data from policy stakeholders to estimate collaboration preferences (e.g., Berardo and Scholz 2010; Ingold et al. 2017; Kalesnikaite and Neshkova 2021). However, they do not explicitly test policymakers’ individual preferences for different collaboration options. Additionally, it remains to be explored how policy actors’ individual-level motivations (e.g., partisanship) interact with organizational attributes in the formation of collaborative partnerships within policy processes.

I conducted a survey-based conjoint experiment with municipal officials across the United States. The survey included a vignette about adopting a sustainable development program. Municipal officials were asked to select program proposals from potential collaborating cities. The party affiliations of officials in these collaborating cities, along with three collaborative attributes—resource allocation, potential policy outcome, and reciprocal trust—were randomly assigned as attributes to each program proposal. This design targets two research questions: (1) Does co-partisanship enhance the likelihood of local policymakers adopting collaborative programs? (2) Does co-partisanship moderate the impacts of other collaborative attributes in the policy process? Addressing these questions, this study seeks to bridge existing research gaps and systematically investigate the relationship between partisanship and collaboration in policy adoption.

## 2 Co-Partisanship in Collaborative Policy Adoption

Group identity theory suggests that people systematically prefer their in-group members over out-group members, and base their political judgments and economic decisions on this preference (Chen and Li 2009). In today’s politically polarized United States, partisanship is one of the most salient group identities. Constituents’ voting behaviors and policy preferences largely depend on their party affiliations (Barber and Pope 2019). Often, the effect of partisanship on political preferences can surpass the influence of candidates’ ethics and the

actual benefits of the policies (Bisgaard 2019; Graham and Svolik 2020). In response, policy elites are trained to remain consistent with their party identity, as voters and other political stakeholders would otherwise punish them (Diermeier and Li 2019).

Recent experimental studies in policy adoption literature have shown that partisanship significantly influences how state and local officials react to policies implemented by other governments. Officials show greater interest in adopting policies endorsed by co-partisans compared to those by bi-partisans or out-partisans (Butler and Pereira 2018; Pereira 2022). The co-partisan effect can even override ideological incongruences in policy learning (Butler et al. 2017). These individual-level findings align with organizational outcomes in observational studies (e.g., Adolph et al. 2021; Brock and Mallinson 2023; Graham et al. 2013; Terman 2015). Furthermore, partisanship affects not only policy adoption but also the collaborative strategies of public officials with other governments. However, this aspect has been infrequently discussed in policy science.

A related concept of party affiliation in policy collaboration is homophily, which defines as a phenomenon that organizations with similar characteristics will be more likely form collaborations than organizations with different characteristics. Policy research has identified various forms of political homophily in collaborative process, including similarity in policy beliefs, ideology, and residents' party registration (e.g., Gerber et al. 2013; Henry 2011; Kammerer et al. 2021). This line of research offers a logical foundation for policymakers of the same party to work together, as their governments often encounter similar challenges due to the analogous interests and needs of their constituents (Gerber et al. 2013). However, the political homophily also introduces confounding factors when trying to isolate the effect of co-partisan identity on policy collaboration. This is because officials from the same party might coincidentally propose collaborative solutions simultaneously, driven by the common social issues they are addressing (Pereira 2022).

Alternatively, the experimental method can isolate the co-partisanship effect at the level of individual policymakers and evaluate their preferences regarding policy collaboration. This

approach is effective to mitigate confounding factors that arise from political homophily at both the organizational and network levels. A recent experimental study (Sheffer et al. 2023) reveals that public officials demonstrate strong partisan bias in resource allocation, favoring co-partisans by giving more and demanding less from them. While this finding does not directly relate to policy collaboration, it suggests that co-partisanship triggers the collaborative behaviors of public officials. Based on this rationale, I propose the following hypothesis.

**Co-partisanship hypothesis (H1):** The collaborative program proposed by co-partisans will increase the interest of municipal officials in adopting it, compared to the same program proposed by out-partisans.

### 3 Co-Partisanship and Collaborative Attributes

Partisanship influences not only the direct decision-making in collaborative policy processes but also moderates how policy actors consider other attributes of collaboration. In this study, I am particularly interested in examining three attributes: issue definition for policy outcomes, resource allocation between collaborative partners, and reciprocal trust in the collaborative process. These attributes align with the classic categories identified by Koontz et al. (2010, 23), which depict the government’s role in affecting both the process and outcomes of collaborative governance.

The existing literature offers substantial evidence suggesting that policy actors are inclined to adopt collaborative policies due to anticipated improved policy outcomes (Liu et al. 2023), cost-effective or equitable resource allocation plans with policy partners (Hileman and Bodin 2019), and established trustworthy relationships from previous collaborations (Ingold et al. 2017). However, I argue that the impact of these attributes on the adoption of collaborative policy is dependent on the party identity of potential partners. If the party identity of potential partners differs from that of the policy actors, this difference tends to diminish the perceived importance of these collaborative attributes in the policy decision-making process.

Therefore, I propose the second hypothesis.

**Conditional hypothesis (H2):** The importance of resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and policy outcomes will weaken if the collaborative program is not proposed by co-partisans.

## 4 Empirical Strategy


### 4.1 Data Collection and Sample Representativeness

I conducted a survey experiment to study the relationships between co-partisanship, collaborative attributes, and collaborative policy adoption. This study targeted municipal officials in the United States, which include elected officials (mayors, councilors, or the equivalent) and municipal managers (city managers or the equivalent). These public officials serve often as decision-makers in policy implementation, so their leadership affects collaborative actions. To build the sample pool of municipal officials, I collected their names, sex, and email addresses from municipalities’ websites. The sample pool included officials from large- and medium-sized American municipalities with populations over 30,000 (1,352 municipalities in total). Approximately half of the United States’ population lives in these areas. Municipalities without the public officials’ email addresses were removed from the study. I used Qualtrics to create the survey and sent it to municipal officials via email. To increase the response rate, I sent one initial invitation with two reminders between April and June 2021.

I successfully sent survey invitations to 9,928 municipal officials. The final sample included 772 individual respondents (39% female, 78% White, Mage = 57), including 674 elected officials and 98 municipal managers. Overall, 363 respondents are Democrats, 193 are Republicans, and 216 are independent or other parties. All respondents in analysis completed at least one conjoint proposal comparison task and provided their party affiliation and ideology information . The effective response rate was approximately 8%, higher compared to other recent surveys using similar samples (e.g., [Lee 2022](#); [Malhotra et al. 2019](#); [Sheffer et al. 2023](#)).

The final sample was broadly representative of the entire sample pool at the level of cities. It covered municipal officials from 49 states and the District of Columbia (see Figure 1), and 533 (39%) municipalities had at least one official who responded to the survey effectively . [Appendix A](#) offers the description of sample characteristics. I collected municipal-level demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau and compared it between municipalities with at least one respondent and those without any respondents. The results showed few statistical differences between municipalities that did and did not respond. Detailed analysis of the sample’s representativeness is reported in [Appendix B](#).

**Figure 1:** Geographic Locations of Survey Respondents



## 4.2 Experimental Design

The study is a conjoint experiment. The first part of the survey introduced a hypothetical sustainable development policy vignette. Then I presented three pairs of collaborative program proposals from other cities, asking respondents to choose their preferred proposal from each pair. Table 1 outlines the attributes of these program proposals, including the partisanship condition and three collaborative attributes. Specifically, resource allocation was measured by the sharing of inputs between the respondent’s city and the partner city;

policy outcome centered on job creation, a politically neutral objective; and reciprocal trust was demonstrated through past collaborations with the partner city. The values in program attributes were randomly assigned simultaneously in every proposal, rendering each attribute value an independent treatment in a mixed between- and within-subjects design (Hainmueller et al. 2014). The proposals chosen were coded as 1, 0 otherwise. Following the conjoint comparison tasks, respondents provided information regarding their party affiliation, ideology, and tenure in their current position. Additionally, they responded to demographic questions about race, gender, age, and education level. Appendix C reports the survey instruments and a sample screenshot of the conjoint task.

**Table 1:** Attributes for Program Proposals in Conjoint Design

Theoretical construct	Program attributes	Possible values
Partisanship	The program is proposed by	(1) Democrat (2) Republican
Resource allocation	Cost of the program	(1) You pay \$250,000; your partner pays \$750,000 (2) You pay \$500,000; your partner pays \$500,000 (3) You pay \$750,000; your partner pays \$250,000
Reciprocal trust	Your previous working experiences with this city	(1) Bad (2) No experience (3) Good
Policy outcome	The program will create	(1) 200 jobs in your city (2) 500 jobs in your city (3) 800 jobs in your city

I adopted the same strategy as Butler et al. (2017) to measure the co-partisanship: I coded the co-partisanship variable 1 if the respondents were from the same party as the collaborators in the conjoint program proposals, and 0 if they were from different parties. Based upon the co-partisanship hypothesis, if partisanship attribute components in the proposals match respondents’ own partisanship identities, for example a Democrat respondent sees a program proposed by Democrats, the probability that s/he chooses this program proposal



increases.

The conjoint experiment using a hypothetical policy vignette offers several benefits for our research objectives. First, the hypothetical vignette effectively reduces pretreatment biases arising from officials’ previous knowledge of implemented policies or their collaborative experiences with other governments ([Druckman and Leeper 2012](#)). Furthermore, the vignette’s politically neutral program description helps to prevent discouragement among respondents from both Democrat and Republican backgrounds when responding my online survey ([Feezell 2016](#)).

Second, the conjoint design enhanced the internal validity. Unlike the traditional survey experiments where respondents are typically assigned randomly to a single treatment condition, my conjoint design simultaneously randomized both partisanship and collaborative attributes in the program proposals. This complex information setting reduced concerns about social desirability biases, making it challenging for respondents to discern the experimental intent ([Horiuchi et al. 2022](#)). This is especially relevant for my study as public officials often display partisan cheerleading in surveys, which can exaggerate partisanship’s impact ([Bullock and Lenz 2019](#)). The conjoint design helps mitigate this overstatement.

Finally, the conjoint design aligns well with my objective of hypothesis testing. By including multiple attributes in each proposal, it enables me not only to compare the effects between partisanship and collaborative attributes but also to examine their interactions ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)). Additionally, it necessitates that respondents make trade-offs between different attributes through forced-choice outcome measurement, thereby improving realism compared to traditional factorial experiments, even within a hypothetical vignette ([Hainmueller et al. 2015](#)).

## 5 Testing the Co-Partisanship Hypothesis

In the subsequent analyses, I estimate the marginal means (MMs) as the primary causal quantities of interest. MMs indicate the respondents’ preferences for a program profile


containing a specific attribute value, averaged across all other attribute values (Leeper et al. 2020). Within the forced-choice design, MMs inherently average at 0.5, where values above 0.5 indicate attribute values that enhance program favorability, and values below 0.5 denote values that decrease program favorability. I clustered standard errors at the individual level to control the non-independence of the within-subject proposal comparison. In addition, all the MMs figures shown in this research include error bars representing 95% confidence intervals.

The left panel of Figure 2 shows the MMs for the full sample. Overall, the results support the H1. If the collaborative program is proposed by officials from the same party in the partner city, the likelihood of program adoption is 0.56. Conversely, if it is proposed by officials from a different party in the partner city, this probability drops to 0.46. On average, co-partisan program proposals have a 10 percentage point higher chance of being adopted compared to out-partisan proposals. The right panel of Figure 2 exhibits similar patterns for both Democrat and Republican subgroups. Respondents from each party are more inclined to adopt programs proposed by co-partisans compared to those proposed by out-partisans, demonstrating the symmetry of the co-partisanship effect in policy collaboration.

However, collaborative attributes exert a more substantial impact than partisanship in predicting the probability of program adoption. For example, when the input sharing between the respondent’s city and the partner city is skewed towards “250:750”, the likelihood of adopting the program increases to 0.60. Similarly, if there is a history of positive collaborative experiences with the partner city, this probability rises to 0.65. Moreover, if the program promises to create 800 jobs, the probability of adoption is 0.66. Notably, there are significant ordering effects for all three collaborative attributes: respondents show a preference for contributing less in resource allocation, having positive over negative past collaborative experiences, and achieving more favorable policy outcomes. These trends in preferences are consistently observed across both party subgroups. In addition, I compared the effects of co-partisanship across various subgroups, encompassing officials’ gender, race,

education level, age, and the population size of their cities. These analyses, reported in [Appendix D](#), show results consistent with our main findings, thereby reinforcing the convincing nature of the co-partisanship effect.

**Figure 2:** Main Estimates of Partisanship and Collaborative Attributes




## 6 Testing the Conditional Hypothesis

Results in [Figure 3](#) support the H2, indicating that the importance of each collaborative attribute is conditional on whether it is proposed by co-partisans from the partner city. In most values in collaborative attributes, proposals from co-partisans are more likely to be

adopted compared to those from out-partisans, a pattern that holds true across the full sample and both party subgroups. An exception is observed in the resource allocation within the Republican subgroup. While the ordering effect is evident in out-partisan proposals, for co-partisan proposals, the “500:500” option shows a 0.64 probability of adoption, which is higher than the 0.59 probability for the “250:750” option. This indicates that Republicans are more likely to prioritize achieving cost fairness with their in-group members in resource allocation over the benefit of lower cost.

**Figure 3:** Conditional Effects of Partisanship on Collaborative Attributes



## 7 Do Ideology and Professional Experience Make a Difference?


To test the robustness of the co-partisanship effect on the adoption of collaborative policies, I further examined whether the co-partisanship effect varied depending on factors such as ideology and professional experience, both of which have been shown to significantly influence political decisions ([Barber and Dynes 2023](#); [Butler et al. 2017](#); [Jankowski et al. 2020](#)). Specifically, I focused on four types of subgroups: conservatism, ideology intensity, position role, and tenure. The constructs of conservatism and ideology intensity were derived from the survey question (see [Appendix C](#)): “How would you describe your political views as of today?” For the conservatism analysis, responses categorizing political views as “liberal” and “very liberal” were grouped into the liberal subgroup, while those identifying as “conservative” and “very conservative” were classified under the conservative subgroup. In the ideology intensity analysis, respondents labeled as “liberal” and “conservative” were assigned to the weak ideology subgroup, whereas “very liberal” and “very conservative” responses formed the strong ideology subgroup. Regarding position role, respondents were differentiated between elected officials and appointed municipal managers. For the tenure analysis, respondents were categorized based on their years in office.

Figure 4 presents the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) in each subgroup, which estimate the change in the average probability of program adoption when switching from a program proposed by a “different party” to one by the “same party” ([Hainmueller et al. 2014](#)). Overall, the effect of co-partisanship appears consistent across various subgroups. In terms of ideology, the magnitude of co-partisanship’s effect is comparable between liberal and conservative respondents. Notably, the respondents with strong ideological intensity show a more pronounced preference for co-partisan proposals, but even those with moderate political views demonstrate a significant preference for adopting proposals from co-partisans.

In the subgroups of professional experience, the co-partisanship effect is stronger among

elected officials compared to appointed managers, which is expected given the electoral pressures elected officials face to align their policies with the preferences of partisan voters. However, the analysis reveals no conditional impact of tenure on the co-partisanship effect. Public officials of varying tenures exhibit a similar preference for co-partisan proposals.

**Figure 4:** Co-Partisanship Effects in Ideology and Professional Experiences Subgroups



## 8 Discussion

In summary, my findings reveal that local policymakers show a systematic preference for program proposals when they come from members of the same party in collaborating cities. While the influence of this co-partisanship attribute is smaller than that of resource allocation, reciprocal trust, and potential policy outcome in predicting policymakers' collaborative choices in policy adoption, it positively moderates the explanatory power of these collaborative attributes at almost all levels. Further subgroup analyses indicate that the

co-partisanship effect is similar across subgroups of ideology and professional experience, suggesting that the impact of co-partisanship is robust in local policy processes.

The primary insight from this research is that co-partisanship can significantly shape policymakers' collaborative behaviors. Although the current development in policy adoption literature hints at this effect (Butler et al. 2017; Pereira 2022), prior studies have not provided a clear answer of when and how co-partisanship impacts policy collaboration. My study indicates that this effect is consistent across various demographic and political subgroups. It also influences the adoption of collaborative programs by moderating policymakers' considerations of resource allocation, the collaborative process, and policy outcomes. Partisanship is not merely an indicator of policy collaboration; it may also serve as a fundamental consideration for policymakers when evaluating other policy attributes (Terman 2015). Therefore, I call for more scholarly attentions in the future to develop effective strategies for mitigating partisan bias in the policy process.

Causal identification is the other contribution of this study. My experimental approach isolates the co-partisanship effect from confounding factors at both organizational and network levels in predicting policy collaboration (Siciliano et al. 2021). More importantly, predicting decision-making in the early stages of collaboration presents an empirical challenge, as the data collected for observational studies often originate from established or complete policy networks. Therefore, this study offers new evidence into the underlying motivations driving policymakers' initial decisions to collaborate.

In addition, the findings of this study do not substantiate the moderating role of ideology or professional experience on the co-partisanship effect. This observation suggests that the effect is predominantly rooted in the in-group loyalty associated with their identity, rather than in shared policy beliefs among co-partisans (Clifford 2017). Notably, such loyalty is pronounced among Republican officials, who are willing to sacrifice self-interests to achieve resource balance with their co-partisan partners (Graham et al. 2009). Therefore, co-partisanship should not be seen as a mere manifestation of organizational political

homophily, but rather as a driver behind political homophily, which facilitates policy collaboration. According to the gradually increasing partisan polarization among the U.S. policy elites (Brock and Mallinson 2023), we should combine more individual and organizational level evidence to explore the reasons and consequences of partisanship in policy collaboration.

While this study offers new research opportunities for collaborative policy adoption, more work should be done to address its limitations. First, policy contexts may affect collaboration process. Although I demonstrate the program’s information neutrally in this study, future experimental vignettes could include more policy areas that either party favors and compare co-partisanship effects under different scenarios (Mummolo et al. 2021). Moreover, the survey experimental data in this study are cross-sectional, which do not identify longitudinal causal impacts of co-partisanship on collaboration dynamics (Siciliano et al. 2021). Future research could conduct the experiment with multi-wave surveys or embrace field experiments to explore policy network evolution and tie dissolution further.

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# Supplemental Information


## Appendix A Sample Characteristics

**Table A.1:** Descriptive Summary

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<b>City Level Variables</b>				
Population (in 1000)	117.09	397.70	30.07	8336.82
Median houshold income (in \$1000)	67.83	26.40	21.92	235.28
Female official ratio	34.24	17.92	0.00	100.00
Labor force participation	64.91	5.92	39.90	79.90
Home value (in \$1000)	299.11	255.25	40.44	2000.00
Unemployment rate	5.36	2.25	1.40	16.90
White percentage (residents)	71.18	17.01	5.60	95.50
Black percentage (residents)	12.98	15.64	0.10	91.80
<b>Individual Level Variables</b>				
Democrats	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00
Republicans	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Ideology	2.89	0.97	1.00	5.00
Tenure	2.52	0.97	1.00	4.00
White	0.78	0.41	0.00	1.00
Black	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Hispanic	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00
Asian	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00
Other	0.03	0.18	0.00	1.00
Female	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00
Age	56.51	12.59	19.00	89.00
Grad School	0.57	0.49	0.00	1.00

## Appendix B Sample Representativeness

**Figure B.1:** Representativeness of Municipal Officials Who Responded



**Table B.1:** Representativeness of City Level Variables

	Responded Cities	No Response Cities	<i>P</i> -value
Population	114995.24	117051.15	0.92
Median household income	67833.97	68341.71	0.74
Female official ratio	34.24	31.73	0.03
Labor force participation	64.91	64.99	0.81
Home value	299108.16	301116.71	0.89
Unemployment rate	5.36	5.56	0.13
White percentage	71.18	68.98	0.03
Black percentage	12.98	13.23	0.78

## Appendix C Survey Instruments

First, the respondents saw an introduction to the sustainable development program vignette.

### Introduction

We are interested in the intergovernmental collaborative decisions of American local governments. In the following part, we will show you several **hypothetical** decision-making situations and ask you to provide opinions. Please try to be honest in answering the questions. Describe what you would **really** do if a similar situation occurs in your working live. Remember that your answers to all questions in this survey will be kept **completely confidential**.

Assuming you and your municipal government plan to collaborate with another city on an interlocal sustainable development program. The potential benefits of the program include:

- Economic development
- Community development
- Environmental protection

Based on your consideration for the best option to develop your municipality, please evaluate the following hypothetical city partners and their proposals. In total, you are asked to evaluate 3 pairs of cities in 3 separate pages. Please provide your choice in each pair.

**Note:** There is **no** right or wrong answer to any comparisons.

Next, the respondents completed three pairs of comparison task like the following.

Suppose you can only collaborate with one out of the two cities:

Program Attributes:	City A	City B
The program will create	500 jobs in your city	800 jobs in your city
The program is proposed by	Democrats	Republicans
Your previous working experiences with this city	Good	No experience
Cost of the program	You pay: \$250,000; This city pays: \$750,000	You pay: \$500,000; This city pays: \$500,000

Please indicate which city do you prefer to collaborate with:

City A

City B



Next, the respondents answered political background questions and demographic questions.

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a . . .

- Democrat
- Republican
- Independent
- Other party (please specify)

How would you describe your political views as of today?

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Moderate
- Conservative
- Very Conservative
- No opinion

How many years have you been in your current government position?

- Less than 1 year
- Less than 5 years
- Less than 10 years
- More than 10 years

Do you consider yourself to be...

- White, not Hispanic or Latino
- Black, not Hispanic or Latino
- Hispanic or Latino
- Asian, not Hispanic or Latino
- Other

Which of the following best describes your gender identity?

- Male
- Female




- Non-binary/third gender
- prefer not to say

Your age: \_\_\_\_\_


What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- Less than high school
- High school/GED
- Some college
- 2-year college degree
- 4-year college degree
- master degree
- doctoral degree
- Professional Degree (JD, MD)


## Appendix D Subgroup Analysis




### Subgroup Analysis: White and Nonwhite Officials



## Subgroup Analysis: Graduate Degree and Other Officials



## Subgroup Analysis: Older and Younger Officials



Subgroup Analysis: Larger or Smaller Cities

