

# ***CS/ECE/Math 435***

## ***Introduction to Cryptography***

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(1)

Vulnerability of LFSR-based stream ciphers to plaintext attack is associated with the linearity of the LFSR update equation.

Suggests a "fix" in the form of introducing nonlinearity that is "harder to invert" in plaintext attack.  
A Nonlinear Shift Register (NSR) device.

Syllabus / Coverage Note: Bach course  
notes devote considerable time to  
NSR's in sections 23 & 24.

Coverage here will focus only on  
multiplexer approach of section 24  
(you'll be responsible only for multiplexers  
on upcoming HW, and on final exam)

Idea: A more complex (harder to  
invert) NSR algorithm may incorporate  
one or more LFSR's within the  
algorithm.

(3)

For simplicity of design, one NSR uses LFSR's for the portion of the algorithm with "memory" (i.e.- dependence of  $x[k]$  on past  $x[k-1]$ ,  $x[k-2], \dots$ ).

Nonlinearity added is memoryless;  
i.e., it involves only value(s) at  
"present" time position  $k$

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Most common NSR algorithm of this type is termed a multiplexer. It can be constructed with a single higher order LFSR, but more easily visualized as multiple, lower order LFSR's.

Simplest multiplexer algorithm 1 utilizes  $(1 + 2^1) = 3$  LFSR's

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LFSR "A", label its sequence of bits

$$R = \{ r[0], r[1], r[2], \dots \}$$

LFSR "O", with sequence

$$S = \{ s[0], s[1], s[2], \dots \}$$

LFSR "I", with sequence

$$T = \{ t[0], t[1], t[2], \dots \}$$

Notation (standard in Boolean) : for given stream bit, e.g.  $r_0$ ,  $\bar{r}_0$  = "NOT  $r_0$ " denotes logical complement

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Then, memoriless output nonlinearity produces NSR sequence  $X = \{x[0], x[1], \dots\}$  as:

$$x[k] = \overline{r[k]} \cdot s[k] + r[k] \cdot t[k]$$

(the multiply operations introduce nonlinearity)  
i.e. at time position  $k$ , if

$r[k] = 0$ , choose NSR output

$$x[k] = s[k]$$

OR

if  $r[k] = 1$ , choose NSR output

$$x[k] = t[k]$$

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LFSR stream "A" is said to be the "address stream" if chooses the address among the "data streams," stream 0 or stream 1.

We labeled this simplest case as NSR 1.

Q: What would constitute generalization to NSR 2?

Ans: 2 address streams, and  $2^2$  data streams.

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Address LFSR's yield  $P$  (as most significant bit)  
 $R$  (as least significant bit)  
 of address  
 of address

Data streams : LFSR 00 yields 5

LFSR 01 "  $\pi$

LFSR 10 "

LFSR 11 " v

At time position  $k$ , two bit address  $(p[k]r[k])$  selects ("multiplexes")

$$x[k] = \begin{cases} s[k] & \text{for } 00 \\ t[k] & \text{for } 01 \\ u[k] & \text{for } 10 \\ v[k] & \text{for } 11 \end{cases}$$

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This multiplex NSR algorithm generalizes easily to  $m$  address LFSR's,  $2^m$  data LFSR's.

Note that key information sent from encryption entity to authorized decryption entities will be:

If each LFSR has order  $n$ :

$$\text{key space size} = (m + 2^m) \cdot \underbrace{2^n}_{n \text{ coefficients}}$$

(plus a very small amount of data to "label" our address & data streams)

+  $n$  initial conditions for each LFSR

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Multiplexer NSR will be  
specific NSR algorithm treated here.

But key ideas of NSR  
play important role in the  
modern Block ciphers on  $\mathbb{Z}_2$   
to follow.

Modern (post 1970's) block ciphers;

" " DES = Data Encryption Standard

"AES" = Advanced Encryption Standard

Block ciphers on  $\mathbb{Z}_2$ , with block size  $m$ , and length  $l$  key (e.g., for Hill, matrix operator,  $M \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{m \times m}$ )

However, alternative, more general viewpoint is often helpful:

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Block cipher on  $\mathbb{Z}_2$  as a  
Boolean function taking:

$m + l$  inputs ; e.g. DES  
 ↑              ↑  
 plaintext      key  
 block            specifics  
 $m = 64$   
 $l = 56$

and producing

$m$  outputs  
↑  
ciphertext  
block.


We take a qualitative insight from our experience with LFSR's versus NSR's: we want to choose our encryption function to be nonlinear ( $\Rightarrow$  no simple Hill ciphers or periodic ciphers).

Added qualitative lesson from LFSR/NSR:  
algorithmic components of one encryption scheme used together to build more secure overall algorithm.

# "Modes of Operation" for Block Ciphers

Simplest case, only examined thus far in 435, is known as the "code book mode"

Plaintext

$$x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{m-1}, x_m, x_{m+1}, \dots, x_{2m-1}$$


$B_K(x)$

Ciphertext

$$y_0, y_1, \dots, y_{m-1}, y_m, y_{m+1}, \dots, y_{2m-1}$$

## "Counter - Mode"

This can be thought of as an improvement on our memoryless nonlinearity  $N8R$ : here we use the (yet to be specified) nonlinear  $B_k(\underline{x})$  as a nonlinearity with memory:

LFSR bit stream:  $x_0 \dots x_{m-1} ; x_m \dots$

$$\downarrow B_k(\underline{x})$$

Use bit stream  $\mathbf{Y}$  in  $\leftarrow y_0 \dots y_{m-1} ;$   
a stream cipher

## Output Feedback Mode

Use  $B_K$  to directly construct a  $NSR$ , producing pseudo-random sequence  $s_0, s_1, s_2 \dots$  used in a stream cipher:  $s_0$ :

$$\text{plaintext } X = x_0, x_1, x_2 \dots$$

$$\text{ciphertext } Y = y_0, \dots$$

$$y_i = x_i + s_i \quad (\text{stream cipher})$$

where

$$s_i = f\left(B_K \begin{pmatrix} s_{i-1} \\ s_{i-2} \\ \vdots \\ s_{i-m} \end{pmatrix}\right) \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{where } f \text{ "selects"} \\ \text{the last component} \\ \text{of the vector output} \\ \text{of } B_K \begin{pmatrix} s_{i-1} \\ \vdots \\ s_{i-m} \end{pmatrix} \end{array} \right.$$

## Block Chaining Mode

Notation : Plaintext      Underscore as vector block  
Ciphertext

<u><math>x_1</math></u> =	$x_0$	<u><math>y_0</math></u> =	$y_0$	}
$\vdots$	$x_1$	$\vdots$	$y_0$	
<u><math>x_{m-1}</math></u>	$x_{m-1}$	<u><math>y_{m-1}</math></u>	$y_{m-1}$	
<u><math>x_2</math></u> =	$x_m$	<u><math>y_1</math></u>	$y_m$	}
$\vdots$	$x_{m+1}$	$\vdots$	$y_m$	
<u><math>x_{2m-1}</math></u>	$x_{2m-1}$	<u><math>y_{2m-1}</math></u>	$y_{2m-1}$	}
$\ddots$	$\ddots$	$\ddots$	$\ddots$	

Note:  
Introduce  
"an arbitrary  
"priming  
block"

For  $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$

$$\underline{y}_i^o = B_K (\underline{y}_{i-1}^o + \underline{x}_i)$$

<u>Cipher</u>	<u>Feedback</u>	<u>Mode</u>
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For  $i = 1, 2, 3, \dots$

$$\underline{y}_i^o = \underline{x}_i + B_K (\underline{y}_{i-1}^o)$$