**Neural Networks**

**Fine-Grained Hierarchical Multi-Round Iterative Semantic Optimization Attack Method for RAG Systems**

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| **Abstract:** | Knowledge corruption attacks refer to cases where an attacker injects a small amount of malicious text into the knowledge database of a RAG system, inducing the LLM to generate target answers chosen by the attacker for the selected target question.  Traditional knowledge corruption attacks are susceptible to semantic deviation and interference due to the single-generation strategy, that is, it is directly injected into the RAG system after generating malicious text, resulting in insufficient concealment.  Based on this, this paper innovatively proposed a fine-grained hierarchical multiround iterative semantic optimization attack framework (FHM-ISO) for RAG systems. Firstly, this framework can continuously optimize the generated text by selecting different prompts based on the semantic relationships between the original question and the generated content to guide RAG systems to generate valid malicious texts. Secondly, we proposed a cosine-dot product weighted similarity calculation method in FHM-ISO, which takes into account both the directional sensitivity and the magnitude differences of sentences, breaking through the limitations of traditional single similarity metrics.  The experimental results show that the proposed method significantly improves the effectiveness of the attack against RAG systems in multiple public datasets, the success rate of the attack reaches 50\% when only one piece of malicious text is injected per question. |

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Highlights

# Fine-Grained Hierarchical Multi-Round Iterative Semantic Optimization Attack Method for RAG Systems

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* We propose FHM-ISO, a fine-grained hierarchical multi-round semantic optimization framework, to enhance the stealth and effectiveness of knowledge corruption attacks on RAG systems.
* A novel weighted similarity metric combining cosine and dot product similarities is introduced to guide semantic optimization with both directional and magnitude sensitivity.
* Experimental results on multiple LLMs show that FHM-ISO achieves up to 50% attack success rate with only one malicious text injected per query, surpassing existing baselines.

Fine-Grained Hierarchical Multi-Round Iterative Semantic Optimization Attack Method for RAG Systems

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A B S T R A C T

Knowledge corruption attacks refer to cases where an attacker injects a small amount of malicious text into the knowledge database of a RAG system, inducing the LLM to generate target answers chosen by the attacker for the selected target question. Traditional knowledge corruption attacks are susceptible to semantic deviation and interference due to the single-generation strategy, that is, it is directly injected into the RAG system after generating malicious text, resulting in insufficient concealment. Based on this, this paper innovatively proposed a fine-grained hierarchical multiround iterative semantic optimization attack framework (FHM-ISO) for RAG systems. Firstly, this framework can continuously optimize the generated text by selecting different prompts based on the semantic relationships between the original question and the generated content to guide RAG systems to generate valid malicious texts. Secondly, we proposed a cosine-dot product weighted similarity calculation method in FHM-ISO, which takes into account both the directional sensitivity and the magnitude differences of sentences, breaking through the limitations of traditional single similarity metrics. The experimental results show that the proposed method significantly improves the effectiveness of the attack against RAG systems in multiple public datasets, the success rate of the attack reaches 50% when only one piece of malicious text is injected per question.

# Introduction

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have achieved widespread application in diverse practical scenar- ios due to their robust content generation capabilities[[1](#_bookmark12)]. Representative models such as the GPT series[[2](#_bookmark13)][[3](#_bookmark14)] and PaLM[[4](#_bookmark15)], trained on massive datasets, demonstrate signif- icant potential in comprehending complex semantics and allowing natural language interactions[[5](#_bookmark16)][[6](#_bookmark17)].

However, these models still face notable challenges in real-world deployment. First, their training data exhibit temporal constraints, making it difficult to incorporate up- dated knowledge in real time[[7](#_bookmark18)]. Second, generated content may contain factual inaccuracies or logical inconsistencies, known as "hallucination" phenomena[[8](#_bookmark19)]. Third, in vertical professional domains such as medical diagnosis and legal consultation, knowledge gaps frequently arise due to insuf- ficient coverage in training data[[9](#_bookmark20)]. These limitations pose risks for LLM applications in industries requiring high reli- ability, necessitating supplementary technical interventions for optimization[[10](#_bookmark21)].

To address these challenges, Retrieval-Augmented Gen- eration (RAG)[[11](#_bookmark22)] has emerged as a pivotal technology, whose core principle lies in dynamically enhancing model

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generation through external knowledge repositories[[12](#_bookmark23)]. RAG systems can significantly enhance the response timeli- ness of LLMs by integrating external knowledge bases[[13](#_bookmark24)], but it also introduces new security threats[[14](#_bookmark25)]. The archi- tecture of RAG systems shifts the attack surface from the traditional model training phase to the retrieval-generation phase. Currently, there is a wide variety of attack types targeting RAG systems[[15](#_bookmark26)], with significant differences in their technical evolution and attack logic. In prompt injection attacks[[16](#_bookmark27)], attackers embed adversarial instruc- tions into user queries through semantic obfuscation. For instance, they might induce the model to execute actions like ’ignore security protocols and generate a phishing email template.’ Such attacks rely on the vagueness of the model’s interpretative boundaries, directly overriding the pre-established security rules, yet their explicit character- istics make them easily identifiable by instruction parsing tree-based detection mechanisms[[17](#_bookmark28)]. In contrast, greedy coordinate gradient attacks (GCG Attack) generate adversar- ial character suffixes, such as special symbol combinations, through hundreds of iterations[[18](#_bookmark29)], which leverage gradient optimization to overlap the embedding space distributions of adversarial instructions with those of legitimate inputs, thus circumventing traditional keyword filtering mechanisms. In response to the dynamic nature of knowledge bases, data poisoning attacks[[19](#_bookmark30)] have evolved from traditional training data contamination to targeted infiltrations against retrieval mechanisms. Corpus poisoning attacks[[20](#_bookmark31)] inject semanti- cally related but factually incorrect document fragments into retrieval databases (for example, inserting a forged paper stating that ’a certain drug has no side effects’ into a medical

**Table 1**

Comparative analysis table of different attack methods

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Attack type** | **Injection size** | **Target module** | **Concealment** | **Cost** |
| Corpus Poisoning | Medium to Large (tens to hundreds) | Retrieval module | Medium | Medium |
| Semantic Poisoning | Very Low (1–5) | Retrieval + fleneration module | High | Low |
| Cross-method | Small amount of text | Retrieval + fleneration module | Very High | Low to Medium |

knowledge base), manipulating the document’s embedding vector features to prioritize their return during similarity searches[[21](#_bookmark32)]. The covert nature of these attacks stems from their alignment in vector space with legitimate knowledge, making traditional cosine similarity detection challenging. Therefore, knowledge corruption attack conception was introduced. PoisondRAG[[14](#_bookmark25)], as the first framework for knowledge corruption attacks on RAG, injects malicious texts into retrieval databases to manipulate LLM outputs.

Despite these methods making progress in revealing the security issues present in RAG, two key limitations still ex- ist: (1) Semantic vulnerability: Single-generation strategies (directly injecting carefully crafted malicious texts) often produce outputs that deviate from the original intent of the query[[7](#_bookmark18)].(2) Insufficient metrics: Relying on unimodal similarity measures (such as cosine similarity) neglects the interaction between directional alignment and amplitude sensitivity, diminishing the stealthiness and adaptability of attacks[[22](#_bookmark33)].

To bridge this gap, this study proposed a knowledge cor- ruption attack framework based on fine-grained hierarchical multi-round iterative semantic optimization, aiming to ex- pose latent vulnerabilities in RAG systems under scenarios of adversarial data infiltration. Our findings provide theoreti- cal foundations and practical insights for constructing secure and reliable augmented generation frameworks.

The main innovations of this paper can be summarized as follows:

1. We propose a fine-grained based multi-round itera- tive optimization method guided by semantic similarity for LLMs, which enhances the semantic alignment between the generated malicious texts and the original queries, thereby improving the attack effectiveness.
2. We design a similarity weighting mechanism that combines cosine similarity and dot product similarity, taking into account both directional sensitivity and magnitude vari- ations to improve the precision and stealthiness of malicious texts generation.
3. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed method on multiple mainstream LLMs, and the results demonstrate that it outperforms traditional adversarial generation strate- gies, significantly increasing the attack success rate.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews background and related work. Section 3 presents the design of our method. Section 4 describes the experimental setup and evaluation results. Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses future research directions.

# Background and Related Work

### RAG Systems

The RAG system is a framework that integrates external knowledge retrieval and text generation, aiming to enhance the responsiveness of large language models to factuality, timeliness, and expertise. Its structure mainly includes three core components:

* + 1. **Knowledge base**: used to store structured or un- structured document sources, such as encyclopedia entries, corporate documents, or technical manuals, and to build semantic indexes through embedding;
    2. **Retrieval module**: based on user queries, select several document fragments with the highest semantic rele- vance from the knowledge base, often using vector similarity methods (such as cosine similarity, dot product, or nearest neighbor retrieval);
    3. **Generation module**: The LLM combines the query and the retrieved document content to generate the final answer. This structure supports dynamic information update, reduces hallucinations, and improves the accuracy of profes- sional questions and answers. It is widely used in intelligent search, legal/medical question and answer, financial analy- sis, and other fields.

Currently, RAG has been widely deployed in multiple open source frameworks and commercial systems, such as LangChain, LlamaIndex (formerly GPT Index), Haystack, and the original RAG implementation provided by Hugging- Face. These systems usually use vector databases (such as FAISS, Weaviate, Milvus) as the retrieval backend, com- bined with LLMs(such as GPT-4, Qwen, DeepSeek) to complete question-answering or document generation tasks. In addition, commercial platforms such as OpenAI ChatGPT Retrieval Plugin, Azure AI Search, and Google Vertex AI Search have also deeply integrated the RAG architecture in their products.

However, while the performance of the RAG system has been improved, it has also exposed new security challenges. Among them, Knowledge Corruption Attacks mainly attack the knowledge base and retrieval module in the above archi- tecture. The attacker injects forged or misleading malicious text (such as false scientific research conclusions, forged regulatory fragments) into the knowledge base and adjusts its embedded representation to align it with specific queries in the vector space, so that it is recalled frequently during the retrieval process. Since the existing RAG system trusts the retrieval content as a factual basis by default, once the contaminated document is selected, it will directly affect the output results of the generation module. This type of attack does not require modifying model weights, is highly

concealed, and is suitable for long-term latent infiltration, posing a serious threat to high-credibility scenarios.

### Related Work

Knowledge Corruption Attacks in RAG systems typi- cally fall into four categories: Corpus Poisoning, Seman- tic Poisoning, Embedding Manipulation, and Retrieval or Prompt Hijacking. This paper aims to achieve efficient and stealthy attacks by injecting a small amount of carefully crafted adversarial text into the knowledge base, maintaining a high success rate while significantly reducing the injection cost. The approach combines characteristics of both Seman- tic Poisoning and Corpus Poisoning, and thus we focus our related work review on these two types of attacks.

Corpus Poisoning, where false information is injected at scale to overwhelm retrieval. Zhong et al. proposed to inject 50 adversarial paragraphs into Natural Questions to study the vulnerability of dense retrieval models to contamination, which can be transferred to the financial and forum fields, with an attack success rate of over 94% [[23](#_bookmark34)]. Zhuang et al. generated adversarial text in the re- verse direction of Vec2Text, without model weight access, which can cause serious manipulation of retrieval rankings [[24](#_bookmark35)].Humpty Dumpty controls word embedding through corpus contamination, affecting retrieval and downstream tasks, posing a threat to named entity recognition/translation systems[[25](#_bookmark36)]. Joint-GCG proposed a unified gradient method to optimize contaminated text across retrieval and generation stages, and improved the success rate of multiple models by 5–25% on average under white-box conditions [[26](#_bookmark37)]. Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks Constructs an evaluation framework covering 13 attacks and 7 defenses, and a large number of QA data sets, and finds that most attacks are still effective in RAG [[27](#_bookmark38)].Traceback of Poisoning Attacks Proposes RAGForensics, the first traceability system for poisoned text, to achieve poisoning source identification [[28](#_bookmark39)]. In Poison-RAG, the RAG recommendation system, metadata (such as tags and descriptions) are polluted to change the recommendation ranking. Local injection can improve the operation effect by 50% [[29](#_bookmark40)]. Many studies have found that even if only a very low proportion (such as 0.05%) of the text is polluted, it can cause retrieval hijacking and system distortion (such as Covert Backdoors[[30](#_bookmark41)], Pandora Attack[[31](#_bookmark42)]).

From Table 1, we can see that Corpus Poisoning relies on large-scale text injection and affects the retrieval module by optimizing embedding or perturbing the vector space. Al- though the attack surface is wide, the cost and concealment are at a medium level; Semantic Poisoning induces system behavior with a very small amount of highly semantically related text, which can manipulate retrieval and generation at the same time, with high concealment and extremely low cost; The cross method combines semantics and embedding strategies, and only a small amount of injection is needed to achieve cross-module attacks. It has both accuracy, conceal- ment and high cost-effectiveness, and is currently the most practical attack method.

Semantic Poisoning, which uses misleading content that closely resembles legitimate queries. Chaudhari et al. [[32](#_bookmark43)] and Fontaine [[33](#_bookmark44)] proposed to embed triggers and inductive statements to achieve "backdoor" manipulation of the gener- ation module, further improving the concealment and attack effect.

The cross-method of Corpus Poisoning and Semantic Poisoning can accurately obtain malicious samples of the target query. PoisonedRAG achieves 90–99% attack success rate under black/white box conditions by injecting very little text (≈ 5 pieces) [[14](#_bookmark25)].Joint-GCG embeds gradient attacks on both the retriever and the generator, integrating semantic selection and embedding optimization, which is a fusion of two types of attacks[[34](#_bookmark45)]. Methods such as Pandora/Covert Backdoors achieve semantic relevance and retrieval promi- nence by implanting a small amount of hidden text into a large corpus, with both high concealment and strong gen- eralization capabilities[[30](#_bookmark41)][[31](#_bookmark42)]. SafeRAG benchmark Sys- tematic evaluation of data poisoning and prompt injection attacks, pointing out that the two-in-one structure of retrieval

+ generation is more vulnerable to compound attacks [**?** ].

# Method

In this section, we elaborate on the details of the pro- posed method FHM-ISO, the overall structure of FHM-ISO is depicted in Fig. [1](#_bookmark0).

### Problem Description

For a given question 𝑄, knowledge corruption attacks aim to construct 𝑛 malicious texts 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, ⋯ , 𝑃𝑛}. These texts are then injected into the knowledge base of the RAG system to mislead it toward generating an incor-

rect response 𝑅. In addition, knowledge corruption attacks require semantic optimization of the malicious texts 𝑃 , so that these texts are more likely to be retrieved by the RAG system. This, in turn, increases the chances of generating the incorrect response 𝑅.



### Prompt-Based Initialization

To mislead the RAG system to produce an incorrect response 𝑅 for a given question 𝑄, the malicious texts must first be initialized. We therefore use a prompt-based method, inspired by PoisonedRAG[[14](#_bookmark25)], to generate the initial mali- cious texts 𝑃 0 for 𝑄. The specific prompt is illustrated in Fig. [2](#_bookmark1)

### Fine-Grained Semantic Hierarchical Optimization

Once the initial malicious text 𝑃 0 is obtained, further refinement of 𝑃 0 is required. To this end, we perform mul- tiple iterations using fine-grained semantic optimization to adjust 𝑃 0. This process ensures that the semantics of the malicious texts in 𝑃 0 closely match that of the target question

𝑄, thereby enhancing their retrieval likelihood within the RAG system.



**The proposed FHM-ISO Attack Method**

**Target Question: What day is groundhog's day?**

**Target Answer: February 2**

**Malicious text generator**

**Malicious text optimizer**

**Malicious Text: [...]Groundhog's**

**day[...]March 15.**

**Inject**

**External System**

**Wrong Answer: March 15**

**Output**

**User**

**Wikipedia**

**What day is groundhog's day?**

**Input**

**Collect**

**LLM**

**Context: [...]Groundhog's day[...]March 15. Question: What day is groundhog's day?**

**Prompt: Please generate a response for the question based on the context.**

**...... Groundhog's day [...] on February 2 of every year.**


**[...]Groundhog's**

**day[...]March 15.**

**The RAG System**

**Retriever**

**Figure 1:** Overall architecture of FHM-ISO. Given a target question and desired response, FHM-ISO constructs an adversarial text through multi-round iterative semantic optimization. After being injected into the knowledge base, this optimized text guides the LLM within the RAG framework to produce the target response for the given question.

understanding. By doing so, it avoids interference between cross-interval optimization objectives and improves the op- timization effectiveness for texts in different similarity inter- vals through targeted prompt guidance.

The detailed prompt design is illustrated in Fig. [3](#_bookmark2). Let

𝜃1, 𝜃2, 𝜃3 be the similarity thresholds. At 𝑡-th iteration, for a current malicious text 𝑃 𝑡, its semantic similarity score 𝑆𝑡

**Figure 2:** Prompt for generating the initial malicious texts 𝑃 0.

Where 𝐿 is a hyperparameter that specifies the length of 𝑃 0.

Traditional prompt-based optimization strategies are constrained by the non-linear distribution of semantic simi- larity within the range of [0, 1], making it difficult for a single prompt mechanism to adapt to varying degrees of semantic variability. As a result, these optimization strategies often fail to meet the conflicting demands across different similar- ity intervals.

In that case, we propose a fine-grained hierarchical par-

𝑖 𝑖

determines the activation of a specific optimization mode:

* **Global Restructuring Mode** (Prompt 1): Activated when 𝑆𝑡 < 𝜃1, this mode performs large-scale frame- work reorganization and terminological replacement guided by keyword extraction, aiming to reshape the overall semantic structure of 𝑃 𝑡.

𝑖

𝑖

* **Local Optimization Mode** (Prompt 2 and 3): Trig- gered when 𝑆𝑡 ∈ [𝜃1, 𝜃2)𝑜𝑟[𝜃2, 𝜃3), this mode uses constrained generation strategies, including synonym substitution and syntactic restructuring, to improve se- mantic fidelity of 𝑃 𝑡 while preserving the core mean-

𝑖

𝑖

titioning strategy based on semantic similarity, where each

similarity interval is assigned a dedicated prompt designed to provide targeted guidance based on the similarity level. In the **low-similarity interval**, we use a concept-reconstruction prompt to guide the malicious text focus on the topic. In the **medium-similarity interval**, we employ a structure- optimization prompt to enhance the text’s logical coherence. In the **high-similarity interval**, we apply a micro-correction prompt to refine the text’s language while preserving its semantic alignment with 𝑄. This optimization strategy sim- ulates the multi-stage cognitive process of human language

ing.

* **Fine-Tuning Mode** (Prompt 4): Engaged when 𝑆𝑡 ≥


𝑖

𝜃3, this mode allows only minor edits, such as punc- tuation adjustments and low-impact lexical substitu- tions, to ensure high-level semantic coherence be- tween 𝑃 𝑡 and the target question 𝑄.

𝑖

### Weighted Cosine-Dot Similarity

In addition to making malicious texts more likely to be retrieved by the RAG system through fine-grained hierarchi- cal semantic optimization, we also propose a novel semantic



**Figure 3:** The specific prompt configuration during the iterative optimization process selects the optimal prompt template based on different ranges of semantic similarity.

similarity measurement approach designed to bypass the RAG system’s detection mechanisms triggered by conven- tional similarity metrics. As the optimization objective, the weighted similarity 𝑆 is defined as a linear combination of dot product similarity 𝑆dot and normalized cosine similarity

𝑆cos, providing a more comprehensive and robust measure

of semantic alignment. The weighted similarity 𝑆 is given

by:

𝑆cos + 1

𝑆 = 𝜆𝑆dot + (1 − 𝜆) 2 (1)

where 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1] is an adjustable weighting parameter. 𝑆dot and 𝑆cos are dot product and cosine similarity, respectively, given by:

𝑆dot = Sigmoid(𝐯𝑄 ⋅ 𝐯𝑡)

𝑖

The proposed composite metric captures absolute posi- tional relationships via 𝑆dot and directional similarity via

𝑆cos in the semantic space. This dual consideration enables

a more accurate assessment of semantic relevance between

malicious text and target question compared to relying on a single similarity measure.

### Overall Process

Following the established framework [[14](#_bookmark25)], we imple- ment both black-box and white-box attack to evaluate our attack method. In the black-box setting, the attacker has no access to the retriever’s parameters and cannot issue queries. To address this challenge, the attacker simply ap- pends the target question 𝑄 before the initial malicious texts 𝑃 0. This strategy enhances the similarity between 𝑃 and 𝑄, increasing the chance of retrieval. In the white-box setting, the attacker can access the retriever’s parameters

𝐯 ⋅ 𝐯𝑡

𝑆cos = 𝑖

‖𝐯𝑄‖‖𝐯𝑡‖

𝑖

(2)

and optimize the prefix to better align with the embedding

of the target question 𝑄. This enables more precise control over retrieval while maintaining the effectiveness of the

where 𝐯𝑄 and 𝐯𝑡 denote the vector representations of 𝑄 and

misleading content. Algorithm 1 details the workflow of

𝑡 𝑖

𝑃𝑖 , respectively. Meanwhile, the normalization operation

𝑆cos+1 maps the cosine similarity range to [0, 1], ensuring that it shares a comparable value range with dot product similarity for effective combination.

2

FHM-ISO. The function INIT utilizes prompt-based method to initialize malicious texts. After that, FHM-ISO performs an iterative refinement for these texts. For each text, we perform 𝑇 iterations of optimization.

**Algorithm 1** FHM-ISO

**Require:** • Target question 𝑄

* Target answer 𝑅
* Hyperparameters 𝑛, 𝐿
* An attacker - chosen LLM n

**Ensure:** A set of malicious texts 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, ⋯ , 𝑃𝑛}

1: **for** 𝑖 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑛 **do**

2: 𝑃 0 = INIT(𝑄, 𝑅, 𝐿)

𝑖

3: **for** 𝑡 = 1, 2, ⋯ , 𝑇 **do**

4: Compute similarity 𝑆𝑡(𝑃 𝑡−1, 𝑄) use (1)

𝑖 𝑖

5: Select prompt according to the interval:

6: prompt 1 if 𝑆𝑡 ∈ [0, 𝜃1)

𝑖

7: prompt 2 if 𝑆𝑡 ∈ [𝜃1, 𝜃2)

𝑖

8: prompt 3 if 𝑆𝑡 ∈ [𝜃2, 𝜃3)

𝑖

9: prompt 4 if 𝑆𝑡 ∈ [𝜃3, 1]

𝑖

𝑡

10: Update 𝑃𝑖 with the selected prompt

11: **end for**

12: **end for**

13: 𝑃 = 𝑃 𝑇

14: **return** 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, ⋯ , 𝑃𝑛}

# Experiments

### Datasets

We employ three benchmark question-answering datasets: Natural Questions (NQ) [[35](#_bookmark46)], HotpotQA [[36](#_bookmark47)], and MS- MARCO [[37](#_bookmark48)], each associated with its own knowledge base. The knowledge bases for NQ and HotpotQA are constructed from Wikipedia, containing 2,681,468 and 5,233,329 docu- ments, respectively. In contrast, the MS-MARCO knowledge base consists of 8,841,823 web documents collected via the Microsoft Bing search engine. Each dataset is also accompanied by a corresponding set of questions.Table [2](#_bookmark3) presents the statistics of the datasets.

### RAG Setting

A RAG system comprises three core components: a knowledge database, a retriever, and a large language model (LLM). For the knowledge database, we use distinct corpora associated with each dataset, resulting in three separate knowledge bases. For the retriever, we evaluate three vari- ants: Contriever [[37](#_bookmark48)] as a standard baseline, Contriever-ms, which is fine-tuned on the MS-MARCO dataset [[37](#_bookmark48)], and ANCE [[38](#_bookmark49)]. Following prior work, we compute similarity scores using the dot product between the embedding vectors of the target question and candidate documents. We further investigate the impact of this design choice in our evalua- tions. As for the LLM, we assess several models, including Gemini [[39](#_bookmark50)], GPT-4 [[2](#_bookmark13)], GPT-3.5 [[3](#_bookmark14)], LLaMA [[40](#_bookmark51)], Qwen

[[41](#_bookmark52)], and Deepseek R1 [[42](#_bookmark53)]. To ensure output consistency, we set the temperature parameter of the LLMs to 0.1.

### Evaluation Metrics

For ease of evaluation, we select 100 fixed-answer ques- tions from each dataset and generate corresponding mali- cious texts for experimentation.

**Table 2**

Statistics of datasets.

Datasets #Texts #Questions Natural Question (NQ) 2,681,468 3,452

HotpotQA 5,233,329 7,405

MS - MARCO 8,841,823 6,980

We use attack success rate (ASR) to measure the pro- portion of cases in which the LLM’s output matches the attacker-specified target answer for a given question. Fol- lowing prior work, we consider an attack successful under substring matching, i.e., when the target answer appears as a substring within the LLM-generated response.

FHM-ISO injects 𝑁 malicious texts into the knowledge base for each target question. To evaluate their retrievability, we use precision, recall, and F1-score, based on whether the injected texts are retrieved in response to the target query.Specifically, for each target question, the RAG system retrieves the top-𝑘 documents. Precision is defined as the proportion of malicious texts among these top-𝑘 retrieved documents. Recall measures the proportion of injected ma- licious texts (out of the total 𝑁) that appear in the retrieved set. The F1-score captures the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and is defined as:

Fl = 2 ⋅ Precision ⋅ Recall∕(Precision + Recall) (3)

We report the average precision, recall, and F1 scores across all target questions. Higher values for these metrics indicate that a larger proportion of injected malicious texts have been successfully retrieved.

### Baseline

To better evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we compare FHM-ISO against several baseline methods across multiple datasets. These baselines include Naive Attack, Corpus Poisoning Attack [[43](#_bookmark54)], Disinformation Attack [[44](#_bookmark55), [45](#_bookmark56)], Prompt Injection Attack [[46](#_bookmark57), [47](#_bookmark58)], GCG

Attack [[48](#_bookmark59)], and PoisonedRAG [[14](#_bookmark25)].

### Main Results

The experimental results are presented in Table [3](#_bookmark4). Al- though both Naive Attack and Corpus Poisoning Attack achieve high F1 scores (close to 1.0) by maintaining seman- tic similarity to the original questions through simple text perturbations, they lack targeted guidance mechanisms. As a result, their attack success rates (ASR) remain below 0.1, making it difficult to achieve effective attacks. The Disin- formation Attack and Prompt Injection Attack methods im- prove attack effectiveness in certain scenarios (e.g., Prompt Injection Attack achieving an ASR of 0.93 on HotpotQA). However, they suffer from significant semantic deviation between the generated text and the original question (F1- Score of only 0.48 for Disinformation Attack on NQ), reveal- ing a disconnect between attack effectiveness and semantic consistency. The GCG Attack method almost entirely loses

**Table 3**

Results on GPT-4

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Dataset** | **Attack Method** | **ASR** | **F1-Score** |
|  | Naive Attack | 0.03 | **1.00** |
|  | Corpus Poisoning Attack | 0.01 | 0.99 |
|  | Disinformation Attack | **0.69** | 0.48 |
|  | Prompt Injection Attack | 0.62 | 0.73 |
| NQ | flCfl Attack | 0.02 | 0.00 |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.48 | — |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (White-Box) (k=1) | 0.40 | — |
|  | FHM-ISO (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.65 | 0.91 |
|  | FHM-ISO (White-Box) (k=1) | 0.67 | **1.00** |
|  | Naive Attack | 0.06 | **1.00** |
|  | Corpus Poisoning Attack | 0.01 | **1.00** |
|  | Disinformation Attack | **1.00** | 0.99 |
|  | Prompt Injection Attack | 0.93 | 0.99 |
| HotpotQA | flCfl Attack | 0.01 | 0.00 |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.54 | — |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (White-Box) (k=1) | 0.51 | — |
|  | FHM-ISO (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.84 | **1.00** |
|  | FHM-ISO (White-Box) (k=1) | 0.86 | **1.00** |
|  | Naive Attack | 0.02 | **1.00** |
|  | Corpus Poisoning Attack | 0.03 | 0.97 |
|  | Disinformation Attack | 0.57 | 0.36 |
|  | Prompt Injection Attack | 0.71 | 0.75 |
| MS-MARCO | flCfl Attack | 0.02 | 0.00 |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.44 | — |
|  | PoisonedRAfl (White-Box) (k=1) | 0.35 | — |
|  | FHM-ISO (Black-Box) (k=1) | 0.56 | 0.83 |
|  | FHM-ISO (White-Box) (k=1) | **0.59** | 0.92 |

its attack capability, with the generated text completely losing semantic relevance to the original question (F1-Score approaching 0). Although the PoisonedRAG series shows certain attack potential under both black-box and white-box settings, its ASR metric is generally lower than that of our proposed FHM-ISO method, which achieves the best results across all datasets in both black-box and white-box modes.

### Results on Different LLMs

As shown in the experimental results in Table [4](#_bookmark5), the attack effectiveness of FHM-ISO varies across the NQ, Hot- potQA, and MS-MARCO datasets when targeting different LLMs, including GPT-4, LLaMa, Qwen, DeepSeek R1, Gemini, and GPT-3.5.

On the NQ dataset, under FHM-ISO (Black-Box) at- tacks, both qwen and DeepSeek R1 achieved an ASR of 0.91, significantly higher than GPT-4’s 0.65; Gemini (0.62) and GPT-3.5 (0.61) exhibited ASRs lower than qwen and DeepSeek yet slightly inferior to GPT-4, while their F1- Scores both reached 0.94, demonstrating stable task perfor- mance. Meanwhile, qwen (0.95) and DeepSeek R1 (0.94) maintained high F1-Scores, suggesting the attacks did not substantially degrade task performance. When switching to FHM-ISO (White-Box) attacks, GPT-4’s ASR increased to 0.67 with an F1-Score of 1.00, reflecting that white- box knowledge injection improves attack precision while preserving task performance; Gemini (0.63) and GPT-3.5 (0.62) also saw ASR improvements under white-box con- ditions, with F1-Scores remaining at 1.00, further verifying the robustness of task performance across multiple models

in this scenario. LLaMa, qwen, and DeepSeek R1 also saw their ASRs rise to around 0.94, further demonstrating the enhanced attack effectiveness under white-box conditions for most models.

For the HotpotQA dataset, FHM-ISO (Black-Box) at- tacks achieved near-peak ASRs of 0.98 for DeepSeek R1 and 0.97 for GPT-4; Gemini and GPT-3.5 both recorded an ASR of 0.84, which, although lower than LLaMa and qwen, matched GPT-4’s performance, with all models maintaining an F1-Score of 1.00, indicating no loss in task performance during successful attacks in this dataset. Under the FHM- ISO (White-Box) attack scenario, DeepSeek R1’s ASR fur- ther increased to 0.99, while GPT-4 reached 0.96; Gemini and GPT-3.5 maintained an ASR of 0.82, which did not rise as significantly as LLaMa and qwen yet retained an F1-Score of 1.00, illustrating divergent model responses to white-box attacks in complex QA scenarios. This validates that white- box attacks enhance attack success rates in complex QA scenarios while balancing task robustness.

On the MS-MARCO dataset, ASRs of FHM-ISO (Black- Box) attacks were generally lower than those on NQ and Hot- potQA (e.g., GPT-4’s ASR was only 0.56); Gemini (0.45) and GPT-3.5 (0.44) exhibited even lower ASRs than GPT- 4, yet all models sustained F1-Scores above 0.84, reflect- ing the universal resilience of information retrieval tasks under black-box attacks. Following FHM-ISO (White-Box) attacks, GPT-4’s ASR increased to 0.59, and F1-Score im- proved to 0.92; Gemini (0.53) and GPT-3.5 (0.54) also experienced ASR gains and maintained an F1-Score of 0.92, demonstrating that white-box attacks enhance effectiveness in information retrieval tasks and may improve task per- formance due to synergy between malicious injection and task relevance, with Gemini and GPT-3.5 synergistically confirming this gain effect alongside GPT-4.

Overall, FHM-ISO attacks demonstrate higher effective- ness in white-box scenarios compared to black-box set- tings, with noticeable variation across datasets. HotpotQA achieves the best balance between attack success rate and task robustness, whereas MS-MARCO poses greater chal- lenges in black-box settings but exhibits substantial im- provement under white-box conditions. At the model level, Qwen and DeepSeek R1 are more vulnerable to black-box attacks on NQ, while GPT-4 shows stronger resistance in the black-box setting and superior performance under white- box attacks. Gemini and GPT-3.5, though less susceptible to black-box attacks than Qwen and DeepSeek R1, maintain consistently high task performance across both attack sce- narios and datasets.

### Ablation Study

The ablation study investigates the individual contri- butions of FHM-ISO’s core components to overall attack effectiveness (ASR) and semantic consistency (F1-score). Experimental results are presented in Table [5](#_bookmark6).

When only the dot product similarity is retained—i.e., the cosine similarity component is removed—both ASR and F1-score decline to varying degrees across all datasets. The

**Table 4**

Main results of FHM-ISO. For each target question, we inject one malicious text into the knowledge database. We omit precision and recall because they are equivalent to the F1 score.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dataset | Attack | Metrics | Gemini | GPT-3.5 | GPT-4 | LLaMa | qwen | DeepSeek R1 |
|  | FHM-ISO(Black-Box) | ASR | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.65 | 0.81 | 0.91 | 0.91 |
| NQ |  | F1 - Score | 0.94 | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 0.94 |
|  | FHM-ISO(White-Box) | ASR | 0.63 | 0.62 | 0.67 | 0.89 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
|  |  | F1-Score | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.98 |
|  | FHM-ISO(Black-Box) | ASR | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.97 | 0.95 | 0.98 |
| HotpotQA |  | F1-Score | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
|  | FHM-ISO(White-Box) | ASR | 0.82 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.99 |
|  |  | F1-Score | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
|  | FHM-ISO(Black-Box) | ASR | 0.45 | 0.44 | 0.56 | 0.81 | 0.78 | 0.76 |
| MS-MARCO |  | F1-Score | 0.84 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.81 |
|  | FHM-ISO(White-Box) | ASR | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.59 | 0.91 | 0.80 | 0.86 |
|  |  | F1-Score | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.88 |

**Table 5**

Ablation study of FHM-ISO. For each target question, we inject one malicious text into the knowledge database, and each malicious text is optimized through two iterations.

**NQ HotpotQA MS-MARCO**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Model Variant** | ASR | F1-Score |  | ASR | F1-Score |  | ASR | F1-Score |  |
| FHM-ISO | **0.65** | 0.91 |  | **0.84** | **1.0** |  | **0.56** | 0.83 |  |
| FHM-ISO (- weighted similarity, dot only) | 0.62 | 0.91 |  | 0.82 | **1.0** |  | 0.50 | 0.82 |  |
| FHM-ISO (- weighted similarity, cosine only) | 0.61 | 0.90 |  | 0.83 | **1.0** |  | 0.50 | 0.81 |  |
| FHM-ISO (- multi-round Iterative) | 0.60 | **0.94** |  | 0.82 | **1.0** |  | 0.44 | **0.84** |  |

performance drop becomes even more pronounced when only cosine similarity is used. These results highlight the complementary roles of the two similarity metrics: cosine similarity captures semantic directional alignment, whereas dot product similarity reflects differences in semantic mag- nitude. Their combination mitigates the limitations of using a single metric, providing more comprehensive semantic guidance to the model and enhancing attack performance.

In addition, removing the multi-round iterative optimiza- tion module leads to a noticeable reduction in both ASR and F1-score. This confirms the importance of iterative refinement, which enforces semantic constraints between the generated text and the original query throughout the optimization process. As a result, adversarial texts can be gradually optimized within a solution space that preserves semantic alignment while achieving the attack objective.

Overall, the ablation study validates the effectiveness of FHM-ISO’s core design choices and their contributions to both attack success and semantic fidelity.

### Impact of 𝑘

As shown in Table [6](#_bookmark7), the attack success rate (ASR) increases with the number of injected texts (𝑘) in both black-box and white-box settings. Additional malicious texts

significantly enhance ASR by introducing diverse semantic perturbations and reinforcing multi-perspective coverage of the attack logic.

However, excessive injection may lead to self-interference, where semantic conflicts among the injected texts weaken the overall attack intent. Moreover, repeated exposure to similar attack patterns may increase the model’s adaptability, resulting in diminishing returns or even local fluctuations in ASR. For example, in the HotpotQA white-box setting, the ASR for 𝑘 = 5 is slightly lower than that for 𝑘 = 4.

The performance gap between black-box and white- box settings further illustrates the regulatory role of model knowledge visibility. In white-box scenarios—where inter- nal semantic representations can be directly leveraged to guide adversarial text optimization—the information gain per additional text is generally higher, and ASR tends to outperform the corresponding black-box setting.

### Impact of Iterations of Optimization

The purpose of iterative optimization is to guide the attack text toward convergence within a solution space that aligns with the semantics of the original question while fulfilling the attack logic. This is achieved through multiple rounds of semantic calibration.

**Table 6**

Impact of iterations of 𝑘. For each target question, the corresponding malicious texts are iterated twice.

Dataset Attack 1 2 3 4 5

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| NQ FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.65 0.75 0.78 | 0.80  0.85 | **0.86**  **0.92** |
| HotpotQA FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.84 0.91 0.93 | 0.93 | **0.94** |
| FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.83 0.93 0.95 | **0.97** | 0.95 |

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.67 0.81 0.89

FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.56 0.66 0.70 0.75 **0.77**

MS-MARCO

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.59 0.79 0.82 0.83 **0.86**

**Table 7**

Impact of iterations of optimization. For each target question, we inject one malicious text into the knowledge database.

Dataset Attack 1 2 3 4 5

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| NQ FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.66 0.65 **0.67** | 0.66  0.64 | 0.67  0.65 |
| HotpotQA FHM-ISO(Black-Box) **0.84 0.84 0.84** | 0.83 | 0.82 |
| FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.84 0.86 0.86 | 0.84 | **0.87** |
| MS-MARCO FHM-ISO(Black-Box) **0.57** 0.56 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.54 |
| FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.55 **0.59** 0.57 | **0.59** | 0.57 |

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.63 0.67 **0.69**

As shown in Table [7](#_bookmark8), the first iteration (iteration = 1), which applies initial targeted perturbations, already yields basic attack effectiveness. As the number of iterations in- creases (from 2 to 3), semantic consistency further im- proves—resulting in an ASR of 0.69 on NQ (white-box) and 0.86 on HotpotQA (white-box) at iteration 3. These results confirm the effectiveness of multi-round optimization in refining the attack trajectory.

However, when the number of iterations exceeds a crit- ical threshold (typically 3 rounds), ASR gains begin to plateau or even decline. For instance, in the fourth iteration, ASR drops to 0.64 on NQ (white-box) and to 0.83 on HotpotQA (black-box). This decline is primarily due to two factors: overfitting and model adaptability. Excessive itera- tions may cause the attack text to overfit the local semantic calibration objectives, thereby reducing its generalizability across rounds. Simultaneously, repeated optimization pat- terns make the model more adaptive, diminishing the overall effectiveness of the attack logic.

The difference between black-box and white-box perfor- mance stems from access to internal semantic representa- tions. In the white-box setting, these representations can be directly leveraged to guide optimization, leading to more efficient and sustained improvements. On the HotpotQA dataset, for example, the ASR remains as high as 0.87 after five white-box iterations.

To investigate how the similarity score evolves during the iterative process, we computed the average similarity across 100 malicious texts at each iteration step. As shown in the Fig. [4](#_bookmark10), the similarity scores consistently increase with more iterations. Notably, there is a significant improvement in similarity after the first iteration compared to the initial

**Table 8**

Impact of variable 𝐿. For each target question, we inject one malicious text into the knowledge database, and each malicious text is optimized through two iterations.

Dataset Attack 25 50 100 150 200

FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.62 0.64 **0.65** 0.62 0.60

NQ

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.64 0.64 **0.67** 0.62 0.65

FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.78 0.82 **0.84** 0.83 0.83

HotpotQA

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.80 0.80 **0.86** 0.84 0.85

FHM-ISO(Black-Box) 0.48 0.47 **0.56** 0.48 0.46

MS-MARCO

FHM-ISO(White-Box) 0.56 0.54 **0.59** 0.57 0.57

state. This demonstrates that our iterative optimization ef- fectively enhances semantic similarity, making the malicious texts more likely to be retrieved by the RAG system.

### Impact of 𝐿

The effect of the variable 𝐿 on ASR of FHM-ISO reflects a fundamental trade-off between the semantic capacity of the text and the density of the attack logic. It serves as a regulatory threshold that balances semantic integrity against information redundancy.




As shown in Table [8](#_bookmark9), when 𝐿 is small (e.g., 𝐿 = 25), the malicious text contains too few words to adequately express semantic richness or construct coherent attack logic. As a result, critical semantic dimensions are missing, and the fragmented logic fails to establish effective adversarial pathways, yielding a low ASR.

As 𝐿 increases, the text gains greater capacity to convey attack semantics. The synergy between improved semantic completeness and denser attack cues drives a steady increase in ASR. However, once 𝐿 surpasses a critical threshold (typically around 𝐿 = 100), excessive length introduces semantic dilution and cognitive overload for the model. In this case, the core attack logic is buried under redundant content, and the signal-to-noise ratio deteriorates during long-text processing—ultimately leading to a drop in ASR.

### Case Study


To empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our method in adversarial prompt attacks against LLMs, we conducted two case studies focused on factual question answering, using GPT-4 as the target model. The results are illustrated in Fig. [5](#_bookmark11).

In Case 1, the target question was: “When did An- drew Jackson campaign for president?” The historically verified answers—1824, 1828, and 1832—were contrasted with two rounds of adversarial prompts. The original mali- cious prompt deliberately embedded incorrect information, falsely asserting the campaign years as 1816, 1820, and 1824. However, it suffered from a fragmented narrative and lacked syntactic coherence. For example, the sentence “campaigned for Presidential office thrice, marking impact- ful years of U.S. politics: first in 1816, then in 1820, and again prominently in 1824” fails to form a clear and flu- ent structure. Consequently, GPT-4 produced the correct

(a) NQ (b) HotpotQA (c) MS-MARCO

**Figure 4:** Similarity score over iterations on different datasets.



**Figure 5:** Examples of RAG under FHM-ISO on MS-MARCO.

response—“Andrew Jackson campaigned for president in 1824, 1828, and 1832”—indicating that the initial attack attempt was unsuccessful. In contrast, the malicious text refined through two rounds of semantic optimization re- placed the verb “campaigned” with the more formal phrase “sought the Presidency”, and recontextualized the incorrect dates as “important moments in American political history.” This revision enhanced narrative authority and increased topical relevance to the original question, ultimately leading GPT-4 to generate factually biased answers. In Case 2, two

rounds of semantic optimization introduced more credible phrasing—such as “commonly labeled Confederate—was actually Union-aligned”—which successfully misled GPT- 4 into producing an incorrect response. These case studies demonstrate that iterative semantic optimization of mali- cious prompts can significantly increase the likelihood of large language models producing factually inaccurate out- puts.

# Conclusion

This paper proposes FHM-ISO, a multi-round iterative semantic optimization attack method targeting retrieval- augmented generation (RAG) systems, along with a novel semantic similarity measurement approach. Experimental results show that leveraging a weighted similarity func- tion—which combines dot product and cosine similarity—for iterative optimization significantly improves the success rate of adversarial attacks. Furthermore, FHM-ISO demonstrates competitive performance compared to state-of-the-art attack methods across multiple datasets and large language models. While this study focuses on fact-based queries with fixed answers, future work may extend this framework to open- ended questions and explore multi-query joint attack strate- gies during malicious text injection.

# CRediT authorship contribution statement

**Qidong Chen:** Conceive the study, Lead investigation, Write the initial draft. **Vasile Palade:** Methodology, Data curation. **Zihao Yu:** Conceive the study, Write the initial draft. **Ruixiang Deng:** Analysis and Interpretation. **Jun Sun:** Analysis and Interpretation, Supervise and acquire funding. **Hao Wu:** Analysis and Interpretation.

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
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Declaration of Interest Statement

### Declaration of interests

☒The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

☐The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests: