# Bidding Algorithm Overview

Yuanlong Chen

Brand Auction

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Bidding Products

- Bidding Products
- Auto-Bidding Algorithm

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- Cost Cap Bidding Algorithm

#### Three Major Bidding Products

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#### Formulation(use CPC ads as example)

$$\max_{x_t} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \cdot r_t \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t \cdot c_t \le B$$

where

t — t-th auction opportunity

T – total auction opportunity

 $r_t$  — pctr at t

 $c_t$  — cost at t

B − total budget

 $x_t$  — indicator whether t-th auction win or lose,  $x_t \in \{0,1\}$ 



#### Optimal Bidding Formula

Auction Mechanism: assume we use second price auction, then

$$\mathbf{x}_t = \mathbf{1}_{\{\mathsf{ecpm}_t > c_t\}} \quad \mathsf{where} \quad \mathsf{ecpm}_t = b_t * r_t$$

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#### STEP 1: Write Lagrangian

$$\mathcal{L}(x_t, \lambda) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t r_t + \lambda \left( B - \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t c_t \right)$$
$$= \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t (r_t - \lambda c_t) + \lambda B$$

#### Optimal Bidding Formula(cont'd)

#### STEP 2: Derive dual problem

$$\mathcal{L}^*(\lambda) = \max_{\mathsf{x}_t} \mathcal{L}(\mathsf{x}_t, \lambda)$$

$$=\sum_{t=1}^T (r_t - \lambda c_t)_+ + \lambda B$$

where  $(z)_+ = \max(0, z)$  (a.k.a ReLU)

#### Optimal Bidding Formula(cont'd)

#### STEP 3: Solve dual problem

$$\lambda^* = \min_{\lambda \geq 0} \mathcal{L}^*(\lambda)$$

$$\Rightarrow \mathsf{ecpm}_t^* = \frac{r_t}{\lambda^*}$$

i.e.

$$b_t^* \cdot r_t = rac{r_t}{\lambda^*} \Rightarrow b_t^* = rac{1}{\lambda^*}$$

Note: this is true for all incentive compatible auctions

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Conclusion: optimal bid is constant bid

#### How To Find Optimal Bid $b^*$

(From KKT condition)  $b^*$  is the bid level that exactly depletes the budget, i.e.,

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Assume  $r_t$ ,  $c_t$  are subject to i.i.d. at  $(\tau, \tau + d\tau)$ , the cost

$$\sum_{ au \leq t \leq au + d au} x_t c_t \sim \#$$
 of auction opportunities in  $( au, au + d au)$ 




Figure: Left: Accumulated number of eligible requests. Right:Accumulated expected cost.

In practice, we construct an expected cost curve based on flow ratio map (e.g. 15 minute granularity):




Figure: Expected cost vs Actual cost over time

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By following the curve:  $b_t \to b^*$ 

### Controller-based Algrorithm

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 $b(t_{k+1}) \leftarrow b(t_k) \cdot \exp(\phi(t_{k+1}))$ 

#### Controller-based Algrorithm(cont'd)

#### Approach 2: MPC Controller

MPC optimizes the entire future spend, at time t, remaining budget  $B_{t,r}$ 

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- $\Rightarrow$  expected cost speed  $cs_t$
- $\Rightarrow$  expected bid price  $b_t$

**Goal:** find  $cs_t = f(b_t)$  where f is monotonically non-decreasing

iMPC: Longest Increasing Subsequence of historical (bid, cost) pairs + interpolation




Figure: (Bid, cost) pair in past N minutes. Blue line represents the longest increasing subsequence used for interpolation.

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### iMPC algorithm:

- fetch historical bid-cost pairs in past N minutes
- $oldsymbol{\circ}$  Choose longest increasing subsequence(LIS), then interpolate to get f

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### iMPC algorithm:

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- **3**  $b_t = f^{-1}(cs_t)$

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Idea: Use Isotonic Regression




Figure: Isotonic Regression vs LIS.

### Formulation(use CPC ads as example)

$$\max_{x_t} \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t r_t$$

subject to

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t c_t \leq B$$

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t c_t \le C \left( \sum_{t=1}^{T} x_t r_t \right)$$

where C is cost cap (advertiser bid)

### Optimal Bidding Formula

Use primal-dual method, similarly we get optimal bid:

$$b^* = \frac{1 + \mu^* C}{\lambda^* + \mu^*} = \frac{\lambda^*}{\lambda^* + \mu^*} \cdot \frac{1}{\lambda^*} + \frac{\mu^*}{\lambda^* + \mu^*} \cdot C$$

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Note: if  $\mu^*=0$ ,  $b^*=\frac{1}{\lambda^*}$  which is equivalent to auto bidding In practice, we use the "cost-min" algorithm:

$$b_t = \min(\text{flow\_bid}, \text{risk\_bid})$$

where

$$risk\_bid = \frac{remaining\ budget}{remaining\ event\ goal}$$

flow\_bid is the same as in auto-bidding.