

# TITLE

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## Abstract

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## 18 Introduction

19 The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in extreme non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) in many  
20 affected countries. These interventions, from social distancing to lockdowns, are applied in a rapid  
21 and widespread fashion. The NPIs are designed and assessed using epidemiological models, which  
22 follow the dynamics of the viral infection to forecast the effect of different mitigation and suppression  
23 strategies on the levels of infection, hospitalization, and fatality. These epidemiological models usually  
24 assume that the effect of NPIs on disease transmission begins at the officially declared date (e.g. Gatto  
25 et al.<sup>6</sup>, Li et al.<sup>7</sup>).

26 However, behavioural and social change does not occur immediately, but rather requires time to diffuse  
27 in the population through media, social networks, social interactions, and even cognitive processes.  
28 Moreover, compliance to NPIs may differ between interventions and people. For example, in a survey  
29 of 2,108 adults in the UK during Mar 2020, Atchison et al.<sup>2</sup> found that those over 70 years old were  
30 more likely to adopt social distancing than young adults (18-34 years), and that those with lower  
31 income were less likely to be able work from home and to self-isolate. Furthermore, compliance to  
32 NPIs may be impacted both by the number of domestic cases, as well as by reported cases in other  
33 regions and countries.

34 Here, we hypothesise that there is a significant difference between the official start of NPIs and the  
35 start of their intended effect on transmission dynamics. We apply a *Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-*  
36 *Recovered* (SEIR) epidemiological model and *Markov Chain Monte Carlo* (MCMC) parameter esti-  
37 mation framework to estimate the effective start date of NPIs in several geographical regions using  
38 publicly available confirmed COVID-19 case data. We compare these estimates to the official dates  
39 and find both delayed and advanced effect of NPIs on COVID-19 transmission dynamics. We con-  
40 clude by demonstrating how differences between the official and effective start of NPIs can confuse  
41 assessments of the effectiveness of the NPIs in a simple epidemic control framework.

## 42 Models and Methods

43 **Data.** We use daily confirmed case data  $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots, X_T)$  from several different countries. These  
44 incidence data summarize the number of individuals  $X_t$  tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA (using  
45 RT-qPCR) at each day  $t$ . Data was retrieved for  $X$  regions, see Table 1 for details and references. In  
46 regions in which there were multiple sequences of days with zero confirmed cases (e.g. France), we  
47 cropped the data to begin with the last sequence so that our analysis focuses on the first community-  
48 transmitted outbreak rather than isolated imported cases.

Region	Start date	End date	Reference
Austria	X Feb		Flaxman et al. <sup>4</sup>
Wuhan, China	10 Jan	8 Feb	Pei and Shaman <sup>8</sup>

Table 1: Reference for confirmed cases incidence data. All dates in 2020.

49 **SEIR model.** We model SARS-CoV-2 infection dynamics by following the number of susceptible  
50  $S$ , exposed  $E$ , reported infected  $I_r$ , and unreported infected  $I_u$  individuals in a population of size  $N$ .  
51 This model distinguishes between reported and unreported infected individuals: the reported infected  
52 are those that have enough symptoms to eventually be tested and thus appear in daily case reports, to  
53 which we fit the model.

54 Susceptible ( $S$ ) individuals become exposed due to contact with reported or unreported infected  
 55 individuals ( $I_r$  or  $I_u$ ) at a rate  $\beta_t$  or  $\mu\beta_t$ . The parameter  $0 < \mu < 1$  represents the decreased transmission  
 56 rate from unreported infected individuals, who are often subclinical or even asymptomatic. The  
 57 transmission rate  $\beta_t \geq 0$  may change over time  $t$  due to behavioural changes of both susceptible  
 58 and infected individuals. Exposed individuals, after an average incubation period of  $Z$  days, become  
 59 reported infected with probability  $\alpha_t$  or unreported infected with probability  $(1 - \alpha_t)$ . The reporting  
 60 rate  $0 < \alpha_t < 1$  may also change over time due to changes in human behavior. Infected individuals  
 61 remain infectious for an average period of  $D$  days, after which they either recover, or becomes ill  
 62 enough to be quarantined. They therefore no longer infect other individuals, and the model does not  
 63 track their frequency. The model is described by the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{dS}{dt} &= -\beta_t S \frac{I_p}{N} - \mu\beta_t S \frac{I_s}{N} \\
 \frac{dE}{dt} &= \beta_t S \frac{I_p}{N} + \mu\beta_t S \frac{I_s}{N} - \frac{E}{Z} \\
 \frac{dI_r}{dt} &= \alpha_t \frac{E}{Z} - \frac{I_r}{D} \\
 \frac{dI_u}{dt} &= (1 - \alpha_t) \frac{E}{Z} - \frac{I_r}{D}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

65 The initial numbers of exposed  $E(0)$  and unreported infected  $I_u(0)$  are considered model parameters,  
 66 whereas the initial number of reported infected is assumed to be zero  $I_r(0) = 0$ , and the number of  
 67 susceptible is  $S(0) = N - E(0) - I_u(0)$ . The vector  $\theta$  of model parameters is

$$\theta = \left( Z, D, \mu, \{\beta_t\}, \{\alpha_t\}, \{p_t\}, E(0), I_u(0) \right). \tag{2}$$

69 This model is inspired by Li et al.<sup>7</sup> and Pei and Shaman<sup>8</sup>, who used a similar model with multiple  
 70 regions and constant transmission  $\beta$  and reporting rate  $\alpha$  to infer COVID-19 dynamics in China and  
 71 the continental US, respectively.

72 **Likelihood function.** The *expected* cumulative number of reported infected individuals until day  $t$   
 73 is

$$Y_t = \int_0^t \alpha_s \frac{E(s)}{Z} ds, \quad Y_0 = 0. \tag{3}$$

We assume that reported infected individuals are confirmed and therefore observed in the daily case  
 report of day  $t$  with probability  $p_t$  (note that an individual can only be observed once, and that  $p_t$  may  
 change over time, but  $t$  is a specific date rather than the time elapsed since the individual was infected).  
 Hence, we assume that the number of confirmed cases in day  $t$  is binomially distributed,

$$X_t \sim \text{Bin}(n_t, p_t),$$

where  $n_t$  is the *realized* (rather than expected) number of reported infected individuals yet to appear  
 in daily reports by day  $t$ . The cumulative number of confirmed cases until day  $t$  is

$$\tilde{X}_t = \sum_{i=1}^t X_i, \quad X_0 = 0.$$

Given  $\tilde{X}_{t-1}$ , we assume  $n_t$  is Poisson distributed,

$$(n_t \mid \tilde{X}_{t-1}) \sim \text{Poi}(Y_t - \tilde{X}_{t-1}), \quad n_1 \sim \text{Poi}(Y_1).$$

75 Therefore,  $(X_t | \tilde{X}_{t-1})$  is a binomial conditioned on a Poisson, which reduces to a Poisson with

$$76 \quad (X_t | \tilde{X}_{t-1}) \sim \text{Poi}\left((Y_t - \tilde{X}_{t-1}) \cdot p_t\right), \quad X_1 \sim \text{Poi}(Y_1 \cdot p_1). \quad (4)$$

77 For given vector  $\theta$  of model parameters (Eq. (2)), we compute the expected cumulative number  
 78 of reported infected individuals  $\{Y_t\}_{t=1}^T$  for each day (Eq. (3)). Then, since  $\tilde{X}_{t-1}$  is a function of  
 79  $X_1, \dots, X_{t-1}$ , we can use Eq. (4) to write the probability to observe the confirmed case data  $\mathbf{X} =$   
 80  $(X_1, \dots, X_T)$  as

$$81 \quad \mathbb{L}(\theta | \mathbf{X}) = P(\mathbf{X} | \theta) = P(X_1 | \theta)P(X_2 | \tilde{X}_1, \theta) \cdots P(X_T | \tilde{X}_{T-1}, \theta). \quad (5)$$

82 This defines a *likelihood function*  $\mathbb{L}(\theta | \mathbf{X})$  for the parameter vector  $\theta$  given the data  $\mathbf{X}$ .

83 **NPI model.** To model non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), we set the beginning of the NPIs  
 84 to day  $\tau$  and define

$$85 \quad \beta_t = \begin{cases} \beta, & t < \tau \\ \beta\lambda, & t \geq \tau \end{cases}, \quad \alpha_t = \begin{cases} \alpha_1, & t < \tau \\ \alpha_2, & t \geq \tau \end{cases}, \quad p_t = \begin{cases} 1/9, & t < \tau \\ 1/6, & t \geq \tau \end{cases}, \quad (6)$$

86 where  $0 < \lambda < 1$ . The values for  $p_t$  follow Li et al.<sup>7</sup>, who estimated the average time between infection  
 87 and reporting in Wuhan, China, at 9 days before the start of NPIs (Jan 23, 2020) and 6 days after start  
 88 of NPIs. The parameter  $\tau$  is then added to the parameter vector  $\theta$  (Eq. (2)).

89 **Parameter estimation.** To estimate the parameters  $\theta$  of our model (Eq. (1)) from the data  $\mathbf{X}$ , we  
 90 apply a Bayesian inference approach. We define the following flat priors on the model parameters  
 91  $P(\theta)$ :

$$\begin{aligned} & Z \sim \text{Uniform}(2, 5) \\ & D \sim \text{Uniform}(2, 5) \\ & \mu \sim \text{Uniform}(0.2, 1) \\ & \beta \sim \text{Uniform}(0.8, 1.5) \\ 92 \quad & \lambda \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 1) \\ & \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \sim \text{Uniform}(0.02, 1) \\ & E(0) \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 3000) \\ & I_u(0) \sim \text{Uniform}(0, 3000) \\ & \tau \sim \text{Uniform}(1, T - 1), \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

93 where  $T$  is the number of days in the data  $\mathbf{X}$ . Most priors follow Li et al.<sup>7</sup>, except  $\lambda$ , which is used to  
 94 enforce that the transmission rates are lower after the start of the NPIs ( $\lambda < 1$ ). The likelihood function  
 95 is defined in Eq. (5). The posterior distribution on the model parameters  $P(\theta | \mathbf{X})$  is then estimated  
 96 using an *affine-invariant ensemble sampler for Markov chain Monte Carlo* (MCMC) implemented in  
 97 the *emcee* Python package<sup>5</sup>.

98 **Model selection.** We perform model selection using DIC (deviance information criterion)<sup>9</sup>,

$$\begin{aligned} 99 \quad & \text{DIC}(\theta, \mathbf{X}) = 2\mathbb{E}[D(\theta)] - D(\mathbb{E}[\theta]) \\ & = 2\log \mathcal{L}(\mathbb{E}[\theta] | \mathbf{X}) - 4\mathbb{E}[\log \mathcal{L}(\theta | \mathbf{X})], \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

100 where  $D(\theta)$  is the Bayesian deviance, and expectations  $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$  are taken over the posterior distribution  
 101  $P(\theta | \mathbf{X})$ . We compare models by reporting their relative DIC; lower is better.

102 **Source code.** We use Python 3 (Anaconda) with the NumPy, Matplotlib, SciPy, Pandas, Seaborn,  
103 and emcee packages. All source code will be publicly available under a permissive open-source  
104 license at [github.com/yoavram-lab/EffectiveNPI](https://github.com/yoavram-lab/EffectiveNPI).

## 105 Results

106 Several studies have described the effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions in different regions<sup>4,6,7</sup>.  
107 These studies have assumed that the parameters of the epidemiological model change at a specific  
108 date, as in Eq. (6), and set the change date  $\tau$  to the official NPI date  $\tau^*$ . They then fit the model once  
109 for  $t < \tau^*$  and once for  $t \geq \tau^*$  (see [TABLE 2](#) for a summary of official NPI dates.) For example, Li  
110 et al.<sup>7</sup> estimate the dynamics in China before and after  $\tau^*$  at Jan 23. Thereby, they effectively estimate  
111  $(\beta, \alpha_1)$  and  $(\lambda, \alpha_2)$  separately.

112 Here we estimate the posterior distribution of *effective* start date of the NPI,  $P(\tau | \mathbf{X})$ , as well as  
113 maximum a priori (MAP) estimates,  $\hat{\tau}$ , by jointly estimating  $\tau, \beta, \lambda, \alpha_1, \alpha_2$  on the entire time series  
114 per region (e.g. Italy, Austria), rather than splitting the region time series at  $\tau^*$ . In all examined cases  
115 the effect of an NPI is significant: the DIC of a model without NPI ( $\beta_t \equiv \beta, \alpha_t \equiv \alpha, p_t \equiv p$  for all  $t$ )  
116 was higher than the DIC of a model with NPI (Eq. (6)) by at least [Z](#). Therefore, [FIGURE](#) compares  
117 the official dates  $\tau^*$  and our MAP estimates  $\hat{\tau}$ , with confidence intervals. It can be seen that in most  
118 regions  $\hat{\tau}$  and  $\tau^*$  differ significantly: that is, the effective start of NPI was either advanced or delayed  
119 compared to the official date. [Do we want to report DIC of model with  \$\tau\$  compared to model with](#)  
120 [fixed  \$\tau = \tau^\*\$ ? Or just that  \$\(P\(\tau \neq \tau^\*\) > zzz\)\$ ? Or confidence intervals?](#)

121 In the following, we describe our findings on delayed and advanced start of NPI.

122 **Delayed effective start of NPI.** We find that our MAP estimates  $\hat{\tau}$  often differ significantly from the  
123 official dates  $\tau^*$ . For example, in Italy, the first case officially confirmed on Feb 21, a lockdown was  
124 delayed in Northern Italy on Mar 8, with social distancing implemented in the rest of the country, and  
125 the lockdown was extended to the entire nation on Mar 11<sup>6</sup>. That is, the official date  $\tau^*$  is either Mar  
126 8 or 11. However, we estimate the effective date  $\hat{\tau}$  at Mar 16 (the posterior probability that  $\tau$  is later  
127 than Mar 11 is [\( \$P\(\tau > \tau^\*\) = ???\$ \)](#)). Similarly, in Wuhan, China, lockdown was declared on Jan 23<sup>7</sup>, but  
128 we estimate that the effective start of NPIs to be 3-4 days later [\( \$P\(\tau > \tau^\*\) = ???\$ \)](#).

129 **Advanced effective start of NPIs.** In contrast, in some regions we estimate an effective start of  
130 NPIs  $\hat{\tau}$  that is *earlier* than the official date  $\tau^*$ . For example, social distancing was encouraged starting  
131 on Mar 8<sup>4</sup>, but mass gatherings still occurred on Mar 8, including a march of 120,000 people for the  
132 [International Women's Day](#), and a football match between [Real Betis and Real Madrid](#) (2-1) with a  
133 crowd of 50,965 in Seville. A national lockdown was only announced on Mar 14 ( $\tau^*$ )<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless,  
134 we estimate the effective start of NPI  $\hat{\tau}$  at Mar 8 or 9, rather than Mar 14 [\( \$P\(\tau < \tau^\*\) = ???\$ \)](#).

135 **The exception that proves the rule.** We have also found a single case in which the official and  
136 effective dates match: Switzerland ordered a national lockdown on Mar 20 ( $\tau^*$ ), after banning public  
137 events and closing schools on Mar 13 and 14<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, our MAP estimate  $\hat{\tau}$  is Mar 20, and the posterior  
138 distribution shows two density peaks: a smaller one between Mar 10 and Mar 14, and a taller one  
139 between Mar 17 and Mar 22. It's also worth mentioning that Switzerland was the first to mandate self  
140 isolation of confirmed cases<sup>4</sup>.

## 142 **Discussion**

143 We have estimated the effective start date of NPIs in several geographical regions using an SEIR  
144 epidemiological model and an MCMC parameter estimation framework. We find that in most of  
145 the examined regions the effective and official NPI start dates differ significantly **FIGURE**. We find  
146 examples of both advanced and delayed response to NPIs: for example, in Italy and Wuhan, China,  
147 the effective start of the lockdowns seems to have occurred 3-5 after the official date. This could be  
148 explained by low compliance: in Italy, it seems that a leak about the intent to lockdown Northern  
149 provinces results in people leaving those provinces<sup>6</sup>. However, delayed effect of NPIs could also be  
150 due to the time required by both the government and the citizens to organize for a lockdown. In contrast,  
151 in Spain and France transmission rates seem to have been reduced even before official lockdowns were  
152 imposed, possibly due to adoption of social distancing and similar behavioral adaptations in part of  
153 the population, maybe in response to domestic or international COVID-19-related reports.

154 As several countries (e.g. Austria, Israel) have began to relieve lockdowns and ease restrictions, we  
155 expect similar delays and advances to occur: in some countries people will begin to behave as if  
156 restrictions were eased before the official date, and in some countries people will continue to self-  
157 restrict even after restrictions are officially removed. Such delays and advances could confuse analyses  
158 and lead to wrong conclusions about the effects of NPI removals.

159 **Conclusions.** We have estimated the effective start date of NPIs and found that they often differ  
160 from the official dates. Our results emphasize the complex interaction between personal, regional, and  
161 global determinants of behavioral. Thus, our results highlight the need to further study variability in  
162 compliance and behavior over both time and space. This should be accomplished both by surveying  
163 differences in compliance within and between populations<sup>2</sup>, and by incorporating specific behavioral  
164 models into epidemiological models<sup>1</sup>.

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167

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