Advanced Proof Systems - Course Material

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Lecture 1

Recap

P - Polynomial (Class)

$L \in \{0,1\}^*$ is also in P if there exists an efficient algorithm which decides it.

NP - Nondeterministic Polynomial

$L \in \{0,1\}^*$ is also in NP if there exists an efficient algorithm V and a polynomial p which follow:

1. Completeness: $\forall x \in L, \exists y : V(x,y) = 1 \wedge |y| < p(|x|)$

2. Soundness: $\forall x \notin L \forall y : V(x,y) \neq 1 \vee |y| \geq p(|x|)$

PPT - Probobalistic Polynomial Time

This is a class of algorithms which must run in time polynomial to the size of their input, but also - must be capable of randomization, or 'flipping coins'.

IP - Interactive Proof

A key difference between an Interactive Proof and a proof for an NP proof is that the latter necessarily requires the prover to provide the verifier with something he can use to prove the truth of the calim to others.

We denote $(P,V)(x)$ to be the output of V (verifier) after the interaction between P and V on the input x. Both P and V can be thought of as PPT algorithms or programs which are capable of communicating with one another.

These interactions are often described with an interaction diagram:

- P sends to V something

- V sends to P something else

- ...

- V accepts iff ...

Formal Definition: We say that $L \in IP$ if there exists a polynomial algorithm V, an unbounded algorithm P and some constant $c \in (0.5, 1]$ s.t.

1. Completeness: $\forall x \in L, Pr[(P, V)(x) = 1] > c$

2. Soundness: if $x \notin L, \forall P^* \in \mathbb{M}, Pr[(P^*, V)(x) = 1] < 1 - c$

Note: $\mathbb{M}$ denotes the set of turing machines.

Equivalence of IP separation constants

Iterative Runs

Given an IP protocol (P, V), let (P^k, V^k) be the protocol obtained by running (P, V) k times sequentially. V^k accepts iff in all iterations V accepted.

Lemma

if (P, V) is IP with perfect completeness then for every polynomial k, (P^k, V^k) is IP with perfect completeness and soundness error $2^{-\Omega(k)}$
Proof:

1. V^k is efficient (composition of polynomials).

2. Perfect Completeness - due to Perfect Completeness of the original protocol - each iteration is guaranteed to succeed thus the protocol always does.

3. Soundness: Let $x \in L, P^*$. We will show that $Pr[(P^*, V^k)(x) = 1] \leq 2^{-k}$. Denote by E_i the event that V^k accepts in the i'th iteration. Thus:

$$Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_k] = \prod_{i=1}^{k} Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}]$$

Claim: $Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}] \leq 0.5$.
Proof: Assume toward a contradiction that $Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}] > 0.5$
We design a prover P^{**} that convinces V with up to > 0.5:
P^{**} emulates (P^*, V) for iterations $1...i - 1$ until the event $E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}$ happens and then runs (P^*, V) as the i'th iteration. Since the run of (P^*, V) for the i'th iteration only happens under the condition $Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}]$ - the probability for (P^*, V) to happen on the i'th iteration is exactly $Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_{i-1}] > 0.5$ but this is also the

probability for $Pr[(P^{**}, V)(x) = 1]$. Contradiction.

Thus:

$$Pr[E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_k] = \prod_{i=1}^{k} Pr[E_i | E_1 \wedge E_2 \wedge \ldots E_k] \leq \prod_{i=1}^{k} 0.5 = 2^{-k}$$

Graph Isomorphism & IP Example

Graph Isomorphism - Definition

The graphs $G_1 = (V, E_1), G_2 = (V, E_2)$ are isomorphic or $(G_1, G_2) \in GI$ if $\exists \pi : V \longrightarrow V$ s.t. $(u, v) \in E_1 \iff (\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_2$.
More simply - two graphs are isomorphic if they are identical up to a renaming of their vertices.

GNI is the set of pairs of graphs which are isomorphic.

- Claim (no proof): $NP \subseteq IP$.

- Claim (proof sketch): $GI \in IP$.
  By finding the permutation π it is easy to check the GI condition over a given (G_1, G_2) thus we have an NP relation, meaning $GI \in NP$.

- Claim (no proof): $GNI \in IP$.

Tutorial 1

IP and NP

Claim: $NP \subseteq IP$.
Proof: let $L \in NP$. There exists some NP relation R for L, with an efficient algorithm M_R which decides it.
Now define an IP protocol:

- Both P and V get x.

- If $x \in L$ P find y s.t. $(x, y) \in R$, and send it to V. Otherwise send ϵ.

- V checks if $(x, y) \in R$ by running M_R (known to be efficient) and accepts iff $M(x, y)$ accepts.

1. Completeness: If $x \in L$, such y must exist (NP definition) thus P will find it, and V will have $(x, y) \in R$ so M_R and V will accept.

2. Soundness: If $x \notin L$, there is no y which such that $(x, y) \in R$ so no matter what any P^* sends - $M_R(x, y)$ rejects and so V rejects too.

Similar Proof Systems

Arthur-Merlin - AM

- Both parties get some input x.

- Arthur sends Merlin some randomized α.

- Merlin sends back some β.

- Arthur accepets according to some PPT algorithm which is a function of x, α and β (usually denoted $A(x, \alpha, \beta)$).

Merlin-Arthur - MA

- Both parties get input x.

- Merlin sends β to Arthur.

- Arthur generates some random value α.

- Arthur accepts according to some PPT algorithm which is a function of x, α, β.

Theorem: $MA \subseteq AM$.
Proof: Let $L \in MA$. WLOG (without loss of generality), L has a MA protocol with perfect completeness (we will come back to this assumption later in the course).
Denote by $p(n)$ the length β ($|\beta| \leq p(n)$).

Using repetition we can get to any protocol with perfect completeness and a soundness error of $2^{-p(n)-1}$ (as seen in lecture).
Sketching the repeated protocol would look like:

- M' sends β to A'

- A' sends back a list of α values (as many as there are repetitions).

- A' decides wether to accept.

This is because there is not reason for the prover's proof (β) to change due to different sampling of α, so it is always the same and can be sent once. So the length of Merlin's message does not change in the repeating protocol.

Now consider the same M', A' protocol but where A' sends the aggregated α before M' sends β.

Claim: This new protocol is AM. Proof:

1. Completeness: $\forall x \in L, M'$ sends the same β without looking at α:

$$Pr[(M', A)(x) = 1] = Pr[A(x, \alpha, \beta) = 1] = 1$$

2. Soundness: Let $x \notin L$, fix M^*. Consider:

$$Pr[(M^*, A')(x) = 1] = Pr[\exists \beta \in \{0,1\}^p : A'(x, \alpha, \beta) = 1]$$

$$= \cup_{\beta \in \{0,1\}^p} Pr[A'(x, \alpha, \beta) = 1] \leq_{UB} 2^p 2^{-(p+1)} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Note: UB denotes Union Bound.

Lecture 2

Recap

Remarks on GI

- For any graph G, the set of all (G, G'), where G' is isomorphic to G is an equivalence relation.

- For any graph G: $(\pi(G))_{\pi \leftarrow \mathbb{U}} \approx \mathbb{I} \sim \rtimes(\mathbb{G})$ - meaning uniformly sampling a permutation (over the set of nodes) of G and applying it to G will yield a uniformly sampled graph from the same equivalence partition.

$GNI \subseteq IP$

To prove this we will present an interactive protocol that runs on input G_0, G_1:

- V samples $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, \pi \leftarrow \{\texttt{permutations}\}$.

- V sends $G = \pi(G_b)$.

- P checks: if $G \approx G_0$, $b' = 0$ else $b' = 1$.

- P sends b' to V.

- V accepts iff $b = b'$.

Now we prove that this interactive protocol is indeed an interactive proof for GNI:

1. Soundness: Let $G_0 \approx G_1$ and let P^* be a (possibly) cheating prover.
   If $b = 0$ then G is uniformly distributed over all graphs isomorphic to G_0.
   If $b = 1$ then G is uniformly distributed over all graphs isomorphic to G_1,
   but due to transitivity, this is the same as the prior case, meaning in any
   case, G is distributed uniformly over the equivalence to G_0.
   Since this is the case, no information has been passed from V to P^* by
   sending G (P^* could have just sampled a graph from $Iso(G_0)$ itself!), P^*
   could not do more than guess b, and it's probability for success is no more
   than $\frac{1}{2}$.

2. Completeness: If the graphs are not isomorphic, $G \approx G_0$ iff $b = 0$, which
   will mean $b = b'$ is always the case and V always accepts.

3. Runtime: V does nothing of high complexity, P is unbounded.

Equivalence between IP and $AM[Poly]$

Lemma: Set Lower Bound Protocol

Theorem

- $IP[k]$: k-round interactive proof.

- $AM[k]$: k-round public coin interactive proof.

Claim (no proof): $AM[k] \subseteq IP[k]$.
Theorem: $IP[k] \subseteq AM[k + 2]$.
Corollary: $IP = AM[Poly]$.
Theorem Proof:
Let L be a language with an IP which satisfies the following assumptions:

1. $k = 2$.

2. Perfect Completeness.

3. There is a set of N of possible verifier messages which is constant for any
   specific protocol input x.

4. The message m sent by V is uniformly distributed over the N possible
   messages that could be sent.

5. The soundness error is $\frac{1}{100}$.

We want to show that L is in $AM[k + 2]$.
First, note how our IP can be described as follows when running on input x:

- V samples some $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.

- V calculates some $m = V_1(x, r)$ for some efficient function V_1.

- V sends m to P.

- P sends back some π.

- V accepts iff $V_2(x, \pi, r) = 1$ for some efficient function V_2.

Define:

$$R_m = \{r' \mid m = V_1(x, r')\}, S_m = \{r' \in R_m \mid V_2(x, \pi, r') = 1\}$$

Now consider an alternative protocol, which is the same as the one above, only V also samples $r' \leftarrow R_m$ and accepts iff $V_2(x, \pi, r')$.

Note how $|R_m| = \frac{2^l}{N}$, and if $x \in L$ then $S_m = R_m$. Claim (missing proof): if $x \in L$ then $\mathbb{E}(|S_m|) = \frac{2^l}{N}$ and otherwise $\mathbb{E}(|S_m|) \leq \frac{1}{100}\frac{2^l}{N}$.

Pairwise Independent Hash Functions

Definition: A set of hash functions $\{h : X \leftarrow Y\}$ is pairwise independent if for all $x_1, x_2 \in X$ where $x_1 \neq x_2$ and $y_1, y_2 \in Y$, they satisfy:

$$Pr_{h \leftarrow H}[h(x_1) = y_1 \wedge h(x_2) = y_2] = \frac{1}{|Y|^2}$$

Construction:
Let $\mathbb{F}$ be a finite field. Given $a, b \in \mathbb{F} : h_{a,b}(x) = ax + b$.
Let $H = \{h_{a,b} \mid a, b \in \mathbb{F}\}$.
Construction proof:
Let x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 as described in definition.

$$Pr_{a,b}[ax_1 + b = y_1 \wedge ax_2 + b = y_2] = Pr_{a,b}\left[\begin{pmatrix} x_1 & 1 \\ x_2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}\begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{pmatrix}\right]$$

$$= Pr_{a,b}\left[\begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 & 1 \\ x_2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1}\begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{pmatrix}\right] = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{F}|^2}$$

For the last transition: Note how the right value of the equality (in the probability) is just a constant value, so we just need to randomly sample a, b to be some spesific values within a finite field.

Tutorial 2

Perfect Completeness?

We have seen in the lecture how an IP can be reduced to an AM proof, or in other words; a public coin IP. Here, we would like to show how any AM can be reduced to an AM with perfect completeness (which is also an IP with perfect

completeness).

This means that $\forall L \in IP$, it must have a public coin, perfectly complete interactive proof.

To construct the reduction, we start with the following z-round public coin protocol $(AM[z])$, which runs on input X:

- A samples $\alpha \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{rc}$, and sends it to M.

- M calculates $\beta = M(X, \alpha)$ and sends it to m.

- A accepts iff $A(X, \alpha, \beta) = 1$.

Where we assume completeness error $\epsilon > 0$:

$$\forall x \in L : Pr[(M, A)(X) = 1] \geq 1 - \epsilon$$

$$\Rightarrow \forall x \in L : Pr[\exists \beta : A(X, \alpha, \beta) = 1] \geq 1 - \epsilon$$

Now, we want to use it to construct an equivalent with perfect completeness; for that end, consider the alternative protocol:

- M' samples $s_1, s_2, ..., s_k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{rc}$. s.t. (*)

$$\forall \alpha \{0,1\}^{rc}, \exists i \in [k] : s_i \oplus \alpha \notin REJ$$

.

- M' sends $s_1, s_2, ..., s_k$ to A'.

- A' samples $\alpha \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{rc}$ and sends it to M'.

- M' calculates $\forall i : \beta_i = M(X, s_i \oplus \alpha)$ and sends it.

- A' accepts iff $(\exists i : A(X, s_i \oplus \alpha, \beta_i)) = 1$

Lemma 1: if $x \in L$ then pre-processing succeeds.

We denote $\bar{s} = (s_1, s_2, ..., s_k)$. We say that $\bar{s}$ is 'good' if it satisfies (*).

To prove the lemma, we can show that:

$$\exists \bar{s} : \bar{s} \text{ is good}$$

We will show this by first showing:

$$Pr[\bar{s} \text{ is good }] > 0$$

To start off:

$$Pr_{\bar{s}}[\bar{s} \text{ is not good }] = Pr_{\bar{s}}[\exists \alpha, \forall i : s_i \oplus \alpha \in REJ]$$

$$= Pr_{\bar{s}}[\bigcup_{\alpha} (\forall i : s_i \oplus \alpha \in REJ)] \leq 2^{rc} \cdot \epsilon^k$$

8

From here we can see that for k of at-least rc, the probability is less then 1, meaning that the complementory probability is more than 0, meaning :

$$\exists \bar{s} : \bar{s} \text{ is good}$$

Completeness is trivial given Lemma 1.
Soundness of the protocol can be found in notes of Tutorial 2 in the website.

Lecture 3

Public Coin Protocol For Set Size

Lemma (Set LB)

Exists a protocol (P, V) such that: Given membership access to $s \subseteq U, t \subseteq \mathbb{N}$:

1. Completeness:
$$|s| \geq t \Rightarrow Pr[V \text{ accepts}] \geq \frac{2}{3}$$

2. Soundness:
$$\forall P^*, |s| \leq \frac{t}{100} \Rightarrow Pr[V \text{ accepts}] \leq \frac{1}{3}$$

The Protocol

1. V samples $h \leftarrow H$ where $H = \{h : U \to [t]\}$

2. P finds $x \in S$ s.t. $h(x) = 17$ and sends it to V (if none exist, P fails).

3. accepts iff $x \in S$ and $h(x) = 17$

Proof

For $x \in U, h \in H$, denote E_x if $h(x) = 17$.
Soundness: $|S| \leq \frac{t}{100}$.

$$Pr_{h \leftarrow H}[\exists x \in S, h(x) = 17] = Pr_{h \leftarrow H}[\bigcup_{x \in S} E_x] \leq \sum_{x \in S} Pr[E_x] = \frac{|S|}{t} \leq \frac{1}{100}$$

Completeness: $|S| = t$.

$$Pr_{h \leftarrow H}[\exists x \in S, h(x) = 17] = Pr_{h \leftarrow H}[\bigcup_{x \in S} E_x] \geq \sum_{x \in S} Pr[E_x] - Pr_{x, x' \in S, x < x'}[E_x \cap E_{x'}]$$

$$= \frac{|S|}{t} - \binom{|S|}{2} \frac{1}{t^2} \geq \frac{|s|}{t} - \frac{|s|^2}{2t^2} = \frac{1}{2}$$

Zero Knowlage Proofs (ZKP)

ZKP **protocol for** GI

Given input G_0, G_1:

- P finds a permutation $\psi \in S_n$ s.t. $G_0 = \psi(G_1)$.

- P uniformly samples a random permutation $\pi \leftarrow S_n$.

- P sends $G = \pi(G_0)$ to V.

- V samples $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and sends it to P.

- P defines $\sigma = \pi$ if $b = 0$ else $\sigma = \pi \circ \psi$ and sends it to V.

- V accepts iff $\sigma(G_b) = G$.

$HV - ZKP$ **definition**

An interactive proof (P, V) is a honest-verifier zero knolage proof of $L \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$
if there exists a PPT algorithm S called 'the simulator' for which: $\forall x \in L$:
The following distributions are 'similar':

- $View^{x,p}(x) :=$ (the input x, randomized coins r, communications transcript)

- $S(x)$ (the output of the simulator)

Here 'similar' can mean two different things:

- If it means identiacal, meaning these two distributions are the same distribution, we call the protocol a **perfect** ZKP.

- If it means that the distributions are computationally indistinguishable, we call the protocol a **statistical** ZKP, the definition for 'computationally indistinguishable' is in the next tutorial.

The idea here is that since the verifier V could have seen everything which is seen during the interactive protocol (P, V) by running the simulator S, the verifier did not actually learn anything from it.

The reason this is 'honset-verifier' is because this definition does not catch the case where the verifier 'cheats' and does not run the protocol V, and might be able to extract information P by doing it.

ZKP **definition**

An interactive proof (P, V) is a zero knowlage proof for L if:

$$\forall x, V^*, \exists S : View^{P,V^*}(x) \approx S(x)$$

Like to 'similar' from the honest verifier definition, '$\approx$' can mean either 'identical' or 'computational indistinguishable'; with the former being a perfect ZKP

and the latter being a statistical ZKP. We sometimes denote computational indistinguishability by $X \approx_C Y$ and perfect indistinguishability with $X \approx_P Y$.

In words, the difference from the honest-verifier zero ZKP is that now the simulator should be able to simulate anything that ANY verifier protocol manages to extract, meaning that regardless of the verifier protocol - no information is extracted.

$HZ - ZKP$ proof for GI protocol above

$$View := (G_0, G_1, G, b, \sigma), G = \sigma(G_b)$$

Define the following protocol (simulator); on input G_0, G_1 do:

- Sample $\sigma \leftarrow S_n$
- Sample $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
- Define $G = \sigma(G_b)$
- return (G_0, G_1, G, b, σ)

Now consider each cell in the output tuple of the two distributions ($View$ and $S(G_0, G_1)$), G_0, G_1 are constant and always the same. $b\sigma$ are sampled uniformly from their ranges in both cases. So far there is no corralation between the cells. G is defined exactly given the rest of the variables meaning that since the rest of the variables are the same for both distributions G is also the same. Furthermore, since the correlations were identical so far, the new correlations are too.

These proofs often (such as in this case) follow the pattern of first showing that given a subset of the cells of the distribution tuples are the same due to being uniformly sampled respectively ((G_0, G_1, b, σ) in this case), then showing how the rest of the cells (G in this case) are a deterministic function of the other cells, and so the addition of these new cells does not impare with the distributions being the same.

Formally, if we have distributions D_1, D_2 and a (deterministic) function f:

$$D_1 \approx D_2 \Rightarrow (D_1, f_{d \leftarrow D_1}(d)) \approx (D_2, f_{d \leftarrow D_2}(d))$$

$NP \subseteq ZKP$ (proof concept)

In the lecture, proof by picture is shown for $3COL \in NPC$ has a zero knowlage proof. The main course of the proof consists of the prover commiting to a spesific permutation of the colors on a graph (without showing the verifier what these are), and allowing the verifier to choose a sepsific edge and see that indeed the coloring on both sides of that edge differ. For each iteration a cheating prover has some chance of failing due to the verifier haveing a chance to guess an edge where the two sides have the same color. Furthermore, the protocol is

zero knowlage since the actual colors seen in each iteration are just two random colors.

Tutorial 3

Computational & Statistical Zero Knowledge

Distinguisher and Advantage - Definition

A distinguisher D is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm; it receives an input w and tries to decide if $w \in X$ or $w \in Y$.
The advantage of D over X, Y is defined as:

$$adv_D(X, Y) := |Pr_{w \leftarrow X}[D(w) = 1] - Pr_{w \leftarrow Y}[D(w) = 1]|$$

Negligable Functions

A negligable function is a function $\epsilon : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ s.t.

$$\forall c \in \mathbb{R}, \epsilon(n) = o(\frac{1}{n^c})$$

This is equivalent to saying that:

$$\forall \texttt{polynomial } p(n), \epsilon(n) \leq \frac{1}{p(n)}$$

Computational Indistinguishability

Let X, Y be two ensambles of distributions, meaning that each of them consists of a seiries of distributions:

$$X = \{X_1, X_2, ...\}, Y = \{Y_1, Y_2, ...\}$$

We say that X is computationally indistinguishable from Y if for every distinguisher D there exists a negligable function ϵ such that:

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, adv_D(X_n, Y_n) \leq \epsilon(n)$$

ZKP for $3COL$ (more formally)

Given an input graph $G = ([n], E)$:

- P finds a 3-coloring ϕ of G.

- P samples a permutation ξ over $[3]$ (the colors).

- $\forall v \in [n]$, 'put $\xi(v)$ in a box' β_v and send it to V.

- V samples $(u, v) = e \leftarrow E$ and sends it to P.

- P sends the keys for β_v and β_u to V.

- V accepts iff colors 'inside' β_v, β_u are different.

To formalize the idea of these 'boxes' we define the notion of a commitment scheme:

A **commitment scheme** is a pair of PPT algorithms: $commit, check$ with the following syntax:

- $commit(b; r) \rightarrow c$

- $check(c, b, r) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$

And which satisfy the following conditions:

1. **Computationally Hiding**: $commit(0) \approx_C commit(1)$.

2. **Perfectly Binding**: There is no n_0, r_0, r_1 and C^* s.t.

$$check(C^*, 0, r_0) = check(C^*, 1, r_1) = 1 \text{ (1 means accept)}$$

Lecture 4

$coNP \subseteq IP$

Arithmetization

We interested in a reduction from a $coNP$ problem to an arithmetic problem.

   The Sumcheck Problem:
Parameters: a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, and $n, d \in \mathbb{N}$.
Input: $Q : \mathbb{F}^n \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$. Problem: does $\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} Q(x) = \alpha$?

   The reduction We will be reducing from $coNP$ to the sumcheck problem by reducing $3 - CNF$ to it (since $3 - CNF$ is $coNP$-complete).
Let $\phi \in 3 - CNF$ with n variables and m clauses.
We will start the construction by translating each building block of $3 - CNF$ formulas and expressing it in terms of polynomials:

1. $\phi(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n) = x_1 \longrightarrow p(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n) = x_1$

2. $x_1 \wedge x_2 \longrightarrow x_1 \cdot x_2$

3. $x_1 \wedge \neg x_3 \longrightarrow x_1 \cdot (1 - x_3)$

4. $(x_1) \lor (x_2) = \neg((\neg x_1) \land (\neg x_2)) \longrightarrow 1 - (1 - x_1) \cdot (1 - x_2)$

Lemma: for every $3 - CNF$ formula ϕ on m clauses and a finite field $\mathbb{F}$, there exists a ploynomial $p : \mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}$ with degree $O(m)$ s.t. $\phi = p$.
Furthermore, given ϕ and $z \in \mathbb{F}^n$, $p(z)$ can be evaluated in $poly(n, m, log(|\mathbb{F}|))$ time.

Given the lemma, we can esaly solve $3 - CNF$, by constructing the appropriate polynomial p, and evaluating the sum of the polynomial: and checking if the sum is 0.

IP for the sumcheck problem

We will show that the sumcheck problem is in IP by the following protocol on the inputs $Q : \mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}$, $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$:

- P defines $Q_1 : \mathbb{F} \to \mathbb{F}$ as

$$Q_1(\lambda) = \sum_{x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n \in \{0,1\}} Q(\lambda, x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n)$$

  And sends it as $\hat{Q}_0$.

- V rejects if $\hat{Q}_0(0) + \hat{Q}_0(1) \neq \alpha$.

- for $i \in [n]$:

    - V samples $r_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$ and sends it.
    - P defines:

$$Q_i(\lambda) = \sum_{x_{i+2}, x_{i+3}, \ldots x_n \in \{0,1\}} (r_1, \ldots, r_i, \lambda, x_{i+1}, \ldots x_n)$$

      And sends it as $\hat{Q}_i$.
    - V rejects if $\hat{Q}_i(0) + Q(1) \neq \hat{Q}_{i-1}(r_i)$

- V accepts.

Completness: Here we know that: $\sum_x Q(x) = \alpha$. So we can write:

$$\hat{Q}_1(0) + \hat{Q}_1(1) = \hat{Q}_1(0) + \hat{Q}_1(1) = \sum_{x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n} Q(0, x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n) + \sum_{x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n} Q(1, x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n)$$

$$= \sum_x Q(x) = \alpha$$

Thus first check passes. Additionally:

$$\hat{Q}_1(r_1) + \hat{Q}_1(r_1) = \sum_{x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n} Q(r_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots, x_n)$$

14

By induction appect w.p. 1.

Soundness: Assume $\sum_x \neq \alpha$ and let P^* be a cheating prover.
WLOG P^* always sends $\hat{Q}_1 \neq Q_1$.
Observe that Q_1 and $\hat{Q}_1$ are polynomials of degree d so with all but a probability
of $\frac{d}{|\mathbb{F}|}$ - we we have $Q_1(r_1) \neq \hat{Q}_1(r_1)$.
Assume $Q_1(r_1) \neq \hat{Q}_1(r_1)$, thus:

$$\hat{Q}_1(r_1) \neq \sum_{x_2, x_3, ..., x_n} Q(r_1, x_2, x_3, ..., x_n)$$

$$Pr[V \texttt{ accepts}] \leq Pr[Q_1(r_1) = \hat{Q}_1(r_1)] + Pr[V_{n-1} \texttt{ accepts} \mid Q_1(r_1) = \hat{Q}_1(r_1)]$$

$$\leq \frac{d}{|\mathbb{F}|} + \frac{d \cdot (n-1)}{|\mathbb{F}|} = \frac{d \cdot n}{|\mathbb{F}|}$$

Tutorial 4

Lecture 5

Reminder

Lemma (sumcheck):
There exists an IP between P and V where P gets as input a polynomial $Q :$
$\mathbb{F}^n \to \mathbb{F}$, of individual degree d and a value $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ and V gets 'oracle access' to
Q and α explicitly.

- Completeness:

$$\left[\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} Q(x) = \alpha \right] \Rightarrow V \texttt{ accepts w.p. } 1$$

- Soundness:

$$\left[\sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} Q(x) \neq \alpha \right] \Rightarrow \left[\forall P^*, Pr[V \texttt{ accepts with } P^*] \leq \frac{nd}{|\mathbb{F}|} \right]$$

Lemma: For every $3CNF; \phi : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$ on m clauses and field $\mathbb{F}$

15

Probobalistically Checkable Proofs - PCP

Definition

We say that a PPT machine V is a PCP verifier for L if:

1. Completeness:
$$[x \in L] \Rightarrow \exists \pi : Pr[V^\pi(x) = 1] = 1$$

2. Soundness:
$$[x \notin L] \Rightarrow \forall \pi^* : Pr[V^{\pi^*}(x) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

3. Parameters:
   - Query complexity - number of queries to π, denoted with q.
   - Proof length - $|\pi|$, denoted with l.
   - Randomness length - number of random bits sampled by the verifier, denoted with r.

We denote $PCP(q, r)$ the class of languages with PCP with query complexity q and randomness length r.

Initial Properties & Conclusions

1. Claim: $l \leq q \cdot 2^r$

2. Claim: $NP \subseteq PCP(poly, 0)$, more formally:
$$NP \subseteq \bigcup_{p \in poly} PCP(p, 0)$$

3. Claim: if L has an interactive proof in which each prover/verifier message has length a/b respectively. and with k rounds, then L has a PCP with length $a \cdot 2^{kb}$ and query complexity $a \cdot k$.

4. Claim: $PCP(q, r)$ has NP proof of length $q \cdot 2^r$.

3. results with that any $L \in PSPACE$ has a proof of exponential length that can be checked by a polynomial verifier, with a polynomial number of queries.

PCP theorem: $NP = PCP(O(1), O(log(n)))$

We will see the proof of this claim in a few steps:

- $NP \subseteq PCP(O(1), poly(n))$
- $NP \subseteq PCP(O(log(n)^2), O(log(n)))$
- Combining the two claims above to get the theorem.

Hardness of Approxiamtion (Application)

$GapSAT_\epsilon$: Accept satisfiable CNF formulas, and reject formulas s.t. every assignment satisfies at most ϵ clauses. (here $\epsilon \in [0,1]$ is the proportion of clauses satisfied).

<u>Theorem:</u>

$$\exists \epsilon > 0 : GapSAT_\epsilon \in NPC$$

<u>Proof:</u>
Let $L \in NP$.
Given $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, if $x \in L$, there exists a PCP proof π for x (The PCP theorem).

For a given x, p and V_{PCP}, define $V_{x,p} : \{0,1\}^q \to \{0,1\}$ as follows:
There exists a CNF computing $V_{x,p}$ with 2^q clauses.
Consider the following CNF: $\bigwedge_p V_{x,p}$

- if $x \in L$, it is easy to see that $V_{x,p}$ is satisfied.

- if $x \notin L$ for any assignment π for half of p's $V_{x,p}(\pi) = 0$ so overall, at-least $\frac{1}{2}\frac{1}{2^q}$ of the clauses are not satisfied.

With $\epsilon = 1 - \frac{1}{2^{q+1}}$, we have that $L \in GapSAT_\epsilon$.

Tutorial 5

Error-Correcting Codes (ECC)

Motivation

The purpose of error correcting codes is to handle systems where information is passed through a noisy channel, some information needs to be written and read from a medium, but there there is no guarenteed that the information will be read exactly as written - rather, the are some weaker guarentees about the amount of errors or changes that can occur between the information that is written and the information that is read.

Introduction

A simple solution to enable correcting errors would be to repeat the written message multiple times - for example, write the input 3 times, and if there is a conflict on some bit - choose the majority.
It is easy to see how any single bit error can be corrected by this method.

Parameters for ECC

For an error correction code $C : \mathbb{F}^k \to \mathbb{F}^n$

1. Rate: $\frac{n}{k}$ (redundency $n - k$)

2. Minimal Distance:

$$min_{m_1 \neq m_2} \Delta \left(C(m_1), C(m_2) \right)$$

$$hw(x) = |\{i | x_i \neq 0\}|, \Delta(x, y) = hw(x - y)$$

Linear Codes

If $C : \mathbb{F}^k \to \mathbb{F}^n$ is a linear function, meaning:

$$\forall m_1, m_2 \in \mathbb{F}^k, \forall \alpha, \beta : C(\alpha \cdot m_1 + \beta \cdot m_2) = \alpha \cdot C(m_1) + \beta \cdot C(m_2)$$

Then we get the following conclusions:

- $C(0) = 0$.
  Easy to prove by adding 0 to the argument of C.

- $d = min_{m \in \mathbb{F}^k \setminus \{0\}} C(m)$.
  Proof:

  1.

  $$d = min_{m_1 \neq m_2} \Delta(C(m_1), C(m_2)) = min_{m_1 \neq m_2} hw(C(m_1) - C(m_2))$$

  $$= min_{m_1 \neq m_2} hw(C(m_1 - m_2)) \leq min_{m \neq 0} hw(C(m))$$

  $$d \leq min_{m \neq 0} \Delta(C(m), C(0)) = min_{m \neq 0} hw(C(m))$$

- Singlton Bound: $d \leq n - k + 1$.

ECC important examples

Hadamard Code

Let $Had : \{0, 1\}^k \to \{0, 1\}^{2^k}$ where:

$$\forall m \in \{0, 1\}^k : Had(m)_i = <m, i>$$

Then get get:

1. Rate: $\frac{n}{k} = \frac{2^k}{k}$

2. Absolute distance: $\frac{2^k}{2}$.
   Proof: $\frac{d}{n}$ of Had is $\frac{1}{2}$.
   Claim: if $m \in \{0,1\}^k \setminus \{\bar{0}\}$ then

$$Pr_{x\in\{0,1\}^k}[< m,x >= 0] = Pr_{x\in\{0,1\}^k}[< m,x >= 1] = \frac{1}{2}$$

Let $m \in \{0,1\}^k \setminus \{\bar{0}\}$, by claim from HW1, exactly half of the bits of $Had(m)$ are 1, and thus - $hw(Had(m)) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2^k$

Read-Solomon Codes

Presume we map each input to a polynomial: $m \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}^k[x]$.
And let $m_1 \neq m_2 \longrightarrow p_1 \neq p_2$.
Thus p_1, p_2 agree on at most $k-1$ points in $\mathbb{F}^k$.

$$RS(m) = p(\alpha_1), p(\alpha_2), \ldots, p(\alpha_n) \Rightarrow d = n - k + 1$$

Lecture 6

$NP \subseteq PCP(O(1), Poly(n))$ - cont.

Hadamard Code: $Had : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$, Relative distance $\frac{1}{2}$.

Hadamard PCP

Quadratic Equations: $GF(2)$.
n-variables, m-equations:

$$x_1 x_2 + x_7 + x_{19} x_1 = 1$$

$$x_2 + x_{38} x_{19} = 0$$

Each such equation can be described by $a \in \{0,1\}^{n^2}$ for the coeeficiants of x_i's.
So the whole set of equations can be described with a matrix $A \in \{0,1\}^{n^2 \times m}$ for all equations and $b \in \{0,1\}^m$ for the constant terms.

Now given such A and b, consider the problem of deciding:

$$\exists u \in \{0,1\}^n A(u \otimes u) = b$$

Where here $\otimes$ denotes the open product:

$$u \otimes u = \begin{matrix} u_1 u_1 & u_1 u_2 & \ldots & u_1 u_n \\ u_2 u_1 & u_2 u_2 & \ldots & u_2 u_n \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ u_n u_1 & u_n u_2 & \ldots & u_n u_n \end{matrix}$$

Verifier sketch

Now we can define a Hadamard PCP verifier for this problem:
The PCP proof string: given $u \in \{0,1\}^n$ s.t. $A(u \otimes u) = b$, a proof is $(Had(u) \in \{0,1\}^{2^n}, Had(u \otimes u) \in \{0,1\}^{2^{n^2}})$.

Given A, b we want to check the following:

1. The proof string consists of some $(Had(u), Had(U))$.

2. Check $U = u \otimes u$.

3. $A \cdot U = b$.

Checking 2

:
To start off, we will show how 2 can be verified:
For that end, consider the following indentity:
$\forall a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{F}^n$:

$$< a \otimes b, c \otimes d > = \sum_{i,j} a_i b_j c_i d_j = \sum_i a_i c_i \sum_j b_j d_j = < a, c > \cdot < b, d >$$

Now consider it with u, r, s:

$$< u \otimes u, r \otimes s > = < u, r > \cdot < u, s >$$

Moreover, for the purposes of our verifier, we know that if 2 is satisfied, the following identity should be satisfied (Soundness):

$$< U, r \otimes s > = < u, r > \cdot < u, s >$$

And if $\forall r, s \in \{0,1\}^n$ we have the identity - then 2 must be satisfied (Completness).

So to check 2, our verifier will choose $r, s \in \{0,1\}^n$ and test

$$< U, r \otimes s > = < u, r > \cdot < u, s >$$

Formally;

20

- Soundness: let $U \neq u \otimes u$.

$$\Pr_{r,s}[< U, r \otimes s >=< u, r > \cdot < u, s >] = \Pr_{r,s}[< U, r \otimes s >=< u \otimes u, r \otimes s >]$$

$$= \Pr_{r,s}[< u - u \otimes u, r \otimes s >= 0] \leq_* \frac{3}{4}$$

To understand *, we can see that for any $A \neq 0$, the probability that $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ is 0 is negligable, thus $r^T A \neq 0$ and so $r^t As$ is a multiplication between a non-zero matrix and a uniformly sampled vector - which is also uniformly distributed. Hence:

$$\Pr_{r,s}[< A, r \otimes s >= 0] = \Pr_{r,s}[r^t As = 0] = 1 - \Pr_{r,s}[r^t As \neq 0]$$

$$= 1 - \Pr_{r,s}[r^t A \neq 0] \cdot \Pr_{r,s}[(r^t A)s \neq 0 \mid r^t A \neq 0] = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2}$$

Checking 3

:

Let $r \in \{0,1\}^m$ Consider:

$$< r^T A, u \otimes u >= r^T b \Leftrightarrow r^T A \cdot (u \otimes u) = r^T b$$

if $A \cdot u \otimes u = b$ then 1 is satisfied (perfect completness).
if $A(u \otimes u) \neq b$ then (soundness):

$$\Pr_r[r^T A \cdot (u \otimes u) = r^T b] = \Pr_r[r^T (A \cdot u \otimes u - b) = 0] = \frac{1}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$$

Checking 1

:

To check 1, we start off by showing a theorem.
Theorem (Linearity Testing):
There exists a probobalistic algorithm A that takes $O(1)$ quaries to a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ and:

(a) if f is linear then A accpets w.p. 1.

(b) if $\Delta(f, L_{lin-n}) \geq 0.01$ then A accepts w.p. $\leq \frac{1}{2}$.

Proof:
Definition 1: $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ is linear if $\exists c \in \{0,1\}^n$ s.t. $f(x) =< c, x >$.
Definition 2: $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ is linear if $\forall x, y : f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y)$.
Now we show that the two definitions are equivalent:

- $1 \Rightarrow 2$: Let $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ for which $\exists c \in \{0,1\}^n$ s.t. $f(x) =< c, x >$.

$$f(x+y) =< c, x+y >=< c, x > + < c, y >= f(x) + f(y)$$

21

- $2 \Rightarrow 1$: Let $f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ for which $\forall x, y : f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y)$.

$$f(x) = f(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \bar{e}_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(x_i \bar{e}_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f(x_i e_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i f(e_i)$$

Lemma:

$$\Delta(f, L_{lin-n}) > \delta \Rightarrow \Pr_{x,y}[f(x+y) \neq f(x) + f(y)] > 1 - \delta$$

Fourier Analysis:

$$\{0,1\} \to \{1,-1\}, b \to (-1)^b$$
$$f : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}, g : \{1,-1\}^n \to \{1,-1\}$$

f is linear iff $g(x) = \prod_{i \in s} x_i$, (because mapping is homomorphism).

Forurier Analysis Crash Course:

Consider the set of functions: $g : \{1, -1\}^n \Rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.
This set is a vector space over $\mathbb{R}$.
A basis for this vector space is the *Fourier Basis* $\{g_1, g_2, ..., g_n\}$. $g_i(x)$ can be calculated as follows:
let $b_0, b_1, ..., b_{n-1}$ be the binary representation of i.

$$g_i(x) = \prod_{j=0}^{n-1} x_j^{b_j}$$

Tutorial 6

Error Correcting Codes - cont.

Locally Testable Codes

Goal: Given $\pi \in \{0,1\}^n$, we want to decide if $\exists x : C(x) = \pi$.
Moreover, we are interested in doing so while only reading a fraction of x's bits.
Doing so exactly, is impossible due to the ability of an adveresery to change a single random bit from a correct value.

Relaxed Requirment:

1. if $\exists x : C(x) = \pi$ accept.

2. reject if π is δ-far from C.

Distance from code:

$$\Delta(\pi, C) = \min_x \Delta(\pi, C(x)) \Rightarrow \pi \text{ is } \delta - \text{far from } C : \Delta(\pi, C) \geq \delta$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi \text{ is } \delta - \text{close from } C : \Delta(\pi, C) \leq \delta$$

<u>Definition:</u> C is q-local δ-testable if:
$\exists A \in PPT$ s.t. given oracle access to π:

1. if $\exists x : C(x) = \pi$ then $A^\pi = 1$.

2. if $\Delta(\pi, C) > \delta$ then:
$$\Pr[A^\pi = 1] < \frac{1}{2}$$

and A makes (up to) q queries to π.

Locally Decodable Codes

A code that allows us to decode a bit from original message by making a small amount of queries even if there's a small fraction of corrupted bits.
   <u>Definition:</u>
a code is (q, δ, ϵ)-locally decodable if:
$\exists A \in PPT$ that given $i \in [n]$ and oracle access to π s.t.

$$[\exists x : \Delta(\pi, C(x)) \leq \delta] \Rightarrow \Pr[A^\pi(i) = x_i] \geq 1 - \epsilon$$

and A makes q queries to π.
   <u>Lemma:</u>
Had is ()-locally decodable.
   <u>Proof:</u>
Show some alg $A^\pi(i)$:

1. $\beta \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k, \gamma = \beta + e_i$
   (where for ex. $e_3 = 00100...0$).

2. $\pi_\beta + \pi_\gamma$

   <u>Correctness:</u>
let $x : \Delta(C(x), \pi) \leq \delta$.

$$\Pr[A^\pi(i) = x_i] = \Pr_\beta[\pi_\beta + \pi_{\beta+e_i}] \geq \Pr[\pi_\beta = Had_\beta(x) \wedge \pi_{\beta+e_i} = Had_{\beta+e_i}(x)]$$

$$\Pr[\pi_\beta \neq Had(x) \vee \pi_{\beta+e_i} \neq Had_{\beta+e_i}(x)]$$
$$\leq \Pr[\pi_\beta \neq Had_\beta(x)] + \Pr[\pi_\gamma \neq Had_\beta(x)] \leq 2\delta$$