

Modern Cryptology - Homework 2

Yosef Goren

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In this homework I will be denoting \mathbb{P} to mean the set of primes. and denoting $a \equiv_N b$ to mean $a \equiv b \pmod{N}$.

1 Public-key Encryption from QR

1.1 QR given factorization

For any $X \in \mathbb{N}$ denote: $QR(X)$ as the set of quadratic residues modulus X .

Lemma I;

$$\forall P, Q \in \mathbb{P} : QR(N) = QR(P) \cap QR(Q)$$

Proof Lemma I:

Let $a \in QR(N)$.

$$\exists x, K : x^2 \equiv_N a \Rightarrow x^2 = a + (K)PQ$$

$$\Rightarrow x^2 = a + (KP)Q \wedge x^2 = a + (KQ)P$$

$$\Rightarrow x^2 \equiv_Q a \wedge x^2 \equiv_P a$$

$$\Rightarrow a \in QR(Q) \wedge a \in QR(P) \Rightarrow a \in QR(Q) \cap QR(P)$$

Let $a \in QR(P) \cap QR(Q)$. Thus:

$$\exists x_1, x_2 : a \equiv_P x_1 \wedge a \equiv_Q x_2$$

Thanks to the Chinese remainder theorem we know there exists a solution x which satisfies:

$$x \equiv_P x_1, x \equiv_Q x_2$$

Thus:

$$\Rightarrow a \equiv_P x^2, a \equiv_Q x^2 \Rightarrow a \equiv_{PQ} x^2 \Rightarrow a \in QR(N)$$

Now we use the correctness of the Lemma I to define a polynomial algorithm:

```
1 def qr(a: int, P: int, Q: int) -> bool:
2     """the algorithm determines if 'x' is
3     quadratic residue of under modulus PQ"""
4     a_is_P_qr = a**((P-1)/2)%P == 1
5     a_is_Q_qr = a**((Q-1)/2)%Q == 1
6     return a_is_P_qr and a_is_Q_qr
```

Indeed the names of the variables at lines 4 and 5 are informative (and correct) due to the properties of Euler's criterion as seen in class, meaning that a is qr modulus P iff $a^{(P-1)/2} \equiv_P 1$, and same with Q . This together with Lemma I proves the correctness of this algorithm.

We have seen in the last homework how modulus exponentiation can be done efficiently; which makes this algorithm polynomial.

1.2 Generating QR

In the following, all expressions and operations are in the \mathbb{Z}_N^* group unless said otherwise.

Let $x \in QNR(N)$.

Lemma I; $x, z \in QNR(N) \Rightarrow zx^{-1} \in QR(N)$:

Since $QNR(N) = QNR(P) \cap QNR(Q)$ we get:

$$(zx^{-1})^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv_P (z)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} (x^{-1})^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv_P (z)^{\frac{p-1}{2}} (x^{\frac{p-1}{2}})^{-1} \equiv_P (-1)(-1)^{-1} = 1$$

and in the same way under modulus Q we get $(zx^{-1})^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv_Q 1$. From Euile's criterion we get that $(zx^{-1})^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \in QR(N)$.

Lemma II; $\{y^2x : y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*\} \supseteq QNR(N)$:

Let $z \in QNR(N)$, from Lemma I we get $x^{-1}z \in QR(N)$ Thus:

$$\exists y : y^2 = zx^{-1} \Rightarrow y^2x = z \Rightarrow z \in \{y^2x : y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*\}$$

Lemma III; $\{y^2x : y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*\} \subseteq QNR(N)$:

Let $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. Assume $\exists z : z^2 = y^2x$. Thus:

$$z^2y^{-2} = x \Rightarrow (zy^{-1})^2 = x \Rightarrow x \notin QNR(N)$$

Hence the assumption is incorrect, and $y^2x \in QNR(N)$.

Proof:

Define $g(z) = z \cdot x, g : QR(N) \rightarrow QNR(N)$.

From Lemma II and III, we get that g 's image is exactly $QNR(N)$.

g is invertible and thus is a bijection.

Let:

$$a^2 \in QR(N), y \stackrel{\S}{\sim} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$$

Since y^2 has four different roots:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*} [y^2 = a^2] &= \frac{4}{|\mathbb{Z}_N^*|} = \frac{1}{\frac{|\mathbb{Z}_N^*|}{4}} = \frac{1}{|QR(N)|} \\ &\Rightarrow y^2 \stackrel{\S}{\sim} QR(N) \end{aligned}$$

And since g is bijection $QR(N) \rightarrow QNR(N)$:

$$g(y^2) = y^2 x \stackrel{\$}{\sim} QNR(N)$$

□

1.3 Public-key Encryption

The main idea:

If factoring primes and QR are hard (without factorization), generate two primes, use their product as the public key, and their tuple as private key. Now this 'private key' can be used as a 'cheat' for solving QR problems; anyone that wants to break the cypher will either have to find QR without factorization or manage to factor the primes from the public key:

```

1 import qr_given_factor
2
3 def KeyGen(n, prime_generator: function)->tuple:
4     """given the security parameter 'n'.
5     function 'prime_generator' generates random
6     primes of length dictated by a parameter."""
7     P, Q = prime_generator(n), prime_generator(n)
8     private_key = (P,Q)
9     public_key = P*Q #this is 'N'
10    return private_key, public_key
11
12 def Encrypt(bit: bool, public_key, uniform_sampler: function):
13     """'uniform_sampler(k)' samples uniformly from {1...k}."""
14     N = public_key
15     root = uniform_sampler(N)
16     if bit:
17         return (root**2)*(-1)%N #cypher is QNR
18     else:
19         return (root**2)%N #cypher is QR
20
21 def Decrypt(cypher: bool, private_key)->bool:
22     """the 'qr' function used here is the one defined in
23     subsection 1.1"""
24     P,Q = private_key
25     return not qr_given_factor.qr(cypher, P, Q)

```

For complexity purposes, assume n is given in unary format.

1.4 Malleability

Given two cyphers c_1, c_2 encrypted under N , we can return $c_1 \cdot c_2$.

We need to show that if b_1, b_2 are the original bits, then:

$$Decrypt(c_1 \cdot c_2) = XOR(b_1, b_2)$$

Since we defined our cypher to be QR in the case that the plaintext is 0, and QNR otherwise, than this is equivalent to proving that $c_1 \cdot c_2$ is QNR iff exactly one of the bits b_1, b_2 is on.

Taking this further; the question is equivalent to showing that $c_1 \cdot c_2$ is QNR iff exactly one out of the pair c_1, c_2 is QR.

Let $c_1 \cdot c_2 \in QR$.
if both are QR, then:

$$c_1 = y_1^2, c_2 = y_2^2$$

$$c_1 c_2 = y_1^2 y_2^2 = (y_1 y_2)^2 \in QR$$

if both are QNR then:

Assume that $x_1 \cdot x_2 \in QNR$. Than from Lemma II in section 1.2: $y^2 x = x_1 x_2$, thus $x^{-1} x_1 x_2$ is QR, contredicting Lemma I. So $x_1 x_2 \in QR$.

if $x_1 \in QR, x_2 \in QNR$ (oppesite case symmetrical); than $x_1 x_2 = y^2 x_2 \in QR$ from Lemma III.

1.5

Our algorithm will simply take the input cypher c , public key N , uniformly sample z from $1...N$, and return $z^2 \cdot c$. This works because, as we have seen in section 1.2 multiplying QNR by QR results with QNR, and as we have seen in section 1.4; multiplying QR by QR results with a QR. This means that after our operation the cypher will be changed, but the decryption will not change (since the value of the decryption corresponds exactly to the question of the cypher being a QR or being QNR).

2 Statistically Hiding Commitments

2.1 Inner Product with Random String

Let:

$$\langle a, b \rangle = (\sum_i a_i b_i) \% 2$$

$$L = \{0, 1\}^n$$

Proof: Let $b \in L \setminus \{0^n\}$. Let j be the first non-zero index of b . Define:

$$f(a) = a_1 a_2 \dots \bar{a}_j \dots a_n$$

Lemma I; $\langle a, b \rangle =_2 \langle f(a), b \rangle + 1$:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle a, b \rangle &= \sum_i a_i b_i = \sum_{i \neq j} a_i b_i + a_j b_j = \sum_{i \neq j} a_i b_i + a_j \\ &= \sum_{i \neq j} a_i b_i + \bar{a}_j + 1 = \sum_i f(a)_i b_i + 1 < \langle f(a), b \rangle + 1 \end{aligned}$$

Lemma II: f is bijection $\{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 1\} \longleftrightarrow \{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 0\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} x \in \{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 0\} &\Leftrightarrow \langle x, b \rangle =_2 0 \Leftrightarrow \langle f(x), b \rangle =_2 1 \\ &\Leftrightarrow \langle f(x), b \rangle =_2 1 \Leftrightarrow f(x) \in \{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 1\} \end{aligned}$$

Thus f is bijection.

Proof using the Lemma II: Let:

$$a = |\{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 1\}|, b = |\{a : \langle a, b \rangle =_2 0\}|$$

From Lemma II: $a = b$.

In addition one of the two cases must always be correct, hence: $a + b = 1$.

Solving these two equations gives $a = b = \frac{1}{2}$.

By definition:

$$a = \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [\langle a, b \rangle =_2 0], b = \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [\langle a, b \rangle =_2 1]$$

meaning they are both $\frac{1}{2}$.

2.2 Inner Product is Universal

Denote: $H = \{h_a : a \in L\}$.

Let $a \in L$. We want to show that:

$$\forall x, y \in L : x \neq y \quad \Pr_{h \leftarrow H} [h(x) = h(y)] \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

Proof:

Let $x, y \in L : x \neq y$.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{h \leftarrow H} [h(x) = h(y)] &= \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [h_a(x) = h_a(y)] \\ &= \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [h_a(x) = h_a(y)] = \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [\langle a, x \rangle = \langle a, y \rangle] \\ &= \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [\langle a, x \rangle = \langle a, y \rangle : \langle a, x \rangle = b] \cdot \Pr[\langle a, x \rangle = b] \\ &= \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \Pr_{a \leftarrow L} [\langle a, x \rangle = \langle a, y \rangle] \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

Since $\frac{1}{2}$ is the size of the output space, this indeed shows that H is universal hash function family.

2.3 Purifying Randomness

Denote $L_n = \{0, 1\}^n$.

Denote a uniform distribution over G with $\mathbb{U}(G)$.

Denote $A \circ B$ operator here denotes a distribution obtained by sampling from $a \leftarrow A, b \leftarrow B$ and resulting with the sample $a(b)$.

Denote (A, B) to mean a distribution that is sampled by sampling $a \leftarrow A, b \leftarrow B$ and returning the sample (a, b) .

The distribution $\langle r, \langle r, s \rangle \rangle$ from the question can be described with: $(\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(H) \circ \mathbb{U}(L_1))$.

So we want to show that:

$$SD((\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(H) \circ \mathbb{U}(L_1)), (\mathbb{U}(L_{n+1}))) = O(\sqrt{\frac{1}{|S|}})$$

Let $H = \{h_a\}_{a \in L}$ where each h_a is the function defined in the last section. Now consider the leftover hash lemma; indeed we have seen in the prior section, H is a universal hash function family. Thus we conclude from leftover hash lemma that:

$$SD((\mathbb{U}(H), \mathbb{U}(H) \circ \mathbb{U}(S)), (\mathbb{U}(H), \mathbb{U}(L_1))) \leq \frac{\sqrt{\frac{1}{|S|}}}{2}$$

Furthermore; H is defined as $\{h_a : a \in L_n\}$, so sampling h uniformly from H is like sampling a uniformly from L_n . So we could say that:

$$(\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(L_1)) = (\mathbb{U}(H), \mathbb{U}(L_1))$$

$$(\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(L_1) \circ \mathbb{U}(S)) = (\mathbb{U}(H), \mathbb{U}(L_1) \circ \mathbb{U}(S))$$

Going back to the prior formula:

$$SD((\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(L_1) \circ \mathbb{U}(S)), (\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(L_1))) \leq \frac{\sqrt{\frac{1}{|S|}}}{2}$$

Finally, since sampling $n + 1$ bits uniformly is the same sampling n bits, than sampling another bit:

$$\mathbb{U}(L_{n+1}) = (\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(L_1))$$

And we have the original statment we wanted to prove:

$$SD((\mathbb{U}(L_n), \mathbb{U}(H) \circ \mathbb{U}(L_1)), (\mathbb{U}(L_{n+1}))) = O(\sqrt{\frac{1}{|S|}})$$

2.4 Commitments

3 Is Factoring NP complete?

3.1 Equivalence to Factoring

We show that there exists a polynomial turing machine for deciding L iff there exists a polynomial factoring TM by showing:

1. Polynomial TM for factoring which uses a polynomial TM for deciding L .
2. Polynomial TM for deciding L which uses a polynomial TM for factoring.

Armed with the church turing thesis; we describe these two turing machines as code of a contemporary programming language.

1. Factoring given decision:

```
1 def factor(N: int, decide_oracle)->tuple:
2     """given a number 'N',
3     and given a 'decide_oracle' function which decides 'L',
4     return the list of prime factors of 'N'.
5     The implementation is a loop of binary searches."""
6     prime_factors = []
7     while N > 1:
8         #find the largest prime factor of current 'N':
9         left, right = 1, N
10        while left < right-1:
11            M = (left+right)//2
12            if decide_oracle(N, M):
13                left = M
14            else:
15                right = M
16        largest_prime_factor = right
17        #add it to list and update 'N':
18        prime_factors.append(largest_prime_factor)
19        N = N//largest_prime_factor
20    return prime_factors
```

Indeed this implementation does a polynomial (w.r to #bits) number of calls to the oracle, and executes only a polynomial number of operations itself:

note how each iteration of the binary search algorithm is polynomial with the number of bits of N since it is logarithmic with the size of the search space. In addition, there can only be a polynomial (w.r to #bits) number of factors since each one is at-least 2; this means there are only a polynomial number of iterations in the main loop.

2. Decision given factoring:

```
1 def decide(N: int, M: int, factoring_oracle)->bool:
2     """returns 'True' if (N,M) is in L, and False otherwise."""
3     prime_factors = factoring_oracle(N)
4     return max(prime_factors) > M
```

3.2 coNP

Here we show $L \in NP \cap coNP$ in two parts:

- $L = L_a \in NP$.
- $\bar{L} = L_b \in NP$.

To show each of these we will define a relation R which will satisfy all conditions:

1. $\forall (x, y) \in R, |y| = Poly(|x|)$
 2. $(x, y) \in R \Leftrightarrow x \in L$
 3. $\exists M_R$, NTM which decides R and is polynomial.
- Define R_a for L_a :

$$R_a = \{((N, M), p) : p \in \mathbb{P} \wedge p > M \wedge N \% p = 0\}$$

It is easy to see that if $(N, M), p \in R_a$ then since p is a prime factor of N which is larger than M - it means that $(N, M) \in \mathbb{P}$. In addition, $\#bits(p) \leq \#bits(N)$ thus the length is linear (and polynomial).

As for the last condition, we define a NTM M_a which will decide R_a : Given some input M_a will simply check for the three conditions for the pair of inputs to be contained within R_a . Checking for the first condition in polynomial time is far from trivial, nevertheless it is widely known that $PRIME \in \mathbb{P}$, and thus it is possible to check if $p \in \mathbb{P}$ in polynomial time; ofcourse it is possible for the other two conditions also.

- Define R_b for L_b :

$$\{((N, M), S) : \prod_{p \in S} p = N \wedge S \subseteq \mathbb{P} \wedge \max(S) \leq M\}$$

Note how S is the set of prime factors of N .

We define a NTM to decide R_b :

Given an input $((N, M), S)$ - the machine will check each condition for being contained in R_b and accept iff all three are statisfied; taking the product of a set of numbers can comparing it can be done in polynomial time, same as taking the maximal value in a list. As before, we know that checking if a number is prime can be done in polynomial time, and there can only be a polynomial number of elements in the input to begin with (w.r to the size of the input...).

Additionally, it is worth noting how in this case too the length of S will be polynomially bound to the length of N (hence to the length of (N, M) too): This is because the number of prime factors of N is $O(\log(N))$, and each of them has length of $O(\log(N))$.

To sum up, we have shown that $L \in NP$, and that $L_b = \bar{L} \in NP$ hence $L \in coNP$, meaning $L \in NP \cap coNP$.