

# An Overview of Hardware Security and Trust: Threats, Countermeasures, and Design Tools

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**Abstract**—Hardware security and trust have become a pressing issue during the last two decades due to the globalization of the semiconductor supply chain and ubiquitous network connection of computing devices. Computing hardware is now an attractive attack surface for launching powerful cross-layer security attacks, allowing attackers to infer secret information, hijack control flow, compromise system root-of-trust, steal intellectual property (IP), and fool machine learners. On the other hand, security practitioners have been making tremendous efforts in developing protection techniques and design tools to detect hardware vulnerabilities and fortify hardware design against various known hardware attacks. This article presents an overview of hardware security and trust from the perspectives of threats, countermeasures, and design tools. By introducing the most recent advances in hardware security research and developments, we aim to motivate hardware designers and electronic design automation tool developers to consider the new challenges and opportunities of incorporating an additional dimension of security into robust hardware design, testing, and verification.

**Index Terms**—Design tools, hardware security, security countermeasures, security threat, survey.

## I. INTRODUCTION

MODERN computing hardware devices are usually crafted by vendors with different established levels of trust and at discrete locations. These hardware components,

while residing in a mixed-trust computing environment, are often shared among execution contexts of different security levels in a back-to-back manner. In addition, the rich connectivity features of modern computing systems expose critical hardware resources to attackers and open up doors for remote attacks without requiring physical access to the victim. As a consequence, our computing hardware is ever closer to the front line of a burning battle field and confronted with various security threats.

Hardware security threats can arise during various stages of the entire semiconductor life cycle, ranging from specification to fabrication and even recycling. They can result from unintentional design flaws [1]–[3], system side effects [4]–[7], and intended malicious design modifications [8]–[10]. They usually target security assets, such as cryptographic functions, secure architectures, intellectual property (IP), and machine learning (ML) models. While classic hardware security threats, such as covert and side channels, hardware Trojans, and reverse engineering (RE), are constantly evolving, recent powerful attacks exploit remote [6], [11], cross-layer [2], [3], [12], and specification-compatible [8], [13] attack surfaces to compromise strong cryptographic primitives, isolation mechanisms, memory protection techniques, and deep neural networks (DNNs). Understanding the different hardware security threats is an important first step to developing effective security countermeasures and design tools for circumventing them.

Security practitioners have been making tremendous efforts in developing effective hardware security countermeasures. An important first task is to create hardware security primitives that can serve as the building blocks for crafting an architectural level trusted computing environment enhanced with strong isolation mechanisms. Effective side channel protection and Trojan detection techniques are essential for verifying that the security primitives and trusted computing environment are free of design flaws, covert and side channels, and backdoors. Recent advances in ML and artificial intelligence (AI) have shown promise in developing more accurate detection solutions [14], [15]. IP protection techniques [16]–[19], on the other hand, protect security primitives, hardware designs, and DNN models from RE, counterfeiting, model extraction, and other adversary attacks.

Despite the numerous protection techniques for thwarting hardware security threats, security is still at large an afterthought in hardware design. Most security holes are

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exposed only after their exploitation by the threat actors. Overreliance on software patches for hardware flaws also contributed to the trove of zero-day exploits for the attackers. In many ways, the database of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) is just the tip of an iceberg. This is largely due to the lack of effective hardware security tools that allow automated specification, verification, and evaluation of security constraints. Best design practices and tacit knowledge are necessary but inadequate. We need better design tools to enforce hardware security properties for trust assurance. Proactive hardware information flow analyses facilitate vulnerability shielding and on-site monitoring. For example, unintentional hardware flaws and potential security vulnerabilities can be detected early by the recent security-driven hardware design flow [20]–[22]. As the rally of attacks and countermeasures is a never-ending recursion, it is important to keep abreast of its latest development to continuously close the productivity gap of secure hardware design. If the tool chain does not constantly update to catch up with the latest design-for-trust and security verification methodologies, at the present rate of growth in hardware design complexity, security may terminate Moore’s law before other physical limits.

At present, the hardware security space has grown to a point with many different specialized topics and each topic has been discussed in several focused survey papers. Examples of recent surveys on a few specialized topics are side and covert channels [4], [23], [24], RE [25], hardware Trojan [26], [27], physical unclonable function (PUF) [28], logic locking [29], and security verification tools [30]. This article provides a concise overview of hardware security from three perspectives, namely, threats, countermeasures, and design tools, with emphasis on niche, uncharted topics, and updated recent developments for hardware security in a mixed-trust environment. We also identify potential future research directions with this overarching vision.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. A brief description about the common hardware security properties is introduced in Section II. In Section III, an overview of the classic as well as state-of-the-art hardware security attacks is provided. Section IV reviews the frequently used hardware security mechanisms for thwarting these attacks. Section V summarizes various secure hardware design tools from both the academia and industry. Some research challenges and opportunities in the discussed topics are highlighted in Section VI and this article is concluded in Section VII.

## II. HARDWARE SECURITY PROPERTIES

Hardware security properties are formal specifications about invariant security-related behaviors of circuit designs. Security threats and attacks usually cause violations of desirable security properties while security countermeasures implement mechanisms for enforcing them. Security properties provide important constraints to security verification tools. In the following, we briefly cover different hardware security properties.

### A. Dependability

*Reliability, availability, and safety* are three important attributes to assess the trustworthiness of a computing hardware device to perform the expected function during its service lifespan. Reliability is the ability to produce the intended functions under normal operation and even under small fluctuations in the computing environment for a specified time period. Availability is the percentage of time a system is able to serve its intended function. Safety is the ability to avoid catastrophic consequences for the user or the environment. Catastrophic failures represent only a small subset of all failures. Hence, safety is a relative and subjective attribute that cannot be measured directly. Critical path timing failures, single-event-upsets, and aging effects can be resulted from security exploits, such as fault injection [31] and recent ML attacks [32], to reduce the reliability, increasing the downtime, or impose safety hazards upon a system.

### B. Confidentiality

*Confidentiality* is a general security property stating that secret information should never be obtained or inferred by observing a public output or memory location. While the direct movements of sensitive information can be easily identified, the stealthy leakage through system side effects and back doors can be more subtle. These include the covert and side channels [4], [33] in cryptographic cores, system bus and high-performance elements, such as caches and branch predictors [2], [3], as well as hardware Trojans [34].

### C. Integrity

*Integrity* is the dual property of confidentiality. It requires that a trusted data object should never be overwritten by an untrusted entity. Integrity attacks often target critical memory locations, e.g., the cryptographic key, program counter, and privilege registers. These attacks are usually a first step for performing further malicious activities, e.g., hijacking the control flow [35] and fooling machine learners [36].

### D. Isolation

*Isolation* is a two-way property requiring that two hardware components of different security levels should not directly communicate with each other. It is a common security property that needs to be enforced in System on Chip (SoC), modern processors, and the cloud, where the interaction between the secure and normal worlds is strictly controlled. However, there are still ingenious security exploits that break strong isolation mechanisms, such as ARM Trust-Zone [37] and Intel software guard extension (SGX) [38].

### E. Constant Time

The *constant time* security property enforces that the hardware design should take an invariant amount of time to compute and produce the results under different input combinations. In other words, we cannot learn any information about the inputs by observing the computation time. Violation of the constant time property creates a timing channel that

can leak sensitive information. Such violation can result from performance optimizations [2], [3], e.g., cache and branch predictor, as well as fast path in arithmetic units.

#### F. Quantitative Security Properties

Quantitative security properties allow more accurate measurement of hardware design security, e.g., assessing the severity of a vulnerability or evaluating the effectiveness of a security protection mechanism. Typical examples of such quantitative properties include randomness of the output of a cryptographic function [20], leakage of side and covert channels [39], and strength of a security mitigation technique [40]. These security properties are usually measured using statistical and information theoretic security metrics [41]. The security of approximate computing and ML is more often measured quantitatively.

### III. HARDWARE SECURITY THREATS

#### A. Architectural and System Threats

1) *Secure Boot Attacks*: A secure boot starts by loading code from an immutable boot ROM, correctly initializing critical peripherals, configuring security and system settings, authenticating and properly loading boot images and application code, and properly sanitizing data upon reset. Many issues arise due to the system being configured incorrectly, e.g., system memory space not protected. Other issues relate to data not being properly erased (e.g., keyboard strokes stay in buffers). These and many other real-world secure boot attacks are documented by Bulygin *et al.* [42].

The secure boot process is fairly well documented making it amenable to formal property specification [43], [44]. Such properties relate to isolation and access control between boot stages (e.g., the next stage can only access a limited subset of the previous stage information), determining if a boot stage completes fully before continuing to the next stage and protecting boot state information properly upon completion (e.g., it cannot be modified and can only be read from boot code). Additionally, there should be a sequence that causes the hardware to fully reset all data, code, configuration, and any other state, and the system should only load from the boot ROM upon reset.

2) *Firmware Attacks*: Firmware is the low-level software that controls the interaction and behavior of a piece of hardware or IP core. Firmware plays a key role in determining the security of SoC. Incorrectly setting configuration registers can lead to catastrophic consequences and open the door to leaking confidential information, unsafe behaviors, and critical flaws that can be exploited by attackers. An analysis in 2014 showed that at least 140 000 devices had a firmware vulnerability [45]. This should not be too surprising as determining the correctness of the firmware is challenging as each hardware core has different configurations that interact with the overall system in a nonobvious manner.

Firmware is particularly important for SoC architectures. Modern SoC architectures are a patchwork of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of different IP cores that are cobbled together from in-house sources, outside vendors, and open source

repositories. Ensuring that these are functionally correct is a massive undertaking; determining that they lack security flaws is even more challenging. Subramanyan *et al.* [46] provided good motivation and the early work in this space.

Device drivers are typically small, but important pieces of low-level C or assembly code that play an important role in firmware security. They provide an application program interface (API) that is used to deliver data to/from a device, query the status of the device, or set the device mode. More often than not, device drivers require access to critical parts of the system and thus it is crucial that they execute efficiently, handle real-time constraints, and be secure. The first step toward synthesizing correct, efficient, and secure device drivers is to create properties around on-chip communication protocols, such as advanced extensible interface (AXI) and Wishbone [47]. Properly handling access control to the hardware resource is also important for secure computing with devices [48].

3) *Dynamic Random Access Memory Threats*: The Coldboot [49] and Rowhammer [50] attacks demonstrate the importance of protecting sensitive data stored in dynamic random access memory (DRAM). Coldboot exploits the physical phenomenon that DRAM data persist for a short amount of time even after powering off the memory. This time can be extended by cooling down the memory, which further reduces the leakage of current from the DRAM capacitors. Researchers used this idea to show how to remove a DRAM from one computer, place it into another, and grab the data. Other malicious attacks are also possible. Rowhammer exploits another physical vulnerability of DRAM, this time using the fact that DRAM data can be altered by accessing nearby data. The attacker locates some of their data next to some critical data in DRAM. By changing the values of their data, the attacker induces circuit noise that causes the target sensitive data to change.

4) *Cache Attacks*: Cache attacks [4] exploit information leakage through cache state and are extremely effective at extracting protected information. The cache is a shared resource and any process that uses it can leave traces about their computation, in particular, the memory addresses they accessed.

Cache timing attacks can be categorized as time driven and access driven [23]. A time-driven attack measures the execution time of the victim process. The attacker manipulates the contents of a shared cache and observes the timing of another process (e.g., a cryptographic operation). The timing is effected by cache hits and misses, which provides information about the key [51]. An access-driven attack extracts information by measuring the time that it takes the attacker to perform a cache access [52]. If a particular cache line is accessed by the victim process, the attacker would observe a cache hit and *vice versa*. For instance, an attacker can identify data access patterns by the victim (e.g., which S-Box entries are being accessed during AES execution) and use this information to extract the confidential information (e.g., the secret key). Cache side channel is a powerful attack that is often used in combination with other attacks, e.g., Meltdown [3] and Spectre [2], as we will discuss.

5) *Speculative Execution Attacks*: Meltdown [3] and Spectre [2] are the first of a series of attacks that leverage speculative execution, out of order execution, caching, and other architectural performance enhancements to break isolation and other security policies.

Meltdown enables unauthorized processes to read data from any address that is mapped to the current process's memory space. Meltdown exploits a race condition where the unauthorized process attempts to access privileged data. A privilege check eventually squashes the execution of that code, but not before the data are temporarily loaded into cache. The attack then uses a cache side-channel attack (SCA) to determine contents of the data.

Spectre is a vulnerability that tricks a victim process to leak its data. Many processors perform speculative execution by branch prediction. Spectre uses the fact that this speculative code leaves traces of its execution in the cache whose information can be extracted using a cache SCA (similar to Meltdown). Spectre trains a branch predictor to make a wrong decision and then wraps code that should not be executed in a condition. The code is speculatively executed since the branch predictor is wrong. It eventually gets squashed but it leaves important information in the cache state, which is extracted via a cache SCA.

6) *Code Reuse Attacks*: Code reuse attacks carefully use existing snippets of software to perform computation of the attackers' choosing. Return-oriented programming (ROP) [53] is an example of code reuse attack where existing code fragments (or gadgets) are carefully sequenced to perform a malicious act. The attacker's goal is to divert the control flow by gaining control of the call stack and invoking the first gadget, which in turn calls subsequent gadgets. This allows the attacker to perform actions of their choosing.

## B. Covert and Side Channels

Covert and side channels have emerged as two types of potent information leakage channels. Microarchitectural features targeted toward performance improvement, e.g., shared cache, speculative control, and hyperthreading, create new covert and side-channel security issues. Covert channels use nontraditional communication mechanisms to leak critical information—often between an insider process (e.g., a Trojan horse program) and an outsider spy process. These two processes do not communicate directly through the traditional mechanism, e.g., shared cache. Instead, a Trojan process may communicate with a spy process by modulating timing of specific events on a shared resource or writing/checking if a file is locked. On the other hand, SCAs utilize physical side-channel parameters (supply current, event timing, electromagnetic emission, etc.) to leak on-chip secrets.

While some covert channels require sharing of hardware resources among exchanging parties (e.g., shared cache), others may exist among hardware components that are physically isolated or not even in proximity. Hardware-oriented covert channels are typically initiated by introducing manipulation or exploitation of certain functional (response to a fault) or parametric (e.g., timing, power and electromagnetic radiation,

etc.) behavior of the hardware that is observed to decode the secret information being transmitted. Side channels are unintentional information leakage where an attacker tries to extract information from a target computing system utilizing its inherent implementation vulnerabilities. Similar to covert channels, side channel also requires the observation of certain functional or parametric behaviors at runtime.

1) *Timing Channel*: A timing channel is established through the observation of the execution time of a certain process. Timing-based covert and side channels may exist due to the sharing of hardware resources across different software processes. Moreover, an IC may contain fast and slow execution paths that reveal information regarding the underlying operation being executed (e.g., arithmetic versus Boolean operation [54]). While chip designers introduce novel features to improve execution time, more timing channels are being discovered. These channels may facilitate information transfer at a rate of up to few megabits per second [55]. These timing channels are often practical only under certain assumptions regarding the attacker and the victim. For instance, to form a timing channel using some cache-based attack, the victim and the attack processes must execute on the same processor core for a specific amount of time. The attacker's ability to adhere to these assumptions can significantly impact the capacity or sensitivity of the channel.

Over the last few years, researchers have demonstrated the feasibility of a wide range of timing-based covert and side channels. Szefer [4] presented a comprehensive overview of timing attacks that are feasible due to vulnerabilities in processor architecture. Execution time differences for various instructions, resource sharing, impact of functional units (FUs) state on program execution (e.g., branch prediction), and timing behaviors of memory subsystems (e.g., cache, prefetcher, etc.) are some characteristics of modern processors that lead to microarchitectural timing channels.

2) *Power Channel*: In power SCA [56], [57], an attacker measures the switching power traces of an electronic component during operation and then employ mathematical analysis on the traces to extract secret information. The basic premise of such an attack lies in the fact that the transient power traces of a chip leak its internal switching patterns, thereby leaking data secrets (e.g., cryptographic key) through the switching behavior. Shrinking technology nodes and increasing power density have made it possible for attackers to carry out power SCAs with increasing degree of success.

Attackers have utilized a wide variety of techniques to extract information. A simple visual inspection of the power signal information known as simple power analysis (SPA) [56] is utilized when the internal implementation is known to the attacker. If the attacker has complete access to a device, he/she resorts to template matching attacks. Template attacks [5] consist of a profiling step and an attack step. The attacker has the freedom to collect many samples in the profiling phase as he/she fully controls the device. In the profiling step, the parameters of the design are learned from a device and a profile of the device is created. This profile is applied as a template to other copies of the same device in the attack phase.

Differential power analysis (DPA) [56] relies on the principles of statistical hypothesis testing, where the attacker measures the power consumption traces of a target device over several time steps by feeding a large number of input vectors. The attacker then partitions the resulting power traces into subsets. The difference in the average values of these subsets reveals the presence or absence of information leakage in the design. In the absence of leakage, the difference in average values tends to be zero as the choice of assigning a trace to a subset is purely random and is uncorrelated with the power measurements. On the other hand, a statistically significant difference implies that there exists a correlation between the partitioning and trace measurements. Unlike SPA, DPA does not require any knowledge about the underlying implementation and can be carried out in highly noisy environments. Correlation power analysis (CPA) [57] relies on using statistical models to estimate the correlation between the secret and the power consumption of the device when the secret is being used for computation. A CPA typically relies on building a model of the device's dynamic power consumption. The activity factor  $\alpha$  is modeled using the hamming distance (HD) or hamming weight (HW). The change in the bits of the input that cause a change in  $\alpha$  can be modeled by HD between the initial input and the changed input values or HW of an input in the case of a software implementation (e.g., on a smart card). This HD or HW model serves as a good approximation to estimate the power consumption of a device. During a CPA attack, the attacker guesses the value of the secret and obtains as many traces as possible for each guess of the secret.

ML algorithms have also been applied to both profiling-based and nonprofiling-based SCAs. In profiling-based approaches, where attackers have access to an exact copy of the attacked hardware, a supervised ML model can be trained based on data points in different profiling traces [58]. In nonprofiling-based approaches, where attackers do not have access to a copy of the device, unsupervised ML algorithms such as clustering are applied to reveal the secret information [59].

The growth of cloud-based service providers, such as Amazon and Google, has led to an increase in multiple users sharing the same hardware resource, such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA). In such multitenant operating environments, remote power attacks are becoming feasible when an untrusted party shares resources with a trusted one [6], [11]. The attacker can infer information regarding the trusted program executing in the same resource as the attacker by accessing the power delivery network. Furthermore, in cloud settings, new attacks are emerging where malicious power/current surge caused by an untrusted process can create the denial-of-service attack in another process mapped to the same FPGA device [60].

3) *Electromagnetic and Photonic Channels*: Unintentional electromagnetic (EM) radiation from electronic devices is a well-known concern for semiconductor vendors due to the possibility of interference with wireless communication channels and potential health risks to the end users [24]. However, EM radiation during a security-critical process could also lead to vulnerabilities due to its potential to leak information

regarding the operation. EM emission characteristics are largely device dependent; hence, it is difficult to develop a break-one-break-all scenario for the attackers. The effectiveness of small magnetic loop antennas in detecting EM emission from ICs has been evaluated in various studies [61]. The signals captured by magnetic loop antennas are digitized for the extraction of the secret. EM signal for information leakage can be observed in various ways. Visual inspection of the time-domain representation of EM signals is called simple EM analysis (SEMA) [62]. SEMA can be considered as the EM equivalent of the SPA. EM signal can be transformed to frequency domain to perform visual analysis of the spectrogram to reveal information. The SEMA approach has been used to extract secret information from various cryptographic processes, including RSA, elliptic curve-based Diffie–Hellman (ECDH), and elliptic curve-based digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [63]. Algorithms, such as ECDH and ECDSA, are suitable for mobile devices and Internet-of-Things (IoT) platforms where a malicious end user with complete physical access can compromise the cryptographic process using the SEMA approach.

Simple visual observation of EM signal may not be sufficient for revealing information from many applications. A more sophisticated attack vector called differential EM analysis (DEMA), a variant of DPA for EM, is proposed [64]. However, DEMA requires a large number of EM traces of a given operation to extract the secret bits that are involved in the process by observing the variation in EM emission. With the alteration of signal or register states between logic high and low, energy dissipation in a CPU varies and consequently, the EM emission is impacted [61]. Moreover, the alteration of signal states in a CPU depends on the instructions and variables. Hence, the observation of EM emission for a large number of operations is useful in retrieving the instructions being executed and intermediate states of different variables.

4) *Fault Injection*: Fault attacks form a potent class of SCAs wherein the attacker can subvert the execution of the hardware by deliberately injecting a fault. A well-placed fault attack could cause the system to reveal secret information, such as the key bits [65]. Fault attacks have also emerged as major threats for a program executed by a processor. For example, precisely flipping the status flags can allow an attacker to bypass the authentication process giving unauthorized control or privilege escalation [7]. These faults can be injected by causing a glitch in the underlying hardware. The attacker typically attempts to manipulate one or more of the devices' power supply or clock or utilizes a highly powerful laser to control the temperature of the device.

Fault attacks have been demonstrated on several cryptofunctions, such as data encryption standard (DES), advanced encryption standard (AES), international data encryption algorithm (IDEA), secure and fast encryption routine (SAFER), and Blowfish. However, not all faults are exploitable. Hence, it requires careful profiling of the fault space to identify the set of exploitable faults. In AES, it has been demonstrated that a well-placed fault injected in between the seventh and ninth round operation could cause the device to reveal the entire key with as few as eight faulty ciphertexts.

More recently, attacks, such as PlunderVolt [31], VoltJockey [38], and CLKScrew [7], have demonstrated that fault attacks are not restricted to cryptocores but can also impact general purpose SoCs. Both CLKScrew and PlunderVolt are software generated fault attacks. The attacker leverages the access to clock or energy management APIs for injecting the fault. CLKScrew exploits the dynamic voltage frequency scaling utility to extract secrets from ARM Trust-Zone. PlunderVolt utilizes the power management utility to compromise the execution of Intel's SGX.

Apart from the above-discussed side and covert channels, test and debug infrastructures usually provide privileged access to critical hardware resources, such as machine state and configuration registers. Insecure test and debug ports are potential attack surfaces for launching powerful low-level attacks. In 2012, a military grade FPGA was reported to have a backdoor in the JTAG port, which allows the attacker to retrieve the AES key for decrypting the protected bitstream [66]. Rajput and Maniatakos [67] summarized the security attacks and protections for the commonly used JTAG port. Valea *et al.* [68] performed a more complete survey of security threats and countermeasures in different test standards.

### C. IP Theft and Counterfeiting Threats

Modern SoC and IC designs usually involve different forms of IPs, e.g., register transfer-level (RTL) design (soft IP), gate-level netlist (firm IP), and physical layout (hard IP). The owner's IP is outsourced to trustworthy offshore design houses/foundries for SoC integration or IC fabrication to reduce design complexity, time to market pressure, and manufacturing cost. This can lead to various IP security threats.

In IP counterfeiting, an attacker illegally imitates the original design, creates counterfeited versions of the IPs/ICs, and sells them in the brand name of a genuine supplier. In the cloning attack, an adversary copies the original design and supplies cloned versions of original IPs/ICs under his/her own label. These attacks result in the integration of fake IPs/ICs in the electronics systems used in critical applications, such as military, healthcare, banking, etc. The fake designs not only sabotage the genuine vendor's reputation and revenue but also lead to large consequences: 1) affecting the reliability and performance of the critical systems and 2) containing malicious or backdoor logic that cause leakage of confidential information or assist to override the critical systems [69].

In the RE attack, an attacker back engineers the design in order to deduce the design structure or functionality. This can be done by RE's various design forms, such as RTL, netlist, layout (GDS-II), mask, or a manufactured IC [70]. An RE attack allows the adversary to realize his/her intentions of inserting backdoors or Trojans into the design and also enables counterfeiting and IC overbuilding, thereby entails reassessing trust in electronics hardware [70], [71].

### D. Hardware Trojan

1) *Classical Digital Trojans*: Early HTs typically use a single trigger signal to activate the Trojan under a rare event. The *Trust-HUB* benchmarks [72] employ such a simple trigger mechanism, which is very sensitive to switching probability analysis. The *De-Trust* [73] project provides some HT designs that use multiple discrete trigger signals so that each trigger signal will be able to switch normally. These HTs, when activated, will violate explicitly specified design behavior in the design specification.

A comprehensive list of Trojan taxonomies [74], [75], benchmark sets [72], [75], and lessons [27] of these classical HT research has been documented. In what follows, we will discuss some recent HT designs and attacks.

2) *Exploitation of Don't Care Conditions*: Fern *et al.* [8] leveraged external don't care conditions (i.e., unspecified functionality) for HT design. For example, the design output may be unspecified under certain "illegal" input conditions or when the output is not yet valid. Such don't care HTs can be hard to detect since they are out of the functional specification. A more recent work hides HT in the unspecified functionality in obfuscated hardware designs [13]. Based on the fact that the design functionality under incorrect obfuscation keys cannot be explicitly specified in order to protect the correct key, the IP designer has numerous flexibility in implementing the obfuscation logic, including inserting malicious circuitry.

Nahiyani *et al.* [76] proposed an HT design by adding malicious state to the finite-state machine (FSM). The idea is to use unoccupied state encoding to insert a floating Trojan state. The FSM will never transit to the dangling Trojan state during normal operation. The Trojan can be activated using a fault attack to force the FSM into the malicious state.

Hu *et al.* [34] leveraged satisfiability don't care for HT insertion. The Trojan uses a pair of signals that will never reach a specific input combination (e.g., cannot be logical "0" simultaneously due to path correlation) under normal operation as triggers. Thus, the Trojan will never be triggered during normal run although each trigger signal is able to switch. Similarly, fault injection is used to force the trigger signals into a desired condition to activate the Trojan. Such Trojan has recently been demonstrated on a multitenant FPGA, where the attacker can remotely activate the Trojan by deploying power wasting circuitry to induce considerable fluctuations in the on-chip signal delays and, consequently, timing faults [77].

3) *Analog Trojans*: Researchers have also demonstrated how to create analog HTs through slight modifications of the design layout [78]. Becker *et al.* [79] and Kumar *et al.* [80] inserted analog HTs by changing the dopant polarity or ratio of input to transistors to cause a short circuit. These dopant-level HTs can be hard to identify since they do not introduce additional transistors but only modify circuit parameter. Liu *et al.* [10] demonstrated an analog HT that leaks the AES key by slightly modulating the amplitude or frequency of wireless transmission without violating the protocol specification. The HT cannot be detected using routine testing methods since it does not change the design functionality. The A2 Trojan [9] is a small and stealthy malicious analog circuitry. It

only adds a single capacitor that siphons charge from nearby wires as they transit. When the capacitor is fully charged, it drives a victim flip flop to a desired value to perform malicious activities, e.g., elevating privilege. The Trojan will remain dormant if the capacitor resets through leakage current due to inactive switching activities in the charging wires. A more recent work exploits analog/mixed-signal circuits for hardware Trojans, whose trigger mechanism is deployed in the digital domain while the payload is transferred to the analog domain via the on-chip test infrastructure [81].

4) *Trojans Induced Aging and Performance Degradation:* In a nanoscale semiconductor device, physical occurrences, such as hot-carrier injection, electromigration, time-driven dielectric breakdown, and negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), lead to aging phenomenon [82]. These physical occurrences are the result of the restrained design margins and transistor scaling. Even a small change in the transistor parameter may significantly affect the device performance and reliability [82], [83]. Device aging may result in failure of semiconductor devices during critical operations. The heavy reliance of SoCs on third-party IPs (3PIPs) raises the possibilities of aging attacks. A rouge 3PIP vendor may accelerate the device aging process by covertly making malicious modifications in the design of 3PIPs, with an aim of causing a premature failure of an electronic device within the desired service period [84].

One prevalent way of launching an accelerated aging attack is through NBTI stress. NBTI refers to the increase in threshold voltage of a P-type metal oxide semiconductor (PMOS) transistor over time due to the charges trapped under the gate area by the negative bias applied between its source and gate terminals [82]. As NBTI is heavily dependent on the dynamic operating condition of the device, attackers can control the supply voltage, temperature, and input signal probability to increase a device NBTI stress to accelerate its aging effect. An attacker may force the device into continuous stress even in standby mode, by modifying/adding malicious circuitry. To accelerate the aging process, the attacker can use selected input vectors to maximize the NBTI stress on the target devices.

This attack is demonstrated by Kachave *et al.* [84] on a digital signal processor (DSP). In this attack model, an attacker continuously applies NBTI stress during the standby mode of the device to accelerate aging by either hardware or software modifications. In the hardware-based attack, an attacker introduces some alterations in the DSP hardware such that a rare event (hidden Trojan) triggers the application of input vectors that maximize NBTI stress. In the cross-layer attack, an attacker builds a program that automatically applies the test vectors on the DSP circuit to create the greatest stress during the operational mode.

5) *Trojans Insertion Through Malicious EDA Tool:* HT threat arises primarily from untrusted design process and supply chain. EDA tools, as an important element in this untrusted environment, can also assist in Trojan attacks.

Krieg *et al.* [85] demonstrated an automated HT insertion technique through lightweight modification to an open-source synthesis tool. The modified FPGA synthesis front end deploys

a special look-up table (LUT), whose simulated design behavior is totally correct. In a second attack phase, the malicious back end identifies this LUT and changes its functionality when translating the design into bitstream, which acts as a Trojan trigger. The challenge in detecting such HT lies in the lack of bitstream verification tools. In their successive work, the differences in how the don't care "X" appears in logic simulation and implementation are exploited to create a Trojan trigger. The trigger signal "X" will be logic 0 during simulation and logic "1" in hardware implementation. Thus, the HT will remain inactive during the design phase and will be automatically activated upon configured onto the FPGA. Similarly, lightweight modification to the synthesis tool will facilitate automated insertion of such HTs.

Besides, several HTs target emerging computing technologies. In [13], an HT is hidden in the obfuscation logic intended for IP protection. In [6], a remote HT attack targeting multitenant FPGAs deployed in the cloud was demonstrated.

### E. Vulnerabilities and Attacks on Deep Learning Networks

1) *Adversarial Examples:* AI has been promoting fast in the recent decade, thanks to various DNNs, which learn high-level features from raw data to solve many challenging object recognition problems end-to-end with very high accuracy and without requiring human intervention. Similar to any other fast-advancing fields, the infiltration of deep learning models into safety and security critical applications, such as self-driving cars and face recognition payment systems, makes them an interesting target of attack.

A well-known vulnerability has been exposed in a surprising way by the input of adversarial examples. It was initially demonstrated by Szegedy *et al.* [86] that small intentionally designed perturbations added to the original input image can create an optical illusion for the DNN classifier at the inference phase. Adversarial example generation algorithms, such as fast gradient sign method [87], universal perturbations [88], and Carlini and Wagner (C&W) attack [89], have succeeded in subverting the deep learning model output with high success rate. Hardware accelerator for the generation of adversarial examples has also been proposed to improve the attack efficiency [36]. The imperceptibility of the perturbation and generalization ability across models further aggravate the damage of such attacks. The recent research suggests that adversarial example attacks can also be applied in the physical world [90] and incorporated with cameras [91]. Adversarial examples work across different media and are recognized by Open AI Inc. as a concrete problem in AI safety. They shatter the confidence of DNN implementation robustness and extend the DNN attack surface beyond the software boundary. Although conventional techniques, such as laser beam interference, memory collision, and rowhammer, have been deployed as means to attack DNN hardware, they must be subtly and significantly devised to exploit the unique characteristics of DNN. The target asset and threat model of a DNN attack are in many ways different from those of the cryptosystem. DNN has the transferability, noise immunity, and graceful degradation properties that are absent in many



other domain-specific computing solutions. The effectiveness and efficiency of attacks on DNN are often data, model, and application dependent. In general, data play a more significant role than the model and the model plays a more significant role than parameter optimization in the inference.

2) *Hardware-Oriented Attacks*: AI of Things (AIoT) is the convergence of AI and IoT infrastructure. The placement of cognitive computing and AI processing at the IoT edges can benefit in terms of privacy maintenance, bandwidth reduction, and responsiveness. As a core enabler of innovation, dedicated hardware accelerators for efficient on-device inference are increasingly used for edge AI deployment. Commercially available hardware accelerators for local AI inferencing include Intel neural compute stick 2 (NCS2), Google Coral, Nvidia Jetson Nano, and Xilinx edge AI IP core. This new wave of edge intelligence in the AIoT age invites new attack vectors, which are methodologically different from software-oriented DNN attacks such as the previously described input of adversarial examples. This is because adversarial examples that assume any input pixel can be precisely altered to any arbitrary value may not achieve the same desired outcomes when they are presented to a DNN hardware accelerator.

Fault injection attacks, such as laser injection [92], glitch disturbance [93], memory collision [94], and rowhammering [95] can impact circuit operations within the DNN and are potential threats to edge intelligence. Straightforward fault injection will cause denial of service, but it also alerts attention. For instance, overheating the DNN hardware will not only affect classification but also suspend the system. An immediate damage control may be triggered to limit the benefits that can be reaped from such attacks. The existing fault attacks on DNN focus mainly on model weight manipulations [95], [96]. Falsifying model parameters such as saturating last layer's bias [32] to converge the output to one specific class regardless of inputs or constraining modification magnitude on the weights of all layers [96] can be used to create selective input misclassification. These simulated attacks assume that the data stored in memory can be precisely manipulated to arbitrary values through fault injection, which are not realistic for real-world DNN hardware accelerators. Moreover, manipulation and interpolation of model parameters tend to leave footprints in memory or create conspicuous output patterns. Such persistent fault induction in the weights is likely to be directly detected by model readback and bypassed by parameter reloading. Although practical fault injection techniques, such as laser beam interference [92] and Rowhammer [95], are able to perturb the output of the DNN algorithm running on general purpose hardware, the attacks can be mitigated by low-precision numeral representation, as suggested in [95], which happens to be a common practice of existing deep learning accelerator for edge applications.

HTs pose a real threat for outsourced DNN IC design, fabrication or testing activity, or the use of 3PIPs within DNN hardware. Successfully embedded stealthy trigger and payload into the activation layer [97] or memory controller [98] can cause misclassification. Fortunately, hardware attacks on edge deep learning applications have so far been constrained

to DNN hardware on small scale (ten categories) classification [92], [94] or are based on simulated instead of physically induced faults [96], [98] on larger network such as ImageNet [99] (1000 categories) classification. One exception is the most recently reported stealthy misclassification attack on deep learning accelerator for ImageNet applications in [100]. This attack induces temporal fault into intermediate results of the convolutional layer by introducing infrequent instantaneous glitches into the clock signal. The temporary perturbed data will propagate to the inference stage but they will be overwritten by the correct data after each prediction, leaving no trace for detection.

3) *Model Extraction Attacks*: Model extraction attack [101] occurs when attackers attempt to replicate a pretrained model. Because of the amount of costly training data collected, a superior deep learning model trained for a specific task is a precious IP that an enterprise can monetize as a commodity through third-party offerings or leverage as a technology barrier to competitors of the market. Unlike cryptosystems, model confidentiality assumed as a trained DNN is a pricey IP. For this reason, there is strong incentive for opponents to steal the model so as to build similar performance AI products or solutions at substantially reduced cost. The existing model extraction attacks can be broadly divided into two categories: 1) query based and 2) implementation based. The query-based model extraction attack mainly utilizes the input-output relationship of the target model to build a substitute model that has the similar functionality [101]. In the scenario of embedded devices, the internal model is exposed to the risk of being attacked by malicious users who have physical access to the device by observing the I/O dataflow [102]. These users can then train a new model with similar performance based on the I/O pairs, i.e., replicating the original model. Unlike crypto engine, where all computations can be completed fully on chip, edge implementations of DNN models, except a few tiny models, require some off-chip communications for each inference. The implementation-based model extraction attack exploits side-channel leakage during model execution. The fine-grained information could be obtained by tracking cache misses, memory access pattern, power consumption, and hardware performance counters [103], [104]. Algorithms, such as DPA and CPA, can be applied to extract the number of parameters in each layer, the value of each parameter, the total number of layers, and the type of activation function. Optimization techniques on DNN hardware, such as zero weight pruning, can be utilized to reduce the complexity of RE [105]. The success of model extraction can enable further exploitation of the security weaknesses of deep learning, such as evading systems, thereby forcing incorrect predictions and revealing additional information from the training data to leak sensitive and confidential information.

## IV. COUNTERMEASURES

### A. Hardware Security Primitives

True random number generator (TRNG) and PUF are two important hardware-intrinsic security primitives that provide



built-in instead of bolted-on defense against various emerging threats and vulnerabilities arising at different phases of the IC life cycle or device operation. Compared with TRNG, PUFs have been very well surveyed by many researchers in recent years [28]. For TRNG, we exemplify typical CMOS circuit implementations from four different entropy sources. For PUFs, we focus on the feasibility of its integration with other nondevice signatures. Such a unique provenance proof is promising in detecting imposter, tampering, spoofing, and fabrication attacks that aim to gain unauthorized access to system, data, or premises.

1) *TRNG*: A random number generator is a device or software that generates sequences of unpredictable numbers. The ancient ways of using dice roll or coin toss to harvest natural randomness are too slow to meet the demands of modern computing systems. A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is an algorithm or a mathematical formula that can be used to produce a sequence of random numbers with a sufficiently long but finite period from a seed state. PRNGs that are suitable for the cryptographic applications are called cryptographically secure PRNGs (CSPRNGs). CSPNGs are designed from cryptographic primitives or hard mathematical problems to pass the next-bit test such that the  $(k + 1)$ th bit of a sequence cannot be successfully predicted in polynomial time from the knowledge of the first  $k$  bits. CSPRNG should also be resilient to the “state compromise extensions” attack, which is an attack that makes use of some known internal states to predict future outputs or recover previous outputs. On the contrary, a TRNG is a hardware security primitive that yields unpredictable random numbers even if the internal design details are all known. With infinite period, it provides higher security property than CSPRNG. TRNG designs that originated from solid-state devices typically harvest their randomness from four sources, namely, noise, jitter, metastability, and chaos.

Thermal noise is a good source of randomness because it is frequency independent and technology independent [106]. The weak thermal noise needs to be boosted by a wide-bandwidth amplifier, which can consume significant silicon area and power. Matsumoto *et al.* [107] added a silicon nitride (SiN) layer in a standard CMOS process to amplify the thermal noise to a measurable level without the amplifier but the extra SiN mask is itself expensive. Recently, Bae *et al.* [108] proposed a high-speed TRNG by harvesting the thermal noise from the biasing circuit of a common-mode operating comparator and the sampling uncertainty of a delay flip flop (DFF). The idea is illustrated in Fig. 1. Common-mode noise is generated by connecting both inputs of a comparator to the output of a beta-multiplier voltage reference. The thermal noises of the comparator and the biasing circuit are added up and amplified by the differential-to-single ended (D2S) amplifier. The amplified noise is fed into a slicer to generate a full swing output, which is then sampled by a 3-GHz clocked DFF. By combining thermal noise and sampling uncertainty of the asynchronous input, this TRNG has a very high throughput of 3 Gb/s. Its power consumption is also very high, 5 mW excluding the power-hungry external high-speed clock generator.




Fig. 1. Design concept of noise-based TRNG [108].

Conventional jitter-based TRNGs [109] use a slower jittery frequency clock to sample a faster clock. Using clock jitters of free running ring oscillators (ROs) as entropy source, the extractor design can be simplified, but additional power-hungry clock generators are required to provide adequate jitter variations. Yang *et al.* [110] proposed a process variation tolerant TRNG by exploiting the oscillation collapse in a double edge injected RO. To achieve the robustness against process variations, 32 stages with eight selectable inverters per stage are used to provide the tuning space. Recently, a lightweight TRNG consisting of only two 9-stage current-starved ROs (CSROs) with an identical layout, a 3-stage regular RO, and a 2-b counter was proposed [111]. In order to maximize jitters and reduce power consumption, the inverters in the two CSROs are biased in the weak inversion region and the inverters in the regular RO are operating in the strong inversion region. Systemic biases in the beat frequency are effectively canceled out by XORing the outputs of the two matched CSROs. The resulting random pulse width is used to clock gate the regular inverter-based RO to the 2-b counter. This jitter-based TRNG, fabricated in a standard 65 nm, 1.2-V CMOS process, consumes only 260  $\mu$ W at a bit rate of 52 Mb/s and has a small footprint of 366  $\mu\text{m}^2$ .

Metastability is a stable state of a dynamical system besides the system's state of least energy. Metastabilities in cross-coupled inverters, latches, DFFs, and SRAMs [112] have been utilized to produce random bit streams at high bit rate, but complex postprocessing units are usually required to eliminate the systematic bias. The key component of metastability-based TRNG of [112] is the metastability latch, which is designed based on a cross-coupled inverter pair with equal rise and fall time. A random bit is produced by the metastability latch in each cycle. To assure high entropy, a time-to-digital converter (TDC) is used to measure the settling time and tune the metastable latch against bias introduced by the process and temperature variations. The switching speed of the metastability latch cannot be too fast to prevent the settling time from exceeding the time resolution of the TDC. The latch size and load must also preserve the dominance of thermal noise over flicker noise. By combining three entropy sources of similar cross-coupled inverter pairs that share the same supply and clock, Intel [106] fabricated a fast TRNG in 14-nm FinFET CMOS process that produces three full-entropy bits per clock cycle. The three bitstreams of at least 0.33 min-entropy/bit each are combined by a Barak–Impagliazzo–Wigderson (BIW) extractor [113]. Correlation suppressors and undersampled




Fig. 2. Block diagram of chaos-based TRNG of [116].

feedback shift registers are used to decorrelate and whitening the raw data to generate 24 uncorrelated bits in every 64 clock cycles with an ultralow energy consumption of 3 pJ/bit.

TRNGs can also be designed from the chaotic system described by deterministic equations. At first sight, this may sound like God plays dice with complete law and order. Being extremely sensitive to the initial conditions, the disorder states of a chaotic system are very hard to be modeled mathematically even though they are produced by simple systems that obey precise rules. Chaos is, as described by the legendary Lorenz, “when the present determines the future, but the approximate present does not approximately determine the future” [114]. Chaos-based TRNGs [115] are typically designed by a chaotic map and a bit generation function. Unfortunately, the map characteristics are susceptible to process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) variations. The optimal bit generation function for achieving the highest possible entropy rate from a map function is costly to implement, and consumes great power. An exceptionally energy-efficient implementation [116] is shown in Fig. 2. It consists of a 10-b fine-SAR ADC, a 5-b coarse-SAR ADC, a dynamic residue amplifier, and an XOR postprocessing block. The ADC recursively amplifies the initial state of the system with environmental noise to produce a discrete time chaotic map. Due to quantization errors of the coarse-SAR ADC, the design is highly sensitive to the initial state. The switching power of fine-SAR ADC is reduced by using the coarse-SAR ADC to detect and skip switching. The design consumes only 82 nW of power and 0.3 pJ/b of energy. A larger portion of the power savings are due to the dynamic residue amplifier and adaptive reset comparator.

As the need for publicly auditable randomness from applications, such as elections and lotteries, increases, so is the demand for randomness beacon. A randomness beacon is a public server that produces completely unpredictable bit strings at regular intervals. During the Crypto Week last year, a new public randomness beacon called “League of Entropy” [117] was released by the American Web-infrastructure and website-security titan company Cloudflare. Built upon the provably secure cryptographic architecture of drand [118], this is a network of beacons run by a consortium of global organizations and individual contributors to provide publicly verifiable, decentralized random outputs. Interestingly, Cloudflare actually sources her entropy from a video of a wall of lava lamps. These unpredictable visual

data of floating blobs are converted to truly random numbers. Most recently, truly random numbers were also created from growing crystals [119].

2) *PUF as Provenance Proof*: PUF utilizes intrinsic manufacturing process variations to generate a unique unforgeable device fingerprint. A comprehensive review of PUFs can be found in [28], where different PUF structures, including the conventional delay-based or memory-based PUFs, and the emerging nonvolatile memory (NVM)-based PUFs, FinFET PUF, quantum secure PUF, and sensor PUFs, have been surveyed. In the early stage of development, the reproducibility of PUF responses at different time and in different environmental conditions is the main practical issue that limits its industrial adoption. Majority voting, fuzzy extractor (FE), and reverse FE (RFE) are three commonly used techniques to improve the reliability of a PUF. Majority voting votes for the most stable response by repeated application of the same challenge. It is a lightweight technique to enhance the reliability of a PUF at the expense of latency. FE [28] increases the noise tolerance and uniformity of PUF response by error correction code (ECC) and hash function. As ECC decoding is too expensive for resource-constrained IoT devices, it is moved from the regeneration phase at the prover (device) side to the verifier (server) side by RFE [120]. Instead of generating the helper data only once in the PUF enrolment phase, RFE generates helper data on site to different noisy versions of the same PUF response. While this eases the enrollment of strong PUF with a large number of CRPs, the disclosure of multiple helper data also increases the risk of side-channel information leakage. This problem can be mitigated by a well-structured PUF with balanced BER [121] or appending a Z-channel [122]. Today, PUFs have made their presence known in industry, e.g., Xilinx [123], NXP Semiconductor [124], and Qualcomm [125].

As a hardware root of trust, PUF has opened up new horizons for solving IoT security problems. The rise of IoT has created a huge influx of sensors and accelerated sensor standardization toward building a fully connected and cohesive supply chain. With sensors as the data feeder, a direct consequence is the new gloss on pushed media data and distinctively new interactions between human, events, and devices. A promising new approach to assure real end point security against the imminent risk of sensor and data analytic attacks is to derive provenance proof from the unification of PUF responses and biometrics or other existing data analytic-based security measures. This approach endows PUF systems with the capability to not only identifying the device but also: 1) authenticating the users who have privileged access to the device and its data; 2) assuring the integrity of the data it generated or acquired; and 3) responding actively to events occurred in the area of surveillance. Unlike conventional PUF designs, such interactive PUF systems are usually application specific or sensor specific, and have dedicated authentication protocols.

1) *User-Device PUF*: Typical user and device authentication methods perform user and device authentication sequentially with a substantial message exchange. To protect the

sensitive credentials during transmission, encryption keys are required to be stored in the end device, which are vulnerable to NVM key retrieval attacks [25]. In [126] and [127], a completely different concept of unified user-device (UD) PUF was proposed to distinguish different users and devices by extracting raw biometric information, such as touch screen pressure or voice with the innate silicon sensor variations. The challenge to the UD-PUF in [126] is a series of binary coordinates that forms a pattern on the touchscreen. The response is a digital word obtained by quantizing the sequence of sensed pressure values read from an Android APP when the user traces the pattern. Unfortunately, the intrinsic parametric changes contributed by device fabrication process variations are not structurally harnessed, resulting in high identification error rate for the (same user, same challenge, and different device) combination. The problem is intrigue as amplifying the parametric deviations to improve device identification will reduce the sensitivity of the user biometric whereas noise reduction in biometric information processing will distort device parametric distribution.

Another “UD-PUF” was proposed in [128] for match-on-device applications. A strong PUF is required to generate an obfuscated biometric template by feeding the processed biometric feature into it. As small change in the challenge will cause a dramatic bit flips in the PUF response, the quantized biometric feature-based challenge has to be 100% accurate to ensure reproducibility of template in the authentication phase. This problem is mitigated by selecting the most robust biometric feature for each individual user using noise aware-interval optimized mapping bit allocation (NA-IOMBA). As NA-IOMBA requires accurate noise samples/models over time for different conditions, the scheme can only generate one determinant template for a (user and device) combination. Once the template is leaked, the security of using the particular device will be compromised. This dilemma is resolved by a “UDhashing” scheme in [129]. UDhashing adopts a “fuse-on-device” and “match-on-server” strategy. ML resilient strong PUF [130] is preferred to prevent the reuse of authentication credentials, and to achieve cancellable biometrics and system reconfigurability. To bind a device to its user, the user live biometric and device PUF response are unified by random projection into a biocode at the end device. The endpoint and the server are mutually authenticated by a zero-knowledge proof of the endpoint’s secrets. The server is authenticated by the endpoint through the hashed PUF responses while the endpoint is authenticated by the server through the biocodes. A correct biometric input of a user to his registered device and a correct response to a query from that device are both required to authenticate the biocode. Neither the hashed PUF response nor the biocode reveals the endpoint’s secrets. The biocode can be easily revoked, reissued, or refreshed by a different challenge to prevent permanent compromise of the users’ biometrics.

2) *Data-Device PUF*: Similarly, PUF-assisted data-device authentication systems fill the gap of existing data and device-independent authentication schemes in digital forensics. Digital images and videos have been increasingly exposed as important information or art carriers. Their easy-to-access and low-cost attributes also escalate image fraudulence. Two

related problems are to be solved: a) detection of image tampering and b) authentication of the imaging device. Image tampering is typically detected by image watermarking [131], digital image forensics [132], and perceptual image hashing [133]. Of which perceptual image hashing is most effective in tamper detection. It is very sensitive to content-specific modifications and yet robust against normal content-preserving processing. Since such methods depend on a shared secret key for authentication, the security of the whole system will collapse if the secret key is compromised, lost, or stolen. Source camera identification is mainly accomplished with ML-based methods. By analyzing the structure and processing stages of the digital camera, appropriate features representing the unique device characteristics can be algorithmically extracted with the knowledge of lens aberration, sensor imperfection, color filter array interpolation, and salient image features [134]. The existing works focusing on imaging device brand identification achieve very high accuracy but fail to distinguish individual devices from the same model and the same brand. Identifying individual camera devices have been increasingly studied in recent years based on photo response nonuniformity (PRNU) pattern [135], [136]. To achieve high reliability and accuracy, strict conditions in the acquisition process, number, and content of training images, as well as geometrical synchronization of testing images have to be met. More importantly, the same approach can also be used by a malicious user to extract the device features from publicly available images.

To provide dual authentication without the aforementioned shortcomings, PUF-based data device authentication schemes have been proposed. PUF-based perceptual image hash was first conceptualized in [137] for simultaneous tamper detection and source camera identification. This work shares the same PUF reliability problem as [128] since the data features were directly applied as the challenge to the underlying PUF. Alternatively, a data-device PUF (DD PUF) with relaxed reliability requirement was proposed in [138]. The method [138] imprints an indelible birthmark of the camera into its captured images for forgery detection. The robust data-device hash is produced by projecting the rotation-/scaling-invariant image features into the Bernoulli random matrix generated by the PUF responses. This hash is “keyless,” and time, data, and device dependent. Attestation is nonrepudiable as the perceptual image hash can only be generated by the timestamp of the image captured through the camera’s tamper-resistant image sensor PUF. To achieve secure and accurate camera identification with reduced hardware overhead, the CMOS image sensor PUF [139] derived from fixed pattern noise of individual active pixel elements is utilized in both schemes [128], [138].

3) *Event-driven PUF*: Existing PUFs, including the CMOS image sensor PUF [139], are typically triggered by server-provided challenges. Since the challenges are independent from the sensing targets, it is difficult to control the attestation frequency, resulting in either redundant or inadequate security tagging. Traditional frame-based image generates too much redundant background data, which limits its processing bandwidth in high-speed and privacy-preserved video surveillance applications. Dynamic vision sensor (DVS), also known as neuromorphic vision sensor, provides a solution to design

PUF system that is capable of responding actively to incidents occurred in the surveillance scene. DVS responds only to temporal intensity change and records only sparse asynchronous address events with precise timing information. It has low latency, high dynamic range, and significantly reduced data size. These features are exploited to make an event-driven PUF in [140]. It adds only three transistors per DVS pixel to harness the entropy from the fabrication process variability. The PUF response can only be triggered by and is uniquely dependent on the asynchronous addressed event detected in the scene without being interfered by the simultaneous firing of other address events. The package of address events acquired by the DVS camera is tagged by the event-driven PUF response using a keyed hash-based message authentication code (HMAC). This is believed to be the first event-driven PUF system to fill the forensic gap of simultaneously authenticating the event data integrity and source camera identity.

### B. System and Architectural Protection Techniques

Resource sharing is inevitable as it leads to more efficient computation. Software processes share memories, datapaths, accelerators, monitors, sensors, and I/O. Hardware IP cores require shared access to on-chip interconnect and memories. Yet, it is a challenge for security since any entity must consider information leakage through shared resource especially when computing on sensitive data. The cache side channel is a key example of this that has been exploited countless times for nefarious purposes. Resource isolation is a key security mechanism that is often difficult to implement in practice.

1) *Trusted Execution Environment*: One common approach for software isolation is a trusted execution environment (TEE). TEE uses hardware mechanisms to ensure that isolation properties are properly enforced. These properties, in general, enforce rules that provide a fixed set of resources for a sensitive computation, and assurances that those computations are hidden from other system users. There are a number of different TEEs. Intel's SGX [141] uses enclaves—a protected environment that contains the code and data of a security-sensitive computation. SGX performs isolation by setting aside a memory for trusted computation and isolating the memory from any other access, including kernel, hypervisor, and DMA accesses. ARM Trust-Zone [142] has two worlds. Sensitive computations are put into the secure world and are isolated from code running in the normal world.

2) *Cache Side-Channel Mitigations*: Cache side channel mitigations attempt to minimize or eliminate information leakage by isolating secure and nonsecure accesses to the cache. Cache partitioning is one class of approaches that attempts to separate the cache to avoid conflicts. Partitioning can be performed in various ways, including static locking (PLCache) [143], dynamic locking [144], page coloring [145], and selective cache flushing [146]. Randomization is another class of techniques where cache access patterns are permuted to minimize any information leakage on conflicts, e.g., RPCache [143]. Other mitigations include DAWG [147], InvisiSpec [148], nonmonopolizable caches [149], Intel Cache Allocation Technology [150], and CATalyst [151].

It is difficult to develop and implement a cache mitigation scheme. For example, Ardeschiricham *et al.* [152] showed that the well-known PLCache [143] mitigation was flawed, and developed a fix to the vulnerability that was formally verified to be secure. This points to the need for any mitigation to come with proof that they are correct. Property driven hardware security [20] advocates for such an approach where the threat model is formally specified as properties, e.g., SystemVerilog Assertion (SVA) assertions, information flow properties, etc., and hardware security verification tools provide assurance that the designs adhere to the specified properties.

3) *Memory Protection*: Many of the system and architectural threats revolve around performing proper access control on memory locations. This includes strict isolation of memory regions (e.g., nonsecure processes should never read/write secure memory) and dynamic policies (e.g., a cryptographic key is written during secure boot process and is never accessed by anyone after that). Standard memory protections rely on a memory management unit (MMU). Common protections include access control through segmentation to provide isolation, data encryption to provide confidentiality [153], and hashing to provide integrity [154]. Protecting the memory access information, along with the confidentiality and integrity of the data, is also crucial. Oblivious RAM [155] is an example approach for access pattern protection. 3-D integration is a powerful technique for hardware security and can be used for memory protection [156], e.g., embedded DRAM can mitigate threats related to off-chip data accesses. Anti-tamper techniques are also widely adopted by chip makers, such as Altera [157], ON Semiconductor [158], and Cypress [159] to secure key storage. The most recent nonvolatile static RAM technology-based anti-tamper memory [159] can provide a single or combined features of password protection, data destruction, functional destruction, and physical destruction upon tampering.

4) *Control Flow Integrity*: Control flow integrity (CFI) defends against code reuse attacks by monitoring the program's flow of execution and attempts to ensure that it performs the correct sequence of operations. CFI is a general class of mitigation strategies that monitor and restrict the control flow decisions that a program makes. While there are many software CFI techniques, including some done in practice [160], there are fewer hardware-based CFI techniques as they generally require substantial changes to the underlying microarchitecture. Hardware CFI defenses depend on a trusted hardware monitor integrated into the instruction pipeline or with access to the processor's debugging resources to analyze control flow information. De Clercq and Verbauwheide [161] classified CFI mitigation strategies into the following: shadow call stack, labels, tables, FSM, branch regulation, instruction set randomization, signature modeling, and code pointer integrity. These mitigation strategies aim to monitor execution using a limited number of resources. Their differences are reflected in the resources that they monitor, how they track execution flows, and the type and amount of stateful information that must be stored.

### C. Side-Channel Protection Techniques

1) *Timing-Channel Countermeasures*: Existing countermeasures against SCA explore both software- and hardware-level approaches. A countermeasure could be detection of the attack at runtime or analysis of susceptibility during the design stage. It could also be a design approach (both software and hardware) for mitigating the covert or side channel.

Most timing channels in cryptographic implementations occur due to the difference in execution time for different key and data inputs. As key and data inputs vary, the memory access pattern, branches, and various other operations become different across multiple executions that lead to leakage of information. Researchers have proposed constant-time techniques to eliminate such leakage. However, they are difficult to achieve through hardware-level reimplementations and may cause significant impact on performance [162]. Bitslicing technique has been explored to implement constant-time AES core with improved performance [163].

Researchers have developed compiler-based countermeasures to thwart timing channels. These techniques focus on introducing noise or randomization in the software implementation to eliminate timing leakage. Coppens *et al.* [164] proposed compiler-based automatic elimination of key-dependent control flow by removing conditional move instructions.

2) *Power Side-Channel Countermeasures*: Power SCA countermeasures can be categorized as algorithmic, physical, or system-level. Algorithmic countermeasures insert additional operations that mask [165] or split [166] the sensitive computation. They have the advantage of being provably secure. Physical countermeasures rely on measurements for validating the security of the device. The problem of measuring the side-channel leakage of a device has been addressed in [39], [41], [167], and [168]. Works, such as [169] and [170], use custom gates that consume power independent of the gate's switching. System-level countermeasures, such as [171]–[174], use the device's power supply to normalize or randomize the overall power consumption. While algorithmic and system-level countermeasures require additional circuitry, physical countermeasures use custom logic design methodologies to tackle the leakage. System-level countermeasures rely on injecting noise in the power supply, which reduces the signal-to-noise ratio in the side-channel leakage [171]–[174]. The specialized circuitry required by these schemes can drastically affect the area, power, and performance of the design. For example, the popular algorithmic masking scheme [175] results in over  $3\times$  of performance degradation. In the recent years, the need for incorporating security countermeasures in low-cost embedded hardware has motivated the emergence of efficient countermeasures such as [176]–[178], where the algorithms available in the commercial EDA flows are leveraged to reduce area and delay overheads of these countermeasures.

3) *EM Side-Channel Countermeasure*: Both hardware and software-level countermeasures have been proposed to thwart EM side-channel. Execution sequence randomization and randomization of LUTs have been explored as software-based methods [179], [180]. Certain pairs of instruction sequence

may have distinguishing features in the EM signature that can be leveraged for the detection of security critical events [181]. Randomization of sequence can also be useful in mitigating such leakage. Accessing critical data using pointers may raise the difficulty of extracting access pattern information through EM analysis [182]. While masking of critical variables by random values during execution has been explored, they are found less effective in mitigating the leakage [183], [184].

The minimization of metal artifacts in the chip and the use of Faraday cage packaging have been suggested as hardware-level countermeasures against EM emission [24]. Since EM emission is proportional to power consumption, low-power design methodology could also be useful. Introducing asynchronous design methods using multiple clocks may raise the difficulty of analyzing EM signature as different parts of the design will be switching at different frequency [24]. The analysis framework for evaluating hardware designs for EM side-channel vulnerability would be useful for early detection and integration of design-time mitigation techniques [185].

4) *Fault Attack Countermeasures*: Over the years, various countermeasures have been proposed for protecting digital designs against fault attacks. These countermeasures can be broadly classified as infective countermeasures and detection-based countermeasures. Detection-based countermeasures involve the addition of detection circuitry, such as parity or additional copies of the design in order to detect the presence of a fault. Works such as [186]–[189] rely on parity-based circuits while [190] and [191] rely on redundant circuits. Works such as [65] and [192] attempt to thwart a fault attack by increasing the probability of unexploitable faults. They achieve this by transforming the fault space. Infective countermeasures, such as [193] and [194], on the other hand, prevent the occurrence of a fault attack by making it impossible for the attacker to inject a fault. Works such as [193] use diffusion-based technique where portions of the redundant and original outputs are swapped, thereby making it harder for the attacker to identify exploitable faults. Another diffusion method is through the use of a fixed constant matrix to modify the output data [194]. Infection can also be achieved by adding dummy rounds in addition to the redundant datapath [195], [196].

However, a significant drawback of the above-mentioned works is that they still require the design engineer to manually identify the vulnerable fault locations. This poses a significant challenge in larger designs. Thus, in recent years, automatic identification of vulnerable locations has become an interesting area of research. With respect to fault attacks, the initial works were restricted to lightweight ciphers [197] or made strong assumptions such as restricting to bit-flip faults. Safari [198] can cater to a large class of block ciphers including add-rotate-xor (ARX) ciphers. It can comprehensively evaluate all possible fault scenarios, including those with multiple fault locations. Expfault [199] uses data mining to determine vulnerable components of a cipher. Solomon [200] is a formal verification-based tool-flow that can map vulnerable regions in the specification to their corresponding gate level or placed netlist representations. Feds [201] is a similar formal verification tool-flow that can map fault-attack vulnerable regions in

the specification of a cipher to the corresponding lines in the source code for its implementation.

#### D. IP Protection Techniques

1) *Hardware Watermarking*: Hardware watermarking can be performed at electronic system level (ESL), high-level synthesis (HLS) level, or logic synthesis level to protect an IP against threats, such as piracy (or counterfeiting and cloning) and false claim of IP ownership. ESL or HLS-based hardware watermarking is exemplified by binary encoding of author's signature in [202]. This technique embeds watermark in the presynthesis phase of HLS or behavioral synthesis in the form of additional design and timing constraints. The extra constraints encode the author's signature into a binary bitstream of American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) characters. The high-level description of a design is converted into a control data flow graph (CDFG). After scheduling the CDFG into control steps (CS), an interval graph (IG) is created wherein each node indicates a storage variable, and an edge between two nodes indicates the overlapping of the life time between two storage variables. Register allocation to these variables is performed by graph coloring. Each node is first assigned a unique number in increasing order of their life-time. From the sorted list of nodes, each author signature bit is embedded as an extra edge in the IG by selecting a terminal node based on its node number. Bit "0" (or "1") is embedded by selecting an even (or odd) numbered terminal node. The extra constraints are thus imposed into the graph coloring problem for optimal register allocation. The strength of the authorship proof is assessed by the probabilities of coincidence ( $P_C$ ) and tampering ( $P_T$ ).  $P_C$  denotes the probability of coincidentally obtaining the same register allocation to the same storage variables as the signature by using any other register allocation methods.  $P_T$  denotes the probability of successfully corrupting the watermark by eliminating one or more signature bits by altering the color of a node.

Triple phase Watermarking [16] is another HLS watermarking scheme for protecting DSP hardware accelerators. A complex author signature is formed by seven variables, " $\gamma$ ", " $\alpha$ ", " $\beta$ ", " $i$ ", " $T$ ", " $T$ ", and " $!$ ", and embedded into three different phases of HLS. During the scheduling phase, on each occurrence of " $\gamma$ " digit, an operation in the noncritical path with the highest mobility is moved into the next immediate CS. During the resource allocation phase, in the odd CS on each occurrence of " $\alpha$ " digit in the odd CS, hardware resources to the odd and even operations are reallocated to type 1 and type 2 vendors, respectively. In the even CS, on each occurrence of " $\beta$ " digits, hardware resources to even and odd operations are reallocated to type 1 and type 2 vendors, respectively. During the register allocation phase, on each occurrence of " $i$ ", " $T$ ", " $T$ ", and " $!$ " digits, additional edges are added into the colored IG (CIG) to reallocate the registers to a set of storage variables. Specifically, " $i$ " is encoded as an edge between two prime nodes, " $T$ " is an edge between two even nodes, " $T$ " is an edge between a pair of odd and even nodes, and " $!$ " is an edge between node number 0 and any other integer node.




Fig. 3. Triple phase watermarking-based IP protection technique.

Fig. 3 depicts the triple phase watermarking approach. Owing to the large number of signature variables embedded in three different phases of HLS, it is highly tamper tolerant and has extremely low  $P_C$ . The complex signature combination in the three embedding phases has tightly constrained the solution space, making it highly improbable to find a design of the same functionality to also fulfill the additional watermark constraints by coincidence. By embedding the watermark at the highest level of design abstraction, the IP distributed at all lower levels of abstraction will also be protected without introducing integration complexity to the traditional design flow.

Besides HLS, Kirovski *et al.* [203] proposed the first logic synthesis watermarking method by implanting user and tool-specific information into a combinational circuit through technology mapping. Design constraints are generated by hashing the owner signature using SHA-256 and a pseudorandom number generator. The watermark constraints are used to select the internal circuit nodes as pseudoprimary output to synthesize a new netlist with the minimum number of cells for a given technology library without changing the functionality of the original circuit. Instead of full technology mapping, Cui *et al.* [204] proposed an incremental technology mapping technique to adaptively synthesize part of the design for watermark insertion. Using a globally optimized master design, the slack sustainability of disjoint closed cones is assessed to determine their suitability as watermark hosts. The watermarked solution is generated by remapping only the selected closed cones according to the watermark constraint through incremental synthesis. As the closed cones are selected based on both slack and slack sustainability, the embedding capacity is maximized, and the watermark bits are stealthier than hosting them in noncritical paths determined merely by absolute timing slacks.

2) *Hardware Steganography*: A limitation of IP watermarking is that it is arduous, and not always possible, to optimize the design-dependent signature to increase its robustness without exceeding acceptable overhead. Hardware steganography is a promising alternative to watermarking. This is due to the following reasons: 1) hardware steganography provides a seamless control to resolve ownership conflict and piracy detection and 2) the secret stego-based hardware constraints are derived from the entropy threshold parameter instead of the combination and encoding process of signature variables.




Fig. 4. Entropy-based hardware steganography approach.

Consequently, the design overheads are reduced over IP watermarking. From design perspective, modeling the relationship between signature combination and design overhead to select a robust signature is extremely difficult. Hence, it is desirable to do away with signature dependency for IP protection.

In [17], a vendor signature-free entropy-based hardware steganography method is proposed to protect DSP cores. This approach is depicted in Fig. 4. The secret information is embedded in the register allocation phase of HLS through the CIG framework. The stego constraints are derived from a set of edges between node pairs of identical colors. To add an edge between two nodes of the same color, the color of one node in the pair needs to be swapped with another node in the CIG. There are a number of possible swapping pairs corresponding to each potential edge to be embedded. An entropy value is computed for each swapping pair as an indicator of the number of color transformations needed for swapping. The entropy value for all swapping pairs of a potential edge is computed to determine its maximum entropy. Only those edges whose maximum entropy is less than or equal to a chosen entropy threshold ( $E_{th}$ ) are qualified to be embedded as stego constraints. The strength of the ownership proof is also measured by  $P_c$ . The difference is that a steganography technique is capable of embedding effectively a larger number of constraints than HLS-based watermarking approaches. This is because it assumes no default constraint, while some constraints corresponding to the author's signature exist by default for watermarking approaches. All the stego constraints corresponding to the chosen  $E_{th}$  are essentially embedded as the author's secret information. The amount of implanted stego information and the strength of steganography can be increased by increasing  $E_{th}$  with negligible design overhead. Hence, this technique offers more designer control on the digital evidence implanted into the design.

To improve the robustness of steganography, two distinct phases, viz., register allocation and FU vendor allocation of HLS, are leveraged for stego-constraints insertion [205]. In addition, the author's stego-information generation involves cryptographic modules and stego keys to enhance the protection against piracy and false ownership claim. The reasons are: 1) even if the secret constraints are compromised by an attacker, the owner has a meaningful and mathematical way to prove his constraints; 2) the very large size stego key (more than 600 b and scalable with the size of the IP) is only known to the owner, and such a large key cannot be cracked by brute

force; and 3) the stego mark and ownership proof are strengthened by a stronger digital evidence by embedding the stego information in two distinct phases of HLS.

The secret stego constraints are generated using secret design data and stego keys. The secret design data, obtained from CIG of target DSP application, are a set of elements where each element is represented by the indices ( $i$  and  $j$ ) of a node pair ( $V_i$  and  $V_j$ ) of identical colors in CIG. A series of transformations involving row and column diffusions and cryptographic encryptions using the stego keys is applied on the secret design data to obtain the stego constraints in the form of a bitstream. Each bit in the stego constraints is mapped to the hardware security constraints based on designer specific mapping rules. Furthermore, hardware security constraints are embedded during the register allocation and FU vendor allocation phases of HLS; thereby, generating a stego-embedded DSP design. This crypto-based dual phase steganography technique has also been applied along with structural obfuscation to be discussed in the next section to double the line of defense for securing JPEG compression-decompression hardware used in medical imaging systems [206].

3) *Logic Obfuscation*: Logic obfuscation is another effective hardware IP protection technique against illegal black-box reuse and RE. It inserts extra logic associated with dedicated obfuscation key inputs to functionally lock the design. Such design modification introduces programmability into the design such that the circuit functions properly only upon application of the correct obfuscation key and would otherwise malfunction.

Commonly used logic obfuscation techniques include XOR/XNOR and MUX-based logic locking that can affect values of circuit internal nodes or the hardware information flow [207], [208]. Similarly, logic obfuscation can also be implemented by introducing programmable elements to withhold part of the logic for later configuration [209]. However, these obfuscation techniques are vulnerable to powerful functional oracle-guided SAT attacks that iteratively finds distinguishing input patterns (DIPs) to prune the wrong keys [210].

A number of anti-SAT logic locking techniques were proposed to increase the number SAT iterations required. For example, Xie and Srivastava [18] leveraged point function logic to reduce the number of wrong keys pruned by each DIP so that the number of DIPs required exhibits an exponential relation with the obfuscation key length. However, since such anti-SAT logic obfuscation approaches generally rely on AND-tree-based point function structure, they suffer from removal attack and bypass attack [211], [212]. Several research work [213], [214] improved the obfuscation techniques to eliminate such vulnerability by adopting a corrupt-and-correct scheme, which ensures that when the point function logic is removed, the circuit would not function properly. However, a recently proposed functionality analysis on logic locking (FALL) attack combines structural and functional analyses of the obfuscation circuit followed by a SAT-based key confirmation to successfully defeat such obfuscation techniques [215]. Another solution to developing anti-SAT logic locking techniques is to increase the time for each SAT iteration by using programmable logic and routing block networks to obfuscate



the routing of selected wires as well as the logic of the gates preceding and succeeding the selected wires [216].

Another branch of logic encryption is the FSM-based sequential obfuscation techniques. It involves augmenting the original FSM with additional states such that the FSM will start from a dummy state and can only reach a functional state upon receiving the correct key sequence [217]. Sequential obfuscation techniques can be breached if the FSM can be enumerated with its transition graph extracted [19].

### E. Hardware Trojan Detection and Prevention Techniques

1) *Presilicon Countermeasures*: Presilicon HT detection techniques are designed to identify HTs in the early design phase. These techniques include *switching probability analysis*, *structural checking*, and *security verification*.

*Switching probability analysis*-based HT detection approaches are developed upon the assumption that the Trojan trigger signal should have extremely low switching probability in order to prevent HT from being frequently activated. These methods try to identify the signals with switching activities significantly lower than the average through structural analysis or behavioral code analysis [218]–[220]. These research works have revealed the close connection between low controllability or observability signals and Trojan circuitry.

*Structural checking*-based HT detection methods attempt to extract structural features (e.g., gate type, gate count, and manners of interconnections) specific to HT designs and perform detection leveraging techniques such as pattern matching [221]. They usually use a scoring algorithm to match such features against the circuit structures under test to identify Trojan circuitry. However, these methods may indicate false positives and suffer from scalability issues.

*Security verification* can be used to detect certain types of HTs. It works by deriving formal security models for hardware designs and prove security properties, such as *confidentiality* and *integrity* through formal approaches, e.g., SAT solving, model checking, and type checking [222]–[224]. A security property violation indicates the existence of unintentional design flaw or intended malicious design modification. However, formal verification typically has the scalability problem and usually only works for detecting HTs at IP level.

2) *Postsilicon Countermeasure*: Presilicon HT detection methods check for malicious design modifications after chip fabrication. *Destructive RE*, which involves depackaging and delayering the ICs and extracting the circuit structure from layout images, is a common approach for postsilicon HT detection. However, this costly and time-consuming process may fail when HT is only inserted into a small number of chips. On the contrary, nondestructive methods, including *functional testing* and *SCA*, are generally considered more viable in practice.

*Functional testing* aims to activate the rarely triggered Trojan circuitry and propagate the effect to an observable point. A major research vector is how to generate test vectors that can excite each rarely switching node in a

circuit. Statistical approaches have provided one possible solution [225] while another attempt is guided tests against HTs in critical portions of the design [226].

SCA-based methods detect HTs by analyzing physical IC parameters, such as power consumption [227], path delay [228], and chip emissions [229], [230]. The major challenges with these methods lie in the lack of golden chip and the effect of process variation on side-channel measurements. To improve HT detection sensitivity, researchers exploit multiple side-channel parameters [231] or combine logic testing and SCA for directed pattern generation [232]. There are also efforts in developing “golden-free” solutions by estimating the golden signature through simulation [233] or comparing the signatures collected at different time windows [234].

3) *Design-for-Trust (DFS) Techniques*: DFS techniques insert dedicated logic to facilitate HT detection. Some techniques add dummy flip flops and testing points to improve the controllability and observability of internal nodes to accelerate the Trojan activation process [235]. Another type of DFS techniques inserts circuit infrastructure, such as ROs [236] and current sensors [237], to facilitate production screening and on-site monitoring of HT-infected chips or favor SCA-based HT detection. DFS techniques can also be applied to make HT insertion more difficult while detection easier as demonstrated in [238].

4) *Runtime Monitoring Techniques*: Due to the NP-completeness of several testing problems (e.g., controllability, observability, and automatic test pattern generation (ATPG)), it is impossible to guarantee that HTs can be completely eliminated before device deployment. Thus, it is desirable to employ runtime monitoring techniques to detect and prevent HT attacks in security critical systems. This can be done by monitoring critical signals [239], dynamic power [240], or EM radiation [241] and even through hardware-assisted formal approach [223].

5) *3PIP Trojan Detection*: The majority of HT detection methods use Trojan benchmarks for evaluating their effectiveness. The task of detecting unknown HTs in 3PIP is more challenging due to the lack of knowledge about the Trojan implementation. The coverage of functional testing, locality of switching probability analysis, and noise from process variation add difficulty to this process. Functional [242], [243] and security verification [224], [244]–[248] techniques are promising, with detection rate dependent on the quality of the properties. Unfortunately, specifying the right property for Trojan detection is a nontrivial task for 3PIP. Techniques for identifying HTs by matching the design structural [249] or control data flow [250] features to existing templates are reliably provided that the features of the Trojans are included in the feature library. New HTs that have not yet been reported may evade detection. Techniques that deploy on-chip monitors can still protect critical security assets from malicious activities triggered by unknown HTs [251], but full chip protection is infeasible due to the high design overheads.

6) *HT Prevention Techniques*: HT prevention techniques aim to make HT insertion more difficult or ideally impossible. *Logic obfuscation*, *split manufacturing*, and *structural obfuscation* are three common Trojan prevention techniques.

*Logic obfuscation* techniques, initially proposed for IP protection, can also be leveraged as a HT prevention approach. Without the correct key, the functionality of the obfuscated circuit is locked to the untrusted foundry. This renders HT insertion a difficult task [252], [253].

*Split manufacturing* can also help to prevent malicious design modification. It separates a design layout into front end of line (FEOL) and back end of line (BEOL) portions, which will be fabricated by trusted and untrusted foundries, respectively. Without information about the BEOL portion, it is difficult for the untrusted foundry to embed a useful HT [254].

*Structural obfuscation* transforms the design structure in order to hide its functionality and make the structure nonobvious/noninterpretable by an adversary. This renders RE harder, which thwarts malicious component/Trojan insertion. By considering the tradeoff between design metrics, such as area, delay, and power during high-level transformations (HLTs), Lao and Parhi [255] obfuscated DSP circuits with huge structural alterations against RE and HT attacks without compromising their original functionality.

Hierarchical contiguous folding (HCF) is used to fold  $X$  cascaded stages to one hardware module, and  $N$  operations inside one stage to a hardware FU. All operations of one stage are performed before the next stage of operations. Different modes can be implemented by varying the number of stages in the cascaded structure. Some modes produce functionally invalid outputs but are otherwise meaningful from signal processing perspective. Other modes produce nonmeaningful outputs. Manifold meaningful and nonmeaningful modes are regulated through configured data. The functional mode of a DSP design is activated by applying a valid key to an FSM. If an invalid key or wrong configured data is applied, different modes will result in many equivalent circuits to obscure the DSP design structure.

Compiler-based HLTs [256] are an alternative approach that targets mainly loop-based DSP applications to achieve structural obfuscation. The exploitable HLTs include redundant operation elimination (ROE) by eliminating nodes in CDFG with matching inputs and operation type, logic transformation by altering some operation types in CDFG without changing the functionality, tree height transformation (THT) by parallelizing some sequential operations, loop unrolling by unrolling the loop body to reduce latency, and loop invariant code motion by moving noniterative operations out of the loop. The aforementioned compiler-based techniques considerably transform the CDFG and alter the RTL datapath of the DSP application post HLS. The latter alteration includes changes in the size and number of MUXes and DeMUXes, changes in the interconnectivity of FUs with MUXes and DeMUXes, change in the number of storage elements (registers), etc. By integrating particle swarm optimization-based design space exploration (PSO-DSE) framework with the HLS process [256], the transformed/obfuscated graph can be scheduled with the optimal resource constraints, which minimizes the cost of the structurally obfuscated design. THT-based [257] and hybrid transformations-based [258] structural obfuscations are also applied to protect the JPEG codec hardware accelerators and fault secured DSP designs, respectively.

## F. ML-Assisted Solutions

Defenses against hardware security threats leveraging ML are mainly bifold.

1) *ML for Detection*: IC counterfeiting and HTs are two emerging threats to the IC manufacturing industry. In both cases, defective or malicious entities are injected as part of the system. Traditional inspection methods can be either very time-consuming or ineffective. As a result, ML models are used to automate the inspection procedure. Parametric measurements collected from on-chip sensors can be analyzed and classified using support vector machines (SVMs) to identify recycled ICs [259]. SVMs can also be utilized for real-time HT detection [14]. Additionally, various ML models, such as SVM, random forest, and multilayer perceptron (MLP), have been applied to counter microarchitectural SCAs [15].

2) *ML for Robust Architecture Design*: Systems with robust designs stay ahead of security threats. Various designs attempt to combine ML and system characteristics. Yang *et al.* [102] leveraged the memristor's obsolescence effect to design a secure neuromorphic computing system. Shan *et al.* [260] proposed an ML-assisted power compensation circuit that enhances the SCA-resistant capability with a smaller area and lower power overhead compared to traditional methods.

## G. Countermeasures Against DNN Attacks

Most countermeasures against adversarial attacks on DNN can be dichotomized into proactive and reactive categories. The former intends to improve model robustness while the latter aims to detect adversarial inputs.

1) *Proactive Measures*: Proactive measures are carried out offline by three methods. *Adversarial training* retrains the model with off-the-shelf adversarial examples added into the original training data set. Apart from the cost of crafting malicious images from known techniques, it is also limited by the assumption that the attacker is restricted to techniques that are known to the defender. *Gradient masking* hides the gradient information from the adversaries. One example is to extract the probability vectors of a pretrained model as soft labels to build a distilled model with the same architecture [261]. *Input transformation* inhibits the adversarial effect by linear dimensionality reduction. In [262], principal component analysis is used to project the original data to the training data. Instead of building a fresh model specialized for the projected inputs, MagNet [263] reconstructs the inputs using autoencoders before it is trained with sufficient clean examples to move the tampered images toward the legitimate distribution. Hardware-oriented countermeasures have also been proposed to increase the robustness of the DNN model. *Defensive quantization* protects neural networks against adversarial attacks by controlling the Lipschitz constant of the network during quantization [264]. The hardware efficiency for small bitwidth data is still preserved.

2) *Reactive Measures*: Instead of passively regularizing model parameters in black box setting, reactive methods detect the adversarial inputs for follow-up actions. These methods can be divided into three main types: a) sample statistics; b) detector training; and c) prediction inconsistency. *Sample*




Fig. 5. SPN Dash framework [266].

*Statistics* use features, such as density estimates calculated from the activations of the last hidden layer and Bayesian uncertainty extracted directly from the dropout layer, to detect illegitimate points lying far from and nearby the natural data manifold [265]. Nixon *et al.* [266] utilized the sensor pattern noise (SPN) of the device for adversarial examples detection. The SPN Dash system, shown in Fig. 5, is introduced before the classification phase to detect adversarial perturbations after the image compression and submission stage. In Fig. 5,  $I_{enc}$ ,  $SPN_{cur}$ , and  $SPN_{dev}$  denote an input image after the image compression stage, the SPN of the current submitted  $I_{enc}$ , and a reference SPN for a specific device, respectively. The main constraints for the generalization of this method are the susceptibility of SPN detector and device-dependent estimation accuracy. *Detector training* augments the DNN subnetworks as adversarial input detector [267]. The additional module is trained by freezing the parameters of the original model to perform binary classification between the clean and adversarial inputs. This defense requires massive adversarial examples for training, and is prone to over generalization of adversarial attacks. *Prediction inconsistency* uses the degree of consensus among multiple models for the prediction of adversarial attacks. Wang *et al.* [268] integrated mutation and statistic hypothesis testing into the detection algorithm. As adversarial images are more sensitive to the model mutants than clean images, label change rate (LCR) is defined to assess the mutation sensitivity of DNN mutants. Statistic hypothesis testing is then applied to determine the cleanliness of the input based on its LCR. Cognizant of the greater freedom to adversarial abuse offered by the unnecessarily large feature space, Xu *et al.* [269] determines if an input is benign or adversarial by comparing the classification results of the initial and squeezed inputs against a predetermined threshold.

3) *Other Hardware-Oriented Measures*: DNN models are typically implemented on Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) and application-specific accelerator platforms. The former has greater agility while the latter is more energy efficient. It is common to have the model training performed on GPUs with the inference executed in dedicated DNN accelerators. Thus, it is important to port defense algorithms into DNN accelerators

to secure embedded intelligence. Most of the aforementioned countermeasures that target single precision floating-point arithmetic DNN implementation on GPU platform may not have considered the effects of fixed-point arithmetic and quantization on hardware accelerated DNN. Although truncated models have been used for the evaluation of the countermeasures proposed in [270] and [271], they are simulated under the GPU environment without physically integrated into the accelerator. Rouhani *et al.* [272] proposed the first end-to-end hardware accelerated detection framework that falls under the category of sample statistics. It exploits the possible adversarial subspaces spanned by the intermediate output feature maps through the modular robust redundancy that architecturally mirrors the victim DNN model. An automated customization tool has also been developed for different resource-constrained platforms while maximizing the effectiveness of the defense. However, this defense was only tested on small scale classification. The complexity of the detection algorithm may increase substantially with more complex DNN models for large-scale classification. To address this cost and performance tradeoff, DNNGuard [273] is proposed. It is an elastic heterogeneous DNN accelerator architecture that enables simultaneous execution of the victim network and the detection network. It is also scalable to the implementation of various existing detection algorithms. Unfortunately, DNNGuard was also evaluated by simulation instead of physical implementation.

## V. HARDWARE SECURITY TOOLS

### A. Security Verification Tools

Security verification tools for hardware/software systems have been surveyed in [30]. We summarize a few projects from the hardware side and also present some recent advances.

1) *Academia Tools*: One of the earliest hardware security verification tools was developed by the gate-level information flow tracking (GLIFT) [274] project. It establishes the fundamental theories of hardware information flow tracking (IFT) by providing tracking logic formalization [275], [276] and complexity theories [277]. GLIFT has been employed to prove strong isolation in computer architecture [278], identify timing channel [47], and detect HTs [224]. The GLIFT project has evolved to higher level IFT methods such as register-transfer-level IFT (RTLIFT) [279] due the verification performance bottlenecks at the gate level.

Similar to GLIFT, RTLIFT [279], Clepsydra [280], and VeriSketch [152] are a set of secure hardware design tools that employ fine-granularity security labels and label propagation policies to measure the flow of information but target RTL Verilog designs. RTLIFT has observed  $\sim 5X$  improvement in verification performance as compared to GLIFT. Clepsydra provides a formal model for timing-only information flow and allows proving constant time properties in order to detect timing channels in caches and cryptographic cores. VeriSketch employs the sketch technique to automatically synthesize hardware designs that satisfy desired security properties such as confidentiality, integrity and constant time. Like GLIFT, the information flow security models developed by these projects are described in standard HDL while the security assertions are

written in standard property specification languages, e.g., SVA. This allows hardware security verification to be performed under standard EDA verification environments.

The PCH-IP and VeriCoq projects provide several tools for verifying IP security and trust [245]–[247]. These tools define rules for converting RTL Verilog design to Coq<sup>1</sup> semantic circuit models. They use the Coq theorem prover to formally verify confidentiality properties on the Coq circuit models in order to detect malicious design modifications. VeriCoq [245] has recently been extended to the transistor level to verify the security of analog/mix-signal designs and detect analog HTs [281]. However, these projects tend to employ conservative rules to model information flow security behaviors, which can lead to false alarms in security verification.

SecVerilog [282] is an open-source hardware security tool for proving timing noninterference [283] and eliminating timing channels in RTL designs. It incorporates a type system into Verilog and a timing label to verify information flow security at compile time. Timing noninterference is enforced by checking type rules. The SecVerilog tool has been extended to support mutable dependent types to solve the implicit downgrading problem [284] and the chisel HDL. SecChisel [285] can be used to create secure architectures, synthesize secure cryptographic accelerators, and capture information leaks caused by hardware security flaws, timing channels, and HTs through type checking.

2) *Commercial Tools*: EDA and hardware security companies have also released several secure hardware design tools.

*Mentor graphics securecheck* is a security path verification tool running on top of the *Questa Formal* verification engine [286]. It uses assertion-based formal verification to prove confidentiality and integrity properties in order to identify risky paths that will lead to security property violations.

*JasperGold security path verification* [287] is a hardware security formal verification tool from *Cadence*. The tool runs on top of the *JasperGold Formal Verification Platform*. It employs sensitivity analysis to model the flow of information in SoC designs and identify insecure design paths that can lead to tampering or leakage of critical information [288].

*Prospect* is a hardware security formal verification tool from *Tortuga Logic*. It uses GLIFT [274] to generate logic that tracks information flow through the circuit. That logic can then be analyzed by any functional verification tool to prove security properties [277]. The IFT logic is used solely for design time verification; no additional logic is added to the final circuit. *Radix-S* [289] and *Radix-M* [290] are another two hardware security tools from *Tortuga Logic*. *Radix-S* performs IFT-based hardware security simulation while *Radix-M* performs hardware security emulation. Emulation allows for the verification of system properties across the entire SoC. Furthermore, it enables verification of properties that span across software, firmware, and hardware interactions, i.e., the “HardFails” [291].

*Synopsys* focuses more on reliability and functional safety verification. The *CustomSim* [292] is a tool set for device-level and interconnect reliability analysis, including infrared radiation drop, current density and electromigration, and device aging. The *VC functional safety manager* [293] performs failure modes and effect analysis, unified fault campaigns management, annotation and calculation of metrics for the failure modes, and effects and diagnostic analysis.

## B. Security-Driven Hardware Design Tools

There is a recent move toward developing security-driven hardware design tools. DARPA has recently launched the *SSITH* and *AISS* projects. Both aim to develop secure hardware design tools that allow security to be evaluated along with traditional design parameters.

Urdahl *et al.* [294] proposed a property-driven design flow. Abstract properties are specified from the system level and refined along the design process in order to provide a formal relationship between an abstract system model and its concrete implementation at the RTL. In a property-driven solution to hardware security [20], high-level security specification is translated to lower level security policy, property, assertion, and constraints in order to allow security to be formally verified on more concrete design models. This is demonstrated by a property specific approach to information flow security verification [295]. He *et al.* [296] presented a security-driven placement tool for EM side channel protection. The idea is to create an EM leakage model and use this model to guide data-dependent register reallocation. Takarabt *et al.* [297] proposed a presilicon evaluation methodology and tool that allow security verification to be run side by side with functional verification. The tool identifies vulnerabilities and the precise line of code where the vulnerability lies with additional characterization such as severity. Recent advances are also witnessed in security-driven metrics, models, and computer-aided design (CAD) flows that integrate logic encryption, split manufacturing, and camouflaging for secure hardware design [298], [299].

In [21], it is argued that security should be taken as an architectural design constraint in addition to time, space, and power. This motivates a security-aware design flow starting from the choice of security primitives, protocols, and architecture. Knechtel *et al.* [22] provided a comprehensive analysis about the role of EDA on hardware security. They identify the challenges yet to be resolved in effective compilation of security assumptions and constraints across different levels of abstraction, modeling and evaluation of hardware security metrics, and holistic synthesis of security countermeasures without causing side-effects.

## VI. POTENTIAL RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

### A. System and Architecture Security

System designers are constantly trying to balance the delicate tradeoff between performance, power, and area. They must now add security as another optimization criteria! Unfortunately, measuring “security” is a challenging but crucial aspect of hardware design. Security metrics are essential

<sup>1</sup>An iterative theorem prover named after its principal developer, Thierry Coquand.

for any sort of vulnerability analysis, threat mitigation, and security verification. An ideal metric provides a precise measure of the severity of the threat. Security is a multifaceted notion covering a wide range of threat models. Therefore, it is unlikely that one metric can cover all threat models. Thus, we need different metrics to understand the various threats. Metrics that can combine multiple different threat models and can model a high dimension space are valuable. Metrics that provide relative comparisons between different design options are also extremely useful in making architectural design decisions [41]. IFT is a powerful and one of the most popular metrics for hardware security verification, but it enforces binary properties (flow or no flow). Quantitative IFT helps provide some finer resolution for security threat modeling [300].

Debugging is another important but overlooked aspect of hardware security. This is particularly challenging at the system and architectural level due to the complexity of the design and the interactions with many disparate software and hardware components. When verification uncovers a security vulnerability, as it inevitably will do, designers require techniques to help localize the source of this vulnerability and suggestions on how to redesign the system to mitigate the vulnerability. This is particularly important for vulnerabilities that involve both hardware and software.

### B. IoT and Cyber-Physical Security

Security of IoT and CPS are becoming increasingly important. This is due to: 1) these systems interact with the physical world, and hence security issues in these systems may lead to major safety concerns and 2) these systems are designed and manufactured under tight cost and time constraints, which typically do not allow them to go through rigorous security design and verification process. Generally, these systems include a hardware layer that consists of sensors and actuators, electronic components for communication, control and information processing, and a software stack. The hardware layer serves as the root of trust for the entire system. Manufacturers of these systems often use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components for the hardware layer and many open-source software modules in the software stack due to the cost/time constraints. Moreover, these systems tend to incorporate “smartness” through integration of various AI techniques that enable them to act autonomously as well as adapt to an operating environment.

Due to their distinctive properties, these systems will require significant rethinking in how security solutions—both design and verification—can be effectively integrated into them. Specific research directions will include: 1) systematic integration of security in IoT/CPS that considers the varying requirements of the target applications (e.g., power, performance, and cost) with focus on automatic design/verification tools that enables tradeoff between security and other design parameters; 2) security of the sensor/actuator subsystem; 3) security of the COTS components, since they come through an untrusted supply chain, thus being subject to counterfeiting and various tampering attacks; and 4) security of the AI and ML

techniques employed in these systems. Additionally, there will be increasing need for quantifying the security of these systems through development of appropriate, easy-to-use and easy-to-understand metrics.

### C. ML for Hardware Security and Security of ML

ML models can be used to launch or defend attacks against hardware entities. Current ML-assisted countermeasures rely mostly on preliminary models such as SVMs, possibly due to the scale of the problem and limited training data. As the attacks are continuously being developed, more complex ML models such as DNNs may emerge for the prowess in data processing, which in turn requires a large amount of training data. Therefore, unsupervised learning can be a potential key to the problem as labeled data are usually much more valuable than unlabeled raw data. Furthermore, more effort is needed to direct ML-assisted methodologies toward robust architecture design than anomaly detection, since the damage has already been done in the latter case.

Conversely, AI hardware are themselves vulnerable. Although practical constraints, such as limited accessibility and custom hardware optimization, can reduce the success rate of adversarial attacks, RE and potential exploitation of backdoor or flaws through deployed hardware accessibility and unreliable supply chains of IC design remain the valid threats. Existing detection-based countermeasures mostly focus on software-level using off-line analyses, which are often too late for remedy, especially in real-time safety-critical applications. More research effort is desired in built-in resilience against adversarial examples and protection of hardware DNN against theft of confidential trained model through queries or side channels without compromising efficiency and accuracy. Modern primitives for securing hardware, such as PUF, obfuscation, and metering, may be embedded into the deep learning hardware to help monitor or control access to sensitive assets. However, without considering the intrinsic weaknesses of DNN implementation, the overhead and performance penalty may be unacceptable. It boils down to having a hardware-supported solution that takes unique attributes of DNNs into account at design time for system-level defense. Another challenge is the evaluation of the protection measures on large-scale data sets and complex models. More attention needs to be paid in the scalability of defense methodologies. Unfortunately, the opaque nature of deep learning has worsened the defender’s situation. This calls for a learning paradigm shift from data driven to knowledge driven for explainability enhancement. Explainability is the ability to provide reasons for a specific decision derived by the AI. It can be evaluated by interpretability and completeness. Interpretability aims at describing inner operations in a simpler way while completeness measures the level of preciseness for an explanation. The dilemma is a highly interpretable system that is usually weak in prediction whereas a precise description is often hardly understandable. The tremendous computations involved in deep learning processing have added resistivity to provide explanations for its decision. The core of processing explainability enhancement is, therefore, to reduce the

operational complexity of the target DNN by, for instance, constructing a saliency map to underline the most influential operations.

### D. Security-Driven EDA

State-of-the-art EDA flow takes functional correctness and performance budgets as primary design constraints. Incorporating security as an additional dimension of the hardware design space and enabling security properties to be evaluated along with traditional design parameters are a promising yet challenging research direction for both the hardware security and EDA communities. We need to develop more standardized hardware security models to allow security properties to be mapped and verified across different levels of abstractions. In addition, we need to derive effective security metrics to measure security as a quantifiable design variable.

## VII. CONCLUSION

Hardware security involves multiple levels of abstraction in the computing system stack. In view of the enormously broad focus and attractivity of this field, it is not possible to comprehensively survey the voluminous publications, multidisciplinary and vast diversity of problems and solutions in one paper. In this article, we surveyed and discussed the recent advances in selective subfields of hardware security. Specifically, we presented attacks and countermeasures on secure architectures, IP components, and DNN models, as well as the design and niche applications of two popular hardware-intrinsic security primitives. We also outlined recent efforts in developing security-driven hardware design tools. Hardware attacks and countermeasures are rapidly evolving. It is not surprising that a different shortest bar of the wooden barrel can be identified with each major change in processor architectures and computing technologies. We believe that the rally between hardware attack and defense will remain a vibrant presence for a long time. It is, therefore, our aim that this review will alert the hardware designers and tool developers to pay additional attention to significant security gaps not addressable by traditional hardware design and verification methodologies.

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