AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

ISSN: 0096-3445

2024, Vol. 153, No. 8, 2043–2067
https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001608

Interdependent Versus Independent Inconsistency: Cultural Differences in How East Asian and Western People Attribute Hypocrisy

Minjae Seo[1], Shoko Watanabe[1, 2], Young-Hoon Kim[3], and Sean M. Laurent[1, 4]
[1] Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign
[2] Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham
[3] Department of Psychology, Yonsei University
[4] Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University

Humans worldwide have long deplored hypocrisy, a concept that has been mentioned in texts dating back 100–1,000 years (e.g., the Analects of Confucius, the Tao Te Ching, the Bible, and the Qur'an). However, what influences the extent of hypocrisy attribution or counts as hypocrisy may differ as a function of culture. Previous studies have shown that Westerners attribute greater hypocrisy for within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency than East Asians. Building on this, we predict that East Asians' (vs. Westerners') hypocrisy attribution is more heavily influenced by social relationships. Consistent with past research, this can lead to greater leniency. However, as we show, this can also result in the novel finding we present that attributions of mild-to-moderate hypocrisy are made even when no explicit within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency is present. Across six experiments, we found that Koreans (vs. participants from the United States) attributed more hypocrisy to attitude-contradicting behavior when the person enacting the behavior was not the person who stated the attitude but was someone who shared social bonds with that person (i.e., cross-person, within-relationship attitude–behavior inconsistency; "relational hypocrisy"). Specifically, Koreans attributed more hypocrisy than Americans when a child's behavior contradicted their parent's views (Experiments 1a and 1b) or when attitude-contradicting behavior was enacted by the child of a close friend (Experiment 2). Experiments 3–5 replicated the findings from Experiments 1–2 using additional social contexts (e.g., a spousal relationship). Supplementary analyses showed that differences in hypocrisy attribution between Americans and Koreans were mediated by cultural differences in their perceptions of shared responsibility within relationships.

Public Significance Statement

Accusations of hypocrisy are leveled daily at public figures such as politicians and business leaders to suggest that their actions are not consistent with their previously stated attitudes. These accusations can lead to serious consequences for the accused. Yet, within Eastern cultures (e.g., for Koreans), hypocrisy can be attributed even when one's behavior remains consistent with one's past words, based on the actions of someone who is socially connected to the speaker. This suggests that hypocrisy may be an even more flexible concept than previously thought and serves as a caution that monitoring one's own behavior might not be enough to ward off accusations of hypocrisy, depending on the cultural context.

Keywords: hypocrisy, inconsistency, moral judgment, culture, independent vs. interdependent self

Supplemental materials: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001608.supp

This article was published Online First June 27, 2024.

Aysecan Boduroglu served as action editor.

Minjae Seo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7372-7249
Shoko Watanabe https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6118-1736
Young-Hoon Kim https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0167-749X
Sean M. Laurent https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0130-7867

This research was supported by the Yonsei University Signature Research Cluster Program (Grants 2021-22-0005 and 2022-22-0006) awarded to Young-Hoon Kim. The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Experiment 1a was presented as a flash talk at the Justice and Morality Preconference of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology in 2021. Experiments 2–4 were preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/ZGH_38T, https://aspredicted.org/63F_LL9, and https://aspredicted.org/1BL_8J3). Data, analysis codes, and research materials are available at https://osf.io/3zm7e/?view_only=89189691c55b4a45a86cf38ed936257b.

Minjae Seo played a lead role in conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, investigation, methodology, project administration, visualization, and writing–original draft and an equal role in writing–review and editing. Shoko Watanabe played a supporting role in data curation, investigation, methodology, and writing–review and editing and an equal role in conceptualization. Young-Hoon Kim played a supporting role in data curation, methodology, and writing–review and editing and an equal role in funding acquisition and resources. Sean M. Laurent played a lead role in funding acquisition, resources, supervision, and writing–review and editing, a supporting role in writing–original draft, conceptualization, data curation, formal analysis, investigation, and methodology, and an equal role in project administration.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sean M. Laurent, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, 140 Moore Building, University Park, PA 16802, United States. Email: slaurent@psu.edu

In October 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the names most frequently mentioned in Korean media was Kyung-Hwa Kang. This individual, a foreign minister of South Korea, was accused of "flagrant hypocrisy" (E. Kim & Roh, 2020) by both liberals and conservatives, even coming under pressure to resign. Her only transgression was that her *husband* flew to the United States to buy himself a yacht, in defiance of *her* ministry's advice that all but essential travel overseas should be limited during the pandemic (Ahn, 2020). The criticism continued though she apologized for her husband's behavior and explained that she tried her best to persuade him not to go on the trip, suggesting she disapproved of this behavior.

This charge of hypocrisy against Minister Kang in South Korea could not have been anticipated solely based on prior conceptualizations of hypocrisy, which has been mostly conducted in Western cultural contexts. Western researchers have often defined a hypocrite as a person who says one thing and then does something that contradicts what they said earlier (e.g., Barden et al., 2005; Jordan et al., 2017; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Although other factors such as attitude strength and the public–private nature of where behaviors are enacted influence the extent to which hypocrisy is attributed (Alicke et al., 2013; Laurent & Clark, 2019), the broad conclusion seems to be that hypocrisy is primarily attributed to people based on their failing to "practice what they preach" (i.e., within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency). However, Minister Kang did not violate her ministry's advice in any way, and in fact, she tried to stop her husband from behaving as he did. There was no within-person inconsistency between her words and actions. What, then, led Korean people to accuse her of being a hypocrite? Although some research on hypocrisy perception has been conducted outside of the West (e.g., Effron, Markus, et al., 2018), the literature has not yet provided insight into this question.

We believe that cultural differences in the weight people place on social relationships when judging hypocrisy can help answer this question. Recent studies have shown that despite a tendency in both Western and East Asian cultures to attribute hypocrisy as a function of within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency, Westerners focus more on how individuals' actions contradict their own previously expressed beliefs; East Asians care more about social relationships, which may attenuate moral condemnation because of different assumptions about selfish intentions (e.g., Effron, Markus, et al., 2018). Extending this, we hypothesize that contrary to previous findings, East Asians' (vs. Westerners) greater emphasis on social relationships can in some cases lead to stronger relative attributions of hypocrisy. Specifically, when one person's attitude is contradicted by a second person's behavior, this might increase hypocrisy more for East Asians than Westerners when those two people are in a close relationship (e.g., romantic partners). For convenience, we label this relational hypocrisy.

The present research contextualizes these predictions by considering how cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution might emerge as a function of how people from East Asian (vs. Western) cultures tend to construe the self as more interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). We first address the question of why studying hypocrisy cross-culturally is important and discuss the ways that this concept has been traditionally understood. We then review research on cultural differences in the construal of self and others as a way of understanding how these differences could theoretically impact attribution of hypocrisy, before turning to work that has examined cultural differences in perception of self-consistency and self-inconsistency, which in some cases involves consideration of others beyond the self. Finally, we introduce the present research, which integrates these past findings into a set of theoretical predictions.

Why Study Hypocrisy Cross-Culturally?

The concept of hypocrisy is not only old but is represented in a wide range of cultures from across the world. As one example, a quick internet search finds words for hypocrisy in Arabic, Chinese, Czech, Filipino, French, Hindi, Hungarian, Korean, Kurdish, Romanian, Russian, Polish, Punjabi, Spanish, Swahili, Yiddish, Yoruba, and Zulu. Given its wide temporal, geographical, and linguistic reach, it appears that hypocrisy is likely an important evaluative dimension for people everywhere.

Although the power of hypocrisy has sometimes been harnessed for positive behavioral change (e.g., Aronson et al., 1991; Dickerson et al., 1992; Fointiat, 2004; Stone et al., 1994; Stone & Fernandez, 2008), how hypocrisy is reviled is particularly interesting. For example, people really do not like hypocrites (Barden et al., 2005; Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Jordan et al., 2017), view hypocrites as immoral (Laurent & Clark, 2019; Monin & Merritt, 2012), and believe them to be more deserving of punishment than nonhypocritical transgressors (Laurent et al., 2014). Hypocritical leaders are seen as less effective and worthy of support than nonhypocritical leaders (Kreps et al., 2017), and scandals involving hypocrisy cause more severe harm to politicians' and companies' reputations than scandals where no hypocrisy is involved (Bhatti et al., 2013; Smith & Rhiney, 2020; Wagner et al., 2009). Together, these findings suggest that people are quite sensitive to hypocrisy and that there can be serious real-world consequences of being perceived as a hypocrite.

Drawing these conclusions first requires that researchers have some insight into what makes people attribute hypocrisy. Prototypically, hypocrisy involves a person publicly suggesting how others should or should not behave and then behaving in a way that is inconsistent with this proclamation (Alicke et al., 2013; Laurent & Clark, 2019). This theme of "inconsistency," examined in varying forms, has been a fundamental element in the study of hypocrisy, whether it is the inconsistency of trying to appear moral while avoiding the costs of morality (Batson et al., 1997; Batson & Thompson, 2001), of saying one thing and then doing another (Barden et al., 2005; Effron & Miller, 2015; Effron, O'Connor, et al., 2018), of making a moral claim and then reversing it (Kreps et al., 2017), of judgments for others (or outgroup members) that are harsher than for the self (or an ingroup member) for the same behavior (Lammers, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007, 2008), and of an agent behaving in a way that is at odds with expectations for their behavior (Laurent et al., 2014). Indeed, greater hypocrisy perception involves negative attributions about inconsistency (Cha & Edmondson, 2006; Effron, O'Connor, et al., 2018). For example, people condemn inconsistency as hypocrisy to the extent that they believe a person is falsely signaling their virtue (Jordan et al., 2017) or trying to claim undeserved moral benefits (O'Connor et al., 2020).

Yet, although the role of inconsistency in hypocrisy is beginning to be understood, our understanding is primarily derived from a Western conception of the concept, where people are generally viewed as independent entities that are mostly responsible only for their own behavior. In particular, Western notions of the self as

autonomous lead to the belief that others' behaviors are primarily determined by their own motives, values, and interests (Markus, 2016). However, in interdependent cultures, the self is seen as nested within a larger context of interdependency that highlights group memberships and relationships with significant others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Triandis, 1989), and people are expected to pay greater attention to social contexts and adjust their attitudes and behaviors in response to them (Markus, 2016). Accordingly, the interdependent self-view regards individuals as less coherent and as possessing less causal agency while simultaneously expecting greater coherence within relationships and shared responsibility within groups (Tsukamoto et al., 2015).

Given that the attribution of hypocrisy fundamentally results from perception of inconsistency between the claimed and actual selves, these cultural differences in self-construal and the understanding of individual and collective agencies suggest the need to examine the concept of hypocrisy through a cultural lens. For example, one might ask whether a political leader in the United States would be accused of hypocrisy to the same extent as Minister Kang, the Korean foreign minister mentioned earlier.

Cultural Differences in Construal of Self and Other

Culture plays a vital role in shaping people's understanding of the self, and how people perceive and judge themselves and others can be influenced (and is frequently even determined) by how they construe the concept of the self (Dweck et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). The individualistic nature of culture in places like North America and Western Europe, where independence, uniqueness, and autonomy are highly valued, is thought to foster an independent self-construal (Triandis, 1995, 2018). This leads people in Western cultures to view the self as being separate and distinct from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010), with people's internal attributes seen as unchanging across time and situations (Church et al., 2005). These internal attributes are viewed as referents or guides for people's decisions about how to behave (Markus & Kitayama, 2010), which leads to the assumption that people's behaviors come from and *should* come from internal attributes (Markus, 2016; Riemer et al., 2014).

In contrast, the more collectivistic nature of non-Western cultures (e.g., in regions like Asia and Latin America) emphasizes relationships and groups, with norms in place to help maintain those relationships and groups (Triandis, 1995, 2018). As part of this, people from these cultures are encouraged to take others' perspectives, fit with others, and adjust to social contexts (Cohen & Gunz, 2002; H. Kim & Markus, 1999; H. S. Kim et al., 2006; Y.-H. Kim et al., 2010; Tsai et al., 2007). This focus also leads them to have an interdependent self-construal, which involves viewing the self as connected with and related to others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010). With this self-construal, people believe that important parts of themselves are shared with their close others (Cross et al., 2000) and, as such, assume a more contextually determined self (Choi & Choi, 2002; English & Chen, 2007; E. M. Suh, 2002) and a more frequent use of social cues to guide behaviors and understand others (Markus & Kitayama, 2010).

The impacts of cultural differences in self-construal are well-documented. For example, when making career decisions, Chinese university students are more likely to consult with others and follow their advice than American university students (Guan et al., 2015). Even for life-or-death medical decisions, East Asians are more likely to believe that family members should be involved in patients' decisions than Westerners (Al-Bahri et al., 2018; Gabbay et al., 2005). The tendency for people to overemphasize other individuals' dispositions or internal attributes when explaining their behavior (i.e., the fundamental attribution error; Ross, 1977) has been widely supported in research conducted in Western cultural contexts (e.g., Andrews, 2001; Forgas, 1998; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Nisbett et al., 1973; O'Sullivan, 2003; Ross, 1977; cf. Krull et al., 1999) but found to be significantly attenuated in East Asian cultural contexts (Choi et al., 1999; Norenzayan & Nisbett, 2000). East Asians tend to consider situational factors much more than Americans when explaining other individuals' behavior (Choi et al., 2003; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Norenzayan et al., 2002). Meanwhile, however, when a group is an agent, the pattern is reversed, with East Asians more likely than Westerners to attribute responsibility to a group for an outcome (Menon et al., 1999).

Cultural Differences in the Perception of Self-(In)consistency

Cultural differences in self-construal extend to perceptions of self-(in)consistency. Indeed, seminal psychological research on self-(in)consistency is premised on the idea that individuals should strive to behave in a way that is consistent with their thoughts. For example, this tendency was considered to be a vital feature underlying the maintenance of psychological well-being (Jourard, 1963; Rogers, 1951), with the concept of cognitive dissonance predicated on conflicts between one's thoughts or feelings and behaviors causing psychological discomfort and motivating people to resolve the discrepancies (Festinger, 1957).

Importantly, these conclusions are mostly based on work with European American samples. In East Asian samples, these findings are weaker or sometimes not found (e.g., Church et al., 2008; Kitayama et al., 2004; E. M. Suh, 2002; E. Suh et al., 1998). However, people from East Asian cultures do show and expect high consistency *within* social contexts. For example, English and Chen (2007) found that Asian Americans behave differently in different situations and relationships but similarly within each situation or relationship. Spencer-Rodgers et al. (2007) similarly showed that when a hypothetical group (called Snoets) was described as having certain characteristics (e.g., creative, adventurous), Chinese people were more likely than Americans to believe that individual members of the group possessed personality traits consistent with the group traits (e.g., creative).

Studies investigating cultural moderators of cognitive dissonance have also found that unlike people from Western cultures, those from East Asian cultures do not engage in dissonance reduction when a discrepancy between their thoughts and behaviors is private (Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama et al., 2004; Sakai, 1981). However, East Asians experience dissonance when a discrepancy *matters to others*, such as after being primed with significant others (Kitayama et al., 2004) or when making choices for friends (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005). Taken together, these findings indicate that when it comes to self-consistency, Westerners (vs. East Asians) experience greater distress when they behave in ways that are *internally* inconsistent (e.g., incongruent with internal attributes) or when they fail to maintain a stable personal identity across social contexts. In contrast, East Asians experience more distress when they behave in ways that are *externally* inconsistent, such as not adhering

to social norms and others' expectations, or when they fail to harmonize and connect with others.

Given cultural differences in the experience of and response to self-inconsistency as a function of differences in self-construal, and the importance of consistency to attribution of hypocrisy, it seems likely that there are cultural differences in when and why people attribute greater or lesser hypocrisy. Indeed, studies conducted in non-Western contexts have shown that people in Eastern (vs. Western) cultures are less sensitive to and more lenient of within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency. For example, Takaku et al. (2001) increased the salience of American and Japanese participants' within-person inconsistency by asking them to judge a wrongdoer after reminding them of a similar transgression they made in the past. They then examined how much the experience of dissonance induced by this within-person inconsistency affected the likelihood that people in each culture forgive the wrongdoer. Although dissonance played a role in increasing the likelihood of forgiving a wrongdoer in both countries, the effects were smaller in Japan than in the United States.

Recent studies have further found that when judging others' within-person attitude–behavior inconsistencies, participants from Asian countries show less moral condemnation and negative interpersonal reactions than those from Western countries (Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018). Potentially explaining this is how Asians attribute more socially oriented (vs. selfish) motives to inconsistent targets than Westerners (Dong et al., 2022; Effron, Markus, et al., 2018), a finding that becomes pronounced when judging high (vs. low)-status hypocrites who are considered to value their social relationships and responsibility more (Dong et al., 2022; Friedman et al., 2018). Effron, Markus, et al. (2018) posited that independent versus interdependent self-construal is the key cultural difference driving the effects. In contrast, Friedman et al. (2018) proposed that culturally different communication styles place more weight on literal meaning versus social contexts as the main cultural differences. Although focusing on different aspects of Eastern and Western cultures, a common thread in these studies is that (East) Asians value relationships and social context more than Westerners, and these differences lead to culturally varying hypocrisy attributions.

Still, the scope of these studies has been limited to a cultural analysis of hypocrisy attribution that is defined solely by within-person inconsistency. This is informative, but as our literature review has shown, within-person attitude–behavior misalignment is only one form of inconsistency. Questions therefore remain regarding the extent to which people from interdependent (vs. independent) cultures attribute hypocrisy to other forms of inconsistency. Critically, East Asians (vs. Westerners) should sometimes attribute *greater* hypocrisy as a function of cultural differences in the weight placed on social bonds. For example, when two people share a close social bond, inconsistency between what one person says and *a different person* does (i.e., cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency) might result in greater hypocrisy attributions from East Asians than Westerners, even if people within both cultures attribute greater hypocrisy overall to prototypical, within-person inconsistency.

This hypothesis does not require an overhaul of how we understand the concept of hypocrisy. Instead, it is a novel theoretical extension of how hypocrisy can be conceptualized, based on cultural differences in how the self is understood. That is, East Asians include close others, such as family, various affiliated groups, and even society, within the self-concept (Cross et al., 2003; Wu, 1994), and individuals connected to each other through these relationships are expected to share attributes and behave in accordance with each other's values and standards (Cross et al., 2002; Ott-Holland et al., 2014). Accordingly, in East Asian (vs. Western) cultures, collective agency and responsibility for one individual's (negative) behaviors are often attributed to other individuals in a relationship with them (Manchi Chao et al., 2008). Thus, although a situation in which the words and actions of two closely connected people diverge may not be seen as problematic from an independent self-perspective, it could be perceived as involving crucial incoherence from an interdependent self-perspective. Because of this, a person might not have to behave inconsistently with their own prior statements to be seen as somewhat hypocritical within interdependent cultures. Instead, when one person's actions (e.g., a child's) appear to contradict another's words (e.g., the parent's), this cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency might be enough to trigger at least some attribution of hypocrisy to the parent.

The Present Research

The present research introduces a novel paradigm wherein an agent says one thing but then a different person who is socially connected to the first agent does something that contradicts the first person's views (i.e., relational hypocrisy; see Figure 1). To our knowledge, this form of cross-person within-relationship inconsistency has never been proposed or studied in past research. We expected this type of inconsistency to be sensitive to cultural differences in interdependence versus independence, similar to within-person inconsistency. Past research has suggested that Westerners attribute greater hypocrisy than Easterners because of a greater focus on within-person inconsistency. Here, we propose a context wherein Easterners (in the present research, Koreans) will attribute greater hypocrisy than Westerners (in the present research, Americans) because of a greater focus on within-relationship inconsistency, such as when one person expresses an attitude and another person—who is socially connected to the first—behaves in a way that contradicts it.

In Experiments 1a and 1b, to ensure that the social relationship between the two agents was strong and contained some sense of shared agency and responsibility, the person stating an attitude was a parent, and the person contradicting it was their child. Because we expect that across cultures, hypocrisy attribution will be greatest when it is described in prototypical form (i.e., when a person says one thing and then does another), and this novel paradigm does not involve this form (i.e., the parent's behavior never contradicts the attitude they expressed earlier), we expected hypocrisy attribution to be relatively low overall. Importantly, however, we expected it to be particularly reduced for Americans relative to Koreans, leading to a reversal of the cultural effects that have been shown in the past. Experiment 2 explored whether East Asians would continue to attribute greater hypocrisy than Americans when within-relationship inconsistency involved a more distant social relationship (i.e., when the person whose behavior contradicts a parent's words is the child of a close friend; see Figure 1).

In Experiments 3–5, we integrated past research on within-person inconsistency into our framework by examining hypocrisy attributions for both types of inconsistency (i.e., within-person and cross-person, within-relationship) together in the same experiments and when using the same social contexts. Moreover, these experiments tested whether a cultural effect on relational hypocrisy

Figure 1
Forms of Hypocrisy Explored in Experiments 1–5



	Prototypical	Relational	Extended
Experiment 1ab		✓	
Experiment 2		✓	✓
Experiments 3-5	✓	✓	

would generalize beyond parent–child relationships by examining situations where, like the earlier example of Minister Kang, the behavior of a person's spouse contradicts that person's strongly endorsed views. In Experiment 4, we included control conditions where no inconsistency of any form was present to rule out alternative explanations for the expected effects. Finally, in Experiments 4–5, we also examined additional downstream consequences beyond hypocrisy (e.g., moral condemnation, social evaluation), including items we did not expect to be impacted by our manipulations, to further rule out alternative explanations.

Transparency and Openness

We report how we determined sample sizes, all data exclusions,[1] manipulations, and measures used. All measures used for hypothesis testing are reported and discussed in the main text, and exploratory measures and analyses are reported in the online Supplemental Materials. Experiments 2–4 were preregistered (https://aspredicted.org/ZGH_38T, https://aspredicted.org/63F_LL9, and https://aspredicted.org/1BL_8J3). Study materials, including all vignettes, questions, and scales, are available in the online Supplemental Material. Analysis codes and data for all the studies can be found at https://osf.io/3zm7e/?view_only=89189691c55b4a45a86cf38ed936257b.

Experiment 1

In Experiment 1, American and Korean participants reported their agreement that a parent was a hypocrite after the parent publicly states an attitude and their child behaves in a way that contradicts this attitude. We hypothesized that for Americans, who we argue primarily attribute hypocrisy to within-person inconsistency, an agreement that the parent was a hypocrite would be particularly low. For Koreans, however, we expected an agreement to be somewhat higher because of a greater sense that the behavior of the child represents the behavior of the parent. We also measured participants' perceptions of the parent's responsibility for their child's attitude-contradicting behavior to secondarily examine if any cultural differences in relational hypocrisy attribution could be associated with a greater tendency for Koreans (vs. Americans) to attribute responsibility to the parent for the child's behavior.

Experiment 1a

Method

Participants

We aimed to collect data from 200 participants, which would provide 80% power to detect a small-to-medium-sized effect of culture (d = 0.40). American participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were restricted to those

[1] For all studies, no substantive differences emerged from those reported when all participants were retained for analyses, except for the main effect of culture on the perception of hypocrisy in Experiment 1a. While the direction of this finding did not change, it did not reach significance when retaining nonattentive participants (p = .087).

whose IP location was in the United States. The Korean sample was recruited through PanelNow, a Korean panel service operated by dataSpring Korea Inc.[2] One hundred four Americans (M_{age} = 36.72, SD = 10.90; 51 men, 53 women) and 109 Koreans (M_{age} = 39.71, SD = 11.17; 60 men, 49 women) were recruited. In the American sample, participants' self-identified race/ethnicity was 60% White/European American, 24% Black/African American, 8% Asian/Asian American, 6% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 3% other. All Korean participants identified as Korean. Fourteen Americans and 32 Koreans were excluded for failing comprehension or quality checks,[3] leaving a final sample of N = 167.

Procedure

All materials used in Experiments 1–5 were first prepared in English. Next, they were translated into Korean by native Korean speakers and then back-translated to English to verify the comparability of content (Brislin, 1980).

To increase generalizability, two vignettes were created, and participants were randomly assigned to one of the two. In one vignette, a mother ("Jamie" "Eun-Young") with strong prolife/antiabortion views, who had never had an abortion herself, states her attitudes to a friend during a Parent Teacher Association meeting, implying that parents should teach their children these same values. Later, participants learned that Jamie's daughter, who is still in high school, had an abortion. In the other vignette, a father ("Sydney" "Young-Soo") who strongly believes that premarital sex is wrong and who did not have sex before marriage describes his beliefs to a friend, again implying that parents should teach their children the same values. Later, participants learned that Sydney's college-age unmarried daughter had been having sex with her boyfriend.

Measures

Hypocrisy. A single question asked participants about the extent to which they agreed the parent (Jamie or Sydney) was a hypocrite (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*).

Social Responsibility (α = .59). Four items were developed to assess the extent to which participants perceived the parents to be responsible for their children's behavior. One item asked for agreement (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*) with a statement: "Jamie is responsible for her daughter having an abortion (Sydney is responsible for his daughter having sex before marriage)." The other three items asked how likely it was (1 = *extremely unlikely*, 7 = *extremely likely*) that Jamie (Sydney) "taught her daughter about her pro-life, anti-abortion beliefs (taught his daughter about his beliefs that premarital sex is wrong)" (reverse-coded), "failed to teach her daughter about important values regarding abortion (failed to teach his daughter about important values regarding premarital sex)," and "taught her daughter about abortion being wrong, but her daughter disagreed with Jamie's values (or taught his daughter that sex before marriage is wrong, but his daughter disagreed with Sydney's values)" (reverse-coded).

Attitudes Toward the Issue. To check whether any cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution might be a function of different cultural attitudes about abortion or premarital sex, we asked participants to indicate their agreement with the following statement using a 7-point scale (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*): "Abortion (Premarital sex) is morally wrong."

Results and Discussion

Because no significant interactions were found between vignette and culture on hypocrisy or social responsibility (ps > .090), vignette was not included as a factor in analyses.[4] Supporting our primary hypothesis, Koreans (M = 3.22, SD = 1.82) indicated greater agreement than Americans (M = 2.57, SD = 1.78) that the parent was a hypocrite, $t(165)$ = 2.34, p = .020, d = 0.36. This provides initial evidence that Koreans are more sensitive to this novel form of hypocrisy involving inconsistency between a person's stated attitudes and the attitude-contradicting behavior of another person who is socially linked to the first person. Moreover, Koreans (M = 3.51, SD = 0.94) believed that the parents had greater social responsibility for their children's behavior than Americans (M = 2.21, SD = 0.99), $t(165)$ = 8.61, p < .001, d = 1.35. No significant cultural difference was found for attitudes toward either of the issues, ps ≥ .66. No substantive differences were found when controlling participants' attitudes toward the issues.

Mediation

We examined whether social responsibility mediated the effect of culture on hypocrisy. In the mediation model, culture (United States = 0, Korea = 1) positively predicted social responsibility (b = 1.30, p < .001), which in turn positively predicted hypocrisy (b = 0.64, p < .001). The indirect effect of culture on hypocrisy through social responsibility was significant, b = 0.83, 95% CI [0.49, 1.23].[5] The direct effect of culture on perceived hypocrisy was not significant (p = .587), suggesting that differences in perceived social responsibility fully statistically explained cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution for relational hypocrisy.

The results of Experiment 1a suggest that Koreans have a greater agreement (or lesser disagreement) that cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency is evidence of hypocrisy than Americans and that this is associated with Koreans' (vs. Americans') greater belief that parents are socially responsible for their children's behavior. When a parent says one thing (e.g., that people should not get abortions) but their child does something to contradict the parent's words (e.g., by getting an abortion), Koreans agree more that the parent is a hypocrite than Americans, suggesting that to a greater extent for Koreans, within-person inconsistency is not the only predicate for hypocrisy.

[2] Recruitment procedures for both American and Korean participants were the same in all experiments except that American participants were recruited from Prolific in Experiments 3–5.

[3] In all experiments, participants who failed comprehension or culture checks were excluded (see the online Supplemental Material for details). In Experiments 2–5, we proactively screened out nonattentive participants to reduce data loss from exclusions. In Experiments 2–3, those who failed a culture check were also proactively screened out. Thus, only responses from participants who passed the comprehension check (Experiments 4–5) or both comprehension and culture checks (Experiments 2–3) were collected and/or retained for analyses in those studies.

[4] For interested readers, we report separate results for each vignette for each experiment in the online Supplemental Material.

[5] Post hoc power analysis found that all reported mediation tests had greater than 80% power (α = .05) to detect effects (Experiments 1–3).

Experiment 1b

Experiment 1a demonstrated an effect that has not been previously documented to our knowledge: a situation in which East Asians attribute *greater* hypocrisy than Westerners for the same behavior. However, because of stronger norms for interdependency than for Americans, one possibility is that Koreans were more likely to believe that the agents *knew* their children had engaged in the same behavior they castigated. Given the documented role of knowledge in people's moral judgments (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Laurent et al., 2015), this raises the possibility that it was not interdependency norms or beliefs about parental responsibility, per se, driving Koreans' greater hypocrisy attribution. Rather, in a way that Americans did not, Koreans may have perceived that the agents had greater knowledge of their children's behavior at the time they expressed their attitudes to others, leading to a stronger belief that the agents were falsely signaling moral superiority (Jordan et al., 2017).

To test this, Experiment 1b used the same vignettes as in Experiment 1a but provided additional information by manipulating parents' knowledge about their child's behavior to be absent or present. If the cultural effects found in Experiment 1a only replicate when no information about the parents' knowledge is provided, this might suggest that it is not necessarily sensitivity to cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency that explains differences in Koreans' (vs. Americans') feelings about the parent's hypocrisy. Instead, an alternative explanation might be that Koreans felt to a greater extent that the agents (i.e., the parents) were falsely signaling their own moral superiority (Jordan et al., 2017) despite knowing their child's inconsistent behavior and therefore engaging in a form of within-person inconsistency.

In contrast, if the same cultural differences in hypocrisy are found when knowledge is explicitly described as absent, it would suggest that something unique about social relationships makes relational hypocrisy more salient to Koreans than to Americans. In addition, if Koreans again attribute greater hypocrisy than Americans in the knowledge-absent condition but this reverses in the knowledge-present condition, it could suggest in a different way that Americans (vs. Koreans) are more sensitive to inconsistency that primarily involves a target's mental states (i.e., within-person inconsistency).

Method

Participants

To account for the addition of a new factor, sample size was doubled from Experiment 1a, sufficient to capture a moderately small interaction and pairwise effects with 80% power ($\eta_p^2 = .02$, $d = .28$). We recruited 217 Americans ($M_{age} = 36.09$, $SD = 10.89$; 118 men, 99 women) and 221 Koreans ($M_{age} = 39.43$, $SD = 10.87$, 106 men, 114 women, one not disclosed). Americans self-identified as 67% White/European American, 17% Black/African American, 7% Asian/Asian American, 5% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 5% other. One person in the Korean sample did not identify as Korean and was excluded. After screening out 32 Americans and 57 Koreans who failed questions assessing their attention, the final sample size was $N = 348$.

Procedure and Measures

The participants read the same vignettes as in Experiment 1a. However, the participants were additionally randomly assigned to one of two knowledge conditions. In the knowledge-present condition, participants learned that when the parent expressed their attitude to a friend, they knew that their child had engaged in the behavior that contradicted their statement (i.e., the child had an abortion or had started having sex). In the knowledge-absent condition, participants were explicitly informed that the parent did not know about their child's behavior when they expressed their attitudes to a friend. The same measures used in Experiment 1a were used here. These included a single-item agreement measure of hypocrisy, a measure of social responsibility ($\alpha = .64$), and a measure of participants' attitudes toward the issue.

Results and Discussion

Initial analyses examined dependent measures using a 2 (culture: United States vs. Korea) × 2 (knowledge: absent vs. present) × 2 (vignette: abortion vs. premarital sex) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Because there were significant main effects of vignette on hypocrisy and social responsibility, and vignette also interacted with other factors for hypocrisy (i.e., significant three-way interaction and two-way interaction with culture), we retained vignette as a factor in further analyses. Although other analyses are also presented to clarify effects, significant interactions with culture—which were the only interactions of particular interest—were probed by examining contrasts testing the simple main effects of culture within levels of other factors.

Hypocrisy

The main effects of culture, $F(1, 340) = 10.38$, $p = .001$, $d = 0.34$; knowledge, $F(1, 340) = 19.44$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.46$; and vignette, $F(1, 340) = 15.44$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.43$, were all found. Overall, Koreans ($M = 3.23$, $SD = 1.51$) agreed more (or disagreed less) that the parents were hypocrites than Americans ($M = 2.66$, $SD = 1.83$). In addition, people believed that the parents were more hypocritical when knowledge was present ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.82$) rather than absent ($M = 2.54$, $SD = 1.50$), and people rated the parent as more hypocritical in the abortion story ($M = 3.28$, $SD = 1.84$) than in the premarital sex story ($M = 2.56$, $SD = 1.48$).

Although there were no significant two-way interactions between knowledge and vignette ($p = .341$) or culture ($p = .190$), a two-way interaction between culture and vignette was found, $F(1, 340) = 4.00$, $p = .046$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Decomposition suggested that although agreement that the parent was a hypocrite was higher in the abortion story than in the premarital sex story within both cultures, this effect was larger for Americans than for Koreans. However, the interpretation of this effect was further qualified by a significant three-way interaction, $F(1, 340) = 4.20$, $p = .041$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ (see Figure 2).

To probe this interaction, contrast analysis was used to test the two-way interaction of culture and knowledge separately within both vignette conditions. This interaction was not significant within the premarital sex condition ($p = .606$), suggesting that the greater agreement that the parent was a hypocrite from Koreans ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.45$) relative to Americans ($M = 2.15$, $SD = 1.38$) was similar across knowledge conditions. However, this interaction was significant within the abortion condition, $t(340) = 2.40$, $p = .017$. Further decomposition revealed that when knowledge was present, there was no significant effect of culture on hypocrisy for

Figure 2

Average Ratings of Agreement That the Parent Was a Hypocrite for American and Korean Participants as a Function of the Presence Versus Absence of Parental Knowledge (Experiment 1b)



Note. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. CIs = confidence intervals.

the abortion vignette ($M_{U.S.} = 3.91$, $SD = 2.29$; $M_{Korea} = 3.55$, $SD = 1.52$), $p = .278$. However, when knowledge was absent, Koreans ($M = 3.20$, $SD = 1.58$) had significantly greater agreement that the parent was a hypocrite than Americans ($M = 2.42$, $SD = 1.50$), $t(340) = 2.30$, $p = .022$, $d = 0.51$. Both of these findings—the greater endorsement that the parent was a hypocrite for Koreans versus Americans regardless of knowledge in the premarital sex condition and the greater endorsement of hypocrisy for Koreans versus Americans when knowledge was *absent* in the abortion condition—suggest that this agreement about hypocrisy by Koreans in Experiment 1a was not simply due to stronger beliefs that the parent knew about their children's behavior. Confirming this in a different way, for Americans, significantly stronger agreement about hypocrisy was found in the knowledge-present (vs. absent) condition ($p < .001$), suggesting that Americans perceived greater inconsistency when they learned that the parent knew about their child's behavior. For Koreans, though, no effects of knowledge were found ($p = .319$), suggesting that knowledge played little role in the extent to which Koreans attributed hypocrisy.

Social Responsibility

The main effect of culture revealed that Koreans ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 0.82$) believed that the parents were substantially more responsible for their children's behavior than Americans ($M = 2.40$, $SD = 1.11$), $F(1, 340) = 112.33$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.14$. A smaller, but still significant, effect of vignette showed that parents were seen as more responsible in the abortion ($M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.13$) than the premarital sex ($M = 2.74$, $SD = 1.10$) condition, $F(1, 340) = 9.22$, $p = .003$, $d = 0.31$. Potentially, this reflects a belief that the child in the premarital sex story was older, and thus more independent, than the child described as still in high school. The main effect of knowledge on social responsibility was not significant ($p = .076$). Similarly, the interaction between culture and vignette was not significant ($p = .053$), and no other interactions had a significant impact on social responsibility (other ps $> .118$).

Mediation

Because Koreans attributed significantly greater hypocrisy than Americans in almost all conditions, and also because there were no significant interactions of culture with any other variable for social responsibility, we used the full sample to again explore whether responsibility mediated the effects of culture (United States = 0, Korea = 1) on agreement about hypocrisy. Replicating Experiment 1a, culture predicted social responsibility ($b = 1.11$, $p < .001$), which predicted endorsement of hypocrisy ($b = 0.56$, $p < .001$). The indirect effect was significant, $b = 0.62$, 95% CI [0.42, 0.87]. The direct effect of culture on hypocrisy was again not significant ($p = .808$).

Attitude Toward the Issue

Again, no significant cultural differences were found in either story (ps $\geq .062$). Moreover, when controlling attitudes toward the issue, no differences emerged that would impact conclusions.

Experiment 1b replicated the effects found in Experiment 1a and also showed that this earlier finding was not simply the result of Koreans believing that parents were aware of their children's behavior at the time they expressed an attitude related to the issue. Beyond the main effect of culture on hypocrisy across vignette conditions, within the premarital sex condition, Koreans agreed more (or disagreed less) than Americans that parents were hypocrites, independently of whether the parents knew about their children's behavior. Within the abortion condition, there was no significant difference in endorsing a statement about the parents being hypocrites for Koreans and Americans when knowledge was present. However, when knowledge was absent, Koreans agreed more than Americans that parents were hypocrites, and when the effects of knowledge were examined within cultures, knowledge had an effect only for Americans, not Koreans. This suggests that for Americans, this novel type of within-relationship inconsistency can sometimes be seen as hypocritical, hinting at broader generalizability. Plausibly, for Americans, when knowledge is present, it *seems* like the agent is being internally inconsistent by falsely signaling moral superiority. However, for Koreans, internal inconsistency may not be strictly necessary for hypocrisy perception, although it may be necessary for high attributions of hypocrisy. Instead, because of a more interdependent orientation, when someone who is closely connected to an agent behaves in a way that contradicts that agent's strongly stated attitude, Koreans may, more strongly than Americans, feel that this inconsistency between two socially related people represents at least mild-to-moderate hypocrisy, even when the target of judgment is unaware of the close other's counter-attitudinal behavior. Experiment 2 pushes this idea further, testing it when there is no familial relationship between the attitude-imposing agent and the agent who behaves in a way that contradicts the first agent's attitude.

Experiment 2

In Experiment 2, we investigated an extended form of relational hypocrisy by examining whether Koreans attribute greater hypocrisy than Americans to a parent when the child whose behavior contradicts the parent's words is the child of a *close friend*. We hypothesized that in this case, hypocrisy attribution would be particularly low for Americans who focus less on interdependency and that Koreans, whose norms emphasize the importance of social connections, would attribute greater hypocrisy. We continued to explore whether differences in perceived social responsibility would play a role in cultural differences in hypocrisy perception. The design and hypotheses of Experiment 2 were preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/ZGH_38T.[6]

Method

Participants

Because we anticipated that effects, particularly in the "friend's child" condition, might be smaller than those observed in earlier studies, we collected a larger sample in hopes of having 80% power to find small interaction and pairwise effects in hypocrisy ($\eta_p^2 = .01$, $d = 0.23$). This resulted in a final sample of 300 Americans ($M_{age} = 36.88$, $SD = 12.11$; 170 men, 128 women, two other/not disclosed) and 301 Koreans ($M_{age} = 40.90$, $SD = 10.71$, 148 men, 153 women) who completed the study. Americans self-identified as 70% White/European American, 10% Black/African American, 10% Asian/Asian American, 5% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 5% other. All people in the Korean sample identified as Korean. The final sample size was $N = 601$.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to consider one of two different vignettes. One story was similar to the knowledge-absent condition of Experiment 1b, where a parent voices her views about abortion. In the new story—intended to increase generalizability beyond situations involving sex—a parent shares her views about how children should not disrespect school property and teachers. Participants were also randomly assigned to one of two relationship conditions. In the *own child* condition, the behavior of the agent's child contradicts the agent's attitudinal imposition (i.e., as in Experiments 1a and 1b). In the *friend's child* condition, the behavior of a close friend's child (who is also friends with the agent's child) contradicts it.

Measures

Hypocrisy. We again used the same single-item measure of agreement that the parent was a hypocrite that was used in Experiments 1a and 1b.

Social Responsibility. The first item used to measure social responsibility in Experiments 1a and 1b was again used.[7] Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with a single statement measured on a 7-point scale (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*): "Jamie is responsible …" "for [her own/her friend's] daughter having had an abortion" or "for [her own/her friend's] son spray-painting disrespectful graffiti on the school property."

Attitude Toward the Issue. The participants indicated their agreement with the following statements using a 7-point scale (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*): "[Abortion/Vandalism] is morally wrong."

Results and Discussion

Hypotheses were first examined using a 2 (culture: United States vs. Korea) × 2 (relationship: own child vs. friend's child) × 2 (vignette: abortion vs. vandalism) ANOVA. Significant interactions were probed by examining the simple main effects of culture within other factors.

Hypocrisy

Because the three-way interaction between vignette, culture, and relationship and the two-way interactions between vignette and culture or relationship were not significant for hypocrisy ($ps \geq .199$), further analyses collapsed across vignette. No significant main effect of culture was observed, although descriptively, Koreans agreed to a greater extent ($M = 3.16$, $SD = 1.46$) than Americans ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.82$) that the parents were hypocrites, $F(1, 597) = 2.44$, $p = .119$, $d = 0.15$. A main effect of relationship was found, with the own child condition ($M = 3.38$, $SD = 1.69$) associated with higher agreement ratings than friend's child condition ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.53$), $F(1, 597) = 26.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.43$.

Despite a failure to replicate the main effect of culture that was found in Experiments 1a and 1b, an interaction between culture and relationship was observed, $F(1, 597) = 5.56$, $p = .019$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$ (see Figure 3). Within the own child condition, no significant culture difference was observed ($p = .574$). In the friend's child condition, Koreans ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 1.34$) agreed more that the parent was a hypocrite than Americans ($M = 2.45$, $SD = 1.65$), $t(597) = 2.78$, $p = .006$, $d = 0.34$. Thus, although Koreans had descriptively more agreement that the parents were hypocrites overall than Americans, this effect only reached significance when the person whose behavior contradicted the parent's attitude was not the parent's own child, but the child of one of their friends. We discuss this finding in more detail below.

Social Responsibility

The main effect of culture was significant, $F(1, 593) = 59.48$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.58$. Koreans ($M = 3.72$, $SD = 1.88$) rated the parents as having greater responsibility for their own/a friend's child's behavior than Americans ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.85$). Overall, people also thought that the parents were more responsible in the vandalism

[6] We note that in response to issues identified by anonymous reviewers, we removed some preregistered measures related to social responsibility and cultural self-construals from the main text to the online Supplemental Material. More information on these measures and related analysis results (e.g., serial mediation) are available in the online Supplemental Material.

[7] Three other items were excluded from analyses because they make little sense in the friend's child condition. Specifically, the responsibility item was the only one that matched the referenced child to the transgressing child in the own child and friend's child conditions. Additional items concerned the target's failure to teach their *own* child their values, and the target child in these items was not varied across own child and friend's child conditions. We made this choice because we thought it might make little sense, particularly for Americans, to ask about a target's responsibility to teach a friend's child. Later, we realized our mistake, as examining associations in the *friend's child* condition between the target's perceived responsibility to teach their *own* child and ratings of the target's hypocrisy would not make much sense. For a more detailed discussion, see pages 12–13 in the online Supplemental Material.

Figure 3

Average Ratings of Agreement That the Parent Was a Hypocrite for American and Korean Participants as a Function of Relationship of the Agent to the Person Whose Actions Contradicted the Agent's Words (Experiment 2)



Note. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. CIs = confidence intervals.

condition ($M = 3.60$, $SD = 1.99$) than in the abortion condition ($M = 2.76$, $SD = 1.80$), $F(1, 593) = 49.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.44$. Predictably, the main effect of relationship was significant, with people believing that parents were more responsible for their own child's ($M = 4.18$, $SD = 1.69$) than a friend's child's ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 1.64$) actions, $F(1, 593) = 241.82$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.20$.

Although no two-way interactions were significant ($ps > .072$), the three-way interaction was significant, $F(1, 593) = 7.68$, $p = .006$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Further analyses revealed that the interaction of culture with relationship was significant only within the abortion condition ($p = .002$), not the vandalism condition ($p = .380$). Within the abortion condition, the effect of culture was not significant for a friend's child ($p = .418$) but was for their own child ($p < .001$), with Koreans ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.46$) believing the parent had more responsibility than Americans ($M = 2.99$, $SD = 1.79$). As with hypocrisy, overall, Koreans believed that the parents were more responsible for their children than Americans. However, this effect on social responsibility was attenuated and not significant within the abortion condition when the person contradicting the parent's words was the child of a friend.

Mediation

Primarily because we were particularly interested in the extended form of relational hypocrisy in this experiment, but also because the overall main effect of culture on hypocrisy was not significant but the effect of culture was significant within the friend's child condition, analyses focused on this condition only.[8] As in Experiments 1a and 1b, we tested social responsibility as a mediator between culture and hypocrisy. Culture (United States = 0, Korea = 1) predicted social responsibility ($b = 0.76$, $p = .001$), which predicted hypocrisy ($b = 0.56$, $p < .001$). The indirect effect was significant, $b = 0.42$, 95% CI [0.24, 0.62]. The direct effect of culture was again not significant ($p = .529$).

Attitude Toward the Issue

Significant cultural differences were found within both vignette conditions. In the abortion vignette condition, Koreans ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 1.57$) reported perceiving abortion as significantly more morally wrong than Americans ($M = 3.28$, $SD = 2.17$), $t(300) = 3.78$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.43$. In contrast, Americans ($M = 6.42$, $SD = 0.87$) reported perceiving vandalism as significantly more morally wrong than Koreans ($M = 6.03$, $SD = 0.97$), $t(297) = -3.66$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.42$. However, no substantive differences emerged in any of the main findings when controlling these preexisting attitudes.[9]

Overall, with some exceptions, Experiment 2 helped confirm the conclusions drawn from Experiments 1a and 1b: Koreans seem to be more willing than Americans to agree that a person is a hypocrite when someone else—who is socially connected to that person—acts in a way that contradicts that person's earlier attitude toward an issue. This effect was mediated again by Koreans perceiving to a greater extent than Americans that the agent is socially responsible for the behavior of this other person. Notably, in Experiment 2, the strongest effect on hypocrisy was found when the attitude-contradicting behavior was performed by a second person who was even further socially removed from the first person than in Experiments 1a and 1b. Instead of being the person's child, the second person in this case was the child of the first person's friend and also the friend of that person's child.

Although this finding helps support our broader theoretical account of when and why East Asians should perceive more hypocrisy for cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency than Americans, there was no significant total effect of culture on hypocrisy in the own child condition for Experiment 2. That is, the primary finding from Experiments 1a and 1b did not replicate, even though a similar effect was found within a different (and further removed) social relationship. This is hard to explain, except to note that because hypocrisy attributed to this form of hypocrisy (vs. prototypical) is somewhat lower, sample-specific variation might be more likely to lead to a null effect. Still, looking for clues as to why, we examined the own child condition separately for each vignette given that one of the two vignettes (i.e., abortion story) was the same as was used in Experiments 1a and 1b. Consistent with these earlier experiments, the expected pattern was again found for the abortion story, with Koreans agreeing more (or disagreeing less; $M = 3.46$, $SD = 1.64$) that the parent was a hypocrite than Americans ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 1.87$). However, this pattern was not duplicated in the vandalism condition ($M_{Korea} = 3.20$, $SD = 1.42$; $M_{U.S.} = 3.62$, $SD = 1.84$; for more details, see the online Supplemental Material). Speculatively, the child in the vandalism story—explicitly described as 14 years old—may have been viewed as relatively young, leading Americans to attribute greater responsibility to the parent in this case. That is, in the abortion vignette, the child was described as a high school student, and in the premarital sex vignette, the child was described as in college and in a long-term relationship with her boyfriend (but not yet married). Consistent with this possibility, although Americans ($M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.64$) rated parental

[8] A parallel analysis was conducted within the own child condition, and the results were similar to those reported here, with one exception. The significant mediation of culture on hypocrisy through social responsibility was accompanied by a significant direct effect of culture on hypocrisy that suggested suppression (i.e., Koreans agreed significantly less than Americans that the parent was a hypocrite after controlling the effects of social responsibility on hypocrisy). This direct effect with a reversed sign helps explain the lack of total effect within this condition (i.e., the direct effect reversal balances the indirect effect). However, given the findings from Experiments 1a and 1b and the effects found within the friend's child condition, this finding is likely sample specific and should be interpreted cautiously.

[9] Analyses controlling for these attitudes are reported in the online Supplemental Material.

responsibility lower than Koreans ($M = 5.19$, $SD = 1.10$), rated responsibility was substantially higher than for the other vignettes (e.g., Ms ≤ 2.99 for the abortion vignette, Ms ≤ 2.34 for the premarital sex vignette). Still, this possibility should be treated with caution, as other elements of the vignette might have also led to this null finding. Overall, it seems likely that the age of the children or the contexts being studied might have had impacts on perceived responsibility and attributed hypocrisy, and further research might provide insight into these possibilities.

Experiment 3

In Experiment 3, we examined cultural effects on hypocrisy perception while using both within-person (i.e., prototypical) and cross-person, within-relationship (i.e., relational) inconsistency paradigms within the same study. We used this approach because the reversal we found of cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution from what is usually found might be, at least in part, due to something unique about the designs we used (e.g., where similar effects would have been found even for within-person inconsistency). Experiment 3 sought to rule out this alternative explanation by examining cross-cultural perceptions of hypocrisy involving prototypical versus relational inconsistency using the same social contexts for both. To increase generalizability, we also introduced a new relationship type (marriage) as well as behaviors (drinking and driving, littering) that were not examined in Experiments 1–2 and an improved measure of hypocrisy.

First, we expected to replicate prior work (e.g., Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018) on cultural differences in hypocrisy perception for within-person inconsistency (i.e., Western > Eastern). Second, we wanted to show cross-cultural similarities by showing that across cultures, prototypical hypocrisy is seen as "more" hypocritical than relational hypocrisy. More importantly, though, we wanted to demonstrate a cultural reversal (i.e., Eastern > Western) of typical effects when participants considered within-relationship inconsistency. We therefore predicted a main effect of inconsistency type with higher perceived hypocrisy across cultures for prototypical (vs. relational) inconsistency. Second, we hypothesized an interaction between culture and form of inconsistency, with perceived hypocrisy higher for Americans than Koreans when evaluating within-person inconsistency (prototypical hypocrisy) and the reverse for evaluations of cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency (relational hypocrisy).

Beyond these hypotheses, we expected a main effect of culture on the perception of people's responsibility for a romantic partner's behavior, with Koreans reporting higher perceived responsibility than Americans. Finally, we hypothesized that the effect of culture on hypocrisy would be mediated by perceived responsibility and that this mediation effect would be moderated by the form of inconsistency (within-person vs. within-relationship). The design and hypotheses of Experiment 3 were preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/63F_LL9.[10]

Method

Participants

Given the results from Experiments 1–2, we anticipated a medium interaction effect but small pairwise effects (particularly in the within-relationship inconsistency paradigm) and aimed for at least 100 participants per manipulated cell of the design (80% power, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, $d = 0.20$). This resulted in a final sample of 398 Americans ($M_{age} = 35.05$, $SD = 12.09$; 181 men, 209 women, eight other/not disclosed) and 403 Koreans ($M_{age} = 39.44$, $SD = 10.89$, 202 men, 199 women, four not disclosed). Korean participants were recruited through the same Korean online research panel company. Americans self-identified as 73% White/European American, 8% Black/African American, 11% Asian/Asian American, 5% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 3% other. All people in the Korean sample identified as Korean. The final sample size was $N = 801$.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two vignettes. Half of the participants read a story in which "Amanda" ("Soo-Yeon"), who works for an organization to combat drunk driving, tells her coworkers that it is wrong to drive after drinking any alcohol at all (see Laurent et al., 2014). The other half read a story in which Amanda works for an organization to support environmental goals and tells a friend that it is wrong to litter in a park. In addition to varying contexts, participants were randomly assigned to either a within-person (prototypical) or cross-person, within-relationship (relational) inconsistency condition. In the prototypical conditions, participants later read that Amanda drove home after drinking at a party or left trash behind after having lunch in a park. In the relational conditions, it was Amanda's husband who engaged in these behaviors and contradicted Amanda's earlier statements.

Measures

Hypocrisy. We again used a single-item measure (as in Experiments 1–2). However, the question was modified to reduce ambiguity in the interpretation of scores below the midpoint of the scale that might tend to suggest a difference in the degree of disagreement rather than differences in the degree of hypocrisy attribution. The new item asked, "To what extent would you say that Amanda is a hypocrite?" and participants answered using a 7-point scale from 1 (*not at all a hypocrite*) to 7 (*a total hypocrite*).

Social Responsibility ($\alpha = .76$). Four items were developed to assess participants' agreement with statements regarding people's responsibility for their spouse's behavior (1 = *entirely disagree*, 7 = *entirely agree*): "People are responsible for the behavior of their spouses," "People are only responsible for their own behavior; they are not at all responsible for the behavior of their spouses" (reverse-coded), "It is wrong for people to tell others how to behave when their spouses do not even behave that way," and "When people's own spouses engage in a particular behavior, those people are expected to avoid telling others that the same behavior is morally wrong."

Attitude Toward the Issue. Participants answered the question, "To what extent would you say that it is morally wrong for a person to [drive after consuming any alcohol at all/litter in a public park]?" using a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all morally wrong*, 7 = *extremely morally wrong*).

[10] We also included and measured perceptions of hypocrisy after asking participants to counterfactually imagine that the targets did not contradict their own (or their spouse's) earlier words. This element of the design was preregistered but was removed from the main text to the online Supplemental Material in response to reviewer feedback.

Results and Discussion

First, we examined a 2 (culture: United States vs. Korea) × 2 (inconsistency form: prototypical [within-person] vs. relational [cross-person, within-relationship]) × 2 (context: drinking and driving vs. littering) ANOVA. However, because context did not interact with other factors (i.e., no significant three-way interaction or two-way interactions of context with culture or inconsistency form) for hypocrisy ($ps \geq .154$), or social responsibility ($ps \geq .270$), we collapsed across vignette in further analyses. Significant interactions were probed by examining simple main effects of culture within other factors.

Hypocrisy

As expected, the main effect of inconsistency form was found. People attributed substantially greater hypocrisy to within-person inconsistency ($M = 6.15$, $SD = 1.22$) than to within-relationship inconsistency ($M = 2.26$, $SD = 1.45$), $F(1, 797) = 1850.85$, $p < .001$, $d = 3.01$. This suggests that, as expected, within-person attitude–behavior inconsistency is similarly viewed across cultures as more indicative of hypocrisy than cross-person, within-relationship attitude–behavior inconsistency. No main effect of culture was observed, $F(1, 797) = 0.07$, $p = .786$.

Critically, the hypothesized interaction between culture and inconsistency form was found, $F(1, 797) = 77.70$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$ (see Figure 4). When evaluating within-person inconsistency, Americans ($M = 6.56$, $SD = 0.79$) attributed significantly greater hypocrisy than Koreans ($M = 5.74$, $SD = 1.43$), $t(797) = 6.44$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.71$. In contrast, when evaluating within-relationship inconsistency, Koreans ($M = 2.64$, $SD = 1.58$) attributed significantly greater hypocrisy than Americans ($M = 1.87$, $SD = 1.18$), $t(797) = 6.03$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.55$. These results replicate the previous literature on cultural differences in prototypical hypocrisy attributions but also replicate the primary finding demonstrated in Experiments 1–2 of greater hypocrisy attribution for Koreans (vs. Americans) when considering relational hypocrisy, generalizing further to new behaviors and a different measure of hypocrisy. Moreover, by holding contexts constant across inconsistency forms, we ruled out that there was something unique to the contexts in Experiments 1–2 that drove the observed effects. That is, when compared within the same experimental paradigm, Americans appear to attribute more hypocrisy than Koreans for within-person inconsistency, while Koreans attribute more for cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency, even if overall attribution of hypocrisy is reduced in the latter case.

Figure 4

Hypocrisy Ratings for American and Korean Participants as a Function of Inconsistency Form (Experiment 3)



Note. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. CIs = confidence intervals.

Social Responsibility

As expected, the main effect of culture was found, $F(1, 797) = 308.25$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.22$. Koreans ($M = 4.25$, $SD = 1.13$) reported that people are more responsible for their spouses' behavior than Americans ($M = 2.86$, $SD = 1.15$). Unexpectedly, the main effect of inconsistency form was also found, with responsibility rated higher in the within-person ($M = 3.77$, $SD = 1.27$) than in the cross-person ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.37$), within-relationship inconsistency condition, $F(1, 797) = 27.34$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.32$. Potentially, this is because in the abstract, people feel that others are responsible for the behavior of their spouses, but when confronted with a concrete case that highlights inconsistency between partners, these judgments moderate as a function of consideration that partners' words and deeds are not always aligned. No interaction was found between culture and inconsistency form ($p = .821$).

Mediation

A moderated mediation analysis (Model 15 in PROCESS; Hayes, 2018) was then conducted, examining social responsibility as a mediator between culture (United States = 0, Korea = 1) and hypocrisy and inconsistency form as a moderator of the culture to hypocrisy and social responsibility to hypocrisy paths. As hypothesized, the indirect effect of culture on hypocrisy perception via social responsibility differed depending on the type of inconsistency, index of moderated mediation, $b = 0.80$, 95% CI [0.59, 1.02] (see Figure 5). In the within-person inconsistency condition, social responsibility did not predict hypocrisy ($p = .448$), and the indirect effect was not significant, $b = -0.06$, 95% CI [−0.19, 0.07]. However, the direct effect of culture remained significant. In the cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency condition, the indirect effect was significant ($b = 0.74$, 95% CI [0.57, 0.91]), and the direct effect of culture on hypocrisy was not significant ($p = .748$).

Attitude Toward the Issues

In the littering condition, no significant cultural difference was found ($M_{\text{Korea}} = 5.98$, $SD = 1.05$; $M_{\text{U.S.}} = 5.92$, $SD = 0.98$), $p = .533$. However, Koreans ($M = 6.29$, $SD = 0.98$) reported believing that drunk driving is more morally wrong than Americans ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 1.84$), $t(401) = 12.61$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.25$. Nevertheless, no substantive differences emerged when controlling for participants' attitudes toward the issues.[11]

Experiment 3 replicated the main findings from Experiments 1–2 and also directly compared prototypical and relational forms of hypocrisy with one another within the same experiment. In addition, we extended generalizability by introducing a new relationship, two new attitude–behavior combinations, a new measure of social responsibility, and an improved measure of hypocrisy. Consistent with past research findings, Americans attributed more hypocrisy than

[11] Results when controlling for these attitudes are reported in the online Supplemental Material.

Figure 5

Moderated Mediation Model of the Effect of Culture on Hypocrisy Perception With Social Responsibility as a Mediator and Inconsistency Form as a Moderator (Experiment 3)



Note. Coefficients are unstandardized.
* $p < .001$.

Koreans for within-person inconsistency. Consistent with Experiments 1–2, Koreans attributed more hypocrisy than Americans for within-relationship inconsistency. Of interest, while noting that the cross-sectional design and use of a measured mediator cannot allow strong causal inferences, the results of the moderated mediation analysis were fully consistent with our theorizing. That is, for cross-person, within-relationship (but not within-individual) inconsistency, Koreans' (vs. Americans') greater emphasis on people's responsibility for their spouses' behavior mediated the effect of culture on hypocrisy attributions. Yet, when considering prototypical within-person inconsistency, cultural differences in perceived responsibility had no impact on judgments of hypocrisy. This provides supplemental evidence that cultural differences in beliefs about social responsibility can help explain cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution.

Experiment 4

Experiment 4 had several aims. First, to rule out other possible cultural confounds (e.g., cross-cultural differences in beliefs about different behaviors), we included control conditions where no inconsistency was present even though behaviors were the same across all conditions (e.g., Effron et al., 2015; Jordan et al., 2017). In addition, to demonstrate that it is not simply differences in cultural patterns of responding that drove earlier results, we included measures asking about nonevaluative aspects of social perception unrelated to character, attitudes, behaviors, or attitude–behavior combinations. Beyond this, we further improved our measure of hypocrisy, primarily by using a multi-item measure. Although it is not unusual to use a face-valid single item to measure hypocrisy attributions (i.e., measuring the extent to which participants think a target person is a hypocrite; e.g., Effron & Monin, 2010), recent studies also have introduced multi-item measures to improve robustness of the findings (Effron et al., 2015).

In addition, we included other measures related to hypocrisy. One of these, moral condemnation, has been used in past research, as moral judgments tend to track hypocrisy (e.g., Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Jordan & Sommers, 2022; Laurent & Clark, 2019). Likewise, we also measured social evaluations of the target person using items that were conceptually more distant from hypocrisy but should nevertheless be impacted by our manipulations (e.g., liking for the target; Jordan et al., 2017). As in earlier experiments, we also measured attitudes toward the issues to control potential cultural differences.

Finally, we used a new context to further increase generalizability. Specifically, in Experiment 4, a target person (a politician; see also Kreps et al., 2017) campaigns either for companies to refrain from using Chinese products or in favor of promoting child welfare, which is later contradicted by (inconsistency-present) or unrelated to (inconsistency-absent) their own behavior or the behavior of their husband. Given that negative views of China have increased in recent years in both the United States and Korea (Silver et al., 2022) and that politicians in both countries are often vocal in their anti-China views, we assumed that this topic might engage participants in both countries.

Beyond again expecting the main effects of prototypical versus relational hypocrisy, and further expecting stronger hypocrisy attribution when inconsistency was present (vs. absent), our key hypothesis was for a three-way interaction between culture, inconsistency form, and inconsistency presence. Essentially, we hypothesized a two-way interaction between culture and inconsistency form within the inconsistency-present (vs. absent) condition, with Americans attributing greater hypocrisy than Koreans in the within-person inconsistency condition and the reverse in the within-relationship inconsistency condition. Similar patterns were expected on related measures (e.g., moral condemnation), but not on nonevaluative items related to general social perception. The design and hypotheses of Experiment 4 were preregistered at https://aspredicted.org/1BL_8J3.

Method

Participants

Given the results from Experiment 3, we again aimed for at least 100 participants per cell of the design in hopes of having 80% power to find a small three-way interaction effect and small pairwise cultural effects in hypocrisy ($\eta_p^2 = .01$, $d = 0.20$). This resulted in the recruitment of 403 Americans ($M_{age} = 39.00$, $SD = 13.75$; 221 men, 174 women, eight other/not disclosed) and 404 Koreans (M_{age} =

39.27, *SD* = 11.47, 202 men, 200 women, two not disclosed). Americans self-identified as 77% White/European American, 8% Black/African American, 7% Asian/Asian American, 4% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 4% other. Four people in the Korean sample who self-identified as non-Korean were excluded. Seventeen Americans were also excluded for failing a culture check. The final sample size was $N = 786$.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two inconsistency presence conditions (i.e., inconsistency-present vs. inconsistency-absent). In the inconsistency-present condition, participants read about Amanda, a politician running for reelection, who is publicly vocal about the need for corporations to avoid purchasing products from China. In the inconsistency-absent condition, Amanda was described as being publicly vocal about the need to focus on the welfare of children. Participants were also randomly assigned to one of two inconsistency form conditions, where they read that either Amanda (within-person) or her husband (within-relationship), who (also) serves on the board of directors of a large manufacturing company, believes they should continue purchasing Chinese products for their business.

Measures

Hypocrisy (α = .94). In addition to the same single-item measure used in Experiment 3, we used four additional items, including "two-faced," "phony," "genuine" (reverse-coded), and "insincere," adapted from Effron et al. (2015). In this experiment, a 6-point scale was used to partially address concerns about cultural differences in response styles, such as Asians using the midpoint of the scale more frequently than Westerners (e.g., 1 = *not at all [two-faced]*, 6 = *totally [two-faced]*).

Moral Condemnation (α = .94). Participants indicated how positively or negatively they perceived Amanda's character using items adopted from previous research on hypocrisy (Effron et al., 2015; Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Effron & Monin, 2010). Six items measured participants' moral judgments of Amanda on 6-point bipolar scales (good-bad, ethical-unethical, immoral-moral*, mean-nice*, arrogant-humble*, likable-dislikable). Starred items were reverse-coded.

Downstream Consequences (Social Evaluations) (α = .95). In response to a hypothetical poll of people in her district, participants evaluated Amanda's leadership, work ethics, and commitment to the population on a 4-point scale (1 = *does not meet minimum expectations*, 4 = *exceeds expectations*). Three items asked participants to indicate their agreement (1 = *completely disagree*, 6 = *completely agree*) regarding political support for Amanda: "I would vote for Amanda," "I would encourage other people to vote for Amanda," and "I would want Amanda to win the election." Last, a single item asked participants to imagine they worked as a journalist for a local business journal, which recognizes top leaders in the local area each year. Participants were asked whether they would recommend Amanda for this (1 = *not recommend at all*, 10 = *very highly recommend*). Because response scales differed, all items were standardized before aggregation.

General Social Perception. The participants indicated on 6-point scales how much they think Amanda enjoys listening to music and how long they think Amanda's commute to work takes her (e.g., 1 = *not at all*, 6 = *very much*).

Attitude Toward the Issue. The participants indicated the extent to which they think it is morally wrong for companies to purchase products made in China (1 = *not at all morally wrong*, 6 = *extremely morally wrong*).

Results and Discussion

Attitude Toward the Issue

Given the likely current relevance of moralized attitudes toward companies purchasing Chinese products, we examined whether culture impacted these attitudes before continuing to any primary analyses. Americans ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 1.37$) indicated that it was more morally wrong than Koreans ($M = 2.97$, $SD = 1.24$) for a company to purchase Chinese products, $t(784) = 4.28$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.31$. We therefore next examined whether controlling for these attitudes (i.e., in analysis of covariance models) impacted the results of the critical three-way interaction (i.e., Culture × Inconsistency Form × Inconsistency Presence) for any primary dependent measures.

In the analysis examining hypocrisy, the attitude covariate was significant, and the three-way interaction was significant (see Table 1 for inferential test results). Without the covariate, the same pattern of means emerged, but the three-way interaction was reduced to nonsignificance ($p = .056$). We therefore report analyses controlling for the covariate; however, we note that a similar pattern of means emerged when the covariate was not included.[12]

In the analysis examining moral condemnation, the attitude covariate was again significant, and the three-way interaction was at the border of significance. A similar pattern of effects again emerged when the covariate was not included, but the significance of this interaction was reduced ($p = .067$). We therefore again report analyses controlling for the covariate.

For downstream consequences, the covariate was not significant ($p = .312$). We did not examine covariate analyses for the two unrelated general social perception items.

Hypocrisy

We examined ratings of hypocrisy by testing the Culture (United States vs. Korea) × Inconsistency Form (prototypical within-person vs. relational within-relationship) × Inconsistency Presence (inconsistency-present vs. inconsistency-absent) full factorial design, with all analyses controlling for participants' attitudes toward companies purchasing from China.[13] As expected, the main effect of inconsistency presence was found, with hypocrisy attribution higher when inconsistency was present ($M = 4.14$, $SE = .05$) versus absent ($M = 2.90$, $SE = .06$), $d = 1.14$. Likewise, the main effect of inconsistency form was found, with hypocrisy rated higher for within-person ($M = 4.06$, $SE = .06$) than within-relationship ($M = 2.98$, $SE = 0.05$) inconsistency ($d = 1.01$). No main effect of culture was found.

The two-way interaction of culture and inconsistency presence was not significant. The two-way interaction between inconsistency

[12] In the online Supplemental Material, we report analyses that do not adjust for the covariate.

[13] Note that all reported means that control for the covariate are estimated marginal means.

Table 1
Inferential Tests for Main Effects and Interactions on Each Dependent Variable (Experiment 4)

Predictor	Hypocrisy			Moral condemnation			Social evaluation			Commute (unrelated)			Music (unrelated)		
	F^a	p	η_p^2	F^a	p	η_p^2	F^b	p	η_p^2	F^b	p	η_p^2	F^b	p	η_p^2
Culture	0.69	.406	.001	0.18	.671	.0002	1.14	.286	.001	3.87	.049	.01	81.99	<.001	.10
Form	198.24	<.001	.20	152.66	<.001	.16	135.67	<.001	.15	6.68	.010	.01	2.67	.103	.003
Presence	253.46	<.001	.25	257.15	<.001	.25	229.94	<.001	.23	1.18	.279	.002	0.75	.386	.001
Cul. × Form	27.06	<.001	.03	26.49	<.001	.03	22.60	<.001	.03	1.61	.205	.002	4.40	.036	.01
Cul. × Pres	2.73	.099	.004	2.62	.106	.003	1.72	.190	.002	2.43	.120	.003	1.07	.302	.001
Form × Pres.	70.84	<.001	.08	42.42	<.001	.05	23.37	<.001	.03	1.05	.307	.001	0.85	.358	.001
Cul. × Form × Pres.	4.53	.034	.01	3.84	.050	.01	2.93	.087	.004	1.02	.313	.001	6.39	.012	.01
Attitude	19.56	<.001	.03	7.69	.006	.01									

Note. Culture/Cul. = culture; Form = inconsistency form; Presence/Pres. = inconsistency presence; Attitude = attitude toward the issue.
[a] $df1 = 1$, $df2 = 777$. [b] $df1 = 1$, $df2 = 778$.

form and inconsistency presence was significant but was of little theoretical significance. The two-way interaction of culture and inconsistency form was significant. Moreover, the pattern of means was consistent with our theorizing, in that Koreans ($M = 3.14$, $SE = .08$) attributed greater hypocrisy than Americans ($M = 2.81$, $SE = .08$) across within-relationship comparisons, $F(1, 777) = 9.46$, $p = .002$, $d = 0.22$, but Americans ($M = 4.29$, $SE = .08$) attributed grater hypocrisy than Koreans ($M = 3.83$, $SE = .08$) across within-person comparisons, $F(1, 777) = 17.94$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.31$.

The three-way interaction was significant (see Table 1 and Figure 6). Decomposing this and adjusting for multiple comparisons, when inconsistency was absent, there was no significant cultural difference in the within-person ($p = .268$) or within-relationship ($p = .054$) conditions. When inconsistency was present, Americans ($M = 5.38$, $SE = .11$) attributed greater hypocrisy than Koreans ($M = 4.63$, $SE = .11$) for within-person inconsistency, $F(1, 777) = 24.28$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.35$. However, when inconsistency was present and participants evaluated within-*relationship* inconsistency, Koreans ($M = 3.46$, $SE = .11$) attributed greater hypocrisy than Americans ($M = 3.09$, $SE = .11$), $F(1, 777) = 5.90$, $p = .015$, $d = 0.17$. Thus, the primary finding from Experiments 1–3 was replicated in a new sample using a new topic and a better measure of hypocrisy.

Moral Condemnation

Moral condemnation tracked hypocrisy. A main effect of inconsistency presence showed that moral condemnation was higher when targets were inconsistent ($M = 4.17$, $SE = .05$) relative to when the behavior was unrelated to the attitude ($M = 3.08$, $SE = .05$), $d = 1.15$.[14] Higher moral condemnation was also observed across within-person ($M = 4.04$, $SE = .05$) than within-relationship ($M = 3.21$, $SE = .05$) conditions ($d = 0.89$). No main effect of culture was found.

The interaction of inconsistency presence and culture was not significant, and the interaction of inconsistency form and presence, though significant, was again of little interest. The two-way interaction of culture with inconsistency form was again significant. Simple effects revealed the same theoretically consistent pattern that was found for hypocrisy, with Americans ($M = 4.23$, $SE = .07$) condemning the target more than Koreans ($M = 3.86$, $SE = .07$), $F(1, 777) = 15.28$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.28$, across within-person conditions but Koreans ($M = 3.37$, $SE = .07$) condemning the target more than Americans ($M = 3.05$, $SE = .07$) across within-relationship conditions, $F(1, 777) = 11.06$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.24$.

The three-way interaction was at the border of significance. However, decomposition once again revealed a pattern similar to that of hypocrisy. When inconsistency was absent, no cultural difference emerged in the within-person condition ($p = .328$). However, in the inconsistency-absent within-relationship condition, the cultural effect was significant, $F(1, 777) = 4.72$, $p = .030$, $d = 0.16$. Koreans ($M = 3.03$, $SE = .10$) condemned the target more than Americans ($M = 2.73$, $SE = .10$). Cultural comparisons were significant in both inconsistency-present conditions, respectively, within-person and within-relationship, Fs$(1, 777) = 21.09$ and 6.46, $p < .001$ and $p = .011$, ds $= 0.33$ and 0.18. Consistent with the results for hypocrisy, Americans condemned more ($M = 5.12$, $SE = .10$) and less ($M = 3.37$, $SE = .10$) than Koreans ($M = 4.50$, $SE = .09$ and $M = 3.71$, $SE = .09$) in the within-person and within-relationship conditions, respectively.

Downstream Consequences (Social Evaluations)

As a reminder, the downstream consequences measure is an aggregate of standardized measures where higher numbers indicate more favorable evaluations. As with other variables, there was no main effect of culture on downstream effects. The main effect of inconsistency presence showed more favorable evaluations when inconsistency was absent ($M = 0.39$, $SD = 0.71$) than when it was present ($M = -0.37$, $SD = 0.86$), $d = 0.96$. Evaluations were also more positive in the within-relationship condition ($M = 0.29$, $SD = 0.81$) than in the within-person condition ($M = -0.30$, $SD = 0.84$), $d = 0.72$.

The two-way interaction of inconsistency presence and culture was not significant, and though the Inconsistency Presence × Inconsistency Form interaction was significant, it remained of little interest. The significant Inconsistency Form × Culture interaction revealed a pattern similar to other dependent measures, with Americans ($M = -0.44$, $SD = 0.87$) having more negative evaluations of the target than Koreans ($M = -0.16$, $SD = 0.79$) in the within-person condition but Koreans ($M = 0.20$, $SD = 0.78$) having more negative evaluations of the target than Americans ($M = 0.39$,

[14] Plots for moral condemnation and social evaluations are available in the online Supplemental Material.

Figure 6

Hypocrisy Ratings for American and Korean Participants as a Function of Inconsistency Form and Inconsistency Presence (Experiment 4)



Note. Note that hypocrisy ratings are based on estimated marginal means. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. CIs = confidence intervals.

$SD = 0.83$) in the within-relationship condition, respectively, Fs(1, 778) = 16.78 and 6.86, $p < .001$ and = .009, ds = 0.34 and 0.24.

The three-way interaction was not significant. However, as for other variables, we report the simple main effects of culture within conditions as these are of theoretical interest and remain consistent with other variables. Comparisons in the inconsistency-absent condition were not significant (ps > .103). When inconsistency was present within a person, Americans ($M = -1.03$, $SD = 0.51$) evaluated the target more negatively than Koreans ($M = -0.57$, $SD = 0.67$), $t(778) = 4.45$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.77$. When the inconsistency was within a relationship, Koreans ($M = -0.07$, $SD = 0.83$) evaluated the target more negatively than Americans ($M = 0.14$, $SD = 0.88$), $t(778) = 2.08$, $p = .038$, $d = 0.25$.

General Social Perception (Unrelated to Evaluation)

Because the two items were distinct, they were analyzed separately. Beyond a main effect of inconsistency form that suggested beliefs that the target's commute was longer in the within-relationship (vs. within-person) condition, and a main effect of culture that suggested Koreans (vs. Americans) thought the target's commute was longer, no other effects emerged. Critically, no three-way interaction was found, consistent with the idea that the patterns of means on primary dependent measures are not simply related to cultural differences in response styles. For the item asking how much the target likes music, a main effect of culture emerged ($d = 0.65$). Examination of means suggested that Americans ($M = 3.95$, $SD = 1.00$) felt that the target was fonder of music than Koreans ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 1.14$). Although a two-way interaction of culture and inconsistency form and the three-way interaction of all factors were all significant, all simple main effects were in the same direction. That is, whether significant or not, all pairwise comparisons of culture revealed that Americans believed that the target liked music more than Koreans. Despite some interactions being significant, the lack of reversals in the direction of cultural means for any comparison on music preferences suggests again that the observed cultural effects on the primary dependent measures are specific to cultural differences in the perception of different types of inconsistency rather than reflective of general patterns of responding. That is, across all three dependent measures—hypocrisy, moral condemnation, and downstream consequences (social evaluations)—evaluations by Americans versus Koreans were harsher for within-person inconsistency, a trend that consistently reversed when evaluating within-*relationship* inconsistency.

One unexpected finding was the way that cultural differences in the hypothesized direction sometimes emerged even when no inconsistency was present. Potentially, this reflects cultural differences in both the way the self is construed and in how people generally felt about the target as a function of their behavior or their partner's behavior, which in both cases involved purchasing products from China to increase profits for their businesses. Given that Americans place more importance on the self in isolation, if they did not favor the target buying Chinese-made products, this might have increased their negativity toward the target. In contrast, when the target's husband made the same decision, Americans may have felt that it would be unfair to be punitive toward the target as a function of their partner's unappealing decision.

Experiment 5

In Experiment 5, we aimed to test the downstream consequences of cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution for within-person versus within-relationship inconsistency in a context involving (potential) social interactions. In Experiment 4, although the overall trend in participants' social evaluations appeared generally aligned with the other dependent variables, the cultural reversal depending on the consistency form in the inconsistency-present condition was not pronounced enough to reach significance on the three-way interaction. We speculate that one limitation of Experiment 4's approach to measuring social evaluations might be the lack of context for (potential) interactions and relationships. Given that the target person, Amanda, was a politician, participants were unlikely to evaluate her based on their preference for actually working with her and building a relationship with her. However, cultural factors may be more salient when there is a possibility of social interaction, particularly considering how Koreans (vs. Americans) are more sensitive to social reputation and relationships. To address this limitation, Experiment 5 outlined a situation in which the possibility of direct interaction and relationship building was made more explicit by positioning Amanda as a boss and asking participants to evaluate Amanda as if they were her subordinate. Given our particular interest in the downstream implications of hypocrisy attribution, we exclusively measured participants' hypocrisy attribution and their social evaluations of the target person. Moreover, based on the findings from Experiment 4, which indicated that the cultural difference in hypocrisy attribution was especially pronounced in the presence of inconsistency, Experiment 5 again focused exclusively on the presence of inconsistency.

Method

Participants

Given the results from previous experiments, we again aimed for at least 100 participants per cell of the design (80% power, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, $d = 0.20$). This resulted in the recruitment of 198 Americans ($M_{age} = 36.78$, $SD = 12.97$; 98 men, 98 women, two other) and 203 Koreans ($M_{age} = 39.48$, $SD = 11.41$, 109 men, 93 women, one not disclosed). Americans self-identified as 68% White/European American, 10% Black/African American, 10% Asian/Asian American, 4% Hispanic/Latino(a), 5% more than one, and 4% other. One person in the Korean sample who self-identified as non-Korean was excluded. Three Americans were also excluded for failing a culture check. The final sample size was $N = 397$.

Procedure

Participants read about Amanda, a chief financial officer of a large company who was responsible for ensuring the company's profitability. One day, Amanda sends out a memo to all employees, instructing them to set the office air conditioning at 78 °F due to the high costs of electricity this summer. She also specifies that employees are not permitted to use portable air conditioners since these consume a lot of electricity. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two inconsistency form conditions, where they read that either Amanda (within-person) or her husband (within-relationship), who also works in the same company, purchases a portable air conditioner using company funds without informing anyone and sets it up in their office space.

Measures

Hypocrisy ($\alpha = .94$). The same five items used in Experiment 4 were used to measure hypocrisy (but on a 7-point scale, as in Experiments 1–3).

Downstream Consequences (Social Evaluations; $\alpha = .85$). Participants were asked to imagine that they were employees of Amanda's company and were anonymously participating in Amanda's performance review. We emphasized that in this company, employees' evaluations of executives are critical components for their salaries, advancement, and retention. Participants, as hypothetical employees, assessed Amanda in the following areas: leadership, communication skills, work ethic, commitment to the organization, initiative and drive, and employee management (1 = *does not meet minimum expectations*, 4 = *exceeds expectations*).

Attitudes Toward the Issue. Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they think it is morally wrong for a person to use a portable air conditioner at work (1 = *not at all morally wrong*, 7 = *extremely morally wrong*).

Results and Discussion

Hypocrisy

Replicating the results from Experiments 3 to 4, the main effect of inconsistency form was significant. Participants attributed greater hypocrisy to within-person inconsistency ($M = 5.65$, $SD = 1.13$) than to within-relationship inconsistency ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.66$), $F(1, 393) = 278.36$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.64$. No main effect of culture was found ($p = .844$). However, as expected, the interaction between culture and inconsistency form was found (see Figure 7), $F(1, 393) = 9.45$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. When evaluating within-person inconsistency, Americans ($M = 5.89$, $SD = 1.06$) attributed more hypocrisy than Koreans ($M = 5.44$, $SD = 1.15$), $t(393) = 2.38$, $p = .018$, $d = 0.41$. When evaluating within-relationship inconsistency, Koreans ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.58$) attributed more hypocrisy than Americans ($M = 3.13$, $SD = 1.72$), $t(393) = 1.98$, $p = .048$, $d = 0.24$. In sum, the key findings from Experiments 3 to 4 were replicated while using a five-item hypocrisy measure (unlike Experiment 3) and a 7-point scale (unlike Experiment 4).

Downstream Consequences (Social Evaluations)

As in Experiment 4, evaluations were more positive in the within-relationship condition ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 0.67$) than in the within-person condition ($M = 1.86$, $SD = 0.61$), $F(1, 393) = 65.65$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.81$. Again, no main effect of culture was found ($p = .978$). However, the hypothesized interaction between culture and inconsistency form was found, $F(1, 393) = 9.80$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .02$. For within-person inconsistency, Americans ($M = 1.75$, $SD = 0.58$) gave lower performance evaluation to Amanda than Koreans ($M = 1.95$, $SD = 0.62$), $t(393) = 2.30$, $p = .022$, $d = 0.33$. For within-relationship inconsistency, Koreans ($M = 2.27$, $SD = 0.60$) rated Amanda lower than Americans ($M = 2.47$, $SD = 0.73$), $t(393) = 2.13$, $p = .033$, $d = 0.30$. This finding helps make the case that when the possibility of interacting with a target is hypothetically present, cultural differences in within-person and within-relationship inconsistency can exert downstream effects on social evaluations of the target person.

Attitude Toward the Issue

Koreans ($M = 3.86$, $SD = 1.85$) perceived using a portable air conditioner at work to be more morally wrong than Americans ($M = 2.03$, $SD = 1.46$), $t(395) = 10.95$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.10$. However, no substantive differences emerged when controlling for participants' attitudes toward this issue.[15]

Experiment 5 replicated the primary findings on hypocrisy attribution from previous experiments, providing additional evidence beyond that of Experiment 4 for potential downstream effects on social evaluations. These results suggest the possibility that cultural variations in hypocrisy attribution to different forms of inconsistency may have consequences in real-life situations involving actual social interactions and relationships. Although we think this evidence is suggestive, future research adopting diverse methods and testing various situations would be needed to confidently assert that this would have similar effects on real-life decision making and behaviors toward different types of hypocrites. For example, although this study assessed participants' evaluations of the hypocrite as a coworker, which approximates performance reviews in real-world corporate contexts, additional measures might offer different and equally relevant insights into participants' real-life decision making and behaviors, such as measuring participants' trust in the hypocrite or more directly asking about their willingness to work with them. Moreover, as noted by an anonymous reviewer, although the situation we described may be

[15] Analyses controlling for these attitudes are reported in the online Supplemental Material.

Figure 7

Hypocrisy and Downstream Consequences (Social Evaluation) Ratings for American and Korean Participants as a Function of Inconsistency Form (Experiment 5)



Note. Error bars represent 95% CIs of means. CIs = confidence intervals.

realistic, it also introduced the idea of a hypothetical relationship existing between participants and the target by asking participants to imagine themselves as a subordinate who is evaluating the behavior of their supervisor. Introducing this relationship may have influenced the results, even though they appear similar to those from previous studies. Given that hypocrisy attribution can unfold in a variety of real-life relationships, examining the extent to which participant–target relationships influence hypocrisy attribution and whether this differs as a function of culture is an important future direction.

Meta-Analysis: Cultural Effects on Relational Hypocrisy Within and Across Different Contexts

To explore the overall effect of culture on relational and prototypical hypocrisy across each of the contexts we examined, we report separate meta-analyses for each type of hypocrisy.[16] We used fixed effects in which the mean effect size (i.e., mean correlation) was weighted by sample size (Goh et al., 2016). Specifically, we meta-analyzed the results of hypocrisy attribution for relational hypocrisy in Experiments 1–5 and of prototypical hypocrisy in Experiments 3–5. We also meta-analyzed the results of social responsibility perception in Experiments 1–3 to examine the overall effect of culture on the extent to which participants perceive an individual to be responsible for the behaviors of their close others (i.e., child in Experiments 1a and 1b, child or friend's child in Experiment 2, spouse in Experiment 3). To explore the overall effect size of culture on these variables across as many different contexts as possible, we included all relevant conditions in these meta-analyses, including the knowledge-present condition of Experiment 1b, where we expected the cultural effect on relational hypocrisy to be relatively small or even in the opposite direction. However, we did not include the inconsistency-absent condition in Experiment 4. To perform analyses, we converted Cohen's d into Pearson's correlations, followed by Fisher's z transformations for analyses, which were then converted back to Cohen's d for presentation purposes.

As shown in Figure 8, the overall effect of culture was significant for both relational hypocrisy ($M\ d = 0.30$, $Z = 6.28$, $p < .001$, two-tailed) and prototypical hypocrisy ($M\ d = -0.56$, $Z = -6.95$, $p < .001$, two-tailed), with the latter effect in the opposite direction. A fully random effects test also showed that the overall cultural effect for both types of hypocrisy was significant, as indicated by single-sample t tests of each mean effect size against zero, relational hypocrisy: $M\ d = 0.30$, $t(5) = 4.97$, $p = .004$, two-tailed; prototypical hypocrisy: $M\ d = -0.49$, $t(2) = -4.40$, $p = .048$, two-tailed. These results suggest that the cultural effects found for both types of hypocrisy are fairly robust, even if their effect sizes depend on different contexts. Thus, we conclude that at least across the contexts explored in this study, the overall effect size of culture for relational hypocrisy (i.e., hypocrisy attributed to within-relationship inconsistency) is small to medium and that the overall effect size of culture for prototypical hypocrisy (i.e., hypocrisy attributed to within-person inconsistency) is about medium and in the opposite direction. Additionally, the effect of culture on social responsibility perception was also significant, $M\ d = 1.12$, $Z = 19.86$, $p < .001$, two-tailed. A fully random effects test was consistent with this, indicating that Koreans perceive people to be more responsible for their close others' behaviors than Americans do, $M\ d = 1.11$, $t(4) = 7.92$, $p = .001$, two-tailed.

We note that although the effects of culture were robust (and in opposite directions, depending on hypocrisy type) in our meta-analyses, it is important to consider that the magnitude of effects varied depending on the experiments and the contexts used. For instance, the effect sizes of culture for relational hypocrisy were relatively larger for parent–child relationships than married couple relationships, but this was not the case in Experiment 2, especially when participants evaluated the vandalism vignette. Likewise, the cultural effect sizes for relational hypocrisy were generally smaller than those for prototypical hypocrisy but were similar in magnitude in Experiment 3 when participants evaluated the vignette about littering behavior. Furthermore, effect sizes as a function of culture varied not only for relational hypocrisy but for prototypical hypocrisy across Experiments 3–5. Although contexts likely matter for the extent of hypocrisy attribution even when cross-cultural differences are not being explored or when the focus is solely prototypical hypocrisy, these results highlight the sensitivity of cultural effects on both prototypical and relational hypocrisy across different social contexts. This suggests that there is a need for further research to help clarify the contexts in which these effects will emerge most strongly (or disappear). To facilitate understanding of the results from our six experiments, we summarize the significance and magnitude of the cultural effects on hypocrisy attribution for different hypocrisy types, knowledge presence conditions, relationship types, and vignettes in Table 2.

[16] The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

Figure 8

Overall and Individual Effect Sizes of Culture on Hypocrisy Attribution and Social Responsibility Perception Across Different Experiments



Note. Effect sizes are presented as Cohen's *d*. Error bars represent 95% CIs of effect sizes. Positive effect sizes indicate that the Korean mean was greater than the American mean. Negative effect sizes indicate that the American mean was greater than the Korean mean. An effect size of zero is indicated by the solid vertical line. Overall ES = overall effect size (fixed); CIs = confidence intervals.

General Discussion

Hypocrisy is not a new concept. For example, it is mentioned in the Bible, the Qur'an, the Analects of Confucius, as well as the Tao Te Ching, suggesting that across time, location, cultures, and belief systems, recognizing hypocrisy and being wary of hypocrites have been advised. Indeed, in every language for which we found and used a translation tool, a word existed for hypocrisy. Thus, hypocrisy appears to be an important concept, a type of behavior that humans across the globe understand and negatively evaluate. Despite this, most research on hypocrisy has been conducted in Western cultures and using Western samples, with a conceptualization that has almost exclusively focused on a prototypical form (i.e., within-person inconsistency, such as when a person says one thing and then does another; e.g., Alicke et al., 2013; Barden et al., 2005; Batson & Thompson, 2001; Jordan et al., 2017; Kreps et al., 2017; Laurent & Clark, 2019). Notably, recent studies have begun to investigate differences in how cultures attribute hypocrisy (Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018). However, at its core, this work has continued to probe attitudes toward hypocrisy using a Western conceptualization of the concept. We agree that this conceptualization is culturally robust and involves how people feel about the "inconsistent self." However, we also believe that important cultural differences in how the self is construed can lead to cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution that reverse the pattern typically found, which was supported in the data we present.

Building on this notion, our first two experiments (Experiments 1–2) moved beyond prototypical hypocrisy to examine what we labeled relational hypocrisy, a novel form of hypocrisy that to our knowledge has not yet been proposed or investigated. Specifically, we argued that given the greater inclusion of others in the self-concept for Easterners (e.g., Koreans) versus Westerners (e.g., Americans), we should find that Koreans attribute greater hypocrisy than Americans when a target says one thing and then this attitude is contradicted by another person who is *socially connected* to the target because of their close relationship with them. In Experiment 1a, we found that Koreans attribute more hypocrisy than Americans when a parent expresses an attitude and their child behaves in a way that contradicts it. Experiment 1b replicated this, also showing that this is not simply a function of Koreans (but not Americans) assuming that the parent knew about their child's behavior when they expressed their views. Experiment 2 extended this idea further to a further removed social relationship, showing similar effects when a child of a target's friend contradicts the target's attitude imposition.

Experiment 3 directly tested the role of social relationships in explaining cultural variation in hypocrisy attribution by manipulating whose behavior contradicted an agent's attitude (i.e., either the agent themselves or the agent's spouse). This allowed us to replicate past findings investigating prototypical hypocrisy and compare it with relational hypocrisy while also providing direct evidence for a reversal in hypocrisy attribution based on culture (i.e., with Americans attributing more hypocrisy for prototypical hypocrisy and Koreans attributing more hypocrisy for relational hypocrisy). Experiment 3 also allowed us to further generalize our findings beyond those relationships already examined (i.e., a parent and their child, and a parent and a friend's child) using a new social relationship (i.e., a married couple). Of interest, across Experiments 1–3, Koreans' (vs. Americans') greater endorsement of parental or spousal responsibility mediated hypocrisy judgments. Finally, Experiments 4–5 replicated Experiment 3 using a better measure of hypocrisy, measures of moral condemnation (Experiment 4) and social evaluation/downstream consequences (Experiments 4–5), as

Table 2
Magnitude and Significance of Cultural Effects on Hypocrisy Attribution in Different Experiments and for Different Hypocrisy Types, Knowledge Presence Conditions, Relationship Types, and Vignettes

Experiment	Hypocrisy	Knowledge	Relationship	Vignette	Pattern	Effect size (*d*)	*p*
Experiment 1a	Relational	No information	Parent–child	Abortion	United States < Korea	0.40	.055
				Premarital sex	United States < Korea	0.44	.064
Experiment 1b	Relational	Present	Parent–child	Abortion	United States > Korea	0.19	.278
				Premarital sex	United States < Korea	0.70	.001
		Absent	Parent–child	Abortion	United States < Korea	0.51	<.001
				Premarital sex	United States < Korea	0.59	<.001
Experiment 2	Relational	Absent	Parent–child	Abortion	United States < Korea	0.12	.437
				Vandalism	United States > Korea	0.26	.113
	Extended-relational	Absent	Parent-friend's child	Abortion	United States < Korea	0.34	.062
				Vandalism	United States < Korea	0.35	.039
Experiment 3	Prototypical	Absent	Self	Drunk driving	United States > Korea	0.65	<.001
				Littering	United States > Korea	0.78	<.001
	Relational	Absent	Married couple	Drunk driving	United States < Korea	0.40	.001
				Littering	United States < Korea	0.72	<.001
Experiment 4	Prototypical	Absent	Self	Using Chinese	United States > Korea	0.35	<.001
	Relational		Married couple	products	United States < Korea	0.18	.015
Experiment 5	Prototypical	Absent	Self	Using portable air	United States > Korea	0.41	.018
	Relational		Married couple	conditioning	United States < Korea	0.24	.048

well as questions that targeted social perception but were unrelated to social evaluation and inconsistency-absent conditions that controlled the behavior targets engaged in (i.e., control conditions; Experiment 4).

Relational Versus Prototypical Hypocrisy

As alluded to above, although we believe that within-relationship inconsistency is a novel and previously undescribed form of hypocrisy that is particularly pronounced for Koreans, we also believe that at its core, it is conceptually similar to the current understanding of hypocrisy. That is, we believe that it still relies on perceiving self-inconsistency but that because self-construal differs across Korean and American cultures, what it means to be inconsistent with the self also varies culturally, leading Koreans to be more sensitive to this form of inconsistency than Americans. Specifically, Koreans' expectations of relational coherence and agency should lead to the assumption that people share attitudes with others they are in close relationships with and that those others are also responsible for behaving consistently with the attitudes they express. Put differently, within close relationships, each person is perceived as an extension of the other's self, with the words of one indicating to some extent the beliefs of both and the actions of the other reflecting the way both will behave. Thus, similar to how telling others how not to behave suggests that a target would not behave in that way, it can also imply that someone close to the target will not behave in the same way, especially in Korea.

This may further be associated with a greater sense for Koreans relative to Americans that a virtue can only be claimed when close others are similarly virtuous. That is, although both Americans and Koreans attribute greater hypocrisy when they feel that an individual is falsely claiming virtues to which they are not entitled (Effron, O'Connor, et al., 2018; Jordan et al., 2017), Americans will conclude that virtue has been falsely signaled primarily when a target's behavior contradicts their previous stance on an issue. Koreans, in contrast, may additionally feel that virtue has been falsely signaled when someone *else* (close to the target) behaves in a way that contradicts the target's previous stance, concluding that the target does not "deserve" to claim a higher moral ground.

Our consistent findings from Experiments 1 to 3, that Koreans perceive higher shared responsibility in parent–child or spousal relationships than Americans and that this cultural difference mediates Koreans' higher hypocrisy attributions than Americans, particularly in the within-relationship inconsistency conditions, support these explanations, although given the cross-sectional designs and measured mediators, caution in interpretation is recommended. Moreover, a similar finding in Experiment 4 suggests that Koreans more than Americans likely feel that congruence or harmony in the statements and behavior of spouses is important. Future research examining these processes by manipulating perceptions of shared social responsibilities, false signaling, and undeserved moral benefits will help further clarify these issues.

To be fair and not overclaim, we openly acknowledge that perceived within-person inconsistency of some form may be a universal prerequisite for hypocrisy to be attributed, particularly for it to be strongly attributed; however, we argue that social inputs to hypocrisy matter and that the weighting of these inputs varies as a function of culture. Thus, even if some might argue that cross-person, within-relationship inconsistency is not "technically" hypocrisy, we would respond that people do attribute hypocrisy in these cases—even if its attribution is somewhat modest—and that beliefs that this form of inconsistency *is* hypocrisy likely vary by culture. Experiments 3–5 support this by manipulating the involvement of social relationships in the inconsistency and identifying the conditions under which, relative to Americans, Koreans attribute less or *more* hypocrisy for the same behavior. In particular,

Experiment 4 demonstrates the unique contributions of within-person and within-relationship inconsistency to Koreans' and Americans' hypocrisy attributions, respectively, through comparisons with consistency-absent conditions. Taken together, the greater focus on, attention to, or use of social information by East Asians relative to Westerners can either (partially) excuse inconsistency or emphasize it.

Overall, the present research accomplished several goals beyond proposing and testing a theoretical explanation—rooted in past cross-cultural research (Markus, 2016; Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 2010; Triandis, 1995, 2018)—for why cultural differences in hypocrisy are likely to emerge under certain circumstances. First, it confirmed this explanation by replicating previous findings and integrating them in a broader framework of within-person and within-relationship inconsistency using both experimental and measurement-based methods. Second, based on this framework, it proposed and tested a novel form of hypocrisy (i.e., relational hypocrisy) that has not to our knowledge been examined in prior research. Third, based on this novel form of hypocrisy, it documented a previously undemonstrated effect wherein Koreans (vs. Americans) attribute more (rather than less) hypocrisy for the same behavior. Last, it showed that this cultural difference is likely generalizable by adopting a variety of scenarios that involve various behaviors and different relationships.

Additional Contributions

Beyond the theoretical contributions outlined above, the present work makes additional contributions to the literature. First, by providing a theoretical framework in which well-documented cultural East/West differences (e.g., in interdependent vs. independent self-construal) help explain cultural differences in hypocrisy attribution, our findings add to the broader literature by probing the ways in which people from different cultures think about and apply psychological concepts in similar and dissimilar ways. Second, by taking a concept that is relevant to people across the globe, but which has mostly been studied in Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic samples (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010), this work has deepened our understanding of an important moral concept in ways that research using only Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic samples cannot. Moreover, by examining hypocrisy under a cultural microscope and probing mechanisms that might explain cultural differences in its attribution, this work aids a broader attempt to uncover and explain cultural differences in moral judgment (e.g., Arutyunova et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2013; Sverdlik et al., 2012). In addition, the current research informs other works that have examined the perception of inconsistency and interpersonal reactions to others' inconsistency from a cross-cultural perspective (e.g., Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018; Heine & Lehman, 1997; Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005; Kitayama et al., 2004; Sakai, 1981; Soto et al., 2011; Takaku et al., 2001).

Practically, the results reported here could have important implications for trying to successfully navigate intercultural cooperative efforts (e.g., in business, politics, or even relationships). That is, given the extent to which hypocrisy is usually reviled, it is useful to understand the conditions under which people from one culture will attribute more or less hypocrisy than people from another culture. For example, if one partner in an intercultural business venture (e.g., a Korean business) reversed an earlier stance because not doing so could damage a social contract with a different and closely aligned partner, they might believe this reversal was warranted. The cultural collaborator (e.g., an American business), in contrast, might attribute hypocrisy, damaging further cooperation. In a similar circumstance, however, if one collaborator (e.g., an American business) behaved in a way that contradicted the stance or actions of one of their closely aligned partners, that collaborator might think nothing of it because *they* were not the ones to take that stance or behave in a particular way. Yet, their cultural collaborator (e.g., a Korean business) might attribute hypocrisy, harming the partnership.

Constraints on Generality

This research was exclusively conducted using American and Korean participants. Aside from practical reasons, this choice was grounded in how the cultures of the United States and Korea are respectively viewed as being more (vs. less) individualistic and collectivistic and in how Americans and Koreans are commonly recruited for cross-cultural studies on independent and interdependent self-construal (e.g., Na & Choi, 2009; E. M. Suh, 2002). Nevertheless, replicating our findings among Westerners outside the United States and East Asians outside South Korea would aid the generalizability of our conclusions. Relatedly, replicating these studies using participants from non-East Asian collectivistic cultures (e.g., in Latin America or Southeast Asia) should be addressed in future research, as current research on culture and perception of hypocrisy offers little insight into whether these results would replicate (cf. Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Friedman et al., 2018). Going further, diversifying recruitment techniques more generally (i.e., recruiting samples from populations outside of online panels) and diversifying participant populations (in terms of age, social class, etc.) would have positive impacts beyond work in this domain.

Limitations and Future Directions

Several other limitations of this work should be noted. First, our primary research question was addressed using quasi-experiments (i.e., nationality and place of residence as proxies for culture), even if other experimental manipulations were used. Although this method is generally used in cross-cultural research because it is practically difficult to manipulate culture, it does limit the ability to draw causal inferences. Examining variables other than the country of origin as a proxy for culture could provide further evidence for our claims (e.g., Miyamoto et al., 2018; Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens et al., 2014). Additionally, using purely experimental designs, such as by manipulating cultural mindsets (e.g., using priming; Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Oyserman & Sorensen, 2009), would be particularly useful.

Second, potential bias due to the lack of cross-cultural measurement invariance is another important limitation of our (and others') research. Though back-translation assured equivalence of stimulus materials, it is not possible to control all potential cultural confounding factors that could affect people's responses. For example, past work has suggested cultural differences in response style, such that Westerners more frequently use the extreme ends of scales than East Asians (e.g., Chen et al., 1995). Notably, although this remains a possible issue, the current research did not rely simply on average cultural differences. Instead, the studies reported here demonstrated that social relationships play a

role in the pattern of responses beyond the main effects of culture, and based on this idea, a theoretically grounded prediction for a reversal in cultural effects was supported. Moreover, in Experiments 1–3, cultural differences were mediated by the perception of shared responsibility within the social relationships, further increasing confidence that our results are not simply a function of response style differences. Beyond this, the inclusion of measures unrelated to social evaluation in Experiment 4, and finding no similar cultural reversal of effects, helps our claim that what we report is not simply a function of cultural differences in response styles, as do comparisons of inconsistency-absent control conditions.

In this regard, one theoretical question worth revisiting would be what should be considered as potential "cultural confounds" and what constitutes "cultural differences" in hypocrisy judgments. For example, in Experiment 4, even when no inconsistency was in evidence, we still observed the pattern of Americans attributing greater hypocrisy than Koreans in the within-person condition and the opposite in the within-relationship condition, albeit to a lesser extent in both cases. We speculated that this might be due in part to both cultural differences in how the self is construed and in how Americans might discount negative judgments when considering the actions of a target's romantic partner but evaluating the target. Possibly, there is also some role in these effects for Koreans' moderacy bias and/or general cultural trends for Americans to assign more individual responsibility and for Koreans to assign more shared responsibility to close others, even for behaviors unrelated to previous speech.

However, would these possible cultural tendencies, if supported and treated as alternative explanations, suggest that the present findings lack meaning regarding cultural differences in how people attribute hypocrisy? Our response is "probably not." That is, even if Americans emphasize provided information more and make their judgments more dependent on it, and Koreans are more concerned with considering possibilities that have not been explicitly described and adjust their judgments because of this consideration, this might reflect important differences in how hypocrisy attribution (and moral judgments, more broadly) unfolds in the real world. Given that hypocrisy judgments are a special kind of negative attribution, if Americans attribute more causal relevance to documented internal factors and Asians give more weight more to plausible situational factors (e.g., Choi et al., 2003), this may play an important role in how hypocrisy is attributed in different cultures.

Third, as an alternative (or additional) explanation, our findings might also be explained by other aspects of East/West differences than independent versus interdependent self-construal. As an example, Friedman et al. (2018) explained a difference in hypocrisy attribution (for within-person inconsistency) between Easterners and Westerners by noting cultural differences in communication style (Triandis, 1994, 1996), suggesting that Easterners are more lenient toward others' word–deed misalignment than Westerners because they tend not to take words as literally or directly as Westerners, instead emphasizing social contexts in their interpretations. These culturally varying communication tendencies may also contribute to the cultural differences in hypocrisy attributions for within-relationship inconsistency reported here. Future research might explore this possibility as it applies to relational hypocrisy.

Finally, although we consistently documented cultural differences in the attribution of relational hypocrisy, it is also true that the overall attribution of hypocrisy in these cases was relatively low compared with prototypical hypocrisy. However, as seen in the real-world case of Kang, the South Korean foreign minister, the attribution of relational hypocrisy can be influential, leading to serious consequences. As depicted in Table 2, the magnitude of cultural effects on relational hypocrisy (as well as on prototypical hypocrisy) is highly sensitive to different social contexts, and many potential factors could have influenced the degree of hypocrisy attribution. Further research is needed to more precisely determine the conditions under which relational hypocrisy attribution could substantially increase and whether those conditions are similar to or different from the conditions that increase prototypical hypocrisy. Additionally, exploring the behavioral consequences of relational hypocrisy in real-world settings, similar to everyday life situations, would be a useful endeavor for future research, even if it would come with methodological challenges. The present research may provide a theoretical framework for these future studies.

Conclusion

The present research outlined and tested a theoretical model for when and why people from different cultures attribute different levels of hypocrisy for the same behavior. Although this model was supported across six experiments, further research will help confirm or refute our proposal. With some confidence, we can conclude that if you do not practice what you preach, you will be condemned as a hypocrite in both cultures but to a greater extent in Western cultures than in East Asian cultures. Furthermore, in Western cultures, you primarily need to pay attention to whether your own words and actions are consistent. In East Asian cultures, on the contrary, even if your actions are consistent with your words, the inconsistent behaviors of your family or close friends might also earn you condemnation.

References

Ahn, S. (2020, October 5). Foreign minister in hot water over husband's US trip to purchase yacht. *The Korean Herald*. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20201005000857

Al-Bahri, A., Al-Moundhri, M., & Al-Azri, M. (2018). The role of patients' families in cancer treatment decision-making: Perspectives among Eastern and Western families. *Sultan Qaboos University Medical Journal*, *17*(4), 383–385. https://doi.org/10.18295/squmj.2017.17.04.001

Alicke, M., Gordon, E., & Rose, D. (2013). Hypocrisy: What counts? *Philosophical Psychology*, *26*(5), 673–701. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.677397

Andrews, P. W. (2001). The psychology of social chess and the evolution of attribution mechanisms: Explaining the fundamental attribution error. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, *22*(1), 11–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(00)00059-3

Aronson, E., Fried, C., & Stone, J. (1991). Overcoming denial and increasing the intention to use condoms through the induction of hypocrisy. *American Journal of Public Health*, *81*(12), 1636–1638. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.81.12.1636

Arutyunova, K. R., Alexandrov, Y. I., & Hauser, M. D. (2016). Sociocultural influences on moral judgments: East–west, male–female, and young–old. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *7*, Article 1334. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01334

Barden, J., Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2005). "Saying one thing and doing another": Examining the impact of event order on hypocrisy judgments of others. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(11), 1463–1474. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205276430

Batson, C. D., Kobrynowicz, D., Dinnerstein, J. L., Kampf, H. C., & Wilson, A. D. (1997). In a very different voice: Unmasking moral hypocrisy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*(6), 1335–1348. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.72.6.1335

Batson, C. D., & Thompson, E. R. (2001). Why don't moral people act morally? Motivational considerations. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *10*(2), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00114

Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M., & Leth Olsen, A. (2013). Political hypocrisy: The effect of political scandals on candidate evaluations. *Acta Politica*, *48*(4), 408–428. https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2013.6

Brislin, R. W. (1980). Translation and content analysis of oral and written materials. In H. C. Triandis & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (Vol. 1–2, pp. 389–444). Allyn & Bacon.

Cha, S. E., & Edmondson, A. C. (2006). When values backfire: Leadership, attribution, and disenchantment in a values-driven organization. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *17*(1), 57–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2005.10.006

Chen, C., Lee, S., & Stevenson, H. W. (1995). Response style and cross-cultural comparisons of rating scales among East Asian and North American students. *Psychological Science*, *6*(3), 170–175. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00327.x

Choi, I., & Choi, Y. (2002). Culture and self-concept flexibility. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *28*(11), 1508–1517. https://doi.org/10.1177/014616702237578

Choi, I., Dalal, R., Kim-Prieto, C., & Park, H. (2003). Culture and judgment of causal relevance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*(1), 46–59. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.46

Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation and universality. *Psychological Bulletin*, *125*(1), 47–63. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.1.47

Church, A. T., Anderson-Harumi, C. A., del Prado, A. M., Curtis, G. J., Tanaka-Matsumi, J., Valdez Medina, J. L., Mastor, K. A., White, F. A., Miramontes, L. A., & Katigbak, M. S. (2008). Culture, cross-role consistency, and adjustment: Testing trait and cultural psychology perspectives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(3), 739–755. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.3.739

Church, A. T., Katigbak, M. S., Ortiz, F. A., Del Prado, A. M., De Jesús Vargas-Flores, J., Ibáñez-Reyes, J., Reyes, J. A. S., Pe-Pua, R., & Cabrera, H. F. (2005). Investigating implicit trait theories across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *36*(4), 476–496. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022105275963

Cohen, D., & Gunz, A. (2002). As seen by the other… : Perspectives on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners and Westerners. *Psychological Science*, *13*(1), 55–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00409

Cross, S. E., Bacon, P. L., & Morris, M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-construal and relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *78*(4), 791–808. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.4.791

Cross, S. E., Gore, J. S., & Morris, M. L. (2003). The relational-interdependent self-construal, self-concept consistency, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *85*(5), 933–944. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.5.933

Cross, S. E., Morris, M. L., & Gore, J. S. (2002). Thinking about oneself and others: The relational-interdependent self-construal and social cognition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*(3), 399–418. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.3.399

Cushman, F. (2008). Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment. *Cognition*, *108*(2), 353–380. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.006

Dickerson, C. A., Thibodeau, R., Aronson, E., & Miller, D. (1992). Using cognitive dissonance to encourage water conservation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *22*(11), 841–854. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1992.tb00928.x

Dong, M., van Prooijen, J.-W., Wu, S., & van Lange, P. A. M. (2022). Culture, status, and hypocrisy: High-status people who don't practice what they preach are viewed as worse in the United States than China. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *13*(1), 60–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550621990451

Dweck, C. S., Chiu, C., & Hong, Y. (1995). Implicit theories and their role in judgments and reactions: A word from two perspectives. *Psychological Inquiry*, *6*(4), 267–285. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0604_1

Dweck, C. S., & Leggett, E. L. (1988). A social-cognitive approach to motivation and personality. *Psychological Review*, *95*(2), 256–273. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.95.2.256

Effron, D. A., Lucas, B. J., & O'Connor, K. (2015). Hypocrisy by association: When organizational membership increases condemnation for wrongdoing. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *130*, 147–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.05.001

Effron, D. A., Markus, H. R., Jackman, L. M., Muramoto, Y., & Muluk, H. (2018). Hypocrisy and culture: Failing to practice what you preach receives harsher interpersonal reactions in independent (vs. interdependent) cultures. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *76*, 371–384. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.12.009

Effron, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (2015). Do as I say, not as I've done: Suffering for a misdeed reduces the hypocrisy of advising others against it. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *131*, 16–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2015.07.004

Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Letting people off the hook: When do good deeds excuse transgressions? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36*(12), 1618–1634. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210385922

Effron, D. A., O'Connor, K., Leroy, H., & Lucas, B. J. (2018). From inconsistency to hypocrisy: When does "saying one thing but doing another" invite condemnation? *Research in Organizational Behavior*, *38*, 61–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2018.10.003

English, T., & Chen, S. (2007). Culture and self-concept stability: Consistency across and within contexts among Asian Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(3), 478–490. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.478

Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503620766

Fointiat, V. (2004). "I know what I have to do, but …" When hypocrisy leads to behavioral change. *Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal*, *32*(8), 741–746. https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2004.32.8.741

Forgas, J. P. (1998). On being happy and mistaken: Mood effects on the fundamental attribution error. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(2), 318–331. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.2.318

Friedman, R., Hong, Y.-Y., Simons, T., Chi, S.-C., Oh, S.-H. D., & Lachowicz, M. (2018). The impact of culture on reactions to promise breaches: Differences between east and west in behavioral integrity perceptions. *Group & Organization Management*, *43*(2), 273–315. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601116678101

Gabbay, B. B., Matsumura, S., Etzioni, S., Asch, S. M., Rosenfeld, K. E., Shiojiri, T., Balingit, P. P., & Lorenz, K. A. (2005). Negotiating end-of-life decision making: A comparison of Japanese and U.S. residents' approaches. *Academic Medicine*, *80*(7), 617–621. https://doi.org/10.1097/00001888-200507000-00003

Gilbert, D. T., & Jones, E. E. (1986). Exemplification: The self-presentation of moral character. *Journal of Personality*, *54*(3), 593–615. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1986.tb00414.x

Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.21

Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016). Mini meta-analysis of your own studies: Some arguments on why and a primer on how. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *10*(10), 535–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12267

Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Chapter two—Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. In P. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4

Guan, Y., Chen, S. X., Levin, N., Bond, M. H., Luo, N., Xu, J., Zhou, X., Chen, P., Li, C., Fu, R., Zhang, J., Ji, Y., Mo, Z., Li, Y., Fang, Z., Jiang, D., & Han, X. (2015). Differences in career decision-making profiles between American and Chinese university students: The relative strength of mediating mechanisms across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *46*(6), 856–872. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022115585874

Hayes, A. F. (2018). *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach (Methodology in the Social Sciences)* (2nd ed.). The Guilford Press.

Heine, S. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1997). Culture, dissonance, and self-affirmation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *23*(4), 389–400. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167297234005

Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most people are not WEIRD. *Nature*, *466*(7302), Article 29. https://doi.org/10.1038/466029a

Hoshino-Browne, E., Zanna, A. S., Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., Kitayama, S., & Lackenbauer, S. (2005). On the cultural guises of cognitive dissonance: The case of easterners and westerners. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *89*(3), 294–310. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.294

Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. (1967). The attribution of attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *3*(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034-0

Jordan, J. J., & Sommers, R. (2022). When does moral engagement risk triggering a hypocrite penalty? *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *47*, Article 101404. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101404

Jordan, J. J., Sommers, R., Bloom, P., & Rand, D. G. (2017). Why do we hate hypocrites? Evidence for a theory of false signaling. *Psychological Science*, *28*(3), 356–368. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797616685771

Jourard, S. M. (1963). *Personal adjustment: An approach through the study of healthy personality* (2nd ed., pp. xiii, 477). Macmillan.

Kim, E., & Roh, S. (2020, October 5). FM in hot water over husband's yacht-buying trip. *Chosun Ilbo*. https://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2020/10/05/2020100501492.html

Kim, H., & Markus, H. R. (1999). Deviance or uniqueness, harmony or conformity? A cultural analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *77*(4), 785–800. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.4.785

Kim, H. S., Sherman, D. K., Ko, D., & Taylor, S. E. (2006). Pursuit of comfort and pursuit of harmony: Culture, relationships, and social support seeking. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*(12), 1595–1607. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206291991

Kim, Y.-H., Cohen, D., & Au, W.-T. (2010). The jury and abjury of my peers: The self in face and dignity cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(6), 904–916. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017936

Kitayama, S., Snibbe, A. C., Markus, H. R., & Suzuki, T. (2004). Is there any "free" choice? Self and dissonance in two cultures. *Psychological Science*, *15*(8), 527–533. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00714.x

Kreps, T. A., Laurin, K., & Merritt, A. C. (2017). Hypocritical flip-flop, or courageous evolution? When leaders change their moral minds. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *113*(5), 730–752. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000103

Krull, D. S., Loy, M. H.-M., Lin, J., Wang, C.-F., Chen, S., & Zhao, X. (1999). The fundamental fundamental attribution error: Correspondence bias in individualist and collectivist cultures. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*(10), 1208–1219. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299258003

Lammers, J. (2012). Abstraction increases hypocrisy. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *48*(2), 475–480. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.006

Laurent, S. M., & Clark, B. A. M. (2019). What makes hypocrisy? Folk definitions, attitude/behavior combinations, attitude strength, and private/public distinctions. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, *41*(2), 104–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2018.1556160

Laurent, S. M., Clark, B. A. M., Walker, S., & Wiseman, K. D. (2014). Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors. *Cognition and Emotion*, *28*(1), 59–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2013.801339

Laurent, S. M., Nuñez, N. L., & Schweitzer, K. A. (2015). The influence of desire and knowledge on perception of each other and related mental states, and different mechanisms for blame. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *60*, 27–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.04.009

Manchi Chao, M., Zhang, Z.-X., & Chiu, C.-Y. (2008). Personal and collective culpability judgment: A functional analysis of East Asian–North American differences. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *39*(6), 730–744. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022108323788

Markus, H. R. (2016). What moves people to action? Culture and motivation. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, *8*, 161–166. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.10.028

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, *98*(2), 224–253. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224

Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (2010). Cultures and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *5*(4), 420–430. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610375557

Menon, T., Morris, M., Chiu, C. Y., & Hong, Y. Y. (1999). Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *76*(5), 701–717. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.5.701

Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and development of everyday social explanation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*(5), 961–978. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.5.961

Miyamoto, Y., Yoo, J., Levine, C. S., Park, J., Boylan, J. M., Sims, T., Markus, H. R., Kitayama, S., Kawakami, N., Karasawa, M., Coe, C. L., Love, G. D., & Ryff, C. D. (2018). Culture and social hierarchy: Self- and other-oriented correlates of socioeconomic status across cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *115*(3), 427–445. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000133

Monin, B., & Merritt, A. (2012). Moral hypocrisy, moral inconsistency, and the struggle for moral integrity. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (pp. 167–184). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/13091-009

Morris, M. W., & Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese attributions for social and physical events. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*(6), 949–971. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.949

Na, J., & Choi, I. (2009). Culture and first-person pronouns. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *35*(11), 1492–1499. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167209343810

Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., & Marecek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen by the actor and as seen by the observer. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *27*(2), 154–164. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034779

Norenzayan, A., Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (2002). Cultural similarities and differences in social inference: Evidence from behavioral predictions and lay theories of behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *28*(1), 109–120. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202281010

Norenzayan, A., & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture and causal cognition. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *9*(4), 132–135. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00077

O'Connor, K., Effron, D. A., & Lucas, B. J. (2020). Moral cleansing as hypocrisy: When private acts of charity make you feel better than you deserve. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *119*(3), 540–559. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000195

O'Sullivan, M. (2003). The fundamental attribution error in detecting deception: The boy-who-cried-wolf effect. *Personality and Social*

Psychology Bulletin, *29*(10), 1316–1327. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203254610

Ott-Holland, C. J., Huang, J. L., Ryan, A. M., Elizondo, F., & Wadlington, P. L. (2014). The effects of culture and gender on perceived self-other similarity in personality. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *53*, 13–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.07.010

Oyserman, D. (2011). Culture as situated cognition: Cultural mindsets, cultural fluency, and meaning making. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *22*(1), 164–214. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2011.627187

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. S. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism. *Psychological Bulletin*, *134*(2), 311–342. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311

Oyserman, D., & Sorensen, N. (2009). Understanding cultural syndrome effects on what and how we think: A situated cognition model. In R. S. Wyer, C.-y. Chiu, & Y.-y. Hong (Eds.), *Understanding culture: Theory, research, and application* (pp. 25–52). Psychology Press.

Riemer, H., Shavitt, S., Koo, M., & Markus, H. R. (2014). Preferences don't have to be personal: Expanding attitude theorizing with a cross-cultural perspective. *Psychological Review*, *121*(4), 619–648. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037666

Rogers, C. R. (1951). *Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications and theory*. Houghton Mifflin.

Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 10, pp. 173–220). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3

Sakai, H. (1981). Induced compliance and opinion change. *Japanese Psychological Research*, *23*(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.4992/psycholres1954.23.1

Silver, L., Huang, C., & Clancy, L. (2022, June 29). *Negative views of china tied to critical views of its policies on human rights*. Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/29/negative-views-of-china-tied-to-critical-views-of-its-policies-on-human-rights/

Smith, D., & Rhiney, E. (2020). CSR commitments, perceptions of hypocrisy, and recovery. *International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility*, *5*, Article 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40991-019-0046-7

Snibbe, A. C., & Markus, H. R. (2005). You can't always get what you want: Educational attainment, agency, and choice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(4), 703–720. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.4.703

Soto, J. A., Perez, C. R., Kim, Y.-H., Lee, E. A., & Minnick, M. R. (2011). Is expressive suppression always associated with poorer psychological functioning? A cross-cultural comparison between European Americans and Hong Kong Chinese. *Emotion*, *11*(6), 1450–1455. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023340

Spencer-Rodgers, J., Williams, M. J., Hamilton, D. L., Peng, K., & Wang, L. (2007). Culture and group perception: Dispositional and stereotypic inferences about novel and national groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(4), 525–543. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.525

Stephens, N. M., Markus, H. R., & Phillips, L. T. (2014). Social class culture cycles: How three gateway contexts shape selves and fuel inequality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *65*(1), 611–634. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115143

Stone, J., Aronson, E., Crain, A. L., Winslow, M. P., & Fried, C. B. (1994). Inducing hypocrisy as a means of encouraging young adults to use condoms. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *20*(1), 116–128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167294201012

Stone, J., & Fernandez, N. C. (2008). To practice what we preach: The use of hypocrisy and cognitive dissonance to motivate behavior change. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(2), 1024–1051. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00088.x

Suh, E., Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Triandis, H. C. (1998). The shifting basis of life satisfaction judgments across cultures: Emotions versus norms. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*(2), 482–493. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.2.482

Suh, E. M. (2002). Culture, identity consistency, and subjective well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(6), 1378–1391. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1378

Sverdlik, N., Roccas, S., & Sagiv, L. (2012). Morality across cultures: A values perspective. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), *The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil* (pp. 219–235). American Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/13091-012

Takaku, S., Weiner, B., & Ohbuchi, K.-I. (2001). A cross-cultural examination of the effects of apology and perspective taking on forgiveness. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, *20*(1–2), 144–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X01020001007

Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. *Psychological Review*, *96*(3), 506–520. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.506

Triandis, H. C. (1994). *Culture and social behavior*. McGraw-Hill.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and collectivism*. Avalon Publishing.

Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. *American Psychologist*, *51*(4), 407–415. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.51.4.407

Triandis, H. C. (2018). *Individualism and collectivism*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429499845

Tsai, J. L., Miao, F. F., Seppala, E., Fung, H. H., & Yeung, D. Y. (2007). Influence and adjustment goals: Sources of cultural differences in ideal affect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *92*(6), 1102–1117. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.92.6.1102

Tsukamoto, S., Holland, E., Haslam, N., Karasawa, M., & Kashima, Y. (2015). Cultural differences in perceived coherence of the self and ingroup: A Japan–Australia comparison. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*(1), 83–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12090

Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2007). Moral hypocrisy: Social groups and the flexibility of virtue. *Psychological Science*, *18*(8), 689–690. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01961.x

Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2008). The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*(5), 1334–1338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.010

Wagner, T., Lutz, R. J., & Weitz, B. A. (2009). Corporate hypocrisy: Overcoming the threat of inconsistent corporate social responsibility perceptions. *Journal of Marketing*, *73*(6), 77–91. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkg.73.6.77

Wu, D. Y. H. (1994). Self and collectivity: Socialization in Chinese preschools. In R. T. Ames, W. Dissanayake, & T. P. Kasulis (Eds.), *Self as person in Asian theory and practice* (pp. 235–250). SUNY Press.

Received July 26, 2023
Revision received March 18, 2024
Accepted April 4, 2024 ■