# Summary of Research and Proposals DSP Lab 2017


Yousef Amar















How can we design safe, scalable access control systems with arbitrary restrictions in this context?



The Route

- Triad of target, path, and method
- ▶ The container as a host
- RESTful APIs for all operations
- Direct mapping of HTTP methods to CRUD functions
- ▶ Per-route granular permissions

```
{
  "target": "smartphone-store",
  "path": "/accelerometer/ts/latest",
  "method": "POST"
}

{
  "target": "smartphone-store",
  "path": "/(sub|unsub)/gps/*",
  "method": "GET"
}
```

#### Implementation Delegated Authorization

- ► Google Research: Macaroons
  - A standard similar to signed cookies
  - ► Can be attenuated by "caveats"
  - Embedded permissions
  - Minting and verification can be separated through shared secret keys

```
target = smartphone-store
path = /(sub|unsub)/gps/*
method = GET
time < 1489405851417

target = smartphone-store
path = /light/ts/range
method = GET
startTimestamp >= 1489405234352
endTimestamp <= 1489405259525</pre>
```



Resource Discovery


- API for describing APIs
- Directory servers
- Many competing standards
  - Resource Description Framework (RDF)
  - Web Application Description Language (WADL)
  - Web Services Description Language (WSDL)
  - eXtensible Resource Descriptor (XRD)
- ► Subject-predicate-object style pervalent
- ▶ Different formats and applications XML for REST, SOAP, OpenID

Resource Discovery


- Hypercat: Recently joined BSI Group
- IoT-first specification design
- ▶ JSON/REST over XML/SOAP
- Only cataloguing; ontologies and authorisation extensible
- Discoverability vs accessibility
- Catalogues can be nested, allowing decentralisation and distribution

```
"catalogue-metadata": [{
  "rel": "urn:X-hypercat:rels:isContentType",
  "val": "application/vnd.hypercat.catalogue+json"
  "rel": "urn:X-hypercat:rels:hasDescription:en",
  "val": "A Databox Store"
"items": [{
  "href": "http://some-store/light".
  "item-metadata": [{
    "rel": "urn:X-hypercat:rels:hasDescription:en".
    "val": "Light Datasource"
    "rel": "urn:X-databox:rels:hasVendor".
    "val": "Databox Inc."
    "rel": "urn:X-databox:rels:isActuator".
    "val": false
```


#### Implementation The Arbiter



# Implementation Authorisation Flow




# Implementation Authorisation Flow




1. CM passes unique tokens


# Implementation Authorisation Flow




- 1. CM passes unique tokens
- 2. CM updates permissions




- 1. CM passes unique tokens
- 2. CM updates permissions
- 3. Store registers itself




- 1. CM passes unique tokens
- 2. CM updates permissions
- 3. Store registers itself
- 4. Arbiter responds with shared secret



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- 5. Container requests bearer token



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- 5. Container requests bearer token
- 6. Arbiter checks and responds




- 1. CM passes unique tokens
- 2. CM updates permissions
- 3. Store registers itself
- 4. Arbiter responds with shared secret
- 5. Container requests bearer token
- 6. Arbiter checks and responds
- 7. Container can now read/write to store


#### Transcription of Permissions


- 1. Drivers/apps come packaged with a manifest
  - Contain image metadata
  - Enumerate granular permissions for sources, concurrency, external access, and hardware
- 2. Users generate a Service-level Ageement (SLA)
- 3. The arbiter records granted permissions
- 4. Tokens are minted based on these



```
"name": "app",
"author": "amar",
"permissions": [
    "source": "twitter"
    "required": true
    "source": "gps"
```










Figure: Percentage CPU Usage by Container Type




Figure: Memory Usage by Container Type




Figure: Sum Net I/O by Container Type




Figure: Inserts/s over Stores under Maximum Load




Figure: Stores Launched over Time

# Differences in Time to Availability (TTA)

- 1. Device  $\rightarrow$  Cloud: 65ms
- 2. Device  $\rightarrow$  Cloud  $\rightarrow$  Home: 83ms
- 3. Device  $\rightarrow$  Home: 78ms
- 4. Device  $\rightarrow$  Home  $\rightarrow$  Cloud: 80ms




Figure: The four possible data flow scenarios tested




Figure: Data Time to Availability from Device to Cloud Databox Directly




Figure: Data Time to Availability from Device to Home Databox Directly




Figure: Data Time to Availability from Device to Home Databox via Cloud VPN




Figure: Data Time to Availability from Device to Cloud Databox via Home VPN

- ▶ TTA source away from home > source at home
- ► So minor, barely indistinguishable from NTP drift
- Based on performance alone, UX indifferent
- Scenarios through home (especially when source is away) have mean shifted right due to latency spikes
- ▶ Direct connections mean lower TTA, and cloud faster than home ceteris paribus
- Small difference for devices as sources vs cloud servers
- $\blacktriangleright$  For devices, processing at home > in the cloud  $\pm$  NTP error even ignoring privacy advantages
- ► Home vs cloud reliability vs cost
- ▶ Pure cloud only more advantageous for off-site processing (e.g. GPU-heavy image processing)

### Evaluation Time to Availability




Figure: Sections of the data pipeline timed

# Evaluation Time to Availability




Figure: Time-to-Availability (TTA) on a Raspberry Pi for high-frequency sensors

### Evaluation Time to Availability




Figure: Time-to-Availability (TTA) on an Intel NUC for high-frequency sensors

# The Serverless Paradigm Background




Figure 1: Evolution of Sharing. Gray layers are shared.

Figure: Hendrickson, et al. "Serverless computation with openlambda." Elastic 60 (2016): 80.

### The Serverless Paradigm Architecture




Figure: IBM's High-level OpenWhisk Architecture Diagram

### The Serverless Paradigm Architecture




Figure: Apache Kafka High-level Architecture Diagram

### Low-latency Serverless Approach




Figure: An Overview of Inter-component Relationships

# Low-latency Serverless Approach




Figure: The Internal Components of a Producer

# Low-latency Serverless Approach




Figure: Producer-intrinsic Steps for Computing Partitioning Decisions from Stale Queue Lengths

### Low-latency Serverless Simulations





Figure: An Example of Simulation Topology

#### Low-latency Serverless Simulations






Figure: Simulation Results with Different Partitioning Algorithms

# Next Steps Privacy and Risk Metrics





Figure: One Proof of Concept Experiment - Surprisal over Real Smart Meter Data

#### Next Steps Serverless over Transient Clouds


- ► Serverless on the edge
- Optimising for context through latency
- ► Processor selection based on arbitrary metrics, e.g. surprisal



#### Next Steps

Transient Privacy-Aware Clouds

- Encoding user-defined thresholds into bearer tokens
- ▶ Joint context at hierarchical levels
- ► TCACs → TPACs?



# Next Steps The Big Picture




Figure: A High-level Dependency Graph of Research Activities

### Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

More info: http://yousefamar.com/