

## Scenario: Bargaining Over the Peanut Peninsula

States A and B bargain over a peninsula with four assets. A partition that runs through an asset distributes its value equally between the two states.

- **Assets:** Mineral-rich mountains, Touristic site, Agricultural area, Strategic island.

- **Valuation:**

- First 3 assets are valued equally by both.
  - Strategic island: 50 utility for A, 0 for B.

- **Known Payoffs (A, B):**

- **Status Quo (sq):** (80, 30)

- **Deal x:** (50, 0)

## Questions 1-4: Baseline Scenario Analysis

### 1. Complete the payoff table:

Outcome	State
War	70
Status Quo (sq)	80
Deal x	50
Deal y	(Req)
Deal z	(Req)

### 2. Can any state credibly challenge the status quo?

A state can credibly challenge if its war payoff is better than the status quo payoff.

A: War (70) < SQ (80). B: War (10) < SQ (30).

**Answer:** No, neither state can credibly challenge the SQ.

### 3. Is the status quo Pareto optimal?

An outcome is Pareto optimal if no other outcome makes at least one player better off without making any player worse off.

### 4. What is the expected outcome of this bargaining scenario?

The status quo (80, 30), as it is preferred to war by both parties and no credible challenge exists.

## Question 6 & 7: Asymmetric & Long-Run Expectations

### 6. Asymmetric Expectations (A thinks C will help, B thinks C won't)

1. **Deals acceptable to A:** Any deal > A's expected war payoff (A+C vs B) of 135.

2. **Deals acceptable to B:** Any deal > B's expected war payoff (A vs B) of 10.

3. **Expected Outcome:** Mutual optimism. A demands > 135. B will only offer deals better than its SQ of 30, and

### 7. Declining State A (Long-Run)

• **Future War Outcome (incl. costs):** (70, 150)

• This future outcome becomes the reversion point for \*today's\* bargaining.

1. **A's long-run payoff if no war today:** 70 (from the future war).

2. **A's long-run payoff if war today:** 70 (from the current war).

3. **Expected Outcome:** State A is indifferent between war now and war later (gets 70 either way). State B, however, prefers a future power shift. A may initiate a preventative war today. The expected outcome is **War Today (70, 10)**.

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