AutoRed: Automated Attack Scenario Generation Framework for Red Teaming of LLMs

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Background

1. Large Language Models (LLMs) pose privacy risks by retaining sensitive information provided during interactions, potentially leading to unintended data exposure.
2. Traditional red-teaming, which relies on human testers to generate malicious prompts, is costly and time-consuming.

Red teaming as a CTF Game





AUTORED comprises three key components to streamline the attack process:

- *Malicious prompt generator*. This component generates a sequence of malicious prompts aimed at infiltrating an LLM;
- *Sensitive information extractor*. This module extracts the desired sensitive data (e.g. access code) from the LLM's responses, completing the attack cycle, and
- *Stop point identifier*. It identifies opportune moments to cease prompt generation, particularly when the LLM response contains the targeted sensitive information.



Figure 1. The workflow of AUTORED in every round of LLM red teaming simulation

Evaluation

The attack is defined to be successful under a predefined *defense* strategy if the CTF game does not conclude within *100* rounds.

LLM Name	Provider	#P	Date	ASR
Llama-3-8B	Meta	8 B	2024-04	0.607
Gemma-2B-Instruct	Google	2B	2024-02	0.827
InternLM-2-7B-Chat	InternLM	7B	2024-01	0.811
Mistral-7B-Instruct	Mistral AI	7.3 B	2023-09	0.670
Llama-2-7B-Chat-HF	Meta	7 B	2023-07	0.614
GPT-3.5-Turbo	Open AI	175 B	2023-03	0.795



Findings & Future Work

- Vanilla LLMs, lacking robust defense mechanisms or agent-based protection, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks.
- Defense strength impacts performance: Stronger defense strategies enhance an LLM's ability to resist prompt injection attacks.
- *Future Work: Is safety alignment dependent on instruction alignment?*

References

[1] Sam Toyer, Olivia Watkins, Ethan Adrian Mendes, Justin Svegliato, Luke Bailey, Tiffany Wang, Isaac Ong, Karim Elmaaroufi, Pieter Abbeel, Trevor Darrell, Alan Ritter, and Stuart Russell. Tensor Trust: Interpretable prompt injection attacks from an online game, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.01011.pdf.

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