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Senate

The Senate met at 12 noon and was called to order by the President pro tempore [Mr. THURMOND].

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Today's prayer will be offered by our guest chaplain, the Venerable Norman H.V. Elliott, Archdeacon of South-Central Alaska, Episcopal Diocese of Alaska, Anchorage, AK. He is the guest of Senator TED STEVENS. We appreciate having him with us.

PRAYER

The Venerable Norman H.V. Elliott offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, in whom our Nation puts its trust, we give You humble and heartfelt thanks for the many blessings You have most graciously bestowed upon us. We especially give thanks for the men and women who had the zeal and courage to oppose oppression and to form a nation dedicated to obtaining and maintaining the ideals of freedom, security, and justice for all its people.

Help us, we pray, to gladly accept with the same zeal and courage the heavy burden You have laid upon us in our time to secure freedom from oppression for all people and to continue to strive for peace among all nations.

Guide the deliberations and decisions of the men and women called to the high office and grave responsibility of Senator and support them as they take up this burden and faithfully seek to serve You and this Nation.

We ask this in Your holy name. Amen.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The able Senator from Kansas is recognized.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.

SCHEDULE

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, today the Senate will be in a period of morn-

ing business until 4 p.m. this afternoon. The first 2 hours have been reserved for general statements, with time controlled by Senators NICKLES and DURBIN. The remaining 2 hours are equally divided between the majority and minority leaders, with the understanding that the time will be used for statements in relation to the situation in Kosovo.

Following morning business, the Senate will resume consideration of the supplemental appropriations bill. The majority leader has announced there will be no rollcall votes during today's session. However, Members are encouraged to come to the floor to offer and debate amendments today to the supplemental bill with any votes ordered postponed until tomorrow.

Members are reminded that a cloture petition was filed on Friday to the Lott second-degree amendment relating to Kosovo, with that vote occurring at 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday.

I thank my colleagues for their attention and yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). The able Senator from Alaska.

GUEST CHAPLAIN

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I give my thanks to Dr. Ogilvie, our Senate Chaplain, for arranging the visit of my good friend, Father Norm Elliott. He was the pastor of the All Saints Episcopal Church in Anchorage and has been a close personal friend since the 1950s. We were both, at that time, residents of Fairbanks, AK.

In 1980, our guest chaplain officiated at my marriage when Catherine and I were married. He has also officiated at the wedding of my daughter Susan, my son Ted and my son Ben. In addition to that, he has christened my daughter Lilly and my granddaughters and my grandson John.

He has been more than a close friend. He also performed the memorial serv-

ice for my first wife Ann and assisted at the dedication of the Ann Stevens Red Cross Building in Anchorage.

Father Elliott was born in England and came to Detroit as a child. He came to Alaska in 1951 at a time when our church considered service in Alaska as overseas duty. For half a century, he has ministered to the people of our State. He has spent time in many small towns and villages in Alaska, such as Nenana, Eagle, Venetie, Beaver and Point Hope, just to name a few. In 1980, at my request, he was appointed to serve on the Commission of Alaska Natives. Members of that Commission were appointed by President Bush and Alaska's Gov. Wally Hickel. Father Elliott and members of that Commission spent 3 years traveling through Alaska to help our native people identify solutions to unique problems they face.

Norm is also chaplain of the Port of Anchorage, and he is the Civilian Episcopalian Chaplain for our Armed Forces in Alaska.

He is truly a dedicated man, dedicated to the word of God and to helping others. I know that some, such as our distinguished President pro tempore, would recall that Father Elliott visited us once before when he gave the opening prayer in 1981.

I am delighted that a cherished personal friend and advisor has been able to visit us today. Again, I thank my good friend, the Chaplain of the Senate, for arranging that.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

RESERVATION OF LEADER TIME

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved.

MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of morning business not to extend beyond the hour

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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of 4 p.m. Under the previous order, the time until 1:00 shall be in the control of the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. NICKLES, or his designee.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GREGG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, acting as Senator NICKLES' designee, I ask unanimous consent to proceed to speak about Kosovo for up to 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Senator is recognized.

KOSOVO

Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, the American people should realize and understand that in his press conference just 2 days ago, President Clinton talked about the justification for United States-led airstrikes against Serbian troops in Kosovo and that today we are apparently within hours—within hours—of going to war. He acknowledged that our U.S. pilots would be put at risk. And last week, the Pentagon's top military commanders also warned those of us on the Senate Armed Services Committee that there could be U.S. casualties if NATO launches airstrikes in an effort to pressure President Milosevic to accept the peace agreement that has been drafted by the U.S. and its allies and apparently signed by the Kosovar Albanians.

General Michael Ryan, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said this:

There is a distinct possibility we will lose aircraft in trying to penetrate those defenses.

Our Marine Corps Commandant Charles Krulak said:

It is going to be tremendously dangerous. Serbian air defenses are mobile, the terrain is very tough and the weather cannot be underestimated.

General Krulak also said there were some bottom-line questions that still need to be answered: What is the end game? What happens if the Serbs do not come to the table after the first airstrike? How long will the strikes go on? Will our allies stay with us?

General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, also discussed the probability—and I emphasize the word "probability"—of sending 4,000 U.S. troops as part of the NATO peacekeeping force. He said:

The current commitment on the ground remains a still-elusive peacekeeping argument. However, our troops earmarked for that are prepared.

General Reimer agreed with the chairman of the committee, Senator JOHN WARNER, who warned of the massing of Serbian troops on the border of

Kosovo preparing for extensive ground operations.

Mr. President, my colleagues and the American public should understand, notwithstanding yet another round of last-minute diplomatic efforts by the administration's special envoy and the architect of U.S. policy in the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke, who is meeting with Mr. Milosevic as of today, the United States is preparing to go to war against the sovereign country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and this air attack is very likely to be followed by U.S. ground troops.

As former Senator Bob Dole said on "Meet the Press" yesterday, it is time for the U.S. to fish or cut bait in the Balkans.

Compounding the situation is the fact that the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Primakov, a staunch opponent of airstrikes and an ally of Milosevic, will be in Washington tomorrow, and I think his visit really presents a unique problem. An attack during Primakov's visit would certainly not help repair frayed U.S. and Russian relations. However, he is not due to leave until Friday. In a real paradox, by meeting with Mr. Primakov this week and delaying the attack, the administration may well give Mr. Milosevic additional time to launch an offensive, an offensive, by the way, which is also happening now.

General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander, has warned time and again that if no accord is reached, the Serb forces will resume fighting on a very large scale, and that is happening.

As the debate showed in the House of Representatives several weeks ago, and as the debate also continues in this body as of today and tomorrow, many in the Congress are concerned and frustrated and torn. Some support airstrikes and some do not. Some support ground troops; more do not. But we all agree, I think, that the Congress and the American people certainly deserve a better explanation of the administration's policy in the Balkans.

It is not that we have not asked the administration for clarification. Last July, I offered an amendment to the defense appropriations bill that required the President to come before the American people and the Congress before he committed the U.S. to a military involvement in Kosovo. The amendment was not prejudicial. It simply required the President to make the case as to why intervention in Kosovo was in our vital national security interest.

The language contained in section 8115 of Public Law 105-262—and it is the law of the land—unambiguously states that none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under the act may be obligated or expended for any additional deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States unless and until the President, in consultation with the leadership of the Congress, transmits to Congress a report that includes the following:

No. 1: certification that the presence of those forces to be deployed is necessary to the national security interests of the United States;

No. 2: the reasons why the deployment is in the national security interest;

No. 3: the number of military personnel to be deployed;

No. 4: the mission and objectives of forces to be deployed;

No. 5: the expected time schedule for accomplishing the objectives of the deployment;

No. 6: the exit strategy;

No. 7: the costs;

And lastly,

No. 8: the anticipated effects on the morale, the retention and the effectiveness of United States forces.

Mr. President, although our United States pilots are about to take part in an air attack that will put them in harm's way, to be followed by some 4,000 ground troops, that report—that report—required by law—has not been submitted to the Congress.

Last week, in the briefing that was conducted by Secretary of State Albright, National Security Council Chairman Berger, and Secretary of Defense Cohen, I again asked if the report would be forthcoming. I asked if the latest briefing—requested, by the way, by our Majority Leader LOTT—served in lieu of the report. The response of Mr. Berger was unclear to me, but in past conversations in previous briefings he said the administration should and could answer all the questions involved, and that the report would be made "at the appropriate time."

With the attack imminent, it would seem now is the appropriate time. As a matter of fact, with all due respect to the administration, submitting such a report would not be difficult and it would be helpful. If the administration thinks—and they apparently think—that this is the case, that threats of military action may alter the behavior of the Serbs, of Milosevic, what clearer signal of intent to forcibly stop the violence against the Albanians than the President of the United States laying out the issues to Congress and the American people?

Perhaps we can do the administration a favor today. In answering these questions, required by public law, let us simply take public statements from the President and his Cabinet officers, as well as statements made in briefings to the Congress that have been reported in the public press.

As a Member of both the Senate Armed Services and Intelligence Committees, I want to emphasize there should not and cannot be any disclosure of military details of any proposed action, the timing of the action or the types or selection of various weapon platforms.

Let's take the reporting requirements—1, 2, and then 4. They ask the President to describe why deploying to Kosovo is in the national security interest of the United States as well as

what specific objectives our forces will have once on the ground in the province.

They are of particular importance because it will be these goals for which our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines will be risking their lives. Let me put it another way. Should a father, a mother, a husband or a wife—or any family member—have to ask, “For what did my son or daughter, husband or wife, mom or dad die for?” the answers to these questions will have to suffice.

Questions Nos. 1 and 2:

Certify the presence of forces to be deployed is necessary to the national security interests of the United States and the reasons why the deployment is in the national security interest.

Here is the answer that I am suggesting to the Clinton administration. President Clinton, taken from President Clinton’s press conference last Friday: It could be in the report. I am quoting the President:

A part of my responsibility is to try to leave to my successors, and to our country in the 21st century, an environment in Europe that is stable, humane and secure. It will be a big part of America’s future.

The President went on to say:

As we prepare to act, we need to remember the lessons learned in the Balkans. We should remember the horror of the war in Bosnia, the sounds of sniper fire aimed at children, the faces of young men behind barbed wire, the despairing voices of those who thought nothing could be done. It took precious time to achieve allied unity there, but when we did, our firmness ended all that. Bosnia is now at peace.

I continue to quote the President:

Make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres. In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill. But, action and resolve can stop armies and save lives.

And then the President goes on to specifically talk about why he thinks this is in our national interest. And it should be made part of the report, if he would simply submit it to the congressional leadership. He said:

We must also understand our stake in peace in the Balkans and in Kosovo. This is a humanitarian crisis, but it is much more. This is a conflict with no boundaries. It threatens our national interests. If it continues, it will push refugees across borders, and draw in neighboring countries. It will undermine the credibility of NATO, on which stability in Europe and our own credibility depend. It will likely reignite the historical animosities, including those that can embrace Albania, Macedonia, Greece, even Turkey. These divisions still have the potential to make the next century a truly violent one for that part of the world that straddles Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

Unquestionably, there are risks in military action, if that becomes necessary. U.S. and other NATO pilots will be put in harm’s way. The Serbs have a strong air defense system. But, we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction. If we don’t act, the war will spread. If it spreads, we will not be able to contain it without far greater risk and cost. I believe the real challenge of our foreign policy today is to deal with problems before they do permanent harm to our vital

interests. That is what we must do in Kosovo.

Finally, the President said this:

One of the things that I wanted to do when I became president is to take advantage of this moment in history to build an alliance with Europe for the 21st century, with a European undivided, strong, secure, prosperous and at peace. That is why I have supported the unification of Europe financially, politically, economically. That is why I’ve supported the expansion of NATO and a redefinition of its missions.

Here is another answer that the administration could include in the report to the Congress as justification for an attack on Serbia and whether or not this is in our vital national interest.

Secretary of State Albright: This is taken from press accounts of congressional briefings. Six reasons:

No. 1: the Balkans represent a bridge between Europe and the Middle East and therefore are of strategic interest.

No. 2: unless we stop this conflict, it will spin into Albania, Macedonia, Greece and Turkey. The First World War started there. Another could again.

No. 3: we have a humanitarian obligation to stop massacres and refugee flight.

No. 4: what we do in Kosovo has a direct bearing on what has been achieved in Bosnia.

No. 5: what we do in Kosovo represents our leadership role in NATO, the credibility of NATO; both relevant to the future of NATO into the next century.

And lastly, No. 6: it is in our national interest to oppose Serb aggression.

One more answer: Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 1999:

First, we have a clear interest in protecting stability in a key part of Europe and our investment in Bosnia. If we don’t stop the conflict in Kosovo, it could draw in Albania and Macedonia, potentially threaten our NATO allies in Greece and Turkey and thereby divide the alliance.

Second, We have an important interest in averting another humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. Continued conflict also would create new opportunities for international terrorists, drug smugglers and criminals.

Third, America has a clear interest in ending years of Serb repression by strengthening democracy, upholding the rule of law including the valuable contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and protecting human rights.

Finally, persisting conflict in Kosovo would undermine NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in the Balkans and U.S. credibility as one of the leaders of NATO.

Now, there, I have submitted the administration’s report as to why this is in our national interest, a report that has not been forthcoming, by simply quoting the President, the Secretary of State, and the Undersecretary of State. Whether or not you think that adds up to a rationale as to why we should be going to war is another question, but at least it is there.

Question No. 3 that is required by public law: Please provide the number of military personnel to be deployed.

Answer: In numerous press reports, President Clinton and various defense officials have stated the United States will commit up to 4,000 troops for deployment to enforce a peace agreement. However, the number of U.S. personnel who provide intelligence, logistical support, extraction capability, and offshore platforms is not available.

Question No. 4: What are the mission and objectives of the forces to be deployed?

Answer: In regard to the airstrike, the press reports as of today state:

NATO plans call first for a short, sharp demonstration airstrike consisting mainly of cruise missiles. [Casualty avoidance—those are my words not the press commentary.] If Mr. Milosevic does not submit, NATO, after additional consultation, [with our allies] plans to launch a sustained and rigorous bombing campaign that could last as long as a week.

The report went on to say:

A combination of U.S. cruise missiles and up to 400 American and European fighter jets would attempt to take out Serbia’s command and control structures and its air defense system and also to strip Serbia’s military in Kosovo of its ability to attack Kosovo fighters.

Just for the record again, the same press reports stress senior U.S. military officers have warned the Congress the air mission over Serbia would be tremendously dangerous with a high risk of NATO casualties.

Question No. 5, as required in the report: The expected schedule for accomplishing the objectives of the deployment.

Answer: It is not available—or at least it is not available on all the press reports, the briefings, and the information I have been able to obtain in regard to this weekend and in many previous months.

Question No. 6: The exit strategy for the United States forces engaged in the deployment.

I want all of my colleagues to pay attention to this response; this is the exit strategy.

Answer: American negotiator Christopher Hill, in discussing the negotiated peace agreement, has stated in the press that under the agreement, Serbia would remain sovereign over Kosovo for the next 3 years. Under the NATO peacekeeping force, including the 4,000 Americans, the Kosovo Liberation Army would disband and the Serbs would withdraw all but security forces.

That is certainly not the case as of today. However, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, again, in a very cogent and a very comprehensive briefing in response said before the committee February 25:

With respect to our exit strategy, we have learned from our experience in Bosnia that we should not set artificial deadlines. Rather, we should seek to create the conditions for self-sustaining peace so that the timing and circumstances for the reduction and ending of the presence of an international military force is well defined. There are a series of core conditions—apparently what will

have to take place in regard to Kosovo before the 4,000 troops—or how many would be deployed there as peacekeepers—could exit:

One, military stability including the swift and orderly departure of all Serb forces except those required for border security; two, replacement of Serb security forces with a functioning, local, representative police force; elections that meet international standards; and establishment of legitimate political institutions that would provide for substantial and sustained Kosovar autonomy.

That is a pretty tall order. That is a pretty tall order. We have seen the situation in Bosnia where we were to be there for 1 year; we have been there for 4 so far. It is now \$10 to \$12 billion. As we learned in the Balkans, time limits don't mean too much.

Question No. 7, as required by the amendment in the defense appropriations bill in regard to a report that has not been forthcoming: The costs associated with the deployment and the funding sources for paying these costs.

Answer: Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Bacon on February 29: We have calculated or estimated the cost of what it would be to send the U.S. portion of a peacekeeping force into Kosovo. That would be about \$1.5 to \$2 billion a year but no decision will be made on sending peacekeepers in until there is a peace agreement.

Again, the Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering, who has been very candid before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "An additional important element"—now, just stop here for a minute. It will be \$2 billion a year at least for 3 years and perhaps more.

Then, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering in a very candid statement said:

An additional important element in ensuring an effective and sustainable agreement will be international assistance for Kosovo. The U.S. plans to make a substantial contribution to bolster European Union efforts. We have requested \$50 million as part of the 2000 fiscal year budget request. We anticipate identifying additional funds needed to support the civilian implementation aspects of the agreement including funds to:

Repair damaged infrastructure—

The thought has just occurred to me, if we have airstrikes in Kosovo and Serbia and we destroy the infrastructure, we are now making the promise to send funds to repair the damaged infrastructure—

Stimulate economic growth in Kosovo through microlending;

Support free elections;

Assist in the establishment both of communal police units and an independent Judiciary system.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that will add up to a great deal more money than the \$2 billion a year. I can find no statement by the administration as to how they will request these funds. I assume they would come under an emergency supplemental, very similar to the one we are discussing on the floor today.

Finally, question No. 8: The anticipated effects of the deployment on the

morale, retention, and effectiveness of the United States forces.

While I think this is certainly needed, there is no answer that is available.

So that is it. Albeit, with very limited time and access to information over this weekend, and probably with some degree a lack of expertise, I have tried to piece together the response that the administration could make within a consultation requirement—a requirement again stated in public law—that would certainly help in the debate we are having today in regard to U.S. policy in the Balkans.

I have to say, with all due respect to the rationale behind this policy, I believe there are a great many more questions that remain that should have been answered before now, before, once again, U.S. credibility is on the line. As a matter of fact, last Friday the situation was summed up aptly by Mr. Fred Hiatt, a columnist with the Washington Post. The column was entitled "The Credibility Factor." I ask unanimous consent to have the full article printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 21, 1999]

THE CREDIBILITY FACTOR

(By Fred Hiatt)

"It's well known," an administration spokesman said last week, that the President is "a tactician and not a strategist, and maybe looks to the next day and not the day after."

The official was talking about Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. But the description seemed oddly apt for President Clinton, too. When the two face off, as they are now doing over Kosovo, that puts the United States at a disadvantage. A tactician with a free totalitarian hand will always have the initiative over one operating in a democracy.

This isn't to say that Clinton is the moral equivalent of Milosevic, one of the reprehensible war criminals of this decade. But Clinton is always inclined toward the easy, short-term win, the half-way solution; and he has been willing to sacrifice truth and to slight principle to achieve his daily victories.

Now, when he should be building support in Congress and among the public for a difficult but necessary confrontation, he is paying a price for that record. With good reason, many voters do not believe he has thought out the consequences of his Kosovo policy; in the post-impeachment era, many members of Congress do not believe him, period.

The tactical victories Clinton has achieved with deception are considerable. During the impeachment trial, it became almost a cliché to attack the President for not having come clean as soon as Ken Starr began nosing around. If he had just 'fessed up in the first place, went the refrain, the country would have been spared this long trauma.

As a matter of principle, of course that was true. But tactically Clinton was right and his critics were wrong. If Clinton had said back in January 1997 that, yes, he had been using the Oval Office for sexual encounters with an intern and, yes, he had lied about this under oath during a civil deposition and, no, he didn't consider oral sex to be sex—he might not have survived the week. But he lied about "that woman" and survived the week, and the next week, and the one after that.

You could say his tactical dissembling has paid off in foreign policy, too. When he was dispatching troops to Bosnia in 1995, he promised they'd be there for only one year. The promise helped him win acquiescence from a reluctant Congress, and there wasn't much Congress could do when one year rolled into another and the troops did not come home.

Sending troops was the right thing to do, and keeping them there beyond a year was right, too. Any maybe, given doubts in Congress and the country, Clinton's way was the only one that would have worked. Maybe honest leadership wouldn't have carried the day. We'll never know.

What we do know is that his method of operation—his search for the risk-free alternative, his reluctance to spend political capital, to fully confront or explain the long-term consequences of policy—has a cumulative, corrosive effect. Clinton wouldn't push for U.S. troops to arrest war criminals or assist in the return of refugees, so Bosnia is farther from real peace than it should be—and the troops will have to stay longer as a result.

Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be used.

Now all these chickens—the diminished credibility abroad, the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to fashion a strategy—are coming to roost in Kosovo. Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time he means it. But then what? Clinton also has promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a "non-permissive" environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.

"These are incompatible objectives," Sen. Gordon Smith said in an interview. A freshman Republican from Oregon who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Europe, Smith is no isolationist; he has said he would support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right circumstances. But he worries that Clinton has no credible plan.

Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in Pristina and villages through the province? Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders, has already promised not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't solve every problem.

If NATO bombs, Smith said, it should no longer pretend to be neutral. "The problem is Milosevic," he said. "If you go along that path, go to win."

Is Clinton prepared to see it through? On Friday he made a case for bombing, but did not explain what might come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life and treasure? Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.

Mr. ROBERTS. In part he stated:

Among foes such as Milosevic, Clinton's credibility diminishes with each unbacked threat, each inflated claim of success for pinprick bombings, each recall of military force even once dispatched. Diminished credibility means, in the long run, a greater likelihood that force will have to be used.

Now all these chickens—the diminished credibility abroad, the skepticism at home, above all the unwillingness to fashion a strategy—are coming [home] to roost in Kosovo. Clinton has threatened to bomb Milosevic yet again. Maybe this time he

means it. [I think he does.] But then what? Clinton also has promised that U.S. troops will not be sent into a "non-permissive" environment. They will enter Kosovo, in other words, only when Milosevic welcomes them in.

"These are incompatible objectives." [He is quoting my colleague and my friend from Oregon, Senator GORDON SMITH, who said in an interview—and, by the way, Senator SMITH is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe] [he] is no isolationists; he has said he would support a dispatch of U.S. troops to Kosovo under the right circumstances. But he worries that [there is] no credible plan.

Perhaps a round of U.S. bombing will compel Milosevic to call off his war against Kosovo civilians, sign a peace treaty and admit NATO troops. But what if it doesn't? What if Milosevic responds, instead, with a bloody crackdown in Pristina and villages throughout the province?

That is happening as I speak.

Clinton, to assuage his fretful military commanders—who have good reason to fret—has already promised not to follow air power with troops. But air power can't solve every problem.

If NATO bombs, [Senator] Smith said, it should no longer pretend to be neutral. "The problem is Milosevic," he said. "If you go along that path, go to win."

I certainly associate myself with the comments of Senator SMITH.

Is Clinton [is this Congress and are the American public] prepared to see it through? On Friday, he made a case for bombing [and the intervention] but did not explain what might come next, nor why those next steps would be worth the risk to U.S. life and treasure. Time enough tomorrow, or maybe the day after.

That was the conclusion of the editorial.

I have questions, but I am not going to take too much time to go over all the questions I have as a result of the statements that have been made. But in regard to Kosovo, what is the end state? What do we want to see in Kosovo once we are done doing whatever it is we plan to do?

If we don't want to support the independence and secession of the Kosovars, why are we serving as their air force?

How do we know we have ever attained our aims?

What are the measures of merit?

How long might it take?

We have talked about an exit strategy. I think we should focus on strategy; that is, on what we are trying to achieve, through what means, and how do we know we are done?

I don't accept the argument in regard to NATO credibility, or that NATO credibility is on the line, as an answer to why we should go there. NATO's credibility is sky high. Just ask all the nations who want to get in.

How is bombing conducive to peaceful conflict resolution? Have we ever been able to bomb a country into submission so that they would agree with our point of view? What if initial strikes don't attain the desired effect? How far are we willing to go to compel the Serbs to bend to our will? What are the risks? Why send peacekeepers when

there is no peace to be kept and neither side wants to compromise? It seems that is the case.

Why are we seeking to compel a sovereign nation—by the way, Yugoslavia was a founding member of the U.N.—to cede its territorial sovereignty to a guerrilla movement? What message does this send to other secessionists worldwide?

How do you explain supporting Yeltsin in fighting to keep Chechnya within the Russian Federation, at a cost of about 50,000 casualties—indeed, comparing the Russian action to the American Civil War and, by implication, Yeltsin to Lincoln—and bombing the Serbs for trying to keep their country together? That is a point of view.

Which of the many Kosovar factions are we supporting? How much top-down control and professional discipline do we expect from all sides involved?

The mission order for Bosnia, which has been referred to as a good case study for Kosovo, was, "Attack across the Sava River," and we went in with overwhelming force, which we then scaled down as the threat receded. We are doing it the other way regarding Kosovo. Why aren't we following that model? Remember the strategic insight of an 18-year-old Marine in Beirut: "If we are here to fight, we are too few; if we are here to die, we are too many."

All of these questions I have mentioned—some of which I share with a great deal of support from others—I think certainly should be debated, should certainly come to the floor. That has not been the case. I do hope the administration will submit their report soon. I hope they don't submit the report after the President has given the order and the troops are there, for at that time every Member of the Senate and House will certainly want to support our troops.

I worry about this, Mr. President. We are going to war. The President has spoken to the issue, other Cabinet officials have spoken to the issue, but many questions remain.

I yield the floor.

Mr. WYDEN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 15 minutes at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TOBACCO SETTLEMENT FUNDS

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss an issue that is vital to improving health care in America—specifically, whether the States are actually going to use a portion of the billions of dollars they received in tobacco settlement funds to keep America's youngsters from starting to smoke. The Senate has discussed this issue over the last few weeks, but I think it may be appropriate to have a new context as we go forward with these discussions.

To get an indication of how the tobacco industry believes it is doing and why the Senate ought to be concerned about this issue, you can take a look at how the tobacco industry assesses its executives' job performance. Recently, the public got a look at information concerning the 1998 compensation packages for several of the CEOs of the major tobacco companies. The combined compensation package for the CEO of Philip Morris and the CEO of RJR equals \$36 million.

Last week, Mr. President, you and I marked up the Federal budget in the Budget Committee with our colleagues, but even when you spend a week dealing with the Federal budget, \$36 million certainly sounds like a lot of money.

I am not against CEOs being compensated for their work. My guess is that the CEOs, in this case, earn their salaries. I don't think they would be pulling down \$36 million a year unless they were doing a pretty good job of keeping the ashtrays filled in America.

Now, the combined compensation packages for just these two CEOs is more than 39 of our States and the District of Columbia would have received under the legislation Congress voted on last week. Let me be clear. Two of the tobacco CEOs were making more money in 1998 than the vast majority of our States would have received for programs to keep young people from getting started with tobacco.

For example, my home State of Oregon would receive just over \$15 million under the legislation which was considered last week. That is less than half of the CEOs' compensation. The State of Wyoming would have received \$3.61 million, 10 percent of the combined compensation packages. I believe that the traditional targets of tobacco in harvesting new smokers—women, children, and minorities—are certainly worth 10 percent of the combined compensation for 1 year of these two executives.

Let us also remember that it is not just the money the tobacco industry is spending on high-priced executives that the Congress should be concerned about. There is another threat to our children, and that comes from the \$5 billion the tobacco industry spent last year on advertising and marketing. That is \$96.2 million every week, or \$13.7 million every day. Again, that is far more than many of our States would have received to protect young people from smoking.

Last year, in the Senate Commerce Committee, I wanted to make sure that the individuals who had historically been targeted by the tobacco companies would have been eligible to receive funds for tobacco control and prevention programs. I wanted to make sure that just as the tobacco companies have poured billions of dollars into advertising in the inner cities and for ads targeted to children, the Federal Government would make a special effort to prevent smoking in those communities.

I continue to believe the Federal Government needs to play an activist role in assuring that populations which historically have been targeted by the tobacco industry would be armed with good information and good preventive kinds of services, so that the tobacco companies would know that our communities are fighting back.

Let me give you an example of some of the steps that the tobacco companies may be pursuing in the days ahead to circumvent efforts by the Federal Government such as those we discussed last week.

We know the tobacco companies are now test marketing cigarettes which produce less smoke so that individuals around the smoker will not be bothered in the same way as they were so often in the past. Yet, one of the cigarettes, the Eclipse, made by RJR, is showing even more signs of being dangerous to the smoker. With the Eclipse, the evidence shows that smokers may actually be breathing in glass fibers in addition to other carcinogens.

I think it is important that the Senate understand this as we go forward with further discussions about how the tobacco settlement funds are going to be used. If the Federal Government wishes to waive its portion of the billions of dollars involved in the tobacco settlement, let's make sure that at least a portion of this money—at least a modest portion—is used to protect future generations of Americans against the tobacco industry.

I hope the Congress won't pass up another opportunity to protect America's youngsters. I urge my colleagues to continue to try to assure that some portion of the dollars secured in the tobacco settlement are actually used for health services for American's children.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a chart prepared by the National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids which compares the compensation package of just two of the tobacco CEOs with the money that would have been received by the States under the Senate legislation be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COMPARISON OF AMOUNT STATES WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO SPEND ON TOBACCO PREVENTION UNDER THE SPECTER-HARKIN AMENDMENT WITH CEOs' COMPENSATION FROM RJR AND PHILIP MORRIS

States	15% of tobacco settlement payments (millions per year)	20% of tobacco settlement payments (millions per year)	Combined total CEO's compensation for 1998 (millions)
Wyoming	\$2.71	\$3.61	\$36
Alaska	3.72	4.96	36
South Dakota	3.80	5.07	36
Idaho	3.96	5.27	36
North Dakota	3.98	5.31	36
Delaware	4.31	5.74	36
Vermont	4.48	5.97	36
Montana	4.62	6.16	36
Utah	4.84	6.46	36
Nebraska	6.48	8.64	36
New Mexico	6.49	8.65	36
Hawaii	6.55	8.73	36
Washington, DC	6.61	8.81	36

COMPARISON OF AMOUNT STATES WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO SPEND ON TOBACCO PREVENTION UNDER THE SPECTER-HARKIN AMENDMENT WITH CEOs' COMPENSATION FROM RJR AND PHILIP MORRIS—Continued

States	15% of tobacco settlement payments (millions per year)	20% of tobacco settlement payments (millions per year)	Combined total CEO's compensation for 1998 (millions)
Nevada	6.64	8.85	36
New Hampshire	7.25	9.67	36
Rhode Island	7.82	10.43	36
Maine	8.37	11.16	36
Arkansas	9.01	12.01	36
Kansas	9.07	12.10	36
Iowa	9.47	12.62	36
West Virginia	9.65	12.87	36
Oklahoma	11.28	15.04	36
Oregon	12.49	16.65	36
South Carolina	12.81	17.07	36
Colorado	14.92	19.90	36
Arizona	16.04	21.39	36
Alabama	17.59	23.45	36
Kentucky	19.17	25.56	36
Connecticut	20.21	26.94	36
Indiana	22.20	29.60	36
Virginia	22.26	29.67	36
Washington	22.35	29.80	36
Wisconsin	22.56	30.07	36
Louisiana	24.55	32.73	36
Maryland	24.61	32.81	36
Missouri	24.76	33.01	36
Mississippi	25.20	33.60	36
North Carolina	25.38	33.84	36
Tennessee	26.57	35.42	36
Georgia	26.72	35.62	36
Minnesota	37.02	49.36	36
New Jersey	42.09	56.12	36
Massachusetts	43.96	58.61	36
Michigan	47.37	63.16	36
Illinois	50.66	67.55	36
Ohio	54.83	73.10	36
Pennsylvania	62.55	83.40	36
Florida	80.40	107.20	36
Texas	94.20	125.60	36
New York	138.91	185.21	36
California	138.93	185.24	36

In 39 states and the District of Columbia the use 20% of their total settlement dollars is less than the combined compensation of the top two tobacco industry CEOs Geoffrey Bible, of Philip Morris Inc. and Stephen F. Goldstone, of RJ Reynolds Tobacco. The compensation total includes base salary plus bonuses and stock options (source: USA Today, 3/19/99 & 3/16/99).

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ROBERTS). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Under the previous order, the time between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. shall be under the control of the Senator from Illinois, Mr. DURBIN, or his designee.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I might use. If others arrive on the floor and I have exceeded my 10 or 12 minutes, I will yield to them.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.

THE REPUBLICAN BUDGET

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this week we will have the budget for the Nation before the Senate for consideration. I want to speak now on that budget, and give special focus and attention to the concerns I have about how that budget was put together and its particular implications with regard to Social Security and to Medicare, and also with regard to other domestic priorities. Then I will express my con-

cern on the priority that the Republican budget has given to tax cuts and how that relates to the Nation's priorities and to the Nation's needs.

Mr. President, the Republican FY2000 budget resolution fails to meet the nation's priorities.

It claims that it will extend the solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund. In reality, it would prevent President Clinton's proposed transfer of surplus funds to protect this important program for future generations.

The Republican budget claims that it will set aside money for Medicare. In reality, it squanders those funds to pay for a tax cut for the rich.

The Republican budget claims that it will improve education. In reality, it slashes funds for critical programs like Head Start, job training, and student aid to pay for increases in education.

On the subject of Social Security, the Republican budget is an exercise in deception. The rhetoric surrounding the budget itself conveys the impression that the majority have taken a major step towards protecting Social Security. In truth, they have done nothing to strengthen Social Security. Their budget would not provide one additional dollar to pay benefits to future retirees, nor would it extend the life of the trust fund by even one day. It merely recommits to Social Security those dollars which already belong to the Trust Fund under current law. That is all their so-called "lockbox" does.

By contrast, President Clinton's proposed budget would contribute 2.8 trillion new dollars of the budget surplus to Social Security over the next 15 years. By doing so, his budget would extend the life of the trust fund by more than a generation—to beyond 2050.

Not only does the Republican plan fail to provide the new revenue to extend the life of the Social Security trust fund, it does not even effectively guarantee that the existing payroll tax revenue will be used to pay Social Security benefits. In essence, there is a trapdoor in the Republican lockbox. Their plan would allow Social Security payroll taxes to be used to finance unspecified "reforms". This loophole opens the door to schemes to privatize Social Security by turning it over to the tender mercy of the private insurance industry. Such a privatization plan could actually make Social Security's financial picture far worse than it is today, necessitating deep benefit cuts.

A genuine "lockbox" would prevent any such diversion of funds. A genuine "lockbox" would guarantee that those payroll tax dollars would be used to protect Social Security, not undermine it.

While the Republicans claim that they, too, support using the surplus for debt reduction, they are still unwilling to use it in a way that will help save Social Security for future generations. There is a fundamental difference between the parties on how the savings

which will result from debt reduction should be used. The Federal Government will realize enormous savings from paying down the debt. As a result, billions of dollars which would have been required to pay interest on the national debt will become available each year for other purposes. President Clinton believes those debt savings should be used to strengthen Social Security. I wholeheartedly agree. But the Republicans refuse to commit those dollars to Social Security. Their budget does nothing to increase Social Security's ability to pay full benefits to future generations of retirees. Again, they are short-changing Social Security while pretending to save it.

Currently, the Federal Government spends more than 11 cents of every budget dollar to pay the cost of interest on the national debt. By using the Social Security surplus to pay down the debt over the next 15 years, we can reduce the debt service cost to just 2 cents of every budget dollar by the year 2014 and to zero by 2018. Such prudent fiscal management now will produce an enormous savings to the Government in future years. Since it is payroll tax revenues which made the debt reduction possible, those savings should, in turn, be used to strengthen Social Security when it needs additional revenue to finance the baby boomers' retirement.

Rather than paying interest to bondholding investors today, our plan would use that money to finance Social Security benefits tomorrow. This is analogous to the situation of a couple with young children and a mortgage. They know they will have a major expense 15 years down the road when their children reach college age. They use their extra money now to pay down their home mortgage ahead of schedule. As a result, in 15 years the mortgage will be greatly reduced or even paid off. Thus, the dollars that were going to pay the mortgage each month will be available to finance college for their children. In the same way the Federal Government is reducing its debt over the next 15 years so that it can apply the savings to Social Security in the future.

That is what the President's budget proposes. It would provide an additional \$2.8 trillion to Social Security, most of it in debt service savings, between 2030 and 2055. As a result, the current level of Social Security benefits would be fully financed for all future recipients for more than half a century. It is an eminently reasonable plan, but Republican Members of Congress oppose it.

The budget Republicans have brought to the floor does not provide one new dollar to finance Social Security benefits. What it does provide is nearly 800 billion new dollars for tax cuts over the next decade. Tax cuts, not strengthening Social Security, is their first priority. Budgets speak louder than words. The actual Republican budget tells us much more candidly than their

rhetoric about the GOP's goal of tax cuts at the expense of Social Security.

Mr. President, in addition to claims of extending the solvency of the Social Security trust fund, this budget would prevent the President's proposed transfer of surplus funds to protect important programs for future generations. The Republican budget claims that it will set aside money for Medicare, but in reality it squanders those funds to pay for a tax cut. This is unacceptable. Even worse is the Republican attempt to privatize Medicare—or use the crisis in Medicare financing that their budget will create as an excuse to promote their extreme agenda of slashing Medicare benefits and turning over the program to private insurance companies.

This is the same agenda that Republicans pursued unsuccessfully in 1995 and 1996, and it was the agenda rejected by President Clinton and Democrats in Congress and the American people. But now our Republican friends are at it again.

According to the most recent projections of the Medicare Trustees, if we do nothing else, keeping Medicare solvent for the next 25 years will require benefit cuts of almost 20 percent—massive cuts of hundreds of billions of dollars. The President's plan makes up that shortfall, without any benefit cuts, by investing 15 percent of the surplus in the Trust Fund. This investment avoids the need for any benefit cuts for at least the next 21 years. It also gives us time to develop policies that can reduce Medicare costs without also reducing the health care that the elderly need and deserve.

But Republicans in Congress have a different agenda. They want to use the surplus to grant undeserved tax breaks to the wealthiest Americans—and then use the Medicare shortfall as an excuse to slash the program and turn it over to private insurance companies.

Republicans on the Budget Committee had a clear opportunity to preserve, protect and improve Medicare. All they had to do was to adopt the President's proposal for investing 15% of the surplus in Medicare. Instead of protecting Medicare, they use the surplus to pay for billions of dollars in new tax breaks for the wealthy. You don't need a degree in higher mathematics to understand what is going on here.

Because the Republican budget does nothing to preserve and protect Medicare, their proposals add up to billions of dollars in Medicare cuts.

Every senior citizen knows—and their children and grandchildren know, too—that the elderly cannot afford cuts in Medicare. They are already stretched to the limit—and sometimes beyond the limit—to purchase the health care they need today. Because of gaps in Medicare and high health care costs, Medicare now covers only about 50% of the health care costs of senior citizens. On average, senior citizens spend 19% of their limited incomes to purchase the health care they need—

almost as large a proportion as they had to pay before Medicare was enacted a generation ago. Many senior citizens have to pay even more as a proportion of their income. By 2025, if we do nothing, that proportion will have risen to 29%. Too often, even with today's Medicare benefits, the elderly have to choose between putting food on the table, paying the rent, or purchasing the health care they need.

The typical Medicare beneficiary is a single woman, seventy-six years old, living alone, with an annual income of approximately \$10,000. She has one or more chronic illnesses. She is a mother and a grandmother. These are the women whose benefits Republicans want to cut to pay for new tax breaks for the wealthy. These are the women who will be unable to see a doctor, or will go without needed prescription drugs, or who will go without meals or heat, so that wealthy Americans earning hundreds of thousands of dollars a year can have additional thousands of dollars a year in tax breaks.

This is the wrong priority—and Americans know it is the wrong priority, even if Republicans in Congress do not.

We all recall that four years ago, Republicans in Congress also tried to cut Medicare to pay for new tax breaks for the wealthy. They sought to cut Medicare by \$270 billion to pay for \$240 billion worth of tax cuts for the wealthiest individuals and corporations. Under their proposals, senior citizens would have seen their premiums skyrocket—an additional \$2,400 for senior couples over the budget period. The deductible that senior citizens pay to see a physician would have doubled. The Medicare eligibility age would have been raised to 67. Protections against extra billing by doctors would have been rolled back. Under the guise of preserving Medicare, Republicans also proposed to turn the program over to private insurance companies, and force senior citizens to give up their family doctors and join HMOs. But President Clinton and Democrats in Congress stood firm against these regressive proposals, and they were not enacted into law.

Now, Republicans on the Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee are at it again. They are already drafting new Medicare "reform" plans. No details have been revealed. But the funds already earmarked for tax breaks for the wealthy under the Republican budget proposal means that there is no alternative to the harsh cuts in Medicare. No wonder so many senior citizens believe that G.O.P. stands for "Get Old People." The Republican elephant never learns.

As we debate these issues this week, the Republican response is predictable. They will deny that they have any plans to cut Medicare. But the American people will not be fooled. They know that the President's plan will put Medicare on a sound financial footing for the next two decades—without benefit cuts, without tax increases, and

without raising the retirement age. They also know that the Republican plan will take the surplus intended for Medicare and squander it on new tax breaks for the wealthy. They know that the Republican plan for Medicare is benefit cuts and additional burdens on the elderly, not the honest protection our senior citizens deserve.

This week, Democrats will offer amendments to assure that this year's budget protects Medicare, rather than destroying it. Under our proposals, all of the funds the President has proposed to devote to Medicare will be put into the Medicare Trust Fund. Our amendments will assure that Medicare will be solvent for the next 21 years, without benefit cuts or tax increases or raising the retirement age. Republicans will have a chance to vote on whether they are sincere about protecting Medicare—and the vote on our amendments will test whether they care more about senior citizens or the wealthy.

The choice is clear. The Congress must act to preserve the benefits that senior citizens have earned, instead of granting new tax breaks for the wealthiest Americans.

Just as important as preserving and protecting Medicare is improving it. And the most important single step we can take to improve Medicare is to provide prescription drug coverage for senior citizens. Medicare is a compact between workers and their government that says, "Work hard, pay into the system when you are young, and Medicare will provide health security in your retirement years." But that commitment is being broken every day, because Medicare does not cover prescription drugs.

When Medicare was enacted in 1964, coverage of prescription drugs by private insurance was not the norm—and Medicare followed the standard practice in the private insurance market. Today, ninety-nine percent of employment-based health insurance policies provide prescription drug coverage—but Medicare does not. Medicare is caught in a 35 year old time warp—and too many senior citizens are suffering as a result.

Too many seniors take half the pills their doctor prescribes, or don't fill needed prescriptions—because they simply cannot afford the high cost of prescription drugs. In 1983, before the most recent surge in drug costs, one in eight senior citizens said they sometimes had to choose between prescription drugs and food on the table. Too many elderly Americans are paying twice as much as they should for the drugs they need, because they are forced to pay the full price, while other Americans pay less because their health plans grant discounts.

As a result, too many senior citizens are ending up hospitalized—at immense cost to Medicare—because they are not receiving the drugs they need or are not taking them correctly. As we enter the new century, pharmaceutical products are increasingly the source of mir-

acle cures for more and more diseases—but senior citizens will be left out and left behind if we do not act.

The 21st century may well be the century of life sciences. With the support of the American people, Congress is on its way to the goal of doubling the budget of the National Institutes of Health to support additional basic research, so that scientists can develop new therapies to improve and extend the lives of senior citizens and all citizens.

These miracle drugs save lives—and they save dollars too, by preventing unnecessary hospitalization and expensive surgery. All patients deserve affordable access to these medications. Yet, Medicare, the nation's largest insurer, does not cover out-patient prescription drugs, and senior citizens and persons with disabilities pay a heavy price for this glaring omission.

Up to 19 million Medicare beneficiaries are forced to fend for themselves when it comes to purchasing these life-saving and life-improving therapies. They have no prescription drug coverage from any source. Other Medicare beneficiaries have some coverage, but too often it is inadequate, unreliable and unaffordable.

Prescription drugs are the single largest out-of-pocket cost to the elderly for health services. The average senior citizen fills an average of eighteen prescriptions a year, and takes four to six prescriptions daily. Many elderly Americans face monthly drug bills of \$100 to \$200 or more. Some of the newer drugs that can produce miraculous results for those who can afford them cost \$10,000 a year or more.

Misuse of prescription drugs results in preventable illnesses that cost Medicare an estimated \$16-\$20 billion annually, while imposing vast misery on senior citizens. What are needed are effective ways to encourage proper use. Large savings to Medicare will result if physicians, pharmacists and senior citizens are better educated about identifying, correcting, and preventing these problems.

Too often, elderly Americans skimp on their medicine—they take half doses or otherwise try to stretch their prescription and to make it last longer. This is not right. And it doesn't have to happen. If the prescription drugs they need are covered by Medicare, needless hospitalizations will be avoided and physician visits will be reduced.

The Senate Budget Committee recognized the need for prescription drug coverage by adopting a reserve fund for this coverage. But the Committee reserve fund is hedged with unacceptable conditions that could retard rather than enhance the cause of ensuring a meaningful drug benefit. The Congress can do better—and it must.

The provision in the budget resolution does not actually provide funds for a prescription drug benefit. Instead, it allows a prescription drug benefit to be enacted if certain conditions are met, but those conditions are far too limited.

Senior citizens need a drug benefit more than the wealthy need new tax breaks. Every senior citizen understands that—and so do their children and grandchildren.

Finally, it is vital that we continue to make investments in education programs that serve Americans of all ages. The Republican budget claims it will improve education. In reality, it slashes funds for critical programs like Head Start, job training, and student aid to pay for increases in education. It is vital that we continue to make investments in education programs which serve Americans of all ages. The Nation's children and families deserve the opportunity for a good education throughout their lives.

Student performance is rising across the nation by many indicators. The federal-state-local partnership is working—we shouldn't do anything to undermine it. Instead, we should do more to accelerate positive change.

Student achievement is improving. Performance on the National Assessment of Educational Progress has increased, particularly in reading, math, and science—critical subjects for success in learning. Average reading scores increased from 1994 to 1998 in 4th, 8th, and 12th grades. U.S. students scored near the top on the latest international assessment of reading, with 4th graders outperforming students from all other nations except Finland. Average performance in math has improved since 1978, with the largest gains made by 9-year-olds. Between 1992 and 1997, the combined verbal and math scores on the SAT increased by 15 points.

Students are taking more rigorous subjects than ever—and doing better in them. The proportion of high school graduates taking the core courses recommended in the 1983 report, *A Nation At Risk*, had increased to 52 percent by 1994, up from 14 percent in 1982 and 40 percent in 1990. Since 1982, the percentage of graduates taking biology, chemistry, and physics has doubled, rising from 10 percent in 1982 to 21 percent in 1994. With increased participation in advanced placement courses, the number of students who scored at the highest levels on AP exams has risen nearly five-fold since 1982, from 132,000 in 1982 to 636,000 in 1998.

But too many students in too many schools in too many communities across the country fail to achieve that standard. More children need to come to school ready to learn. More children need modern schools with world-class teachers. More students need opportunities for after-school programs. And more qualified students should be able to afford to go to college.

The Republican budget proposal is a welcome improvement over past years. Previous Republican plans drastically cut funding for education. In one of their first acts as the majority party in 1995, Republicans rescinded education funding by \$1.7 billion and proposed to abolish the Department of Education.

In subsequent years, they proposed to cut education by \$3.9 billion and \$3.1 billion. With the strong leadership of President Clinton, these cuts were never enacted, and Federal funding for education has steadily increased.

Republicans have finally begun to listen to the American people on education. The Senate Republican FY2000 Budget Resolution increases funding for elementary and secondary education by \$2.6 billion over a freeze. But that increase in elementary and secondary education comes at an unacceptable and irresponsible cost. The Republicans proposed a reasonable increase in funding for elementary and secondary education, but at the same time they cut funding for critical programs like Head Start, job training, and aid for college students by at least 10 percent in FY2000 and by more than 20 percent in FY2004.

It is wrong to rob Peter to pay Paul, and it is wrong for the Republicans to propose this irresponsible budget.

It is irresponsible to increase funding for elementary and secondary education programs in order to improve the Nation's public schools and slash funding that helps young children and college students.

It is irresponsible to deny 100,000 children Head Start services that help them to come to school ready to learn.

It is irresponsible to eliminate 73,000 summer jobs and training opportunities for low-income young people.

It is irresponsible to jeopardize funding that helps make college more accessible and affordable for all qualified students.

It is irresponsible to ignore the needs of communities that need help in modernizing their school buildings. Schools across the nation face serious problems of overcrowding. Antiquated facilities are suffering from physical decay, and are not equipped to handle the needs of modern education. Across the country, 14 million children in a third of the nation's schools are learning in substandard buildings. Half the schools have at least one unsatisfactory environmental condition. It will take over \$100 billion just to repair existing facilities nationwide.

It is irresponsible to do nothing to see that key education priorities will be met, such as reducing class size, improving teacher recruitment and training, expanding after-school programs, and ensuring strong accountability for how federal education dollars are spent.

Mr. President, a nation's budget is a reflection of its priorities. The nation's children and families deserve a budget that invests in their priorities—not the priorities of the right wing. Clearly, this Republican budget contains the wrong priorities for the nation's future. It gives priority to large tax cuts for the wealthy, instead of saving Social Security and Medicare, and at the expense of programs for college students, young children, and young adults. I urge my colleagues to oppose this misguided budget.

I yield the floor.

Mr. HOLLINGS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished Senator from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed in morning business for 20 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized for 20 minutes following the Senator from South Carolina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRUTH IN BUDGETING

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I remember the day when we had truth in budgeting. I will never forget when we promulgated in 1985, almost 15 years ago, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. At that time, we realized that Reaganomics was going up and away with respect to the growth of the debt and the accelerated interest costs upon that debt, not just necessarily the growth of the economy.

We got together on a bipartisan basis and, under the auspices of truth in budgeting, we came to the floor, and even though we had opposition on both sides early on—President Reagan opposed it, certainly over here the majority leader, the whip, and the chairman of the Budget Committee opposed it—on this side of the aisle, on 14 up-or-down votes, we got a majority of the Democrats on the basis of truth in budgeting.

Fifteen years later, we have gone to fraud in budgeting. It is all a political exercise that will bring us later in the year to what one might call a Mexican standoff. Then both sides will probably get together, hopefully, and, since the media will be covering them and they are moving into an election, do some saving of Social Security or at least some paying down of the debt. But I have a bill today, Mr. President, that actually requires us to save Social Security.

Let me mention that, once the government receives the moneys from the payroll tax under section 201 of the Social Security Act, it immediately buys special securities, 30-year T-bills. With those 30-year T-bills, of course, Social Security has the bond, or the IOU, the Government has the money, and obviously they have been spending that money for either increased spending or for tax cuts, but not for any paying down of the debt. The debt continues to go up.

Under section 201 in that particular instance, it is like having two credit cards. You have a Visa card and a MasterCard, and you want to pay off your MasterCard with your Visa card. So you pay down the public debt. Herein, let's say the Visa card is Social Security and the MasterCard is the public debt or Wall Street credit card. That is

the crowd that does not want the sharp elbows of Government coming in and crowding out finance, running up interest costs and disturbing corporate finance.

When you take the Social Security credit card to pay down public debt, it is simply a transaction of increasing your Social Security debt. At the present time, the deficit in Social Security is some \$730 billion in the red.

Mr. President, we did not intend that in 1983. In 1983, what we did was say: We are going to put in an inordinately high payroll tax in order to build up a surplus to take care of the baby boomers in the next generation.

That is exactly what we are not doing. We are crowding around on the floor saying, "Beware, beware, beware, the baby boomers, baby boomers." It is not the baby boomers, it is the adults on the floor of the Senate looting the fund if we keep the money in, as was intended in section 201 of the Social Security Act.

As Mr. Greenspan said, take Social Security outside the unified budget, do not have any unified budget and growth deficit, just have the national debt and the national deficit, one accounting, not two sets of books. That is what we called for. We wrote it into law under President Bush in November 1990. It is constantly disobeyed and is being disobeyed with the two budget proposals of the President and the Republicans now.

President Clinton's budget came to us. And I call it a fraud because everyone else has called it a fraud. What it did was say we are going to hedge a way against this so-called tax cut move on the Republican side politically, so we are going to save Social Security, we are going to take care of Medicare, and pay down the debt. They mean public debt. They know they can easily do that with the Social Security money.

Incidentally, we had a motion on President Clinton's budget in the Budget Committee, so I speak advisedly. The record will show it did not get a single vote, Democrat or Republican, for that President's budget.

Along comes the Republican budget, and you can see exactly what is going on. They are meeting with the candidate for President, Mr. KASICH, who knows better. He is the one, incidentally—I do not know if he is running as a Democrat or a Republican—he said if the 1993 tax increase and spending cut and paring down the size of Government, corporate downsizing, Government downsizing some 300,000—he said if this thing works, "I will change parties." I have not seen the distinguished Congressman recently, but I am waiting to, because I am going to ask him how he is running, as a Republican or Democrat. He promised to change parties and become a Democrat if it worked. It is working.

The Republican budget comes in now and they say, "We have to do better. We have the House and Senate. We

want to take over the White House, so we want to give them a tax cut."

How do they do it? With a fraudulent budget. They go up and above, and my distinguished chairman of the Budget Committee on the Senate side, the Senator from New Mexico, knows better. I have worked with him. We are the two original members since 1974 of the budget process and the Budget Committee.

He comes in and he adds on almost \$800 billion to the debt. In addition to adding to the debt, he comes around and says now, "We are going to direct in reconciliation that the chairman of the Finance Committee, the Finance Committee itself, come out with a tax cut." This is an absolute adulteration and fraud of the budget process. We intended—and it is right in the reconciliation provisions—that if you get to the end of the road—and you are always slightly over—you can increase some revenues here, there, or yonder, or you can cut some spending here, there, or yonder. You reconcile spending and revenue so you do what you say and say what you do to balance items in the budget.

Instead, now the Republicans are going to use reconciliation to cut the revenues. Here we are spending \$100 billion more this fiscal year 1999 than we are taking in. Under current policy, it would be \$90 billion more, but you can see already with this particular monkey shine in the face of reality, there is no chance of a tax cut and having a real budget. We have already come in with caps.

Last year we exceeded the caps by \$12 billion. We exceed the caps \$21 billion this year. Then we come and pass an \$18 billion increase for military pay. That is \$50 billion we ought to be looking for in either increased revenues or spending cuts. Rather, the wonderful Budget Committee, on a partisan basis—the Republican budget is a fraud—comes forward and says, Here it is—and we are amending the reconciliation in this particular process—and sends it to the floor directing the Finance Committee—and the chairman of the Finance Committee, incidentally, the distinguished Senator from Delaware, said: If we do not have a tax cut, it would be highway robbery. We've got money sloshing around up here.

Unfortunately, they also repeal the pay-go rule. This means they will not need an off-set to pay for their tax cut. When we debate the budget this week, the Republicans are going to ram it through the Senate—10 hours, 10 hours, and 10 hours. They can get it through in three days and back up all the roll calls. And they already have it greased on the Republican side to send it through. Instead of a Budget Committee exercising its responsibility to promote fiscal responsibility, this budget here is a fraud and promotes irresponsibility.

To those who say, Mr. President, what are you going to do if you pass the Hollings bill that sets aside the

money in Social Security? It does not just sit there; it earns the highest amount allowed by law, just as it did for 33 years—from 1935 until 1968. The Social Security trust fund was sound. That is a requirement for all corporate endeavors, in that we make it a felony if you try to pay down the company debt with the pension fund.

The distinguished Presiding Officer, he heard me speak of Denny McLain the other afternoon. So I keep harping on it. Here we say in corporate America, if you engage in that kind of nefarious activity, it is a felony, and off you go to jail. But here you get the "Good Government Award." It is totally fraudulent what is going on. Neither side is giving. Both sides are out of reality and they are going merrily down the road as they are with the census, with no reconciliation. But be that as it may, there isn't any question that we can pay down the debt under current policy if we just stay the course.

That was my motion in the Budget Committee. You say, "All that big talk, HOLLINGS. What then would you do?" Look at the particular budget we have. Look at the economy we have. If you were the mayor of a city, if you were the Governor of a State, you would immediately say, "Well, let's stay the course. We don't want to let go of the firemen or the policemen. We don't want to start any new endeavors right now. Let's keep this economy growing."

All we have to do, as Mr. Greenspan finally testified, is do nothing, just hold the line, generally speaking, taking this year's budget for next year. By 2006, by that time, above Social Security surpluses, we would have regular surpluses, true surpluses. And that money could be used to pay down the debt.

I am not for the gamesmanship about public debt and the interest costs going down. That is a story out of the whole cloth. That is not going to happen. Right now, we owe \$730 billion to Social Security. By the year 2013, we will owe Social Security \$3 trillion—\$3 trillion.

We are supposed to have, under the Greenspan Commission report and law as it now stands, \$3 trillion in the bank. I know my distinguished friend from North Dakota is waiting to come here, but I want to make sure we understand the fiscal cancer this country has.

When Lyndon Johnson last balanced the budget, we only had to pay \$16 billion in interest costs on the national debt—today, we pay \$357 billion each year—almost \$1 billion each day. And the interest costs go up, just like the price of energy and gas is going up now, as indicated in the morning paper. If those little interest costs go up, it will be over a billion dollars a day.

With the money we would save in interest costs on the national debt, I could give my Republican friends an \$80 billion tax cut. I could give my Democratic friends \$80 billion in in-

creased spending. I could give Social Security \$80 billion. I could give paying down the debt \$80 billion. That is only \$320 billion. We are going to spend that each year—next year and more. This country has fiscal cancer. That is the state of the Union. And in the best of times that we are all enjoying now, if we cannot get some kind of discipline in reality out of the process here in the Congress, I do not know how we are ever going to save it.

I thank the distinguished Chair and yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator is recognized.

SPRING PLANTING LOANS FOR FAMILY FARMERS

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, the agenda for the Senate this week is to continue on the supplemental appropriations bill. Then at some point this week we will go to the budget bill. My hope is that we will finish work on the supplemental appropriations bill. I understand that we are heading towards a vote tomorrow on cloture on a Kosovo amendment to the emergency supplemental appropriations bill. So we are off on a range of other issues, that being a foreign policy issue. We already had votes on tobacco and tobacco proceeds from the settlement, and so on.

But my hope is that one way or another we will get through the supplemental appropriations bill in order to provide the resources in that legislation for spring planting loans for family farmers. There are not very many weeks until our family farmers will be in the fields, and they need some operating loans to buy the seed and the fuel and to pay the expenses to do spring planting. And we have many farmers in North Dakota who are not, under current circumstances, going to be able to get loans from the Farm Service Agency unless we pass this supplemental bill.

So if we do not pass the supplemental appropriations bill this week, and we go home, then we are not in session the next 2 weeks, we are going to be leaving these farmers in pretty tough circumstances. Then this supplemental has to go through the House, the Senate, and go to the President for his signature. Frankly, the fate of a lot of family farmers rests on our ability to get this done.

Last week, a friend of mine announced that he was quitting farming, which I suppose is not such unusual news these days. A lot of farmers are quitting farming. This friend happens to be Elroy Lindaas, who is a State senator. Elroy is a wonderful fellow. He

farms near Mayville, ND. I have been to the barn dance on his farm a good many times. I guess the last time was about 5 months ago. The barn dances that Elroy has are held up in the hayloft of a very large white barn.

Elroy and his wife have gone to various garage sales in and around Mayville over the years, and they would pick up a davenport here or a couch or a chair. So up in the hayloft of his barn he has this large expanse lined with very comfortable old chairs.

He has built himself a little stage. He plays guitar and he has neighbors that play musical instruments, as well. At this barn dance that he holds every year, they get a little band together. They hang some crepe paper. They get a couple hundred people who come up and fill the hayloft at the Lindaas barn.

On this farmstead, they have planted 120 consecutive crops. For 120 years they have planted crops on the Lindaas farm. But this year, the 121st year they won't be planting a crop because he is selling his farm this June.

Here is a farm that has been in that family for 120 years, passed from granddad to dad and son. Why does that farm at this point cease operation? Why does the family decide it cannot make it any longer? Here is a family farmer trying to do business, with prices for wheat and other grains at Depression-era prices. In constant dollars, the price they get for a bushel of wheat today is no different than it was during the Great Depression.

What does all this mean and what do we do about it all? The chart with this map shows what is happening in our country as we talk about the choices and priorities we will make in the supplemental appropriations bill and then the budget bill. This map shows those counties, which are marked in red, where we have had an outmigration of people. You will see the outmigration from the middle part of America, up and down the farm belt and especially in North Dakota. Up and down the entire farm belt in the Great Plains, we have an entire region of America that is being depopulated. People are leaving, not coming. Look at all of these counties, each of these in red are rural counties in which the population is leaving. These are the counties that have lost fifteen percent or more of their population in a fifteen-year period.

My home county, Hettinger County, ND, is probably a good example. Hettinger County, ND, is right here in Southwestern North Dakota. It, too, is marked in red. When I left Hettinger County there were 5,000 citizens living there. Now there are 3,000 citizens. The next county is Slope County. Both my home county and the next county are the size of Rhode Island, individually. Slope County has 900 people. A year ago or so they had seven babies born in the entire county.

What is happening with the depopulation of rural areas, with people moving

out, not moving in? Elroy Lindaas, after 120 years of planting crops and making a family farm work, is saying, "I can't do it anymore."

What is happening? A lot of things. The Presiding Officer will not be surprised when I mention the current farm bill, which in my judgment, is a disaster. In fact, it is interesting that in 1995 when we discussed the Budget Act on the floor of the Senate, that budget bill provided the framework for changing the farm bill. The budget that year framed the requirements under which a new farm bill had to be developed. It was developed into what was called the Freedom to Farm bill.

Freedom to Farm had two parts to it. One part made a lot of sense. It gave farmers the freedom to plant what they chose to plant, not what the Federal Government allowed them to plant.

Second, it cut the tie between farm prices and government payments. The bill's sponsors said because farm prices were so good and so robust and healthy at that time, we would give a transition payment on top of the current strong market prices, and then farmers would be on their own. That payment would decrease over a number of years after which farmers would be on their own. That was essentially the theory of the program. It was called transitioning-the-farmers-out-of-a-farm program.

The problem is, farm prices didn't stay healthy and family farmers discovered very quickly that as commodity prices for wheat, feed grains and others began to collapse, there wasn't much of a price support for them. There wasn't a government program that said, "You are important. So, when commodity prices collapse, somehow we will build a bridge over that pricing valley to see if we can help you get across."

We have our farm people looking 2 years, 5 years, 7 years ahead. They hear the economists say prices aren't going to improve much. They say if that is the case and if the Federal Government is not going to help and doesn't care whether there are family farmers left, they will leave. That is what is creating the depopulation of a rural area.

It is also true that the ability to raise grain here and ship it to Asia has diminished, as the Asian financial crisis took away our export markets. It is true that this administration has not been nearly as aggressive as it should have been on the Export Enhancement Program. It is also true that, frankly, the Congress did not provide what the administration asked for on EEP. The administration, Congress, and the markets shaped the circumstances that now conspire in ways that say to farmers there is not much hope for you out here.

As we watch the depopulation of a major part of our country, let me make another observation. Those farmers that stay in business will harvest a crop this fall and receive a price that is pretty anemic. When the farmers get in

the truck and haul the grain to the elevator, they will be told the food they produce doesn't really have much value. The farmers will scratch their heads and say, "I don't understand that."

This world adds a New York City in population every single month. Every single month another New York City in population appears on the face of this globe. At least a half billion people and probably far more than that go to bed every single night with an ache in their belly because they don't have anything to eat. Yet, we are telling our farmers that what they produce has no value. There is something fundamentally wrong with that.

Working on a bipartisan basis as a Congress, we have to find a way in this budget mechanism to say to family farmers that their presence in this country matters to America. It strengthens our country to have our food production produced by a network of broad-based economic owners, by our family farmers. It strengthens our country to have the family farm system existing in America.

We must decide and decide quickly that the current farm bill doesn't work. It must be changed. People say, "Do you want to go back to the old support prices?" I don't know. I am willing to discuss that. If you have a better idea, let me know. But, do you really want to go to any community in this area and say our nation's policy is more of the same? Do we want to keep seeing outmigration, and collapsed farm prices? Do we want to keep transitioning farmers out of farming?

Whatever ideas exist in this Chamber, I am willing to discuss. I have an idea for the first step. Let's take the caps off the price support loan rates and at least give farmers what the big print said it was going to give them in the farm bill, and what the fine print took away. Let's take the caps off the loan rates, and get the loan rates up to where they ought to be. That is the first step.

We have all the farm organizations around town who purport to support family farmers. I assume that is who is financing them. Yet, every single one has a different message about what ought to be done. Some do not support taking the cap off the loan rates. They don't have ideas, but they oppose those who do have ideas.

At some point, if we are going to save family farming for this country, we have to get together and find some kind of approach that will reconnect a decent income to those who produce.

This isn't the fault of family farmers. This is not their doing. They didn't cause the markets to collapse. They didn't cause the financial crisis in Asia. They didn't cause the unfair trade from Canada that allows a massive quantity of spring wheat and durum wheat to flood into our marketplace. They didn't cause that, and they ought not be victims.

They didn't cause the foreign policy problems that require us to have sanctions against other countries, or the foolish notion that we ought to have any sanctions at all on food and medicine. Farmers didn't cause that.

That is another step we ought to take. I don't say this suggesting that it will solve the farm problem, because it won't. We ought to decide all sanctions on food and medicine anywhere in the world ought to be ended. I may offer that to the budget resolution this week. Does anyone think Saddam Hussein or Fidel Castro missed a meal because we can't ship food to Cuba or Iraq? Not hardly. All that sanctions hurt are our farmers here in this country and poor people and hungry people abroad.

My point is we must pass this supplemental bill in order to allow some of these family farmers to get into the field this spring. Without it, many of them won't get into the field. Then we must fix this farm program because this farm program doesn't work. We must work on a range of other issues, including trade to deal with the unfair trade problems our farmers face. There are a whole series of other steps that we can and should take.

I want to mention this issue of priorities. I come from one of the most rural States in America, and our family farmers are in desperate trouble. Even as we debate these issues, we are told there is limited money available and we just can't do all of these things. If that is your priority, then farmers don't matter much.

I mentioned that in 1995 the genesis of the current farm bill originated here on the Senate floor in the Budget Act that was brought for a vote to the Senate. And so better farm policy could start this week here in the budget resolution that is brought to the Senate later this week.

Let's talk about what the priorities are. The majority party will bring a domestic budget mark to the floor this week that decreases domestic spending by slightly over \$20 billion. The proposed mark of the Budget Committee will have a \$9.1 billion increase for defense over that which was assumed in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. So, in defense, their budget will provide \$290 billion, a \$9 billion increase. But, in other domestic discretionary spending, their budget would take \$20 billion in cuts.

Now, last year in the fall, we passed some emergency aid for farmers. In that omnibus appropriations bill Congress provided aid for a range of things, including agriculture. \$1 billion was added for the national missile defense program. \$1 billion. It was money that wasn't asked for by the Defense Department. This money wasn't needed by the Defense Department. The Defense Department said it was spending money as rapidly as it could to find the technology and the solutions to hitting a bullet with a bullet, which is what the national missile defense program is.

The Defense Department said it really didn't have the capability of using any more money. The Congress said it didn't matter to them and demanded that they have \$1 billion more. So \$1 billion more emerged. I tried to get a few thousand dollars, a few hundred-thousand-dollars, or a few million dollars to deal with the emergencies in Indian housing and Indian health care. I couldn't do it. But \$1 billion, which the Department of Defense didn't want, didn't ask for, and didn't need emerged mysteriously. In fact, it turns out that they could not even spend it.

Of the \$1 billion, the Department of Defense could only find \$150 million in uses in fiscal year 1999. Do you know what that was for? A third of it, amounting to \$56 million was used for contract transition and rebaselining. Does anybody know what that is? Does that sound as if you are building a weapon? Contract transition and rebaselining. They are going to allocate another \$50 million in the next fiscal year because they could not use it in the last fiscal year. They want to use \$400 million on things other than national missile defense because they could not find a use for it in national missile defense.

This priority comes from a Congress that says that we don't have enough money and we can't help these farm folks. It doesn't matter that these farmers aren't doing very well. They say we can't help them much because we don't have the money.

My point is that this is about making choices. We have a responsibility to make thoughtful choices, good choices, choices that will strengthen our country. I find it more than a bit disappointing to discover that there is plenty of money for someone else's priorities, but not enough money to deal with what I think is a priority for this country such as the long-term economic health of family farming.

I want to also mention one contributing factor to the farm troubles in this country of ours. I mentioned trade just a moment ago. I want to go back to it because our prices have collapsed for a range of reasons. These are the prices that our farmers receive for grain when they haul it to the elevator. One of the reasons is that we have a trade policy in this country that is a terrible trade policy. We say to the rest of the world that we are for free trade, open trade, come and trade with us. Yet, we refuse to stand up and have any backbone at all to stand for our producers when we are the victims of unfair trade.

Let me give you an example. The Canadians continue to flood our country with their durum wheat and their spring wheat, undercutting our farmers' prices. Our nation can't seem to do a thing about it. For years now, it has gone on. I acknowledge that our Trade Ambassador and this President have taken some action, which is more than previous Presidents have done. Previous Presidents would not give the

time of day to this issue. But this President's action and the action of the Trade Ambassador is far short of what it should be, and they know it.

I found it interesting when I was in Europe a few months ago and I picked up the paper. I read that we are going into a trade war with Europe over bananas. I am sitting there in Europe thinking, gee, that is strange. Let's see, where do we produce bananas in the United States? I guess maybe we produce a few bananas in Hawaii. But by and large, we don't produce bananas in the United States. So why do we have a Trade Ambassador prepared to go into a trade war over bananas, something we don't produce? I guess it is because U.S. corporations produce bananas in Latin America and they are trying to sell them to Europe. Europe won't let the bananas in, so we get all exercised and we are going to have a trade war over bananas.

I want to ask the Trade Ambassador this: If you are willing to go into a trade war over bananas, which we don't produce, would you be willing to take some reasonable action against countries that inundate our markets and cut our prices on something we do produce, such as spring wheat, durum, and barley? Why is it that we are willing to go to bat here and ratchet up a big trade dispute with Europe over bananas when we don't produce any real bananas. Yet, we seem unable, or unwilling, to take action against the Canadians, who clearly are violating our trade laws and who are causing massive dislocation in the center part of our country by undercutting our grain markets and hurting our family farmers?

Oh, I have thought from time to time about getting a truckload of bananas and dumping it on the front steps of the USTR's office to say at least here you can see some bananas when you walk out. You won't see any in the fields and you won't see any banana trees anywhere you look in the continental United States. You have this big trade dispute going on over bananas, which you won't be able to find in most corners of this country. That would at least give our trade office a chance to see bananas. But I decided I could not afford to do that, and it would probably be a stupid stunt anyway.

Somebody needs to say: You are not thinking straight. If you want to stand up for the economic interests of this country, then stand up for things we produce. Then someone will say to me: Mr. Senator, you know there are some agricultural groups that support action against Europe on the banana issue? Yes, I am sure there are. We have dozens of farm organizations in this country who say they speak for farmers, and they wouldn't know a pair of coveralls from an oil rag. I mean, they wouldn't know a pickup truck from a razorback hog. In fact, they don't know much about farming. They are about agribusiness. They lobby under the

name of farmers, but they really represent the agrifactories of this country.

I say to them: You are off supporting this dispute about bananas, and you are probably all upset that I am undercutting you. No, all I am interested in doing is getting the limited resources of the U.S. Trade Ambassador's office to start fighting for the economic interests of what we produce in this country. Things like wheat and steel? Sure, we have people concerned about steel. I will join them. How about focusing on wheat coming in from Canada at secret prices, sent to us by a state trading enterprise that would be illegal in this country? We send auditors up to Canada and they say, "We want information about what price you are selling for." They say, "We are sorry, we don't intend to give you any information at all." That is violative of our trade laws, and we ought to have a Trade Ambassador who will do something about that and a President who will join her to say it is time to stop that kind of unfair trade.

Well, Mr. President, my time is about over. I know that, as we begin the budget process this week and as we complete, hopefully, action on the supplemental this week, we will have a discussion about choices. I have talked a great deal about agriculture and the farm program.

Let me conclude by saying that one of the most significant choices we will make, in addition to those I have described, will be the issue of the broad choices of what we are able to do with the future surplus. One of the major choices will be to determine whether there will be reserves left from that surplus to invest in Social Security and to protect Medicare. I am especially concerned with the issue of Medicare, which is the major issue that represents the difference between the two budget resolutions that will be brought to the floor of the Senate.

That, I think, will be an aggressive and healthy debate and an appropriate one.

There are those who stood on this floor some 35 or so years ago and said that the Medicare Program would make sense for this country for senior citizens who had no health care. They found that insurance companies were not lining up to ask if they can insure older folks. They didn't run around looking for older folks to insure, because old folks aren't the kind of people you make money from. You insure young, healthy people, and make money from those folks.

Sixty percent of the senior citizens of this country had no health insurance, and we passed Medicare over the objections of many. Now, 99 percent of the senior citizens in this country have health care. They don't go to bed at night worried about whether their health circumstance will change in a way that will cause them very substantial trouble because they won't have the money to deal with their health

care needs. Medicare relieves them of that kind of anxiety.

We must, it seems to me, commit ourselves, in the context of choices that we make in the budget this year and in future years, to the long-term financial future and solvency of both Social Security and Medicare. I think in the next 2 or 3 days we will have a robust, healthy, and aggressive debate on this. Perhaps the debate will include some who never liked Medicare in the first place, and who wouldn't vote for it now, if they had a chance. I have heard a couple of people suggest as much in recent years. But, there are those on that side and perhaps many of us on the other who believe very strongly that this is a program that has been very, very healthy for tens of millions of American people and who believe that we ought to continue to provide solvency for it in the long term.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. VOINOVICH). The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the situation in Kosovo. We have been watching this situation unfold for days, actually months—actually, you could say thousands of years. But it is coming to a head in the very near future, perhaps in hours. As I speak today, Richard Holbrooke is talking to Slobodan Milosevic and trying to encourage him to come to the peace table. I hope he is successful, and I know every American hopes that he is successful. But what I think we must talk about today is what happens if he is not.

What happens if Mr. Milosevic says, "No, I am not going to allow foreign troops in my country," and if he says he is going to move forward with whatever he intends to do in the governance of that country? I think we have to step back and look at the situation and the dilemma which we face, because there is no question, this is not an easy decision. What comes next?

Basically, the President has committed the United States to a policy in NATO to which he really does not have the authority to commit. The consequences are that we have to make a decision that would appear to walk away from the commitment he made without coming to Congress, and that is not a good situation. I do not like having to make such a choice, because I want our word to be good. When the United States speaks, I want our word to be good. Whether it is to our ally or to our enemy, they need to know what we say we will do.

But the problem here is, the President has gone out with a commitment before he talked to Congress about it, and now we have really changed the whole nature of NATO without congressional approval. We are saying that we are going to bomb a sovereign country because of their mistreatment of people within their country, the province of Kosovo, and we are going to take this action, basically declaring war on a country that should not be an enemy of the United States and in fact was a partner at the peace table in the Dayton accords on Bosnia.

So now we are taking sides. We are turning NATO, which was a defense alliance—is a defense alliance—into an aggressive, perhaps, declarer-of-war on a country that is not in NATO. Mr. President, I just do not think we can take a step like that without the Congress and the American people understanding what we are doing and, furthermore, approving of it.

There is no question that Mr. Milosevic is not our kind of person. We have seen atrocities that he has committed in Kosovo. But, in fact, there have been other atrocities committed by the parties with whom we are purporting to be taking sides. The Albanians have committed atrocities as well, the Kosovar Albanians. So we are now picking sides in a civil war where I think the U.S. security interest is not clear.

I think it is incumbent on the President to come to Congress, before he takes any military action in Kosovo, to lay out the case and to get congressional approval. What would he tell Congress? First of all, before we put one American in harm's way, I want to know: What is the intention here? What is the commitment? What happens in the eventuality that Mr. Milosevic does not respond to bombing, that he declares he is going to go forward without responding to an intervention in his country? What do we do then? Do we send ground troops in to force him to come to the peace table? And if we did, could we consider that is really a peace? What if NATO decides to strike and an American plane is shot down? What if there is an American POW? What then? What is our commitment then?

My concern here is that the administration has not looked at the third, fourth, and fifth steps in a plan. They have only addressed step 1, which is, we are going to bomb because they will not come to the peace table and accept the agreement that we have hammered out. I just say, before we go bombing sovereign nations, we ought to have a plan. We ought to know what steps 3, 4, and 5 are, because I believe Congress has a right to know what this commitment is. How many people from the United States of America are going to be put in harm's way? What is it going to cost and where is the money going to come from? Is it going to come from other defense accounts, so other places in the world where we have troops are

put at risk? Is it going to come at the risk of our Strategic Defense Initiative? Just where is the money going to come from? Most of all, most important of all, what is the mission? How much are we going to be required to do and what is the timetable?

Mr. President, I would support a plan that would say when the two parties come to a real peace agreement, we would put our troops, along with our European allies in NATO, together in a peacekeeping mission of a short duration which would make sure that things settle down until we could have others rotate in and take our place. I would support a plan that went that far.

I would also support a plan of helping the Kosovars, but without putting American troops in harm's way. You know, the difference between the Clinton doctrine and the Reagan doctrine is that President Reagan would support freedom fighters with arms, with monetary contributions, with intelligence—many, many forms of support for freedom fighters—but he would never put a U.S. military person in the middle of a civil war. He would help, but he would not make that commitment.

Under the Reagan doctrine, therefore, we could help Afghan rebels and Nicaraguan freedom fighters. At the same time, we could also continue to remain strong in Europe and Asia because we could allocate our resources and we would not drain our resources in small civil conflicts in chosen places around the world.

What bothers me about what has been happening in the last 3 or 4 years is that we have been putting troops into civil conflicts in certain parts of the world but not all parts of the world. So every time we do it, it makes the decision not to do it somewhere else a little harder. We practically invaded Haiti and we still have 500 troops in Haiti today. We had 18 Army Rangers killed in Somalia in a mission that was ill-defined and was actually mission creep. The original mission of feeding starving people had been accomplished, but we didn't leave. We decided to capture a warlord, something our military is not trained to do and, therefore, the miscalculation cost us the lives of 18 great young Americans.

We have inserted ourselves into places like Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia, but we have not inserted ourselves into Algeria, where there are just as many atrocities as there have been in any place in the Balkans. We have not inserted ourselves into Turkey, where there is mistreatment of the Kurds. We aren't getting involved in the Basque separatist movement in Spain. We didn't step into Iran when the Ayatollah took over from the Shah and was assassinating almost every military leader that couldn't get out of the country, plus the religious minorities that were still there and their leadership. It is very difficult, when you start choosing where you are going to in-

volve yourselves, to extricate yourself when there is no clear policy.

That is why so many of us in Congress are concerned and why we realize the dilemma. We understand that this is not an easy black and white decision. We are talking about a commitment that the President has made. I do not like stepping in and saying that we shouldn't keep a commitment the President has made. Overriding that great concern is the consequence of not requiring the President to have a plan and a policy that will set a precedent for the future. I think we could explain it by sitting down with our European allies and saying, first of all, if we are going to change the mission of NATO, this must be fully debated and fully accepted by every member of NATO within their own constitutional framework. If we are going to turn NATO from a defense alliance into an affirmative war-making machine, I think we need to talk about it.

I will support some affirmative action on the part of NATO, if we are able to determine exactly what would trigger that and not go off on one mission without having a precedent for a different mission and, therefore, creating expectations among more and more people that we will step in to defend the autonomy of a country such as Kosovo or Bosnia. We must not allow the expectations to be such that we are drawn into every conflict, because we will not be able to survive with the strength that we must have when only the United States will be the one standing between a real attack from a ballistic missile or a nuclear warhead or an invasion of another country where we do have a strategic interest. We cannot allow there to be so many questions because there is so little policy. That is the responsibility of Congress, to work with the President.

We will work together. Congress will work with the President to hammer out a new mission for NATO. We will always do our fair share in the world. We will never walk away from that. We have to determine what is our fair share, what is our allocation. I submit that the United States will always be the leader in technology, and we will create a ballistic missile defense that will shield not only the United States and our troops wherever they may be in any theater in the world, but we also will protect our allies, if we have the strength to go forward. We will not have the strength to go forward if we continue to spend \$3 and \$4 billion a year on conflicts that do not rise to the level of a U.S. security interest.

We must be able to choose where we spend our defense dollars so that we will all be protected, ourselves and our allies, from a rogue nation with a ballistic missile capability that can put a chemical or biological or nuclear warhead on it and undermine the integrity of people living in our country.

Mr. President, the consequences are too great for us to sit back and let the President commit U.S. forces in a situ-

ation that I can't remember us ever having before; that is, to take an affirmative military action against a sovereign nation that has not committed a security threat to the United States. Before we would sit back and let the President do that, I cannot in good conscience say, well, he has made the commitment, even though he didn't have the right to do it, so we have got to let him go forward. Perhaps if we aren't lucky and if Milosevic does not come to the table, we would have more and more and more responsibilities because of the potential consequences that could occur if he does not come to the table.

We must know what those consequences are and what we are prepared to do in the eventuality that an American plane is shot down, that we have an American prisoner on the ground or that we bomb and bomb and bomb and bomb and he still does not do what we have asked him to do. We have to determine what we do in that eventuality. I certainly hope that we will consult with the Russians so that this war does not escalate into something that we haven't thought about. If Russia decides to step in on the side of Serbia, we could have grief beyond what anyone is saying right now.

I hope the President will work with Congress to fashion a new mission for NATO that will have the full support of Congress and the American people. I believe we could do that, because I don't think we are far apart at all. We cannot do it on an ad hoc basis. We cannot all of a sudden attack another country on an ad hoc basis and call that a policy.

I hope the President will come together with Congress and have hearings. Let's hear from the American people on just what they believe is the role of the United States. Let's hear from Congress about what our commitments should be and what is a ready division of responsibility for keeping the world as safe as we can make it, given that 30 countries have ballistic missile technology, some of whom are rogue nations. Let us step back with our European allies and determine if this is the right decision to make, or are there other ways that we could be helpful to the Kosovar Albanians.

I remember hour after hour after hour, over a 2-year period, talking about letting the Muslims have a fair fight in Bosnia, because they didn't have arms when two of their adversaries did. We never took that step. Now there is a cease-fire in Bosnia, but there are also many years to go before we will know what the cost is and if it can be lasting, because today, Bosnia is still as ethnically divided as it ever was because it is not safe for the refugees to move back in.

One can say there is disagreement on just how successful was the Bosnian mission. We do not see fighting, but NATO has just toppled a duly elected president of one of the provinces. It is pretty hard to understand. I think it is

tenuous that we would go in and forcibly remove an elected president while we are touting democratic ideals.

There was a way to go into Bosnia, but Kosovo is very different. Kosovo is a civil war in a sovereign nation. There are atrocities. There have been atrocities on both sides. We are picking one side, and we are doing it without a vote of Congress. I do not think we can do it. I do not think the President has the right to declare war, and under the Constitution, he certainly does not. And under the War Powers Act, it takes an emergency. This is not an emergency. We are not being attacked. United States troops are not in harm's way at this point.

We can take the time to talk about it, and the consequences are so great I think it is worth the time to set a policy that allows us to have some continuity for the next 25 years, so that our enemies and our allies will know what the greatest superpower in the world is going to do and they will not have to guess.

Mr. President, it is a dilemma, and I realize it is. I do not feel comfortable with the choice. I do not feel comfortable at a time when we have gone out on a limb, through our President who made a commitment for us, even though we were not part of it. Nevertheless, I would like to give the President that support, but it is worth it to take the time and do it right and ask the President to come forward to give us his plan, to tell us what happens when American troops are prisoners of war or on the ground or shot down. We need to know what we would do in that eventuality before we send them there. That is the least that we can expect.

I hope we can debate this resolution. I hope people will give their views. I have heard great debates already on it, not on the Senate floor, though. The time has come for us to have this debate, and let's vote up or down. There will be people voting on both sides in good conscience, seeing it a different way but with the same goal. So let's have that debate. Let's do it right. Let's don't haul off bombing an independent nation before the Senate and the House of Representatives has a plan and approves it or disapproves it. That is what our Founding Fathers intended when they wrote the Constitution, and it is more appropriate today than ever.

I hope we will do that, because then the American people will know what is going on and they will support it or not support it. If we are going to have a long-term commitment, which I hope we do not, but if we do, at least it will be with the support of Congress as Desert Storm was. That was a tough debate. People spoke from the heart on both sides. They took a vote, and Congress supported the President going into Desert Storm. That is the way it should be, Mr. President. That is the way it should be under our Constitution, under our democracy. That is the way our Government works. I hope it

will again as we face the crisis today that could have very long-term consequences for our country and for every one of our young men and women in the field wearing the uniform of the United States of America. Their lives are worth a debate and a policy, and that is what we are going to try to give them in the next 24 hours.

I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I listened to the Senator from Texas and, I must say, there are many Members of the Senate who have concerns about a range of these issues. But I will also say that one of my concerns is that as sensitive negotiations occur in Belgrade today with Mr. Holbrooke and others, a resolution that says "The United States national security interests in Kosovo do not rise to a level that warrants military operations" seems not to be the best of timing.

I understand all the points the Senator made. As she knows, we have had some discussions about NATO in the past. I am someone who voted against expanding NATO for a number of reasons. But NATO does exist. This country is a part of NATO, and NATO has indicated to Mr. Milosevic that there are consequences to his actions. The actions he has taken obviously include the slaughter of innocent civilians.

I am troubled, I guess, by having a resolution on the floor of the Senate at this moment. There will be a time and should be a time for a robust and aggressive discussion about what exactly is in our national security interest.

I was someone who was nervous about Bosnia. I would characterize the circumstances in Bosnia differently than the Senator from Texas did. There is not just a cease-fire there, there is a peace agreement in Bosnia, and this country went to Bosnia as a peacekeeper, not a peacemaker. We did not send American troops into Bosnia to create a peace that did not exist. We sent American troops in as part of a NATO contingent in Bosnia to keep a peace that already existed. Those of us who were watching what happened in Bosnia understood genocide was occurring in that area. We got involved through NATO. Frankly, it has worked to this point in a manner that has undoubtedly saved the lives of many in that region.

The Kosovo issue is, in many ways, as difficult and perhaps more difficult, and I do not know that airstrikes will have any impact at all. I honestly do not know. The Senator from Texas indicates that the President should consult with Congress, and she is absolutely correct about that. I know that there was a meeting on Friday. I was invited to a meeting at the White House on Friday, as were a number of my colleagues. I believe a bipartisan group of Members of Congress were at the White House on Friday when the President discussed the circumstances in Kosovo.

I, too, think consultation on these matters is required. Also required is a significant and robust debate about exactly what is in this country's national interest. The Senator from Texas has been very consistent on raising these questions over a long period of time.

However, it bothers me some that the timing of this particular amendment comes at exactly the moment that there are these discussions today in Belgrade with President Milosevic about the consequences of continuing to do what he is doing. Obviously, anybody has a right to offer any amendment. But I was, frankly, surprised to see the amendment that has been offered as a second-degree amendment. I understand that there will be a vote on a cloture motion tomorrow at 2:15 on this second-degree amendment. And this is a very difficult time for us to be essentially sending this message to Mr. Milosevic.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. DORGAN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. I just say to the Senator from North Dakota that I understand the concern about timing. And I could not agree with him more about the timing. But I will just point out that the amendment I offered was actually offered early last week as an amendment that I thought should be considered in a supplemental appropriations bill because, of course, it will require a supplemental appropriation. As you know, after the bill was laid down and other amendments were considered, this second-degree amendment was put on Friday. And now so much has happened in the last 48 hours that the timing is not perfect; there is no question about it.

I just say to the Senator from North Dakota that we have been trying to talk about this for quite a while. And the House took up an amendment 2 weeks ago that now is totally obsolete, because the Serbs have refused to come to the table. So I concede that the timing is bad, but I do not know when it gets better. We certainly are not going to influence Mr. Milosevic right this minute in that Mr. Holbrooke is talking to him right this minute.

But I do think that we have to have this debate, because if we do start an action before we have had this debate, and before the American people fully understand what the issues are and can weigh in, I do not think that would be acceptable, particularly if it is a long-term commitment. So I do not disagree at all with what seems to be very bad timing. I just do not know when it gets better.

Mr. DORGAN. If I might reclaim my time, the timing here is more than "less than perfect," as the Senator suggested. If I were involved in negotiations this afternoon in Belgrade with Mr. Milosevic, the Lott amendment would be of great concern to me, because I would expect that someone sitting across the table from me would

say, "Well, you are offering threats of airstrikes, but I can tell you that at this moment there is legislation pending in the U.S. Senate to prohibit those very strikes you're suggesting represent the threat to me."

I only say that I wish at this point we could have found a way—or could still find a way—to have the kind of debate about what is in the national security interest, what is the role of NATO, all of the kinds of discussions that the Senator suggests. Clearly, those are discussions we should and will have. But I rose simply to say I think the timing of this amendment detracts from the ability of our negotiators to express the threat of NATO action.

If I were negotiating for our side, debating this amendment is probably the last sort of thing I would want to see happen, because I don't think it serves our negotiating interests.

I do not say that personally in terms of anybody who offered this. The Senator from Texas indicated that she introduced this discussion in the Appropriations Committee, of which I am a member. She is correct about that. But this most recent amendment was laid down, I believe, Friday, and a cloture motion filed on Friday; and that is what I am concerned about.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Senator is correct, it was laid down Friday. But this amendment does not prohibit the airstrikes. It just says that we must come to Congress first, that the President must come to Congress and present a full plan first. And I think that is warranted before this type of action would be taken in this very unusual circumstance.

But as the Senator said, it is coming to a head very quickly. This amendment was offered last week. The second-degree was also offered last week. So we are trying to have a clear plan, certainly, before we get into a situation which could be very long term, with very dire consequences. And I think the full debate is what we are looking for, not necessarily a cutoff, but certainly having all the facts before us before we make such an important decision.

Mr. DORGAN. I would just point out, sending American men and women into harm's way is something I think no President wants to do. We've had ill-fated incursions and actions taken by Republican Presidents and Democratic Presidents alike. The perfection of foreign policy is not the province of any one party.

I was sitting here—the Senator from Texas was talking about President Reagan—and I was recalling that I was in Congress when Americans in Beirut were killed by a truck bomb. There have been a lot of circumstances where we had to learn exactly how and when we involve ourselves. It is a lesson that is very hard to learn.

The folks who feel very strongly about American and NATO involvement in Kosovo will make the case

that if the situation is not contained there, it will spread very quickly and we will have a very substantial, broader problem on our hands in Europe. My colleague from Delaware is waiting to speak. He knows a lot more about these issues and has been involved with them much longer than the combined service of myself and the Senator from Texas.

But I think all of us are probably nervous about these issues. We do not know exactly what the right approach might be. I only rose today to say that I am concerned about the timing of this debate. Just this afternoon sensitive negotiations are occurring in Belgrade with Mr. Milosevic. I hope Mr. Milosevic will hear at least one voice coming from this Congress, perhaps many voices, saying that the slaughter in that region of the world must stop—one way or the other.

With that point, let me yield the floor. I know my colleague, Senator BIDEN, is waiting to speak.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank my friend.

I want to begin by saying to Senator HUTCHISON, I think she is performing a valuable service. This debate needs to be undertaken. She and I have had very different views on the Balkans from the very outset. She, along with a majority of my colleagues, 3, 4, 5, 6 years ago, told me that bombing would not work in Bosnia and we should not be involved in Bosnia and they asked, "Why are we getting involved?" They were legitimate, real questions. And she could have turned out to be as right, though I think she and others have proved to be wrong.

No one knew then. I could not answer some of those questions then. I could not answer in 1992, when I came back from Bosnia and there was the report about what was happening in death camps, about the support of Milosevic across the Drina, with the VJ involved with the Serbs in Bosnia. I could not prove or convince people that there were massive massacres that had taken place and would be taking place. I could not convince anyone—either NATO or the President initially—that the longer we waited, the more the situation would deteriorate, and the harder it would be to put back together.

But the question I was always asked then is the one I am asked now as a vocal supporter of using force, along with NATO, to bomb Milosevic; and that is, people say to me now, "Well, BIDEN, tell me what the last step is. You tell me the first step now. Tell me what the last step is. You've got to have an end game here, BIDEN. If you're talking to the President of committing to a lift-and-strike policy in Bosnia"—that was 6 years ago, or more than that now, 7 years ago—"you've got to be able to tell us, if you lift the embargo and you engage in airstrikes, what happens?" The following are the contingencies—if you list them, they are all reasonable questions.

I say to my friend, the Presiding Officer and former Governor of Ohio, the truth of the matter is the world has changed so fundamentally that this calculus of what the last step will be is no longer relevant, especially if we try to answer it before the first step is taken. It leads to a policy of paralysis.

I remember arguing then with a man I had great admiration for then and do now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell. I remember him making the argument that unless we could submit front-end to put 300,000 troops in Bosnia, then we shouldn't put anybody in there. My argument was then and it is now that that thinking is an absolute policy for paralysis. I guarantee you that the world we are entering in the 21st century doesn't lend itself to that kind of calculus.

When there were two superpowers and we decided whether or not to go into Czechoslovakia when the Prague Spring was crushed, or when we decided whether or not we were going to invade the counteroffensive in Hungary when the Russian tanks rolled in, the calculus then was pretty clear. We could say if we responded, then there was a likely probability the Soviet Union would respond to our response, and there would be a likely possibility this would lead to World War III.

It was a reasonable calculus. We could do a cost-benefit analysis and ask if the cost of involvement was worth the possible payoff. And we do this balance, this calculus. We did this under Democrats and Republicans for 50 years and did it pretty darn well. Indeed, we won the cold war.

We are dealing with a different world now. We are not dealing with a group of people who are essentially cautious, who are part of a great empire, and who had scores of divisions along the Fulda Gap ready to roll into Western Europe if, in fact, war broke out. We are dealing now with a group of tin-armed dictators—malevolent, dangerous dictators.

In Iraq we are dealing with a man named Saddam Hussein. I heard when I urged, along with others, that we should bomb Saddam Hussein, "If you bomb Saddam Hussein, what is the second, third, fourth and fifth step you are likely to take?" We couldn't say then because these guys don't operate under the same rational basis that we do. They are cunning. They are smart. But they have fewer cards to play, and their cards are less obvious.

I approach things a little differently these days. I have been a Senator for 27 years, and I have been involved in foreign policy, deeply involved, for the bulk of that time here. I approach it this way now: Do we know what will happen if there is inaction? What happens if we don't act?

In Iraq, if we don't act, we know for certain Saddam Hussein acquires weapons of mass destruction. We know this because he has used poison gas before. We know he has used chemical weapons. We know he has invaded other

countries. We know that he has been willing to sacrifice tens of thousands of his people in a war with Iran. So we know where this guy is likely to go if we do nothing.

We have a different calculus now. In a superpower world, the calculus involved fairly cautious actors. We did not have Russian troops invading Latin America. We did not have Russian troops, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, storming into Cuba. We did not have Russians looking for opportunities to have a Russian soldier confronting an American soldier. It was a pretty cautious group of folks we dealt with. Dangerous, bad, an evil empire, but pretty cautious.

How about today? What is the downside of not acting? I will argue in a moment that it is immense. It is immense and it is clear, as clear as anything you can prognosticate in international affairs.

We must remember that we are a European power. Whenever I am asked why we would consider keeping 4,000–7,000 troops in Bosnia to protect 100,000 people from being massacred, I respond by saying that for 54 years we have kept as many as 365,000 troops in Europe to prevent the subjugation of people. We now have 100,000 soldiers currently deployed in that theater. Why is the idea of using 2,000–4,000 of them to keep people of Kosovo from being subjugated and massacred such a radical intellectual breakthrough?

Were the United States of America not deeply involved in the affairs of Europe, how many in this Chamber think Europe would be able to avoid the instability that has characterized it for 300 years? Who is going to step to the fore? France? England? Germany? They are all great nations, all great allies, but they suffer from disabilities we do not. They have lived on the continent for an eternity. They have old and deep animosities and differences and allegiances. All of Europe has a history of dealing with Serbs and Moslems, Albanians, Kosovars, Bosniacs, Croats, and it affects significantly their latitude.

What might happen were America to leave? Ask the French whether they would like to see us pull up stakes and leave Europe, bring the boys and the women home. Ask anyone who has spent a lot of time dealing with European affairs what happens if the United States disengages.

As a student of history and a participant in history, I ask whether America has ever been able to keep its distance from an unstable Europe. Lucky Lindbergh thought it was a good idea. A lot of other people who were more deeply involved in the conduct of foreign affairs thought it was a good idea. This question represents an historic isolationism versus internationalism debate we have had in this country for over 200 years. Internationalists are characterized as adventuresome by their critics, and isolationists are characterized as narrow and self-interested by their

critics. But it is a healthy, long-term debate.

My friend asks whether or not I would be happy to yield for questions. I am always happy to yield for questions from the Senator from Pennsylvania. I am not always able to answer them, but if he has a question, I am happy to yield.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I broach this subject gingerly, as we have shared many hours together on the train ride from Washington to Wilmington, where he departs. He should go to Philadelphia, but he gets off at Wilmington. I sent the Senator a note, as he was in the middle of his discourse and I would not want to interrupt him if he chose to proceed with the line he had. However, there are a number of subjects that I think would be useful to discuss with the distinguished Senator from Delaware because he and I have discussed foreign policy, as well as many other subjects, on many occasions. We have agreed on many subjects—not always—and on many of our judgments.

The first subject that is on my mind is on the use of force in Kosovo. Specifically, the level of public understanding and support which is present at the moment. Senator BIDEN and I, along with 29 others, attended a meeting in the Oval Office on Friday to discuss the situation in Kosovo. The general concern uniformly present, was the level of public understanding of this issue and the level of public support, and the question of how much public support we needed in order to undertake these airstrikes. That would be the first subject on which I would be very interested in the views of the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will be happy to respond.

I think the Senator and I agree that there has hardly been any public knowledge or discussion of Kosovo. One of the reasons I am speaking on this matter is that I feel obliged to lay out the background on this issue: what is going on, what is at stake, why we must act, and the consequences of our action. I agree with what is implicit in the Senator's question: The American public has not been given sufficient facts to allow them to be informed as to whether or not the course of action the President wants to take is, in fact, wise.

I was telling my staff as I walked over here that, this weekend, I came out of a 5 o'clock mass, and a friend of mine—a very informed fellow, who is, I think, a supporter—pulled me aside on the steps of the church and said, "JOE, look, you may be right, and I tend to trust your judgment in foreign policy; but I have tried my best to read everything I could." I listened, and he used this phrase: "I listen to MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour every night, and I am waiting to hear somebody explain to me this deal in Kosovo. I know you spent a lot of time, JOE, on the Bosnia thing, but isn't this different? Explain it to me."

Then, the Wednesday before, I was at a St. Patrick's Day function where we raised money for a fund in the name of a deceased mayor, and a very intelligent fellow, a graduate of Annapolis named Healy, a premiere builder in our State, said, "JOE, I'm a Republican"—I hope I am not going to get him in trouble—"but I've been liking you for a while. JOE, for God's sake, don't go down this bombing route." Then I started to explain some things to him and didn't change his mind, but he said, "I didn't know that."

These are two illustrations, and I think you could probably canvas the gallery here and ask them how much they have heard about Kosovo and what do they know, and whether they believe what we are apparently about to undertake makes any sense. The very sure answer to your short question is that, no, the public is not sufficiently informed.

At our recent meeting at the White House, you will recall that I, and I think the Senator from Pennsylvania and others, stood up repeatedly and said, "Mr. President, ultimately, you must educate the public." The President told us that in his first news conference he was going to lead with Kosovo.

But I have said to him and to the national security adviser, as well, that I believe the President has to address the Nation. I think the President should go on television at prime time, and take a half hour and literally, with a map and a pointer, sit there and say: This is Kosovo, this is why it is important, this is what happens if we don't act. When we act, if we do, we think we will bring about the following result. American forces probably will be killed, but possibly not. None were in Bosnia, but this is a much more sophisticated air defense system in possession of the VJ. They are much more sophisticated militarily than we faced anywhere with a bombing campaign in Bosnia, and it is possible that American forces will be hurt.

Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator would yield for a follow-up question, when the Senator from Delaware spoke at the meeting last Friday, he referred to the issue of the likelihood of casualties. When I had an opportunity to speak, I did, too. We both made the same point, although you made yours with more emphasis, which is not uncharacteristic.

I suggested to the President—

Mr. BIDEN. I will take that as a compliment.

Mr. SPECTER. It is a compliment.

I suggested to the President that he be very direct on the problems and the risks, because if there is to be public understanding, the public ought to be informed about the risks.

When the Senator from Delaware spoke, and he has repeated it today so it is not something I am telling out of

a quasi-private meeting, he used the word "probably," as opposed to the word "possibly." The Senator and others including myself all emphasized the point that there had to be public awareness as to what was going on in Kosovo.

The President has made a start. He led off his news conference with the topic, but he did not give a 30-minute speech in detail. That would be a short speech considering the complexity of this subject. This which raises the question as to what is the level of public understanding, which I think is a very important factor in letting me go to a second subject, if I may.

The first part of this is hypothetical. If the President knew he would get an affirmative vote in a resolution from Congress on the use of force in Kosovo would he be wise to seek it? Would it strengthen his hand to have an affirmative vote? I, as the Senator from Delaware, do not like to deal with hypotheticals, but we have to on some occasions. So I ask my colleague about his view as to whether the President would welcome an affirmative vote if he knew he would get one, and would his hand be strengthened if he had congressional authorization before he took military action.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will respond by saying two things. I will answer the second part of his question first, which is very easy. Clearly, his hand would be strengthened if he had one.

Second, the first part of the question: Would President support it?

I also said in my statement to the President and our colleagues that I believe the Congress should—should—be confronted with a specific piece of legislation authorizing the use of force. I think it is constitutionally wise and politically necessary that be done.

Mr. President, such a congressional vote will spark the very debate on this floor that I think is needed to further inform the American public about what is at stake.

By the way, I called the White House after we had our meeting with the President and reiterated that I hoped he would send up a resolution. He did not. So I wrote one. I was prepared to attempt to amend Senator HUTCHISON's amendment. But, in the meantime, as is his prerogative, the majority leader came in and offered a second-degree amendment to Senator HUTCHISON's. So I now have no ability to amend her amendment.

I am told that we are going to vote on cloture. If we get cloture—and I hope we will get cloture—then there will be an up-or-down vote on the Lott-Smith amendment. That amendment says that the President can't take any action in Yugoslavia until funds are authorized. I would prefer having an up-or-down vote on that notion.

My resolution says, "The President is authorized to use the United States Armed Forces for the purposes of conducting air operations and missile

strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, pursuant to a decision of the North Atlantic Council Treaty Organization in order to achieve the objectives in section 2."

Through my resolution, I want us to step right up to our constitutional task of deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force.

I am the guy, by the way, who, in a very contentious meeting with President Bush, insisted that we have hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on a resolution for the use of force in the Persian Gulf war. I believe that is a congressional prerogative.

One might argue that the President doesn't need congressional authorization. I think he does. In my view, a President is always better equipped and better advised to go into a risky operation if the American people know what is at stake.

My experience, Mr. President, is that Senators and Congressmen do not like to be counted. Keep in mind that I have been here for six Presidents. We in Congress don't like to be counted on issues of war and peace—Democrats or Republicans—because if, in fact, the risky business the President wishes to undertake succeeds, we all want to be able to say, "Good idea, Mr. President. I was with you." If it fails, Congress wants the luxury of saying, "I told him. He never should have done that. Bad idea."

I came out of the so-called Vietnam war generation. The only thing most everybody in my generation can agree on is that a foreign policy of this great nation cannot be sustained very long without the informed consent of the American people.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield again, first, I can confirm the contentious meeting. In fact, I can confirm that the Senator from Delaware was present in many contentious meetings, not only with President Bush but others. Those were the meetings where some light was shed.

I was interested to note the generational difference by the Senator from Delaware, and he indeed associated himself with the Vietnam war. I would choose to associate myself with the Persian Gulf war.

Mr. BIDEN. I think that is appropriate.

Mr. SPECTER. I don't want to move to a generation older. I would like to move to a generation younger.

When my colleague talked about submitting a resolution, he was very artful, as he always is. He said it will be constitutionally wise and politically necessary. Then he moved on to say that he believes the President has a constitutional duty, although an argument could be made on the other side. As usual, the Senator from Delaware anticipated the next line of inquiry as to whether this military action is an act of war. I believe this is a subject which really could use some elabo-

ration and some discussion between not only the Senator from Delaware and myself but others in this not totally filled Chamber.

When the Senator from Delaware refers to the pending amendment offered by the Senator from Texas, Mrs. HUTCHISON, and the second-degree amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator SMITH, I believe the Senator from Delaware will be interested to know that the majority leader had looked for an approach where a substitute might be offered by the leader of the Democrats and where a substitute might be offered by Senator LOTT.

It may well be that Senator LOTT would be interested and perhaps agreeable—obviously, I cannot speak for Senator LOTT—to having the Biden amendment proposed as he has articulated. There might be an agreement by the majority leader, which I would certainly endorse, to have an up-down vote without a two-stage procedure and without having to go to a cloture vote.

For the people who are watching on C-SPAN II, a cloture vote means that there would be a vote to try and limit the debate. It requires a supermajority of 60. This would enable us to vote on the resolution, however it is articulated.

There are three items on which I would like the response of the Senator from Delaware. Let me name them and then come back to the one. Let me name them in inverse order.

Should we have the vote strictly on a resolution without a two-step procedure, as the Senator from Delaware articulates it?

Question No. 2: What are the considerations?

What is the argument that he doesn't have to come to Congress, that we are not implicating a constitutional requirement for congressional authorization to undertake this military action, if it is an act of war?

Let me deal with the most immediate question; that is this business of a cloture vote. I am, frankly, a little surprised to see the necessity to go to a cloture vote, although I do not question anybody who seeks to. I really do question this particular cloture vote. It might be something that is worth discussing, whether it is appropriate to have a filibuster over the issue of the use of force. A matter of this magnitude which involves a Constitutional authority, separation of powers, a provision of the Constitution of which there is none any more important.

So let me specify the question for the consideration of the Senator. Is it appropriate for a filibuster to be staged to bar the Senate from voting on whether to authorize or deny the President authority to use force?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me be precise. It is legally permissible but unwise. Let me explain what I mean.

I think the reason for the cloture vote is not because the majority leader expects anyone to filibuster. It is a tool

that he has learned and has sharpened and honed very well to gain control and maintain control of the agenda and provide for the inability of anyone to amend whatever he wishes us to vote on. That is what this is about.

This has nothing to do with anyone filibustering. Indeed, I have not heard a single person suggest a filibuster. It has to do with the leader using, skillfully, as he does, the tools to be able to control the agenda of the Senate and determine what we will vote on, how long we will debate, and if we will debate.

If the Lott-Smith amendment prevails and is attached to the supplemental, I predict that the entire supplemental will fail. If that happens we will never have any action on Kosovo or the supplemental for the near term. That is my guess.

There is some confusion in the House, because they thought, as the President thought, that there would be an agreement between the Kosovars and the Serbs as a consequence of the meetings in France. They concluded that they should debate whether or not we would place American forces on the ground, as offered by the President, if there was a peace agreement.

But there is no peace agreement. So someone introduced an amendment—a freestanding bill on the House side—thinking they could pass a prohibition on the use of any American forces to implement any peace agreement signed. That was voted down.

Again, the public and a lot of our colleagues are not adequately informed on this. The headlines when the House voted were: House Supports Use of American Forces In Kosovo. That is not quite true. The House said it would permit a deployment in a permissive environment.

Now we are going to vote in the Senate on something completely different, something that may produce a very ambiguous result. The Lott-Smith amendment bars all funding for the purpose of conducting military operations by Armed Forces of the United States in Serbia and Montenegro.

What does that mean? Does that mean that, under our Constitution, if this passes with the supermajority necessary to overcome a sure presidential veto, that airstrikes are not permissible because bombs cost money and they are going to be dropped on parts of Serbia? I suspect it does. Rather than take such an ambiguous vote, we should not shirk our responsibility here.

Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator yield for an additional question?

Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.

Mr. SPECTER. The Senator has gone through a discussion as to what Senator LOTT may have intended by the cloture motion, by the amendments pending, and by—as the Senator from Delaware characterizes it—our arcane procedure.

Mr. BIDEN. I could be wrong, but that is my reading of it.

Mr. SPECTER. It may be we can move ahead and structure a freestanding resolution which has been discussed, maybe two resolutions, one by Senator DASCHLE on behalf of the Democrats, one by Senator LOTT on behalf of the Republicans, and vote.

But let me come to the question that I think is by far the most important, which the Senator from Delaware had broached. That is the question about whether there is a constitutional requirement for congressional authorization.

As I look at the proposed military action, what has been described constitutes an act of war. The Constitution gives the President extensive authority, as Commander in Chief, but gives the Congress the sole authority to involve the United States of America in war—to have a declaration of war. That constitutional authority by Congress has been very, very significantly eroded.

Korea is perhaps the best example. I had occasion recently to pick up Margaret Truman's biography on President Truman and, seeing at least her version as to what President Truman faced in 1950, I wondered if the positions I have taken have been correct. But I stand by them, that there ought not to be the use of force without congressional authorization. The use of force was authorized prior to the Gulf war in a historic debate which occurred on this floor back on January 10, 11 and 12 of 1991.

I agree with the distinguished Senator from Delaware when he says the Members of Congress like to avoid votes on these issues. We faced an imminent airstrike last February in Iraq, February of 1998, and we chose not to decide the issue. At that time airstrikes were not made. In December of 1998, the Congress had ample opportunity to decide the question about airstrikes which did occur in mid-December over Iraq. Again, the Congress decided not to take up the issue. When we took up the issue of use of force in 1991, it came in a very unusual procedure, where the Senator from Iowa, Senator HARKIN, raised a procedural point the day we swore in Senators who were elected or reelected in November of 1990, so we took up the question.

So my view—and I have expressed it a number of times on this subject—is that however the matter is resolved, it ought to be resolved by the Congress. This subject has not really had the appropriate kind of discussion and debate.

So, I now ask the question in a specific form to the Senator from Delaware. What are the arguments in favor of the President's position not to require congressional authority? Does the Senator from Delaware agree with the proposition that I have articulated, that the Constitution does require Congressional authority before military force is used in bombing in Kosovo?

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, you can tell the Senator from Pennsylvania and

I are friends because I am happy to have his extended questions, because his questions always shed light on the subject.

I agree with everything he said so far. Let me be specific. When there is a Republican President, the Republicans argue the President doesn't need congressional authority. When there is a Democratic President, all of a sudden the Democrats support the President's unilateral war-making power.

Let me give you the argument that could be made by scholars as to why the President has the constitutional authority to act absent our approval.

They would argue that our actions in Kosovo are not an act of war. But as the Senator knows, the war clause does not require an act of war; it requires a use of force, a use of force that constitutes an offensive action. They would argue that this is defensive in nature. Presidents do that all the time. Remember why President Reagan invaded Grenada. To save medical students. That was the reason. That was the thin reed upon which he held his entire rationale, because everyone acknowledges that if it is an emergency or it is to defend American citizens and their property, it could be done.

In Kosovo, the argument could be made that there are U.S. personnel on the ground who would be in harm's way. If we do not take action, the roughly 40,000 Serbian troops near Pristina could threaten the small number of American forces in Macedonia. I can picture the argument being put together by the President's legal counsel. Because the Americans forces in Macedonia are now in jeopardy, there was a requirement to act to save them.

There also could be an argument made that airpower would be used for the purpose of protecting American personnel in Belgrade. The President could argue that Milosevic, with a long history of genocidal acts and acts of brutality, is about to move on American personnel. That is the nature of the argument that could be made.

There is also an argument, which I think is totally specious, that this qualifies as an emergency. The Founding Fathers, in this Senator's view, clearly contemplated emergency situations where the President would have to use force. That is why they gave Congress the power to "declare" war rather than "make" war. They did not want to tie the President's hands in the context of an emergency.

Another argument being made, which is not accurate but is made all the time by people justifying Presidential action in an area of making war or using force, is that there are 200 years of precedent. They will list hundreds of times where American forces were used without prior congressional authorization. It is a specious argument, in my view, but it is one that has credibility only as a consequence of its repetition. That is the other argument that will be used.

People will cite Libya. Did the President have a right to go in? I found Senator HUTCHISON's rendition of history fascinating, because her memory of Reagan and my memory of Reagan were fundamentally different. I don't mean it critically. I mean it factually. She said Reagan never put American forces in harm's way. Well, hell, they flew all the way from England, all the way across the Iberian Peninsula, and bombed the living devil out of Libya. Was that a declaration of war? Most Senators said it basically worked. It cowed the Libyan dictator for a while, and no American got hurt.

I cite that not to be critical of anything President Reagan did, but to point out that we often hear the precedence argument used. They say the Congress didn't do anything then. Therefore, that makes it constitutional. Yet there is a seamless fabric to the Constitution. Action, no matter how often repeated, cannot make an unconstitutional undertaking constitutional. That argument has been put forward by this administration and at least six other Presidents.

I might point out that the Lott proposal, the very thing we are going to vote on, may also be unconstitutional. It bars Defense Department funds for the purpose of conducting military operations by the Armed Forces of the United States. The only exceptions to the funding restrictions are (1) intelligence activities, including surveillance; (2) the provision of logistics support; and (3) any measure necessary to defend U.S. Armed Forces against immediate threat. Note that this third exception would give the President the excuse I just mentioned.

So the Lott proposal is flawed in two respects. First, as a constitutional matter, it is unnecessary. The Constitution already bars offensive military action by the President unless it is congressionally authorized. If Congress adopts the Lott amendment, it would imply that the President has carte blanche to take offensive action anywhere unless Congress makes a specific statement to the contrary.

We are telling the President he can't do something that the Constitution already says he can't do. Then we build in exceptions, exceptions that give him authority beyond what, in my view and the view of most constitutional scholars, he is entitled to as a matter of constitutional law.

Let me repeat the exceptions he builds. The amendment provides for providing intelligence activities. As the Senator knows, that can involve U.S. personnel. They may be all sitting up in Rhein-Main Air Force Base, or sitting in Italy. They may be on AWACS aircraft at a distance that can't be shot down. I do not know. It also could include spotters. It can include people on the ground. It could include U.S. military aircraft flying in Kosovo airspace, but not participating in the actual strikes.

Secondly, it provides for a provision of logistical support. That could in-

clude logistical support in the theater. If I were the President's lawyer on this one, I would say, Mr. President, don't worry about this sucker passing. You are OK. You can work this one out. You don't have to fight Congress on whether using force is constitutional. With this amendment, you can do what you want.

Thirdly, it excludes any measure necessary to defend forces against an immediate threat. Well, I guarantee you the argument will be made that once NATO decides to move, all those forces in Macedonia are in harm's way. Not only there, but American forces a little bit across the Drina River in Bosnia would also be in harm's way.

I guarantee you that the argument will be made, if this were to become law, that the Lott amendment gives the President the authority to bomb and use force.

Mr. SPECTER. If the Senator will yield on this point.

Mr. BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. SPECTER. When the Senator goes over the sections, they are so comprehensive as to make any prohibition meaningless.

Mr. BIDEN. I think so.

Mr. SPECTER. Which is one of the grave difficulties of having a resolution which prohibits Presidential action, but tries to accommodate to some special circumstance. In the articulation of the circumstances, it renders it absolutely meaningless and gives such latitude to the President, which may well be more latitude than he has under the Constitution.

I come back for purposes of a question, which I am about to ask, what the Senator from Delaware has had to say about the many occasions where force has been used, where acts of war have been undertaken. I agree totally that simply a recitation of those occasions does not establish a constitutional norm. One of the grave difficulties is that as the Congress sits silent, the Senate sits silent again and again and again. There has been such a total erosion of the constitutional requirement that the Congress has the authority to declare war. The situation as to emergency, which is used so frequently to justify Presidential action, is totally absent here.

This may be the clearest kind of case which we have seen where there has been time for a Congress to deliberate, to consider, and to act. I believe that the missile strikes in December of 1998 against Iraq should have required prior congressional authorization. But an argument can be made, tenuous as it is, that we are still operating under the resolution for the use of force from January of 1991. I think it is wrong, but one can make that argument.

When you talk about Libya, you may talk about the element of surprise, injecting some element of emergency. I do not want to get involved as to whether that is justifiable or not. But if you take the present circumstance, where the situation of Kosovo has been

building up for days, weeks, and months, and where there has been ample opportunity for the issue to be considered by the Congress and where the President has not taken the case to the American people, and where debate in the Senate only draws three Senators—we are honored the Senator from Virginia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, has joined us.

I join what the Senator from Delaware has had to say about the debate we had on the War Powers Act in 1983, where I asked then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy, a series of questions as to whether Korea was an act of war, or Vietnam was an act of war, developing at that time a requirement for constitutional authorization.

We then had a very spirited debate with the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Delaware, the then-Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn, and many others on January 10 and 11 in 1991. That is the kind of consideration we ought to have now.

I believe it is possible we can articulate a resolution like the resolution of the distinguished Senator from Delaware so you do not have the prohibition and all these exceptions clauses where we do not know what we are talking about. If you have a resolution denying the use of funds and then exceptions, it is totally unintelligible.

If we have to delay the budget resolution, this matter is of sufficient importance that we can do the budget resolution next week. We might impede upon the recess. We can get that done and have the kind of debate we need.

I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding and for the erudition which he has brought to this subject, as he teaches constitutional law and talks about this substantive matter to acquaint the American people as to what the constitutional law requires. I yield back to him so he can go on with his speech. I want to hear the substance as to why he thinks we ought to be undertaking these military strikes as a matter of national security, as a matter of national policy, as a matter of vital national interest, especially in the context where he says that the American people are not really informed, they are not really in a position to be supportive of this matter at this time.

Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I will respond—

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if I can interpose a question to both my colleagues.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would be delighted to do that, but I want to warn anybody who comes to the floor, I came to the floor to deliver what I thought to be, if not enlightened, a comprehensive rationale for why I think we should act. I am happy to stay here as long as possible, and I am happy to delay giving that speech, but as long as the Senator realizes that when we finish our discussion, it is going to take me 20 to 25 minutes to deliver this speech.

One of the arguments here that no one has laid out sufficiently—I am not sure I am capable of it—is why we should do what the President is seeking to do, why we should do what NATO has voted to do, and why we should be either for or against doing that.

We did discuss here a very important subject about whether or not it is constitutionally permissible to use force absent congressional consent.

All I am suggesting is that the President and those of us who support the use of airpower in conjunction with NATO should lay out why that action is in America's interest. What are the costs, what are the risks, what are the benefits, and why should we do it? Those who disagree with our position should lay out in one place, where people can go to the RECORD, why they think we should not do that. There are legitimate arguments in opposition beyond the constitutional arguments in opposition to the use of force in Kosovo.

As long as the Senator understands that, I am happy to yield for questions. I do not want to keep him here to have to listen to my speech. When we conclude this colloquy, if I do not lose the floor, I will be delivering that speech.

I am happy to yield for a question.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am going to take 1½ minutes to pose a question.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator should take as much time as the Senator wants.

Mr. WARNER. Again, we all draw on our experiences in life. I served overseas in Korea with an air unit, as a combat officer, I might say. Right now, I am trying to put myself—and I hope my colleagues put themselves—into a cockpit and we are strapped in, as these young Americans are right now, strapped in waiting for an order, which could come in the next hour.

Having met with the President the other day with my two colleagues here on the floor, I am convinced that he is going to join other NATO leaders and give that order at an appropriate time if the current mission of diplomacy by another courageous man, Mr. Holbrooke, is not successful.

I hope we can start to focus pretty quickly, not so much on all the historical parts of this important issue, like sovereignty and constitutionality, but on what we are going to do to support our military. It seems to me that this body at this time has to look itself in the eye and say these men and women are about to fly, about to take risks with our allies, and I think it is essential that the Congress of the United States be on record as supporting them. I will address that in such opportunity as I may have following my distinguished colleague's speech.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in response to the Senator's question, for technical purposes, I agree with him 100 percent. I am an admirer of the Senator from Virginia, in no small part

because he was in combat, because he was in the military and because he knows, I suspect, what it feels like sitting there, figuratively speaking, strapped in waiting for an order.

I am always very reluctant to argue a position that may get somebody killed, may get somebody maimed, may get someone put in a prison camp. And men like Senator KERREY, a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, and Senator MCCAIN, who argued against my position for years on Bosnia—not Kosovo; Bosnia—when men who are brave like that, men like DANNY INOUE, Senator CHAFEE, and Senator HOLLINGS, my seatmate, when they have questions about this, I take it very, very seriously.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator would allow me to make one clarification to your statement. I want to make it clear I said I served with others who were in combat. I was a ground officer who helped strap them in, who checked their radios and their communications. Occasionally, I did get to ride along with them in a back seat, but I never put myself in the combat category with those brave men who, day after day, were strapped in to fly combat. But I lived with them, slept there in the same tents, ate in the same mess, used to go up and observe what they had to do.

But let me tell you, I think we have to put ourselves in that cockpit right now as if we were qualified to be in combat and show that the Congress of the United States wants to support them. I think that is absolutely essential.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I did not mean to misrepresent. I have great respect for the Senator. I know he was Secretary of the Navy. He also is more informed in a personal sense about this—not, I am reluctant to say, not the issue; I think I am as informed as he is, or quite frankly, as anybody on the floor—but in terms of all that goes into a young man's or woman's head as they are about to take off the deck of that carrier or off that piece of concrete, or whatever the mission.

But let me suggest that I will lay out for you why I personally am willing to do something that I am not happy about doing; and that is, vote to support asking the brave young women and men of our military, in this case the fliers—Navy, Marine, Air Force—to risk their lives. And it is a real risk. There is a probability someone is going to get hurt.

Mr. WARNER. I look forward to listening very tentatively to hopefully most of it. I think it is important we do lay out the case. I will allude to, I think, much the same case that you do. But I do believe it is essential to this Senate to pass on the Smith amendment, if that is what is before us at this time; and then it seems to me that someone could possibly come on with a resolution like, as I understand, the Senator from Delaware, which clearly focuses on the issue: Do we or do we

not support the use of force by the U.S. military together with our allies in this frightful situation in Kosovo?

Mr. BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. President, let me begin my more formal remarks by referring to the concluding remarks I made on this floor on October 14, 1998, immediately after the agreement between Ambassador Holbrooke and the President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was made public.

I said at that time:

[W]e must never again allow racist thugs like Milosevic to carry out their outrages while the alliance dawdles.

Referring to the just concluded agreement, I further stated:

[W]e must brook no more opposition from Milosevic on its implementation. To use a domestic American term, we must adopt a policy of "zero tolerance" with [this] Yugoslav bully.

Many of us had hoped that the mistakes that enabled the Bosnian horrors to take place would teach us a lesson.

Unfortunately, we have repeated many of those errors and have thereby allowed Milosevic and his storm troopers to repeat their atrocities in Kosovo.

Twice is enough. There must not be a third time.

I do not cite that to suggest any air of erudition, Mr. President. I cite that to say my position—right or wrong—has been consistent since the day this agreement has been signed.

Mr. President, from the bottom of my heart, I regret to report that there has been a third time. There have been more massacres, have been violations of the agreement, and both the massacres and the violations are continuing as we speak; indeed, as I speak at this moment. Let's look at the disgraceful record.

Everybody forgets that we are operating in the context of Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, an agreement that has been signed on by our allies and our friends. The President has been saying for the last month and a half that if Milosevic does not sign on to an agreement, assuming that the Kosovars do sign on, we will bomb. For an unusual thing, NATO already acted. NATO got together and debated this issue. And NATO members all voted unanimously to use airpower if in fact one side or the other did not—did not agree. So what happened here is, there is an agreement. The context of this whole debate is that agreement in 1998.

Immediately following the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, machinery was set in place to prevent a recurrence of massacres that had already occurred in Kosovo and in Bosnia the previous years and to move toward an interim agreement on the future status of Kosovo.

On October 25, 1998, the Yugoslav Government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization fleshed out the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, authorizing exact numbers—exact numbers—of troops, the so-called VJ, and Serbian Interior Police, so-called MUPs, who are a bunch of thugs, would

be able to be in Kosovo province. The agreement also specified the garrisons to which they were to be restricted.

That was signed by NATO and Milosevic, and a cease-fire took effect, monitored by unarmed NATO aircraft, and international compliance verifiers were allowed into Kosovo.

Like his ideological model earlier in this century, Milosevic has treated most of this agreement as a "scrap of paper." The Yugoslav Government has flagrantly violated the limits stipulated in the October agreement. Rather than the 12,500 regular army troops and the 6,500 special police called for—a total of 19,000—there are presently 40,000 Yugoslav soldiers and Serbian special police forces in the province of Kosovo, in clear violation of the agreement.

As for the cease-fire called for—it is a total joke. Milosevic was afraid to refuse entry of the international verifiers or to shoot down NATO planes. So as a result, we have a documented ongoing pattern of warfare, both against units of the Kosovo Liberation Army, but especially against Kosovar civilians.

There have been countless massacres, but the most widely publicized one was perpetrated by the Serbs on January 15, 1999, in the village of Racak. There 45 Kosovar Albanian civilians—women and children—were slaughtered. The Serbs, of course, asserted that they all had been KLA fighters who had either been killed in combat or shot while fleeing.

Unfortunately for the Serbs, a Finnish-led team of forensic experts that examined the bodies reported unequivocally that the victims had been forced to kneel and had been executed by being riddled with small-arms fire.

They got down on their knees. These bullet wounds were in the back of their heads. They were executed, just like they did in Bosnia, just like Hitler did in World War II.

Just yesterday, Mr. President, 10 Kosovars were massacred by Serbs in the village of Srbica. During the past 10 days, the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian special forces have gone on the offensive, seizing the high ground above roads and railroads, moving in their most modern weaponry, including M-72 and M-84 tanks, and conducting a search and destroy mission against Kosovar villages suspected of harboring KLA sympathizers.

The net result is a new flood of refugees so great that their number is now approaching 450,000—450,000 the number reached last fall.

I might remind my colleagues, the only difference was, last fall when it reached that number, folks were able to flee to the mountains because they were not full of snow, they were able to hide. One of the reasons for the urgency that was being argued in the negotiations by Mr. Holbrooke was—and we all seem to agree—was that winter was coming and all these folks would die. Well, it is winter there now.

Mr. President, the tragic events of Kosovo have a clear historical causality which I will summarize now. Kosovo is considered by Serbs to be the heartland of their civilization. There, in the year 1389, on the so-called Blackbirds Field near present-day Pristina, the medieval Serbian knights were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, which led to more than five centuries of Turkish domination of the Balkans.

It was a courageous fight. They saved Christianity and the rest of Europe, but the bottom line was, they lost. And the bottom line was that the Balkans for 500 years were dominated by Turkey and many parts became Moslem.

The Albanians, however, also claim Kosovo as their own and, in fact, can trace their habitation there even further back than the south Slavs, the Serbs.

As a result of the policies of the Communist dictator of the former Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito—whom I had the interesting pleasure of having lunch with in his private residence in Split, Yugoslavia, with now deceased Ambassador Averell Harriman, one of the most interesting encounters I ever had in my career—the former Yugoslavian dictator, Marshal Tito.

In 1974, the Kosovar Albanians were granted the status of an autonomous region within the Republic of Serbia because of this history. Basically, the Albanians were allowed local control, while border security and foreign relations remained under the control of Belgrade. In the next 15 years, the percentage of Serbs in the Kosovo population dropped from approximately one-quarter to less than one-tenth. At the time this agreement was reached—this autonomy was granted by Tito in 1974—one out of four people living in the province of Kosovo were Serbs; three out of four were Albanians living within Serbia. They were basically Moslem, and the others were Orthodox Christians. Since that time, it has become 10-1; only 1 in 10 are Serbs.

Now, this has occurred for several reasons: A much higher birth rate among the Kosovar Albanians than among local Serbs; "buyouts" of many Serbian homesteads by Kosovars, some of whom earned hard currency abroad; and some harassment of Serbs by Kosovars, although nothing approaching the ethnic cleansing that is now being carried out by the Serbs.

Meanwhile, in Serbia proper, an ambitious young Communist politician named Slobodan Milosevic engineered a coup against the communist leadership of Serbia. He needed a vehicle to consolidate his power, and the time-honored vehicle used by most rogues is rabid nationalism. He needed to be able to spread his newly consolidated power to the Serb-inhabited regions of Yugoslavia outside of Serbia. So in a famous speech in 1989—he would have done proud any demagogue who has ever arrived on the political scene, and I am not referring to anyone here, I am referring to those folks who don't make

it usually—in 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Blackbirds Field, to which I earlier referred, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo and delivered a rabble-rousing speech in which he promised that no Serb would ever be pushed around by anyone again anywhere in the world, notwithstanding the fact that it was a hard case to make that that was happening.

On March 23, 1989, without the consent of the people of Kosovo, Milosevic amended the Constitution of Yugoslavia, revoking the autonomous status that they had had for roughly the past 15 years.

The following year, the parliament and the government of Kosovo were abolished by further unlawful amendments to the Constitution of Yugoslavia.

A thoroughgoing purge of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo followed. Thousands of hard-working citizens were summarily fired from their civil service positions, and the Serbian Government denied funding to basic institutions of Kosovo society.

It is absolutely necessary to note the reaction of the Kosovars to these massive violations of their human and civil rights. What was that reaction initially? Under the leadership of Dr. Rugova, the Kosovars—and he is a Kosovar—the Kosovars set up a parallel, unofficial system of governance. They set up schools, hospitals, and other institutions that make society run. Mr. President, under Dr. Rugova's leadership, the Kosovars held to a policy of nonviolence for nearly seven years. I do not know any other example elsewhere of such self-restraint anywhere in recent years.

The United States recognized that Kosovo was a tinderbox that could explode at any time. For that reason, former President George Bush sent a warning to Mr. Milosevic at Christmas 1992, the so-called Christmas warning. Keep in mind, the Kosovars had not used violence; they were still peacefully trying to piece together their society. On Christmas of 1992, the three Senators in this Chamber at the time—not in the Chamber—and President Bush, a Republican President, issued the Christmas warning that said the United States was prepared to intervene militarily if Serbia attacked the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. STEVENS. Is that the quote from President Bush's statement?

Mr. BIDEN. No; it is not a quote; it is a paraphrase.

Mr. STEVENS. I urge the Senator to quote.

Mr. BIDEN. As a matter of fact, I am about to come to that quote.

President Bush's warning was contained in a letter delivered to Milosevic and General Panic, the commander of the Yugoslavian Army. The New York Times and the Associated

Press quoted Bush's letter as saying: "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."

Let me read it again: "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."

Perhaps because of this Christmas warning, Milosevic refrained from an all-out military assault on the Kosovars, contenting himself with the legal repression that I described earlier.

The Kosovars waited in vain for the West to help. They hoped that their plight would be placed on the agenda of the Dayton peace negotiations in November of 1995, but having been warned by Milosevic that he would walk out if Kosovo were brought up, the West, under this President, President Clinton, and our NATO allies, restricted the talks to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

So, finally, in late 1996, armed Kosovar resistance began on a small scale under the loosely organized Kosovo Liberation Army, abbreviated UCK in Albanian, but as KLA in the West. Gradually, the KLA escalated to larger attacks by February of 1998. Let me review the bidding again here, and I will get the letter, or the news accounts quoting the letter, if I can, for my friend from Alaska, and I will enter it into the RECORD.

Now, what happened? In 1989, this genocidal leader of Yugoslavia, named Milosevic, had seized power and attempted to consolidate Serbs throughout the former Yugoslavia. He made a speech on the 600th anniversary of Blackbirds Field near Pristina to enrage and bring up the blood of every Serbian living in the region. It worked very well in Bosnia. It got them going in Bosnia and, as well, in Kosovo. Then he, under the Serb Constitution, by most accounts, unconstitutionally amended the Constitution, taking away the autonomy that Tito had granted to Kosovo in 1974. But even when that was done, the Albanian Serbs did not use force or violence. They were headed by a guy named Dr. Rugova, who said they would, by non-violent means, attempt to reestablish their societal institutions, allowing them their dignity and their right to work.

In the meantime, Milosevic comes in and he heads down from Belgrade and the orders are essentially: fire them all. Fire them all. All of the civil service jobs were eliminated, all of the schools were shut down, the language was not allowed, and so on. Still, the Kosovars did not use force. Still, they attempted, through peaceful means, to regain their autonomy. And with the help of President Bush—I can only surmise this, I can't read Milosevic's mind, but knowing what a coward he is, based on what he has done in the

past, I expect that the Christmas warning by President Bush kept him from using the force he wanted to.

Dr. Rugova came to me and others and said, "Get us into Dayton. While this is being discussed, get us on the agenda." We made a mistake, in my view. We said, "No; you are not on the agenda; this is just about Bosnia. This is about Bosnia and nothing else." And so when peaceful means began to fail, and had clearly failed in late 1996, seven years later, the Kosovar resistance called the Kosovo Liberation Army—the UCK or the KLA, whatever you would like to call it—began to engage in larger attacks, a la the IRA.

Milosevic then saw an opportunity. Having been humiliated in his aggressive wars against Slovenia in the spring of 1991, and Croatia in the summer of 1995, and having seen the Bosnian Serb puppets routed in the fall of 1995 and forced to accept a compromise settlement in Dayton, the Yugoslav dictator needed another crisis to divert the Serbian people's attention from the massive failure of his authoritarian, Communist economic and political policies.

So what did he do? He did what is often done. He found a common enemy. He appealed to this naked, rabid nationalism and used the suppression of the KLA as a justification, as his vehicle, attempting in the process to drive the ethnic Albanian population out of large areas of Kosovo. What have been the results?

To date, approximately 2,000 Kosovar Albanians and Serbian civilians have been killed. More than 400,000 Kosovar Albanians have been driven from their homes, including tens of thousands during the past 10 days. Thousands of homes in hundreds of villages in Kosovo have been razed to the ground. One-quarter of Kosovo's livestock has been slaughtered and 10 percent of its arable land burned. A food blockade has been imposed upon large segments of the Kosovar population.

The world has taken note of this. The United Nations Security Council has passed two important resolutions—Nos. 1160 and 1199—in 1998, decrying the repression and calling for an end to it. Milosevic publicly agreed to the U.N. demands and has cynically continued his state terrorism.

Mr. President, why should we be surprised by this? We saw it repeated and repeated in Bosnia, until we had the nerve to act.

What is at stake for the United States in all of this? In the interest of time, I will come back to the floor at a more appropriate time to enlarge upon this. But I will say that our entire policy in Europe since the end of World War II has been to promote stability through the spread of democracy. In order to create the security conditions for this development in Western Europe, we created NATO in 1949, and for 50 years this alliance has provided an umbrella under which our allies have survived and prospered.

Since the end of the Cold War, it has been our policy to extend this zone of stability eastward in Europe by three methods.

First, we have agreed to a well-conceived, measured enlargement of NATO, which has already brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance.

Second, NATO has entered into partnerships with many countries in the region, which in time will probably yield additional alliance members, which also in the short run has created productive relationships with a great power like Russia.

Third—and here is where Kosovo comes in—we have determined to oppose directly the aggressive policies of demagogues like Milosevic who are trying to foment ethnic and religious hatred.

We know, as NATO knows, that its credibility is on the line in Kosovo. We have warned Milosevic countless times to halt his fascist aggression. We have cooperated with our NATO allies, and with Russia, in fashioning a fair interim settlement for Kosovo.

We know that if Milosevic's scorched-earth policy of "ethnic cleansing" is allowed to continue, the inevitable result will be a massive tide of refugees, which would destabilize fragile democracies in Macedonia and Albania. We also know that Milosevic is itching for the excuse to overthrow the democratic and reformist government of Montenegro, which is a direct challenge to his authoritarian communist rule in Yugoslavia.

We also know that the ultimate nightmare—which is not impossible by any means—is a widening of the hostilities to include NATO members Greece and Turkey, who have different interests in this outcome.

Mr. President, the national interests of the United States are directly threatened by the continued aggressive actions of the Yugoslav Government in Kosovo.

For that reason, Mr. President, I think we should do what I said earlier, which is, introduce a resolution authorizing air operations, in conjunction with the Activation Order voted on by the North Atlantic Council of NATO.

I urge my colleagues to support that resolution.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the majority leader and Senators HUTCHISON and SMITH for bringing this matter to the Senate floor today. With fighting escalating in Kosovo, with the Serbs refusing to sign a peace agreement, and with U.S. military air units, together with those of our allies, poised to strike, it is important, if there is time, for the Senate to address this situation.

Under most contingencies, the U.S. military should not be sent into harm's way without the support of the American people and the Congress. Our nation has learned, from recent contingencies that, without such support,

when casualties occur, a clamor could begin to "bring our troops home." We witnessed that in Somalia; we could see that again in Kosovo. Our military deserves our support. I say to my fellow Senators, if you were sitting in a cockpit, ordered to carry out strikes against the Serbian military, you would like to know that the Congress, the elected representatives of the people, is with you, supporting your mission and concerned for the risks you are taking.

I first visited Kosovo in August of 1990 on a delegation headed by Senator Robert Dole. I commend this brave veteran for his mission to the Balkan region in the past few weeks in the cause of peace. His efforts contributed to the securing of signatures by the Kosovar Albanian delegation on a peace agreement.

During my visit to Kosovo in 1990, I saw first-hand the oppression of the Kosovar Albanians by the Serb authorities. I returned to the region most recently in September of 1998, traveling through Kosovo with Ambassador Christopher Hill and elements of a courageous international observer group called KDOM.

Since last March we have all closely followed developments—indeed the humanitarian tragedy—in this troubled region. And since last September, when NATO first threatened the use of force against Milosevic, NATO credibility has been on the line. We are now at a defining moment in this crisis.

Since September, I have been outspoken in my support for the use of U.S. ground troops as part of a NATO-led force to implement a peace agreement that is in place relative to Kosovo. In my view, such a military force is necessary—once a peace agreement is reached—if the parties to the agreement are to have the confidence necessary to be bound by the provisions of such a peace agreement. And I believe U.S. participation in such a force is necessary if we are to maintain our status as the leader of the NATO Alliance.

My greatest concern has been and continues to be that a deterioration of the situation in Kosovo could undermine the modest gains we have achieved in Bosnia—at a cost of over \$8 billion to date to the American taxpayer; and could lead to problems in neighboring Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey.

In addition, I share with all Americans concern for the humanitarian tragedy we have witnessed—are now witnessing—in that troubled land.

But what happens if a peace agreement remains elusive, which is now the situation with which we are faced. It is one thing to deploy troops into a permissive environment for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of a peace agreement. It is quite another to use military power—air—to compel a sovereign nation to sign an agreement to end what is essentially an internal civil war.

There are many questions that must be addressed. The most important question is, what happens if bombing does not succeed? There are very few operations, historic examples, where air power alone has succeeded in meeting our military objectives. Some have made the argument here today that air strikes were the key to bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table in Dayton. I had the opportunity to visit with two people last week who were intimately involved in the Bosnia crisis—former British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo and former U.N. High Representative in Bosnia, Carl Bildt. Both of these men told me that air strikes were an important part, but not the decisive factor in ending the fighting in Bosnia. History records that the Croatian offensive against the Serbs, and the fact that the parties were all exhausted from fighting were of equal significance to the important air campaign by the United States and our allies. Today, that is not the case in Kosovo—the parties there are, regrettably, ready to fight.

My point is,—there is risk in relying on air strikes, alone, to stop the fighting in this crisis. We must know what our next steps will be and how far we are ready to go with other initiatives to stop the fighting in Kosovo. If this first military action is taken—which in my view this contingency is tantamount to an act of war—what comes next and how far we are willing to go? We must have in mind not simply our first step, but our second, third or fourth steps before we commit U.S. troops.

While one of my main concerns in this is the credibility of NATO now that we have threatened military action for many months, we must ask ourselves what happens to NATO credibility if the air strikes fail to accomplish their objectives? That would be a devastating blow to the Alliance if we take the drastic step of attacking a sovereign nation, and are not successful in the ultimate objective.

What of the credibility of the United States and our leadership on the continent of Europe, in military as well as economic or diplomatic partnerships? What of the credibility of the U.S. military as a partner in other actions? There are important issues that can be debated in the context of the pending amendment.

The Smith amendment provides that the Congress must be on record as supporting this operation before we commit the U.S. military to the crisis in Kosovo. I agree. We owe it to the men and women of the Armed Forces to act on this issue. For that reason, I will support the Smith amendment and vote for cloture on this amendment.

CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning business is closed.

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 544, which the clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 544) making emergency supplemental appropriations and rescissions for recovery from natural disasters, and foreign assistance, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes.

The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

Pending:

Hutchison amendment No. 81, to set forth restrictions on deployment of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo.

Lott amendment No. 124 (to amendment No. 81), to prohibit the use of funds for military operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) unless Congress enacts specific authorization in law for the conduct of those operations.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

AMENDMENT NO. 124

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, what is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The present business is amendment No. 124 offered by the majority leader.

Mr. STEVENS. The amendment to the Hutchison amendment?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. The Kosovo question is the pending issue.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have listened with interest at the statements made by the distinguished Senator from Delaware. And he has some very good points. My memory of the conversations that were held at the time President Bush made the statement that the Senator from Delaware referred to was that the President was talking about racial cleansing, or genocide, on the part of the Serbs versus the Kosovo population—not just a military incident, but an act of genocide, but an act of racial cleansing in the magnitude of a national aspect.

There is no question that there is a dispute here. And the Senator from Delaware has heard my comments that I made to the President. I believe that article V of the NATO agreement does not authorize bombing in Serbia.

I was very interested over the weekend to listen to people talk on the radio and television about Yugoslavia. It seems that we are slipping back now, that it is a Yugoslav question, not just a Serb-Kosovo question, that is being raised now by the media. But in any event, I think this would be the first time in the history of NATO that NATO has taken offensive action against a nation that has a dispute within its borders. I think it is a horrendous proposition that the Serbs are presenting to Kosovo. "Either leave, or be exterminated."

But the question really is, What is the proper justification for this action

at the present time? If it is genocide, then I think we have really ample cause to be involved. If it is a matter of relocation of people within a nation, based upon whatever power the nation claims to relocate people within their boundaries, it is a different issue.

I must admit to being torn, as one who has attended the NATO meetings many, many times in the past, of what will be the future of NATO, if this action is taken.

I think the threat that President Bush made is the threat that all Americans would support; that is, that we would use military force to retaliate against a nation that instituted a process of racial cleansing, racial extermination within its borders, to the extent that it was contemplated at the time.

But I have to also raise the question: Where were we in Cambodia? Where were we in Ethiopia? Where are we going to be as this type of process continues in Africa? And we are reading more and more about that. Even this last weekend, juxtaposed to the story about Kosovo, is the story about the new racial cleansing commencing once again in Ethiopia.

It is not an easy issue. And I think it is one that we ought to pursue, because, from the point of view of this Senator, I do not like to set the precedent that an administration informs a foreign nation to sign an agreement, or, if you do not sign the agreement, we are going to bomb until you do. That to me is a precedent of which I don't want to be a part.

If we make a statement, as President Bush made, that if you engage in a process that is really against a whole concept of humanity, we are going to be first in line to punish you for doing it. Somehow or other, there is a place here where we can find a common position and support taking action as a nation. But, for myself, I just revolt at the concept that we are going to send people out to negotiate peace agreements, or whatever other kind of agreement it is, and authorize them to say, "Unless you agree with us, we are going to bomb you, and we are going to bomb you until you change your mind, and, if you do not change your mind, within our period of time, we are going to bomb you again." In this instance, the process would require taking down the air defenses of another nation in order that we might attack the forces that are on the ground.

I assume that most Members of the Senate have been there now and know what they are talking about. This is the most mountainous country of Europe. It is a place where, as I recall, some 20-odd divisions under the command of Adolf Hitler got just absolutely tied down by the actions of the people there on the ground. Of course, they didn't have the precision bombing we have now. They didn't have the automated systems that we have now and unmanned systems that can wreck havoc on any nation.

The question, really, to me is, "Are we to offer the use of military power to

carry out a threat of a negotiating team based upon their interpretation of the reasons behind a foreign nation's unwillingness to enter into an agreement that we sponsor?" Or, are we going to take action, as I said, on behalf of humanity to prevent the extermination of a race? To me, there is a great gulf between those two positions.

I intend to continue to raise the question with the President and his representatives about the constitutional power to make these threats, and then carry them out as threats as opposed to making a national statement—as President Bush did, as I understand it—that if there is a process of extermination going on, or racial cleansing going on, we will not stand idly by and watch that process, and we will use our military power.

I don't know whether the Senator from Delaware sees the difference in the two circumstances. But, as far as I am concerned, we are still on the first base. And that is we are asked to support the concept of using force—our force, mainly unmanned—to coerce the Serbs into signing an agreement. They have refused to sign that. As a sovereign nation, they have that right. If they take the action that is contemplated, and that many people feel they are going to take—that is, to enter into a process of racial extermination—then it is an entirely different question. I do hope that the Senate will remember that as we are considering the majority leader's amendment tomorrow.

It does seem to me that we are still on the question of should we use force to coerce the Serbs into signing the agreement that they do not want to sign. It is perhaps a distinction without a difference to some people. But it is a great difference to me.

Mr. BIDEN. May I respond, Mr. President?

Mr. STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. BIDEN. I think the way that the Senator phrased it, I can understand how he arrives at this issue as he does. I would argue that it is a distinction without much of a difference.

For example, the distinguished chairman talks about extermination justifying our action but relocation not. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference in terms of genocide. Historically, that is a distinction without a difference. In Bosnia, it was a distinction without a difference. This guy has a track record. The track record is clear. The track record is documented. The track record is obvious. So it is not a significant leap from President Bush's letter, which said: If they move against the Kosovars. We could argue, and President Bush could enlighten us what he meant by that, but the truth of the matter is he has moved against the Kosovars, and he is moving as we speak against the Kosovars. And a half-million people up in the mountains is a pretty big deal.

Second, with regard to this notion of forcing a peace agreement on someone

by saying, "If you don't sign, we will in fact bomb," that would make sense, I would argue, if in fact we were arguing about a border dispute, if we are arguing about whether or not they were to pay reparations, if we were arguing about whether or not they are going to sell oil or whatever. It is not about that. It is about genocide and ethnic cleansing. The whole purpose of the agreement, the only reason why the rest of Europe—of NATO—agrees with us that there is a need for force on the ground in Kosovo, is to prevent—prevent—prevent ethnic cleansing; prevent the systematic isolation of Albanians, Moslem Kosovars, Moslem Serbs.

So I understand the technical point the chairman is making. I do not understand the practical difference. This agreement that was signed onto relates to a framework that will assure the international community that this thug is not going to engage in the genocide he already has, the ethnic cleansing he has been promoting since 1989, and the thing for which we have a tribunal in the Hague. His military leadership, his puppets, are on the indictment list of the people engaged in this.

I acknowledge that it has not reached the proportions it did in Bosnia. I acknowledge that 43 men and women forced to kneel down and have guns pointed to the backs of their heads and have their brains blown out is not enough to say it is genocide countrywide. But it sure is enough, in my view anyway, to get the tickler file moving a little bit and saying: Wait a minute, what happened after that when they did that in Bosnia? What happened after that when the intercepted communications we have between Milosevic and Karadzic and others in Bosnia said, "Go get them, boys." Do we wait for Srebrenica to recur in Pristina? Do we wait for that?

What the international community said, I say to my friend from Alaska—international? Let me be more precise. The contact group in NATO—they said, "We do not. We learned a lesson here. We are not going to wait until he does that in Kosovo. We are going to work out an agreement." So they went outside Paris in some fancy old castle and they sat down and negotiated. And the idiot KLA, like the IRA, scuttled it initially because they threatened the Kosovar negotiators who were up there negotiating this agreement.

But keep in mind the purpose of the negotiation. The only reason to put international forces on the ground in Kosovo—the only reason, none other—is to guarantee personnel and institutions that will prevent Milosevic from being able to do what President Bush was worried he would do and threatened him that, if he did do it, he would use force. So there is a distinction, I acknowledge, between preemptively making this case based upon recent historical record and waiting until it happens.

But I will just say only one thing to my friend, who has forgotten more—and I mean this sincerely—he has forgotten more about our national defenses, has forgotten more about the conduct of war and the way to pursue it, than I am going to learn; and I acknowledge that. I mean that sincerely. But the one thing I am prepared to bet—prepared to bet my career on it—is if we do not act, I will bet my colleagues anything they wish to, within two years—within I think eight months, by the time the snows fall next winter—there will be genocide, documented, on a large scale, in Kosovo.

My only argument is I think NATO is correct and the President is correct. I believe President Bush was correct in saying that we are going to stop you from doing that.

The mechanism picked by the community, by NATO, was this peace agreement. That is the purpose of it. It was not to extract from Milosevic money, commitment, borders—anything else. It was to say: We are setting these folks in place to guarantee that you keep your promise that you are not going to eliminate these folks.

I understand the difference. I have enormous respect for my friend from Alaska, but that is the basis upon which the Senator from Delaware believes we should act, knowing full well what he says. I do not say it lightly, and never having been in combat myself, as my friend from Alaska has been, I want him to know I do not say lightly risk these young women and men. Because it is a risk. He was there in the room. We were both there with the President. I indicated that I thought the President, based on the intelligence community reports and also based upon the briefings I have received from the military, that it is probable—not possible, probable—that some American flier is going to lose his or her life. So I do not say it lightly, but I think it is balanced off against whether or not we set a chain reaction in place, again, where we watch genocide. Either we have to act at a higher price or don't act and see it spread.

I thank my colleague for his time. I know he has other business he wants to get to.

Mr. STEVENS. No, Mr. President, this is the pending business. If the Senator is finished?

Mr. BIDEN. I am. I yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS. I will go on a little bit and let him know my fears, as I expressed to the President, if we go after those air defenses. I hope Serbia knows if we go after them we will get them. There is no question in my mind we have absolute capability to totally destroy the air defenses of Serbia. After having done so, though, I wonder how are we going to get him to sign the agreement. If he doesn't sign the agreement, then I assume we are going to carry out the threat, and we are going to bomb his tanks. And we can do that, too. And then, if he doesn't sign the

agreement, we can start bombing his people. And we can do that, too. All without involving our airmen yet. We can do all that without involving our airmen.

But the time is going to come when we are going to have to use manpower in the air or on the ground, and that is war. We ought to make up our mind. What the President is deciding is to commit an act of war. It is not covered by article V. I do not think there would be any hesitancy in President Bush, that he was threatening war. If you are threatening war in this country, that means you get a resolution, you get approval of the Congress. Only Congress can declare war.

Mr. BIDEN. If the Senator will yield, I agree with you.

Mr. STEVENS. I hope you do. But what is more, as I see it, once you do that, once you lay down the air defenses of a country, once you cripple their military—remember who is around them, a bunch of people who would like to find them crippled. Pretty soon you are going to have other people coming in there. We will be protecting the Serbs, before this is over.

People just do not understand. We are finally going to have to put people on the ground and when we get people on the ground—how long have they been in Germany since we conquered Germany? We still have men and women in uniform in Germany pursuant to a peace agreement that was entered into 50 or more years ago. That is what I told the President. Mr. President, these people are going to be there 50 years if you do this. If you are going to do it, you better have the support of the American people before you do it. And the way you get the support of the American people is to have their Representatives here in Congress stand up and say yes, I am ready to vote for a declaration of war.

I told the President, if he can show me that there is a concept of inhumanity, of absolutely racial cleansing, ethnic extermination, I will introduce his resolution of war. I told him that. But short of that, I do not see we should authorize a negotiator to go over to a foreign conference and say: Tell them if they don't agree with what you tell them to do, we will bomb them. If they do not agree after that, we will bomb them again. That is using our Armed Forces as a process of negotiation, not for the purpose that we maintain our military. We maintain our military to defend this Nation and to carry out our national interests abroad, not as an arm of negotiators and not to give the Presidency a feeling that all they have to do is enter into a series of negotiations, and if they fail, then use the military and bomb away. There is more to it than just bombing. There is more to it than just using Tomahawks or unmanned weapons. There is the concept of what is the followup. I say if we do that, if we take out their air defenses, we will be involved in trying to manage the

Serbian military for the rest of my lifetime. I think I am going to live a little while, Mr. President. It does seem to me that it is wrong the way we are approaching this.

We ought to look at what is in our national interest. If our national interest requires us to use military power, Congress should authorize them to use it. But the Presidency should not use our military power to carry out negotiations. That is wrong. I still maintain that the way it is being approached this time is wrong.

I yield the floor.

Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to compliment Senator STEVENS for the statement he just made. I think he is exactly right.

I want to follow those comments and read from the paper what the purpose of this proposed bombing strike is. This is the front page of the New York Times quoting Secretary Albright. She says:

Mr. Milosevic has a stark choice. That choice was for him to agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by the ethnic Albanians who make up most of Kosovo's population or face NATO air strikes.

In other words, Mr. Milosevic has to agree to the peace settlement, and he never has agreed to it, but if he doesn't agree to it, he is going to be bombed.

Bombing is an act of war. So our Secretary of State and our President on Friday have said they support this agreement. The Serbs agree to this settlement that NATO has negotiated and that the Kosovars have now signed, or else they are going to be bombed.

I made the comment Sunday, I said that is a crummy way to start a war. I look at that as us starting the war. Are the Serbians right now at war against Kosovo? No, Kosovo is actually part of Serbia. It has been for hundreds of years. Is there a lot of fighting, a lot of tension? Yes. The Kosovo Liberation Army, for a little over a year, has been attacking Serbian forces for the purpose of independence for Kosovo. As a matter of fact, there was a celebration in one of the towns that was attacked in the last 2 days, a celebration recognizing the fact that about a year ago in February was the first martyr for the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army.

The goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army isn't autonomy. The goal of the Kosovo Liberation Army is independence. They have been fighting for independence. They have been attacking Serbian police in the process, and they have been killing some. Then Serbia usually responds with a lot more force. They have a lot more force. They have a bigger army. They have tanks, and they have killed a lot of people. I am not saying any of this is right. I am just saying this shouldn't be a purpose for the United States to go to war, to initiate bombing, because Serbia has not yet signed on to a peace accord that we think is the right thing to do.

I, for one, have serious reservations about it. What is the peace agreement that we have decided they have to accept? It is autonomy for Kosovo, and the second part of it is stationing 28,000 foreign troops in Kosovo.

Again, Kosovo is part of Serbia. We are telling them, you must agree to this or you are going to be bombed. I think that is using NATO's air force as a bargaining tool to try to bomb them into submission to a peace accord that they do not want to sign. Most sovereign nations wouldn't want to sign onto a deal that would put 28,000 foreign troops on its soil.

I think the administration is wrong in this area. Don't get me wrong. I think Milosevic is a tyrant. I think he is guilty of a lot of bad things. That still doesn't mean that I think we should go to war with Serbia. If we start a massive bombing campaign, we are going to war.

I think Senator STEVENS is right. The Constitution says Congress shall declare war. Our forefathers showed great wisdom. They did not want to get involved in a lot of wars. They knew that the elected representatives—the Congress, House Members and Senate Members—would be very reluctant to do so because we would be sending our constituents that we represent into war, so we wouldn't do it lightly. Granted, we also say in the Constitution the President is Commander in Chief, and he has the authority, and we give him that authority, to respond if U.S. lives, U.S. interests are at stake, but that is not the case. And something has to happen before Congress has a chance to convene and pass a declaration of war. We have all kind of assumed that.

Frankly, this President has tried to expand that power and I think even abused that power in saying he has the right to agree to an international force that is going to conduct a war.

NATO has never done that. Senator STEVENS is exactly right. NATO is a defensive alliance, and it has been successful. It was formed to make sure that if Soviet aggression against our European allies would happen, that we would all work together to repel that aggression. The very fact that we had significant forces in training and integrated training, demonstrates it has been a successful alliance. Never has NATO gone in to say we are going to go into another country that is not threatening neighboring countries, not threatening part of the alliance, and conduct military affairs to quell a civil war.

If we conduct bombing, if NATO conducts bombing into Serbia, we are going to be on the side of the KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army. I said before, their goal is not autonomy; their goal is independence.

I will tell my colleagues, there are some of our allies who have very serious problems about that happening. The Greeks primarily have serious reservations about the wisdom of that. I

just wonder how well thought out this has been, or if we conduct the bombing, what happens?

I have heard President Clinton say we want to restore stability in the Balkans. It may be just the opposite result. We may start bombing and the Serbs may really escalate their attacks. I will read a comment from an article in today's New York Times:

The Yugoslav foreign minister told CNN, "We are not looking for confrontation," but his country considers any NATO force dispatched to Kosovo to be an aggression against sovereign territory, Yugoslavia.

Other reports were that if the NATO forces would strike into Serbia, they would use that as an excuse to be more aggressive against the KLA. They might try to strike against the United States, but they hopefully won't have very much success against our airplanes. U.S. planes are going to be too high and too fast, too sophisticated to attack. They will see the United States is now taking sides with the Kosovars and so instead of attacking the United States, where they can't really be successful, they will be attacking the Kosovars. Instead of stopping violence and bringing stability and peace to the region, we might be escalating the war. We might be starting the war.

I mentioned that to President Clinton. I do not want to see us start the war, but if we start bombing we may turn a guerrilla effort, that is going on right now between the KLA and Serbs, into a full-fledged war between the Serbs and Kosovo and see the loss of life greatly escalate, yet still not be successful. Just because we bomb does not mean that Serbia is going to say, OK, fine, you can bring the 28,000 troops in and station them in Kosovo. They may not agree with that. They may escalate their warfare. You may have a greater loss of life.

Then we are going to have another decision. Are we going to go after that 40,000 Serbian military force that is in Kosovo? Are we going to be attacking those tanks? Are we going to be attacking the platoons? Are we going to be going after those people? You can do only so much, as we all know, with airpower. How deeply engaged in this civil war are we going to become? Again, if our purpose was to bring about peace and stability, can that really happen, if we ignite that type of warfare throughout Kosovo and into Serbia?

I am afraid we may be starting something we can't get out of; I am afraid we might be there for years and years and years.

I have heard some of my colleagues say, wait a minute, President Bush was for this. I haven't heard President Bush say that he was for this. In December of 1992, President Bush issued a warning to Mr. Milosevic: Don't you dare go in and start genocide against the Kosovars or there will be a price to be paid.

Frankly, I supported that. It worked. It worked for one reason—because I think Mr. Milosevic respected Presi-

dent Bush, which is more than what I can say at the present time on U.S. leadership, or even NATO leadership. That is regrettable. But also I didn't hear President Bush, in December of 1992, saying he wanted to have a multinational peacekeeping force stationed in Kosovo, occupying Kosovo. He didn't say that.

He just let him know that if he started a very significant genocide in Kosovo, there would be a price to be paid. I do not mind if this President lets Mr. Milosevic know that. If he started slaughtering a large number of people, yes, there would be a military action against him. It does not mean we are going to be occupying Kosovo with 28,000 troops. I think that signal can be sent.

That is not what I am reading in the paper. Today I read in the paper that Mr. Milosevic must agree to the settlement signed in Paris last week by ethnic Albanians that make up most of Kosovo's population or face NATO airstrikes. In other words, we are going to be striking if they do not agree to a peace agreement, and that calls for autonomy for Kosovo and calls for stationing 28,000 troops in their country.

I believe that is unrealistic. I do not think that is the right negotiation. I do not think you can bomb another country into submitting to a peace plan. If they did, we would be putting 28,000 troops, in my opinion, into very hostile territory. They would be vulnerable to sniper fire, and that is not a very good situation either.

I have very, very strong reservations about deploying U.S. ground forces into Kosovo. I have told that to the President. I think that is a serious mistake. I hope we will not do it. That is part of the peace plan.

A lot of people are not aware of it. They seem to think we are trying to bring Milosevic to the peace table. I want him to come to the peace table. I want him to sign a peace agreement. I want him to have peace in Kosovo. But what this administration is saying is, unless he agrees to the plan that has already been agreed to by NATO and the Kosovars, including the deployment of 28,000 troops, we are going to begin bombing him.

Are we going to keep on bombing him until he agrees to the stationing of 28,000 troops in Kosovo? I do not think that is realistic. Then if we station 28,000 troops there, one, they are vulnerable to attack because it is a hostile area and, two, they will have to be there for a long, long time.

This area does have a history of fighting that goes back for many, many centuries. The Ottoman Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, 1389, the war in Kosovo—they have been fighting for centuries. There is real ethnic violence there. There are real problems, and I understand that.

I do not think you can station U.S. peacekeeping forces everywhere in the world where there is violence. There are reports that 80-some-odd people

were killed in the last few days in Borneo; 50-some were killed in Russia by 1 bomb. I heard my colleague from Delaware say in 1 village, 40-some people were assassinated, murdered, or they were killed. I do not know that we have seen the autopsy reports. We do not know whether they were carrying guns or not. They were shot point blank. We heard that. I do not know that to be the case.

There are lots of atrocities when you start fighting, and we know that. I know we had a civil war in this country 130 years ago, and we had hundreds of thousands of Americans who were killed. I am glad we did not have other countries intervening in our Civil War. I just think that would have been a mistake. I know both sides were trying to get the French and the British involved, but I am glad they did not get involved.

I seriously question the wisdom of us getting involved in this war, or if we are going to get involved in this one, why we are not getting involved on behalf of some of the Kurds in Turkey, where the loss of life has been some 37,000 in the last several years. Or what about in Sudan, where there have been over a million people massacred in the last 10 years? What about in Burundi, where 200,000 people have been murdered? I could go on and on.

We have to be very, very cautious when we start deploying U.S. forces around the world. In some cases, we have done it with very noble intentions, but it has not worked. It did not work in the early eighties in Lebanon. It did not work in Somalia. We had to bring our troops back and, unfortunately, we brought back a lot of our troops in body bags.

Again, I urge my colleagues to think seriously about what we are doing. For crying out loud, let's not be threatening bombing because the Serbs have not signed on to a peace accord that we somewhat arrogantly say, "This is what you have to do, and if you don't agree, you're going to be bombed." I do not think you can bomb a country into submission to sign a peace agreement, especially one that also says they have to agree to foreign troops stationed on their soil for an indefinite period of time. That is a mistake.

I compliment my friend from Alaska for his statement. Also, Mr. President, I reiterate that Congress needs to assert its constitutional prerogative, and that is that Congress has the right under article I, section 8, of the Constitution to declare war. Our forefathers did not want to make it easy for us to be involved in foreign entanglements, and they wanted Congress, i.e., the support of the American people, to be involved before we would ever do so. I think they were exactly right.

If President Clinton wants to initiate this effort, he should be asking Congress for a declaration of war. I think we, as leaders in Congress, should cooperate to bring that resolution to the floor and have a debate, a discussion, and have a vote.

Right now we have been talking about an amendment: No funds will be used for this combat or airstrikes or stationing troops until or unless Congress authorizes it. That may be the most expedient way of getting this up for a vote.

I personally would like to see a straight resolution, just like we had in the Persian Gulf war, which we voted on in January of 1991, which authorized the use of force in the Persian Gulf. We had a very significant debate. Most of my colleagues who were here at the time said that probably was the most important vote they ever cast.

I would like for us to have that. That resolution, I say to my colleagues, passed by a vote of 52 to 47, but it was significant, it was intense. We knew what we were talking about. We had significant debate on it. It was a healthy debate, and Congress supported the resolution. Airstrikes, I tell my friends and colleagues, started shortly after that resolution.

I do not think we are ready for that in this case in Kosovo today. The administration needs to make their case. They then should request a resolution of authorization—we should prepare one or they should prepare one—and we would vote on it. I hope we will do that before hostilities are initiated by NATO; i.e., the United States.

Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from Alaska for his indulgence, and I yield the floor.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following amendments be removed from the list at the desk: Senator DURBIN's Medicaid recoupment amendment, Senator KOHL's bankruptcy technical correction amendment, and Senator LOTT's rules amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set aside so that we may consider other amendments that are in order under the previous order.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.

The Senator from Alaska has the floor.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I know Senator FEINGOLD wishes to make a statement, and I wish to accord him that privilege.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to add my thoughts to this critical debate about the potential deployment of United States troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping mission. I commend the Senator from Texas, Senator HUTCHISON, for her commitment to ensuring that the Members of this body have the opportunity to fully debate this important issue.

I also commend the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator SMITH, for his

work on this issue, and I share his contention that the President should seek congressional authorization prior to ordering a deployment to Kosovo.

Mr. President, like all of us, I am gravely concerned about the situation in Kosovo. More than 2,000 people, including women and children, have been killed since the fighting between ethnic Albanians and Serb security forces escalated just over a year ago. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee from their homes and hide in the woods during the cold winter months. Those that are able to return to their villages often find their possessions looted and their homes burned. Recent television news reports have shown Serb police shamelessly waiving to the cameras as they steal televisions and other valuables from the deserted homes of ethnic Albanians before setting the homes on fire.

Even today, as peace talks have adjourned without an agreement, the violence continues in Kosovo. I am pleased that four representatives from the Kosovar Albanian delegation last week signed the so-called Rambouillet agreement. However, I am alarmed that the government in Belgrade continues to offer ultimatums and to deploy troops and tanks in Kosovo. The continued defiance of President Slobodan Milosevic and other Serb leaders is very troubling. Once again, NATO has threatened airstrikes against Belgrade if the Milosevic government does not comply with the will of the international community. Once again, Belgrade has refused.

Last week, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe evacuated its observers from Kosovo in anticipation of possible NATO airstrikes. The violence in Kosovo has continued, with the aggression from both sides of this conflict.

As we debate this important issue, United States Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke is again in Belgrade attempting one last time to convince President Milosevic to cease his operations against the Kosovar Albanians and embark on a path to peace. Although I commend Mr. Holbrooke for his efforts, and hope, of course, that he is successful, I am skeptical.

Mr. President, I firmly believe that it is critical for Congress to take an active role in the debate and decision to send our men and women in uniform into any potentially hostile situation. As our constituents' voices in matters of policy, we in Congress must fully debate this important issue and vote up or down on whether or not to authorize such a deployment.

While I am pleased that the European members of NATO are taking the lead on the proposed deployment to Kosovo to implement the Rambouillet agreement, I have serious concerns about the United States participation in the form of U.S. troops in that mission.

No matter how one feels about the conflict in Kosovo or about the future of that province, under current American policy Kosovo is considered part of

Serbia, comprising, along with Montenegro, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic had made it abundantly clear that NATO troops are not welcome on what he refers to as "Serb territory," and he has begun to amass troops along the border with Macedonia, where approximately 12,000 NATO troops are already currently deployed.

In addition, for the moment, there is no peace to be kept by the peacekeeping force. While the Kosovar Albanian delegation in France has signed the Rambouillet agreement, the Serbs remain adamant that they will not sign the agreement unless the Kosovar Albanians and the Contact Group accept their latest demands. Many observers see this as a stalling tactic on the part of the Serbs, since they are demanding changes to text that already has been agreed upon.

It is into this very uncertain situation and environment that the President has proposed to deploy 4,000 United States troops.

Mr. President, with great regret, I have concluded that I must oppose the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at this time. I am compelled to do so for several reasons.

First, the potential for harm to our men and women in uniform is too great, and there is too much uncertainty surrounding the proposed deployment. The continuing violence in Kosovo, coupled with the mobilization of Serb troops in the area, fosters a volatile environment into which our troops should not be deployed. The fact that the Serbs are not presently willing to sign the Rambouillet agreement or allow NATO troops into Kosovo makes it hard to believe that there will be any peace at all for foreign troops to keep.

Second, since 1995, I have vigorously opposed the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia. One can draw disturbing parallels between the deployment to Bosnia and the proposed deployment to Kosovo. The administration, in my opinion, has again failed to make the case to the American people and to the Congress for the deployment of U.S. ground troops in the Balkans. As with the Bosnia mission, there is no clear set of goals beyond "maintaining" a currently nonexistent peace, there is no timetable for withdrawal, no cost estimate, and no exit strategy.

Mr. President, I have come to the floor of the Senate many times in the last 3 years to talk about the U.S. deployment to Bosnia. I have consistently opposed that deployment and have supported a number of attempts to end it. I cannot help but think that this proposed deployment to Kosovo is another in the long line of ill-fated and seemingly unending peacekeeping missions that this administration has chosen to undertake without the explicit authorization of the Congress.

Last week in the Washington Post, columnist David Broder wrote, "Sending in the military to impose a peace

on a people who have not yet settled ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the standard way of doing business." I agree with Mr. Broder. Peacekeeping should be the exception, not the rule. I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Mr. Broder's column be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am seriously concerned that the administration has cited the Bosnia mission as some kind of positive precedent for a deployment to Kosovo—or anywhere else. In my view, the mission to Bosnia should not be a precedent for anything. The deployment to Bosnia has resulted in, of course, some real benefits for the people of that region, but it has resulted in less favorable consequences for the United States. However, the lack of clear goals and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and the glaring absence of an exit strategy, now more than 3 years later, and more than \$9 billion after the initial deployment, remain troubling.

Let me repeat that. We were promised that the troops would be out of Bosnia in 1 year, that the troops would be home by December of 1996; and after we were promised that, we would spend at the most \$2 billion. Our troops are still there, and it has cost over \$9 or \$10 billion. And now they do not even talk about getting out on any date certain. Any new deployment to the Balkans must not unduly add to the spiraling cost American taxpayers are being asked to bear for our already very, very expensive mission in Bosnia.

I do not want to see the mistakes of Bosnia repeated in Kosovo at the expense of our men and women in uniform. Our armed services have served very admirably in the Balkans. They and their families and fellow citizens have a right to know the details of the proposed deployment before it happens.

Third, I am concerned that the proposed deployment to Kosovo could set a new precedent for international peacekeeping. As we prepare to mark NATO's 50th anniversary, the topic of continued out-of-area NATO deployments for peacekeeping is a valid point of concern. How do we justify United States participation in NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo but not in international deployments in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, or the Congo, where many of the same tragic types of occurrences have been occurring for several years? Violent civil wars have shredded the fabric of civil society around the globe, but it doesn't seem to me, after observing this for over 6 years, that we have a clear principle for deciding where and when to intervene. No such principle emerges from the observation and the justifications for both the Bosnia and Kosovo proposed intervention.

Finally, I am concerned about the deployment of our men and women in uniform to Kosovo because our troops

are already stretched too thin around the globe. Currently, there are more than a quarter-million American troops deployed in foreign areas, from Haiti, to Bosnia, to the Persian Gulf, to the Korean peninsula. When I talk to my constituents, they are startled to hear that there is something like a quarter-million American troops, approximately 250,000 American troops, stationed around the world at this time.

I commend again our men and women in uniform for their service to our country. I cannot, however, support a policy that overcommits our American troops abroad, especially when the situation into which they would be sent in Kosovo is so very uncertain. Again, there will be more debate on this, and I think that is terribly important.

I conclude my remarks by thanking the Senators from Texas and New Hampshire for their work on this issue. I am also pleased that the House of Representatives took an opportunity to debate this extremely important issue and that the Senate has followed suit today.

Again, I regret that I am unable to support the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo at this time.

EXHIBIT No. 1

[From the Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1999]

BEFORE WE SEND IN THE TROOPS . . .

(By David S. Broder)

Last Saturday, two days after the House of Representatives had narrowly defeated a resolution opposing the deployment of U.S. troops as part of a NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, The Post's Douglas Farah reported some disquieting news about a previous peacekeeping mission to Haiti.

The chief of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, had told a closed session of a House subcommittee last month he wanted the troops removed from Haiti because the continuing instability of that poverty-stricken island nation put them at too grave a risk, according to a transcript of the hearing obtained by Farah.

You may be forgiven if you are surprised to learn the Army is still in Haiti. It has been more than four years now since the September day in 1994 when President Clinton sent a force of 20,000 troops onto the island. There was immense relief when last-minute negotiations cleared the way for their arrival; when they left their bases, they expected to have to fight their way ashore. But the brutal generals running the country backed down, and soon were replaced—thanks to U.S. force—by elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

Neither Aristide nor his successor, Rene Preval, has been able to bring peace or democracy to Haiti. Factional fighting has immobilized the government and stymied efforts at economic recovery. And now that the factionalism has provoked assassinations and bombings reminiscent of the bad old days, the 500 U.S. troops still in Haiti spend much of their energy just trying to protect themselves against those they came to help.

It would be difficult for the Clinton administration to accept the general's call for a pullout, for it would concede the failure of a peacekeeping mission regularly touted as one of the signal achievements of recent years.

It would be especially embarrassing at the very moment when the administration is

trying to squelch opposition in Congress—fed by such foreign policy luminaries as Henry Kissinger—to sending 4,000 U.S. troops to Kosovo in a new peacekeeping mission.

Two days before peace talks resumed between the Serb forces occupying Kosovo and the rebel forces who claim to speak for the 90 percent Albanian population of the province, bombs planted by unknown persons killed at least seven people—a reminder of how far from peace Kosovo is.

During House debate, the question repeatedly raised was what assurance the administration could give that once the troops were sent into Kosovo, they would ever be able to get out. The response was that without NATO troops on the ground, the killing would go on, and without U.S. participation, our European NATO allies would not go it alone.

This was the latest manifestation of what might be called the Wilsonian conundrum. It was Woodrow Wilson, in the aftermath of World War I, who most boldly asserted the doctrine that the United States would not only use its might to protect its national interests against any external threats but would aid the struggle for democracy, freedom and self-determination of oppressed people wherever it was being fought.

Wilson's ambitions were almost instantly repudiated by the Senate in the debate over the League of Nations, but his ideas have influenced almost all his successors from FDR through Clinton. Under the slogans of human rights, liberation of captive nations or peacekeeping, they have tried—with only intermittent success—to lift American foreign policy beyond the crass calculations of power politics and into the exalted realm of morality and justice.

What we have learned, I think, is that all those good values cannot be imposed at the point of a gun—even if the gun is held by an American soldier who wants nothing in return but a safe trip back home.

Peace cannot be built unless and until the warring parties have exhausted themselves with bloodshed and are ready to take the responsibility on themselves to turn a new page. No better example can be found this Saint Patrick's Day than Northern Ireland, where decades of sectarian violence blessedly have given way to a shaky peace.

The United States, led personally by Clinton, played an honorable and vital role in bringing about that change. But it did so at the conference table, using diplomats, not troops.

The lesson is not that we should never be peacekeepers; rather, that there has to be a peace to keep. Sending in the military to impose a peace on people who have not settled ancient quarrels has to be the last resort, not the standard way of doing business.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, in view of the posture taken by the other side of the aisle, as I understand it, we will not take up any other amendments until we dispose of this amendment, which I understand. I will pursue the closing arrangement for the Senate so that we might put Senators on notice that there will be no other amendments considered today and that we will close.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period for morning business, with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business yesterday, Monday, March 19, 1999, the federal debt stood at \$5,640,185,158,295.15 (Five trillion, six hundred forty billion, one hundred eighty-five million, one hundred fifty-eight thousand, two hundred ninety-five dollars and fifteen cents).

One year ago, March 19, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,537,630,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred thirty-seven billion, six hundred thirty million).

Fifteen years ago, March 19, 1984, the federal debt stood at \$1,465,615,000,000 (One trillion, four hundred sixty-five billion, six hundred fifteen million).

Twenty-five years ago, March 19, 1974, the federal debt stood at \$471,306,000,000 (Four hundred seventy-one billion, three hundred six million) which reflects a debt increase of more than \$5 trillion—\$5,168,879,158,295.15 (Five trillion, one hundred sixty-eight billion, eight hundred seventy-nine million, one hundred fifty-eight thousand, two hundred ninety-five dollars and fifteen cents) during the past 25 years.

EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS

The following communications were laid before the Senate, together with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred as indicated:

EC-2241. A communication from the Managing Director for Administration, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Production of Nonpublic Records and Testimony of OPIC Employees in Legal Proceedings" (RIN3420-AA02) received on March 8, 1999; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

EC-2242. A communication from the General Counsel, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Motion to Reopen: Suspension of Deportation and Cancellation of Removal" (RIN1125-AA23) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2243. A communication from the Director of the Policy Directives and Instructions Branch, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Exceptions to the Educational Requirements for Naturalization for Certain Applicants" (RIN115-AE02) received on February 22, 1999; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EC-2244. A communication from the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch" (RIN3209-AA04) received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2245. A communication from the Director of the Division of Commissioned Personnel, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Department's report on the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps Retirement System for fiscal year 1997; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2246. A communication from the Executive Director of the Committee for Purchase

From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled, transmitting, pursuant to law, a list of additions to and deletions from the Committee's Procurement List dated March 3, 1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.

EC-2247. A communication from the Chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, transmitting, pursuant to law, the Commission's report on the Secretary of Health and Human Services' report concerning the development and implementation of a Medicare prospective payment system for home health agencies; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2248. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Branch, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Technical Amendment to the Customs Regulations" (T.D. 99-24) received on March 4, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2249. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Branch, U.S. Customs Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Technical Corrections Regarding Customs Organization" (T.D. 99-27) received on March 4, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2250. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Determination of Interest Rate" (Rev. Rul. 99-16) received on March 15, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2251. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Congressional Review of Market Segment Specialization Program Audit Techniques Guides" received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2252. A communication from the Chief of the Regulations Unit, Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Oshkosh Truck Corporation v. United States" (Fed. Cir. 1997) received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Finance.

EC-2253. A communication from the Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Allocation of Assets in Single-Employer Plans; Interest Assumptions for Valuing Benefits" received on March 9, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2254. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Indirect Food Additives: Polymers" (Docket 97F-0412) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2255. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent; Technical Amendment" (RIN0910-AA60) received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2256. A communication from the Director of the Regulations Policy and Management Staff, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Ear, Nose, and Throat Devices; Classification of the Nasal Dilator, the Intranasal Splint, and the Bone Particle Collector" (RIN98N-0249) received on March 16,

1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2257. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research" received on March 16, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2258. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulatory Services, Office of Postsecondary Education, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Graduate Assistance in Areas of National Need" (34 CFR 648) received on March 15, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2259. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Office of Postsecondary Education, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Demonstration Projects to Ensure Students With Disabilities Receive a Quality Higher Education" (CFDA No. 84.333) received on March 15, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

EC-2260. A communication from the Assistant General Counsel for Regulations, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Department of Education, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled "Assistance to States for Education of Children with Disabilities Program" (RIN1820-AC40) received on March 12, 1999; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, without amendment:

S. 361. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to John R. and Margaret J. Lowe of Big Horn County, Wyoming, certain land so as to correct an error in the patent issued to their predecessors in interest (Rept. No. 106-29).

By Mr. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, with amendments:

S. 426. A bill to amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, to provide for a land exchange between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Huna Totem Corporation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 106-30).

S. 430. A bill to amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, to provide for a land exchange between the Secretary of Agriculture and the Kake Tribal Corporation, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 106-31).

By Mr. MURKOWSKI, from the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, without amendment:

S. 449. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to the personal representative of the estate of Fred Steffens of Big Horn County, Wyoming, certain land comprising the Steffens family property (Rept. No. 106-32).

S. 330. A bill to promote the research, identification, assessment, exploration, and development of methane hydrate resources, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 106-33).

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. CAMPBELL (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. KERRY, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. ALLARD, and Mr. SANTORUM):

S. 676. A bill to locate and secure the return of Zachary Baumel, a citizen of the United States, and other Israeli soldiers missing in action; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

By Mr. LUGAR:

S. 677. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide a limited waiver of a requirement for reimbursement of local educational agencies for the costs of foreign students' education in certain cases; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. GRAMM, and Mr. INHOFE):

S. Res. 71. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate rejecting a tax increase on investment income of certain associations; to the Committee on Finance.

STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

By Mr. CAMPBELL (for himself, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. KERRY, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. COVERDELL, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. ASHCROFT, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. ALLARD, and Mr. SANTORUM):

S. 676. A bill to locate and secure the return of Zachary Baumel, a citizen of the United States, and other Israeli soldiers missing in action; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. President, today I continue to voice my support for the Middle East peace process and my work on behalf of soldiers Missing in Action and Prisoners of War. During the last Congress, I introduced the Missing Service Personnel Act, provisions of which were signed into law to restore critical Department of Defense procedures for identifying and recovering POW/MIAs. The Act ensures that our government is and will do everything in its power to return those lost during times of conflict. Last month, I introduced S. 484, the "Bring Them Home Alive Act of 1999" which creates a significant incentive for foreign nationals to return any possibly surviving American POW/MIAs.

Mr. President, today I introduce legislation that continues my support for POW/MIAs and assists our Israeli allies in their efforts to learn the fate of several soldiers who were overtaken by Syrian forces in June 1982. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators TORRICELLI, MCCAIN, KERRY of Massachusetts, SMITH of New Hampshire,

LUGAR, COVERDELL, LIEBERMAN, LAUTENBERG, ASHCROFT, KENNEDY, SCHUMER, ALLARD, and SANTORUM. This bill is a companion to legislation which Congressmen LANTOS, GILMAN, and 65 other members introduced in the House.

Reports indicate that three soldiers of an Israeli tank crew were captured by Syrian forces at the 1982 battle of Sultan Yaqub in northern Lebanon. These men were later paraded through the streets of the Syrian capital of Damascus. They were never seen nor heard from again. Zachary Baumel, an American citizen and sergeant in the Israeli Defense Forces was one of those men. For over sixteen years, the Syrian government and the leadership of the PLO have failed to cooperate in the effort to determine their fate. In 1993, Yasser Arafat produced the most tangible link to the missing men, returning half of Baumel's identification dog tag. For the last five years, however, no additional information has been forthcoming.

The bill I introduce today requires the State Department to raise this issue with the Syrian government and leaders of the Palestinian Authority and provide the Congress with a report on the information that has been uncovered. It also requires that Palestinian and Syrian cooperation in this effort be a factor in the consideration for future U.S. assistance.

This legislation is a targeted approach to address the unique and compelling merits of this case in which an American-born Israeli soldier and his comrades remain unaccounted for in a time of war. As Americans know all too well, the bitter legacy of missing soldiers and POWs can haunt a nation and interfere with efforts to build better relations between former enemies. Clearly, resolving the issue of the MIAs can only strengthen American efforts to make Middle East peace into a reality.

This is the first week of the Jewish month of Nissan—the month of the Jewish holiday of Passover—the ancient festival that celebrates freedom. I can think of no time that is more appropriate to propose this legislation, and to hopefully begin a process that will help to resolve the fate of Zachary Baumel and his comrades after so many years.

I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the RECORD and I urge my colleagues to support passage of this bill.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 676

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Zachary Baumel, a citizen of the United States serving in the Israeli military forces, has been missing in action since June 1982 when he was captured by forces affiliated

with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) following a tank battle with Syrian forces at Sultan Ya'akub in Lebanon.

(2) Yehuda Katz and Zvi Feldman, Israeli citizens serving in the Israeli military forces, have been missing in action since June 1982 when they were also captured by these same forces in a tank battle with Syrian forces at Sultan Ya'akub in Lebanon.

(3) These three soldiers were last known to be in the hands of a Palestinian faction splintered from the PLO and operating in Syrian-controlled territory, thus making this a matter within the responsibility of the Government of Syria.

(4) Diplomatic efforts to secure their release have been unsuccessful, although PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat delivered one-half of Zachary Baumel's dog tag to Israeli government authorities.

(5) In the Gaza-Jericho agreement between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel of May 4, 1994, Palestinian officials agreed to cooperate with Israel in locating and working for the return of Israeli soldiers missing in action.

SEC. 2. ACTIONS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

(a) RESPONSIBILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Secretary of State shall raise the matter of Zachary Baumel, Yehuda Katz, and Zvi Feldman on an urgent basis with appropriate government officials of Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and with other governments in the region and other governments elsewhere which in the Secretary's view may be helpful in locating and securing the return of these soldiers.

(b) COOPERATION AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINATIONS OF ASSISTANCE.—Decisions with regard to United States economic and other forms of assistance to Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, and other governments in the region, and United States policy towards these governments and authorities, should take into consideration the willingness of these governments and authorities to assist in locating and securing the return of these soldiers.

SEC. 3. REPORTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

(a) INITIAL REPORT.—Ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a report in writing to Congress detailing the Secretary's consultations with governments pursuant to section 2(a) and the changes in United States policies made pursuant to section 2(b). The report shall be a public document and may include a classified annex.

(b) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—After the initial report to Congress, the Secretary of State shall submit a report in writing to Congress within 15 days whenever any additional information from any source relating to these individuals arises. The report shall be a public document and may include a classified annex.

(c) CONGRESSIONAL RECIPIENTS OF REPORTS.—The reports to Congress identified in subsections (a) and (b) shall be made to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

By Mr. LUGAR:

S. 677. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide a limited waiver of a requirement for reimbursement of local educational agencies for the costs of foreign students' education in certain cases; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

LIMITED WAIVER OF COST REQUIREMENTS FOR FOREIGN STUDENTS

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill that will per-

mit local school officials the opportunity to waive the cost requirements of foreign students studying in our public high schools in the United States on F-1 visas. The law now mandates that all foreign students who are not in a government-funded exchange program pay or reimburse the local school district the cost of their education.

In those public school districts flooded with foreign students who pay no taxes, this requirement makes good sense. However, in those school districts which enroll a small number of foreign students or experience little or no burden, there may be no desire for tuition reimbursement. The decision to enroll and to require cost reimbursement should be made at the local level. Current law, however, does not permit this local discretion. The bill I am introducing today will allow local school districts the chance to waive the requirement that foreign students pay for the cost of their education. The decision to waive or not waive this requirement should be made at the grassroots level where the problem, if any, exist, not in Washington. My bill seeks to preserve this principle. It would amend the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).

Foreign exchange students bring knowledge, cultural exposure and understanding to American students, schools and communities. I have been a proponent of cultural and educational exchanges and have supported most international exchange programs over the years—both those which bring foreign visitors here and those which send American students, scholars and practitioners abroad. Most recently, my office participated in the Congress-Bundestag program. An intern from Germany worked in my office for several weeks and learned about how a Senate office functions. I remain committed to these exchange programs. They bring enormous benefits to our country as well as to the individuals.

In 1996, I supported the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. This law states that as of November 30, 1996, IIRIRA prohibits any alien from receiving an F-1 student visa to attend a public elementary school, grades K-8, or a publicly-funded adult education program unless they pay the unsubsidized, per capita cost of their education in advance. My bill would not change current law relating to elementary schools or adult education. It would not pertain to students on formal, government-funded international exchanges such as those managed by the State Department, the USIA and many other federal government agencies. It would simply allow high school officials to waive the cost of the education of high school-level foreign students if that was their own choice.

Several municipalities have "Sister City" arrangements between American cities and cities in foreign countries.

One valuable component of these arrangements is an exchange program for high school students enabling American youth to spend a year in a foreign high school while students from abroad spend a year in a high school here. No tuition is generally exchanged under the sister city agreement, but current U.S. law states that visitors to our country must pay the unsubsidized cost of their education, even though American students attending schools abroad are exempted from the cost requirement.

Along the Alaska-Yukon, Alaska-British Columbia and U.S.-Mexican borders there are schools serving very remote communities on both sides of the border. After enactment of the 1996 law, Canadian or Mexican students were no longer eligible to enter the United States to attend local public schools even though governments and the local school districts agreed to enroll the students.

Many school districts choose to enroll one or two exchange students a year. Reciprocal exchange agreements are beneficial and host families enjoy these students in their homes. American exchange students attending schools in Germany, for example, are not subjected to the same tuition requirements for their schooling, yet they gain an understanding of German history and culture and benefit from their travels. Currently, U.S. law requires foreign students to pay their tuition before they arrive in the United States. The extra paper work, the upfront costs and the extra burden these requirements place on foreign students tend to undermine the purpose of cultural exchanges.

I remain mindful to past abuses of F-1 visas and am sympathetic to the burden that large enrollments of foreign students place on American public schools. My purpose in introducing this bill today is not to weaken the law as it currently reads, but to provide an outlet for our schools to have an opportunity for enrolling international exchange students.

Last year, I was successful in getting similar legislation passed in the Senate. Unfortunately, it was dropped in conference. This bill has the support of many Senators, of the Department of Education, Department of State and the USIA as well as most U.S. non-governmental organizations interested in immigration, student exchanges, public education. It is my hope that the Senate will once again pass this bill.

Mr. President, I ask that the bill be included in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

S. 677

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITED WAIVER OF REIMBURSEMENT REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN FOREIGN STUDENTS.

Section 214(l)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1184(l)(1)), as added

by section 625(a)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 3009-699), is amended—

(1) in subparagraph (B), by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subclauses (I) and (II), respectively;

(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;

(3) by striking “(1)(1)” and inserting “(1)(A)”; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(B) The Attorney General shall waive the application of subparagraph (A)(ii) for an alien seeking to pursue a course of study in a public secondary school served by a local educational agency (as defined in section 14101 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 8801) if the agency determines and certifies to the Attorney General that such waiver will promote the educational interest of the agency and will not impose an undue financial burden on the agency.”.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

S. 25

At the request of Ms. LANDRIEU, the name of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. COVERDELL) was added as a cosponsor of S. 25, a bill to provide Coastal Impact Assistance to State and local governments, to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act, and the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (commonly referred to as the Pittman-Robertson Act) to establish a fund to meet the outdoor conservation and recreation needs of the American people, and for other purposes.

S. 185

At the request of Mr. ASHCROFT, the name of the Senator from Kansas (Mr. ROBERTS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 185, a bill to establish a Chief Agricultural Negotiator in the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

S. 227

At the request of Mr. COVERDELL, the name of the Senator from Michigan (Mr. ABRAHAM) was added as a cosponsor of S. 227, a bill to prohibit the expenditure of Federal funds to provide or support programs to provide individuals with hypodermic needles or syringes for the use of illegal drugs.

S. 296

At the request of Mr. FRIST, the name of the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 296, A bill to provide for continuation of the Federal research investment in a fiscally sustainable way, and for other purposes.

S. 333

At the request of Mr. LEAHY, the names of the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. REED) and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SANTORUM) were added as cosponsors of S. 333, a bill to amend the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 to improve the farmland protection program.

S. 376

At the request of Mr. BURNS, the name of the Senator from Missouri

(Mr. ASHCROFT) was added as a cosponsor of S. 376, a bill to amend the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and privatization in satellite communications, and for other purposes.

S. 395

At the request of Mr. ROCKEFELLER, the name of the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SESSIONS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 395, a bill to ensure that the volume of steel imports does not exceed the average monthly volume of such imports during the 36-month period preceding July 1997.

S. 425

At the request of Mr. ASHCROFT, the name of the Senator from Kansas (Mr. ROBERTS) was added as a cosponsor of S. 425, a bill to require the approval of Congress for the imposition of any new unilateral agricultural sanction, or any new unilateral sanction with respect to medicine, medical supplies, or medical equipment, against a foreign country.

S. 434

At the request of Mr. BREAUX, the name of the Senator from Georgia (Mr. CLELAND) was added as a cosponsor of S. 434, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to simplify the method of payment of taxes on distilled spirits.

S. 459

At the request of Mr. BREAUX, the name of the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. KERREY) was added as a cosponsor of S. 459, a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the State ceiling on private activity bonds.

S. 528

At the request of Mr. SPECTER, the name of the Senator from Maryland (Ms. MIKULSKI) was added as a cosponsor of S. 528, a bill to provide for a private right of action in the case of injury from the importation of certain dumped and subsidized merchandise.

S. 531

At the request of Mr. ABRAHAM, the names of the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. SANTORUM), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. BREAUX), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. GRASSLEY), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN), the Senator from Georgia (Mr. COVERDELL), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. CHAFEE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. BINGAMAN), the Senator from Utah (Mr. HATCH), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. SMITH), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. INHOFE), and the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. EDWARDS) were added as cosponsors of S. 531, a bill to authorize the President to award a gold medal on behalf of the Congress to Rosa Parks in recognition of her contributions to the Nation.

S. 575

At the request of Mr. CLELAND, the name of the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) was added as a cosponsor of S. 575, a bill to redesignate the National School Lunch Act as the “Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act.”

S. 655

At the request of Mr. LOTT, the name of the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. BREAUX) was added as a cosponsor of S. 655, a bill to establish nationally uniform requirements regarding the titling and registration of salvage, non-repairable, and rebuilt vehicles.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 19

At the request of Mr. CAMPBELL, the names of the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BIDEN) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) were added as cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 19, a concurrent resolution concerning anti-Semitic statements made by members of the Duma of the Russian Federation.

SENATE RESOLUTION 19

At the request of Mr. SPECTER, the name of the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. JOHNSON) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 19, a resolution to express the sense of the Senate that the Federal investment in biomedical research should be increased by \$2,000,000,000 in fiscal year 2000.

SENATE RESOLUTION 26

At the request of Mr. MURKOWSKI, the names of the Senator from Iowa (Mr. GRASSLEY) and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. FEINGOLD) were added as cosponsors of Senate Resolution 26, a resolution relating to Taiwan's Participation in the World Health Organization.

SENATE RESOLUTION 71—EX-PRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE REJECTING A TAX INCREASE ON INVESTMENT INCOME OF CERTAIN ASSOCIATIONS

Mr. ABRAHAM (for himself, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. SANTORUM, Mr. GRAMM, and Mr. INHOFE) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

S. RES. 71

Whereas the President's fiscal year 2000 Federal budget proposal to impose a tax on the interest, dividends, capital gains, rents, and royalties in excess of \$10,000 of trade associations and professional societies exempt under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 represents an unjust and unnecessary penalty on legitimate association activities;

Whereas at a time when the Government is projecting on-budget surpluses of more than \$800,000,000,000 over the next 10 years, the President proposes to increase the tax burden on trade and professional associations by \$1,440,000,000 over the next 5 years;

Whereas the President's association tax increase proposal will impose a tremendous burden on thousands of small and mid-sized trade associations and professional societies;

Whereas under the President's association tax increase proposal, most associations with annual operating budgets of as low as \$200,000 or more will be taxed on investment income and as many as 70,000 associations nationwide could be affected by this proposal;

Whereas associations rely on this targeted investment income to carry out exempt-status-related activities, such as training individuals to adapt to the changing workplace,

improving industry safety, providing statistical data, and providing community services;

Whereas keeping investment income free from tax encourages associations to maintain modest surplus funds that cushion against economic and fiscal downturns; and

Whereas corporations can increase prices to cover increased costs, while small and medium-sized local, regional, and State-based associations do not have such an option, and thus increased costs imposed by the President's association tax increase would reduce resources available for the important standard-setting, educational training, and professionalism training performed by associations: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that Congress should reject the President's proposed tax increase on investment income of associations as defined under section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

• Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I am joined today by Senator CRAPO in introducing a Sense of the Senate Resolution rejecting a new tax proposed by the Clinton administration. As part of the administration's fiscal year 2000 budget proposal, this tax would be levied on the investment income earned by nonprofit trade associations and professional societies. This proposal, which would tax any income earned through interest, dividends, capital gains, rents and royalties in excess of \$10,000, imposes a tremendous burden on thousands of small- and mid-sized trade associations and professional societies currently exempt under 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.

The administration would like us to believe that this tax is targeted to a few large associations, affecting only those "lobbying organizations" which exist as tax shelters for members and to further the goals of special interests. Mr. President, nothing could be further from the truth.

This new tax would affect an estimated 70,000 registered trade associations and professional societies. The bulk of these associations operate at a state and local level, many of whom perform little, if any, lobbying function. In fact, associations rely on investment income to perform such vital services as education, training, standard setting, industry safety, research and statistical data, and community outreach. Through association-organized volunteer programs, Americans contribute more than 173 million volunteer hours per year, at a value estimated at over \$2 billion annually.

These organizations already contribute millions in taxes for any activities which place them in competition with for-profit businesses. Yet the administration would like to impose a new tax on income earned outside of the competitive business environment, income which is used to fund functions serving the public welfare. Unlike for-profit corporations, investment income does not go to shareholders, individuals, or other companies. Associations do not have the liberty of simply raising prices, as do ordinary corporations, to cover increased costs.

Mr. President, faced with an additional increase in taxes of \$1.44 billion

over the next five years, many associations will be forced to cut back on important services, and some may not survive an economic downturn without the small cushion their investments provide.

Without such services provided by associations, the Government will be forced to step in, increasing expenditures and creating additional Government programs and departments.

During a time when the Government is projecting on-budget tax surpluses of more than \$800 billion over the next 10 years, it is unconscionable that we allow the administration to levy a new tax on these nonprofit organizations.●

AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEES TO MEET

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent on behalf of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Governmental Affairs Committee to meet on Monday, March 22, 1999, at 1:30 p.m. for a hearing on the topic of "Securities Fraud On The Internet."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities be authorized to meet at 2 p.m. on Monday, March 22, 1999, in closed/open session to receive testimony on Department of Defense Policies and programs to combat terrorism.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

STRATEGIC SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the strategic subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet on Monday, March 22, 1999, at 9 a.m. in open session, to receive testimony on National Security Space Programs and Policies, in review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 2000 and the future years defense program.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON YOUTH VIOLENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a joint hearing, before the subcommittees on Youth Violence and Criminal Justice Oversight of the Senate Judiciary Committee, be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Monday, March 22, 1999 at 1 p.m. to hold a hearing in room 226 of the Senate Dirksen Office building on: "Review of DOJ Firearm Prosecutions."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Committee on Aging be permitted to

meet on March 22, 1999 at 1 p.m. in Hart 216 for the purpose of conducting a hearing.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

TUNISIA NATIONAL DAY

• Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the Government and the people of Tunisia on the occasion of their annual National Day celebration, March 20, which this year marks the 43rd anniversary of their independence from France. While the Republic of Tunisia is only 43 years old, the Tunisian nation has a long rich history, dating back to ancient Carthage.

Accompanied by the senior U.S.-N.A.T.O. military commander responsible for the region, I was privileged to visit Tunisia last April. At the request of Admiral Lopez, I met with top government and military officials in the company of U.S. Embassy officials in hopes of integrating U.S. and Tunisian actions and efforts in Europe.

The United States and Tunisia go back a long way. In 1797, our two nations signed a treaty of peace and friendship. Among other things, this treaty called for "perpetual and constant peace." Indeed, for the past 200 years, our two nations have enjoyed such a relationship. During World War II, Tunisia's nationalist leaders suspended their struggle against France in order to support the Allied cause: they knew which side in that war was fighting for the values they held dear. During the tense cold war years, Tunisia was one of America's most reliable allies in the Mediterranean, and Tunisia's friendship proved of tremendous benefit to the Sixth Fleet.

Since the end of the cold war, Tunisia has continued to be a friend and ally of the United States. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali has been very active in supporting the Middle East peace process. He has also sought to open his country's economy to greater US investment, a goal that has gotten a recent boost from our own State Department, which has proposed a new trade partnership with the countries of North Africa, including Tunisia. Our military ties with Tunisia also remain strong. Just last month Defense Secretary William Cohen visited Tunisia and discussed a number of issues of mutual interest, including the Iraqi situation, the Middle East peace process and the Lockerbie bombing.

I think it is safe to say that few of our nation's bilateral relationships have been broadly and consistently positive for so long. I hope my colleagues will join me in congratulating Tunisia on its National Day and in honoring this great friend of the United States.●

JAMES D. WOOD, P.E.

• Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. President, I am proud that one of my constituents, James D. Wood of Abingdon, Maryland, is a finalist for the National Society of Professional Engineers' Federal Engineer of the Year Award.

Mr. Wood is a Program Manager for the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He has made significant and lasting contributions to resolve complex air quality issues and enhance environmental auditing efforts at DOD installations throughout the world over the past two decades. His extraordinary technical skills, dedication to the engineering profession, superlative leadership, and personal commitment to subordinates distinguish him as a premier air quality expert in the Department of the Army.

Mr. Wood was instrumental in directing responses to air quality crises affecting U.S. forces, including assessing and mitigating health risks to U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia. He is one of the foremost authorities on environmental auditing in the Army.

A member of the National Society of Professional Engineers, he has served in key leadership roles and on the Board of Directors of the Maryland Society of Professional Engineers, and in every leadership position of its Susquehanna Chapter during the past 15 years. His selfless efforts to promote engineering awareness of high school students are superb.

Wood holds a B.S. in chemical engineering from the University of Missouri-Rolla, a M.S. in environmental engineering from the Johns Hopkins University, and a M.S. in engineering management from the Florida Institute of Technology. •

YELLOWSTONE COUNTY AGENT JOHN RAMNEY'S 37 YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE

• Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize Mr. John Ramney, a fellow Montana, who has spent 37 years in public service as an Agriculture Extension Agent for Yellowstone County, Montana. Over this period he has helped farmers, downtown business folks and the media with agricultural-related questions, in a professional manner that is a role model for exemplary public service today.

Mr. Ramney's career served Montana's agriculture industry with a unique quiet dedication not usually seen today. He began his career as a county agent in training in Thompson Falls and Great Falls, Montana. He then became a 4-H Agent with the Yellowstone County Extension Office in 1961. After serving as an assistant county agent in training in Billings for six years, he became a full fledged County Agent for Yellowstone County.

His job has involved educating the agricultural producers in Yellowstone

County, Montana to enhance their productivity. He has done this primarily by providing information from research done at Montana State University or other experiment stations. He has also conducted numerous meetings and workshops to strengthen the farmers' knowledge and capabilities as Yellowstone County moved from a rural to a more urban county. In addition, he tirelessly maintained personal contacts with local farmers to ensure their understanding about crops, livestock, farm machinery, and land leases were up to date.

Over his almost 40 years as a County Agent, Mr. Ramney always acted in a positive and helpful manner. He said that even though he has answered many, many questions over the years, he has learned that everyone who calls or stops by teaches him something. For example, he noted that a lot more calls were looking for information that people heard about from other universities and experimental stations in other parts of the country. With the advent of better communications, farmers knew more about what was happening in Oklahoma, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Nebraska. As Mr. Ramney said, "They ask for it and I hunt for information wherever it might be." Ms. Mary Zartman, Personnel Director of the Montana State University Extension Service stated, with the news of Mr. Ramney's retirement, "He'll be a hard act to follow." Please join with me in recognizing an unusual American and a great Montanan. •

TRIBUTE TO SPECIAL AGENT STEVEN J. PIROTTE

• Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, for the past two years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' Office of Legislative Affairs has been under the able leadership of Steven J. Pirotte. Special Agent Pirotte has served as the Executive Assistant to the Director of ATF since the beginning of 1997, and in that capacity, has provided conscientious service to many Members of Congress and their staffs, my own included.

Steve is moving to a new challenge on April 18, when he reports to his new post of duty as the Division Director and Special Agent in Charge of ATF's Boston Field Division, with oversight over ATF's functions in Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, Northern New York and New Hampshire. His honest counsel, assistance, and expertise will be missed by all of us who have worked with him.

Special Agent Pirotte began his career with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in 1975 in Falls Church, Virginia, later serving posts of duty in Washington, D.C., Winchester, Virginia, and Denver, Colorado. From 1986 to 1989, he served as Group Supervisor for the Mid-Atlantic Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force and coordinated all OCDETF investigations in the two field divisions and 26 offices throughout the Mid-Atlantic

states, including Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.

He served three years on ATF's National Response Team, served as supervisor with the Metropolitan Area Task Force for the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and just prior to his current assignment, served as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of ATF's Charlotte, North Carolina Field Division, overseeing bombing, church arson, firearms trafficking and cigarette diversion investigations.

Members of Congress have been well served with Steve at the helm of ATF's Legislative Affairs office, and we wish him well in his new position. •

SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 22, which is S. 364.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.

The bill clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 364) to improve certain loan programs of the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes.

The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Small Business Investment Improvement Act of 1999. I am pleased to report the bill received unanimous support of my colleagues on the Committee on Small Business, when we voted to report the bill on February 5, 1999. This is important legislation for one simple reason: it makes more investment capital available to small businesses that are seeking to grow and hire new employees.

In 1958, Congress created the SBIC program to assist small business owners obtain investment capital. Forty years later, small businesses continue to experience difficulty in obtaining investment capital from banks and traditional investment sources. Although investment capital is readily available to large businesses from traditional Wall Street investment firms, small businesses seeking investments in the range of \$100,000-\$2.5 million have to look elsewhere. SBIC's are frequently the only sources of investment capital for growing small businesses.

Often we are reminded that the SBIC program has helped some of our Nation's best known companies. It has provided a financial boost at critical points in the early growth period for many companies that are familiar to all of us. For example, Federal Express received a needed infusion of capital from two SBA-licensed SBIC's at a critical juncture in its development stage. The SBIC program also helped other well-known companies, when they were not so well-known, such as Intel, Outback Steakhouse, America Online, and Callaway Golf.

What is not well known is the extraordinary help the SBIC program

provides to Main Street America Small businesses. These are companies we know from home towns all over the United States. Main Street companies provide both stability and growth in our local business communities. A good example of a Main Street company is Steelweld Equipment Company, founded in 1932, which designs and manufactures utility truck bodies in St. Clair, MO. The truck bodies are mounted on chassis made by Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors. Steelweld provides truck bodies for Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Texas Utilities, Paragon Cable, GTE, and GE Capital Fleet.

Steelweld is a privately held, woman-owned corporation. The owner, Elaine Hunter, went to work for Steelweld in 1966 as a billing clerk right out of high school. She rose through the ranks of the company and was selected to serve on the board of directors. In December 1995, following the death of Steelweld's founder and owner, Ms. Hunter received financing from a Missouri-based SBIC, Capital for Business (CFB) Venture Fund II, to help her complete the acquisition of Steelweld. CFB provided \$500,000 in subordinated debt. Senior bank debt and seller debt were also used in the acquisition.

Since Mr. Hunter acquired Steelweld, its manufacturing process was redesigned to make the company run more efficiently. By 1997, Steelweld's profitability had doubled, with annual sales of \$10 million and 115 employees. SBIC program success stories like Ms. Hunter's experience at Steelweld occur regularly throughout the United States.

In 1991, the SBIC program was experiencing major losses, and the future of the program was in doubt. Consequently, in 1992 and 1996, the Committee on Small Business worked closely with the Small Business Administration to correct deficiencies in the law in order to ensure the future of the program. Today, the SBIC Program is expanding rapidly in an effort to meet the growing demands of small business owners for debt and equity investment capital.

Last year, the Senate unanimously approved a bill similar to the bill that is now before the Senate. Today's bill includes two technical changes in the SBIC program. The first change removes a requirement that at least 50 percent of the annual program level of the approved participating securities under the SBIC Program be reserved for funding with SBIC's having private capital of not more than \$20 million. The requirement became obsolete following SBA's imposition of its leverage commitment process and congressional approval for SBA to issue 5-year commitments for SBIC leverage.

The second technical change requires SBA to issue SBIC guarantees and trust certificates at periodic intervals of not less than 12 months. The current requirement is 6 months. This change will give maximum flexibility for SBA and the SBIC industry to negotiate the placement of certificates that fund le-

verage and obtain the lowest possible interest rate.

The Small Business Investment Improvement Act of 1999 clarifies the rules for the determination of an eligible small business or small enterprise that is not required to pay Federal income tax at the corporate level, but that is required to pass income through to its shareholders or partners by using a specified formula to compute its after-tax income. This provision is intended to permit "pass through" enterprises to be treated the same as enterprises that pay Federal taxes for purposes of SBA size standard determinations.

The bill would also make a relatively small change in the operation of the program. This change, however, would help smaller, small businesses to be more attractive to investors. SBIC's would be permitted to accept royalty payments contingent on future performance from companies in which they invest as a form of equity return for their investment.

SBA already permits SBICs to receive warrants from small businesses, which give the investing SBIC the right to acquire a portion of the equity of the small business. By pledging royalties or warrants, the small business is able to reduce the interest that would otherwise be payable by the small business to the SBIC. Importantly, the royalty feature provides the smaller, small business with an incentive to attract SBIC investments when the return may otherwise be insufficient to attract venture capital.

Lastly, the bill increases the program authorization levels to fund participating securities. In fiscal year 1999, the authorization level would increase from \$800 million to \$1.2 billion; in fiscal year 2000, it would increase from \$900 million to \$1.5 billion. The two increases have become necessary as the demand in the SBIC program was growing at a rapid rate. Higher authorization levels are necessary if the SBIC Program is going to meet the demand for investment capital from the small business community.

Mr. President, this is a sound bill, which has the unanimous support of all 18 members of the Committee on Small Business. On February 2, 1999, a similar version of this legislation passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 402-2. I strongly urge my colleagues in the Senate to vote in favor of the Small Business Investment Improvement Act of 1999.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read for the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (S. 364) was read the third time.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Small Business Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 68, and that the Senate proceed to its consideration. I further ask unanimous

consent that all after the enacting clause be stricken and the text of S. 364 be inserted in lieu thereof; that the bill then be read for the third time and passed; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to this legislation appear at appropriate place in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (H.R. 68), as amended, was read the third time and passed, as follows:

Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 68) entitled "An Act to amend section 20 of the Small Business Act and make technical corrections in title III of the Small Business Investment Act.", do pass with the following amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Small Business Investment Improvement Act of 1999".

SEC. 2. SBIC PROGRAM.

(a) *IN GENERAL.*—Section 308(i)(2) of the Small Business Investment following: "In this paragraph, the term 'interest' includes only the maximum mandatory sum, expressed in dollars or as a percentage rate, that is payable with respect to the business loan amount received by the small business concern, and does not include the value, if any, of contingent obligations, including warrants, royalty, or conversion rights, granting the small business investment company an ownership interest in the equity or increased future revenue of the small business concern receiving the business loan."

(b) *FUNDING LEVELS.*—Section 20 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 note) is amended—

(1) in subsection (d)(1)(C)(i), by striking "\$800,000,000" and inserting "\$1,200,000,000"; and

(2) in subsection (e)(1)(C)(i), by striking "\$900,000,000" and inserting "\$1,500,000,000".

(c) *DEFINITIONS.*—

(1) *SMALL BUSINESS CONCERN.*—Section 103(5) of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 662(5)) is amended—

(A) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), and indenting appropriately;

(B) in clause (iii), as redesignated, by adding "and" at the end;

(C) by striking "purposes of this Act, an investment" and inserting the following: "purposes of this Act—

"(A) an investment"; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

"(B) in determining whether a business concern satisfies net income standards established pursuant to section 3(a)(2) of the Small Business Act, if the business concern is not required by law to pay Federal income taxes at the enterprise level, but is required to pass income through to the shareholders, partners, beneficiaries, or other equitable owners of the business concern, the net income of the business concern shall be determined by allowing a deduction in an amount equal to the sum of—

"(i) if the business concern is not required by law to pay State (and local, if any) income taxes at the enterprise level, the net income (determined without regard to this subparagraph), multiplied by the marginal State income tax rate (or by the combined State and local income tax rates, as applicable) that would have applied if the business concern were a corporation; and

"(ii) the net income (so determined) less any deduction for State (and local) income taxes calculated under clause (i), multiplied by the marginal Federal income tax rate that would have applied if the business concern were a corporation;"

(2) *SMALLER ENTERPRISE.*—Section 103(12)(A)(ii) of the *Small Business Investment Act of 1958* (15 U.S.C. 662(12)(A)(ii)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the following: “except that, for purposes of this clause, if the business concern is not required by law to pay Federal income taxes at the enterprise level, but is required to pass income through to the shareholders, partners, beneficiaries, or other equitable owners of the business concern, the net income of the business concern shall be determined by allowing a deduction in an amount equal to the sum of—

“(I) if the business concern is not required by law to pay State (and local, if any) income taxes at the enterprise level, the net income (determined without regard to this clause), multiplied by the marginal State income tax rate (or by the combined State and local income tax rates, as applicable) that would have applied if the business concern were a corporation; and

“(II) the net income (so determined) less any deduction for State (and local) income taxes calculated under subclause (I), multiplied by the marginal Federal income tax rate that would have applied if the business concern were a corporation”.

(d) *TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.*—

(1) *REPEAL.*—Section 303(g) of the *Small Business Investment Act of 1958* (15 U.S.C. 683(g)) is amended by striking paragraph (13).

(2) *ISSUANCE OF GUARANTEES AND TRUST CERTIFICATES.*—Section 320 of the *Small Business Investment Act of 1958* (15 U.S.C. 687m) is amended by striking “6” and inserting “12”.

(3) *ELIMINATION OF TABLE OF CONTENTS.*—Section 101 of the *Small Business Investment Act of 1958* (15 U.S.C. 661 note) is amended to read as follows:

“**SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.**

“This Act may be cited as the ‘Small Business Investment Act of 1958’.”.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I finally ask consent that S. 364 be placed back on the Calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1999

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m., Tuesday, March 23. I further ask consent that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved and the Senate resume consideration of S. 544, the supplemental appropriations bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. I further ask unanimous consent that the time between 10 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. be equally divided between the leaders, or their designees, for debate on the Lott second-degree amendment relating to Kosovo.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STEVENS. I further ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in

recess from 12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday to allow for the weekly caucuses to meet.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. STEVENS. For the information of all Senators, the Senate will reconvene tomorrow at 10 a.m. and resume consideration of the Lott amendment to the supplemental appropriations bill. Under the previous order, the time until 12:30 will be equally divided for debate on the amendment.

The Senate will then recess until 2:15 p.m. for the policy lunches and upon reconvening will proceed to vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the Lott amendment. Following that vote, it is hoped that the Senate will begin consideration of the fiscal year 2000 budget resolution. Therefore, Members should expect rollcall votes throughout Tuesday's session, with the first vote to occur on cloture at 2:15.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

There being no objection, the Senate, at 5:12 p.m., adjourned until Tuesday, March 23, 1999, at 10 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate March 22, 1999:

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

JOSEPH E. BRENNAN, OF MAINE, TO BE A FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSIONER FOR THE TERM EXPIRING JUNE 30, 2003, VICE WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, RESIGNED.

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTIONS 624 AND 628:

To be colonel

ROBERT J. VAUGHN, 0000

To be lieutenant colonel

CHARLES E. BUCHANAN, 0000	HAROLD M. McDONALD III, 0000
JAMES F. BUGLEWICZ, 0000	KEVIN C. SMITH, 0000
DUANE L. JONES, 0000	KENNETH V. VOLMERT, 0000

To be major

DAVID H.T. KIM, 0000	JACK F. ROCCO, 0000
MARK E. NUNES, 0000	TODD B. SILVERMAN, 0000
DAVID J. REES, 0000	

IN THE AIR FORCE

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 531:

To be colonel

GERALD F. BUNTING	JAMES R. EBERT, 0000
BLAKE, 0000	JAMES E. HANSEN, 0000
CHARLES W. CAMPBELL, JR., 0000	ROBERT B. HULL, 0000
STEPHAN B. CHRISMAN, 0000	CHRISTIAN L. MAEDER, 0000
DAVID S. DOUGHERTY, 0000	JOHN A. REYBURN, JR., 0000
	FREDERICK W. RUDGE, 0000

ROBERT L. TRAMALONI, 0000
STANLEY F. UCHMAN, 0000

MICHAEL J. WHITE, 0000
DAVID C. WILLIAMS, 0000
BUJUNG ZEN, 0000

To be lieutenant colonel

ROBERT C. ALLEN, 0000
ANTHONY H. ARNOLD, 0000
BERNADETTE C. ARROYO-KEMP, 0000
JEFFERY F. BAKER, 0000
DAUGLAS E. BEAKES, 0000
JAMES H. BERRO, 0000
MARCUS P. BEYERLE, 0000
JEFFERY M. BISHOP, 0000
JAMES C. BLOOM, 0000
DEBORAH J. BOSTOCK, 0000
ROBERT M. BUCHSBAUM II, 0000
STEPHEN M. BURNS, 0000
WALTER R. CAYCE, 0000
CEDRIC C. CHENET, 0000
JAY A. CLEMENS, 0000
LOUIS A. DAGOSTINO, 0000
DOMINIC A. DEFRANCIS, 0000
ROBERT M. DIXON, 0000
RUSSELL W. EGGERT, 0000
BRIAN J. FINLEY, 0000
CRAIG A. FLICKINGER, 0000
RUSSELL G. GELORMINI, 0000
DAVID C. HALL, 0000
KAREN L. HARTER, 0000
PETER J. HEATH, 0000
GEORGE M. HILGENDORF, JR., 0000
NEIL C. HUFFMAN, 0000
JOSE E. IBANEZ PABON, 0000
JAMES L. JOHNSON, 0000
HARVEY E. KELLEY, 0000
JAMES E. KING, JR., 0000
MICHAEL A. KOCH, 0000
JOHN KUSSMAUL, JR., 0000
JANICE L. LEE, 0000
RUSSELL M. LINMAN, 0000
DAVID J. LOUIS, 0000
MARK F. LUPPINO, 0000
CHARLES W. MACKETT, 0000
THOMAS L. MCKNIGHT, 0000
EVELYN MENDEZ, 0000

THEODORE A. MICKLE, JR., 0000
PAUL F. MONTANY, 0000
ANDREW R. MONTEIRO, JR., 0000
PAUL S. MUELLER, 0000
EMMET P. MURPHY, 0000
ANTONIO NELSON, 0000
DANNY W. NICHOLLS, 0000
KEVIN M. NOALL, 0000
KEITH J. ODBGARD, 0000
MARTIN G. OTTOLINI, 0000
MICHAEL S. PANOSIAN, 0000
DAVID L. PAUL, 0000
LEE E. PAYNE, 0000
ROBERT PERKINS, 0000
JAMES PETTEY, 0000
RONALD PEVETO, 0000
DANGTUAN PHAM, 0000
ROBERT H. POINDEXTER, 0000
KENNETH G. REINERT, 0000
DOUGLAS J. ROBB, 0000
JAMES L. RUSHFORD, 0000
BRADLEY S. RUST, 0000
VICENTE E. SANCHEZ CASTRO, 0000
MICHAEL G. SCHAFFFRINNA, 0000
CARL G. SIMPSON, 0000
JILL L. STERLING, 0000
JAMES R. STEWART, 0000
LARRY TABATCHNICK, 0000
JOHN J. TAPPEL, 0000
JULIA H. TOWNSEND, 0000
ANTHONY J. VANGOOR, 0000
SCOTT W. VANVALKENBURG, 0000
JAMES M. WATSON, 0000
JOSEPH M. WEMPE, 0000
NORMA I. WESTERBAND, 0000
STEVEN L. WIRE, 0000
MYGLEETUS W. WRIGHT, 0000

To be major

EDDY L. BUFFKIN, 0000
JON D. HAYWOOD, 0000
JOHN J. HIGGINS, 0000
JAMES F. KELLEY, 0000
ROBIN M. KING, 0000
JEFFERY A. RENSHAW, 0000

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY TO THE GRADE INDICATED WHILE ASSIGNED TO A POSITION OF IMPORTANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 601:

To be general

LT. GEN. JOHN G. COBURN, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be brigadier general, medical corps

COL. JOSEPH G. WEBB, JR., 0000

IN THE MARINE CORPS

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 5046:

To be brigadier general

COL. JOSEPH COMPOSTO, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be brigadier general

WILLIAM D. CATTO, 0000	Richard A. Huck, 0000
TONY L. CORWIN, 0000	Richard S. Kramlich, 0000
Robert C. Dickerson, Jr., 0000	Timothy R. Larsen, 0000
Jon A. Gallinetti, 0000	Bradley M. Lott, 0000
Timothy F. Ghormley, 0000	Jerry C. McAbee, 0000
Samuel T. Helland, 0000	Thomas L. Moore, Jr., 0000
Leif H. Hendrickson, 0000	Richard F. Natonski, 0000
	JOHNNY R. THOMAS, 0000

IN THE NAVY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICER FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY TO THE GRADE INDICATED UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 624:

To be rear admiral (lower half)

CAPT. CRAIG R. QUIGLEY, 0000

THE FOLLOWING NAMED OFFICERS FOR TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE INDICATED IN THE U. S. NAVY UNDER TITLE 10, U.S.C., SECTION 5721:

CLIFFORD A. ANDERSON, 0000
WALTER L. BANKS, 0000
VICTOR A. BARRIOS, 0000
JOSEPH E. BELL, 0000
JERRY R. BOSTER, 0000
MICHAEL O. BRUNNER, 0000
CARL A. BURKINS, 0000
THOMAS W. CARROLL, 0000
JEFFREY L. CIMA, 0000
TIMOTHY M. CIOCCO, 0000
JOSE L. CISNEROS, 0000
JOHN C. COLUCCI, 0000
JOHN A. DONNELL, 0000
DAVID K. FLICK, 0000
JAMES R. GARNER, 0000
CHARLES R. GILLUM, JR, 0000
DOUGLAS K. GLESSNER, 0000

RICHARD A. GOODWIN, 0000
RAYMOND D. GOYET, JR, 0000
WILLIAM B. HALE, 0000
STEVEN M. HARRISON, 0000
GEOFFREY M. HENDRICK, 0000
DIEGO HERNANDEZ, 0000
TUNG HO, 0000
LAWRENCE J. HOLLOWAY, 0000
HUGH J. HUCK, III, 0000
MICHAEL A. HURNI, 0000
JOKER L. JENKINS, 0000
CARTHER F. JORGENSEN, 0000
JARED A. KEYS, 0000
KEITH A. KNUITSEN, 0000
ROBERT A. KOONCE, 0000
ROBERT H. LEDOUX, III, 0000
BRYAN J. LETHCOE, 0000
MICHAEL A. McCARTNEY, 0000
JOHN J. McCracken, 0000
JAMES L. MINTA, 0000
JAMES D. MINYARD, 0000

DANA A. NELSON, 0000
EUGENE J. NEMETH, 0000
MARK J. OBERLEY, 0000
MARK H. OESTERREICH, 0000
DEAN T. RAWLS, 0000
ROBERT T. REZENDES, 0000
DAVID G. SCHAPPERT, 0000
SCOTT B. SEAL, 0000
BRENT E. SMITH, 0000
GERHARD A. SOMLAI, 0000
DAVID W. SPANKA, 0000
JOHN W. SPRAGUE, 0000
ANDREW B. ST JOHN, 0000
EDWARD J. STOCKTON, 0000
ROBERT J. STOWE, 0000
KAI O. TORKELOSON, 0000
VINH X. TRAN, 0000
DANIEL T. TREM, 0000
DAVID M. TRZECIAKIEWICZ, 0000
JOSEPH M. TURK, 0000
THOMAS L. WILLIAMS, 0000
ERIC P. WOELPER, 0000
SAMUEL T. T.
WORTHINGTON, 0000
STEPHEN G. YOUNG, 0000