

ALL YOUR IOT ARE BELONG TO ME

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Director of Product Management, Pwnie Express



Prepared for Adobe DEFENDCON, 21 September 2017

"Ok, so I mixed my memes.  
Give me a break"

– Old English Proverb

# OVERVIEW

- Housekeeping
- About Me
- A Typical IoT Ecosystem
- A Brief Recap on Ways to Deal with Risk
- Defensive Techniques in IoT
- All Your IoT Belongs to Me: A Demonstration
- Strategy, Operations and Tactics to Deal with the IoT Island
- Questions

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# ABOUT ME

- Then: USAF Cyber Defense Operations Officer
- Iraq, Afghanistan,Djibouti deployments
- Advanced Network Operations + NSA
- AF cyber defense capabilities development
- Now: Director of Product Management, Pwnie Express
- Focused on closing the IoT Security Gap
- Discovery, classification, correlation & prevention of business disruption caused by proliferation of IoT systems



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# ABOUT ME



- Sometimes:
  - Amateur beer brewer
  - Animal rescue
- Always:
  - Focused on getting (and keeping) girls/women involved in STEM
- Mentorship: Black Girls Code
- National Society of Black Engineers Professional Development

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# WHY ARE WE HERE TODAY?

**Global Hack Pressures Officials, Victims**

Security experts say the cyberattack is the largest ever seen. Investigators are hunting for the perpetrator, as far-reaching as the world.

By Nick Kolcheff and Stu Suttorus | OCT 16



**21 Hacked Cameras, D Massive Internet Outages in the Aftermath of the Attack**

OCT 16 Dyn Customer Analysis: Before and After Mirai DDoS Attack

Security experts say the cyberattack is the largest ever seen. Investigators are hunting for the perpetrator, as far-reaching as the world.

The data analyzed a representative sample of 783,000 domains hosted on Dyn before and immediately after the 2016 attacks, and revealed that more than 14,000 internet domains dropped Dyn as their DNS service provider in the wake of the incident (roughly 8%).

The findings are interesting because it's rare that the financial fallout from a DDoS attack is laid out so clearly in the public eye. But when you consider the impact of the attack on Dyn's top destinations, the attack began creating problems for Internet users reaching an array of sites, including Twitter, Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, Spotify and Netflix.

**Everyone was running around saying we've been hacked...it spread like wildfire,"**

By Nick Kolcheff and Stu Suttorus | OCT 16

Investigators are hunting for the perpetrator, as far-reaching as the world.

Mohamed Amri, Parts Maker, Renault

On Sunday, AIO

**U.S. WORK**


try in the West

tested it would be able

The RISK Team provided me with a report detailing known indicators found in the firewall and DNS logs that I had sent over earlier. Of the thousands of domains requested, only 15 distinct IP addresses were returned. Four of these IP addresses and close to 100 of the domains appeared in recent indicator lists for an emergent IoT botnet. This botnet spread from device to device by brute-forcing default and weak passwords. Once the password was known, the malware had full control of the device. While we waited for the full packet capture solution to be set up, I instructed the Network Operations Team to prepare to shut down all network access for our IoT segments once we had intercepted the malware password. Short lived as it was, the impact from severing all of our IoT devices from the internet during that brief period was noticeable across the campus – and we were determined never to have a repeat incident.

**“Short of replacing every soda machine and lamp post, I was at a loss for how to remediate the situation”**


**Incident Commander**  
Unnamed Canadian University



A depiction of the outages caused by today's attacks on Dyn, an Internet infrastructure company. Source: Downtendetector.com.


**The direct costs of computer downtime from the cyberattacks totals around \$8 billion**

# TYPICAL IOT ECOSYSTEM

- Device 
- Gateway 
- Connectivity 
- Secure Configuration 
- Secure Upgrade Pathing + Patching 
- Concept of 'System' 

# WHAT MAKES IOT SO SPECIAL?

1. Multiple communications paths on a single chip
2. Direct and demonstrable impact on physical world
  1. Health, safety & life support systems
  2. Drives critical systems which run key business & P/L initiatives
3. Machine longevity & security mismatch
4. Value placed on rush to market instead of security



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# QUICK RECAP: RISK CONTROL STRATEGIES

1. Ignore it
2. Defer it
3. Isolate it
4. Accept it (usually with conditions)


*"I don't have a problem with IoT. If people need a webcam or something, I'll just put it on a separate network segment. They can deal with the consequences."*

– Actual CISO of a New York University Healthcare System

# COMMON DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES

- Don't allow it on the network
- Isolate it to a different network (airgap)
- VLAN + Network Segmentation
- Willful ignorance/didn't know it was there

# CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS




# DEMONSTRATION

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# CONSTRUCTING THE ATTACK

1. Steal the network (and keep it)
2. Port/service scan
3. Plant malware
4. Embed a backdoor
5. Hack the planet



# TOOLS REQUIRED

1. Hak5 Pineapple running evil AP
2. Ubuntu Linux VM
  - Fing network scanner (port/service fingerprinting)
  - Python & Ruby scripts (malware development)
  - Netcat (backdoor placement)
3. CWIPS to keep everything under my control



*Total cost for this attack: \$ 150 USD*


# WHAT YOU WON'T SEE

Cracking of WPA passwords

- If you want info on that, check out aircrack-ng, coWPAtty and similar tools

The epic battle raging for control of the devices

- Devices are dumb & Wi-Fi is ubiquitous



*This demonstration was prepared with the expressed and written permission of the DefendCon Conference team and the hosting organization, Adobe. The demonstration was tested and vetted on specific devices, networks and software. As a precaution, now would be a good time to turn off your Wi-Fi. If you leave it on and your devices stop working, I'm going to make this face: 😱 followed immediately by this face \\_(ツ)\_/*

## **DISCLAIMER**

*"But isn't this just consumer IoT?"*

# REAL WORLD EXAMPLE

Security

## Connected kettles boil over, spill Wi-Fi passwords over London

Pen-tester's killer cuppas: made in cracked iKettle

By Darren Paul | 19 Oct 2015 at 05:57

124 □ SHARE ▾



Now, I know what you're thinking: who cares if the smart kettle ends up on the hospital network as long as it's not on a super-special network segment like, say, the cardiology ward? Well, I don't want to burst your bubble:

A security man has me

across London, provin'

## How Your Doctor's Coffee Jones is Going to Get Your Personal Data Stolen\*

Read more...

## Services

23 Cardiology

tcp

iKettle

telnet

user:



2000 Cardiology  
tcp iKettle  
\xf\b\x01\xff\xfb\x03\xff\xfd\x18\ntelnet user:

Prepared for Anne Trennert, L | September 2017

# NEXT STEPS

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# MITIGATING IOT RISK



WHOLE DEVICE  
PICTURE

- ①

CONTINUOUS  
POSTURE ASSESSMENT

- ②
- ③

DEVICE RELATIONSHIP  
& SYSTEM CONTEXT

FACILITATE  
TRUST-DRIVEN ACCESS

- ④

# GETTING IOT OFF THE ISLAND



## STRATEGIC

- Starts with acceptance of IoT as yours to know and manage
  - Ask about upgrade pathing, resiliency && warranty
  - Level of security should match the life expectancy of the system (not just the device)
  - Policy must be enforceable && tied to organizational needs
- 
- ## OPERATIONAL
- Network segmentation isn't bad – blind isolation is bad
  - IoT: short bursts of communication between long periods of sleep. Your whole stack needs to work together to catch anomalies
  - Make sure threat models, TTXs and DFIR drills include IoT scenarios
  - Reflect the system & it's long-term importance to the organization
- 
- ## TACTICAL
- Low-hanging fruit: Telnet (TCP 23), FTP (TCP 21), Web Servers (not just on 80)  
    - **Don't forget UDP!**
  - IoT likes 4 protocols:
    - IP
    - Wi-Fi
    - Bluetooth LE
    - Cellular

# RESOURCES & ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/hacked-cameras-dvrs-powered-todays-massive-internet-outage/>
  - Lisa Lee
  - Tracie Martin
- <https://www.corero.com/blog/797-financial-impact-of-mirai-ddos-attack-on-dyn-revealed-in-new-data.html>
  - Adobe
- [http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp\\_data-breach-digest-2017-perspective-is-reality\\_xg\\_en.pdf](http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-digest-2017-perspective-is-reality_xg_en.pdf)
  - My chiropractor
- <https://medium.com/@ysmithnd/how-your-doctors-coffee-jones-is-going-to-get-your-personal-data-stolen-6cc944d5d92e>
  - Zero\_Chaos (Rick Farina)

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# QUESTIONS?

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# PROOF POINT 1

yolondasmith — fing.bin < fing 10.1.1/24 — 80x24			
State	Host	MAC Address	Last change
UP	10.1.1.1	50:C7:BF:39:17:84	
UP	10.1.1.100	A0:20:A6:2C:62:3C	
UP	10.1.1.101	50:C7:BF:74:D0:95	
UP	10.1.1.102	C0:21:0D:D6:90:68	
UP	10.1.1.103	38:A2:8C:BF:CD:9B	
UP	10.1.1.104	AC:BC:32:C3:9C:63	
UP	10.1.1.105	50:F4:3C:00:51:2F	

00:36:02 > Host is up: 10.1.1.105  
HW Address: 50:F4:3C:00:51:2F

00:36:02 > Discovery progress 25%  
00:36:03 > Discovery progress 50%  
00:36:04 > Discovery progress 75%

00:36:06 > Discovery round completed in 4.787 seconds.  
00:36:06 > Network 10.1.1.0/24 has 7/7 hosts up.

00:36:06 > Next round starting at 00:37:01. Press Ctrl^C to exit.

# PROOF POINT 2

The screenshot shows the WiFi Pineapple management interface. At the top, there's a header with a logo, the text "WiFi Pineapple", an IP address "172.16.42.1:1471/#/modules/Networking", and a search bar. Below the header is a navigation menu with links: "Networking" (selected), "Configuration", "Advanced", and "Help". The main content area has a table with two columns: "Channel" and "AP". In the "Channel" column, there's a row for "Pineapple\_99" with options "Open AP SSID" (unchecked), "Hide", "Open AP" (unchecked), and a "Management AP" section. This "Management AP" section is highlighted with a red box and contains the following items:

- Management IoT\_Network AP SSID
- Management ..... AP Key
- Disable  Management AP

To the right of the table is a button labeled "Update Access Point".

# PROOF POINT 3

```
yolondasmith — $
```

```
{  
    "corp_aps": [  
        "00:C0:CA:90:99:29",  
        "02:C0:CA:90:99:29"  
    ],  
    "corp_clients": [  
        "A0:20:A6:2C:62:3C",  
        "38:A2:8C:BF:CD:9B",  
        "50:C7:BF:74:D0:95",  
        "C0:21:0D:D6:90:68",  
        "50:F4:3C:00:51:2F"  
    ],  
    "suppressed_aps": [  
        "50:C7:BF:39:17:84"  
    ],  
    "suppressed_clients": [  
    ],  
    "special_flowers": [  
    ],  
    "very_special_flowers": [  
    ],  
    "interface": "wlan0mon",  
    "log_level": "info",  
    "channel_hop_velocity": 5,  
    "master_enable_switch": true,  
    "prevent_excluded": false,  
    "prevent_suppressed": true,  
    "protect_corp_clients": true,  
    "prevent_corp_clients_on_guest": false,  
    "protect_guest_clients": false,  
    "prevent_ssid_theft": false,  
    "signal_spitter": true,  
    "deauth_debug": false  
}
```

# PROOF POINT 4

root@yolonda-VirtualBox:~/home/yolonda/Downloads

```
root@yolonda:~# ls -l /tmp/Downloads/00000000000000000000000000000000
total 0
root@yolonda:~# rm -rf /tmp/Downloads/00000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
root@pineapple:~# iw dev wlan0-1 station dump
```

Station	MAC address	HW type	Flags	HW address
ac:bc:32:c3:9c:63 (on wlan0-1)	72.16.42.163	0x1	0x0	00:c0:ca:90:df:59
inactive time: 7120 ms				38:a2:8c:bf:cd:9b
rx bytes: 63320				a0:20:a6:2c:62:3c
rx packets: 688				00:c0:ca:90:df:59
tx bytes: 13689				ac:bc:32:c3:9c:63
tx packets: 134				
tx retries: 20				
tx failed: 2				
signal: -24 [-24] dBm				
signal avg: -23 [-23] dBm				
tx bitrate: 52.0 MBit/s MCS 5				
rx bitrate: 24.0 MBit/s				
expected throughput: 28.14Mbps				
authorized: yes				
authenticated: yes				
preamble: short				
WMM/WME: yes				
MFP: no				
TDLS peer: no				

```
root@pineapple:~# iw dev wlan0-1 station dump
Station 50:c7:bf:74:d0:95 (on wlan0-1)
  connected time: 772 seconds
  inactive time: 29670 ms
  rx bytes: 3730
  rx packets: 53
  tx bytes: 520
  tx packets: 4
  tx retries: 0
  tx failed: 0
  signal: -48 [-48] dBm
```

1 iw dev wlan0-1 station dump

arp -a

Station	MAC address	HW type	Flags	HW address
ac:bc:32:c3:9c:63 (on wlan0-1)	72.16.42.163	0x1	0x0	00:c0:ca:90:df:59
inactive time: 7120 ms				38:a2:8c:bf:cd:9b
rx bytes: 63320				a0:20:a6:2c:62:3c
rx packets: 688				00:c0:ca:90:df:59
tx bytes: 13689				ac:bc:32:c3:9c:63
tx packets: 134				
tx retries: 20				
tx failed: 2				
signal: -24 [-24] dBm				
signal avg: -23 [-23] dBm				
tx bitrate: 52.0 MBit/s MCS 5				
rx bitrate: 24.0 MBit/s				
expected throughput: 28.14Mbps				
authorized: yes				
authenticated: yes				
preamble: short				
WMM/WME: yes				
MFP: no				
TDLS peer: no				

2 arp -a

# PROOF POINT 5

HotelAndra ▾	2C:5D:93:06:15:A8 ▾	Open	no	3	-84
	6C:72:E7:D1:30:77 ▾				
HotelAndra ▾	2C:5D:93:06:55:28 ▾	Open	no	6	-85
HotelAndra ▾	2C:5D:93:06:6A:F8 ▾	Open	no	11	-67
Paxton ▾	30:B5:C2:BE:01:99 ▾	Mixed WPA	yes	11	-85
HotelAndra ▾	34:8F:27:27:15:A8 ▾	Open	no	3	-82
IoT_Network ▾	50:C7:BF:39:17:84 ▾	Mixed WPA	yes	10	-53
CenturyLink5053 ▾	58:8B:F3:E5:67:FB ▾	Mixed WPA	yes	11	-90
Wahoo ▾	60:E3:27:39:C4:35 ▾	WPA2	yes	11	-87
Blastworks AirPort01 ▾	64:A5:C3:68:74:A8 ▾	WPA2	no	6	-90
Pavia System - Wireless ▾	74:3E:2B:11:48:98 ▾	WPA2	no	8	-83
SPRW ▾	80:2A:A8:81:EE:64 ▾	Mixed WPA	no	6	-91
The Dark Side ▾	8E:15:44:A8:DA:2C ▾	Mixed WPA	no	1	-81
The Dark Side ▾	8E:15:44:A8:DB:87 ▾	Mixed WPA	no	11	-80
TDGUEST ▾	94:B4:0F:3C:E5:A0 ▾	Open	no	1	-76

# PROOF POINT 6

```
172.16.42.127 0x1          0x2  
root@Pineapple:~# nc -z -v 172.16.42.199  
Error: No ports specified for connection  
root@Pineapple:~# nc -z -v 172.16.42.199 1-10000  
172.16.42.199 4444 open  
172.16.42.199 8000 open  
root@Pineapple:~# █
```

1 Kerberos ticketing & webserver

```
-computer root@yolonda-VirtualBox: /home/yolonda/Downloads  
root@Pineapple:~# nc -z -v 172.16.42.214 1-10000  
172.16.42.214 6668 open  
root@Pineapple:~# █
```

2 irc