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ACLU

# S/MIME Example Keys and Certificates

#### **Abstract**

The S/MIME development community benefits from sharing samples of signed or encrypted data. This document facilitates such collaboration by defining a small set of X.509v3 certificates and keys for use when generating such samples.

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## 1. Introduction

The S/MIME ([RFC8551]) development community, in particular the e-mail development community, benefits from sharing samples of signed and/or encrypted data. Often the exact key material used does not matter because the properties being tested pertain to implementation correctness, completeness or interoperability of the overall system. However, without access to the relevant secret key material, a sample is useless.

This document defines a small set of X.509v3 certificates ([RFC5280]) and secret keys for use when generating or operating on such samples.

An example certificate authority is supplied, and samples are provided for two "personas", Alice and Bob.

#### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

#### 1.2. Terminology

- "Certificate Authority" (or "CA") is a party capable of issuing X.509 certificates
- "End-Entity" is a party that is capable of using X.509 certificates (and their corresponding secret key material)
- "Mail User Agent" (or "MUA") is a program that generates or handles [RFC5322] e-mail messages.

#### 1.3. Prior Work

[RFC4134] contains some sample certificates, as well as messages of various S/MIME formats. That older work has unacceptably old algorithm choices that may introduce failures when testing modern systems: in 2019, some tools explicitly mark 1024-bit RSA and 1024-bit DSS as weak.

This earlier document also does not use the now widely-accepted PEM encoding for the objects, and instead embeds runnable perl code to extract them from the document.

It also includes examples of messages and other structures which are greater in ambition than this document intends to be. This document intends to focus specifically on identity and key material, as a starting point for other documents that can develop examples or test cases from them.

# 2. Background

### 2.1. Certificate Usage

These X.509 certificates ([RFC5280]) are designed for use with S/MIME protections ([RFC8551]) for e-mail ([RFC5322]).

In particular, they should be usable with signed and encrypted messages.

## 2.2. Certificate Expiration

The certificates included in this draft expire in 2052. This should be sufficiently far in the future that they will be useful for a few decades. However, when testing tools in the far future (or when playing with clock skew scenarios), care should be taken to consider the certificate validity window.

Due to this lengthy expiration window, these certificates will not be particularly useful to test or evaluate the interaction between certificate expiration and protected messages.

#### 2.3. Certificate Revocation

Because these are expected to be used in test suites or examples, and we do not expect there to be online network services in these use cases, we do not expect these certificates to produce any revocation artifacts.

As a result, there are no OCSP or CRL indicators in any of the certificates.

#### 2.4. Using the CA in Test Suites

To use these end-entity certificates in a piece of software (for example, in a test suite or an interoperability matrix), most tools will need to accept the example CA (Section 3) as a legitimate root authority.

Note that some tooling behaves differently for certificates validated by "locally-installed root CAs" than for pre-installed "system-level" root CAs). For example, many common implementations of HPKP ([RFC7469]) only applied the designed protections when dealing with a certificate issued by a pre-installed "system-level" root CA, and were disabled when dealing with a certificate issued by a "locally-installed root CA".

To test some tooling specifically, it may be necessary to install the root CA as a "system-level" root CA.

#### 2.5. Certificate Chains

In most real-world examples, X.509 certificates are deployed with a chain of more than one X.509 certificate. In particular, there is typically a long-lived root CA that users' software knows about upon installation, and the end-entity certificate is issued by an intermediate CA, which is in turn issued by the root CA.

The examples presented in this document use a simple two-link certificate chain, and therefore may be unsuitable for simulating some real-world deployments.

In particular, testing the use of a "transvalid" certificate (an end-entity certificate that is supplied without its intermediate certificate) is not possible with the configuration here.

#### 2.6. Passwords

Each secret key presented in this draft is unprotected (it has no password).

As such, the secret key objects are not suitable for verifying interoperable password protection schemes.

However, the PKCS#12 [RFC7292] objects do have simple textual passwords, because tooling for dealing with passwordless PKCS#12 objects is underdeveloped at the time of this draft.

# 3. Example Certificate Authority

The example Certificate Authority has the following information:

• Name: Sample LAMPS Certificate Authority

#### 3.1. Certificate Authority Certificate

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIIDLTCCAhWqAwIBAqIULXcNXGI2bZp38sV7cF6VcQfnKDwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEN BQAwLTErMCkGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0 eTAgFw0x0TExMjAwNjU0MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQx0FowLTErMCkGA1UEAxMi U2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0eTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMUfZ8+NYSh6h36zQcXBo5B6ficAcBJ1f3aLxyN8 QXB83XuP8aDRWQ9uJvJpQkWVH4zx96/E/zI0t0lDMYtZNgra16h+gxbHJqog2pRw RCOiyYu/p2vzvvZ1dtFTMc/mIiqjA/73kokui62j1EFy//fNVIihkVS3rAweq+fI 8qJHSMhdc2aYa9w0P0eGe/HTiDYgT4L4f2HTGMGGwQgj1vub0gpR4YHmNqr0GyEA 63mHUQUZpnmN1FEl+nVFA5Ntu4uF++qf/tkTji89/eXYBdKX2yUdTeTIKoCI65IL EXxezjTc8aFjf/8E0aWGVZR/DtCsjWOh/s/mV7n/YPyb4+ECAwEAAaNDMEEwDwYD VROTAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAPBqNVHQ8BAf8EBQMDBwYAMB0GA1UdDqQWBBS3Uk1zwIq9 ssN6WqzzlPf3qKJ32zANBqkqhkiG9w0BAQ0FAAOCAQEALsU91Bmhc6EqCNr7inY2 2gYPnosJ+kZ1eC0hvHIK9e0Tx74RmhT0e8M2C9YXQKehHpRaX+DLcjup6scoH/bT u0THbmzeOy29TTiFcyV9BK+SEKQWW4s98Fwdk9fPWcflHtYvqxjooAV3vHbt6Xmp KrKDz/jdg7t0ptI4zSqAf3wNppiJoswlOHBUnH2W1MIYkWQ4jYj5socblVlklHOr ykKUiEZAbjU+C1+0FhT4HqLjBB9R4H1H0JRKsqqWiZBBJ6UpN0dTN4iD0mDVa0jy sJqqWnIViy/xaSDcNaWJmU3o2KmkMkdpinoJ5uLkAHQqXjFaujdU1PkufeA7v3uG Rw== ----END CERTIFICATE----

## 3.2. Certificate Authority Secret Key

----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAxR9nz41hKHqHfrNBxcGjkHp+JwBwEnV/dovHI3xBcHzde4/x oNFZD24m8mlCRZUfjPH3r8T/MjS3SUMxi1k2qtrXqH6DFscmCiralHBEI6LJi7+n a/O+9nV20VMxz+YiKCMD/veSiS6LraPUQXL/981UiKGRVLesDB6r58jyokdIyF1z Zphr3A4/R4Z78d0INiBPgvh/YdMYwYbBCCPW+5vSClHhgeY2qvQbIQDreYdRBRmm eY3UUSX6dUUDk227i4X76p/+2R00Lz395dgF0pfbJR1N5MgqgIjrkgsRfF70NNzx oWN//wTRpYZVlH800KyNY6H+z+ZXuf9q/Jvj4QIDAQABAoIBAQC6LWFU7IkZPDEA /7ldV/huGuNPXuB67rLGelpJL7B219gwPdHPPCrLohPy3GuVYLT94AM55evJtXRv I6GFpWs2j58kKukQ+GL7M2Ji1G3m4ndNIGS2Vu7DxEnGhrcDTq5wDjJV++pQ2r9d 7uAoOL99glcW/NJQm3FJuSZPssFHdjfzFrirRUwLPq9RoYsvst/EECxoq5WOZbeM OsyGJ0ARsJpvBhIMFq/6eo/dFfTR4qba3BP0RksbETRNUk7ld2iQJ9huZkThNz1l lxMpvpYRCHkmM8CIVzvb0IsCBmio/5YpShP3PVB39Zw5XDs/A9Yn5b46hjEX45mn HTqaAz/JAoGBAN7ayderxL4C0jm8aif3wWMazXetuU8dU0jeYAmYCNl+R6dxtBSI KAv770caDfDD7wxmjBDqEIBqIHYUPo3ouXiGt6r3WWNEzvRp3Vb0S9TfR0MQys1K WAgroB7mSJUG14I/JTpuFqwqN+VBXNTND2zb7ULj9UY0edIgxBqNCkbbAoGBAOJw 3r2tQNGBaT2VKlp5Jflvy0900FaypdqMujSkbLi/gfU2WulYw8hti9yjsJdeAhv7 jk8LBIfiXyByXk/qc+IcEov79Uq5x44lV/KiP4FcZ3kGVMYmr2ldTa+JJ0qtIkDh ZKVzw6SaXnqxbygCtNY+DRxCTBGcCpZQCkZhjIbzAoGBAJPjd1zjRU2fC6l66quZ U8GT0NRh+f6RhGpwACV9uimzDpQE9a9GZ+UEDFcP6D5lmCaPitXSrp65Ts9tQdHk pehg5lPTj4M772btNhBcGKCsh1rvMtYnRuItKTY4NeSHxM5PX0I20l+IKM2/oX4q ktj33aytIGCcTKVwTxMbk71PAoGACVtIm0XTy9RhGN5VBbAD1a684+YDhfGT0NgH ya0Ro0Coyg0Y7JNyY5HD0ba50UddJvLaCoIWCddcvuZ65yp0517plUcv94p9qG36 mFgD78B1thaA4j8u+FeWoi40pVLYG340vnFuIBsQ1FkIksqp1kByIjzLD982wMdF 5Wqad+kCgYEAjqXkzyFiD71D6g205kwwPzoIV8unmNMsvNn3UFF50/MS/f/ubTTy FoHYUt5E/YiHbPRyr8zTzSGWUGhV286jRPq4iCwhd2ZQDRw1DuqNooQAqQeY93nS YDg6U+BjPWQx0lN4LucF+BKwXWQ8ZNdwxjs8SSf6XQMVco4LiUZBOyo= ----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----

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# 4. Alice's Sample

Alice has the following information:

Name: Alice Lovelace

• E-mail Address: alice@smime.example

#### 4.1. Alice's End-Entity Certificate

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIIDbjCCAlaqAwIBAqIUZ4K0WXNSS8H0cUcZavD9EYqqTAswDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEN BQAwLTErMCkGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0 eTAgFw0x0TExMjAwNjU0MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQx0FowGTEXMBUGA1UEAxM0 QWxpY2UgTG92ZWxhY2UwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDD 7q35ZdG2JAzzJGNZDZ9sV7AKh0hlRfoFjTZN5m4RegQAYSyag43ouWi1xRN0avf0 UTYrwjK04qRdV7GzCACoEKq/xiNU0sjfJXzbCublN3fZM0XDshKKBqThlK75SjA9 Czxg7ejGoiY/iidk0e91neK30SCCaBTJlfR2ZDrPk73IPMeksxoTatfF9hw9dDA+ /HilyptN/aG0Q/s9icFrxr6y2zQXsjuQPmjMZgj10aD9cazWVgRYCgflhmA0V1uQ llwobYU8DAVxVn+GgabqyjGQMoythIK0Gn5+ofwxXXUM/zbU+g6+1ISdoXxRRFtq 2GzbIqkAHZZQm+BbnFrhAgMBAAGjgZcwgZQwDAYDVROTAQH/BAIwADAeBqNVHREE FzAVgRNhbGljZUBzbWltZS5leGFtcGxlMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMEMA8G A1UdDwEB/wQFAwMHoAAwHQYDVR00BBYEFKwuVFqk/VUYry7oZkQ40SXR1wB5MB8G A1UdIwQYMBaAFLdSTXPAiD2yw3paDPOU9/eAonfbMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAA4IB AQB76o4Yz7yrVSFcpXqLrcGtdI4q93aKCXECCCzNQLp4yesh6brqaZHNJtwYcJ5T gbUym9hJ70iJE4jGNN+yAZR1ltte0HFKYIBKM4EJumG++2hgbUaLz4tl06BHa0PC v/9NiNY7q9R9c/B6s1YzHhwqkWht2a+AtgJ4BkpG+g+MmZMQV/Ao7RwLFKJ90lMW LBmEXFcpiJN0HpPasT0nEl/MmotSu+8RnClAi3yFfyTKb+8rD7VxuyXetqDZ6dU/ 9/iqD/SZS70QIjywtd343mACz3B1RlFxMHSA6dQAf2btGumqR0KiAp3KkYRAePoa JqYkB7Zad06ngFl0G0FH0N+7 ---END CERTIFICATE----

December 2019

#### 4.2. Alice's Private Key Material

----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIIEoqIBAAKCAQEAw+6t+WXRtiQM8yRjWQ2fbFewCodIZUX6BY02TeZuEXoEAGEs moON6LlotcUTdGr39FE2K8IytOKkXVexswqAqBCqv8YjVDrI3yV82wrm5Td32TDl w7ISigak4ZSu+UowPQs8Y03oxqImP4onZNHvdZ3it9EggmgUyZX0dmQ6z509yDzH pLMaE2rXxfYcPXQwPvx4tcqbTf2htEP7PYnBa8a+sts0F7I7kD5ozGYI9dGg/XGs 1lYEWAoH5YZgNFdbkJdcKG2FPAwFcVZ/hoGm6soxkDKMrYSCtBp+fqH8MV11DP82 1PoOvtSEnaF8UURbaths2yKpAB2WUJvgW5xa4QIDAQABAoIBAA7vrwuIG4iLDwGq EHjFdRXJSX5D+dzejMTHkxA1NMbYSl3NCp1s0fCf0b+pmmYRkX1qq3qqfzsS2/zR ppZDUel9+8ZK0H6nTJDWRsJb/mYS6GwCMkHM3WTwRLl9oCkY4ryEksHA4THjQo8t dPtWla6drp7crmHClXMYn143HdSdCIB9StRPkSgyHjyFLOThReOog2Nsm7eShmov 7WkMuESFku50HFPLUw5FyLEzHJar8ZI7qYbT7X6IamX0f9aTMPDA1rqAcix+4KQa zF3cNY1xqq/yIvtsv6oyknTStw1i3i46PWzMWf845Eayunrq8e6F3hWt7zndjXWQ Jq/qAAECqYEA3SLl02tGdb5qWHwzzZAnTzBMo1Z3toEN25LetuSmY7mxkjMTRDAi 5V0dpSXrVFaT5r8qwU9yFEm+0uB6k52CVbTE1Fp96JlbzYjZnKaLn50G8+HSLdtn 1vj1XyCGRDJKJ8GaZpZp+WvBfp6449WpSgupXMdIOM8jfekgTEh6rgECgYEA4tKM Da3tFEEyVy9ZSxZV9ep9dhE7kmVQnr2pvt2YfJTiKnSo2kkj/qKoMi2PhS8Z00JQ J90bDngqI5sIo/OGi+hwYRmcKCrvfnfJUEq3v+3BFQYPDfwktqiBu5TGDNimFA2t l+23SwwCPfjPh5frk8GTq0IslRhXY3djNPhhb0ECqYAojSeqN9HZ8alVUKFnRtIO kXrcURTu4MebxlkVD0T+UKUhfEBCNtmPWEAGcueutZm1rMS4Yks3MTazMUsJGs81 zEpz7ow8RTMyg6/0LA5amwEaZATY5+0o3MqSQTKd+uLiW3xm55pTZNE82PpqvVmn /G94VgsGb+XARynnEzt8AQKBgDER356t+9Yf7KYT5jtqT5pt6kp6m+ql5HUTDv/t rKl3BB6vMkBXBmR2B/EjDiN/9vNs+y5ElS/iKyucxJfDfV4TIQzAn5nJABraC0FF iM8KvnSv5N3fqImA+Z/9JYNt8y/vbZiqoranmGyTwUHSSfKjNDEelcqDq5RPJbU1 7s3BAoGAdqDEx0K1sW/e0p0tb97fBNIRgUemSUctUiaV1imwIku1wuxVvD8z92xh g0DszHZfhSIvZwrhxF0VqPEgh1mDWVfuSHG1g74gDyPy5p30nEnrk4bloBhXit2Z pUSPi7ME4rNgAEXlfdVUPg4T1Yg95lDMaf0lCmUZU0DnuAy19dc= ----END RSA PRIVATE KEY---

### 4.3. PKCS12 Object for Alice

This PKCS12 ([RFC7292]) object contains the same information as presented in Section 4.1, Section 4.2, and Section 3.1.

It is locked with the simple five-letter password alice.

#### ----BEGIN PKCS12----

MIINxQIBAzCCDV0GCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCDU4Eqq1KMIINRjCCBC8GCSqGSIb3DQEH BqCCBCAwqqQcAqEAMIIEFQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDqQIxzMo cGN7mdMCAhQ3qIID6L6IPosvmOWsvjWwTaxivUEtkMqTVVh7Gk79/JzaHKRw6Vsb N+Ji8GrrjU/024D08G/z7T3afyEWV18Kbiduxq5m9ZPLEKctF1HETwutywp6rB0d tOYw1jrj7C2QsJ0wMElf5nHeA+XYiim2KR6d0nFtX/pwZAaw7jnaBCGci2KQN0gL 9QY05ulHk0BoSa0ABKXuJcCIhFMgf4wRjgwFRPdzCzx0EEv7njAeFHz4msfqScVb hdi3ZgWFdklFA2jiTtg0VvrkH1c0HlSMdG98JoYPw7FSHFMV0MNUEyHnJ5N1WlWy 2A4FxcHo50CKX5vN+5aiNmRynU6h0vEHzKFT6IcyI6BrArfrLAl8BaihU7As4Qae EQPiH7A6ENs9dv8fzBST02UlZK9B8oLvh2YmCNMDuVRLrj6BvriDfAqRYCrLvUqf oIQM4wPEQMKf5V/UMCBUHYLVXPxIlzJ96Ai5JEjI6gAPVSfFDSZbsYsX9SPXAG3l Edd51X1PeEv4ayc1cbhQ4lEpyu9g3M5jzP9lteiYyygAxGUrPZri4tNJ3in55E2D AJsze8FNWhGoHyoWawgf2nm5E+U83gFJkzj/9HDe/owE0PGPgJvRLsMaizdiCLJG jqAGPCCvZW7uqOl/YSu1GIZq/AEZMJu+hh2Q3asOPkpZ3rGEFeVlSeU/d0CIZQqA SZpULDhtq4upRsq5aA2nI91HHPzr7v7XV7iTpSx2ycbuu8kPGvmvlWX5pvE7ffwi CWHfSAokYLc8FNXluneJi7ePcGTSbNHg8eTMg3AWb3vG0CgmIbqt896AgsbcYsAr +049yZL5b08p76A3ZzNkkNR8q0BgYenCiuT+Bs2VB25kbHbkozPJl/BaMYN4uAuA sLc6peraLilf/gv5jTgcaHlf9gqIv3pn6vKha6GptrZL1u8AU7XX1lA8s2ICBY92 VtqUpffBEVLq2qr84Br4ZGIJ5iW4EQT6FASVvXtKenP0wNAe5ZX/HD5JnhzhQww3 bxpzYP+vderrbYyyUBKvnZUd+wqfiGjVxcuv3MGw/ca0Kxd0/70CpatJnFmkaBk1 KSOzFG4kXzGYl64PUvJy0WYcO+sCtNze3FqjWWKTXTuBoeccyuekWDXeEL/6UocJ pt0oRGxF3PqHnC9RTwGXtfkF6dBmterFuHFrQYgs2m5vMX7/80SgZ11NL7t7H400 7Wt3GHgwvK5nwwgAYYn5crRIxy1awpjmQvtA+0F+R/542w30tyc1bmo0Azj5R8Z1 PGA/oeUg807VkwCg1cMi6eX261vvXvBdcLr42hrnrZRYnsHJ/XRg6uz7h0caKH5+ qul5Jdgwgq0vBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagqg0gMIIDnAIBADCCA5UGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAc BgoghkiG9w0BDAEDMA4ECH2Bt5G6lvBfAgIUbYCCA2gMr1bPEerGCQBxD+3Chj3T PU5Zc8ij1MQJU/UruW2mM8zaZSEMxpr7tHw1YvcBl0YrLACWfv0pAtDahD3RPGpF Gk7ro0039CJHdCU6bI3IKkdCyNuYdIwhKuctbhXxhD7V0aUuWF7SVNmG7Yin90Wi 20yw3NkzaD2jZV1HxKACwEn4gn8Bc5T6jJ4FzQjaf4THmVdvqthjFmUVSYfz+akY l2c0x3xggeP0df3nH0ReHl/yXUly7keILIsYeDq5Tq4SC7kFntbxE05VPbHlzxQ1 XQfaQvl5Nzz41v00AGgW1h0iliAU7qlpT/ej+PKJZwtLa3pw+LrPwqaVWTXfWyBq NA89QfuoGXbqmIPNaC+wNjE4II9r3Uc0i96Jhhkyqz9Tni/42JuxTR4mo4bbixn4 qBHTZ5oUicHSto0EMaydWnE32xBbqE0UF36lYC2Xi9SAn8CIqwtV/J3WwFQRwji7 YcABIXsKo5dw9RLIWJw2yRRhcUw1+VozS4v4G0GSdZVJGo1r1H10c5e0pJwHX7pW 7LrLYN1ZBmiee+kkafPafFdojbBl77aUk0qkoBmhAt4XpXnfMoFBDQH7PfzBNy9d USFsKqv0ALSsCNBdse2hBbTTr3xst0R1ulXcZ2rwbAQfXk/Duy+JjtW07047rAvR t4+KzQm6QlrHBWS8vv24HrPlgeTjRbXGH5clTYgbDknypHpmb0e9fGI14ECnIB3K q9ubADclJsyB+K+dUzkfaQjEMKLfWWKYPWNmo2NJ1uKknd4116hlD4r1HW2e07qk NbUn2XroJSBknK0+CqxMJqYkL9IUgiLxxB+dFA6Gq0IbcD3PXLD/kl03GgveMvV7 8az3LfpMuKD0WJfCw4RidGFRgU0AIu2y/GdawRERLbEA3u6ayxe901c60oWFI6td 3bBpaNy2K+hryq2u+NByFa5EixB0+U9HQd7xcYL6Z64DpKsLJRENkWquiTYdzSji KECQIIC1iQEv/WNWzYFE0/Mw5TutLjkP95E1NCZJotUetGgxISLcEB4NhzFHLsgg RA27SvtDZ36sD8LTEqwSBrw4f/b+ER66ZU1rJB+N99rmMRg02wGd/9si0S15Ntww TkMiCJv/7dv2kTPTD1dG3kuNSH9EspnQ7Ih4LF5P204SVswVUC4GUzCCBVwGCSqG SIb3DQEHAaCCBU0EggVJMIIFRTCCBUEGCyqGSIb3DQEMCgECoIIE7jCCBOowHAYK KoZIhvcNAQwBAzAOBAgeMVJxqpj2fQICFPsEggTITkrmiezeN/JQ7nBhIMPWgFWZ KGsfA5h7jHKKj5qaA0KssGIUEstvfPX5sz/X/zwQv+V4gXeHUP+0Do0cD56wiTWg VB001eZ439bhyRCMC5cQUbjeSmpTsABvQNIHUaJ1i9DMzVwct6rBf0DvS7mr8/wi wF+sQca/NoxltbiH+YXn7qcMq9dC7U0Nm/b65djhgp0lhP2/zSelvwFssUx6c/8s hQIqn+6/vD0EVwPYg7KqZdtLn2ulIUlz04WCvpPckGoBb1p0T+dNWXLqsYWQb9aE hmQYjSeteMDzLSaaz9Qm3yf/sokkT/tUtq1X0Ln9oT7ZAgahl24T422SNCQKglGJ wmw91YuhLK2hhDEfP1Ax7q4vvT9b23qkRybYtOov+IBeQw88lcJ8bqKMoWUE0BBm fkmqrfYXAaK54ZUlEm2MQMwuTDTNmns9IzVSeULaA3SUGXFEVhs2rvjgMcG85lRz qz8r/wqZhLpoAuNo8rvCueAE+095svpFCVXfsp+ehh+yCx8xaqLLJnIE6+1r51ls LUcIw3S/DyoJwVq8Q06J1cQpZzJoS8697TCY6jHtgzKchGV0HauPX+44kPn2VnSF sVxazp2binU0/r/Mdtxkjxpfs0cwM3hcxQDllGJDs1AIj7xQvV9YwzgbVb02U8Ln IhR9qLSCGEXsl8pndM+GL55Q+TWhTTBRPGhTCsyHMpL0Rif4Qwh005eVM0xKkGbk

/5hdl3/s8nM6vXFiZ7ZDH/LODcOW13TPVa1U7Ws+4zUbvYl1a4Mfan0d2KIBv0tf NE01BzwHZ3XRq36RP8srR8pFPwW/yQywQhL/k3pdH2quTJHBTC/HGFLa0+RbQjGh zsKHjef00sAR4WTV+/Dw0/afGNUgJ69288BryEasj3+tji4RDx/gMPQs3zvoE0VX MPOlxqNrVtBdJiep36sxokssPNutQQauDBPG0nvMejjyvjHK2oFgz88dwRIxeW0I dr81RYN9ak50hJfEG8li6c5W3NpvtcMncAGLFsqkxIKW7PJqT6jYZ51K0lxhzv28 5KlU8RQT6q0Zc6IM806qPMNUoaDh2mcuia4qChutwCzjHL1ernr0y40ihmLu/X6I uoY6MJPb3fdbWK7y5s8ltwh2ubTKAh5MvZhox6p7007nfRAqMenHh9bx0sqho/pC tp5V/8EG/WL8/DIDQbuzYeqPVJvSX6EUDnHdkZkTnsNYWEHi0f1BMwqD0MEKLaVa 4it++qCQbrMJw/g01eGWFfzQ5vYP0mqm/OKWKmbyfgo2pRkhqlmvgKKM9Y3Cm4hr t85Y/7Q8RSXx0iPnwUl0vYLx4q6/c0/1tEccVdTRN+YB3NTQk60Nacs0EQf8WKoW 2U748aaDb3NCh+tliCf4Aw9oWR478rzU36hkLRmSfxRHJwJspHF1v3xGrrWs9svk YTqv6tasytWGG8trwGJA/HRFrQ0QlWrMkNVyw3UjLQW0T8YVi0xGyNtx3K4bw4ir lZIdZhLe+JoVHaAd8FEtIuvUlC9KCI5YJm9ELN7D1y6PyQ3Cm8U7R7zRcYkruHtb hukumLkKBYKukQb3fJNyeUrQU0QBNct9j2YQ5ssX3BL270FNQXxay5eF/i0IJkf5 baAMsso4MUAwGQYJKoZIhvcNAQkUMQweCgBhAGwAaQBjAGUwIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkV MRYEFKwuVFgk/VUYry7oZkQ40SXR1wB5MF8wTzALBqlqhkqBZQMEAqMEQDazWV14 R5Ze7BE+lc47t07S5FAX8y5JA8ocPsxl40F2br4ekbv4hroGjK3Y04Mklsm7qlKQ Mr2Ty/Cl3qC0f0MECENNGvi+IeEtAqIoAA== ----END PKCS12----

# 5. Bob's Sample

Bob has the following information:

Name: Bob Babbage

• E-mail Address: bob@smime.example

## 5.1. Bob's End-Entity Certificate

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----MIIDaTCCAlGgAwIBAgIUIlPuMG0CCx8CzfXJwT4633mmG8IwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEN BQAwLTErMCkGA1UEAxMiU2FtcGxlIExBTVBTIENlcnRpZmljYXRlIEF1dGhvcml0 eTAgFw0x0TExMjAwNjU0MThaGA8yMDUyMDkyNzA2NTQx0FowFjEUMBIGA1UEAxML Qm9iIEJhYmJhZ2UwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDCZjlu Li00rpoCsq2s8SHqb91QPP5bdfzfaJg/G61lHUhfavEX9zZluyMwPPE50wqwV2RJ X5dg0kStyH9s9Ja5D59pPnX8oJJ7XEqNKwxqSfJt7lRmM8BrDvSP55iP70fx+0+2 MzVA4tA6WUaUy2j9984CMmXH/CHjBK/+w21vSTmzFVGmeTqxxH0Nbd2z0qQ6Yqr/ LBaHjAWl+tj9Q+2nIjEQFKlWs6vZll3Xwid6+dAxrtpE05rIpKZcbn40qT1pyDpr ylNk8h3P90nwr0ISpdlAJ2p71ZDdLfLd8c6qZGBPjmHwTUnjmH0oy33uBukT73RU W6raD8MwM4AhQ4ETAgMBAAGjgZUwgZIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAcBgNVHREEFTAT gRFib2JAc21pbWUuZXhhbXBsZTATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDBDAPBgNVHQ8B Af8EBQMDB6AAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQBrAKQ6Dj0kN4Z7pXzMnThZgAopzAfBgNVHSME GDAWgBS3Uk1zwIg9ssN6WgzzlPf3gKJ32zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQOFAA0CAQEAa/tJ ZPgdlmc7Zbn5bccc1TXNn8qBhECGHma4iSTWczDUmsNjezmDNniM3hs8Q0qUZvx4 ey6diTlEngrKZ8bnwsX03k9Bn8UDPT5Y5sbxwEHpwKew41LRiLP0ZFSh3DzCKYS7 HDSXJsJEGop1AwzKxtRss06C35g4ELK0Q2MwLw1u95f0+rC4q+vYndS9NzFyS3Bj MIt37gN+Yy8h/r2wvtPVJ40mYNGmtQhdNuYnr56LOuFMmGiMIYXE8owo6L/kzCcy YxxCy71lbnBOWLGcJz4HmRMdWJMRDV+mgLmTNnN8mPltgQU9gE3KNrYcST9v2kk+ N+cfxLhC0caHFL5G8g==

----END CERTIFICĀTE----

#### 5.2. Bob's Private Key Material

----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIIEpAIBAAKCAOEAwmY5bi4tNK6aArKtrPEh6m/dUDz+W3X832iYPxutZR1IX2rx F/c2ZbsjMDzxOdMKsFdkSV+XYNJErch/bPSWuQ+faT51/KCSe1xKjSsMaknybe5U ZjPAaw70j+eYj+zn8fjvtjM1Q0LQ0llGlMto/ff0AjJlx/wh4wSv/sNtb0k5sxVR pnk6scRzjW3dszqk0mKq/ywWh4wFpfrY/UPtpyIxEBSpVr0r2ZZd18InevnQMa7a RDuayKSmXG5+NKk9acg6a8pTZPIdz/dJ8KziEqXZQCdqe9WQ3S3y3fH0qmRgT45h 8E1J45h9KMt97qbpE+90VFuq2q/DMD0AIU0BEwIDAQABAoIBAAvQiKcAmXC9N9D4 KQP8t7H20H2C53aJii/NvIsBVJ1zlSVva22ocZ7nK7FP0t1PzT0AbDDlZV7WCKSD LfNiPhLLN0X/LM6It75VkpZXym5fRiOW03zmokgfZY+lZKlCnaogFfl9zTu/TSZu rJJ4dk4RFG0fwP3RfgG9FDEokWsU7fNS52VCnd0WdGIt0EmsZIfX9H8rnnSrSTro Dsk9cQjyjMcCH7X340KDUaVJlRtx+1YlbPTyuKF2nbNjSWfsYhuIOGT4xGm6Trda z6bWjuxH7nNrGKrt014aE8Xv56sC+J5ulwaIjf/V+eDZVfpVgiXyq6oa6JioPv7u rx7cIQECqYEA9ovq0i/OYdDNQTJXB4LNMtS1WLxqrpzE/SNPEV5XknQ5yf6rrKZ3 +lr/r6w20pr4PY+3/igMoBZcN7YgIM9Drkg6bDLzrS354A9dZLDBNAgCnDR0yY87 U3f2ljjpCA2zZrahYhhKsfyMxt2w3cUso2990YgjNwLaLI7LrXvPa4ECgYEAydpv fw+zdEc0xbGGILb4xiiFpJY2s604auZ3/s/y9W3v8LSKrytHHopQ0g3GALvQi+Ay LWRBIaJTzEueE6lIYInZI2+WvK2zP2GB21/JX5MI3x7AcRp//1muvhnW3GfvPGpa 6zRE45dZPm9nklywl4+yl47ubd0vNyxifBmDxpMCqYAQHb1F6HIZOsjwBhZiS06W kAj6r/Wx9FV8Jp64h+45iJdueNNICem119T26s7wrcikXYytdHi+zjdg/0rEuke2 UMpg4EPFgkff0aHlPxiiChQBmfw4YMCECEd6MmYpPJwJjs6lluirEdMx/LPfC1CL rnIFHL0Qj4MrfnoZ8QnyAQKBgQC6WT2ryPv8MiynAi/4jdL3ZbuTadYQZK98CU7o YGRFbnwf9R0/qC3FJR3RqpuMW9e4+n54Z2C1w12ncnv6XMLj1P8wdrlrcNTVq5hV xYVsBZsqGQzCnhtiyxHRpK82hYQdqHv/SB79GeGbAVBVz9p74X6X6q11mQLeZcx6 EzgTnwKBgQDjWmtDk85A0GQuJBR7Q0B+CXb39j0a78Qwywpx+XYibmg+N3aD1yJB 8VVtHWYbq3wM51EdjxYVagyKd3IKIjnPbBIWIjFWqEgDXmBROwwR8DBpfvff3jh4 JjK+LtvnHhhw09KtfCvZGplZYfSfC1tLuodBMNjxUX9u04bqTyqx/g== -- END RSA PRIVATE KEY----

### 5.3. PKCS12 Object for Bob

This PKCS12 ([RFC7292]) object contains the same information as presented in Section 5.1, Section 5.2, and Section 3.1.

It is locked with the simple three-letter password bob.

----BEGIN PKCS12----

MIINuQIBAzCCDVEGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCDUIEqq0+MIINOjCCBCcGCSqGSIb3DQEH BqCCBBqwqqQUAqEAMIIEDQYJKoZIhvcNAQcBMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEMAQMwDqQIKuAW qo5aXBwCAhSWqIID4MdnJrlVYTYYFnsWs8tWL6AD8tW3DBy4QlEpWdIMjCfetDH+ hPblFWNAPEYqDid6Q8XHa8FBVAHQwdLqOMNonlj36WnQeDrMjxbPQiJWDsmD5kw+ opnmG3fbi0pvAfX1fichlee30mIw0qphr5mypPmgJo9SYq8QVCseXLaSyc3F3Mao WEdEvzpUZCY/8vPp8j/dnTZtF0kcCHAeh0XYA0MMB56Eb2DhX3k1eaqeuYhXnu0L joR0tKa1RY5T+hm8n2XHo8pZiIKRZE71o00PEB+hdgrZsHEJgKYgX0Z+owsiT6cR E0YRcOlqJwX8xfYB6RrQR4iiEZM8P0sHFud5W9fL/toQmh//4kU8Jz7HLeKSijRD SzYtYhHN0GclRZsGoesCS3c0MyBR5j2ANqkS6R0r0jt0239We/9EpeRdc0SaCr/X efcSQwBXRJVdcVe30RFjsjQFmIfbrt/ZOfUW0s7iMNkI3KcwMBppVfPU6wy+XhJM P3MTjsXNl3iHKstvDnYCKq7BVxCH8Q7evGr407QqFfFpRP5sno3HbgN76JkRgD1Q 9B0GClinY4b/6Q0vccWsa6v32iKCXGJ9ARTFa4ebLCt2N4GRzYKj5MuuB3cbghk9 tESGkfyn/iarLq6qYqeUIt8wo+qpo+I7Yw29hiVk3ZH4GSfdnvZbHFUpuVLdVtfl /L4ep2BvNXbBw1DDPm8I+GcHJrTfk8oeTTXPKLvv02TENMN9pBc+De0+qK3Mmt2u UrrM00mDS1uyS0N57U6t+GWZeAT4Zeu6oU30WjsqM5CIcAfA/2QAbkhGab+nqp4F hEPNMYVvNHXqwAfwbUTg9qDuCqLVjqhS1T8n0Vl/bB0NtuTSRjwF30z0fbYOulm5 IYWl1NjpSY3qnsb7CMGlzeJUGPV5tjqL00BgVtlVyZSCzw2lZp9nJXCcsboLkF+B l7ZmIzNFh1Ut2W5UZX7bxwJqvW+BIvHY5wuAzMF04GxqyqKenCfub01C57hY1Mp+ B05Roe4aqbiaiM7doEKCcZQTAqYzIIZYZxVv0lva7Zl+Qq6UA/u0KAdAIDaZ8b63 NRN6KU8ncgATrpNpXA3JRxHirkpp7pBC7Ft0zblD6Dhmo+NzHQEPAALNE122BWzR 4PnrUWhvLwN1Tqq9klrXfTFIyvKwoLIwGBTZK69u2uoLX+HioBFNFhhua9Aj6eXe sGBGnMNqFhSqhMlS3amKlDRa9k5kYx94eWgac44D0B33icLPzjAYvwq1EiLDX0B7 Q6q05D2zR3nKu1qKAq4NDkRwqaMITvq;wlcf1QXYA8SMeMdsVLTv63bxmxNmMIID rwYJKoZIhvcNAQcGoIIDoDCCA5wCAQAwgqOVBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYKKoZIhvcN AQWBAzAOBAhot+9QPhtLWwICFK6AggNo49L9gonFW0JJv1Q31JN+Y7pc5DH0Scfc NSrBBNAM7fcTwBpJzciusYu/HdYBvqG7Kd5hPXIVwdJNXzFphQ8DPd4wcoowJb+8 z1zjY/8armxwFGuTz4Zhjnl1xo+32WPdX0j5tr3etKFvRbH5t0jppwUY7kLk6L5X RCLMfVwZBczsB+aIuB02CowxRpi9q5Kb80sfZbdqdo2A3uDZ6ZiWNalam6V0I2q4 SD/iEGqRs7H+lmLTywMdmxxjBVzrcbE5KwczBhr1eMMSwW+hN+EV0c0TZd5A00Rf vHb7LxaKQwqJ2mpSP3ym0YY6r+BENa4Ciok3CTYuti8i2dKWBgmujBBua/aLWfJa xHSwMFeWa22fMgn1KLmEJr0yT9W1i12Li5W47L8mIvAj8PyjZ7ElTAASPWuocrqH qDoSepaufvid0GtdYYE3+2MWMn+RZoyt3ZjJ0jtI+N5Zob1MyVtK0dJLSsAaJj0o BdoPK7C6cjXNxw5DGHcK0frSvPSSNfisnxw+8R/AlshS6DmvRscA22qzbpfDkhFq ydpMa+/K9vN2u07v2ja5ayIaft2NlxorAUF6NMFcI/uoHWweAozfKXb9BSrUlNck X1z8H9m28vkKw9lguUf0TLZyLP8neGD+jMV9vpuH5uuu7nuxdLbbZXsEm70BtUPb k0ZVPYRc6PAqm+5nNGYyp/IsS/iC0V7S/8rUmo0xuzPzj1+K/3eSrjTd8UHxszYo WxP8ph7cJWinnlKNaTBDiG6K7Du17AxcQPjkAvv34iQRgmhmjp1Ae0ZlCE09p9Ve AMQRTMTG9Ki0XbUTd3Xf0R05Sy20BqqUc55kPzrxpmLhT3Si4QFYuRyNXCeSvnaW iV/oQJCSflA1EWqvYKAnCK+a2CUEVQHyiJ1mX9DBeBRACHJhqXJqoHLJP3sqPd9i akrFhfLHVE05o9FCPb49pxBMg2ElEXxPIycewfDFAUjrYma+FBLELGsj4EZdVAkb YJPzVf5JIq3mMhRQ4v66Ns6G0rk1rp3FKk4CRFygjmrM/jADuWy6av6yViH0Jqew uqEY+zcT/mRiRoiACTqciIXsKnSwnXzf+mcowF7PSMEYxYNk1usverEsUL4XlXv/ eIKBepm/FjV0k1l5pWk7JKfY8rc1zyrXnK0QhTMDpUgwggVYBgkqhkiG9w0BBwGg ggVJBIIFRTCCBUEwggU9BgsqhkiG9w0BDAoBAqCCB04wggTqMBwGCiqGSIb3DQEM AQMwDgQIO4ck/+gdo4UCAhRFBIIEyPyarONCAchxW15LB6KUfF4AdiHfpTNAuYBF 6A/zb8Wz/J4F0cVi0+9dx7E/VxeNMvJkmNtFqUEofRlAkGqeeyLDMNVZqLv1N1SU isA5d7Wsu6mfpFx4zdfFtFzHCnUt6DAzcXrlX4gtixthNKbsnrgB+D3YS7oofza4 EnPny7xKEBS3XCi6IXefhI3+gz0tg04PNCpeI3d9pt3ew6rndn25roNsIEr+P121 DiMCiE3fkxp8bQw4mE2fhWBhPsM0VvwCnGCdLhBP/ihoV2YAF/rtxfb/iI2Sl0XF fFh8zE8jl0VTVqF1rBAa43Fcapa1QbEHv83WSmZy4pH0b0fGCqU0TFNLwxvbQRI2 Kxk0Ljp8dD6d6uati0z0Lr2vsk61AewNDv523vCvuviMlXvMUpJE4LJQ4M2H0VDD 4EuSMBmdJyl1P4WE6nMQgKE8bG5d8+YYfcgAY71KXnpq/Kah5zNqk05RNAhg7LuV ujhFjB6ypA4TRiVrV0iMtK8U+ZAHS54B2VU3LqcHv4F7cf/xZ5SRfRBnboDF18A0 WCtpSSf20H21Xl9BeSrZhjc543G4s9e9vjYD2AhCbSQALJQyadX0EUY87ryyTiGZ G6/YoD07rcsxZVufiV9TK1cz+Kx2pxEb3VgDfLLcziSi5xvYPeFA+HPZ6jGbME4Y KNOtyZBQDINHEjaOP5lAfQ1ePg50fS2lI9k2D5URV6q+LvksElI86tetcUnU8nCj

y31M66oJCbQ4v8TKyzDm1W0BAlN8yhfWG6W9Ttapt4qVBfKmPY2Ak+rLNP5qTJ6X m3KDAlqSVNd4KNrQW0FtORWbIU0V2u1+0F3njleGGsXplWfKwwVdkD2Tc462qWdZ CR/Lp4lDrVe4+Ezf52emkaaiha0uALlzU2VGVWoBTgFeHPBUSGG78/tLPuzSfsVm 0+8GCPmgLqrZv+QoezGpdFbwcDF+AXaDTTKE90kqMk0ActULlMJXZ7S/edNs9XSL qevUe5u+y3IyV9T0cShd2/xNdBTfzEErT0/NIYJiuGYb3N0xFvjizi0flW2Newdl pM/kh4SW9cJiaDv7zAziztAUK8U4EqoS3N5deM+lK5newIaBBX9fdugEc2lDluPK kM5Jic06B+u6WpcUlMIsDyiH0zXMNoILd1SoU+XvKFXPVDOmg8rpv3Ff3INJE+00 ODo17XJZGY9FdQiRRN5A5EQsQxYzdeO5ax9sVqGMsOo/5YrXvGzAmQ5KT8DL6qxZ m4fBxomvlEfxbH+vxlKpbmiMaWrAKm7NdrbE9QQlUztQQUbp1nRyV15LzE+v0A9g LXH1ZJNPQjeK5awoCtYeQFKrJCI9KqvmAKXAJqYMbrf7iFo3GPWMv0318vuQhTM7 sQiCcUu0Ga7mqNGweICWVWJG8qqIbet996oL8N4UJdKk+zq/kVWqP7iaUCKoUArP udFo6+h1fia+EhjcLcR1UJvWicsoUCuUjJsFCMBHUuaYJ9uItVQY3VE301B88Z9M vTxBkS+USLvbjwjHV5PJ38qYUo7y02L50gAi6UWKg+2v20CfXIg1Vm0hfaPUUfSi yn3T0iVGhJeC2uzmuqUoPSimgakY4whGVrzkm82A7C5yv2nMbrmyZACkqqa98TE8 MBUGCSqGSIb3DQEJFDEIHgYAYgBvAGIwIwYJKoZIhvcNAQkVMRYEFAGsApDoOPSQ 3hnulfMyd0FmACinMF8wTzALBglghkgBZQMEAgMEQFP+9F1uFuKVThpIjkbWCN05 g57aXR9DKOPLzHQoZ19wUYyP/Nn5D8bG/c2y0+U6BsTe9SEe6pIviN+u186tdL0E CNLOBlp8HmeXAgIoAA==

-----END PKCS12-----

# 6. Security Considerations

The keys presented in this document should be considered compromised and insecure, because the secret key material is published and therefore not secret.

Applications which maintain blacklists of invalid key material SHOULD include these keys in their lists.

#### 7. IANA Considerations

IANA has nothing to do for this document.

#### 8. Document Considerations

[ RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication ]

This document is currently edited as markdown. Minor editorial changes can be suggested via merge requests at https://gitlab.com/dkg/lamps-samples or by e-mail to the author. Please direct all significant commentary to the public IETF LAMPS mailing list: spasm@ietf.org

#### 8.1. Document History

#### 8.1.1. Substantive Changes from -01 to -02

• PKCS#12 objects are deliberately locked with simple passphrases

## 8.1.2. Substantive Changes from -00 to -01

- changed all three keys to use RSA instead of RSA-PSS
- set keyEncipherment keyUsage flag instead of dataEncipherment in EE certs

## 9. Acknowledgements

This draft was inspired by similar work in the OpenPGP space by Bjarni Runar and juga at [I-D.bre-openpgp-samples].

Eric Rescorla helped spot issues with certificate formats.

Sean Turner pointed to [RFC4134] as prior work.

## 10. References

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