

Twitter Information Operations



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Project Definition


- ❏ Twitter released a data set of tweets and accounts that were used to **influence foreign politics and public opinion**
- ❏ We would like to **compare the behaviors and techniques** of information operations between specific countries
- ❏ Countries Specified: **Russia, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Iran**

Who Cares?

- ❏ Governments
- ❏ Citizens
- ❏ Social Media Users

Current Research

Analyzing the Digital Traces of Political Manipulation: The 2016 Russian Interference Twitter Campaign



Information operations is the use of information or **misinformation** to affect public opinion, typically to sow **discourse** or prevent rational debate.

Current research has focused on how information operations affect the United States, therefore **focusing on only English tweets**.

Current Research

Limitations:

- ❑ Limited scopes (only English and Russian posts in Medium Article)
- ❑ **Outdated data**
 - ❑ Our data set is new (Oct 2018)
 - ❑ Tons of new bots/misinformation posted daily
- ❑ Misclassification of bot accounts
- ❑ Bot accounts are deactivated
- ❑ Overlooked independent voters

Literature Survey

(part 1/2)

- ❏ Twitter Elections Integrity Datasets Readme
- ❏ *Don't @ Me* by Duo Labs
- ❏ Botometer
- ❏ #DEBATENIGHT: The Role and Influence of Socialbots on Twitter During the 1st 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate
- ❏ Twitter's list of Russian bots

Literature Survey

(part 2/2)

- ❑ Do Bots Impact Twitter Activity?
- ❑ A First Glimpse through the Data Window onto the Internet Research Agency's Twitter Operations
- ❑ Using Sentiment to Detect Bots on Twitter: Are Humans More Opinionated than Bots?
- ❑ Acting the Part: Examining Information Operations Within #BlackLivesMatter Discourse

Research Questions

- ❏ What topics are popular?
- ❏ How are other users reacting to tweets?
- ❏ What percentage of information operations are done by bots?
- ❏ How do the countries differ in target audience?

Our Approach

(Expected Innovation)

- ❏ Use recent data
- ❏ Expand our scope to Russia, Iran, Bangladesh, and Venezuela
- ❏ Include non-English posts
- ❏ **Expected Innovation:**
Analyze how these countries affect each other, if at all

Challenges

- ❏ Scope of research
- ❏ Multiple languages
- ❏ Establishing a baseline,
if one exists

Resources

Twitter Data Archive from Russia,
Venezuela, Iran, Bangladesh

Twitter Elections Integrity Datasets

- * ira (3,613 users)*
- * iranian (770 users)*
- * bangladesh_201901_1 (15 users)*
- * iran_201901_1 (2,320 users)*
- * russia_201901_1 (416 users)*
- * venezuela_201901_1 (1,196 users)*
- * venezuela_201901_2 (764 users)*

Measuring Progress

(part 1/2)

For the midterm, answer these questions:

- Percentage and post frequency of bots across countries
- Which topics are popular and unpopular in different countries
- Do bots' tweets get retweeted by bots or real users?

Measuring Progress

(part 2/2)


Final: From the analysis and observation from the midterm, we should be able to answer these questions:

- Is there a significant difference in the bot behavior across countries (languages, strategies, etc.)?
- Are they aiming at the same groups?
- Are they manipulating political issues in their regions or in foreign regions?

Risks

- ❑ Possibilities of misclassification of bot accounts
- ❑ Uneven distribution of of data
- ❑ Possible difficulty in understanding the sentiment of foreign languages

Account Archive Distribution



Payoffs

- ❏ Combat foreign interference
- ❏ Raise awareness
- ❏ Actual users' posts and opinions

Impact

“On Oct. 17, Twitter published more than **10 million** tweets by around **4,600** Russian and Iranian-linked propaganda accounts”(Haldevang, Max de, 2018)

“Automated accounts generate as many as **25 to 30 times** the number of messages as genuine political accounts”(Riechmann & Clare Jalonick, 2019)

Plan of Activities (Gantt Chart)

[illegible]

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