

# Applied Hodge Theory

Yuan Yao

School of Mathematical Sciences  
Peking University

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
# Helmholtz-Hodge Decomposition


Theorem (c.f. Marsden-Chorin 1992)

A vector field  $\mathbf{w}$  on a simply-connected  $D$  can be uniquely decomposed in the form

$$\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{u} + \underline{\text{grad } \phi}$$

where  $\mathbf{u}$  has zero divergence and is parallel to  $\partial D$ .


$$\text{vector field} = \text{curl-free} + \text{div-free}$$







# Hodge Decomposition=Rank-Nullity Theorem

Take product space  $V = \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \times \mathcal{Z}$ , define

$$\text{Dirac } D = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ A & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & B & 0 \end{pmatrix}, \quad \underline{BA = 0},$$

## Laplacian

$$L = (D+D^*)^2 = \text{diag}(A^*A, AA^*+B^*B, BB^*) = \text{diag}(L_0, L_1, L_2^{(\text{down})})$$

Rank-nullity Theorem:  $\underline{\text{im}(D) + \ker(D^*) = V}$ , in particular

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{Y} &= \text{im}(A) + \ker(A^*) \\ &= \text{im}(A) + \ker(A^*) / \text{im}(B^*) + \text{im}(B^*), \text{ since } \text{im}(A) \subseteq \ker(B) \\ &= \text{im}(A) + \ker(A^*) \cap \ker(B) + \text{im}(B^*) \end{aligned}$$

# Terminology

- **coboundary maps:**  $A : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}, B : \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}$
- **cochains:** elements in  $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{Z}$
- **cochain complex:**  $\mathcal{X} \xrightarrow{A} \mathcal{Y} \xrightarrow{B} \mathcal{Z}$ .
- **cocycles:** elements of  $\ker(A)$
- **coboundaries:** elements of  $\text{im}(B)$
- **cohomology classes:** elements of  $\ker(A)/\text{im}(B)$
- **harmonic cochains:** elements of  $\ker(A^*A + BB^*)$
- **Betti number:**  $\dim \ker(A^*A + BB^*)$
- **closed:**  $Ax = 0$
- **exact:**  $x = Bz$

# Classical Hodge Theory on Riemannian Manifolds

- (W.V.D. Hodge, 1903-1975) de Rham complex:

$$0 \rightarrow \Omega^0(M) \xrightarrow{d_0} \Omega^1(M) \xrightarrow{d_1} \cdots \xrightarrow{d_{n-1}} \Omega^n(M) \xrightarrow{d_n} 0$$

- $M$ : compact Riemannian manifold
- $\Omega^k(M)$ : with  $k$ -differential forms
- $d$ : the exterior derivative

$$\underbrace{d^2 = d_k \circ d_{k-1}}_{\text{ }} = 0$$





## Combinatorial Hodge Theory on Simplicial Complexes

# Combinatorial Hodge Theory on Simplicial Complexes

$$0 \rightarrow \Omega^0(X) \xrightarrow{d_0} \Omega^1(X) \xrightarrow{d_1} \cdots \xrightarrow{d_{n-1}} \Omega^n(X) \xrightarrow{d_n} \cdots$$

- $X$  is finite
- $\chi(X) \subseteq 2^X$ : simplicial complex formed by  $X \Leftrightarrow$  if  $\tau \in \chi(X)$  and  $\sigma \subseteq \tau$ , then  $\sigma \in \chi(X)$
- $k$ -forms or cochains as alternating functions

$$\Omega^k(X) = \{u : \chi_{k+1}(X) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, u_{i_{\sigma(0)}, \dots, i_{\sigma(k)}} = \text{sign}(\sigma) u_{i_0, \dots, i_k}\}$$

- coboundary maps  $d_k : \Omega^k(X) \rightarrow \Omega^{k+1}(X)$  alternating difference

$$(d_k u)(i_0, \dots, i_{k+1}) = \sum_{j=0}^{k+1} (-1)^{j+1} u(i_0, \dots, i_{j-1}, i_{j+1}, \dots, i_{k+1})$$

- $d_k \circ d_{k-1} = 0$





# Hodge Laplacian

- combinatorial Laplacian  $\Delta = d_{k-1}d_{k-1}^* + d_k^*d_k$ 
  - $k = 0$ ,  $\Delta_0 = d_0^*d_0$  is the (unnormalized) graph Laplacian
  - $k = 1$ , 1-Hodge Laplacian (Helmholtzian)

$$\Delta_1 = \text{curl} \circ \text{curl}^* - \text{div} \circ \text{grad}$$

- Hodge decomposition holds for  $\Omega^k(X)$ 
  - $\Omega^k(X) = \text{im}(d_{k-1}) \oplus \ker(\Delta_k) \oplus \text{im}(\delta_k)$
  - $\dim(\Delta_k) = \beta_k(\chi(X))$




Figure: Courtesy by Asu Ozdaglar

# Social Choice Problem

How to aggregate preferences  
which faithfully represent individuals?

# Crowdsourcing QoE evaluation of Multimedia



Figure: (Xu-Huang-Y., et al. 11) Crowdsourcing subjective Quality of Experience evaluation

# Crowdsourcing ranking



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Figure: Left: [www.allourideas.org/wikipedia-banner-challenge](http://www.allourideas.org/wikipedia-banner-challenge), by Prof. Matt Salganik at Princeton; Right: [www.crowdrank.net](http://www.crowdrank.net)

# Learning relative attributes: age





Figure: Age: a relative attribute estimated from paired comparisons (Fu-Y.-Xiang et al. 2014)

# Paired comparison data on graphs

Graph  $G = (V, E)$

- $V$ : alternatives to be ranked or rated
- $(i_\alpha, j_\alpha) \in E$  a pair of alternatives
- $y_{ij}^\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$  degree of preference by rater  $\alpha$
- $\omega_{ij}^\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+$  confidence weight of rater  $\alpha$
- Examples: relative attributes, subjective QoE assessment, perception of illuminance intensity, sports, wine taste, etc.



# Modern settings

Modern ranking data are

- **distributive** on networks
- **incomplete** with missing values
- **imbalanced**
- even adaptive to **dynamic** and **random** settings?

Here we introduce:

Hodge Theory approach to Social Choice

# History

Classical social choice theory origins from Voting Theory

- Borda 1770, B. Count against plurality vote
- Condorcet 1785, C. Winner who wins all paired elections
- Impossibility theorems: Kenneth Arrow 1963, Amartya Sen 1973
- Resolving conflicts: Kemeny, Saari ...
- In these settings, we study **complete ranking orders** from voters.

# Classical Social Choice or Voting Theory

## Problem

Given  $m$  voters whose preferences are total orders (permutation)  $\{\succeq_i : i = 1, \dots, m\}$  on a candidate set  $V$ , find a social choice mapping

$$f : (\succeq_1, \dots, \succeq_m) \mapsto \succeq^*,$$

as a total order on  $V$ , which “best” represents voter’s will.

## Social Choice and Impossibility Theorems

## Example: 3 candidates ABC

Preference order	Votes
$A \succeq B \succeq C$	2
$B \succeq A \succ C$	3
$B \succeq C \succ A$	1
$C \succ B \succeq A$	3
$C \succeq A \succ B$	2
$A \succeq C \succ B$	2

# What we did in practice I: Position rules

There are two important classes of social mapping in realities:

- I. Position rules: assign a **score**  $s : V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , such that for each voter's order(permutation)  $\sigma_i \in S_n$  ( $i = 1, \dots, m$ ),  
 $s_{\sigma_i(k)} \geq s_{\sigma_i(k+1)}$ . Define the social order by the descending order of total score over raters, i.e. the score for  $k$ -th candidate

$$f(k) = \sum_{i=1}^m s_{\sigma_i}(k).$$

- **Borda Count**:  $s : V \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is given by  $(n-1, n-2, \dots, 1, 0)$
- **Vote-for-top-1**:  $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$
- **Vote-for-top-2**:  $(1, 1, 0, \dots, 0)$

# What we did in practice II: pairwise rules

- **II. Pairwise rules:** convert the voting profile, a (distribution) function on  $n!$  set  $S_n$ , into paired comparison matrix  $X \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  where  $X(i,j)$  is the number (distribution) of voters that  $i \succ j$ ; define the social order based on paired comparison data  $X$ .
  - Kemeny Optimization: minimizes the number of pairwise mismatches to  $X$  over  $S_n$  (NP-hard)
  - Plurality: the number of wins in paired comparisons (tournaments) – equivalent to Borda count in complete Round-Robin tournaments

# Revisit the ABC-Example


## ■ Position:

- $s < 1/2$ , C wins
- $s = 1/2$ , ties
- $s > 1/2$ , A/B wins

## ■ Pairwise:

- A, B: 13 wins
- C: 14 wins
- Kemeny winner C

so completely in chaos!



Position  $(1, s, 0)$

$$1 \geq s \geq 0$$



# Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

(Arrow'1963)

Consider the Unrestricted Domain, i.e. voters may have all complete and transitive preferences. The only social choice rule satisfying the following conditions is the dictator rule

- **Pareto (Unanimity):** if all voters agree that  $A \succeq B$  then such a preference should appear in the social order
- **Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA):** the social order of any pair only depends on voter's relative rankings of that pair

# Sen's Impossibility Theorem

(Sen'1970)

With Unrestricted Domain, there are cases with voting data that no social choice mapping,


$$f : (\succeq_1, \dots, \succeq_m) \mapsto 2^V,$$

exists under the following conditions


- **Pareto**: if all voters agree that  $A > B$  then such a preference should appear in the social order
- **Minimal Liberalism**: two distinct voters decide social orders of two distinct pairs respectively

Saari Decomposition


# A Decomposition of Voting Profile $R^3!$



Condorcet Profile



Departure Profile



Position = Pairwise

Pairwise ?

Position ?

# Saari Decomposition of Complete Voting Profile

Every profile, or distribution function on symmetric group  $S_n$ , can be decomposed into the following components:

- **Universal kernel**: all ranking methods induce a complete tie on any subset of  $V$ 
  - dimension:  $n! - 2^{n-1}(n-2) - 2$
- **Borda** profile: all ranking methods give the same result
  - dimension:  $n - 1$
  - basis:  $\{1(\sigma(1) = i, *) - 1(*, \sigma(n) = i) : i = 1, \dots, n\}$
- **Condorcet** profile: all positional rules give the same result
  - dimension:  $\frac{(n-1)!}{2}$
  - basis: sum of  $Z_n$  orbit of  $\sigma$  minus their reversals
- **Departure** profile: all pairwise rules give the same result

# Borda Count: the most faithful representation?

Borda count is the most consistent ranking method, since

- for **full set** ranking, it only depends on **Borda** profile
- for **subset** ranking it depends on both **Borda** and **Condorcet** profiles

while

- **Pairwise** rules depend on both **Borda** and **Condorcet** profiles
- **Position** rules depend on both **Borda** and **Departure** profiles (except Borda)

So, if you look for best **possibility** from **impossibility**, perhaps Borda count is the choice.

# Borda Count as a Pairwise Rule: Least Square

Borda Count is equivalent to

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}} \sum_{\alpha, \{i,j\} \in E} (x_i - x_j - y_{ij}^\alpha)^2,$$

where

- $y_{ij}^\alpha > 0$  (e.g. 1), if  $i \succeq j$  by voter  $\alpha$ , and  $y_{ij}^\alpha < 0$ , on the opposite (e.g. -1).

Note: NP-hard Kemeny Optimization, or

Minimum-Feedback-Arc-Set:

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}} \sum_{\alpha, \{i,j\} \in E} (\text{sign}(x_i - x_j) - y_{ij}^\alpha)^2,$$

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

## Generalized Borda Count with Incomplete Data

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}} \sum_{\alpha, \{i,j\} \in E} \omega_{ij}^\alpha (x_i - x_j - y_{ij}^\alpha)^2,$$

 $\Leftrightarrow$ 

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}} \sum_{\{i,j\} \in E} (\omega_{ij} (x_i - x_j) - \hat{y}_{ij})^2,$$

where  $\hat{y}_{ij} = \hat{\mathbb{E}}_\alpha y_{ij}^\alpha = (\sum_{\alpha} \omega_{ij}^\alpha y_{ij}^\alpha) / \omega_{ij} = -\hat{y}_{ji}$ ,  $\omega_{ij} = \sum_{\alpha} \omega_{ij}^\alpha$

So  $\hat{y} \in l_\omega^2(E)$ , inner product space with  $\langle u, v \rangle_\omega = \sum u_{ij} v_{ij} \omega_{ij}$ ,  $u, v$  skew-symmetric

# Statistical Majority Voting: $l^2(E)$

- $\hat{y}_{ij} = (\sum_{\alpha} \omega_{ij}^{\alpha} y_{ij}^{\alpha}) / (\sum_{\alpha} \omega_{ij}^{\alpha}) = -\hat{y}_{ji}$ ,  $\omega_{ij} = \sum_{\alpha} \omega_{ij}^{\alpha}$
- $\hat{y}$  from generalized linear models:
  - [1] *Uniform* model:  $\hat{y}_{ij} = 2\hat{\pi}_{ij} - 1$ .
  - [2] *Bradley-Terry* model:  $\hat{y}_{ij} = \log \frac{\hat{\pi}_{ij}}{1-\hat{\pi}_{ij}}$ .
  - [3] *Thurstone-Mosteller* model:  $\hat{y}_{ij} = \Phi^{-1}(\hat{\pi}_{ij})$ ,  $\Phi(x)$  is Gaussian CDF
  - [4] *Angular transform* model:  $\hat{y}_{ij} = \arcsin(2\hat{\pi}_{ij} - 1)$ .

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

$\hat{y}_{ij} = -\hat{y}_{ji} \in L^2_\omega(E)$  admits an **orthogonal** decomposition,

$$\hat{y} = \underbrace{Ax}_{\text{gradient}} + \underbrace{B^T z}_{\text{triangular cycle/curl}} + \underbrace{w}_{\text{harmonic}}, \quad (1)$$

where

$$(Ax)(i,j) := x_i - x_j, \text{ gradient, as } \underline{\text{Borda profile}}, \quad (2a)$$

$$(B\hat{y})(i,j,k) := \hat{y}_{ij} + \hat{y}_{jk} + \hat{y}_{ki}, \text{ triangular cycle/curl, } \underline{\text{Condorcet}} \quad (2b)$$

$$w \in \ker(A^T) \cap \ker(B), \text{ harmonic, } \underline{\text{Condorcet}}. \quad (2c)$$

In other words

$$\text{im}(A) \oplus \ker(AA^T + B^T B) \oplus \text{im}(B^T)$$

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

## Why?

Note  $B \circ A = 0$  since

$$(B \circ Ax)(i, j, k) = (x_i - x_j) + (x_j - x_k) + (x_k - x_i) = 0.$$

Hence

$$A^T \hat{y} = A^T(Ax + B^T z + w) = A^T Ax \Rightarrow x = (A^T A)^\dagger A^T \hat{y}$$

$$B\hat{y} = B(Ax + B^T z + w) = BB^T z \Rightarrow z = (BB^T)^\dagger B\hat{y}$$

$$A^T w = Bw = 0 \Rightarrow w \in \ker(\Delta_1), \quad \Delta_1 = AA^T + B^T B.$$

# Generalized Borda Count estimator

Gradient flow  $\hat{y}^{(g)} := (Ax)(i,j) = x_i - x_j$  gives the generalized Borda count score,  $x$  which solves Graph Laplacian equation

$$\min_{x \in \mathbb{R}^{|V|}} \sum_{\alpha, (i,j) \in E} \omega_{ij}^\alpha (x_i - x_j - y_{ij}^\alpha)^2 \Leftrightarrow \underline{\underline{\Delta_0 x = A^T \hat{y}}}$$

where  $\Delta_0 = A^T A$  is the unnormalized graph Laplacian of  $G$ .

- In theory, nearly linear algorithms for such equations, e.g. [Spielman-Teng'04](#), [Koutis-Miller-Peng'12](#), etc.
- But in practice? ...

# Online HodgeRank as Stochastic Approximations

Robbins-Monro (1951) algorithm for  $\bar{A}x = \bar{b}$

$$x_{t+1} = x_t - \gamma_t(A_t x_t - b_t), \quad \mathbb{E}(A_t) = \bar{A}, \quad \mathbb{E}(b_t) = b$$

Now consider  $\Delta_0 x = \delta_0^* \hat{y}$ , with new rating  $y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})$

$$\begin{aligned} x_{t+1}(i_{t+1}) &= x_t(i_{t+1}) - \gamma_t[x_t(i_{t+1}) - x_t(j_{t+1}) - y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})] \\ x_{t+1}(j_{t+1}) &= x_t(j_{t+1}) + \gamma_t[x_t(i_{t+1}) - x_t(j_{t+1}) - y_t(i_{t+1}, j_{t+1})] \end{aligned}$$

Note:

- updates only occur locally on edge  $\{i_{t+1}, j_{t+1}\}$
- initial choice:  $s_0 = 0$  or any vector  $\sum_i x_0(i) = 0$
- step size
  - $\gamma_t = a(t+b)^{-\theta}$  ( $\theta \in (0, 1]$ )
  - $\gamma_t = \text{const}(T)$ , e.g.  $1/T$  where  $T$  is total sample size

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

# Minimax Optimal Convergence Rates

- Choose  $\gamma_t \sim t^{-1/2}$  (e.g.  $a=1/\lambda_1(\Delta_0)$  and  $b$  large enough)
- In this case,  $s_t$  converges to  $s^*$  (population solution) in the (optimal) rate of  $t$

$$\mathbb{E}\|x_t - x^*\|^2 \leq O(t^{-1} \cdot \lambda_2^{-2}(\Delta_0))$$

where  $\lambda_2(\Delta_0)$  is the Fiedler Value of graph Laplacian

- Using Tong Zhang's stochastic variance reduction gradient (SVRG)


$$\mathbb{E}\|x_t - x^*\|^2 \leq O(t^{-1} + \lambda_2^{-2}(\Delta_0)t^{-2})$$

## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

## Condorcet Profile splits into Local vs. Global Cycles

Residues  $\hat{y}^{(c)} = B^T z$  and  $\hat{y}^{(h)} = w$  are cyclic rankings, accounting for conflicts of interests:

- $\hat{y}^{(c)}$ , the local/triangular inconsistency, triangular curls ( $Z_3$ -invariant)
  - $\hat{y}_{ij}^{(c)} + \hat{y}_{jk}^{(c)} + \hat{y}_{ki}^{(c)} \neq 0$  ,  $\{i,j,k\} \in T$



## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking


## Condorcet Profile in Harmonic Ranking

- $\hat{y}^{(h)} = w$ , the global inconsistency, harmonic ranking ( $Z_n$ -invariant)

$$\hat{y}_{ij}^{(h)} + \hat{y}_{jk}^{(h)} + \hat{y}_{ki}^{(h)} = 0, \text{ for each } \{i, j, k\} \in T, \quad (3a)$$

$$\sum_{j \sim i} \omega_{ij} \hat{y}_{ij}^{(h)} = 0, \text{ for each } i \in V. \quad (3b)$$

- voting chaos: circular coordinates on  $V \Rightarrow$  fixed tournament issue



## Hodge Decomposition of Pairwise Ranking

# Cyclic Ranking and Outliers [Xu-Xiong-Huang-Y.'13]

- Robust ranking can be formulated as a Huber's LASSO problem (Gannaz'07, She-Owen'09, Fan-Tang-Shi'12)
- Sparse outliers are sparse approximation of cyclic rankings (curl+harmonic)
- Bregman ISS or linearized Bregman iterations: efficient algorithms
- Exact recovery is possible without Gaussian noise
- Outlier detection is possible against Gaussian noise, provided
  - Irrepresentable condition (e.g. random graph)
  - Outliers have large enough magnitudes

# Topological Obstructions

Two **topological** conditions are important:

- **Connectivity:**
  - $G$  is connected  $\Rightarrow$  unique global ranking is possible;
- **Loop-free:**
  - for cyclic rankings, consider clique complex  $\chi_G^2 = (V, E, T)$  by attaching triangles  $T = \{(i, j, k)\}$
  - $\dim(\ker(\Delta_1)) = \beta_1(\chi_G^2)$ , so harmonic ranking  $w = 0$  if  $\chi_G^2$  is loop-free, here topology plays a role of **obstruction of fixed-tournament**
  - “Triangular arbitrage-free implies arbitrage-free”



# Random Graph Models for Crowdsourcing


- Recall that in crowdsourcing ranking on internet,
  - unspecified raters compare item pairs randomly
  - online, or sequentially sampling
- random graph models for experimental designs
  - $P$  a distribution on random graphs, invariant under permutations (relabeling)
  - Generalized de Finetti's Theorem [Aldous 1983, Kallenberg 2005]:  $P(i,j)$  ( $P$  ergodic) is an uniform mixture of

$$h(u, v) = h(v, u) : [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow [0, 1],$$

$h$  unique up to sets of zero-measure

- Erdős-Rényi:  $P(i,j) = P(\text{edge}) = \int_0^1 \int_0^1 h(u, v) du dv =: p$
- edge-independent process (Chung-Lu'06)

# Phase Transitions in Erdös-Rényi Random Graphs



# Phase Transitions of Large Random Graphs

For an Erdos-Renyi random graph  $G(n, p)$  with  $n$  vertices and each edge independently emerging with probability  $p(n)$ ,

- (Erdös-Rényi 1959) **One phase-transition** for  $\beta_0$ 
  - $p << 1/n^{1+\epsilon}$  ( $\forall \epsilon > 0$ ), almost always disconnected
  - $p >> \log(n)/n$ , almost always connected
- (Kahle 2009) **Two phase-transitions** for  $\beta_k$  ( $k \geq 1$ )
  - $p << n^{-1/k}$  or  $p >> n^{-1/(k+1)}$ , almost always  $\beta_k$  vanishes;
  - $n^{-1/k} << p << n^{-1/(k+1)}$ , almost always  $\beta_k$  is nontrivial

For example: with  $n = 16$ , 75% distinct edges included in  $G$ , then  $\chi_G$  with high probability is connected and loop-free. In general,  $O(n \log(n))$  samples for connectivity and  $O(n^{3/2})$  for loop-free.




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  - Xu, Xiong, Huang, and Yao, *ACM Multimedia* 2013
- Active sampling
  - Osting, Brune, and Osher, *ICML* 2013
  - Osting, Xiong, Xu, and Yao, 2014

# Multiple Utility Flows for Games

	O	F
O	3, 2	0, 0
F	0, 0	2, 3

(a) Battle of the sexes



Extension to multiplayer games:  $G = (V, E)$

- $V = \{(x_1, \dots, x_n) =: (x_i, x_{-i})\} = \prod_{i=1}^n S_i$ ,  $n$  person game;
- undirected edge:  $\{(x_i, x_{-i}), (x'_i, x_{-i})\} = E$
- each player has utility function  $u_i(x_i, x_{-i})$ ;
- Edge flow (1-form):  $u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) - u_i(x'_i, x_{-i})$

# Nash and Correlated Equilibrium

$\pi(x_i, x_{-i})$ , a joint distribution tensor on  $\prod_i S_i$ , satisfies  $\forall x_i, x'_i$ ,

$$\sum_{x_{-i}} \pi(x_i, x_{-i})(u_i(x_i, x_{-i}) - u_i(x'_i, x_{-i})) \geq 0,$$

i.e. expected flow ( $\mathbb{E}[\cdot | x_i]$ ) is nonnegative. Then,

- tensor  $\pi$  is a **correlated equilibrium** (CE, Aumann 1974);
- if  $\pi$  is a rank-one tensor,

$$\pi(x) = \prod_i \mu(x_i),$$

then it is a **Nash equilibrium** (NE, Nash 1951);

- fully decided by the edge flow data.

## Hodge Decomposition of Finite Games

# Hodge Decomposition of Finite Games

Theorem (Candogan-Menache-Ozdaglar-Parrilo,2011)

*Every finite game admits a unique decomposition:*

*Potential Games  $\oplus$  Harmonic Games  $\oplus$  Neutral Games*

Furthermore:

- Shapley-Monderer Condition: Potential games  $\equiv$  quadrangular-curl free
- Extending  $G = (V, E)$  to complex by adding quadrangular cells, harmonic games can be further decomposed into **(quadrangular) curl games**

# Bimatrix Games

For bi-matrix game  $(A, B)$ ,

- potential game is decided by  $((A + A')/2, (B + B')/2)$
- harmonic game is zero-sum  $((A - A')/2, (B - B')/2)$
- Computation of Nash Equilibrium:
  - each of them is tractable
  - however direct sum is NP-hard
  - approximate potential game leads to approximate NE

## Hodge Decomposition of Finite Games

# What Does Hodge Decomposition Tell Us?

Christos Papadimitriou: best response players might experience  
transient potential games + periodic equilibrium



# Summary

Hodge Decomposition for Social Choice:

- Generalized Borda Count
- Borda profile in gradient flow  $\Rightarrow$  global ranking or utility function
- Condorcet profile in cyclic ranking, triangular cyclic or harmonic rankings

for Game theory with multiple utility functions:

- Potential games in gradient flow
- Harmonic games in cycles
- CE and NE are preserved, tractable in some settings

in Computer Vision: optical flow decomposition, subjective visual attributes, and more are coming ...