# Selected Topics Blockchain Security

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# **ILLINOIS TECH**

**College of Computing** 






- Scenario 1: Alice hands Bob a token physically
  - Central bank is required





- Scenario 2: Alice hands Bob a digital token via email
  - How to stop Alice from forging a copy of the token?
  - How to stop Alice from using the same token twice?
  - If Alice and Bob own the same token, who is the real owner?


#### **Digital Transaction**





- Scenario 3: Alice hands Bob a digital token via a trusted third-party
  - Can we trust Dave?
    - He may change the ledger
    - He may make mistakes

#### **Digital Transaction: Ledger**






- Scenario 4: Alice hands Bob a digital token using a decentralized ledger
  - Every participant has a copy of ledger
  - only add a transaction to the ledger when majority of participants agree
  - Ledger syncs among all participants



a digital ledger of transactions


decentralized system



duplicated and distributed across the entire network

consensus mechanism


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- A peer-2-peer network
  - Decentralized system
  - No central node or central government
  - Two ways of viewing blockchain
    - A ledger with transactions
    - A sequence of state changes





# **Block**

transaction 1

transaction 2


transaction 3

• • •

transaction n




- A sequence of state changes
  - At any given time *i*, there is a state s
  - Blockchain is nothing but a sequence of these state changes chained together






- Consensus mechanisms:
  - O How to confirm a transaction in blockchain?
  - Two major consensus protocols
    - Proof of Work (PoW)
      - Most popular
      - Used by bitcoin, ethereum, etc
    - Proof of Stake (PoS)
      - Very promising




- Proof of Work (PoW)
  - Miners solve puzzles to mine blocks (a sequence of transactions)
    - Hard to find a solution
    - Easy to verify the correctness of a solution
  - When a miner finds a solution
    - The new block is broadcast to the network for verification
    - Append the block to the blockchain
  - O Limitations:
    - HUGE power consumption
    - 51% attacks



- Proof of Stake (PoS)
  - Like shareholders of a company
  - Participants must have a stake
    - Stake: usually by owning some cryptocurrencies
    - To have a chance of selecting, verifying and validating transactions
  - Factors of having the chance
    - the amount of stake
    - the duration of the stake
  - No mining involved
  - No need for the entire network to be involved in validation process





#### **Physical contracts**


#### TRADITIONAL CONTRACT



**Trusted 3rd party** 

Slow speed

High cost






- Scenario 1: buyer buys a house
  - Traditional contract
  - Third-party involved





- Scenario 2: buyer buys a house via Ethereum
  - Write code to implement the contract
  - Code is stored in Ethereum blockchain
  - Logic is immutable




flexible


/// Give your vote (inclu
/// to proposal `prop

function vote(uint
Voter storage s
 require(!sender
 sender.voted = tro
 sender.vote = pro

// If `proposal'
// this will throw
// changes.
proposals[proposal].voteCount

flexible
immutable
self-executed
high speed


















```
/// Give your vote (including votes delegated to you)
/// to proposal 'proposals[proposal].name'.
function vote(uint proposal) public {
    Voter storage sender = voters[msg.sender];
    require(!sender.voted, "Already voted.");
    sender.voted = true;
    sender.vote = proposal:
    // If 'proposal' is out of the range of the array,
    // this will throw automatically and revert all
    // changes.
    proposals[proposal].voteCount += sender.weight;
/// @dev Computes the winning proposal taking all
/// previous votes into account.
function winningProposal() public view
        returns (uint winningProposal_)
    uint winningVoteCount = 0;
    for (uint p = 0; p < proposals.length; p++) {</pre>
        if (proposals[p].voteCount > winningVoteCount) {
            winningVoteCount = proposals[p].voteCount;
            winningProposal = p;
```



Smart Contracts Market Size to Reach USD 345.4 Million by 2026 at CAGR 18.1% | Valuates Reports





- Smart contract
  - A program that is running on top of blockchain
  - Code logic is automatically enforced by blockchain
  - No party can ever change the code once it is put in the blockchain

```
/// Give your vote (including votes delegated to you)
/// to proposal `proposals[proposal].name`.
function vote(uint proposal) public {
    Voter storage sender = voters[msg.sender];
    require(!sender.voted, "Already voted.");
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       if (proposals[p].voteCount > winningVoteCount) {
            winningVoteCount = proposals[p].voteCount;
            winningProposal = p;
```



# **Blockchain Security issues**

- Double-spending attack
  - o a.k.a, 51% attack
  - Not as impractical as many people would expect
  - Caused by deep chain reorganization

"If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains."

--- bitcoin white paper


#### PoW 51% Attack Cost

This is a collection of coins and the theoretical cost of a 51% attack on each network.

Name	Symbol	Market Cap	Algorithm	Hash Rate	1h Attack Cost	NiceHash-able
Bitcoin	втс	\$185.00 B	SHA-256	136,198 PH/s	\$565,959	0%
Ethereum	ETH	\$37.52 B	Ethash	232 TH/s	\$276,331	4%
BitcoinCashABC	ВСН	\$4.06 B	SHA-256	2,480 PH/s	\$10,305	18%
BitcoinSV	BSV	\$3.10 B	SHA-256	2,144 PH/s	\$8,910	21%
Litecoin	LTC	\$3.07 B	Scrypt	314 TH/s	\$19,380	4%
Dash	DASH	\$723.90 M	X11	7 PH/s	\$2,643	2%
Zcash	ZEC	\$579.78 M	Equihash	7 GH/s	\$14,174	3%
EthereumClassic	ETC	\$575.68 M	Ethash	3 TH/s	\$3,865	280%
BitcoinGold	BTG	\$142.71 M	Zhash	941 KH/s	\$283	50%
Ravencoin	RVN	\$112.15 M	KawPow	2 TH/s	\$4,427	34%

# **Double Spend Attack Overview**


- When a miner finds a solution, it is supposed to be broadcasted to all other miners.
- However, a malicious miner can create an offspring of the blockchain by not broadcasting the solutions of his blocks to the rest of the network



There are now two versions of the blockchain. The red blockchain can be considered in 'stealth' mode.




- The malicious miner then spends cryptocurrency on public chain.
- This transaction, however, is not shown in his private chain.



The corrupt miner excludes his own transaction in his private blockchain.

# **Double Spend Attack Overview**


• The malicious miner now tries to add more blocks in his private chain than the public chain.



The corrupt miner is now adding blocks to his private chain faster because he has more hashing power.

# **Double Spend Attack Overview**

 Eventually, malicious miner broadcasts his longer version of the chain, rendering his previous transaction reversed.



The corrupt miner broadcasts its chain to the rest of the network once it is longer (heavier) than the original chain.



• Key idea: find a function that makes an external call to another contract before it resolves any effects

```
function withdraw(uint amount) public {
    ① if (credit[msg.sender] >= amount) {check
    ②    msg.sender.call.value(amount)()); transfer
    ③    credit[msg.sender] -= amount); update
    }
}
```




# Reentrancy attack

- fallback function:
  - o a function without name or parameter
  - can be overridden by developers
  - executed when ether is transferred to the contract

```
function () public {
    }
}
```


```
function () public payable {
    if (address(this).balance < 999999 ether) {
        callWithdrawBalance(msg.sender);
    }
}</pre>
```

# Reentrancy attack







• Key idea: transaction order is not deterministic




#### Scenario 1








# **PuzzleSolver Contract** PuzzleSolver() SetPuzzle reward=100 SubmitSolution(solution) if isCorrect(solution): Send(reward) UpdateReward(newReward) reward=newReward





# Thank you! Question?