Program Analysis Fuzzing

Yue Duan


Outline

- Fuzzing recap
- Research paper:
 - Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing as Markov Chain
 - Directed Greybox Fuzzing



- Fuzz testing
 - an automated testing technique that uncovers software errors by executing the target program with large number of randomly generated test inputs
 - Three main approaches
 - black-box fuzzing
 - pure random fuzzing
 - grey-box fuzzing
 - leverage some knowledge during testing for guidance
 - white-box fuzzing
 - full knowledge about the target program is needed

- American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) https://github.com/google/AFL
 - coverage-based greybox fuzzer
 - code instrumentation:
 - collect runtime code coverage info
 - can be done at source code and binary level
 - source code: compile with instrumented code
 - binary: QEMU user mode for instrumentation



- Seed scheduling
 - pick the next seed for testing from a set of seed inputs
 - essentially random

- Seed Mutation
 - bitflips
 - boundary values (0, -1, 1, INT_MAX, etc)
 - simple arithmetics (add/subtract 1)
 - block deletion
 - block insertion


embrassait l'immensité de l'océan, elle aperçut once beaux cygnes qui nageaien

qu'il faudrait pour confectionner ces chemises libératrices!

La nuit suivante, le Roi de l'Île Merveilleuse où se cachait Eliza, aperçu

Seed input

- Seed Selection
 - coverage metrics used to define 'interesting' seeds
 - preserve only the interesting inputs for next round
 - coverage bitmap: new basic block discovery



Common limitation for grey-box fuzzing:

```
x = int(input())
if x > 10:
    if x < 100:
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"</pre>
```

```
Let's fuzz it!

1 ⇒ "You lose!"

593 ⇒ "You lose!"

183 ⇒ "You lose!"

4 ⇒ "You lose!"

498 ⇒ "You lose!"

48 ⇒ "You win!"
```

```
x = int(input())
if x > 10:
    if x^2 == 152399025;
        print "You win!"
    else:
        print "You lose!"
else:
    print "You lose!"
```

```
Let's fuzz it!
   1 ⇒ "You lose!"
   593 ⇒ "You lose!"
   183 ⇒ "You lose!"
  4 ⇒ "You lose!"
  498 ⇒ "You lose!"
  42 ⇒ "You lose!"
   3 ⇒ "You lose!"
      ..........
   57 ⇒ "You lose!"
```

Coverage-based Greybox Fuzzing as Markov Chain


Marcel Böhme, Van Thuan Pham, Abhik Roychoudhury

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Introduction

Markov chain

describes the prob Pij that fuzzing the input exercising path i generates an input exercising path j




Introduction

Add energy to each state

energy = #fuzz






Introduction


How much #fuzz should be generated?

= What is the minimum energy required to expect discovery of new path j from path i?




Challenges


 AFL's power schedule is constant in the number of times s(i) for the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.





Challenges


 AFL's power schedule is constant in the number of times s(i) for the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.
























Challenges

• AFL's power schedule is *constant* in the number of times s(i) for the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.

AFL's power schedule always assigns high energy



Challenges

- AFL's power schedule is constant in the number of times s(i) the seed has been chosen for fuzzing.
- AFL's power schedule always assigns high energy

Too much energy assigned to high-frequency paths




Figure 1: #Fuzz exercising a path (on a log-scale) after running AFL for 10 minutes on the nm-tool.

Most fuzz exercises the same few paths

- AFLFast's power schedule assigns energy that is inversely proportional to the density of the stationary distribution
 - assign low energy to high-frequency paths
 - assign high energy to low-frequency paths
 - approximate the density of distribution for a state i by counting the number of fuzz f(i) that exercises the path i

Power Schedules

- AFL: constant power schedule
 - \circ p(i) = α (i)
 - \circ $\alpha(i)$ is how AFL judges fuzzing time for path i (~1 min)
- AFLFast:
 - spend more energy on low-frequency paths
 - less energy on high-frequency paths
 - spend the minimum energy required to discover a new state

$$p(i) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } f(i) > \mu \\ \min\left(\frac{\alpha(i)}{\beta} \cdot 2^{s(i)}, M\right) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

$$p(i) = \min\left(\frac{\alpha(i)}{\beta} \cdot \frac{2^{s(i)}}{f(i)}, M\right)$$

Search Strategies

- AFL
 - chooses the seeds in the order they are added
 - after the last seed, begin with the first
- AFLFast
 - prioritizes seeds that
 - exercise low-frequency paths
 - have been chosen less often
 - chooses each seed at most once per cycle

Binutils

Table 1: CVE-IDs and Exploitation Type

Vulnerability Type			
CVE-2016-2226	Exploitable Buffer Overflow		
CVE-2016-4487	Invalid Write due to a Use-After-Free		
CVE-2016-4488	Invalid Write due to a Use-After-Free		
CVE-2016-4489	Invalid Write due to Integer Overflow		
CVE-2016-4490	Write Access Violation		
CVE-2016-4491	Various Stack Corruptions		
CVE-2016-4492	Write Access Violation		
CVE-2016-4493	Write Access Violation		
CVE-2016-6131	Stack Corruption		
Bug 1	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)		
Bug 2	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)		
Bug 3	Buffer Overflow (Invalid Read)		

General results

Vulnerability	AFL	AFL-Fast	Factor
CVE-2016-2226	> 24.00 h	3.85 h	N/A
CVE-2016-4487	2.63 h	0.46 h	5.8
CVE-2016-4488	6.92 h	0.98 h	7.0
CVE-2016-4489	10.68 h	2.78 h	3.8
CVE-2016-4490	3.68 h	0.41 h	9.1
CVE-2016-4491	> 24.00 h	4.74 h	N/A
CVE-2016-4492	12.18 h	0.87 h	14.1
CVE-2016-4493	4.48 h	1.00 h	4.5
CVE-2016-6131	> 24.00 h	5.48 h	N/A
Bug 1	20.43 h	3.38 h	6.0
Bug 2	20.91 h	2.89 h	7.2
Bug 3	> 24.00 h	5.07 h	N/A

Figure 8: Time to expose the vulnerability.

Power schedules




Figure 10: #Crashes over Time (Schedules).

Directed Greybox Fuzzing

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Motivation

- Grey-box fuzzing is frequently used
 - state-of-the-art in automated vulnerability detection
 - extremely efficient
 - all program analysis before/at instrumentation time
 - start with a seed, choose a seed file, fuzz it
 - add to corpus only if new input increases coverage
- Cannot be directed!

Motivation

- Directed fuzzing
 - patch testing: reach changed statements
 - crash reproduction: exercise stack traces
 - SA report verification: reach 'dangerous' locations
 - etc

Overview of AFLGo


- Directed fuzzing as optimization problem
 - instrumentation time:
 - extract call graph and control-flow graphs
 - for each BB, compute distance to target locations
 - instrument program to aggregate distance values
 - Runtime
 - collect coverage and distance information
 - decide how long to be fuzzed based on distance
 - if input is closer to the targets, fuzz longer
 - if input is further away, fuzz shorter

Instrumentation

- Function-level target distance
 - use call graph
 - identify target functions in CG


compute the harmonic mean of the lengths of the shortest path

to targets




Instrumentation

- BB-level target distance
 - use CFG
 - identify target BBs and assign distance 0
 - identify BBs that call functions and assign 10*FLTD
 - for each BB, compute harmonic mean of
 - (length of shortest path to any function-calling BB + 10*FLTD)



Runtime

- Seed distance
 - from instrumented binary
 - two 64-bit shared memory entries
 - aggregated BB-level distance values
 - number of executed BBs



Seed distance: 10.4 = (8.7 + 11 + 10 + 12)/4

Directed Fuzzing

- Assign more energy to seeds that are closer to the given targets
- Problem
 - if always assign more energy to closer seeds
 - likely reach only a local minimum distance but never a global minimum distance
- Solution (simulated annealing)
 - sometimes assign more energy to further-away seeds
 - approaches global minimum distance

- Patch testing: reach changed statements
 - state-of-the-art
 - KATCH (based on symbolic execution)
 - Experiment setup
 - reuse KATCH benchmark
 - measure path coverage
 - measure vulnerability detection

Patch testing: reach changed statements

	#Changed Basic Blocks	#Uncovered Changed BBs	Катсн	AFLGo
Binutils	852	702	135	159
Diffutils	166	108	63	64
Sum	1018	810	198	223

	Катсн	-5598	AFLGo		
	#Reports	#Reports14	#New Reports	#CVEs	
Binutils	7	4	12	7	
Diffutils	0	N/A	1	0	
Sum	7	4	13	7	

- Crash reproduction: exercise stack trace
 - state-of-the-art:
 - BugRedux (based on symbolic execution)
 - Experiment setup
 - reuse original BugRedux benchmark
 - determine whether or not crash can be reproduced

	Subjects	BugRedux	AFLGo	Comments
	sed.fault1	X	X	Takes two files as input
	sed.fault2	X	/	
	grep	X	1	
	gzip.fault1	X	1	
	gzip.fault2	X	1	
	ncompress	1	/	
	polymorph	1	1	

Thank you!

Questions?