# SELECTED TOPICS 2 AI SECURITY



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Thanks to Nicolas Papernot, Ian Goodfellow, Somesh Jha and Jerry Zhu for some slides.


• Machine learning brings social disruption at scale



Transportation
Source: Google




Education
Source: Gradescope



Healthcare Source: Peng and Gulshan (2017)


• Machine learning is not magic






**Training data** 

Machine learning is not magic



- Machine learning is deployed in adversarial settings
- Training data poisoning
  - During training, machine learning algorithms search for the most accessible pattern that correlates pixels to labels.




• Machine learning does not always generalize well




Training data Test data

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Attacks on the machine learning pipeline



- I.I.D. Machine LearningI: Independent, I: Identically, D: Distributed
- All train and test examples drawn independently from same distribution




- Security Requires Moving Beyond I.I.D.
  - Not identical: attackers can use unusual inputs
  - Not independent: attacker can repeatedly send a single mistake




(Eykholt et al, 2017)

### TRAINING TIME ATTACK




#### TRAINING TIME ATTACK

- Setting: attacker perturbs training set to fool a model on a test set
- Training data from users is fundamentally a huge security hole




#### MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACK



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
- Model theft: extract model parameters by queries (intellectual property theft)
  - $\circ$  Given a classifier F
  - $\circ$  Query F on q1,...,qn and learn a classifier G
  - $\circ$   $F \approx G$
- Goals: leverage active learning literature to develop new attacks and preventive techniques

#### ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES




#### ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES


 Adversarial examples are inputs to machine learning models that an attacker has intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake.



- Code Search
  - given two pieces of binary code (e.g., binary functions)
    - maybe in different architectures
    - maybe by different compilation configs
      - compilers
      - compiler versions
      - optimization levels
      - other options
  - check if they are semantically equivalent or similar



• Gemini [CCS'17]




• Gemini [CCS'17]

3. After the last iteration, the embeddings on all vertexes are aggregated together


2. In each iteration, the embedding on each vertex is propagated to its neighbors

1. Initially, each vertex has an embedding vector computed from each code block



4. An affine transformation is applied in the end to compute the embedding for the graph

• Gemini [CCS'17]



- Alias analysis
  - Given a control flow, it assigns each instruction into different memory region (Heap, Stack, global).
  - Tracks down a-locs: register, memory call on stack, heap or global.
  - Compute a value set for each a-loc: (global, stack, heap).
  - Identify memory alias according to the value sets.


```
m(a) {
    b = a;
    x = a.f;
    y = b.f;
}
```

- Alias analysis
  - Complete trace: 100% correctly identify the alias pairs.
  - Incomplete trace: mark 60% of the memory pairs as may-alias.

Incomplete trace

	[esp]	[0xC4]	[0xC8]	[eax]	[ebx]	[esp+4]
[esp]	-	0	0	0	0	0
[0xC4]	NA	-	0	0	0	0
[8xc8]	NA	0	-	0	0	0
[eax]	NA	?	?	-	0	1
[ebx]	NA	?	?	?	1	0
[esp+4]	NA	?	?	?	?	-

- DeepVSA [USENIX SEC'19]
  - use bi-directional LSTM
  - capture the sequential dependence within input sequence
    - forward sequential dependence
    - backward sequential dependence



# THANK YOU! QUESTIONS?