Mobile Security: Framework Analysis

Yue Duan

Outline

Research paper:

- EdgeMiner: Automatically Detecting Implicit
 Control Flow Transitions through the Android
 Framework
- Kratos: Discovering Inconsistent Security
 Policy Enforcement in the Android
 Framework



EdgeMiner: Automatically Detecting Implicit Control Flow Transitions through the Android Framework

Yinzhi Cao, Yanick Fratantonio, Antonio Bianchi, Manuel Egele, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, and Yan Chen

NDSS 2015

Introduction

- Static analysis has been used for security and privacy
- Many analyses rely on the control flow graph
- Challenge:
 - ignoring the framework ⇒ incorrect control flow
 - common cause for imprecision: 'callbacks', e.g., onClick
 - analyzing the framework ⇒ 8.6 million lines of code
 - no existing research


Motivating Example

```
1 public class MainClass {
     static String url;
     public static void main(String[] args) {
          MalComparator mal = new MalComparator();
          MainClass.value = 42
          Collections.sort(list, mal);
6
          sendToInternet(MainClass.v
         Privacy leakage is up to the value of MainClass.value.
10 public class MalComparator implements Comparable<Object> {
    public int compare(Object arg0, Object rg1) {
      MainClass.value = GPSCoords
12
      return 0;
14
```

Existing Approaches

- Whole program analysis
 - state explosion
 - redundant efforts (slow-down of static analysis)
- Summary-based analysis
 - extensive manual efforts
 - incomplete due to the high volume of callbacks
 - heuristic summarization: inaccurate


Existing Approaches



```
//Ljava/util/LinkedList;.add
{
    signature = "<java.util.LinkedList: boolean add(java.lang.Object)>";
    stod = new LinkedHashMap<Integer, List<Integer>>();
    source = new Integer(0);
    dests = new ArrayList<Integer>();
    dests.add(new Integer(thisObject));
    stod.put(source, dests);
    summary.put(signature, stod);
}
```

EdgeMiner

Summarize framework: list of registration-callback pairs



Concepts

- Callbacks
 - necessary condition: a framework method that can be overridden by an application method
- Registration
 - necessary condition: a framework method that is invokable from the application space


A Data Flow

```
1 public class Collections { Registration Argument
2 public static void sort List list, Comparator comparator {
3 ...
4 comparator compare(e1, e2); Data Flow Backward Data
5 } An object with the Callback Flow Analysis
6 } callback
```

Implementation

- ROP intermediate representation (IR)
 - Well-suited for static analysis
 - SSA format
 - Integral part of Android SDK
- EdgeMiner
 - built on top of ROP
 - performs backward dataflow analysis
 - summarizes implicit control flows through framework

System Architecture



Implementation

- Preprocessing
 - transforms individual methods into SSA format
 - extracts class hierarchy
 - need for generating an over-approximation of the call graph
 - generates call graph
 - necessary for data-flow analysis
- Potential callback callsites
 - The method is public or protected.
 - The class in which the method is declared has a public or protected modifier.
 - The method is not final or static.
 - The class in which the method is declared does not have the final modifier.
 - The class in which the method is declared is an interface or has at least one explicitly or implicitly declared, public or protected constructor.

- Tested on Android 2.3, 3.0 and 4.2 frameworks
- Number of registrations and callbacks

Android Version	# Registrations	# Callbacks	# Pairs	H
2.3 (API 10)	10,998	11,044	1,926,543	
3.0 (API 11)	12,019	13,391	2,606,763	
4.2 (API 17)	21,388	19,647	5,125,472	

Accuracy

- False negative
 - compare with dynamic approach
 - incomplete but accurate
 - 8,195 randomly selected applications
 - 6,906 registration-callback pairs
 - EdgeMiner finds all pairs
- False positive
 - against manual inspection
 - 8 FP out of 200 pairs

Improving Static Analyzer

- Integration with FlowDroid
 - synchronous callbacks: inline invocation
 - e.e., collections.sort and Comparator.compare
 - asynchronous callbacks: delayed invocation
 - e.g., setOnClickListener and onClick
- Patterns of callbacks used by FlowDroid and identified by

Pattern	# FlowDroid	# EdgeMiner
Listener	155	576
Callback	19	319
On	3	509
None of the above	4	18,243
Total	181	19,647

Improving Static Analyzer

- Run 9 new apps in TaintDroid
 - 4 verified, 2 crash and 3 no leak
- Incorrect call graph → missed privacy leaks
- Performance
 - 34.7 seconds one-time loading
 - only 1.85% overhead added to Flowdroid

Tool	FlowDroid	FlowDroid + EdgeMiner
# Apps with ≥ 1 privacy leak	285	294 (285 + 9)
# Privacy leaks (in total)	46,586	51,418
# Apps timeout	48	48

Kratos: Discovering Inconsistent Security Policy Enforcement in the Android Framework

Yuru Shao, Jason Ott, Qi Alfred Chen, Zhiyun Qian, Z. Morley Mao

NDSS 2016


Security Policy Enforcement

- Security policies regulate access to
 - sensitive data
 - system resources
 - privileged operations
- Policies need to be correctly enforced

Motivation


The enforcement of a security policy on different code paths can be inconsistent

- Inconsistencies do exist
- According to the Android documentation
 - apps that hold a CALL_PHONE permission can end phone calls




Security Implication

Privilege escalation







Existing Research

- Inconsistent security policy enforcement is also found in SELinux and Xen [AutoISES Usenix Sec'08]
 - unauthorized user account access
 - permanent data loss
- No solution for Android framework
 - prior work is OS specific
 - Android has no explicitly defined policies


Problem Statement

- Focus on the Android framework
- Seek to answer the following question:
 - How can we systematically detect inconsistent security policy enforcement <u>without any knowledge of the policies</u>?

Approach


- Discover <u>app-accessible service interfaces</u> that have overlaps in functionality
 - expected to have consistent security enforcement
- Perform a <u>differential analysis</u> on security checks that two overlapping interfaces employ

Differential Analysis



enforcePhone() checks if the caller's UID is 1001 (RADIO)


Pruning



enforcePhone() checks if the caller's UID is 1001 (RADIO)

App-accessible Service Interfaces


- Analysis scope:
 - system services perform enforcement
- Service interfaces
 - AIDL (Android interface definition language) methods
 - broadcast receivers



Security Checks

- Security enforcement:
 - a set of security checks
- Kratos formulates 4 types of checks
 - permission check
 - UID/PID check
 - package name check
 - thread status check

Kratos Design



Implementation

- Support AOSP and customized frameworks
 - obtain java classes from
 - intermediate building output (AOSP)
 - decompiled dex files (customized)
- Build a precise framework call graph
 - points-to analysis using Spark
 - create an artificial and static entry point including app app-accessible service interfaces
- Perform data-flow analysis
 - identify security check methods
 - collect system services

- 6 different Android codebases
 - AOSP 4.4, 5.0, 5.1 and M preview
 - HTC one, Samsung Galaxy Note 3
- Accuracy

Codebase	# Inconsistencies	# TP	# FP	Precision	# Exploitable
Android 4.4	21	16	5	76.2%	8
Android 5.0	61	50	11	82.0%	11
Android 5.1	63	49	14	77.8%	10
M Preview	73	58	15	79.5%	8
AT&T HTC One	29	20	9	69.0%	8
T-Mobile Samsung Galaxy Note 3	128	102	26	79.7%	10

- False positive
 - two interfaces are not equivalent in functionality
 - \circ points-to analysis \Rightarrow over-approximated results
- not all inconsistencies are exploitable
 - difficult to construct valid arguments
 - difficult to trigger particular privileged methods


Found 14 vulnerabilities



- 5 out of 14 affect all codebases
- bug reports confirmed by Google


Case Study 1

Bypass system permission to change HTTP proxy settings



Case Study 3

Send arbitrary requests to the radio hardware without any permission



Other Observations

- 11 vulnerable interfaces are <u>hidden</u> to apps
 - not available in the Android SDK
 - invoke using Java reflection
- AOSP frameworks
 - new system services introduce new inconsistencies
 - lead to new vulnerabilities
- Customized frameworks
 - Samsung added many system services
 - introduced 2 additional vulnerabilities
 - 1 vulnerability in AOSP was fixed

Thank you!

Questions?