


Introduction to Mobile Security

Yue Duan



Introduction to Android


- Kernel layer
 - Linux
 - Binder for IPC
 - Low-level resource management
- Middleware layer
 - Unique to Android
 - Framework
 - high-level resource management
 - Runtime
 - Dalvik Virtual Machine
 - Android Runtime (ART)
- Application layer
 - System applications
 - User applications



Introduction to Android


- Android framework
 - Resources management such as location, telephony, etc
 - Largely in Java
 - Access control enforcement: permissions

```
@RequiresPermission(anyOf = {ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION, ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION})  
@Nullable  
public Location getLastKnownLocation(@NonNull String provider) {  
    checkProvider(provider);  
    String packageName = mContext.getPackageName();  
    LocationRequest request = LocationRequest.createFromDeprecatedProvider(  
        provider, 0, 0, true);  
  
    try {  
        return mService.getLastLocation(request, packageName);  
    } catch (RemoteException e) {  
        throw e.rethrowFromSystemServer();  
    }  
}
```



Introduction to Android

- Android framework




```
/** @hide */
@SystemApi
@RequiresPermission(android.Manifest.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE)
public boolean disableDataConnectivity() {
    try {
        ITelephony telephony = getITelephony();
        if (telephony != null)
            return telephony.disableDataConnectivity();
    } catch (RemoteException e) {
        Log.e(TAG, "Error calling ITelephony#disableDataConnectivity", e);
    }
    return false;
}
```

Introduction to Android

- Runtime


- Where Android applications can be installed and executed
- Dalvik virtual machine
 - Before Android 5.0
 - Bytecode interpreter
 - Similar to JVM but a register-based machine
 - Has performance issues
- After Android 5.0
 - Android Runtime (ART)
 - Native code
 - Huge performance boost



android

Introduction to Android

The life of an APK



Introduction to Android

- Android applications
 - Resource files
 - Dex files
 - Android Manifest file

assets	970 770	884 417
com	4 386	2 997
kotlin	26 742	9 507
lib	10 791 552	5 420 469
META-INF	818 486	275 261
net	905	309
okhttp3	34 000	34 015
org	907	520
res	10 365 043	9 269 409
AndroidManifest.xml	54 436	10 082
classes.dex	7 519 812	3 057 722
classes2.dex	7 551 680	2 946 555
miui_push_version	237	213
pom.xml	1 552	547
resources.arsc	1 457 196	1 457 196

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
    package="com.homeandlearn.ken.twoactivities">

    <application
        android:allowBackup="true"
        android:icon="@mipmap/ic_launcher"
        android:label="TwoActivities"
        android:roundIcon="@mipmap/ic_launcher_round"
        android:supportRtl="true"
        android:theme="@style/AppTheme">
        <activity android:name=".MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />

                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <activity android:name=".SecondActivity"></activity>
    </application>

</manifest>
```

Introduction to Android

- Android applications
 - Can be written in Java or C++ (most likely in Java)
 - Java compiled into Dex (Dalvik Executable) bytecode

```
public boolean offer(E e) {
    checkNotNull(e);
    final ReentrantLock lock = this.lock;
    lock.lock();
    try {
        if (count == items.length)
            return false;
        else {
            enqueue(e);
            return true;
        }
    } finally {
        lock.unlock();
    }
}
```



```
.METHOD offer : boolean
    .PARAM java.lang.Object
    .MODIFIERS public
    .REGISTERS 5
    .ANNOTATION dalvik.annotation.Signature
        value=["(TE;)Z"]
    .CODE
        1190288  invoke-static {v4}, meth@12229
        1190294  iget-object v0, v3 field@4169
        1190298  invoke-virtual {v0}, meth@14543
                .TRY #0
        1190304  iget v1, v3 field@4166
        1190308  iget-object v2, v3 field@4167
        1190312  array-length v2, v2
                .CATCH
                        ALL address:1190344
        1190314  if-ne v1, v2, 7
        1190318  const/4 v1, #0
        1190320  invoke-virtual {v0}, meth@14549
        1190326  return v1
                .TRY #1
        1190328  invoke-direct {v3, v4}, meth@12236
                .CATCH
                        ALL address:1190344
        1190334  const/4 v1, #1
        1190336  invoke-virtual {v0}, meth@14549
        1190342  goto -8
        1190344  move-exception v1
        1190346  invoke-virtual {v0}, meth@14549
        1190352  throw v1
```



Introduction to Android

- Android applications

- Four major components
 - Activity
 - Service
 - Content provider
 - Broadcast receiver


- Intent

- Used as inter-component signaling
- Example:
 - start an activity
 - Query a content provider



Introduction to Android


- Activity
 - Each activity is a 'screen' in app
 - One app can have multiple activities
 - **Intent** is used to launch an activity
 - Can be invisible/transparent
 - Security consequences!



Introduction to Android


- Activity

- Lifecycle
- Multiple entry points
- No explicit control flow within Android apps
- Make program analysis harder



Introduction to Android

- Service Component
 - Background processing
 - Download a file
 - Play music
 - Multiple interfaces
 - Control: start, stop
 - Method invocation: bind
 - Service lifecycle
 - Similar to activity lifecycle



Introduction to Android

- Permission system

- Used for access control to sensitive APIs
- Sensitive APIs:
 - Send text message
 - Retrieve location
 - Access your contacts
 - etc
- Android apps need to request permissions at installation time

```
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"></uses-permission>
```

- Security:
 - Over-privilege issue
 - Hard to understand
 - Repackaged apps

Android Security Analysis

- Android application analysis
 - Vulnerability analysis
 - Component hijacking vulnerability
 - Information leakage
 - Collusion attacks
 - etc
 - Malware analysis
 - packing techniques
- Android framework analysis
 - Inconsistent security policy
 - Implicit control flow transitions

Android Security Analysis

- Component hijacking vulnerability
 - Export components
 - Publicly available
 - Can be launched by other components from a different app
 - Accidentally share permissions


```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
    xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools">

    <application tools:ignore="GoogleAppIndexingWarning">
        <activity
            android:name="com.samples.medium.SecondaryActivity"
            android:exported="true"
            android:screenOrientation="sensorLandscape"/>
    </application>

</manifest>
```


Android Security Analysis

- Component hijacking vulnerability




Android Security Analysis

- Collusion attack
 - Multiple apps work together
 - Communicate via intent
 - stealthier




Android Security Analysis


- Information leakage



Packing techniques



Packing techniques



Packing techniques

4.1 MB

```
./apktool.yml
./AndroidManifest.xml
./smali
./smali/com
./smali/com/example
./smali/com/example/hellojni
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$color.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$layout.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$string.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/HelloJni.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$dimen.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$mipmap.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$integer.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$style.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$id.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$bool.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$anim.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$styleable.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$drawable.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$attr.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/BuildConfig.smali
./original
./original/META-INF
./original/META-INF/ALIAS_NA.SF
./original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
./original/META-INF/ALIAS_NA.RSA
./original/AndroidManifest.xml
./lib
./lib/armeabi-v7a
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libhello-jni.so
```

After packing

1 KB

```
./apktool.yml
./AndroidManifest.xml
./smali
./smali/com
./smali/com/ali
./smali/com/ali/fixHelper.smali
./smali/com/example
./smali/com/example/hellojni
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$color.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$layout.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$string.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/HelloJni.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$dimen.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$mipmap.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$integer.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$style.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$id.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$bool.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$anim.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$styleable.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$drawable.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/R$attr.smali
./smali/com/example/hellojni/BuildConfig.smali
./original
./original/META-INF
./original/META-INF/ALIAS_NA.SF
./original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
./original/META-INF/ALIAS_NA.RSA
./original/AndroidManifest.xml
./lib
./lib/armeabi-v7a
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libpreverify1.so
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libdemolishdata
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libdemolish.so
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libdemolishdata.so
./lib/armeabi-v7a/libhello-jni.so
```

Framework analysis

- Framework
 - Sensitive resources protection
 - Even experts can make mistakes
 - Severe consequences

```
/**
 * Used by device administration to set the maximum screen off timeout.
 *
 * This method must only be called by the device administration policy manager
 */
@Override // Binder call
public void setMaximumScreenOffTimeoutFromDeviceAdmin(int timeMs) {
    final long ident = Binder.clearCallingIdentity();
    try {
        setMaximumScreenOffTimeoutFromDeviceAdminInternal(timeMs);
    } finally {
        Binder.restoreCallingIdentity(ident);
    }
}
```

They know the use of this method should be restricted but did not apply any security checks


```
@Override
public boolean havePassword(int userId) throws RemoteException {
    // Do we need a permissions check here?
    return new File(getLockPasswordFilename(userId)).length() > 0;
}

@Override
public boolean havePattern(int userId) throws RemoteException {
    // Do we need a permissions check here?
    return new File(getLockPatternFilename(userId)).length() > 0;
}
```

Android framework developers lack knowledge of security policies that should be enforced

Framework analysis

- Security protection inconsistency
 - An app can use either of the two interfaces to update configs
 - Two interfaces enforce different permissions



Summary

- Understand Android system design
 - Uniqueness of Android
 - Framework
 - Android runtime
- Introduce basics of Android applications
 - Four components
 - Permission system
- Present Android security problems
 - Application vulnerabilities
 - Framework issues
 - Packing techniques

Thank you!!
Questions?