

SPAM BASICS



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
SPAM

- A registered trademark
- Unwanted message was inspired by the 1970 SPAM Monty Python's Flying Circus.
- Was first applied to messages that were used to **scroll other messages off** user screens
- To respect the trademark, we call it “spam” rather than “SPAM.”



SPAM

3rd QUATER SPAM STATISTICS FY2018-2019



Source: UTEP INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICE

SPAM

Common Email Spam File Types



94% of malware is delivered via email



Office doc files



Windows apps



Other

Source: Verizon report 2021

SPAM

- Submit the same message to a **large group** of individuals.
- In an effort to force the message onto people who would otherwise choose not to receive this message.
- A message is spam only if it is both **Unsolicited and Bulk**.
 - Unsolicited Email is normal (examples: job enquiries)
 - Bulk Email is normal (examples: subscriber newsletters)

HOW EMAIL WORKS

- The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (**SMTP**) is an internet standard communication protocol for electronic mail transmission.

```
S: 220 smtp.example.com ESMTP Postfix
C: HELO relay.example.com
S: 250 smtp.example.com, I am glad to meet you
C: MAIL FROM:<bob@example.com>
S: 250 Ok
C: RCPT TO:<alice@example.com>
S: 250 Ok
C: RCPT TO:<theboss@example.com>
S: 250 Ok
C: DATA
S: 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
C: From: "Bob Example" <bob@example.com>
C: To: Alice Example <alice@example.com>
C: Cc: theboss@example.com
C: Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2008 16:02:43 -0500
C: Subject: Test message
C:
C: Hello Alice.
C: This is a test message with 5 header fields and 4 lines in the message body.
C: Your friend,
C: Bob
C: .
S: 250 Ok: queued as 12345
C: QUIT
S: 221 Bye
{The server closes the connection}
```

HOW EMAIL WORKS

- Sender (SMTP client) establishes a reliable communication channel
- Initiation
- Receiver and bounce address
- Data transmission
- Session ended


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HOW EMAIL WORKS



WHY SPAM STILL A PROBLEM?

- Email system design
 - Headers allow spoofing
- Identity concealing
 - Bot-networks
 - Open proxies
 - Open mail relays
 - Untraceable Internet connection
- Available bulk email tools

EMAIL SYSTEM DESIGN

- SMTP designed for a trusting world
 - email is **not private**
 - can be **altered** en route
 - **no way to validate** the identify of the email source
 - **MAIL FROM** under total control of sender
 - Recipient's mail server only sees IP address of direct peer (recorded in the first **From** header)
- SMTP-AUTH (IETF RFC 4954)
 - an extension of the SMTP

EMAIL SYSTEM DESIGN

- Headers are unreliable, can be used for spoofing
 - Insert fictitious email addresses in the From: lines

Check out the view



Inbox x

? Donald Trump <potus@whitehouse.gov>

to dft

from: Donald Trump <potus@whitehouse.gov>

to: dft@tweney.com

date: Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 9:35 PM

subject: Check out the view

[MEMBER FOR \\$19/year.](#)

The view from my office is just amazing! It's really terrific!

```
<?php
$to      = 'nobody@example.com';
$subject = 'the subject';
$message = 'hello';
$headers = 'From: webmaster@example.com' . "\r\n";
mail($to, $subject, $message, $headers);
?>
```

IDENTITY CONCEALING: BOT-NETWORKS


- Compromised machines running malicious software
- Once infected, spammer can send spam from it
- The bot software **hides itself and periodically checks for instructions** from the administrator
- Emails appear to come from **legitimate users**
- Example botnets:
 - Phatbot had 400,000 bots
 - Bobax : assimilated machines with high speed Internet connection

IDENTITY CONCEALING: OPEN PROXIES

- An open proxy is one which will create connections for any client to any server, without authentication
 - SOCKS
 - HTTPS
- Possible for a computer to be running an open proxy server without knowledge of the computer's owner
- More difficult to detect when chain of open proxies used

IDENTITY CONCEALING: OPEN PROXIES

- Web caching proxy (HTTP/HTTPS proxy) e.g., Squid




- To spam:

```
CONNECT SpamRecipient-IP 25
SMTP Commands
```

- Squid becomes a mail relay ...

IDENTITY CONCEALING: OPEN MAIL RELAYS



- An email server configured to allow **anyone** on the Internet to relay email through it.
- Network address of spammer appears in one of the Received: headers
- Add **fake** Received: headers


OPEN RELAYS VS. OPEN PROXIES

- HTTP proxy design problem:
 - Port 25 should have been blocked by default
 - Otherwise, violates principle of least privilege
- Relay vs. proxy
 - Relay takes list of address and send msg to all
 - Proxy: spammer must send msg body to each recipient through proxy.

==> zombies typically provide hacked mail relays

COMBINING OPEN PROXY AND OPEN RELAY

- Establish TCP connection with Open Proxy1
- Connect with Open Proxy2
- Send email to Open Relay through this chain
- Forward to destination SMTP server




IDENTITY CONCEALING: UNTRACEABLE INTERNET CONNECTION

- Public Internet cafes
- Free/stolen wireless connections
- Connections need not identify users
- Hence they need not hide network address
 - Send email directly to spam recipients
 - No way to associate email accounts with the spammer

BULK EMAIL TOOLS (SPAMWARE)

- SPAMWARE automates:
 - Message personalization
 - Mailing list and proxy list management



SPAM COUNTERMEASURES

- Blacklists
- Graylists
- Puzzles and CAPTCHA
- Sender verification
- Spam filter

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: BLACKLISTS

- RBL: Realtime Blackhole Lists
 - Includes servers or ISPs that generate spams
 - e.g., spamhaus.org , spamcop.net
- Effectiveness (stats from spamhaus.org):
 - RBL can stop about 15 - 25% of incoming spam at SMTP connection time
 - Over 90% of spam with message body URI checks
- Spammers evade blacklists by hiding its source IP address

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: GRAYLISTS


- Recipient's mail server records triples:
 - (sender email, recipient email, peer IP)
 - Mail server maintains DB of triples
- First time : triple not in DB
 - Mail server sends 421 reply: "I am busy"
 - Records triple in DB
- Second time (after 5 minutes): allow email to pass
- Triples kept for 3 days (configurable)
- Easy to defeat but currently works ok

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: PUZZLES AND CAPTCHA

- General DDoS defense techniques
- Puzzles : slow down spam server
 - Every email contains solution to puzzle where
 - challenge = (sender, recipient, time)
- CAPTCHA – Every email contains a token
 - Sender obtains tokens from a CAPTCHA server
 - Say: 100 tokens for solving a CAPTCHA
 - CAPTCHA server ensures tokens are not reused
- Either method is difficult to deploy

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SENDER VERIFICATION I: SPF

- SPF: sender policy framework
- Goal: prevent spoof email claiming to be from Hotmail
 - Why? Bounce messages flood HotMail system




Check if SenderIP is in the list

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SENDER VERIFICATION II: DKIM

- DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
 - Same goal as SPF
 - Harder to spoof
- Basic idea:
 - Sender's message transfer agent (MTA) signs email
 - Including body and selected header fields
 - Receiver's mail user agent (MUA) checks signature
 - Rejects email if invalid
 - Sender's public key managed by DNS
 - Subdomain: **domainkey.hotmail.com**

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SENDER VERIFICATION II: DKIM



SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SENDER VERIFICATION II: DKIM

Submitted to signer	After signing
<p>From: John Doe <jdoe@anydomain.com> To: Jane Doe <jane@otherdomain.com> Subject: Test message Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 18:00:20 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <20060228010020.32345.5F7J@anydomain.com></p> <p>This is a test.</p> <p>Please reply to this message to confirm you have in fact received it.</p> <p>Thanks.</p>	<p>DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; s=newyork; d=anydomain.com; c=simple; q=dns; i=jdoe@anydomain.com; h=Received : From : To : Subject : Date : Message-ID; b=r6YHkli98DSewl2OPjIkd43SDeru78PI9iOu30wQdfE398KjHtGYJhBvCx65Mkl9</p> <p>Received: from mail.anydomain.com [10.2.3.4] by submitserver.anydomain.com with SUBMISSION; Tue, 28 Feb 2006 18:01:34 -0700 (PDT)</p> <p>From: John Doe <jdoe@anydomain.com> To: Jane Doe <jane@otherdomain.com> Subject: Test message Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2006 18:00:20 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <20060228010020.32345.5F7J@anydomain.com></p> <p>This is a test.</p> <p>Please reply to this message to confirm you have in fact received it.</p> <p>Thanks.</p> <div>Signature header added. Contains tags specifying various signing and key selection info (e.g. signing algorithm, signed header field info, key)</div>

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING

- Goal 1: No false positives
 - i.e., valid email ranked as spam
 - 0.02% more realistic
- Goal 2: No false negatives
 - i.e., spam email marked as valid
 - 8% more realistic
- Filters must be adaptive
 - Machine learning and data mining
 - Statistical methods
- Customizable policies per user group

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - CONTENT FILTERING

- Example: SpamAssassin
- a **rule-based** spam filter
 - Many rules to give scores for all fields in an email
 - e.g., Email header, special keywords in email, URLs in email
 - Final decision is the combined score compared with a threshold
 - Has false positive and false negative
 - False positive is very **damaging**! Nobody wants to lose an important email!
- Also contains Bayesian filtering to match a user's statistical profile
 - Need "ham" (wanted) and "spam" (unwanted) samples for training

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - CONTENT FILTERING

- Bayesian Spam Filtering
 - Tokenize mail content into words or phrases
 - Use a classified training set of spam and ham messages to derive conditional probabilities for each token
 - Use Bayes' Theorem to **calculate a probability** that a new message is spam based on these learned conditional probabilities
- Bayes' Theorem: $P(A|B) P(B) = P(B|A)P(A)$


SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - CONTENT FILTERING

- Problems with Content Filtering
 - **Low cost to evasion**: Spammers can easily alter features of an email's content can be easily adjusted and changed
 - Customized emails are **easy to generate**: Content - based filters need fuzzy hashes over content, etc.
 - **High cost to filter maintainers**: Filters must be continually updated as content - changing techniques become more sophisticated

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - NETWORK-BASED




- Network-Based Filtering
 - Filter email based on **how** it is sent, in addition to simply **what** is sent
 - Network-level properties are less malleable
 - Set of target recipients
 - Hosting or upstream ISP (AS number)
 - Membership in a botnet (spammer, hosting infrastructure)
 - Network location of sender and receiver
- Key idea: find **invariants**

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - NETWORK-BASED



- **Spammer's sending pattern has not changed**

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - NETWORK-BASED



SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - NETWORK-BASED

- Feature: **Distribution** of email sending volumes across recipient domains
- Clustering Approach
 - Build initial seed list of bad IP addresses
 - For each IP address, compute feature vector
 - volume per domain per time interval
 - Collapse into a single IP x domain matrix
 - Compute clusters
- Classifying IP Addresses
 - Given “new” IP address, build a **feature vector** based on its sending pattern across domains
 - Compute the similarity of this sending pattern to that of each known spam cluster

SPAM COUNTERMEASURES: SPAM FILTERING - EVASION

- Problem: Malicious senders could add noise
 - Solution: Use smaller number of trusted domains
- Problem: Malicious senders could change sending behavior to emulate “normal” senders
 - Use additional features and combine for more robust classification
 - Temporal: interarrival times, diurnal patterns
 - Spatial: sending patterns of groups of senders

SPAM BASICS

THANK YOU!
QUESTIONS?