

# **CSC 252: Computer Organization**

## **Spring 2026: Lecture 9**

Instructor: Yuhao Zhu

Department of Computer Science  
University of Rochester




# Today: Data Structures and Buffer Overflow

- Arrays
  - One-dimensional
  - Multi-dimensional (nested)
- Structures
  - Allocation
  - Access
  - Alignment
- Buffer Overflow

# Array Allocation: Basic Principle

$T$  **A**[ $L$ ];


- Array of data type  $T$  and length  $L$
- Contiguously allocated region of  $L * \text{sizeof}(T)$  bytes in memory




# Byte Ordering

- How are the bytes of a multi-byte variable ordered in memory?
- Example
  - Variable x has 4-byte value of 0x01234567
  - Address given by &x is 0x100
- Conventions
  - **Big Endian**: Sun, PPC Mac, IBM z, Internet
    - Most significant byte has lowest address (**MSB first**)
  - **Little Endian**: x86, ARM
    - Least significant byte has lowest address (**LSB first**)

## Big Endian



## Little Endian



# Representing Integers



Hex: 00003B6D

Hex: FFFFC493

`int A = 15213;`

`int B = -15213;`


Address Increase  
↓



# Array Access: Basic Principle

$T$  **A**[ $L$ ];

- Array of data type  $T$  and length  $L$
- Identifier **A** can be used as a pointer to array element 0: Type  $T^*$




Reference	Type	Value
<code>val[4]</code>	<code>int</code>	3
<code>val</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x$
<code>val+1</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+4$
<code>val + i</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+4i$
<code>&amp;val[2]</code>	<code>int *</code>	$x+8$
<code>val[5]</code>	<code>int</code>	??
<code>*(val+1)</code>	<code>int</code>	5

# Multidimensional (Nested) Arrays

- Declaration

$T \ A[R][C];$

- 2D array of data type  $T$
- $R$  rows,  $C$  columns
- Type  $T$  element requires  $K$  bytes




- Array Size

- $R * C * K$  bytes

- Arrangement

- Row-Major Ordering in most languages, including C


`int A[R][C];`



# Nested Array Row Access

- $T \ A[R][C];$ 
  - $A[i]$  is array of  $C$  elements
  - Each element of type  $T$  requires  $K$  bytes
  - Starting address  $A + i * (C * K)$

`int A[R][C];`






# Nested Array Element Access

- Array Elements

- $A[i][j]$  is element of type  $T$ , which requires  $K$  bytes
- Address  $A + i * (C * K) + j * K = A + (i * C + j) * K$

```
int A[R][C];
```




# Today: Data Structures and Buffer Overflow

- Arrays
  - One-dimensional
  - Multi-dimensional (nested)
- Structures
  - Allocation
  - Access
  - Alignment
- Buffer Overflow

# Structures

```
struct rec {  
    int a[4];  
    double i;  
    struct rec *next;  
};
```




- Characteristics

- Contiguously-allocated region of memory
- Refer to members within struct by names
- Members may be of different types

# Access Struct Members


```
struct rec {  
    int a[4];  
    double i;  
    struct rec *next;  
};
```



- Given a struct, we can use the `.` operator:
  - `struct rec r1; r1.i = val;`
- Suppose we have a pointer `r` pointing to `struct res`. How to access `res`'s member using `r`?
  - Using `*` and `.` operators: `(*r).i = val;`
  - Or simply, the `->` operator for short: `r->i = val;`

# Generating Pointer to Structure Member

```
struct rec {  
    int a[4];  
    double i;  
    struct rec *next;  
};
```




```
int *get_ap  
    (struct rec *r, size_t idx)  
{  
    return &(r->a[idx]);  
}
```

$\&((\ast r).a[idx])$

```
# r in %rdi, idx in %rsi  
leaq  (%rdi,%rsi,4), %rax  
ret
```

# Alignment


- Unaligned Data



```
struct S1 {  
    char c;  
    int i[2];  
    double v;  
} *p;
```

- Aligned Data

- If the data type requires **K** bytes, address must be multiple of **K**



# Alignment Principles

- **Aligned Data**
  - If the data type requires  $K$  bytes, address must be multiple of  $K$
- **Required on some machines; advised on x86-64**
- **Motivation for Aligning Data: Performance**
  - Inefficient to load or store data that is unaligned
  - Some machines don't even support unaligned memory access
- **Compiler**
  - Inserts gaps in structure to ensure correct alignment of fields
  - `sizeof()` returns the actual size of structs (i.e., including padding)

# Specific Cases of Alignment (x86-64)


- **1 byte:** `char`, ...
  - no restrictions on address
- **2 bytes:** `short`, ...
  - lowest 1 bit of address must be  $0_2$
- **4 bytes:** `int`, `float`, ...
  - lowest 2 bits of address must be  $00_2$
- **8 bytes:** `double`, `long`, `char *`, ...
  - lowest 3 bits of address must be  $000_2$



# Satisfying Alignment with Structures

- Within structure:
  - Must satisfy each element's alignment requirement
- Overall structure placement
  - Structure length must be multiples of **K**, where:
    - **K** = Largest alignment of any element
  - **WHY?!**


```
struct S2 {  
    double v;  
    int i[2];  
    char c;  
} *p;
```



# Arrays of Structures

- Overall structure length multiple of K
- Satisfy alignment requirement for every element


```
struct S2 {  
    double v;  
    int i[2];  
    char c;  
} a[10];
```




# Saving Space

- Put large data types first in a Struct
- This is not something that a C compiler would always do
  - But knowing low-level details empower a C programmer to write more efficient code

```
struct S4 {  
    char c;  
    int i;  
    char d;  
} *p;
```



```
struct S5 {  
    int i;  
    char c;  
    char d;  
} *p;
```



# Return Struct Values

```
struct S{
    int a, b;
};

struct S foo(int c, int d){
    struct S retval;
    retval.a = c;
    retval.b = d;
    return retval;
}

void bar() {
    struct S test = foo(3, 4);
    fprintf(stdout, "%d, %d\n",
test.a, test.b);
    // you will get "3, 4" from
the terminal
}
```

- This is perfectly fine.
- A struct could contain many members, how would this work if the return value has to be in **%rax**??
- We don't have to follow that convention...
- If there are only a few members in a struct, we could return through a few registers.
- If there are lots of members, we could return through memory, i.e., requires memory copy.
- But either way, there needs to be some sort convention for returning struct.

# Return Struct Values

```
struct S{
    int a, b;
};

struct S foo(int c, int d){
    struct S retval;
    retval.a = c;
    retval.b = d;
    return retval;
}

void bar() {
    struct S test = foo(3, 4);
    fprintf(stdout, "%d, %d\n",
test.a, test.b);
    // you will get "3, 4" from
the terminal
}
```

- The entire calling convention is part of what's called Application Binary Interface (ABI), which specifies how **two binaries** should interact.
- ABI includes: ISA, data type size, calling convention, etc.
- API defines the interface as the **source code** (e.g., C) level.
- The OS and compiler have to agree on the ABI.
- Linux x86-64 ABI specifies that returning a struct with two scalar (e.g. pointers, or long) values is done via **%rax** & **%rdx**

# Today: Data Structures and Buffer Overflow

- Arrays
  - One-dimensional
  - Multi-dimensional (nested)
- Structures
  - Allocation
  - Access
  - Alignment
- Buffer Overflow

# String Library Code

- Implementation of Unix function `gets()`
  - No way to specify limit on number of characters to read
- Similar problems with other library functions
  - **`strcpy`, `strcat`**: Copy strings of arbitrary length
  - **`scanf`, `fscanf`, `sscanf`**, when given **`%s`** conversion specification

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char *gets(char *dest)
{
    int c = getchar();
    char *p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

# Vulnerable Buffer Code

```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

```
void call_echo() {  
    echo();  
}
```


```
unix>./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string:012345678901234567890123  
012345678901234567890123
```

```
unix>./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string:0123456789012345678901234  
Segmentation Fault
```



# Buffer Overflow Stack Example

Before call to gets



```
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
}
```

```
echo:  
    subq    $24, %rsp  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  
    call    gets  
    ...
```

`call_echo:`

```
. . .  
4006f1:    callq   4006cf <echo>  
4006f6:    add     $0x8,%rsp  
. . .
```

# Buffer Overflow Stack Example #1

After call to gets

Stack Frame for <code>call_echo</code>			
00	00	00	00
00	40	06	f6
00	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
}
```

```
echo:  
    subq    $24, %rsp  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  
    call    gets  
    ...
```

`call_echo:`

```
. . .  
4006f1:    callq   4006cf <echo>  
4006f6:    add     $0x8,%rsp  
. . .
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string: 01234567890123456789012  
01234567890123456789012
```

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

# Buffer Overflow Stack Example #2

After call to gets

Stack Frame for <code>call_echo</code>			
00	00	00	00
00	40	00	34
33	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
}
```

```
echo:  
    subq    $24, %rsp  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  
    call    gets  
    ...
```

`call_echo:`

```
. . .  
4006f1:    callq   4006cf <echo>  
4006f6:    add     $0x8,%rsp  
. . .
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string: 0123456789012345678901234  
Segmentation Fault
```

Overflowed buffer, and corrupt return address

# Buffer Overflow Stack Example #3

After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo			
00	00	00	00
00	40	06	00
33	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	29	28
27	26	25	24
23	22	21	20

buf ← %rsp

```
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
}
```

```
echo:  
    subq    $24, %rsp  
    movq    %rsp, %rdi  
    call    gets  
    ...
```

call\_echo:

```
. . .  
4006f1:    callq   4006cf <echo>  
4006f6:    add     $0x8,%rsp  
. . .
```

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp  
Type a string: 012345678901234567890123  
012345678901234567890123
```

**Overflowed buffer, corrupt return address, but program appears to still work!**

# Buffer Overflow Stack Example #4

After call to gets

Stack Frame for <code>call_echo</code>			
00	00	00	00
00	40	06	00
33	32	31	30
39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32
31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34
33	32	31	30

buf ← %rsp

`register_tm_clones:`

```
. . .  
400600:  mov    %rsp,%rbp  
400603:  mov    %rax,%rdx  
400606:  shr    $0x3f,%rdx  
40060a:  add    %rdx,%rax  
40060d:  sar    %rax  
400610:  jne    400614  
400612:  pop    %rbp  
400613:  retq
```

“Returns” to unrelated code  
Could be code controlled by attackers!

# What to do about buffer overflow attacks

- Avoid overflow vulnerabilities
- Employ system-level protections
- Have compiler use “stack canaries”

# 1. Avoid Overflow Vulnerabilities in Code (!)


```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    fgets(buf, 4, stdin);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

- For example, use library routines that limit string lengths
  - fgets instead of gets
  - strncpy instead of strcpy
  - Don't use scanf with %s conversion specification
    - Use fgets to read the string
    - Or use %ns where n is a suitable integer

## 2. System-Level Protections can help

- Randomized stack offsets


- At start of program, allocate random amount of space on stack
- Shifts stack addresses for entire program
- Makes it difficult for hacker to predict beginning of inserted code





## 2. System-Level Protections can help

- Nonexecutable code segments
  - In traditional x86, can mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”
  - Can execute anything readable
  - X86-64 added explicit “execute” permission
  - Stack marked as non-executable



Any attempt to execute  
this code will fail

# 3. Stack Canaries can help

- Idea

- Place special value (“canary”) on stack just beyond buffer
- Check for corruption before exiting function

- GCC Implementation


- `-fstack-protector`
- Now the default (disabled earlier)

```
unix>./bufdemo-sp  
Type a string:0123456  
0123456
```

```
unix>./bufdemo-sp  
Type a string:01234567  
*** stack smashing detected ***
```

# Setting Up Canary

Before call to gets




```
/* Echo Line */  
void echo()  
{  
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */  
    gets(buf);  
    puts(buf);  
}
```

```
echo:  
    . . .  
    movq    %fs:40, %rax    # Get canary  
    movq    %rax, 8(%rsp)  # Place on stack  
    xorl    %rax, %rax     # Erase canary  
    . . .
```

# Checking Canary

After call to gets



```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4]; /* Way too small! */
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

Input: **0123456**

buf ← %rsp

```
echo:
    . . .
    movq    8(%rsp), %rax    # Retrieve from stack
    xorq    %fs:40, %rax    # Compare to canary
    je      .L6              # If same, OK
    call    __stack_chk_fail # FAIL
.L6: . . .
```