Formal Method on Hardware Security

Oct 2022

CPU Models

Refinement Property

More CPU Models

More Properties on CPU

Single-trace Property and Hyperpropert

Example: Non-interference Property

An Estimation Schome: Taint Analysis

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► RTL Implementation

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- ► RTL Implementation
- ► ISA Specification

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- ► RTL Implementation
- ► ISA Specification: A set of implementations

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 - Not correct in Verilog, is a good property in Bluespec

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- ➤ The real implementation refines our model in the paper regarding to ... :)

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- RTL, but replace ALU with a symbolic-cycle ALU
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- Non-interference property: Say we have a combinational function $y_1, y_2 = f(x_1, x_2)$

$$x_1$$
 not interfere y_1 iff $\forall x_1, x_1', x_2,$ let $y_1, y_2 = f(x_1, x_2),$ $y_1', y_2' = f(x_1', x_2),$ we have, $y_1 = y_1'$

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Hyperproperty is a property on a multiple traces

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Verify it with single trace: taint analysis: for a function $y_1, y_2 = f(x_1, x_2)$, we design an augment $yt_1, yt_2 = ft(x_1, xt_1, x_2, xt_2)$, such that:

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Finally, let me show a tool to automatically augment verilog with Taint functions.

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Taint Analysis: Gate-Level Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT)

Augment at each gate

► More on https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5948366

Taint Analysis: Gate-Level Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT)

- Augment at each gate
- When compose gates together or compose cycles together, will be conservative.
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