



Security Council

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Letter dated 28 February 2023 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the 113th monthly report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) (see annex).

The report provides information on the activities of OPCW in implementing Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and the relevant provisions of the OPCW Executive Council decisions in relation to the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. It covers the period from 24 January to 23 February 2023.

As I have stated previously, the use of chemical weapons anywhere by anyone, and under any circumstances, is intolerable. Impunity for their use is equally unacceptable. It is imperative that those who have used chemical weapons be identified and held accountable. Unity in the Security Council is essential to achieve this urgent objective.

(Signed) António Guterres



Annex

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled “Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme”, prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 24 January to 23 February 2023 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(Signed) Fernando **Arias**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Report by the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons**Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme**

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2(f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”) at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1, dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) is to report to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#), the report by the Secretariat is also to be submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.
2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities” (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of that decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation “in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2(f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
3. The Council, at its Forty-Eighth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled “Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria” (EC-M-48/DEC.1, dated 4 February 2015), noting the Director-General’s intent to include reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), along with information on the Council’s discussion thereof, as part of the monthly reporting pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). Similarly, the Council, at its Eighty-First Session, adopted a decision entitled “Report by the Director-General Regarding the Declaration and Related Submissions by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-81/DEC.4, dated 23 March 2016), noting the Director-General’s intent to provide information on the implementation of that decision.
4. The Council, at its Eighty-Third Session, adopted a decision entitled “OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism Reports on Chemical Weapons Use in the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-83/DEC.5, dated 11 November 2016). In subparagraph 12(a) of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly inform the Council on the implementation of this decision and incorporate information regarding the implementation of this decision into his monthly reporting to the United Nations Security Council, through the United Nations Secretary-General, regarding EC-M-33/DEC.1”.
5. The Council, at its Ninety-Fourth Session, adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (EC-94/DEC.2, dated 9 July 2020). In paragraph 12 of that decision, the Council decided that the Director-General shall “regularly report to the Council on the implementation of this decision and decide[d] also that the Director-General shall provide a copy of this decision and its associated reports by the Secretariat to all States Parties and to the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly through the United Nations Secretary-General”.
6. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter “the Conference”) at its Twenty-Fifth Session adopted a decision entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” (C-25/DEC.9, dated 21 April 2021). In paragraph 8 of this decision, the Conference decided that the Director-General shall regularly report to the Council and States Parties on whether the Syrian

Arab Republic has completed all of the measures contained in paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

7. This, the 113th monthly report, is therefore submitted in accordance with the aforementioned Council and Conference decisions and includes information relevant to the period from 24 January to 23 February 2023.

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

8. Progress by the Syrian Arab Republic is as follows:

(a) As stated in previous reports, the Secretariat has verified the destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) declared by the Syrian Arab Republic;

(b) On 17 February 2023, the Syrian Arab Republic submitted to the Council its 111th monthly report (EC-102/P/NAT.5, dated 17 February 2023) regarding activities on its territory related to the destruction of its chemical weapons and CWPFs, as required by paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

Progress in the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons by States Parties hosting destruction activities

9. As stated in previous reports, all of the chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic that were removed from its territory in 2014 have been destroyed.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decisions EC-81/DEC.4 and EC-83/DEC.5

10. The Secretariat, through the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), continues its efforts to clarify all outstanding issues regarding the initial and subsequent declarations submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”), paragraph 1 of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, paragraph 3 of Council decision EC-81/DEC.4, paragraph 6 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, and paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

11. The last round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority took place in Damascus in February 2021. As reported previously, between 30 April 2021 and May 2022, all of the Secretariat’s efforts to organise the next round of consultations between the DAT and the Syrian National Authority remained unsuccessful.

12. Consequently, in May 2022 the Secretariat proposed the resumption of addressing declaration-related issues through exchange of correspondence, although this demonstrably brings fewer outcomes as compared to the DAT’s deployments to the Syrian Arab Republic. This had been the practice during the period between June 2016 and April 2019 (see the report by the Director-General to the Eighty-Second Session of the Council, EC-82/HP/DG.2*, dated 30 June 2016). This proposal was agreed to by the Syrian Arab Republic through a letter dated 31 May 2022.

13. Through its note verbale dated 14 September 2022, the Secretariat provided the Syrian Arab Republic with the list of pending declarations and other documents requested by the DAT since 2019 that could assist in resolving the current 20 outstanding issues.

14. As at the date of this report, the Secretariat still had not received any such pending declarations or other documents from the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes the complete declaration of activities at the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), and the declaration of quantities of nerve agents produced at

one CWPf that was declared by the Syrian Arab Republic as never having been used to produce chemical weapons, and declarations in accordance with paragraph 5 of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2.

15. In a further attempt to implement its mandate, considering the ongoing impossibility to organise a full round of consultations, the Secretariat deployed a reduced team comprised of some members of the DAT to conduct limited in-country activities (LICAs) in the Syrian Arab Republic from 17 to 22 January 2023. Prior to deployment, the Secretariat provided the Syrian National Authority with a list of activities for the mission, recalling that these would not involve any technical consultations between the Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority. Over the course of the mission, the reduced team conducted three site visits and one interview, shared the results of analysis of the samples related to one outstanding issue, and coordinated with the Syrian National Authority on logistical and administrative matters related to the mission.

16. The outcome of this mission will be included in the next report of the DAT ahead of the forthcoming 102nd Session of the Council, to be held from 14 to 17 March 2023.

17. The Secretariat remains fully committed to verifying the full implementation by the Syrian Arab Republic of all its declaration requirements and to assisting the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling its obligations under the Convention, policy-making organs' decisions, and United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#). The Secretariat also reiterates its earlier calls to the Syrian Arab Republic to submit pending declarations and documents and to fulfil all of its obligations, including to provide full and unfettered access to all locations and sites for all personnel designated by the Secretariat.

18. Considering the identified gaps, inconsistencies, and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the Secretariat assesses that the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-94/DEC.2, and United Nations Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#).

19. In accordance with paragraph 10 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is continuing to assess conditions for the conduct of inspections at the sites identified by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism in its third and fourth reports.

20. With regard to the inspections of the Barzah and Jamrayah facilities of the SSRC as mandated by paragraph 11 of Council decision EC-83/DEC.5, the Secretariat is continuing to plan the next round of inspections in 2023.

21. Concerning the detection of a Schedule 2.B.04 chemical during the third round of inspections at the Barzah facilities of the SSRC in November 2018, the Syrian Arab Republic has yet to provide sufficient technical information or explanations that would enable the Secretariat to close this issue.

Other activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

22. Following an invitation extended on 24 June 2021 by the Director-General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic to an in-person meeting, the Secretariat stands ready to engage further on an agreed agenda for the meeting through the agreed channel.

23. In a note verbale to the Secretariat dated 9 July 2021, the Syrian National Authority also reported the destruction in an attack on a CWPf of, inter alia, two chlorine cylinders used in the chemical weapons incident that took place in Douma,

the Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018. In its reply dated 15 July 2021, the Secretariat requested the Syrian Arab Republic to, inter alia, provide all relevant information regarding the unauthorised movement of the two cylinders from the site where they had been stored and inspected in November 2020, 60 kilometres away from the site where the cylinders were allegedly destroyed. As at the date of this report, the Secretariat had not received a response to this request. By note verbale dated 8 February 2023, the Syrian Arab Republic shared with the Secretariat pictures from the site where the cylinders were reportedly destroyed. While the Secretariat is analysing these pictures and will revert to the Syrian Arab Republic on the matter in due course, the Secretariat is still awaiting information related to the above-mentioned unauthorised movement of the cylinders. The Secretariat will keep the Council informed of further developments.

24. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) continues to provide support to the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement concluded between the OPCW, UNOPS, and the Syrian Arab Republic. This agreement facilitates the Secretariat's mandated activities in the Syrian Arab Republic pertaining to the full elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme, and to any subsequent decision or resolution of the relevant organs of the OPCW or the United Nations, as well as any bilateral agreements concluded between the OPCW and the Syrian Arab Republic. The current extension of the Tripartite Agreement remains in force up to and including 30 June 2023.

25. As at the cut-off date of this report, one OPCW staff member was deployed as part of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic.

Activities carried out with respect to the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria

26. Guided by Council decisions EC-M-48/DEC.1 and EC-M-50/DEC.1 (dated 4 February 2015 and 23 November 2015, respectively), as well as by United Nations Security Council resolution [2209 \(2015\)](#), the FFM continues to study all available information relating to allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

27. The FFM continues to fulfil its engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States Parties with regard to a number of incidents. The FFM deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic from 6 to 12 November 2022 to conduct interviews with witnesses regarding several of the incidents under review.

28. The FFM is preparing upcoming deployments and will report to the Council on the results of its work in due course.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Conference of the States Parties at its Fourth Special Session related to the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic

29. Pursuant to paragraph 10 of C-SS-4/DEC.3 (dated 27 June 2018), the Secretariat established the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the FFM determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism did not issue a report.

30. On 27 January 2023, the Secretariat issued a Note entitled "Third Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 'Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use', Douma (Syrian Arab Republic) – 7 April 2018" ([S/2125/2023](#), dated 27 January 2023). In this report,

the IIT concluded, on the basis of all the information obtained and its analysis, that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that, between 19:10 and 19:40 (UTC+3) on 7 April 2018, during a major military offensive aimed at regaining control of the city of Douma, at least one Mi-8/17 helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force, departing from Dumayr airbase and operating under the control of the Tiger Forces, dropped two yellow cylinders which hit two residential buildings in a central area of the city”, killing at least 43 named individuals and affecting dozens of others. As mandated by paragraph 10 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, the report was submitted to the Council and to the United Nations Secretary-General for their consideration.

31. On 2 February 2023, the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT briefed States Parties in The Hague on the report. Upon the invitation of the President of the United Nations Security Council, on 7 February 2023 the Director-General and the Coordinator of the IIT briefed the United Nations Security Council on the report.

32. The IIT is continuing its investigations in accordance with the Note entitled “Work of the Investigation and Identification Team Established by Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 (Dated 27 June 2018)” (EC-91/S/3, dated 28 June 2019) and will issue further reports in due course.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Executive Council decision EC-94/DEC.2

33. In paragraph 5 of decision EC-94/DEC.2, the Council decided to request, pursuant to paragraph 36 of Article VIII of the Convention, that the Syrian Arab Republic complete all of the following measures within 90 days of this decision in order to redress the situation:

(a) declare to the Secretariat the facilities where the chemical weapons, including precursors, munitions, and devices, used in the 24, 25, and 30 March 2017 attacks were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery;

(b) declare to the Secretariat all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses, including sarin, sarin precursors, and chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities;

(c) resolve all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile and programme.

34. At the end of the 90 days, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

35. With regard to the inspections mandated by paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2, the Secretariat is monitoring the current security situation and will inform the Syrian Arab Republic when it is prepared to deploy for this purpose.

Activities carried out by the Technical Secretariat with respect to Conference decision C-25/DEC.9

36. In paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9, the Conference decided, after careful review, and without prejudice to the Syrian Arab Republic’s obligations under the Convention, pursuant to subparagraph 21(k) of Article VIII and paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Convention, to suspend several rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention.

37. In paragraph 8 of the decision, the Conference decided, inter alia, that the rights and privileges of the Syrian Arab Republic suspended in accordance with paragraph 7 of decision C-25/DEC.9 are reinstated by the Conference once the Director-General has reported to the Council that the Syrian Arab Republic has completed all of the

measures stipulated in paragraph 5 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the date of this report, the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of these measures.

38. The Secretariat will continue to engage with the Syrian Arab Republic with regard to their completion and will continue to report to the Council as mandated.

Supplementary resources

39. The Trust Fund for Syria Missions was established in November 2015 to support the FFM and other remaining activities, which presently include the work of the DAT and the IIT, as well as the biannual inspections of the SSRC and the two sites identified in paragraph 8 of EC-94/DEC.2. As at the cut-off date of this report, total contributions and pledges to this fund stood at EUR 37.9 million. Contribution agreements had been concluded with Australia, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, and the European Union.

Conclusion

40. The future activities of the OPCW Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic will focus on the work of the FFM; the implementation of Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1, EC-81/DEC.4, and EC-83/DEC.5, including declaration-related issues; inspections at the Barzah and Jamrayah sites of the SSRC; the implementation of Conference decision C-SS-4/DEC.3; the implementation of Council decision EC-94/DEC.2; and the implementation of Conference decision C-25/DEC.9.
