

Executive Summary

We find a broad scholarly recognition that **formal citizenship rights** (legal status and entitlements “on paper”) often do not translate into **effective citizenship** in practice. Effective citizenship – sometimes termed **substantive citizenship** or “rights-as-practice” – refers to the actual capacity of individuals to exercise and benefit from their rights ¹ ². Numerous studies across sociology, political theory, and legal studies document a persistent gap between de jure rights and de facto rights, especially for marginalized groups. Crucially, this gap is framed as a **structural** phenomenon (e.g. due to social, economic, and institutional inequalities) rather than simply individual failure. Prior research on inequality has largely focused on how wealth disparities undermine equal enjoyment of rights (the “wealth → rights” direction). We found relatively little work explicitly arguing the reverse causal direction – that a **structural maldistribution of rights** (権利の構造的偏重) is a root cause of wealth maldistribution – which suggests that **Yuji's hypothesis** addresses a fresh angle. Nonetheless, related strands (e.g. theories of **extractive institutions** in political economy and the **capability approach**) imply that when rights and power are concentrated, economic inequalities tend to follow. Overall, the literature emphasizes making formal rights “real” through institutional reforms (e.g. welfare provisions, access-to-justice initiatives) so that all citizens can effectively participate in society. This sets the stage for Yuji’s proposed focus on how an unequal structure of rights might be the deeper driver of observed wealth inequality.

Key Findings per Research Question

RQ1: “What is effective citizenship and how does it differ from formal/legal citizenship?”

- **Patrick Heller (2000; 2020)** – Defines effective citizenship as “the actual capacity of citizens to make use of formal political and civic rights.” In other words, beyond holding legal citizenship status, do people have the substantive means to exercise their rights? Heller contrasts formal enfranchisement with whether citizens can truly participate and benefit. For example, in young democracies, pervasive social inequalities can limit people’s ability to act on their formal rights ¹. This concept underscores a gap between nominal citizenship (status with rights on paper) and lived citizenship (ability to exercise those rights), directly speaking to Yuji’s interest in rights that exist de jure but not de facto. It emphasizes that formal/legal citizenship alone may be insufficient if socio-economic conditions prevent effective use of rights.

- **Rogers Brubaker (1992)** – Early scholarship distinguished **formal** vs. **substantive** citizenship. Brubaker observed that possessing formal citizenship (legal membership in a state) is neither sufficient nor necessary for enjoying substantive citizenship ³. Substantive (or effective) citizenship refers to actual inclusion and equality in civic life – one may lack this even with legal citizenship, or conversely non-citizens can sometimes exercise certain rights in practice. This highlights that formal status and effective rights do not always align. The distinction laid groundwork for later studies of the “citizenship gap” and aligns with Yuji’s premise that something beyond formal rights (i.e. structural factors enabling their exercise) must be in place for true equality.
- **T.H. Marshall (1950)** – In his classic theory of citizenship ⁴ ⁵, Marshall argued that citizenship evolved from civil rights (e.g. legal equality), to political rights (voting), and finally to social rights (education, welfare). He essentially recognized that formal civil/political rights needed to be

complemented by social provisions to achieve “a basic level of socioeconomic well-being” for all ⁶ ⁷. Marshall’s “social citizenship” thus foreshadows the idea of effective citizenship: without social rights (such as healthcare, income support), formal equality remains incomplete. His work implies that formal rights must be backed by substantive conditions (like education, health, income) to be meaningfully exercisable. This supports Yuji’s view by showing an early acknowledgment that equal legal rights (alone) don’t guarantee equal outcomes – additional measures are required to make rights effective.

- **Somers (1993)** – Expanding on Marshall, Somers and others explicitly called for analytically separating “rights-as-status” (formal legal rights) from “rights-as-practice” (actual efficacy of those rights) ². This sociological perspective insists that we study how people experience and deploy their rights “on the ground,” not just what rights they legally have. It reinforces that effective citizenship is about practice and agency – whether one can actually vote, speak freely, access services, etc., in practice – which may be curtailed by structural barriers (poverty, discrimination, etc.). This framework directly informs RQ1 by providing terminology and theory to articulate the formal vs. effective citizenship divide.

RQ2: “Is there existing research conceptualizing the gap between formal rights and effective rights as a structural/systemic issue (not individual failure)?”

- **Partha Chatterjee (2004, 2006)** – Yes. Scholarship on “differentiated citizenship” in postcolonial contexts explicitly frames the formal–effective rights gap as structural. Chatterjee famously argued that in countries like India, formal democratic citizenship exists, but in practice “civil society” (where rights are fully used) is largely the domain of the urban middle class, while the poor are relegated to a realm of political society where they have only voting power ⁸. In this view, the urban poor’s failure to enjoy many civil rights (e.g. legal protections, public services) is not due to personal negligence but systemic factors – informality, clientelism, bureaucratic exclusion – that structurally limit their access. This concept of “democracy of the governed” shows the gap between rights on paper and rights in reality as an endemic feature of the social structure. It closely mirrors Yuji’s concern by identifying structural conditions (class, caste, etc.) that yield an unequal distribution of effective rights across populations.

- **Marc Galanter (1974)** – In legal sociology, Galanter’s seminal essay “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead” argued that disparities in legal outcomes are rooted in structural advantages enjoyed by repeat players (e.g. wealthy individuals, corporations) ⁹ ¹⁰. He demonstrated that the “haves” systematically use superior resources, expertise, and institutional relationships to better assert their rights, whereas “have-nots” (one-shot litigants, typically poorer) face hurdles in effectively claiming rights. This is not about individual skill or willpower, but about systemic imbalances – for instance, unequal access to quality lawyers, information, time, and the shaping of legal rules to favor those who litigate often ¹¹. Galanter essentially conceptualized the rights implementation gap as a structural problem built into the legal system. His work provides an early theoretical basis for viewing unequal effective rights (legal outcomes) as resulting from social structure (resource inequality, institutional bias) rather than personal failings. This directly supports Yuji’s inquiry by illustrating a concrete mechanism of rights maldistribution feeding cumulative advantages for the wealthy.

- **“Access to Justice” research (e.g. Rebecca Sandefur, 2010s)** – Contemporary socio-legal research further solidifies that the gap between formal and effective rights is systemic. Studies on **access to justice (A2J)** document a widespread “justice gap” – defined as the difference between people’s legal needs and the resources available to meet them ¹². For example, surveys by the Legal Services Corporation in the U.S. show the poor and vulnerable have many civil legal grievances (rights to housing, benefits, safety) but most receive no legal help, due to cost,

complexity, or lack of information ¹² ¹³. Sandefur and colleagues emphasize that it's not simply that individuals "fail" to pursue their rights; rather, **structural factors** like lack of legal aid funding, procedural barriers, and power imbalances between ordinary people and institutions create this enforcement gap. The **legal empowerment movement** in development (e.g. Golub 2003; CLEP 2008) similarly treats the inability of the poor to claim property or legal rights as a systemic condition tied to poverty, not individual choice. Overall, A2J research frames the formal-effective rights divide as a **structural access problem** – aligning with Yuji's focus – and advocates institutional reforms (simplified procedures, community paralegals, etc.) to close the gap.

- **Iris Marion Young (2011)** – In political theory, Young's concept of "**structural injustice**" provides a normative lens: she argues that injustices like poverty or unequal rights realization arise from **diffuse systemic processes** (economic structures, institutional biases, cultural norms) rather than the aberrant actions of a few individuals. For instance, if certain groups (say, racial minorities or persons with disabilities) consistently find their formal rights ineffective (in education, employment, etc.), Young would locate the cause in structural dynamics – e.g. segregation, stereotypes, policy design – instead of blaming individual inadequacies. While Young doesn't specifically use the term "rights maldistribution," her framework of structural injustice and the "**social connection model**" of responsibility (which holds all participants in a system accountable for changing unjust structures) resonates strongly with viewing the formal-effective rights gap as a systemic issue. It bolsters the theoretical justification for Yuji's claim: if rights are unevenly effective across society, the root causes lie in social structures that privilege some and disadvantage others, not merely in personal failings.

RQ3: "Is there research arguing that rights maldistribution precedes (causes) wealth maldistribution?"

- **Historical Institutional Analyses** – Yes, there is some scholarship hinting at this causal direction. For example, comparative historical research on political and economic inequality suggests that **inequality in the distribution of rights and power tends to produce inequality in wealth**. One source summarizes that "political inequality, or the inequality in the distribution of power, was the primary source of income and wealth inequality throughout preindustrial history." ¹⁴. This aligns with the argument that when rights (political voice, legal protections, property rights) are monopolized by elites, those elites accumulate disproportionate wealth over time. Notably, **Acemoglu & Robinson's theory of extractive vs. inclusive institutions (2012)** posits that when political rights and institutions are narrowly held ("extractive institutions"), economic resources will be extracted by and concentrated among the powerful, causing wealth inequality. Conversely, broadly distributed rights ("inclusive institutions") lead to more equitable economic outcomes. Though not couched in the exact term "rights maldistribution," this body of work essentially asserts that **skewed initial distribution of rights (e.g. voting rights, rule of law, property rights) sets the stage for later wealth maldistribution**. It provides a theoretical precedent for Yuji's hypothesis on a macro scale.

- **Development Economics – Property Rights and Poverty** – Another strand linking rights to wealth comes from development debates. **Hernando de Soto (2000)** famously argued that the poor hold considerable assets as "dead capital" because they lack formal property rights; once given legal titles and rights, they can generate wealth. While de Soto's thesis has been contested, it illustrates the notion that extending **effective legal rights** (like property/contract rights, business rights) to marginalized groups can improve their economic position, implying that prior exclusion from rights was a cause of their poverty. More generally, rights-based approaches to development (e.g. UN's Human Development Reports in the 2000s) assert that securing people's rights (to education, health, work, land, legal identity) is a **precondition** for reducing income/wealth inequality. These works stop short of explicitly saying "rights maldistribution causes

wealth maldistribution,” but they strongly suggest that **unequal access to rights produces unequal economic outcomes** – essentially the causal direction Yuji is investigating.

- **Ingrid Robeyns (2017 – Limitarianism)** – Robeyns’ limitarianism is focused on curbing excessive wealth, but she tangentially notes the interplay of wealth with democratic rights. She argues that in a truly democratic society “there are no rights without duties – and no wealth without limits,” proposing that extreme concentrations of wealth undermine equal citizenship ¹⁵. While her work centers on wealth distribution (advocating a cap on wealth to preserve fairness and democracy ¹⁶), it implies that unconstrained wealth inequality can distort the effective rights of others (e.g. the super-rich gain disproportionate political influence). Robeyns does not explicitly frame it as rights maldistribution leading to wealth inequality – in fact, her emphasis is more on wealth → political inequality. However, her argument that democracy requires limiting wealth hints at the flip side of Yuji’s hypothesis: to the extent that rights (like equal political voice) remain “well-distributed,” it prevents extreme wealth gaps. **Thus, Robeyns’ work complements Yuji’s by tackling the wealth end of the equation**, whereas Yuji focuses on the under-theorized rights end. Together, one could infer a reciprocal relationship: equitable distribution of participatory rights and resources helps prevent wealth concentration, which in turn safeguards equal rights – a virtuous circle opposite to the vicious cycle of rights and wealth maldistribution reinforcing each other.

(Overall, direct literature explicitly arguing “rights inequality causes wealth inequality” is scarce. Most research approaches this indirectly via institutional theory or development policy. This absence is itself notable and indicates a potential gap for Yuji’s contribution.)

RQ4: “How does access to justice research frame the unequal distribution of legal rights enforcement?”

- **Justice Gap and Unmet Legal Needs** – Access-to-justice researchers document that formal legal rights are not equally enforced or attainable for all citizens, and they frame this as an issue of **structural accessibility**. The concept of the “**justice gap**” is central: for instance, the U.S. Legal Services Corporation defines it as “the difference between the civil legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet those needs.” ¹². Studies show the poor encounter numerous legal problems (unlawful evictions, wage theft, denial of benefits) – i.e. their rights are violated – but the vast majority get no legal help or remedy. This gap is not because low-income people lack interest or merit, but because **legal enforcement mechanisms (lawyers, courts, legal aid) are distributed unequally**. Scholars like **Rebecca L. Sandefur** note that most people in justice gap studies do not even recognize their problems as legal in nature due to education barriers, or they lack affordable counsel – meaning their formal rights exist on paper but are inaccessible in practice. The A2J field thus frames unequal rights enforcement as a **structural deficit in the legal system**: insufficient funding for public legal services, procedural complexity, geographic and language barriers, etc. The recommended solutions (e.g. simplifying court processes, expanding legal aid, allowing non-lawyer advocates) are systemic reforms aimed at leveling the playing field so that effective legal rights are more evenly distributed ¹³. This perspective reinforces Yuji’s notion of “rights maldistribution” – here specifically the maldistribution of the means to enforce rights. It treats the inability of certain populations to vindicate their rights as a collective social shortcoming (a failure of institutions to ensure equal justice) rather than individual inability.

- **Legal Empowerment and “Haves” vs. “Have-Nots”** – Access to justice research often invokes Galanter’s idea that the “haves” (those with resources, knowledge, status) consistently prevail over “have-nots” in legal arenas ⁹. The legal empowerment movement (championed by groups like the World Bank, UNDP, and scholars such as Stephen Golub) frames this in terms of power: laws and courts tend to serve those already empowered, unless deliberate

efforts are made to empower the disadvantaged to use legal tools. For example, community paralegal programs, rights education campaigns, and institutional reforms are promoted to redistribute legal power. The implicit theory is that an unequal distribution of “legal capital” – awareness of rights, representation, capacity to navigate law – leads to unequal outcomes, which is fundamentally unjust. Empirical studies (e.g. surveys by Sandefur and Stern, 2014) show even when formal rights (to counsel, to a fair hearing) exist, poor litigants often forfeit them or are ignored by courts due to bias or lack of support. Such findings underscore how enforcement inequality is systemic: the “law in action” often deviates from the “law on the books” in favor of those better positioned. Access-to-justice scholarship, therefore, provides concrete evidence and conceptual language for Yuji’s structural rights gap – it highlights how structural maldistribution of legal resources and power** results in only a subset of society effectively enjoying the full benefits of the law.

- **Global South Perspectives** – In development contexts, access-to-justice research also examines how **colonial legacies and administrative structures** leave many citizens with “paper rights” only. For instance, land formalization projects note a gap between **de jure land rights and de facto control** – marginalized groups might have legal titles but cannot enforce them against elites or face prohibitively high legal costs ¹⁷. Studies in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia often describe a dual system where the elite de facto enjoy property and contract enforcement, while the poor live in legal informality or are stuck in bureaucratic hurdles. The framing here is highly systemic: the legal system’s design and power relations determine whose rights are actually secure. **Legal anthropologists** sometimes speak of “law’s shadow” – people technically have rights, but without money or connections, those rights are illusory. This complements formal A2J research by reinforcing on a global scale that **legal rights enforcement is stratified** by class and social status. In summary, access-to-justice literature frames unequal rights enforcement as a **justice system design problem** and a **political problem** (of resource allocation and power), rather than blaming individuals. This adds a practical, empirical dimension to Yuji’s inquiry: it’s one arena where the maldistribution of rights can be observed and measured (e.g. who gets legal help and who doesn’t).

RQ5: “What is the relationship between the Capability Approach and citizenship theory?”

- **Capabilities and Social Citizenship** – Scholars have drawn parallels between Amartya Sen’s **Capability Approach (CA)** and theories of citizenship, especially regarding what it means to be an “effective” citizen. While Sen and Martha Nussbaum did not originally frame their work as a citizenship theory, their focus on what people are actually able to do and be resonates with the idea of substantive citizenship. For example, **Thomas Pfister (2012)** argues that the CA “has informed recent attempts to reformulate social citizenship” and shares goals with “radical” citizenship perspectives that emphasize **democracy, voice, and agency** ¹⁸. In other words, both approaches are concerned with ensuring individuals have the real freedom and capability to participate in political and social life (not just formal rights on paper). The capability lens reinforces that formal rights are insufficient unless people have the means (capabilities) to utilize them – a clear common ground with citizenship theory’s concern for substantive equality. Indeed, one can view **social citizenship rights (à la Marshall)** as providing the material and social preconditions (education, health, income) that enhance people’s capabilities to function as equal citizens. Thus, the CA offers a normative justification for broadening citizenship to include enabling conditions, aligning with Yuji’s structural approach.

- **Political Participation as a Capability** – Martha Nussbaum explicitly incorporates aspects of citizenship into the capability framework. She lists “Control over one’s environment (Political)” as one of the central human capabilities: “Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association,” etc. ¹⁹. This clearly bridges the two domains: it casts the exercise of citizenship

rights (voting, speech, association) as essential components of human flourishing. In effect, Nussbaum is saying that to live a fully human life, one must not only formally possess political rights, but have the real opportunity to use them effectively. This idea provides a theoretical backing for Yuji's emphasis on **effective rights** – it suggests that a society should be assessed by whether people actually have the capability to exercise their citizen rights. If large segments lack that capability (due to poverty, discrimination, etc.), then from a CA perspective, justice is not achieved. In summary, Nussbaum and Sen offer a framework in which citizenship is evaluated by outcomes (functionings and capabilities), reinforcing the notion that rights must be substantively accessible. Their work helps connect Yuji's project to a well-developed ethical theory and may guide how to operationalize "effective citizenship" (e.g. through capability indices for political and civil participation).

- **Citizenship as Agency and Empowerment** – Both the CA and modern citizenship theory stress **agency**. Sen speaks of people as "agents" who must have the freedom to pursue goals they value; likewise, citizenship theorists like **Ruth Lister (1997)** talk about citizenship as **practice and participation** ("agency-rich" rather than a passive status). The literature suggests a synergistic relationship: the capability approach can enrich citizenship theory by highlighting what social conditions (education, economic security, non-discrimination) are necessary for people to actually exercise citizenship rights (to speak, to organize, to vote effectively). Conversely, citizenship theory provides concrete political context to capabilities, underlining that capabilities are not just personal attributes but are deeply influenced by public institutions and power structures (which determine who gets to be an "effective citizen"). Some authors call this fusion "**capability for voice**" or "**capability for citizenship**" – essentially, ensuring that everyone has the real freedom to act as a full citizen. The convergence of these ideas supports Yuji's approach: it provides intellectual tools to argue that **measuring justice by distribution of wealth alone is insufficient – one must examine the distribution of effective rights and capabilities**. Where the capability approach asks, "what can people do with the resources/rights they have?", citizenship theory asks, "are people recognized and empowered as equal members of the polity?" Merging these, we get a potent lens to identify structural inequalities that Yuji's hypothesis targets.

Theoretical Gaps Identified

Through this literature mapping, we can pinpoint several gaps or under-explored areas that highlight the originality of Yuji's research:

- **Lack of Explicit Focus on "Rights Maldistribution" as Causal Mechanism:** While many works touch on disparities in rights enjoyment, we found no comprehensive theory explicitly positing that a structural maldistribution of rights precedes and causes wealth inequality. The dominant narrative in existing research runs the opposite way – i.e. that economic inequality leads to unequal realization of rights (the rich can buy better access to law, politics, etc.). Yuji's hypothesis flips this script. Aside from tangential references in institutional economics (e.g. political power concentration leading to economic disparity ¹⁴), the idea of systematically mapping how uneven access to rights (legal, political, social) produces unequal wealth has not been fully developed. This gap in the literature suggests that Yuji's work could be truly novel: it aims to uncover a more foundational layer of inequality (rights and power distribution) that existing frameworks have not explicitly centered as the causal driver. In doing so, it would add a new dimension to debates on inequality that traditionally focus on material wealth or income.
- **Fragmentation Across Disciplines:** The research findings relevant to Yuji's topic are scattered across citizenship studies, law, political philosophy, and development studies, with each using its

own terminology (e.g. “substantive citizenship,” “justice gap,” “capabilities”). There is a gap in integrating these insights into a cohesive theory. No single study was found that connects the dots between, say, socio-legal evidence of rights enforcement gaps and philosophical arguments about social contract or limitarianism. Yuji’s proposed framework (Service of Empowerment, quasi-mandate welfare, etc.) seeks to synthesize these strands – bridging empirical “access to rights” problems with normative theory about social obligations. The gap here is an interdisciplinary one: a structural theory of rights distribution that can speak to economists, political theorists, and legal scholars alike. By filling it, Yuji’s work could provide a more holistic understanding of inequality (one that includes institutional and rights-based factors alongside economic ones).

- **Terminology and Conceptualization Gaps:** We did not encounter a specific term or widely-used metric for what Yuji calls “**権利の構造的偏重**” (**structural maldistribution of rights**). Scholars describe related phenomena (differentiated citizenship, second-class citizenship, “paper rights,” etc.), but the concept of systematically skewed distribution of effective rights lacks a unified label and analysis. This indicates a conceptual gap that Yuji’s research can fill by defining and operationalizing “rights maldistribution” as a distinct object of study. For example, there’s extensive work on **wealth Gini coefficients** and income percentiles, but far less on measuring the inequality of rights access (how to quantify who can utilize their rights?). Yuji’s project could pioneer new conceptual tools or indices for this purpose, which would be a significant theoretical contribution.
- **Limitarianism’s Blind Spot:** Ingrid Robeyns’ limitarianism (advocating limits on extreme wealth) is a cutting-edge discourse on curbing inequality, yet it mainly fixates on wealth itself and its moral/political impacts. We found no indication that limitarianism or similar contemporary egalitarian theories incorporate an analysis of rights distribution. Robeyns emphasizes limiting wealth to protect democracy, implying concern about unequal influence, but stops short of analyzing whether the initial distribution of rights (e.g. education, political voice, legal standing) sets the stage for unequal accumulation. This is a gap Yuji can exploit: by showing that even before extreme wealth is accumulated, there may have been an uneven ground in terms of rights and opportunities. In other words, Yuji’s work could add a preventative or upstream perspective to limitarianism – ensuring fair distribution of empowering rights so that gross wealth disparities do not arise in the first place. This would highlight the complementarity and the currently missing piece in debates on how to achieve a just society.
- **Empirical Gap – Linking Rights Access to Wealth Outcomes:** Although development studies hint at connections between empowering rights (education, legal inclusion) and economic outcomes, there is a paucity of longitudinal or structural research demonstrating this link in advanced democratic-capitalist societies. For instance, does unequal access to justice or political participation statistically explain subsequent patterns of wealth inequality within a country? Such analyses are rare. This empirical gap means Yuji could break new ground by providing evidence (even if qualitative or conceptual) that inequities in rights access systematically tilt the distribution of life chances and wealth. Identifying this pathway would be an innovative contribution, moving beyond the common correlation that wealth → better rights, to show that causation likely runs both ways in a reinforcing cycle. Exposing the “rights antecedent” of economic inequality would underscore the urgency of addressing rights gaps as part of tackling wealth inequality – a point largely absent from current policy discourse.

In sum, **Yuji’s research stands to fill a critical void** by explicitly theorizing and investigating the role of structurally unequal rights in generating material inequality. It offers to connect silos of knowledge and

address oversights (like the lack of focus on rights in wealth debates), thereby carving out a novel scholarly niche.

Key Authors to Follow

To deepen this exploration, the following researchers and thinkers are especially pertinent for further reading, as their work aligns with various facets of the topic:

- **Patrick Heller** – Sociologist known for work on democratic deepening and effective citizenship (case studies in India, South Africa). Heller's analyses of how inequality affects participation can inform the rights-vs-wealth dynamic.
- **T.H. Marshall** – Classic reference for citizenship theory (civil, political, social rights). Provides foundational theory on why social rights matter for true equality.
- **Bryan S. Turner** – Sociologist of citizenship; has written on citizenship in capitalist societies and how rights relate to social stratification. Turner's work may offer theoretical bridges between citizenship and social class.
- **Ruth Lister** – Feminist sociologist focusing on poverty, welfare, and citizenship (e.g. "Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives"). Lister conceives citizenship as lived experience and has insight into the agency and practice of rights among the poor.
- **Engin F. Isin** – Scholar of citizenship studies; introduced ideas like "acts of citizenship" and **subaltern citizenship**. His perspective can add dimension on how marginalized people enact citizenship, relevant to effective rights.
- **Partha Chatterjee** – Political theorist (postcolonial studies) whose concept of political society in India shows structural citizenship gaps. His work exemplifies analysis of formal vs substantive citizenship in a real-world context.
- **Marc Galanter** – Law and society scholar; his classic work on legal advantage of the "haves" is essential for understanding structural biases in legal rights enforcement.
- **Rebecca Sandefur** – Sociologist/legal scholar at the forefront of access-to-justice research. Her empirical studies on the justice gap and legal empowerment will provide data and conceptual frameworks for rights enforcement inequality.
- **Iris Marion Young** – Political philosopher; her theory of structural injustice (especially "Responsibility for Justice," 2011) offers normative grounding for why we should view rights disparities as societal wrongs requiring collective action.
- **Ingrid Robeyns** – Philosopher/economist behind libertarianism. Following her latest writings (and critiques thereof) will help position Yuji's wealth-inequality arguments in the current landscape and highlight how adding a rights dimension can enrich those debates.
- **Amartya Sen & Martha Nussbaum** – Economists/philosophers who developed the Capability Approach. Their works (e.g. Sen's "Development as Freedom", Nussbaum's "Women and Human Development" and "Creating Capabilities") are crucial for linking formal rights to actual well-being and agency.
- **Jack Knight & James Johnson** – Political theorists who have written on institutions, inequality, and justice (e.g. Knight's work on rules and social outcomes). They might provide insights into how institutional distributions (rights, power) shape economic distribution.
- **Legal Empowerment Advocates** (e.g. Stephan Golub, Vivek Maru) – Practitioners and scholars who write on empowering the poor through rights (land rights, legal aid). They offer case studies and conceptualizations of making rights effective in development settings, relevant for drawing analogies or lessons.
- **(Potential Japanese scholarship)** – It may also be worth exploring if Japanese scholars have addressed similar issues in local context (e.g. analyses of 福祉と権利 (welfare and rights) or 実効的の権利 in Japan). While not identified in the initial search, keeping an eye on Japanese journals or

books on social rights and inequality (社会権と不平等) could provide culturally specific perspectives that complement the primarily Western literature above.

These authors form a map of the intellectual terrain: engaging with their work will provide depth, various angles, and possibly empirical evidence for each component of Yuji's theory. Following their writings and subsequent scholarship citing them will ensure the research is well-grounded in existing knowledge yet clearly directed at the gaps identified.

Suggested Search Queries for Next Phase

Building on the findings and gaps, we propose the following search queries to guide further research in subsequent phases:

- “**Rights Inequality and Wealth Inequality**” – To directly seek any literature that uses these terms together, potentially uncovering any obscure or recent studies directly testing this linkage.
- “**Inclusive vs Extractive Institutions wealth distribution Acemoglu**” – To gather details from political economy on how the distribution of political rights/power impacts economic inequality (useful for bolstering RQ3 with modern data or models).
- “**Paper Rights vs Real Rights case studies**” – To find empirical case studies (perhaps in human rights or development literature) where rights existed formally but failed in practice, examining causes and outcomes.
- “**Legal Empowerment poverty outcomes data**” – To find if there is quantitative research connecting legal empowerment interventions (like granting land titles, improving legal aid) with changes in economic inequality or poverty reduction.
- “**Limitarianism criticism rights**” – To see if any critiques of Robeyns or related debates mention the absence of a rights perspective, which could provide scholarly dialogue for Yuji to engage with.
- “**Substantive citizenship measurement index**” – To find if anyone has attempted to measure effective citizenship or the citizenship gap across countries or groups (e.g. an index of legal empowerment or civic capability), which could inspire methodological approaches.
- “**Capability approach citizenship case study**” – To look for applied research that uses capabilities to evaluate citizens' participation or rights access in specific contexts (e.g. studies on women's political agency as a capability).
- “**構造的権利格差 富の不平等**” (Japanese) – A Japanese query meaning “structural rights disparity wealth inequality,” to check if Japanese academics have discussed similar ideas in Japanese-language publications.
- “**実効的市民権評価方法**” (Japanese) – Meaning “effective citizenship evaluation method,” to possibly find Japanese discourse on how to evaluate or ensure substantive citizenship, given Yuji's interest in theory-building that might draw on both English and Japanese sources.
- “**Structural injustice wealth distribution Young**” – To specifically see if any scholars have extended Iris Young's framework to analyze wealth inequality, which could indirectly support the rights→wealth causality argument.
- “**Welfare quasi-mandate contract theory**” – Since Yuji's notes mention “準委任契約としての福祉” (welfare as a quasi-mandate contract), searching this phrase or its English equivalent might reveal niche legal or philosophical works on conceptualizing social support as delegated responsibility (which could tie into rights obligations of society).

Using these queries will help uncover both any remaining literature we might have missed and newer research (2024–2025) as it emerges. The goal for the next phase is to drill down on specifics (e.g. empirical evidence for rights affecting outcomes, detailed mechanisms of structural exclusion) and to

begin assembling a more formal literature review structure. Each query is aimed at either filling a knowledge gap identified or at cross-validating the hypothesis through different scholarly lenses.

① Does Citizenship Abate Class? Evidence and Reflections from a ...

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6916647/>

② ⑧ saxena.watson.brown.edu

https://saxena.watson.brown.edu/sites/default/files/2025-06/CIUG_Vadodara.pdf

③ (PDF) Cities and Citizenship: Introduction. Special Issue

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281463555_Cities_and_Citizenship_Introduction_Special_Issue

④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ T.H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class" - Dissent Magazine

<https://dissentmagazine.org/article/t-h-marshalls-citizenship-and-social-class/>

⑨ ⑩ ⑪ "Do the Haves Come Out Ahead in Alternative Justice Systems? Repeat Pla" by Carrie Menkel-Meadow

<https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1759/>

⑫ [PDF] Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans

<https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf>

⑬ [PDF] Bridging the Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to Justice

<https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1967&context=lawreview>

⑭ Elite Networks: The Political Economy of Inequality 0197774237 ...

<https://dokumen.pub/elite-networks-the-political-economy-of-inequality-0197774237-9780197774236.html>

⑮ ⑯ Limitarianism: The Case Against Extreme Wealth - Amazon.com

<https://www.amazon.com/Limitarianism-Case-Against-Extreme-Wealth/dp/1662601840>

⑰ [PDF] Exploring forest landscape restoration: Tenure, multi-level ...

<https://www.foresttreesagroforestry.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/workshop/docs/science/4.4%20GIZ-CIFOR%20FLR%20and%20tenure%20Nov%203%202017.pdf>

⑱ (PDF) Citizenship and capability? Amartya Sen's capabilities approach from a citizenship perspective

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254243206_Citizenship_and_capability_Amartya_Sen's_capabilities_approach_from_a_citizenship_perspective

⑲ [PDF] Human Rights and Human Capabilities

<https://journals.law.harvard.edu/hrj/wp-content/uploads/sites/83/2020/06/20HHRJ21-Nussbaum.pdf>