

# The Role of Gender and Cognitive Skills on Other People's Generosity

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## Abstract

Cognitive skills are an important personal attribute that affects career success. However, colleagues' support is also vital as most works are done in groups, and the degree of their support is influenced by their generosity. Social norms enter in groups, and gender may interact with cognitive skills through gender norms in society. Because these gender norms penalize women with high potential, they can reduce colleagues' generosity towards these women. Using a novel experimental design where I exogenously vary gender and cognitive skills and sufficiently powered analysis, I find neither the two attributes nor their interactions affect other people's generosity; if anything, people are more generous to women with high potential. I argue that my findings have implications for the role of gender norms in labor markets.

**JEL Classification:** J16, M54, D91, C91

**Keywords:** gender, cognitive skills, social norm, generosity, dictator game

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# 1 Introduction

Cognitive skills are an important personal attribute that affects career success (Herrnstein and Murray 1996).<sup>1</sup> However, colleagues’ support is also vital because most works are done in groups (Jones 2021; Lazear and Shaw 2007; Wuchty, Jones, and Uzzi 2007) and the degree of their support is influenced by their generosity. Social norms enter in groups, and gender may interact with cognitive skills through gender norms in society. Because these gender norms penalize women with high potential as those women are inconsistent with the stereotypical women (Eagly and Karau 2002; Heilman 2001; Ridgeway 2001; Rudman and Phelan 2008), they can reduce colleagues’ generosity towards these women.<sup>2</sup>

This paper studies how gender, cognitive skills, and their interaction affect other people’s generosity, focusing on women with high cognitive skills. Answering this question using secondary data is difficult due to non-random group formation and that cognitive skills are correlated with economic preferences and hence with generosity (Falk et al. 2021). Also, a clean measure of other people’s generosity is not readily available in secondary data.

Thus, I design a laboratory experiment where participants first work on an incentivized IQ test which measures cognitive skills. After the test, participants are randomly assigned to a group of six and receive a ranking of their IQ within their group. Then three of the six members are randomly chosen to be dictators and play three rounds of dictator game with the other three members chosen to be recipients, observing the recipients’ facial photos and first names, both of which convey information about gender, and the IQ ranks. The dictators’ allocation is used as a measure of generosity. The use of photos follows recent literature and allows the dictators to infer the gender of the recipients naturally as they would do in the real world (Babcock et al. 2017; Coffman 2014; Isaksson 2018). I use dictator IQ fixed effects in the analysis to compare allocations of dictators with the same cognitive skills but assigned different IQ ranks due to random group formation.

I find neither gender, IQ, nor their interactions affect dictators’ allocation: the point estimate is quantitatively negligible and statistically indistinguishable from 0, and the confidence interval is tight; if anything, women with higher IQ receive more allocation. This result is not driven by the so-called “beauty premium.” The results hold across the whole distribution and even when I separately examine female and male dictators’ allocation. Although statistically insignificant, belief about paired recipients’ IQ is roughly consistent with the experimental design. These findings suggest that one’s gender, cognitive skills, or their interaction do not play a significant role in other people’s generosity.

This paper primarily relates to studies on the role of gender norms in one’s career. The literature finds that people perceive female leaders (Heilman, Block, and Martell 1995; Heilman and Okimoto 2007; Rudman and Kilianski 2000) and competent women (Heilman et al. 2004; Rudman 1998)

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1. Yet another prominent attribute is non-cognitive skills: (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlačil 2001; Cunha and Heckman 2008; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006).

2. Indeed, gender affects one’s career through structural problems in labor markets such as unequal burden of family and child care (Bertrand 2018; Goldin 2014) and labor market norms designed for men who are more risk-loving and like competition (Bertrand 2011; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Dohmen et al. 2011; Niederle and Vesterlund 2011).

negatively.<sup>34</sup> Evidence from laboratory experiments shows that female leaders (Chakraborty and Serra 2021) and competitors (Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval 2013) receive more aggressive treatments and less support from men (Born, Ranehill, and Sandberg 2020). Nevertheless, evidence from audit studies is mixed: while Quadlin (2018) finds top-performing female college students receive less favorable treatment in hiring than equally qualified male students, Ceci and Williams (2015) and Williams and Ceci (2015) find qualified female candidates for assistant professors receive equal or more favorable treatment than equally qualified male candidates.<sup>5</sup> Also, Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017) find that unmarried female MBA students behave in a less career-ambitious way in front of male classmates. My results suggest that these studies’ findings are not likely to be driven by violation of cognitive skill-related gender norms.

This paper also contributes to the literature on the role of gender in dictator games. Bolton and Katok (1995) and Boschini, Muren, and Persson (2012) find that female and male dictators allocate the same amount, while Chowdhury, Grossman, and Jeon (2019), Dreber et al. (2013), and Eckel and Grossman (1998) find that female dictators allocate more. Bilén, Dreber, and Johannesson (2021) find that although female dictators allocate more, it is not quantitatively significant. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that the role of a dictator’s gender on allocation depends on the price of allocation: female dictators allocate more when doing so reduces their own earnings while male dictators allocate more when doing so does not reduce their own earnings so much. Klinowski (2018) finds that female dictators allocate so that the amount between themselves and recipients are equalized, but aside from that, female and male dictators allocate the same amount. Aguiar et al. (2009) find that people expect female dictators to allocate more. Rosenblat (2008) finds that female dictators allocate more to physically attractive women and men than male dictators. Aksoy, Chadd, and Koh (2021) find that Republican heterosexual people allocate less to LGBTQ+ people. My paper enriches this literature by introducing cognitive skills in the role of gender in dictator game allocation.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, procedure, and implementation. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 show robustness of the main results. Section 6 concludes.

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3. The literature also finds that people even evaluate competent women negatively, but these results are obtained in set-ups without real consequences (Phelan, MossRacusin, and Rudman 2008; Rudman and Fairchild 2004; Rudman et al. 2012).

4. The literature also finds that people penalize male losers (Cappelen, Falch, and Tungodden 2019; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, and Rudman 2010) and LGBTQ+ people (Aksoy, Chadd, and Koh 2021; Gorsuch 2019). These are equally important issues which we have to deal with.

5. However, Håkansson (2021) finds that female politicians, especially those in high positions, receive unfavorable treatment using Swedish data.

## 2 Experiment

### 2.1 Design and procedure

The experiment consists of two parts. Participants receive instructions at the beginning of each part. They earn a participation fee of 2.5€ for their participation.

#### **Pre-experiment: Random desk assignment & photo taking**

After registration at the laboratory entrance, participants are randomly assigned to a partitioned computer desk. Afterwards, participants have their facial photos taken at a photo booth and enter their first name on their computer. After that, the experimenters go to each participant’s desk to check that their photo and first name match them to ensure all participants that other participants’ photos and first names are real, following Isaksson (2018).

#### **Part 1: IQ test**

In part 1, participants work on an incentivized 9 IQ questions for 9 minutes. I use Bilker et al. (2012)’s form A 9-item Raven test which measures one’s IQ more than 90% as good as the full-length Raven test. Participants receive 0.5€ for each correct answer, and they do not receive information about how many IQ questions they have solved correctly until the end of the experiment.

After the IQ test, participants make an incentivized guess on the number of IQ questions they have solved correctly; they receive 0.5€ if their guess is correct. The answer to this question measures their over-confidence level. They do not receive feedback on their guess until the end of the experiment.

Following Eil and Rao (2011), six participants are randomly grouped and informed of the ranking of their IQ relative to other group members. Ties are broken randomly. They then answer a set of comprehension questions about their IQ rank; they cannot proceed to the next part until they answer these questions correctly.

#### **Part 2a: Dictator game (dictators only)**

In part 2, three participants in each group are randomly assigned to the role of dictators and the other three participants the role of recipients. Dictators are paired with the three recipients in their group one by one in a random order, receive an endowment, and play a dictator game. Thus, they play a dictator game three times with three different recipients. When they play the dictator game, dictators observe the recipients’ facial photo and first name and IQ rank; see panel A of figure 1 for an example. The use of photos follows recent literature (Babcock et al. 2017; Coffman 2014; Isaksson 2018) and minimizes experimenter demand effects. While I use photos, I show later that the results are not driven by the so-called “beauty premium.”

Dictators are also told that their allocation decisions are anonymous: they are told that their allocation will be paid to the recipients as a “top-up” to their earnings. Dictators decide allocation

Figure 1: Dictator's allocation screen

(a) Initial screen

Round 1 of 3



**Neve**

**Rank 5**

You have received **7€** for this round.

You have been paired with **Neve**.

Please allocate the endowment between yourself and Neve. When you click the line below, a cursor appears. You can move the cursor by dragging it. Please move the cursor to your preferred position to determine the allocation.

You  Neve

Next

(b) After clicking the slider

Please allocate the endowment between yourself and Neve. When you click the line below, a cursor appears. You can move the cursor by dragging it. Please move the cursor to your preferred position to determine the allocation.

You  Neve

Next

*Notes:* This figure shows an example of a dictator's allocation screen. Panel A shows the screen before clicking the slider bar and panel B after clicking it. In this example, the dictator is playing the first round and paired with a recipient whose first name is Neve with IQ rank 5.

by moving a cursor on a slider where the cursor is initially hidden to prevent anchoring; panel B of figure 1 shows the cursor after clicking the slider. I vary the endowment across rounds to make each dictator game less repetitive: 7€ for 1st and 3rd rounds, 5€ for 2nd round. At the end of the experiment, one out of three allocations is randomly chosen for each participant as earnings for this

part.<sup>6</sup>

## Part 2b: Belief elicitation (recipients only)

I also collect an indirect measure of dictators' beliefs on how many IQ questions the paired recipients have solved correctly. To prevent the belief elicitation to affect or be affected by the dictator game, I exploit the random assignment of participants to dictators and recipients (derived from the random desk assignment) and use recipients' beliefs as a proxy for dictators' beliefs. Specifically, while dictators are playing the dictator game, recipients are paired with the other two recipients in the same group one by one in random order and make incentivized guesses on how many IQ questions they have solved correctly, observing the other two recipients' facial photo, first name, and IQ rank. Each correct guess gives them 0.5€.

To address the non-anonymity of showing facial photos and first names, I ask participants how well they know the paired participants on a scale of 4.<sup>7</sup> I ask this question twice to make sure they do not answer randomly: right after the three dictator games for dictators or two guesses for recipients and in the post-experimental questionnaire.

## Post-experiment: Questionnaire

After the dictator game and guessing are over, participants are told their earnings from the IQ test, dictator game, and the guesses. Before receiving their earnings, participants answer a short questionnaire about their demographics that are used for balance tests and robustness checks. Recipients are also asked if I could use their photo in another experiment with a gratuity of 1.5€.

## 2.2 Implementation

The experiment was programmed with oTree (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens 2016) and conducted in English during November-December 2019 at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Science (BLESS). I recruited 390 students (195 female and 195 male) of the University of Bologna via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) who (i) were born in Italy, (ii) had not participated in gender-related experiments in the past (as far as I know), and (iii) available to participate in English experiments. The first condition is to reduce the chance that recipients' first names and photos signal ethnicity, race, or cultural background. The second condition is to reduce experimenter demand effects. The third condition is to run the experiment in English. The number of participants was based on the power simulation in the pre-analysis plan to achieve 80% power.<sup>8</sup> The experiment is pre-registered with the OSF.<sup>9</sup>

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6. For each dictator for each round, one of the three recipients in the same group is randomly chosen *without replacement* and the dictator allocates the endowment between themselves and the recipient. Thus, it is possible that two dictators play dictator game with the same recipient in the same round. At the end of the dictator games, each participant has three allocations, and one of which is randomly chosen for payment.

7. The answer choices are: "I didn't know him/her at all," "I saw him/her before," "I knew him/her but not very well," and "I knew him/her very well."

8. I exclude the 1st session data because of the problem discussed in appendix A.

9. The pre-registration documents are available at the OSF registry: <https://osf.io/r6d8f/files>.

As a further attempt to make the data cleaner, I exclude recipients with non-Italian sounding names and allocations in which the dictator declared they knew the paired recipients “very well” at least once.<sup>10</sup> These data screenings leave me 388 participants, 195 dictators, and 558 dictators’ allocations.

I ran 24 sessions in total, and the number of participants in each session was a multiple of 6 (12 to 30). The average length of a session was 70 minutes, including registration and payment. The average payment per participant was about 10€ including the participation fee and 1.5€ of gratuity for photo use in another experiment (only for those recipients who agreed).

### 3 Data description

Table 1 describes own (panel A) and paired participants’ characteristics (panel B) as well as dictators’ social distance with paired recipients (panel C) and dictator game allocation (panel D).

Panel A shows that female dictators solve 0.37 fewer IQ questions (out of 9) than male dictators, but the difference is quantitatively insignificant. Also, female dictators are more likely to major in humanities and less likely to major in STEM fields, consistent with a pattern observed in most OECD countries (see, for example, Carrell, Page, and West 2010). In addition, female dictators are less overconfident than male dictators, another pattern observed in other studies (Bertrand 2011; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund 2011). Further, women are more likely to have finished undergraduate studies, consistent with that women are more educated than men in OECD countries (see, for example, Almås et al. 2016; Autor and Wasserman 2013).

Panel B shows that paired participants’ characteristics are roughly balanced, except that female dictators are 10% more likely to be paired with recipients from the Emilia-Romagna region where the experiment was conducted.

Panel C shows that dictators do not know about 95-98% of the paired recipients, mitigating the concern that dictator game allocation is driven by social distance outside the laboratory. To elaborate on this point, Figure 2 plots empirical CDF of dictators’ allocation, which resembles that of Bohnet and Frey (1999)’s one-way identification with information treatment where the social distance between dictators and recipients is the closest to my setting.

Panel D shows that female dictators allocate their endowment to paired recipients 6% more than male dictators, although the difference is only marginally significant at 10%. This observation is consistent with a meta-analysis that women give more, but the difference is not quantitatively large (Bilén, Dreber, and Johannesson 2021). Residualized dictator game allocation shows the allocation after adding the dictator IQ fixed effects, my empirical approach to address the endogeneity of dictators’ cognitive skills in the analysis explained later, still has enough variation, suggesting that the dictator IQ fixed effects do not over-control dictator game allocation.

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10. Although it is easy to distinguish Italian and non-Italian sounding names, to make sure not to misclassify, I asked the laboratory manager who was native Italian to check participants’ first names after each session.


Table 1: Dictators' and paired recipients' characteristics, proximity between dictators and paired recipients, and dictator game allocation

	Female dictators		Male dictators		Difference (Female – Male)		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SE	P-value
<u>Panel A: Own characteristics</u>							
IQ level	6.52	1.20	6.89	1.24	-0.37	0.18	0.04
IQ rank	3.83	1.59	3.31	1.73	0.52	0.24	0.03
Age	23.68	2.62	23.23	2.81	0.45	0.39	0.25
From Emilia-Romagna	0.18	0.39	0.19	0.39	0.00	0.06	0.94
Humanities	0.58	0.50	0.32	0.47	0.26	0.07	0.00
Social sciences	0.15	0.36	0.24	0.43	-0.09	0.06	0.13
STEM	0.27	0.45	0.44	0.50	-0.17	0.07	0.01
Post bachelor	0.53	0.50	0.37	0.49	0.16	0.07	0.03
Overconfidence	0.31	0.78	0.56	0.72	-0.25	0.11	0.02
Time on feedback (sec.)	107.67	89.88	107.52	102.26	0.16	13.88	0.99
Observations	104		91				
<u>Panel B: Paired recipients' characteristics</u>							
IQ level	6.77	1.19	6.91	1.12	-0.14	0.09	0.11
IQ rank	3.39	1.75	3.45	1.74	-0.05	0.10	0.61
Higher IQ	0.57	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.09	0.05	0.08
Age	23.17	2.57	23.55	2.98	-0.37	0.24	0.12
Female	0.50	0.50	0.43	0.50	0.07	0.04	0.06
From Emilia-Romagna	0.15	0.36	0.25	0.43	-0.09	0.04	0.01
Observations	298		260				
<u>Panel C: Social distance with paired recipients</u>							
Did not know at all	0.98	0.15	0.95	0.23	0.03	0.02	0.14
Knew but not well	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.18	-0.01	0.02	0.48
Saw before	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.14	-0.02	0.01	0.06
Observations	298		260				
<u>Panel D: Dictator game allocation (fraction of endowment)</u>							
Allocation	0.43	0.22	0.37	0.25	0.06	0.03	0.04
Allocation (residualized)	0.03	0.22	-0.03	0.25	0.06	0.03	0.06
Observations	298		260				

*Notes:* This table shows dictators' (Panel A) and paired recipients' characteristics (Panel B), social distance between dictators and paired recipients (Panel C), and dictators' allocation (Panel D) separately for female and male dictators. Residualized allocation is residual from the regression of the dictator game allocation as a fraction of endowment on IQ fixed effects, and shows within dictator IQ variation. P-values for the difference between female and male dictators are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with Bell and McCaffrey (2002)'s small sample bias adjustment for Panel A and with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment for Panels B-D.



Figure 2: CDF of the dictators' allocation



*Notes:* These figures plot the empirical CDF of the dictators' allocation as a fraction of endowment and show that the CDF resembles that of Bohnet and Frey (1999)'s one-way identification with information treatment where the social distance between dictators and recipients is the closest to my setting.

## 4 The role of gender and IQ on dictators' allocation

In this section, I document evidence that one's gender, IQ, or their interaction do not affect the allocation they receive from dictators, both in mean and distribution. If anything, women with higher IQ receive more allocation. I also document evidence that participants' belief about paired recipients' IQ is roughly consistent with the experimental design.

### 4.1 The role of gender and IQ on dictators' allocation: Estimating equation

I estimate the following model with OLS:

$$Allocate_{ij} = \beta_1 HigherIQ_{ij} + \beta_2 Female_j + \beta_3 HigherIQ_{ij} \times Female_j + X'_{ij}\gamma + \mu_i^{IQ} + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where each variable is defined as follows:

- $Allocate_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ : dictator  $i$ 's allocation to recipient  $j$  as a fraction of endowment.
  - $HigherIQ_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if recipient  $j$ 's IQ is higher than that of dictator  $i$ .
  - $Female_j \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if recipient  $j$  is female.
  - $X_{ij}$ : a set of additional covariates to increase statistical power and to address the potential ex-post imbalance. Online Appendix B provides a full description of the covariates.
  - $\epsilon_{ij}$ : omitted factors that affect dictator  $i$ 's allocation to recipient  $j$  conditional on covariates.
- and  $\mu_i^{IQ} \equiv \sum_{k=1}^9 \mu^k \mathbb{1}[i's\ IQ = k]$  is fixed effects for the dictators' IQ (number of IQ questions they have solved correctly), where  $\mathbb{1}$  is the indicator variable. Standard errors are clustered at the dictator level with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment.

Dictator's IQ fixed effects are included following Zimmermann (2020) so that the coefficients in

equation 1 capture allocation differences due to the recipients’ IQ, not that of the dictators. Indeed, Online Appendix Table C1 shows that dictator IQ rank is uncorrelated with dictator characteristics conditional on dictator IQ fixed effects.

The key identification assumption is that conditional on dictator IQ fixed effects, recipient gender, recipient’s IQ rank relative to dictator’s, and their interaction are uncorrelated with factors that affect dictator game allocation. The recipient’s gender is ex-ante exogenous to dictator game allocation by random desk assignment. Recipient’s IQ rank is also ex-ante exogenous to dictator game allocation conditional on dictator’s IQ fixed effects by random desk assignment and random matching of dictators and recipients in part 2. Online Appendix Table C2 shows that they are indeed uncorrelated with the dictator or the paired recipient characteristics, dictator game rounds, or social distance between dictators and paired recipients.

## 4.2 The role of gender and IQ on dictators’ allocation: Results

**Regression results** Columns 1-5 of Table 2 present the regression results of equation 1. Columns 1 and 2 show that when we do not control for dictators’ IQ, dictators allocate more to higher IQ recipients although the difference is statistically insignificant: lower IQ dictators allocate more to higher IQ recipients. Columns 2-5 gradually add more controls and show that coefficient estimates are stable across different specifications, suggesting irregularities in the data is unlikely to be driving the results.

Looking at column 5, the coefficient estimates on all covariates are statistically insignificant even at 10%. They are quantitatively insignificant as well: the effect size of typical dictator game experiments that examine the role of social distance with university students is 8.9% to 11.42% of the endowment,<sup>11</sup> which is much larger than the effect sizes in column 5 that ranges from 0.6% to 3.5% of the endowment. If anything, the coefficient estimate on the interaction between higher IQ recipient and female recipient may be quantitatively significant: female recipients who happen to have a higher IQ than dictators receives about 3.5 percentage point more than equivalent male recipients, albeit statistically insignificant. The same results hold when we separately examine female (column 6) and male (column 7) dictators.

**Addressing “beauty premium”** Note that the so-called beauty premium – that people are more generous to physically attractive people (Landry et al. 2006) and hence affects dictators’ allocation (Rosenblat 2008) – does not confound the results even if it is gender-specific (e.g., women smile more on a photo and hence look more approachable). It is because I am comparing recipients of the same gender who happen to have a higher IQ than their dictators and happen to have a lower IQ than their dictators; thus, gender-specific beauty premium is kept constant.

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11. For example, Charness and Gneezy (2008) examine how informing the recipient’s family name increases the dictators’ allocation using a university student sample and find an 8.9% increase in allocation as a fraction of endowment. Leider et al. (2010) find using a university student sample that dictators increase allocation by 11.42% as a fraction of endowment for their friends relative to someone living in the same student dormitory. Brañas-Garza et al. (2010) also find using a university student sample that dictators give about 10% more of their endowment to friends relative to other students in the same class.

Table 2: The role of gender and IQ in dictators' allocation

Outcome:	Dictator's allocation (fraction of endowment)			
Sample:	All dictators			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Higher IQ recipient	0.031 (0.031) [-0.030, 0.093]	0.011 (0.033) [-0.054, 0.075]	0.013 (0.033) [-0.053, 0.078]	0.005 (0.033) [-0.059, 0.070]
Female recipient	0.018 (0.027) [-0.037, 0.072]	0.014 (0.027) [-0.040, 0.067]	0.014 (0.027) [-0.040, 0.068]	0.007 (0.026) [-0.044, 0.058]
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient	0.024 (0.037) [-0.048, 0.097]	0.027 (0.037) [-0.045, 0.100]	0.026 (0.037) [-0.048, 0.099]	0.034 (0.036) [-0.037, 0.105]
Dictator IQ FE	-	✓	✓	✓
Round FE	-	-	✓	✓
Social distance FE	-	-	✓	✓
Dictator controls	-	-	-	✓
Recipient controls	-	-	-	-
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient +Female recipient	0.042 (0.026) [-0.009, 0.093]	0.041 (0.026) [-0.010, 0.092]	0.040 (0.026) [-0.012, 0.091]	0.041 (0.026) [-0.010, 0.092]
Baseline Mean	0.373	0.373	0.373	0.373
Baseline SD	0.261	0.261	0.261	0.261
Adj. R-squared	0.006	0.010	0.006	0.047
Observations	558	558	558	558
Clusters	195	195	195	195


Outcome:	Dictator's allocation (fraction of endowment)			Belief on IQ (fraction of baseline SD)
Sample:	All dictators	Female dictators	Male dictators	All recipients
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Higher IQ recipient	0.006 (0.034) [-0.061, 0.072]	-0.049 (0.042) [-0.132, 0.034]	0.048 (0.055) [-0.062, 0.158]	0.127 (0.166) [-0.203, 0.458]
Female recipient	0.006 (0.026) [-0.045, 0.057]	-0.014 (0.037) [-0.089, 0.061]	0.014 (0.034) [-0.054, 0.082]	-0.193 (0.160) [-0.511, 0.124]
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient	0.035 (0.037) [-0.037, 0.107]	0.057 (0.046) [-0.035, 0.148]	0.031 (0.061) [-0.090, 0.152]	0.281 (0.215) [-0.143, 0.706]
Dictator IQ FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Round FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Social distance FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Dictator controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Recipient controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient +Female recipient	0.041 (0.026) [-0.011, 0.093]	0.042 (0.029) [-0.015, 0.100]	0.045 (0.047) [-0.048, 0.138]	0.088 (0.141) [-0.190, 0.365]
Baseline Mean	0.373	0.359	0.355	3.559
Baseline SD	0.261	0.256	0.262	1.000
Adj. R-squared	0.050	0.021	0.080	0.048
Observations	558	298	260	368
Clusters	195	104	91	193

*Notes:* This table presents the regression results of equation 1. Column 1 shows that when we do not control for dictators' IQ, dictators allocate more to higher IQ recipients. Columns 2-5 gradually add more controls and show that coefficient estimates are stable across different specifications, suggesting irregularities in the data is unlikely to be driving the results. Column 5 shows that the coefficient estimates on all covariates are statistically and quantitatively insignificant; if anything, the coefficient estimate on the interaction between the higher IQ recipient and the female recipient may be quantitatively significant. Columns 6 and 7 show that the same results hold when we separately examine female and male dictators. Column 8 shows beliefs about paired recipients' IQ is roughly consistent with the experimental design. The standard error (in parenthesis) and the 95% confidence interval (in bracket) are reported below each coefficient estimate. The standard errors are clustered at the dictator level with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment. Baseline mean and standard deviation are that of lower IQ male recipients. Significance levels: \* 10%, \*\* 5%, and \*\*\* 1%.

One may even wonder whether higher IQ people are more physically attractive because they tend to earn more (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994) and look more confident (Mobius and Rosenblat 2006). However, if so, it is the premium they also receive in the real world, and controlling for that premium biases the results.

Yet, one may still wonder if beauty would appear more salient in the experimental setting than in the real world. To address this concern, Figure 3 plots the coefficient estimate on the interaction between higher IQ recipient and female recipient, separately for each IQ rank difference between dictator and recipient, along with the 95% confidence intervals. Note that the probability of receiving a better IQ rank (smaller IQ rank) is higher the higher one's IQ is. Thus, if IQ and beauty are positively correlated *and* more beauty recipients receive a higher allocation, then the coefficient estimate should be more positive/less negative the larger the IQ rank differences when the recipient's IQ is higher than that of dictator's, and should be less positive/more negative the larger the IQ rank differences when the recipient's IQ is lower than that of dictator's. Thus, in the presence of gender-IQ-specific beauty premium, we should expect an upward-sloping relationship between IQ rank and dictator game allocation, as shown in the red arrow. However, the estimates are inconsistent with the beauty premium prediction.

Figure 3: The role of gender and IQ in dictators' allocation – Addressing “beauty premium”




Notes: This figure plots the coefficient estimate on the interaction between higher IQ recipient and female recipient, separately for each IQ rank difference between dictator and recipient, along with the 95% confidence intervals. The red arrow is a relationship one should expect in the presence of gender-IQ-specific beauty premium. The standard errors are clustered at the dictator level with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment.

**Distribution results** While OLS only picks up the average effect, these results also hold in distribution. Panel A of Figure 4 presents empirical CDFs of dictators' allocation for each recipient type, residualized with the dictator IQ fixed effects to give a causal interpretation to the differences.<sup>12</sup>

12. Residualized allocation is residual from regression of dictators' allocation on dictator IQ fixed effects.

Figure 4: The role of gender and IQ in dictators' allocation – Distribution



*Notes:* These figures show the empirical CDF of residualized dictators' allocation by recipient types for all dictators (panel A), female dictators (Panel B), and male dictators (Panel C). The figures show the CDFs of dictators' allocation for each recipient type almost coincide and they are statistically indistinguishable from each other, even when we separately examine female and male dictators. The randomization inference p-value is calculated with the Kruskal-Wallis test.

The figure shows that the CDFs of dictators' allocation for each recipient type almost coincide. The randomization inference (Young 2019) using the Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the p-value of the differences in the CDFs is 0.37, which is far above the conventional 5% cutoff.<sup>13</sup> If anything, the CDF of higher IQ female recipients (the blue line) slightly lies on the right of the other CDFs across the x-axis values, suggesting they might receive a slightly higher allocation. The same results hold when we separately examine female (Panel B) and male (Panel C) dictators. Thus, one's gender, IQ, or their interaction do not affect the allocation they receive from dictators, both in mean and distribution.

**Belief results** To complement the findings so far, column 8 of Table 2 presents the regression results of equation 1 but with recipients' beliefs about paired recipients' IQ as the dependent variable. As discussed in section 2.1, random desk assignment ensures that recipients' belief proxies dictators' belief. Online Appendix Table C3 shows the ex-post balance of this comparability.

Column 8 shows that none of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant, may be because participants did not want to admit that their IQ is lower than the paired recipients even at the cost of reducing their payoff. However, the coefficient estimate on the higher IQ recipient is positive. Also, the coefficient estimate on the sum of the coefficient estimate on the female recipient and the interaction between the female recipient and the higher IQ recipient is positive. These suggest that participants correctly believe that male and female recipients with higher IQ solved a larger number of IQ questions. The coefficient estimate on female recipient is negative, suggesting that participants believe lower IQ female recipients solved a fewer IQ questions than lower IQ male recipients. Thus, participants' belief about paired recipients' IQ is roughly consistent with the experimental design.

## 5 Robustness of the findings


In Figure 5, I re-estimate equation 1 with various sub-samples and plot the coefficient estimates along with their 95% confidence intervals to show the robustness of the findings in Table 2. I plot the estimate of column 5 of Table 2 with the red dot and line labeled as "Baseline" as a reference.

First, overconfident dictators may dislike higher IQ recipients more and hence allocate less. However, the estimates for overconfident (the brown dot and line) and non-overconfident dictators (the dark green dot and line) are very similar to the baseline estimates. Second, since dictators with IQ rank 1 only face lower IQ recipients and IQ rank 6 only face higher IQ recipients, they may behave differently from other dictators. However, the estimates with dictators of IQ rank 2-5 only (the green dot and line) provide very similar estimates as the baseline estimates. Third, although I excluded allocations where dictators knew the paired recipients "very well," knowing the paired recipients even a little may still affect the allocation. However, the estimates with allocations where dictators did not know at all the paired recipients (the light green dot and line) are very similar to the baseline estimates.

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13. I use randomization inference to address arbitrary dependency among allocations. The null hypothesis is that all CDFs coincide.

Figure 5: The role of gender and IQ in dictators' allocation: Robustness



*Notes:* This figure re-estimates equation 1 with various sub-samples and plots the coefficient estimates along with their 95% confidence intervals to show the robustness of the findings in Table 2. The standard errors are clustered at the dictator level with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)’s small cluster bias adjustment for specifications from “Baseline” to “Did not know at all only” and heteroskedasticity-robust with Bell and McCaffrey (2002)’s small sample bias adjustment for specifications “round 1 only,” “round 2 only,” and “round 3 only.”

Last, dictators play three-rounds of dictator games, and there can be across-round heterogeneity. The blue dot and line are estimates with round 1 only, the purple dot and line with round 2 only, and the pink dot and lines with round 3 only. There is indeed some heterogeneity; especially, in round 3, female recipients who happen to have a higher IQ than dictators receive statistically significantly higher allocation: they receive nearly 20 percentage point more allocation (as a fraction of endowment). It is unclear why dictators allocate higher in round 3; however, the bottom line is that it is consistent with that women with higher IQ receive more allocation, if anything. Also, it could be due to chance as I run several robustness regressions: for example, Gelman and Carlin (2014)’s Type M error ratio is about 2.5, suggesting that the estimate is likely to be 2.5 times larger than the true size.<sup>14</sup> Dividing the round 3 estimate by 2.5 makes it very close to the baseline estimate.

14. I use as the true value  $-0.47/(7+5+7)*3 \approx -0.074$  from the pre-analysis plan (I divided -0.47 by the average of the dictator endowment).

## 6 Conclusion

This paper shows that gender, cognitive skills, or their interactions may not play a significant role in other people's generosity. If anything, people are more generous to women with high cognitive skills. While several studies show people perceive and treat women in traditionally male domains negatively (e.g., leadership, competition), and these domains typically require cognitive skills. My results suggest that these studies' findings are unlikely to be driven by violation of cognitive skill-related gender norms, which has implications for the role of gender norms in labor markets.



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# Appendix

## Appendix A The main change to the pre-analysis plan

In the initial design, recipients finished all the tasks except the post-questionnaire and left the laboratory before dictators received their IQ rank so that dictators could play the dictator game without recipients in the same room. The allocation to the recipients was paid electronically as a “participation fee” for the online post-questionnaire, which was sent to recipients via email after the session was over. However, as I ran the 1st session with this initial design with 24 participants, dictators had to wait idly for about 20-30 minutes until recipients left the laboratory, and dictators seemed to have lost concentration during this waiting time: about half of the dictators could not answer the comprehension questions about their IQ rank. Thus, I changed the design and let recipients stay in the laboratory while dictators played the dictator game. I looked at the 1st session data before making this change. I exclude the 1st session data in the analysis, but results are robust to including the 1st session data. The oTree code and instructions used for the 1st session are available upon request.

## Appendix B Description of covariates

$X_{ij}$  in equation 1 includes the following variables:

### Dictator characteristics

- $Age_i \in \mathbb{N}$ : dictator  $i$ 's age.
- $Female_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if dictator  $i$  is female, 0 otherwise.
- $FromEmiliaRomagna_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if dictator  $i$  is from the Emilia-Romagna region where the experiment was conducted, 0 otherwise.
- $SocialSciences_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if dictator  $i$  majors in social sciences, 0 otherwise.
- $STEM_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if dictator  $i$  majors in natural sciences/mathematics, engineering, or medicine; 0 otherwise.
- $PostBachelor_i \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if dictator  $i$  is either a master or post-bachelor student, a student in the 4th year or beyond in a bachelor-master combined program (bachelor is a 3 year program in Italy), or PhD student, 0 otherwise.
- $OverConfidence_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ : degree of dictator  $i$ 's overconfidence. It is equal to  $-1$  if dictator  $i$ 's guess about the number of IQ test questions they have solved correctly is lower than the actual number, 0 if equal to the actual number, and 1 if higher than the actual number.

### Recipient characteristics

- $Age_j \in \mathbb{N}$ : recipient  $j$ 's age.

- $FromEmiliaRomagna_j \in \{0, 1\}$ : an indicator variable equals 1 if recipient  $j$  is from the Emilia-Romagna region where the experiment was conducted, 0 otherwise.

Fixed effects

- $\sum_{k=2}^3 \mathbb{1}[\text{round}_{ij} = k]$ : fixed effects for dictator game or belief elicitation round.  $\mathbb{1}$  is the indicator variable.
- $\sum_{k=2}^3 \mathbb{1}[\text{social distance}_{ij} = k]$ : fixed effects for social distance between dictator  $i$  and recipient  $j$ . social distance $_{ij} = 1$  means dictator  $i$  did not know recipient  $j$  at all,  $= 2$  knew but not well, and  $= 3$  saw before.  $\mathbb{1}$  is the indicator variable.

## Appendix C Additional tables

Table C1: Exogeneity of dictator IQ rank conditional on dictator IQ fixed effects

Outcome:	Age	Female	From Emilia-Romagna	Humanities	Social sciences	STEM	Post bachelor	Over-confidence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
IQ rank = 2	0.010 (0.796)	0.221* (0.128)	0.074 (0.104)	-0.095 (0.130)	0.034 (0.088)	0.061 (0.130)	0.151 (0.127)	0.146 (0.200)
IQ rank = 3	-0.300 (0.776)	0.139 (0.143)	-0.007 (0.103)	-0.101 (0.142)	0.183 (0.120)	-0.081 (0.137)	0.183 (0.137)	0.160 (0.241)
IQ rank = 4	-0.536 (0.894)	0.094 (0.148)	0.138 (0.116)	-0.146 (0.148)	0.101 (0.123)	0.045 (0.148)	0.187 (0.145)	0.430* (0.258)
IQ rank = 5	0.534 (0.959)	0.092 (0.165)	0.062 (0.128)	-0.220 (0.175)	0.166 (0.128)	0.054 (0.165)	0.061 (0.156)	0.158 (0.271)
IQ rank = 6	-0.040 (1.093)	0.070 (0.191)	0.021 (0.147)	-0.368* (0.201)	0.442*** (0.162)	-0.074 (0.173)	0.013 (0.191)	0.346 (0.306)
Dictator IQ FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F statistic	0.571	0.634	0.704	0.697	1.910*	0.626	0.739	0.830
Adj. R-squared	-0.012	0.016	-0.013	-0.010	0.024	0.011	-0.026	-0.020
Observations	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

*Notes:* This table shows dictator IQ rank is uncorrelated with dictator characteristics conditional on dictator IQ fixed effects. The F statistic shows the joint significance of IQ rank = 2 to IQ rank = 6 dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with Bell and McCaffrey (2002)'s small sample bias adjustment are reported below each coefficient estimate. Significance levels: \* 10%, \*\* 5%, and \*\*\* 1%



Table C2: Exogeneity of the main regression's covariates conditional on dictator IQ fixed effects

Outcome:	Age	Female	From Emilia-Romagna	Humanities	Social sciences	STEM	Post bachelor	Over-confidence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Higher IQ recipient	-0.429 (0.350)	0.001 (0.064)	0.105** (0.048)	-0.065 (0.065)	0.106** (0.051)	-0.041 (0.060)	-0.071 (0.063)	0.063 (0.107)
Female recipient	-0.228 (0.336)	0.060 (0.059)	0.080* (0.048)	-0.026 (0.057)	0.015 (0.046)	0.011 (0.057)	-0.043 (0.060)	0.040 (0.090)
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient	0.431 (0.458)	0.010 (0.082)	-0.148** (0.064)	0.014 (0.081)	-0.063 (0.062)	0.049 (0.079)	0.069 (0.084)	-0.051 (0.129)
Dictator IQ FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F statistic	0.522	1.078	2.074	0.505	1.731	0.661	0.417	0.119
Adj. R-squared	0.015	0.039	0.020	0.011	0.014	0.036	-0.000	-0.007
Observations	558	558	558	558	558	558	558	558
Clusters	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

Outcome:	Age (recipient)	From Emilia-Romagna (recipient)	Dictator game round 1	Dictator game round 2	Dictator game round 3	Did not know at all	Saw before	Knew but not very well
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Higher IQ recipient	-0.792** (0.374)	0.188*** (0.050)	-0.084 (0.065)	-0.026 (0.064)	0.110* (0.061)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.008 (0.022)	-0.006 (0.018)
Female recipient	-0.284 (0.344)	0.025 (0.038)	-0.084 (0.062)	0.037 (0.058)	0.047 (0.059)	0.020 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.010)
Higher IQ recipient x Female recipient	0.626 (0.462)	-0.100 (0.062)	0.137 (0.084)	-0.084 (0.079)	-0.053 (0.084)	-0.020 (0.026)	0.005 (0.025)	0.014 (0.020)
Dictator IQ FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
F statistic	1.537	5.510***	0.941	0.890	1.207	0.666	0.415	1.071
Adj. R-squared	-0.002	0.027	-0.008	-0.009	-0.008	0.033	0.000	0.061
Observations	558	558	558	558	558	558	558	558
Clusters	195	195	195	195	195	195	195	195

*Notes:* This table shows recipient gender, recipient's IQ rank relative to dictator's, and their interaction are uncorrelated with dictator or paired recipient characteristics, dictator game rounds, or social distance between dictators and paired recipients. The F statistic shows the joint significance of all covariates. Cluster-robust standard errors with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment are reported below each coefficient estimate. Significance levels: \* 10%, \*\* 5%, and \*\*\* 1%.

Table C3: Balance between dictators and recipients

	Recipients		Dictators		Difference (Recipients – Dictators)		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SE	P-value
<u>Panel A: Own characteristics</u>							
IQ level	6.84	1.14	6.69	1.23	0.15	0.12	0.21
IQ rank	3.40	1.74	3.58	1.67	-0.18	0.17	0.30
Age	23.34	2.78	23.47	2.72	-0.14	0.28	0.63
From Emilia-Romagna	0.20	0.40	0.18	0.39	0.01	0.04	0.76
Humanities	0.34	0.48	0.46	0.50	-0.11	0.05	0.02
Social sciences	0.27	0.44	0.19	0.40	0.07	0.04	0.08
STEM	0.39	0.49	0.35	0.48	0.04	0.05	0.42
Post bachelor	0.49	0.50	0.46	0.50	0.04	0.05	0.48
Overconfidence	0.49	0.75	0.43	0.76	0.06	0.08	0.42
Time on feedback (sec.)	93.26	83.96	107.60	95.60	-14.34	9.13	0.12
Observations	193		195				
<u>Panel B: Paired recipients' characteristics</u>							
IQ level	6.84	1.16	6.84	1.16	0.00	0.07	1.00
IQ rank	3.42	1.74	3.42	1.74	0.00	0.09	0.97
Higher IQ	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.50	-0.03	0.04	0.52
Age	23.35	2.80	23.35	2.77	0.00	0.19	0.99
Female	0.47	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.03	0.99
From Emilia-Romagna	0.19	0.40	0.20	0.40	0.00	0.03	0.88
Observations	368		558				
<u>Panel C: Social distance with paired recipients</u>							
Did not know at all	0.98	0.14	0.96	0.19	0.02	0.01	0.15
Knew but not well	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.17	-0.01	0.01	0.39
Saw before	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.09	-0.01	0.00	0.06
Observations	368		558				
<u>Panel D: Belief on paired recipient's IQ level (fraction of baseline SD)</u>							
Belief on IQ level	3.48	1.04					
Belief on IQ level (residualized)	0.00	1.02					
Observations	368						

*Notes:* This table shows that recipients and dictators are comparable also ex-post. P-values for the difference between recipients and dictators are calculated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors with Bell and McCaffrey (2002)'s small sample bias adjustment for Panel A and with Pustejovsky and Tipton (2018)'s small cluster bias adjustment for Panels B-D.

## Appendix D Experimental instructions

*To the experimenter:*

- Before subjects arrive:
- Clear image cache from the browser.
- Put on each desk (i) a scratch paper and (ii) a pencil.
- Have a printed instructions ready.
- Set up photo booth. The brightness of the camera should be 172 and resolution 0.7 mb with 4:3 aspect ratio.
- Leave a paper in which participants write down their desk number on the photo booth.
- After registration:
- Give them photo taking instructions.
- Ask them to take photo at the photo booth, then take seat.
- After subjects took photo:
- Check that all the participants' photos are neutral: they must not signal nothing other than their gender.
- Make sure that the photos are saved as Pxx.jpg where xx is participant's desk number.
- After reserve participants left the room:
- Rename the photo name to the new desk number's for those who moved to new desks.
- Store photos in \_static/photo folder.
- Startup Chrome & oTree

*App: personal\_info*

**Page: DeskNumber**

**Please enter your desk number and click "Next"**

[Your desk number: ]

**Page: PersonalInfo**

**Please check that the photo is yours**

[Participant's photo]

The photo you took is displayed above. Please check that the photo is yours. Please also enter your first name. We will come to each desk and check the photo and the first name.

[Your first name: ]

[Digital signature (please wait for us to sign you in): ]

*To the experimenter: before type in the password, do the followings:*

- Check that the photo and the first name correspond to the participant.

*Then click "Next" to let participants to proceed.*

**Page: Introduction**

*To the experimenter: read the instructions aloud.*

## **Welcome!**

You are participating in a study of the BLESS. For your participation, you will receive a fixed amount of [Participation fee]€. There are 2 parts in which you can earn additional earnings. The expected length is 1 hour.

During the study, we use your photo and first name to identify you. Your photo and the first name will only be used in this session and deleted immediately afterwards. However, we may ask some of you to allow us to use their photo in another study, which you can opt out.

The study is computerized, meaning that the computer program will give you precise instructions in each task. In the following you will find general instructions of the study, which you can always find in the bottom of the screen.

### **General instructions**

- Please turn off your mobile phone.
- Please do not communicate with other participants.
- Please only use paper and pencil.
- Once you understand the instructions or enter your decisions, please click “Next” to proceed unless instructed otherwise.
- If you have any questions, please raise your hand at any time.

If there is no question, we will start the study.

*To the experimenter:*

- *Confirm that everyone turned off their mobile phone.*
- *Then, if there is no question, click “Advance slowest user(s).”*

*After that, just sit in the experimenter area unless someone raises her or his hand. Do not read instructions aloud unless this document says to do so.*

### ***App: iqtest***

#### ***Page: Introduction***

#### **Part 1: Instructions**

In part 1, you will work on an IQ test, which is frequently used to measure intelligence. The IQ test you will work on is the Raven’s Standardized Progressive Matrices Test.

You will solve the IQ test as follows: for each question, you will see an image in which a piece is missing. Below the image there will be several options. Choose the correct option among them to complete the image. There will be only one correct option.

An example is provided below. In the image, there are 9 large white squares each containing a small black square. In the first column, the small black square is located on the left; in the second column, in the middle; in the third column, on the right. In the first row, it is located on the top; in the second row, in the middle; in the third row, in the bottom. Thus, in the third

column of the third row, the small black square must be located in the right bottom, thus the correct option is 5.

[Raven matrix no. 31 here]

There are 9 questions in total and you have 9 minutes. Once the time is over, you will automatically be directed to the next page. You will earn [Payoff per IQ test]€ for each correct answer. There is no penalty for wrong answers. You can use paper and pencil on your desk.

*Page: IQTest (9 minutes)*

**Please complete the image by choosing the correct option**

[Raven IQ test]

*Page: Guess*

**Guess the number of questions you solved**

The IQ test is over.

We have randomly formed a group of 6 participants including you in this room and constructed a ranking among the 6 group members based on their IQ test performance.

A group member with rank 1 performed the best in the IQ test, followed by a group member with rank 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. In case of a tie between group members, the computer randomly decided who receives the higher rank.

How many questions do you think you have solved correctly? If your guess is correct, you will additionally earn [Earnings from guess]€.

[Guess]

[Dictator] *Page: Feedback*

**Feedback**

Among your 6 group members including you, you received **Rank [Participant's rank]**.

[Among your 6 group members, how many people performed better than you in the IQ test?: ]

[Among your 6 group members, how many people performed worse than you in the IQ test?: ]

*App: dictator*

[Dictator] *Page: IntroductionDict*

**Part 2: Instructions**

In this part, half of you will be active participants who will work on the task described in the next page, and the remaining half will be passive participants who will NOT work on the task described in the next page.

[Dictator] *Page: IntroductionDictCont*

## **Part 2: Instructions**

You are assigned to a role of **active participant**.

Part 2 consist of 3 rounds. In each round, you will first receive an endowment (money). After that, you will be paired with a passive participant in your group.

Your task in this part is to allocate the endowment to yourself and the paired passive participant. The passive participants, other active participants, or anyone else other than us will never know who allocated how much.

At the end of the study, the computer will randomly select 1 out of 3 rounds and the amount you allocated to you in that round will be your earnings in this part.

The computer will also randomly select 1 out of 3 rounds for the paired passive participants and the amount you allocated to him or her in that round will be his or her earnings in this part.

[Recipient] *Page: IntroductionRecip*

## **Part 2: Instructions**

In part 2 consists of 2 rounds. In each round, you will be paired with another participant in your group.

Your task in this part is to guess how many questions the paired participant has solved correctly in the IQ test. For each correct guess, you will earn [Earning from guess other]€.

[Dictator] *Page: PrepEndow*

## **Round [Round number] of 3**

Please wait.

[Dictator] *Page: OfferDict1-3*

## **Round [Round number] of 3**

[Paired participant's photo]

[Paired participant's first name]

Rank [Paired participant's rank]

You have received [7/5/7]€ for this round.

You have been paired with **[Paired participant's first name]**.

Please allocate the endowment between yourself and [Paired participant's first name]. When you click the line below, a cursor appears. You can move the cursor by dragging it. Please move the cursor to your preferred position to determine the allocation.

[Slider from 0 to endowment that moves with increment of 0.5]

[Recipient] *Page: GuessOther1-3*

**Round [Round number] of 2**

[Paired participant's photo]

[Paired participant's first name]

Rank [Paired participant's rank]

You have been paired with **[Paired participant's first name]**.

How many questions do you think [Paired participant's first name] has solved correctly?

[Guess]

[Dictator] **Page: AnonymityCheckDict**

**Round 3 of 3**

Below we display the participants whom you were paired with. How well did you know him/her before participating in this study?

[Paired participant 1's photo]	[Paired participant 2's photo]	[Paired participant 3's photo]
[Paired participant 1's first name]	[Paired participant 2's first name]	[Paired participant 3's first name]
[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]

[Recip] **Page: AnonymityCheckRecip**

**Round 2 of 2**

Below we display the participants whom you were paired with. How well did you know him/her before participating in this study?

[Paired participant 1's photo]	[Paired participant 2's photo]
[Paired participant 1's first name]	[Paired participant 2's first name]
[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]



*Page: ShowResults*

**Results**

The study is over. The results are provided below.

- In part 1, you solved [**Number of IQ test questions solved**] questions and earned [**Earnings from IQ test**]€. [If guess is correct] You have additionally earned [**Earnings from guess**]€ because your guess about the number of questions solved was correct.
- [Dictator] In part 2, computer selected **round** [1/2/3] in which you allocated [**Allocation to self**]€ to yourself.
- [Recipient] In part 2, you made [**Number of correct guesses on others**] guesses correct. So you earned [**Earnings from guesses other**]€.
- [Recipient] You additionally earned a top-up of [**Allocation from dictator**]€.

So, your total earnings are [**Participant's earnings**]€ including [Participation fee]€ of participation fee.

Thank you for participating in this study! We will prepare your payment soon. Meanwhile, please answer a short questionnaire by clicking "Next." Your answer will be kept anonymous and will not affect your payment.

*Page: Questionnaire1*

**Questionnaire 1 of 3**

[Your study program: Agricultural and Food Sciences; Economics and Management; Education; Engineering and Architecture; Humanities; Languages and Literatures, Interpreting and Translation; Law; Medicine; Pharmacy and Biotechnology; Political Sciences; Psychology; Sciences; Sociology; Sport Sciences; Statistics; Veterinary Medicine]

[Please also type your full study program name in Italian: ]

If you are enrolled in a specialized or professional program, please choose the closest study program. If you are enrolled in a post-bachelor vocational program, please choose the study program of your bachelor's degree. If you are an exchange student, please choose the study field closest to the one in your home university.

[Your degree program: Bachelor, Master/Post-bachelor, Bachelor-master combined (ciclo unico), Doctor]

[Your year in the degree program: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th]

[Your age: ]

[Your gender: Male, Female]

[Are you from Emilia-Romagna region?: Yes, No]

[Recipient] In another study, we'd like to use your photo. We will show your photo to some people in the University of Bologna only in this room, but no other people except us will see

your photo. Your photo will be deleted immediately after we finish another study. For your cooperation, we will pay you gratuity of [Gratuity for photo use]€. May we use your photo in another study?

[Yes, I allow the researcher to use my photo in another study; No, I do NOT allow the researcher to use my photo in another study]

[What do you think the study you participated was about?]

[Was there anything unclear or confusing about the study you participated?]

[Do you have any other comments? (optional)]

**Page: Questionnaire2**

*To the experimenter:*

- *Prepare payment.*

**Questionnaire 2 of 3**

Below we display the participants whom you were paired with. How well did you know him/her before participating in this study?

[Dictator]

[Paired participant 3's photo]	[Paired participant 1's photo]	[Paired participant 2's photo]
[Paired participant 3's first name]	[Paired participant 1's first name]	[Paired participant 2's first name]
[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]

[Recipient]

[Paired participant 2's photo]	[Paired participant 1's photo]
[Paired participant 2's first name]	[Paired participant 1's first name]
[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]	[I didn't know him/her at all, I saw him/her before, I knew him/her but not very well, I knew him/her very well]

**Page: Questionnaire3**

**Questionnaire 3 of 3**

[What do you think this study was about?]

[Was there anything unclear or confusing about this study?]

[Do you have any other comments? (optional)]

[Participants with payment less than 5€] *Page: ExtraTask*

**Extra task**

Please solve the additions below and click next to earn [5€ – Participant's earnings]€.

84	33	64
----	----	----

[Sum of the above numbers: ]

19	65	97
----	----	----

[Sum of the above numbers: ]