Yunyun Lv
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CONTACT INFORMATION: **September 2022**

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Expected June 2023.
   Thesis Title: "Essays on Autocracy"
   Thesis Committee: Prof. Richard Van Weelden, Prof. Luca Rigotti,
                     Prof. Daniel Berkowitz, Prof. Iza Ding, Prof. Arie Beresteanu
M.Phil in Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2017.
B.S.Sc in Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 2015.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Primary Fields: Political Economy
Secondary Fields: Microeconomic Theory

WORKING PAPERS

"When Big Brother Meets Big Profit" (*Job Market Paper*)
"When to Censor?"
"Governmental Structure: Vertical or Horizontal?"
"When Would an Autocrat Open the Emigration Floodgates?"

WORKS IN PROGRESS

"A Good Feminist is a Silent Feminist: How Nationalism Crowded-out Feminism in China", with Yixuan Zhang and Liyang Zhou
"Bounds" package for Julia and Python, with Prof. Arie Beresteanu

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Coordinator of Economics Study Group, School of Business, Hong Kong Baptist University, 2021-2022
Research Assistant to Professor Kim Sau Chung, Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013-2017

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Instructor, University of Pittsburgh
   Introduction to Mathematical Methods (Ph.D. Math Camp), Summer 2022
   Game Theory Principles (Undergraduate), Summer 2022, 4.3/5
   Game Theory Principles (Undergraduate), Summer 2021, 4.1/5
   Game Theory Principles (Undergraduate), Summer 2020, 4.0/5
Teaching Assistant, University of Pittsburgh
   Economic Research and Data Skills (Undergraduate), Spring 2022
   Mathematical Methods of Economic Analysis (Ph.D. Level), Fall 2021, 4.9/5

Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D. Level), Spring 2020, 4.4/5
Introduction to Microeconomics (Undergraduate), Fall 2019, 3.8/5
Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D. Level), Spring 2019, 4.5/5
Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D. Level), Fall 2018, 4.8/5

WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS

"When Big Brother Meets Big Profit" (*Job Market Paper*)

The Chinese government ("Big Brother") demands that Social Network Service (SNS) companies (which make "Big Profit") comply with their order to censor sensitive content. The government threatens to punish SNS companies in case of disobedience. At the same time, the government also benefits from the tax paid by these companies. I document and explain two noticeable trends in China: (i) The level of censorship by SNS companies increases when their de facto tax rate decreases. (ii) Bigger SNS companies exhibit higher levels of compliance with the government than smaller SNS companies. The tax rate is determined by the government, serving as a commitment device: If the government sets a higher tax rate, it benefits more from the profit made by the company. Hence the government has weaker incentives to punish the company in case of disobedience. Therefore, the company also has weaker incentives to comply with the government. The higher censorship levels of bigger SNS platforms can be explained by stronger incentives for the government to stop circulating sensitive information on bigger platforms.

"**When to Censor?**"

The censor wants to maximize the receiver's belief that he is a good type instead of a bad type at an exogenous deadline. The censor chooses when to stop the public discussion about a piece of news, which generates a learning process for the receiver about the censor's type. If the censor allows more learning, the receiver has a more accurate belief about the type of censor. In equilibrium, if the censor stops the learning process sooner, the receiver believes he is more likely a bad type.

"Governmental Structure: Vertical or Horizontal?" (**Submitted**)

This paper explores the interaction between the hierarchical structures of governments and the career concerns of local officials using an infinite-horizon principal-agent model. Local officials either keep working to be promoted or shirk to collect benefits and get fired in the next period. The central government infers from the output of officials whether incumbents work or shirk and promotes those who work. The question is: what structure generates the highest total output? This paper shows that there exists a vertical structure that dominates all horizontal structures. Vertical structures generate less uncertainty in the promotion process and hence a clearer career path than horizontal structures. Therefore, vertical structures are more efficient in incentivizing local officials to work.

"When Would an Autocrat Open the Emigration Floodgates?"

This paper explains why autocratic governments draft the emigration policy so that emigration is sometimes easy for citizens and sometimes almost impossible. There are clear gains in opening the floodgates. If more citizens leave the country, fewer citizens will participate in revolutionary activities, making it more likely for the government to

remain in power. Under certain conditions, this improvement in stability dominates the loss in GDP caused by emigration.

SEMINAR AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

Pittsburgh Economics Medley Conference, 2022
Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (Poster), 2022
Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting, 2021
Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (Poster), 2019
Microeconomic Theory Brown Bag, University of Pittsburgh, 2018 - 2022

HONORS, FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS:

Southern Economic Association Graduate Student Award, 2021
Social Sciences Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh, 2020
Arts and Sciences Graduate Summer Research Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh, 2018
Arts and Sciences Graduate Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh, 2017
Dean's List, Faculty of Social Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015
Chung Chi College Class Scholarship, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014

COMPUTER SKILLS:

Python, R, Julia, Stata, LaTeX

LANGUAGES:

Mandarin (Native), English (Fluent), Cantonese (Fluent), Korean (Basic)

REFERENCES:

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