Blockchain for Real-world Assets

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Speaker: David Mazieres (Stanford Computer Science)

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Stellar: equitable access to the financial system

- 1. Open membership
 - a. Anyone can issue, trade, and hold assets
 - b. All developers access the same API, from central banks to PhD students
- 2. Issuer-enforced finality
 - a. Security of issued tokens depends only on issuer
 - b. Still need secure servers, but issuer owns or designates them
- 3. Cross-issuer atomicity
 - a. Trade any asset for any other (ensures you can bootstrap markets)
 - b. Get the best price on any trade without trusting

Non-solutions

- Extend national payment network (ACH, SEPA, UPI) globally
 - E.g. Central Banks systems
 - Requires compliance with national regulations, closed to new assets
- Everyone just issues and manages their own assets
 - E.g. PayPal, Venmo, AliPay
 - Can't pay or trade across systems, closed to new assets

What blockchain really gives us

- 1. Coin distribution
 - a. Distribute new tokens or cryptocurrency while limiting supply
- 2. Irreversible transactions (under some assumptions)
 - a. Can securely exchange or transfer purely digital tokens

Insight: solve #1 & #2 in mutually-reinforcing way with **mining**

Mining

Obtain cryptocurrency as a reward for making digital transactions harder to reverse

- Proof-of-work-based mining (popularized by Bitcoin)
- Proof-of-storage, -memory (burn non-computation resource)
- Proof-of-stake-based mining (many variants)
 - Scale proof-of-work by cryptocurrency holdings

Stellar transaction model

- Global replicated state machine (RSM) executes transactions to keep ledger state
 - Accounts named by public key authorizing operations on the account
 - Accounts can issue assets; issuing account part of asset name
- Transactions guarantee atomicity
 - Multiple operations from multiple accounts with either all succeed or all fail
 - Path payment atomically exchange multiple assets (different types of digital dollars are transferrable)

How to guarantee ledger integrity?

- Model only works if everyone agrees on ledger state
 - If ledger forks, system vulnerable to doublespend attack

Problem: Mining doesn't provide issuer-enforced finality Double redemption risk not under issuer's control

Mining is scary for digital issuers

- Mining is anonymous
 - Anyone with sufficient resources can extend or fork history
 - o Can't even name branch if no policy difference
- Yet mining rewards insufficient to secure flatcurrency tokens
- Non-financial (geo-political) incentives to disrupt blockchain

The internet hypothesis

- Idea: only accept ledgers if the people you care about also accept them
- Hypothesis: any two nodes you'd care about transitively follow a common node