

1.

(a) Risk-neutral probability:

$$\begin{cases} q_1 = r_{11} \pi_1 + r_{21} \pi_2 + r_{31} \pi_3 \\ q_2 = r_{12} \pi_1 + r_{22} \pi_2 + r_{32} \pi_3 \\ 1 = \pi_1 + \pi_2 + \pi_3 \end{cases} \Rightarrow$$

$$\begin{cases} 30 = 50\pi_1 + 10\pi_2 + 5\pi_3 \\ 1 = 2\pi_1 + 0 + 0 \\ 1 = \pi_1 + \pi_2 + \pi_3 \end{cases} \Rightarrow$$

$$\begin{cases} \pi_1 = \frac{1}{2} \\ \pi_2 = \frac{1}{2} \\ \pi_3 = 0 \end{cases}$$

Suppose a European call option

Payoff of state i :

$$(r_{i1} - K, 0)^+$$

$$60\% \cdot r_{11} = \frac{3}{5} \times 50 = 30.$$

If $K=30$, by asset 1 with
\$30 per unit and get \$50.

Payoff matrix: (20, 0, 0).

$$(50\pi_1 + 10\pi_2 + 5\pi_3) = 30$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_1 = \frac{1}{2}.$$

$$q_1 = 20\pi_1 + 0 = 10.$$

$$(u). \quad 60\% \cdot r_{12} = \frac{3}{5} \times 2 = 1.2.$$

The payoff matrix:

$$(48.8, 8.8, 3.8).$$

$$q_c = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 48.8 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 8.8 \\ = 28.8$$

$$(b). \quad 60\% \cdot r_{21} = \frac{3}{5} \times 10 = 6.$$

If $K=6$, buy asset 1 with \$6
per unit and get payoff
matrix if only asset 1 is
included:)

$$(46, 4, 0)$$

$$q_c = (46\pi_1 + 4\pi_2) = 25.$$

2. (a).

From $t=0$ to $t=1$:

$$q_0 = \frac{1}{1+r} (\pi q_u + (1-\pi) q_d)$$

$$q_0 = 100$$

$$1+r = 1+0.04 = 1.04$$

$$q_u = 110, q_d = 80.$$

$$\therefore 100 = \frac{1}{1.04} (110\pi + 80(1-\pi))$$

$$\Rightarrow 104 = 110\pi + 80 - 80\pi$$

$$\Rightarrow 104 = 30\pi + 80$$

$$\Rightarrow 24 = 30\pi$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi = 0.8.$$

$$1-\pi = 0.2$$

Check:

If price goes up to 110:

$$q_0 = 110, q_u = 121, q_d = 88$$

$$110 = \frac{1}{1.04} (121\pi + 88(1-\pi))$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi = 0.8.$$

The same in the case of $q_0 = 80$.

Thus, the risk-neutral probability measure is $(0.8, 0.2)$

(b).

At state 1,
the price of the bond
is 121.

$$(121 - K)_+ = (121 - 90)_+ = 31.$$

The price of the bond
is 88 at state 2.

$$(88 - K)_+ = (88 - 90)_+ = 0.$$

At state 3:

the price of the bond
is 88.

The same as above.

At state 4:

the price of the bond
is 64.

$$(64 - K)_+ = (64 - 90)_+ = 0.$$

$$q_0(110) = \frac{1}{1.04} (\pi \cdot 31 + (1-\pi) \cdot 0)$$

$$= \frac{1}{1.04} \cdot 0.8 \cdot 31$$

$$\approx 23.85$$

$$q_u(88) = 0.$$

(c)

Suppose a portfolio of α shares
of the stock and β shares of the
bond can replicate the call
option.

To find (α, β) , we need to solve
the following systems of equations:

$$23.85 = 110\alpha + 1.04\beta$$

$$0 = 80\alpha + 1.04\beta$$

$$\Rightarrow 30\alpha = 23.85$$

$$\alpha = 0.795.$$

$$1.04\beta = -80\alpha = -63.6$$

$$\beta = \frac{-63.6}{1.04} \approx -61.15.$$

Hence the portfolio consists of
0.795 shares of the stock
and -61.15 shares of the bond

$$q_0 = \alpha q_0 + \beta$$

$$\approx 0.795 \times 100 - 61.15$$

$$= 18.35.$$

(d) Suppose that

$$q_u > q_0 \alpha + \beta = 18.35$$

At $t=0$, the investor

borrow \$61.15,

sells 1 call option on
the stock and ~~buy~~

buys 0.795 shares of the stock.

$$79.5 - 61.15 - q_c$$

$$= 18.35 - q_c < 0$$

If at $t=1$, $q_u = \$110$,

then the option is exercised:

the investor sells 0.795
shares of the stock, get:

$$0.795 \times \$110 = \$87.45$$

The investor returns \$23.85

for the call option, and

pays back the debt on
the bond:

$$1.04 \times 61.15 \approx 63.6$$

Since $\$23.85 + \$63.6 = \$87.45$,

the payoff on the portfolio
is 0.

If at $t=1$, $q_d = \$80$, the investor

won't exercise the option, ~~pay~~

sells 0.795 shares of the
~~bond~~ stock for

$$0.795 \times \$80 = \$63.6$$

The debt on the bond this

investor needs to pay back is


$$1.04 \times 61.15 \approx \$63.6$$

The payoff on the portfolio is 0.

Hence if $q_u > 18.35$, it's possible

to create an arbitrage portfolio.

(e).



3. (a)

If not invest:

when profit goes up,

$$V_{cu}(1) = 15 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_c(w_1)$$

$$= 15 + \frac{1.1 \times 15}{r}$$

$$= 15 + \frac{16.5}{0.01}$$

$$= 15 + 1650 = 1665$$

when profit goes down,

$$V_{cd}(1) = 15 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_c(w_2)$$

$$= 15 + \frac{0.9 \times 15}{r}$$

$$= 15 + \frac{13.5}{0.01}$$

$$= 15 + 1350 = 1365$$

$$V_{c,0} = 0.6 \times 1665 + 0.4 \times 1365$$

$$= 1545$$

If invest:

when profit goes up,

$$V_{cu}^w(1) = 15 - I + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_c^w(w_1)$$

$$= 15 - I + \frac{1.5 \times 1.1 \times 15}{r}$$

$$= 15 - I + \frac{18.975}{0.01}$$

$$= 1912.5 - I$$

when profit goes down:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{0,0}^{w_2}(I) &= 15 - I + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_t^I(w_2) \\ &= 15 - I + \frac{1.15 \times 0.9 \times 15}{r} \\ &= 15 - I + \frac{15.525}{0.01} \\ &= 1567.5 - I \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_{0,0}^I(I) &= 0.6 \times (1912.5 - I) \\ &\quad + 0.4(1567.5 - I) \\ &= 1774.5 - I \end{aligned}$$

if $I < 1774.5$.

The net gain is

$$\begin{aligned} V_{0,0}^I - V_{0,0}^I &= 1774.5 - I - 1545 \\ &= 229.5 - I \quad \text{if } I < 229.5 \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$V_{0,0}^I(I) = \begin{cases} 229.5 - I, & \text{if } 0 < I < 229.5 \\ 0, & \text{if } I > 229.5 \end{cases}$$

cb) At $t=1$,

if profit goes up,

$$\begin{aligned} V_{1,1}^{w_1}(I) &= 1.5 \times 1 - I + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_t^I(w_1) \\ &= 16.5 - I + 1897.5 \\ &= 1914 - I, \quad \text{if } I \leq 1914 \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore V_{1,1}^{w_1}(I) = \begin{cases} 1914 - I, & \text{if } I \leq 1914 \\ 0, & \text{if } I > 1914. \end{cases} \quad \text{cc)}$$

if profit goes down:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{1,1}^{w_2}(I) &= 1.5 \times 0.9 - I + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_t^I(w_2) \\ &= 13.5 - I + 1552.5 \\ &= 1566 - I \quad \text{if } I < 1566. \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore V_{1,1}^{w_2}(I) = \begin{cases} 1566 - I & \text{if } 0 < I < 1566 \\ 0 & \text{if } I > 1566. \end{cases}$$

Hence, if $I \leq 1566$.

$$\begin{aligned} V_{0,1}(I) &= (0.6(1914 - I) + 0.4(1566 - I)) \times \frac{1}{1.01} \\ &= \frac{1774.8 - I}{1.01} \end{aligned}$$

if $1566 < I \leq 1914$:

$$V_{0,1}(I) = \frac{0.6(1914 - I)}{1.01} = \frac{1148.4 - 0.6I}{1.01}$$

if $I > 1914$, the NPV of investment is $V_{0,1}(I) = 0$.

If $I \leq 1566$,

the net gain is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1774.8 - I}{1.01} - 1545 &= \frac{1774.8}{1.01} - \frac{I}{1.01} - 1545 \\ &\approx 212.23 - \frac{I}{1.01} \end{aligned}$$

if $I \leq 214.35$.

If $1566 < I < 1914$:

the net gain is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{0.6(1914 - I)}{1.01} - 1545 &= \frac{1148.4}{1.01} - \frac{0.6I}{1.01} - 1545 \\ &\approx -407.97 - \frac{0.6I}{1.01} \end{aligned}$$

Usually we assume $I > 0$,

\therefore It's not optimal to invest in this case.

Thus

$$V_{0,1}(I) = \begin{cases} 212.3 - \frac{I}{1.01}, & \text{if } 0 < I \leq 214.35 \\ 0, & \text{if } I > 214.35. \end{cases}$$

If $0 < I < 214.35$ and

$$\begin{aligned} 229.5 - I &> 212.23 - \frac{I}{1.01} \\ 229.5 &> 212.23 - \frac{I}{1.01} + I \\ 229.5 &> 212.23 + I(1 - \frac{1}{1.01}) \\ I(\frac{0.01}{1.01}) &> 17.27 \\ I \times \frac{0.01}{1.01} &> 17.27 \\ I &> 1744.27 > 229.5 > 214.35. \end{aligned}$$

if profit goes up,
and not invest:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{1,1}^{w_1} &= 15 \times 1.1 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_t(w_1) \\ &= 15 \times 1.1 + \frac{15 \times 1.1}{r} \\ &= 16.5 + \frac{16.5}{0.01} \\ &= 1666.5 \end{aligned}$$

The net gain is:

$$1914 - I - 1666.5 = 247.5 - I$$

if $I \leq 247.5$.

$$\therefore V_{1,1}^{w_1}(I) = \begin{cases} 247.5 - I & \text{if } 0 < I \leq 247.5 \\ 0 & \text{if } I > 247.5 \end{cases}$$

if profit goes down,

and not invest:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{1,1}^{w_2} &= 15 \times 0.9 + \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \pi_t(w_2) \\ &= 15 \times 0.9 + \frac{15 \times 0.9}{0.01} \\ &= 13.5 + \frac{13.5}{0.01} \\ &= 1363.5 \end{aligned}$$

The net gain is

$$1566 - I - 1363.5 = 202.5 - I$$

if $I \leq 202.5$

$$\therefore V_{1,1}^{w_2}(I) = \begin{cases} 202.5 - I, & \text{if } 0 < I \leq 202.5 \\ 0, & \text{if } I > 202.5 \end{cases}$$

c)

If $0 < I \leq 202.5$,

$$\begin{aligned} V_{0,1}(I) &= [0.6 \times (247.5 - I) + 0.4 \times (202.5 - I)] \times \frac{1}{1-\beta} \\ &= \frac{229.5 - I}{1.01} \end{aligned}$$

If $202.5 < I \leq 247.5$

$$V_{0,1}(I) = \frac{0.6 \times (247.5 - I)}{1.01} = \frac{148.5 - 0.6I}{1.01}$$

If $I > 247.5$, $V_{0,1}(I) = 0$

$$\therefore V_{0,1}(I) = \begin{cases} \frac{229.5 - I}{1.01} & 0 < I \leq 202.5 \\ \frac{148.5 - 0.6I}{1.01} & 202.5 < I \leq 247.5 \\ 0 & I > 247.5 \end{cases}$$

At $t=1$,

$$\text{if } 229.5 - I > 0.6(247.5 - I) \Rightarrow I < 202.5.$$

At $t=0$:

if $0 < I \leq 202.5$:

$$229.5 - I > \frac{229.5 - I}{1.01}$$

Best to invest at $t=0$.

If $202.5 < I \leq 247.5$

$$229.5 - I > \frac{148.5 - 0.6I}{1.01}$$

$$= 229.5 - I - 147.03 + \frac{0.6I}{1.01}$$

$$= 82.47 - \frac{0.4I}{1.01}$$

$$= 0.4(203.18 - I)$$

if $202.5 < I \leq 203.18$,

$$229.5 - I > \frac{148.5 - 0.6I}{1.01}$$

Best to invest at $t=0$.

if $203.18 < I \leq 229.5$,

$$229.5 - I < \frac{148.5 - 0.6I}{1.01}$$

Best to invest at $t=1$ when increasing profit is observed.

If $229.5 < I \leq 247.5$,

$$\frac{0.6(247.5 - I)}{1.01} > 0.$$

Best to invest at $t=1$ when increasing profit is observed.

If $I > 247.5$, not to invest in any cases.

In conclusion:

if $0 < I \leq 203.18$,

best to invest at $t=0$.

if $203.18 < I \leq 247.5$,

best to invest at $t=1$.

if $I > 247.5$,

not to invest in any cases.

$$\therefore 229.5 - \left[2212.23 - \frac{I}{1.01} \right]$$

if $I < 1744.27$

Best to invest at $t=0$

if $0 < I < 229.5$.

Not to invest in any cases

if $I > 229.5$.

4.

(a) For the production plan

(y_0, y_1) , the current dividend on equity

$$S_0 = -y_0,$$

and the future dividend

$$is S_1 = y_1.$$

Let S be the number of shares of the firm and b be the number of shares of the bond that each consumer has in equilibrium.

The representative consumer solves the following problem:

$$\max_{(x_1, x_2, z, b)} \frac{1}{2} \ln x_1 + \frac{1}{2} \ln x_2$$

$$s.t. \quad b + e_0 S = 5 + \frac{1}{20} (e_0 - y_0)$$

$$x_1 = y_1 S + (1+r)b$$

$$x_2 = y_2 S + (1+r)b.$$

Let $\lambda_0 \geq 0$, $\lambda_1 \geq 0$, and $\lambda_2 \geq 0$

be Lagrange multipliers assigned, respectively, to budget constraints at $t=0$ and $t=1$.

Write down the Lagrangian:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(x_1, x_2, S, b, \lambda_0, \lambda_1, \lambda_2) \\ = \frac{1}{2} \ln x_1 + \frac{1}{2} \ln x_2 \\ - \lambda_0 (b + e_0 S - 5 - \frac{1}{20} (e_0 - y_0)) \\ - \lambda_1 (x_1 - y_1 S - (1+r)b) \\ - \lambda_2 (x_2 - y_2 S - (1+r)b) \end{aligned}$$

The FOC's are:

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_1} = \frac{1}{2x_1} - \lambda_1 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_2} = \frac{1}{2x_2} - \lambda_2 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial S} = -\lambda_0 e_0 + \lambda_1 y_1 + \lambda_2 y_2 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial b} = -\lambda_0 + (\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)(1+r) = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda_0} = 5 + \frac{1}{20} (e_0 - y_0) - b - e_0 S = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda_1} = y_1 S + (1+r)b - x_1 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda_2} = y_2 S + (1+r)b - x_2 = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{cb) Set } \bar{x}_1 &= \frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} \quad \bar{x}_2 = \frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2} \\ e_0 &= \frac{\lambda_1 y_1 + \lambda_2 y_2}{\lambda_0} \end{aligned}$$

$$= \frac{\lambda_1 y_1 + \lambda_2 y_2}{(1+r)(\lambda_1 + \lambda_2)}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1+r} (\bar{x}_1 y_1 + \bar{x}_2 y_2)$$

$$\frac{y_1}{1+r} S + b - \frac{\bar{x}_1}{1+r} = 0$$

$$\frac{\bar{x}_1 y_1}{1+r} S + \bar{x}_1 b = \frac{\bar{x}_1 \bar{x}_1}{1+r}$$

$$\frac{\bar{x}_2 y_2}{1+r} S + \bar{x}_2 b = \frac{\bar{x}_2 \bar{x}_2}{1+r}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\bar{x}_1 y_1 + \bar{x}_2 y_2}{1+r} S + (\bar{x}_1 + \bar{x}_2) b \\ = \frac{\bar{x}_1 \bar{x}_1 + \bar{x}_2 \bar{x}_2}{1+r} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow e_0 S + b = \frac{\bar{x}_1 \bar{x}_1 + \bar{x}_2 \bar{x}_2}{1+r}$$

$$\frac{\lambda_L x_L + \lambda_H x_H}{1+r} = 5 + \frac{1}{20} [\lambda_L y_L + \lambda_H y_H] \frac{1}{1+r} - y_0$$

If the EPV is positive, all consumers agree that the firm should choose y_0 to:

$$\max_{y_0} \frac{(18\lambda_L + 25.2\lambda_H) y_0}{1+r} - y_0$$

The FOC is

$$\frac{(18\lambda_L + 25.2\lambda_H)}{2(1+r)} y_0 = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} = y_0$$

$$\Rightarrow y_0 = \left(\frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} \right)^2$$

hence:

$$y_L = \frac{18(9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H)}{1+r}$$

$$y_H = \frac{25.2(9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H)}{1+r}$$

$$= \frac{25.2}{18} y_L$$

$$= 1.4 y_L$$

Check the firm's EPV:

$$\frac{18\lambda_L + 25.2\lambda_H}{1+r} - \frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r}$$

$$- \left(\frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} \right)^2$$

$$= 2 \left(\frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} \right)^2 - \left(\frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} \right)^2$$

$$= \left(\frac{9\lambda_L + 12.6\lambda_H}{1+r} \right)^2$$

$$= y_0$$

Therefore, all the consumers agree on the firm's objectives.

a) The

c) The market clearing conditions:

$$y_0 = 20.5$$

$$20 x_L = y_L$$

$$20 x_H = y_H$$

$$20 s = 1$$

$$20 b = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\lambda_L y_L + \lambda_H y_H}{1+r} = 20 \left(\frac{\lambda_L x_L + \lambda_H x_H}{1+r} \right)$$

$$= 20 \cdot \left(5 + \frac{y_0}{20} \right) = 100 + y_0$$

$$= 100 + 100 = 200$$

$$\left(\frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_L} = \frac{2\lambda_H}{2\lambda_L} = \frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_L} = \frac{x_H}{x_L} \right) \times$$

$$\frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_L} = \frac{2\lambda_L}{2\lambda_H} = \frac{\lambda_L}{\lambda_H} = \frac{x_L}{x_H}$$

$$\therefore \frac{\lambda_H}{\lambda_L} = \frac{y_H}{y_L} = \frac{25.2}{18} = 1.4$$

$$\therefore \frac{1 - \lambda_H}{\lambda_H} = 1.4$$

$$\Rightarrow \lambda_H = \frac{1}{2.4} \approx 0.42$$

$$\lambda_L \approx 0.58$$

$$y_L = \frac{189}{1+r}$$

$$y_H = \frac{264.6}{1+r}$$

$$\left(1 - \frac{1}{2.4} \right) \cdot \frac{189}{1+r} + \frac{1}{2.4} \cdot \frac{264.6}{1+r} = 200$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{110.25 + 110.25}{(1+r)^2} = 200$$

$$\Rightarrow r = 0.05$$

$$y_L = 180 \quad y_H = 252$$

$$x_L = 9 \quad x_H = 12.6$$

$$e_0 = \frac{1}{1.05} \left(\left(1 - \frac{1}{2.4} \right) \cdot 180 + \frac{1}{2.4} \cdot 252 \right)$$

$$= 200$$

$$s = \frac{1}{20}$$

$$b = 0$$