

The Optimization Problem

Zhi Wang

May 3, 2010

Abstract

THE ABSTRACT

1 Design

In [1], M. Varvello *et al.* divide the virtual world of the game into different zones, and have the peer information stored via DHT by their locations in the game zones. Zone division is a simple way to maintain the peers' information in the design, however, it loses the simplicity and brings in great overhead for maintaining the protocols.

In our design, peers are not organized into different zones, instead, each peer directly communicates with the neighbors nearby. When a peer is in a region of the virtual world, it needs to receive the game state messages from the neighbors in its AOI.

The peer also exchange neighbor information between themselves, so that a peer can get new neighbors when it moves in the game world. Each peer in the game holds some neighbors nearby,

Incentives: the contribution of a peer can be: (1) the assistance that peers help friends to relay their game state messages; (2) the share of neighbor information, i.e., a peer can ask a friend or a stranger for the neighbor information. In our design, we give different incentive mechanisms to that between friends and among strangers, and also a combination strategy for the two different mechanisms.

1.1 Game State Messages

Game states can be considered as a stream with different bit rate that a peer needs to send to all the players, who are close to the peer. The bit rate of the game state messages depends on: (1) the game controls a peer is performing, e.g. a peer running in the virtual world might have a higher bit rate than one walks slowly in the world; (2) when a peer is in different regions, it might need to contact with the environment either, with different contacting frequency. In one word, we give variable bit rates to peers.

2 The Optimization

2.1 Global Optimal Problem

Table 1: Notations

Symbol	Definition
a_{ij}	The upload capacity that peer i contribute to stream j
u_i	The upload capacity of node i
d_i	The download capacity of node i
r_i	The bitrate of the stream of node i
S_i	The set of peers who needs to receive the stream of node i (AOI)
R_i	The set of peers whose streams node i needs to receive (AOI)

a_{ij} is the upload bandwidth that node i contribute to the stream j . Here is the constraints in the problem:

- Upload capacity constraint:

$$\sum_{j=1}^N a_{nj} < u_n \quad n = 1, \dots, N$$

- Download capacity constraint:

$$\sum_{j \in R_n} r_j + \sum_{j \notin R_n} r_j \cdot f_{nj} < d_n, \quad n = 1, \dots, N$$

$$\text{Here, } f_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & a_{ij} > 0 \\ 0 & a_{ij} = 0 \end{cases}$$

The Objective Function: The objective function is used to evaluate the streaming quality for all streams in the system. For stream n :

$$e(n) = \frac{\sum_i a_{in}}{r_n \cdot (|R_n| + \sum_{i \notin R_n} f(i))}$$

And we should try to maximize the objective function:

$$\max \min_n e(n)$$

3 The Distributed Optimization

H is the set of friends and some stranger neighbors of the peer n . R_n is the source peers whose streams are not received due the lack of upload capacities. The problem then is how to schedule peers in H_n to help relay the streams in R_n .

Table 2: Notations (distributed algorithm)

Symbol	Definition
H_n	The set of peers that can be used as relays
R_n	The set of unaddressed source peers
u_i^c	Available upload capacity of peer i in H_n
d_i^c	Available download capacity of peer i in H_n
r_j	The stream bitrate of source peer j in R_n
f_{ij}	The indicator function whether peer i is a relay peer of stream j

- For peer $i \in H_n$, the aggregate upload bandwidth used is: $u_i = \sum_j 2 \cdot f_{ij} \cdot r_j$ and

$$u_i \leq u_i^c$$

- For peer $i \in H_n$, the aggregate download bandwidth used is: $d_i = \sum_j f_{ij} \cdot r_j$ and

$$d_i \leq d_i^c$$

To maximize the number of addressed streams, our objective function then is:

$$\max \sum_j g_j, \quad \text{where } g_j = \begin{cases} 0 & f_{ij} = 0, \forall i \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

4 Relay design

A peer moves in the virtual world, and decides which neighbors' game states should be received. Only the interested neighbor's game states should be received, i.e., the peer is staring at aiming at, while other neighbors' avatars, whom the peer is not interested in, could be guided by AI algorithms. The peer sends a control message to the neighbors that it is interested in, who then will add this peer to a receiver list. Peers need to distribute its game state messages to these neighbors in the receiver list.

More importantly, a peer needs to receive messages from the neighbors, in some modern online MMOGs, the peer is forced to go back several frames ago if some of the neighbors' game state messages are found not received. Thus, receiving all the messages from the neighbors is a big incentive for peers, since this can improve the fluency of the game controls.

In our design, peers actively pull the game state messages from the neighbors in its AOI, which are maintained by the neighbor discovery mechanism we will discuss in Sec.???. For the neighbors whose game state messages should be received, (1) the peer asks the neighbor to send the game state messages directly, and it will get the stream directly from the neighbor who has enough upload capacity to send one more stream; (2) or the peer will some relay peers for the neighbor if its upload capacity is exceeded, then the peer tries these relay peers to get the stream from the neighbor; (3) when the relay peers are still




Figure 1: Pull framework




Figure 2: When the peer A finds the neighbor (and the relay peers for it) are not able to send the game state messages, it invites a relay peer from its relay candidate pool. An existing link has to be broken to insert the new relay

unavailable, the peer will invites a peer to relay for the neighbor by inserting it into an existing distribution path of the neighbor.

4.1 The strategy of selecting a relay helper

5 Incentives

5.1 Contributions in the Design

Both relaying game state messages or sending neighboring information to other peers are the contributions a peer can make to the system. A peer in some hot regions might need other peers to help it distribute its game state messages to all the neighbors, on the other hand, it has much more chances to send other

peers the necessary neighbor information for them to find neighbors. So a peer who always stays in hot regions or cold regions are both able to contribute to the system, by relaying and sending neighboring information, respectively.

In our design, we try to find the best quantization scheme for the contribution, so that peers in the system can get best viewing quality without impairing the fairness among peers.

- Relay: (1) upload resource; (2) latency
- Neighbor information

5.2 Quantify the contribution

A peer can contribute to other peers by either relaying game state messages for them or giving neighbor information to them. So total contribution is the combination of the two contributions.

- Relay: what impact the contribution of relay? (1) the bit rate the game state messages r_g ; (2) n_r , the number of receivers that peer i is to relay for peer j ; (3) the promised time to distribute the messages t_r . The contribution by relay CR that peer i has done for peer j then can be calculated:

$$CR_{ij} = a_1 \cdot r_g \cdot t_r \cdot n_r$$

a_1 will be the adjust parameter to combine the relay contribution and the neighbor information contribution.

- Neighboring information: the following metrics impact the neighbor information contribution that peer i has done for peer j , (1) the size of the returned neighbor set N_r ; (2) weights of these neighbors w_n ;

$$CN_{ij} = a_2 \cdot \sum_{n \in N_r} w_n$$

w_n can be evaluated according to the importance of the requesting peers, e.g. the distance of the two peers.

a_1 and a_2 are the parameters to adjust the weights for the two contributions. We have the total contribution that a peer i has done for peer j :

$$C_{ij} = CR_{ij} + CN_{ij}$$

Table 3: Transactions

	Contracts	Game Points
Friends	Update C_{ij}, C_{ji} if $ C_{ij} < B_{ij}$	Transfer GP if $ C_{ij} \geq B_{ij}$
Strangers		Transfer GP
C/S (backup)		

5.3 Participants in the Game

- Friend-Friend: when a peer wants some help (relaying or neighbor information) from other peers, it is easier to get the help from a friend because they have close bounder in the social network, so that a friend can offer the help without having being helped before.
- Stranger-Stranger: for strangers, there might be two approaches for one to help the other for the first time: (1) find a friend chain which connects the two strangers by media intermediate friends, which are the “warrantors” to make sure that the helper is able to get the contribution back some time; (2) use global currency to pay for the help, so that the helper can later get help by the credits. In our design, for strangers, we use the later approach for incentives among strangers, and the credits are the game points which are commonly used in the online games.

We give a bound B_{ij} to two peers in the design, so that the contribution between the two peers can not exceed this bound $|C_{ij}| = |C_{ji}| \leq B_{ij}$, which can be decided by the closeness of the two peers in the social network, e.g., friends in the design have much larger bound than totally strangers.

As mentioned above, game points are used for a peer to “buy” some contribution from strangers. The number of game points that is charged also depends on the contribution C_{ij} . Here we use a simple transfer that the number of game points to be charged by peer i from peer j is:

$$GP = \alpha \cdot \frac{\beta}{B_{ij}} \cdot C_{ij}$$

α is a exchange parameter to convert the contribution value to the game points. $\frac{\beta}{B_{ij}}$ is used to for friends to make the transaction, e.g., when a peer j has required so much help from its friend peer i that the contribution balance exceeds the bound, peer j can’t get more contribution from i without returning any contribution back. At this moment, it can still get help from i by using game points. The rationale of $\frac{\beta}{B_{ij}}$ lies that friends charge less game points than that among strangers.

How do exchange the game points gained from strangers and the contribution gained from friends. Because a peer sometimes might need help from strangers when its friends are not able to provide the help, although it has contributed to the friends.

References

- [1] M. Varvello, C. Diot, and E. Biersack. P2P Second Life: experimental validation using Kad. *Proceedings of INFOCOM09*, 2009.