A Theory of Cloud Bandwidth Pricing for Video-on-Demand Providers

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Background

- Network access in current cloud computing is offered with usage-based pricing, with no bandwidth capacity guarantee.
- Not suitable for bandwidth-intensive application, such as VoD.
- Supposing cloud providers offer bandwidth capacity guarantee, except letting each VoD provider reserves bandwidth capacity from the cloud providers, are there any better solutions?

Idea

- Introducing a broker to collect demands from many VoD providers. It is hopeful that jointly booking can reduce cost compared with individually booking, so that each VoD providers can enjoy a discount and the broker can get profit.
 - Demands of multiple applications may be statistically multiplexed to save bandwidth reservation.
 - Anti-correlation (i.e., negative correlation): a relationship in which one value increases as the other decreases.
 - Similar to Ethernet.

Problem

Payment:

- The broker pays to cloud providers according to a fixed pricing strategy, and decides the amount of reservation
- The pricing policy between the broker and VoD providers are to be discussed, which affects (1) the profit and the amount of reservation of the broker and (2) the cost/enjoyed discount and the utility of VoD providers

Problem


- Conflict of interest:
 - Cloud providers want to maximize resource efficiency (i.e., workload consolidation)
 - Brokers want to maximize profit.
 - VoD providers want to minimize cost.

Contribution of the paper

Present a model:

- Formulate the workload consolidation problem and give the optimal solution to the problem
- Formulate the broker-profit-maximization probem, and answer under what pricing policy (i.e. good pricing region), the optimal value to the problem is equal to the workload consolidation problem
- Show that in the free market where each VoD provider submits a pricing strategy to the broker, the submitted pricing strategies converge to a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the lower bound of the good pricing region

Model



- Consider the demand and reservation in a short time slot, e.g., 10 minutes.
- VoD provider i's bandwidth demand (based on prediction) is a random variable D_i with mean μ_i and variable σ_i
- Optimizing variables
 - load direction matrix $W=[w_{si}]_{S\times N}$: Portion of i's demand D_i directed to and served by cloud provider s.

Workload consolidation problem

$$\min_{\mathbf{W}} \sum_{s} A_{s}$$
 s.t. $A_{s} \leq C_{s}, \quad \forall s,$ $w_{i} = 1, \quad \forall i.$

Where

$$A_s := f_{\epsilon}(L_s)$$

$$L_s = \sum_i w_{si} D_i.$$

$$f_{\epsilon}(X) = \mathbf{E}[X] + \theta \sqrt{\mathbf{Var}[X]}, \quad \theta = F^{-1}(1 - \epsilon)$$

Theorem 2: When $C_{\text{sum}} \ge \mu^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{1} + \theta \sqrt{\mathbf{1}^{\mathsf{T}} \Sigma \mathbf{1}}$, an optimal solution $[w_{si}^*]$ to (15) is given by

$$w_{si}^* = \alpha_s, \quad \forall i, \quad s = 1, \dots, S, \tag{19}$$

where $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_S$ can be any solution to

$$\sum_{s} \alpha_{s} = 1, \ 0 \le \alpha_{s} \le \min \left\{ 1, \frac{C_{s}}{\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{1} + \theta \sqrt{\mathbf{1}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{1}}} \right\}, \ \forall s.$$
(20)

When $C_{\text{sum}} < \mu^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{1} + \theta \sqrt{\mathbf{1}^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{\Sigma} \mathbf{1}}$, there is no feasible solution that satisfies constraints (16) to (18).

The maximum bandwidth saving of joint bandwidth booking over individual booking for each tenant is

$$\Delta B(\mathbf{W}^*) = \sum_{i} B_{i} - \sum_{s} A_{s}$$

$$= \sum_{i} (\mu_{i} + \theta \sigma_{i}) - \sum_{s} (\boldsymbol{\mu}^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{w}^{*}_{s} + \theta \sqrt{\mathbf{w}^{*}_{s}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{w}^{*}_{s}})$$

$$= \theta(\boldsymbol{\sigma}^{\mathsf{T}} \mathbf{1} - \sqrt{\mathbf{1}^{\mathsf{T}} \boldsymbol{\Sigma} \mathbf{1}}) = \theta(\sum_{i} \sigma_{i} - \sigma_{M}), \quad (21)$$

which is θ times the gap between the sum of all demand standard deviations and the standard deviation of all demands combined. This confirms the belief that statistical multiplexing saves resource reservation.

Broker-profit-maximization problem

$$\max_{\mathbf{W}} R(\mathbf{W}) = \sum_{i} P_{i}(w_{i}) - \sum_{s} A_{s}$$
s.t. $A_{s} \leq C_{s}$, $\forall s$.

where

- (1) Pricing strategy $P_i(.)$ is a concave function on [0,1] with $P_i(0)=0$.
- (2) Cloud provider charges \$1 for every unit bandwidth reservation.

Observation

Brokers always have incentive to operate, but may deny demand.

Theorem 3: Broker profit maximization (22) and cloud workload consolidation (15) have a same optimal solution (19), if and only if

$$P_i'(1) \ge \mu_i + \theta \cdot \frac{\sigma_{iM}}{\sigma_M}, \quad \forall i,$$
 (26)

where σ_{iM} is the covariance between D_i and $\sum_i D_i$ given by (12) and σ_M is the standard deviation of $\sum_i D_i$ given by (13). Furthermore, if $P'_i(1) < \mu_i + \theta \sigma_{iM} / \sigma_M$ for some i, then $\mathbf{w}^* \neq \mathbf{1}$.

Good pricing region

Corollary 1: In a good pricing policy $\{P_i(\cdot) : i = 1, ..., N\}$, each $P_i(\cdot)$ must satisfy $\forall w_i \in [0, 1]$,

$$(\mu_i + \theta \cdot \frac{\sigma_{iM}}{\sigma_M})w_i \le P_i(w_i) \le (\mu_i + \theta\sigma_i)w_i. \tag{32}$$




Fig. 2. The region of $P_i(\cdot)$ in a good pricing policy $\{P_i(\cdot)\}$. $P_i(\cdot)$ is between $P_i^*(\cdot)$ and $P_i^0(\cdot)$, and satisfies $P_i'(1) \geq P_i^{*'}(1)$.

Discussion about free markets

In a free market where each selfish tenant (VoD provider) competes for service by submitting a pricing strategy $P_i(\cdot)$, what will $\{P_i(\cdot)\}$ eventually look like?

VoD provider i's utility function

$$U_i[P_1(\cdot), \dots, P_N(\cdot)] = \begin{cases} -P_i(w_i^*), & \text{if } w_i^* = 1, \\ -\infty, & \text{if } w_i^* < 1, \end{cases}$$

Unique Nash equilibrium in free markets

Theorem 4: If tenants have utility (10) and the broker decides \mathbf{W}^* by maximizing its profit via (22), then $\{P_i(\cdot)\}$ will converge to a **unique Nash equilibrium** $\{P_i^*(\cdot)\}$, where

$$P_i^*(w_i) = (\mu_i + \theta \cdot \frac{\sigma_{iM}}{\sigma_M})w_i, \quad 0 \le w_i \le 1, \quad (37)$$

where σ_{iM} and σ_{M} are given by (12) and (13), respectively.

Theorem 1: In a free market, $\{P_i(\cdot)\}$ will converge to a **unique Nash equilibrium** $\{P_i^*(\cdot)\}$, where $w_i^*=1$ and

$$P_i^*(w_i^*) = \mu_i + \theta \sigma_i \rho_{iM}, \tag{11}$$


 $\rho_{iM} \in [-1,1]$ being the correlation coefficient between D_i and $\sum_i D_i$.

The prices at equilibrium are the lower border of the good pricing region.


Simulation

- Use trace of UUSee
 - Let each video channel represent a VoD provider.
- Relatively simple, only show
 - Aggregate bandwidth reservation saving
 - Discount enjoyed by the VoD providers

Aggregate bandwidth reservation saving



Discount enjoyed by the VoD providers



Some VoD providers are risk-neutralizers that earn bonus for having demand negatively correlated to the market.

Summary and inspiration

Idea: statistical multiplexing

- Leverage the fact that VoD demand is fractionally splittable into video requests, which can be optimally directed to different clouds and statistically mixed toward workload consolidation.
- The idea of "View-Upload Decoupling (VUD) design" in the paper "Modeling and Analysis of Multichannel P2P Live Video Systems" (by Di Wu et. al, published on INFOCOM 2010) is also statistical multiplexing -- bandwidth capacity contributed by all peers forms a resource pool and multiplexed. (difference: fixed resource amount+ minimize risk v.s. fixed risk + minimize resource amount)

Inspiration

– Although there are multiple clouds in the model, in fact, their role is almost the same as a single cloud, because their prices are the same and constant (\$1). What if clouds compete against each other, or offer different QoS and charge with different pricing strategies?

Thank you