## YUSUKE YAMAGUCHI

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**Education Toulouse School of Economics, France** 

Ph.D. in Economics, 2020–2025 (expected)

Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan

Visiting Scholar (Host: Takuro Yamashita), Jul-Dec 2024

Hitotsubashi University, Japan M.A. in Economics, 2017

B.A. in Economics, 2015

**Fields** Microeconomic theory, Game theory, Contract theory

Job Market Paper Bilateral Bargaining with a Biased Intermediary

> Bilateral bargaining is often mediated by an intermediary. In many cases, an intermediary shares some interest with one of the two parties in the negotiation and cannot commit to and enforce his decision. This paper studies the implication of having such a biased intermediary without commitment and enforcement power on bargaining outcome. I consider a bilateral trade model à la Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) with binary valuations in which the intermediary offers a price to the traders. I focus on the set of communication equilibria of the game, which characterizes what the players can achieve if they are allowed any preplay and intraplay communication. I show that even a tiny bias is detrimental to ex-post efficiency and that a biased intermediary does not help achieve it. I also characterize the second-best equilibrium and show that the expected social surplus is weakly decreasing in the degree of the intermediary's bias.

**Work in Progress** Moral Hazard with Dual Risk Averse Agent

Buyer-Optimal Learning with Hard Information in Lemons Market

**Fellowships &** TSE Job Market Fellowship, 2024–2025 **Awards** 

Doctoral Contract, Université Toulouse Capitole, 2021–2024

Graduate Scholarship for Degree Seeking Students, JASSO, 2019–2022

**Teaching Toulouse School of Economics** 

**Experience** 

Game Theory (graduate), teaching assistant, 2022 and 2023

Theory of Incentive (graduate), teaching assistant, 2022 and 2023

Industrial Organization (undergraduate), teaching assistant, 2023 and 2024

Hitotsubashi University

Advanced Microeconomics (graduate), teaching assistant, 2017, 2018, and 2019 Intermediate Microeconomics (graduate), teaching assistant, 2017 and 2018

Research Experience

Research Assistant to Professor Takuro Yamashita, TSE, 2020–2021 Research Assistant to Professor Daisuke Hirata, Hitotsubashi, Nov 2020 and Mar 2022

**Presentations** 

**2024:** Fall Meeting of the Japanese Economic Association (Fukuoka U), Economic Theory Workshop (Hitotsubashi U, scheduled)

**2022:** Communication and Persuasion Workshop (virtual), Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in China (virtual), Australasia Meeting of the Econometric Society (virtual), Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (virtual), Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia (Keio U/virtual)

**2019:** Game Theory Workshop (Kyoto U)

**2017:** Economic Theory Workshop (Hitotsubashi U)

Languages

Japanese (native), English (fluent)

Personal Information Born in Tokyo, Japan, in March 1992 Married with one child

Citizenship: Japan.

References

Professor David Martimort Toulouse School of Economics david.martimort@tse-fr.eu

Professor Takuro Yamashita Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University yamashita.takuro.osipp@osaka-u.ac.jp Professor Johannes Hörner Toulouse School of Economics johannes.horner@tse-fr.eu