

# Implementation of SPA

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Semester Project

December 2017

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

PEBCAK [1]. Problem exists between chair and keyboard. This quote is frequently used to explain that many problems come from the user. Unfortunately, users do not always have an advanced knowledge in computer science. They need simple interfaces. However, computers are extremely complex and providing a simple way to use them is a real headache. Passwords are the perfect example where simplicity meets complexity. To provide security, a strong password is necessary, it should look like random. But, a user does not always know what a strong password is. Furthermore, he logs into many accounts and remembering a different password for each account is annoying. At the end, the user selects a small number of passwords and use them to connect to many accounts. This is a problem regarding to security. If an attacker steals one password, he has access to many accounts. Does it exist a perfect solution to provide security and simplicity to a user? This is the purpose of the single password authentication (SPA) protocol. It furnishes simplicity because a user has a unique password to connect to all his online services. Furthermore, it furnished security because an online service never learns the user's password or any way to impersonate him. This protocol has four versions and the aim of this project is to implement these versions and compare them.

## Chapter 2

# Cryptography

Before going into the protocol details, it is necessary to introduce some advanced notions of cryptography.

**Blind signature** The blind signature [2] is an extension of the digital signature. It permits to sign a message without revealing the message to the signer. The concept can be hard to understand because it is difficult to guess why a signer would sign a message without knowing it. Let's consider this simple example: Imagine a political party which wants to hold an election. The party wants to authenticate each vote but each elector does not want his vote to be known. The blind signature is a solution to this problem.

In this project, we use a blind signature based on RSA:  $(N, e)$  is the public key and  $(d)$  is the private key of the RSA signature scheme. The idea is to enclose the message using a blind factor  $r$ . Since the signer does not know  $r$ , he is unable to read the message.

The original message is represented as  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  and the signature as  $s$ . First, we add the blind factor  $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$  to the message.

$$m' = r^e m \mod N$$

Then, the signer signs the blinded message  $m'$  using its private key.

$$s' = (m')^d \mod N = r^{ed} m^d \mod N = r m^d \mod N$$

Finally, we remove the blind factor using the inverse in order to obtain the signature of  $m$ .

$$s = r^{-1} s' \mod N = r^{-1} r m^d \mod N = m^d \mod N$$

**Blinding attack:** Nevertheless, the RSA blind signature is not perfect because it is vulnerable to the blinding attack. This comes from the fact that RSA uses the same key to sign or to decrypt a message. Let's consider an example where Alice is a server. She has a single private key to sign and to decrypt messages. Imagine that Bob sends a message  $m$  to Alice using Alice's public key.

$$m' = m^e \mod N$$

Now, imagine that Oscar wants to read this message. If Oscar can intercept the message from Bob and then he can send it to Alice by asking to sign it. Since Alice is using the same private key to sign a message, Oscar gets the original message of Bob.

$$m = m'^d \mod N = m^{ed} \mod N$$

In other words, Alice decrypts the message when she signs it. Therefore, a different key pair must be used for signing and exchanging messages. In this project, we do not use RSA encryption. Therefore, the blinding attack does not concern us.

**Oblivious transfer** The oblivious transfer[3] is a protocol which permits to exchange data between a client and a server. Let's imagine that the server has  $n$  tuples of the form  $(w_i, c_i)$ ,  $w_i$  is an index and  $c_i$  is the corresponding data. The particularity of this protocol is that the client can retrieve the data  $c_j$  from the index  $w_j$  without revealing the value  $w_j$  to the server and without learning any value  $c_i$  where  $i \neq j$

In this project, the oblivious transfer protocol by Ogata and Kurosowa. Let  $H$  be a hash function and  $G$  be a pseudo-random generator. We assume that the server has a private key ( $d$ ) and the client has the related public key  $(N, e)$ . The server starts by creating  $n$  keys using the indexes  $w_i$ .

$$K_i = (H(w_i))^d \mod N$$

Then it uses these keys to encrypt each data  $c_i$  in the following way:

$$E_i = G(w_i \| K_i \| i) \oplus (0^l \| c_i)$$

To execute the xor, each part must have the same length. Hence, the server adds zeros in front of  $c_i$  to respect this property. Concretely,  $l$  is the length of the output of  $G$  minus the length  $c_i$ . Then, the server sends every  $E_i$  to the client. Now, let's consider that the client wants to retrieve data  $c_j$ . Using blind signature, the client is able to reconstruct the key  $K_j$  corresponding to  $w_j$ . So, using a blind factor  $r$ , the client generates:

$$Y = r^e H(w_j) \mod N$$

Then, the client asks to the server for a blind signature. This way, the server cannot learn the value  $w_j$  chosen. At the end, the client received the value:

$$K_j = r^{ed} H(w_j)^d \mod N = H(w_j)^d \mod N$$

Finally, he can decrypt the corresponding data using:

$$(a_i \| b_i) = E_j \oplus G(w_j \| K_j \| i)$$

If  $a_i = 0^l$ ,  $b_i$  corresponds to the data wanted by the client. Since, the client has only one  $K_j$ , he can only decrypt the data  $c_j$  corresponding to  $w_j$ . So, he cannot learn any other value of  $c_i$  with  $i \neq j$ .

# Chapter 3

## Protocol description

The single password authentication protocol (SPA) [8] lets a client (Alice) to connect to every website (Bob) using the same password. The password is used to encrypt a secret stored in an untrusted storage or a trusted mobile device (Carol).

### 3.1 Overview

**Registration:** First, Alice invents a username and a password. These will be the same for each website Alice wants to connect to. When she registers to Bob, she generates a secret key  $sk$ . She sends her username and  $sk$  to Bob. Then, Alice registers to Carol. She generates an  $id$  and she uses her password to encrypt  $sk$ . Finally, she sends her  $id$  and  $sk$  encrypted to Carol. At that point, Alice only needs to remember her username and her password.

**Connection:** When Alice wants to connect to Bob, she first needs her username and her password. She uses the username to obtain a challenge from Bob. Then, Alice generates  $id$  again and sends it to Carol to recover  $sk$  encrypted. Now, Alice can decrypt  $sk$  and calculate the response to the challenge. Then Alice sends it to Bob. Finally, Bob verifies the response and accepts the connection if it is correct.

SPA describes four different protocols: server optimal cloud SPA, storage optimal cloud SPA, privacy optimal cloud SPA and mobile SPA.

### 3.2 Server optimal cloud SPA

**Registration:** First, Alice generates two RSA key pairs.  $(ssk, svk)$  for digital signature used with Bob and  $(bsk, bvk)$  for blind signature used with Carol. To register to Bob, Alice sends him her username and  $svk$ . Then, to register to Carol, Alice starts by signing her password with  $bsk$  to get  $sig = BSign(bsk, Hash(pwd))$ . Then, she uses  $sig$  to encrypt  $ssk$  and to obtain  $ctext = Encrypt(Hash(sig), ssk)$ . Then, Alice generates an  $id = Hash(Alice, Bob)$ . Finally, Alice sends to Carol  $id$ ,  $bsk$  and  $ctext$ . Now, she can forget everything except her username and her password.




Figure 1: Server optimal cloud SPA registration

**Connection:** When Alice wants to connect to Bob, she only sends him her username and gets a challenge. Then, Alice must recover  $ssk$  to compute a response. She begins by recovering her  $id = Hash(Alice, Bob)$  and sends it to Carol. She asks Carol to sign her password by using a blind signature scheme (BS):  $sig = BSign(bsk, Hash(pwd))$ . Finally, Carol sends Alice  $ctext$ . Now that Alice has  $sig$  and  $ctext$ , she can compute  $ssk = Decrypt(Hash(sig), ctext)$ . Then she can compute the response  $R$  and sends it to Bob which accepts if it is correct.




Figure 2: Server optimal cloud SPA connection

This version of the protocol is the most efficient for the server. Unfortunately, Alice is not anonymous to Carol. Alice's username is calculated using  $Hash(Alice, Bob)$ . So Carol can launch a dictionary attack to find it. Furthermore, Alice is linkable by linking the found username with the id provided.

### 3.3 Storage optimal cloud SPA

**Registration:** As Server optimal cloud SPA, Alice first generates two RSA key pairs ( $ssk, svk$ ) and ( $bsk, bvk$ ). To register to Bob, Alice sends him the username,  $svk$  and  $bsk$ . Then, to register to Carol, Alice begins by generating her  $id = BSign(bsk, Hash(pwd))$ . Then, she encrypts  $ssk$  with her password to get  $ctext = Encrypt(Hash(pwd), ssk)$ . Finally, Alice sends  $id$  and  $ctext$  to Carol.




Figure 3: Storage optimal cloud SPA registration

**Connection:** When Alice wants to connect to Bob, she first sends him her username. Then she asks Bob to sign her password (BS):  $id = BSign(bsk, Hash(pwd))$ . Finally Bob sends Alice a challenge. Then Alice needs  $ssk$  to compute the response. Now that she has recovered her id, she sends it to Carol and Carol sends her the corresponding  $ctext$ . Then, Alice can recover  $ssk = Decrypt(Hash(pwd), ctext)$  and compute the response  $R = Sign(ssk, challenge)$ . At the end, Alice sends the response to Bob which accept if it is correct.




Figure 4: Storage optimal cloud SPA connection

This protocol is the most efficient for storage. But this time, Alice's username is a signature, so Alice is anonymous against Bob. Unfortunately, Carol still has access to the id, so Alice is still linkable.

### 3.4 Privacy optimal cloud SPA

Privacy optimal protocol is the same has storage optimal. The only difference is made during the connection. When Alice retrieves  $ctext$  from Carol. They use oblivious transfer (OT). Since Carol never learns the  $id$  of Alice, this provides unlinkability in addition to anonymity. This protocol provides anonymity to Alice, like storage optimal. Furthermore, Carol never learns the id during a connection. So, Alice is unlinkable.




Figure 5: Privacy optimal cloud SPA connection

### 3.5 Mobile SPA

Mobile SPA does not require a cloud storage. It uses a trusted mobile device instead. The name of Carol is kept to describe the mobile device. This protocol requires a connection between Alice and Carol. It can be a direct internet connection (SSL) or an indirect internet connection (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, USB). Carol must also be able to display and analyze a human-readable information, like a QR code or a sound.

**Registration:** Alice starts by generating a symmetric key  $K$ . To register to Bob, she sends him her username and  $K$ . Then, to register to Carol, Alice encrypts  $K$  using her password:  $c_{text} = \text{Encrypt}(\text{Hash}(pwd), K)$ . Now, Alice can forget everything except her username and her password.




Figure 6: Mobile SPA registration

**Connection:** When Alice wants to connect to Bob, she first sends him her username to get a challenge. This challenge can be sent to Alice (QR code or audio file) or directly to Carol (SMS). If the challenge is sent to Alice, she uses her mobile device to read it. Then, Alice provides her password to Carol. Now, Carol can recover  $K = Decrypt(Hash(pwd), ctext)$  and computes the response  $R = MAC(K, challenge)$ . Carol shortens the response using a *TRIM* function and displays it to Alice. Now, Alice can provide  $R$  to Bob which verifies it and accepts the connection if it is correct.






Figure 7: Mobile SPA connection

## Chapter 4

# Implementation

I decided to implement this project in Java. This programming language is really complete and offers a wide range of libraries and documentation. Since this project requires many features (socket programming, website creation, cryptographic elements, user interface conception, mobile application), Java is one of the best choice. Furthermore, it is the programming language I feel the most comfortable with. I started my implementation by creating my own cryptographic library.

### 4.1 Cryptographic library

**Symmetric algorithms** The first type of algorithms implemented is contained in the `SymmetricEncryption.java` class. It implements functions to encrypt, decrypt or MAC a given message using a symmetric key. The first implemented algorithm is AES256, this implementation is made using a java library [4]. Nevertheless, AES256 requires many calculations. Therefore, the second implemented algorithm is one time padding encryption. It is very fast since it uses one xor operation. It also gives perfect security because:

- We use uniformly distributed random key
- Every message in SPA protocol is encrypted with a new key
- The key size and the message size are the same.

Note that we could use AES256 for the encryption but in terms of efficiency, we preferred to use one-time padding. Regarding MAC, the implemented algorithm is HMacSHA256. It generates MAC efficiently and in a very secured way.

**Asymmetric algorithms** The second type of algorithms implemented are contained in `AsymmetricEncryption.java` class. This class only implements RSA. The choice of this algorithm comes from the fact that blind signature can be based on it. So, the class contains functions to encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify the signature of a message. It also implements functions for blind signature: generating a random blind factor, blind and unblind a message. Like, `SymmetricEncryption.java`, there exist libraries [4] to implement these functions. Nevertheless, I prefer to make my own implementation. It makes the code more readable and it permits to understand in details how blind signature is implemented.

**Key generation:** Encryption can be relatively easy to implement, but key generation is more sophisticated. Therefore, I decided to generate keys using the existing java libraries [4] in `MyKeyGenerator.java` class. So, the generation is secured and efficient. Concretely, AES, RSA and HMacSHA256 keys are generated using these libraries. The key of one time padding is generated using a secure random generator [5]. Each key can be generated in three ways: from random, from a password or into a file which includes the key.

**Hash** The class Hash.java implements SHA256 using java libraries [4]. SHA256 provides the right balance between security and performance.

**Oblivious transfer** Since oblivious transfer is used by a server and a client, I did not choose to create a static library. I created two objects OTSender and OTReceiver which can be instantiated by a server and a client to execute the oblivious transfer protocol. OTSender needs a Map with  $w_i$  the keys and  $c_i$  the corresponding data. It also requires an RSAPrivateKey. OTSender automatically generates the keys  $K_i$  when it is instantiated. Then it provides two functions. One to encrypt the data using  $K_i$  by generating  $E_i$  and one to generate  $K_j$  from the index  $Y$  received from the client. OTReceiver needs an index  $w_j$  and an RSAPublicKey to be instantiated. Then it provides four additional functions. The first one blinds the index using a given blind factor  $r$  to generate  $Y$ . The second one unblinds the value  $K_j$  received by the server. The third one is used to decrypt the data  $E_i$  received by server using  $K_j$ . And finally, the last one checks the data generated during the decryption to find and return the corresponding value.

## 4.2 Implementation of the storage

**Database connection:** After implementing the necessary cryptographic components, the next step was to find an efficient database for the storage. This database must have many properties. It must be free, fast and it must offer a performance report. I chose to use the SQL database of the Microsoft Azure platform [6]. It is free for academic purposes [7]. It is fast because their servers are available in Europe. Furthermore, their platform automatically provides many statistics about the database. The only disadvantage is the storage size since there is only 35 MB available. In the concern of this project, it is enough, since any user store only a small amount of data.

The implementation has two parts: SQL and java. The SQL part means creation of tables and testing queries. I created two tables. Storage\_server\_optimal for the server optimal protocol. It contains three columns (id, bsk and ctext), each one has type varbinary(256) to store 2048 bits:

id	bsk	ctext
0x582A749BFF...	0x80128461BB...	0x4816B4F323...
0x769398B3F3...	0x68154A3FF1...	0x729BA5BB72...

Storage\_storage\_optimal for storage optimal and privacy optimal protocols. It contains two columns (id, ctext), each one is also of type varbinary(256):

id	ctext
0x549748104A...	0x6381036A24...
0x32F38BA233...	0x67C7471B31...

The SQL code can be found in the SQLCommands.txt file.

The java implementation is done using the JDBC library [8] created by Oracle and modified by Microsoft for their database. I provide database connection with an object written in the DatabaseConnector.java class. When the object is instantiated, the user provides which protocol he uses and then the corresponding connection is automatically created with the database. Then, I provide functions to execute SQL queries: insertion, search and deletion. For privacy optimal protocol, I also provide a function to fetch every elements of the table in a random order.

**Connection between storage and client:** When the database was fully implemented, the user must be able to send and retrieve data. Of course, a simple database does not provide

features like blind signature or oblivious transfer. So, I first implemented a server for the storage. This server, contained in the `Storage.java` class, offers an interface between the client and the database. It only includes a main method which creates an SSL socket and wait for a client connection. When the server starts, it creates a pool of 20 executors[10], so 20 clients can connect at the same time. When a client wants to connect, the server executes one of the existing thread which takes care of him.

This server uses two enumerations to classify each client. The first one is in `ProtocolMode.java` class. It contains 4 elements: `Server_optimal`, `Storage_optimal`, `Privacy_optimal` and `Mobile`. These represent each protocol of chapter 3. Of course, `Mobile` is not used in this implementation since this protocol does not require a storage. However, it is useful for the implementation of the website.

The second enumeration is found in `ClientToStorageMode.java`. It contains 2 elements: `Store` and `Retrieve`. These represent the possible user action: `Store` during the registration phase and `Retrieve` during the connection phase.

The thread which takes care of a client is contained in `ClientAdministratorThread.java`. It first receives the user protocol and the user action. Therefore, it identifies the client and acts consequently:

`Server_optimal` and `Store`: The thread receives *id*, *bsk* and *c<sub>text</sub>* and stores them in the database.

`Server_optimal` and `Retrieve`: The thread receives *id* and *Hash(pwd)*, fetches *bsk* and *c<sub>text</sub>* from the database and uses the blind signature scheme to sends *sig* and *c<sub>text</sub>* back.

`Storage_optimal` and `Store`: The thread receives *id* and *c<sub>text</sub>* and stores them in the database.

`Storage_optimal` and `Retrieve`: The thread receives *id*, fetches *c<sub>text</sub>* from the database and sends it back.

`Privacy_optimal` and `Store`: The thread receives *id* and *c<sub>text</sub>*, stores them in the database and sends the public key for oblivious transfer back.

`Privacy_optimal` and `Retrieve`: The thread receives *id*, fetches the `Storage_storage_optimal` table and uses oblivious transfer to send *c<sub>text</sub>*

When the server-side of the storage was implemented, I implemented the corresponding client-side. It is contained in the `StorageClient.java` class. This object acts as an interface for the user. When it is instantiated, it offers two methods: one to store data into the storage during the registration phase and one to retrieve the data during the connection phase. This object contains two constructors: one for the `Server_optimal` protocol and one for the `Storage_optimal` and `Privacy_optimal` protocols.

When the client wants to store data, this object creates an SSL connection and runs two threads. One to send the data (`ClientSenderThread.java`) and one to receive a response from the server (`ClientReceiverThread.java`). These threads are executing with a single executor[10] to avoid parallelism errors.

In the `Server_optimal` implementation, the client sends *id*, *bsk* and *c<sub>text</sub>* and receives an acknowledgement.

In the `Storage_optimal` implementation, the client sends *id* and *c<sub>text</sub>* and receives an acknowledgement.

In the Privacy\_optimal implementation, the client sends *id* and *c<sub>text</sub>* and receives the public key for oblivious transfer.

When the client wants to retrieve the data, the object also creates an SSL connection but this time, it runs one thread (ClientRetrieverThread.java). This thread fetches the data from the server computes and return the private key *ssk* wanted by the client.

In the Server\_optimal case, the client sends *id*. Then, he executes the blind signature scheme to obtain *sig*. Finally, he receives *c<sub>text</sub>* and computes *ssk*.

In the Storage\_optimal case, the client sends *id*, receives *c<sub>text</sub>* and computes *ssk*.

In the Privacy\_optimal case, the client sends *id*. He uses oblivious transfer to obtain *c<sub>text</sub>* and computes *ssk*.

### 4.3 Implementation of the mobile application:

The mobile protocol requires a mobile application. I chose to develop it on Android. This platform is based on java and has a lot of documentation. For this project, this application must read a challenge and display the response to the user. Since Google provides a free and well-documented API to read barcodes [11], I decided to display the challenge as a QR code. The application uses its camera to read it and to display the response on the screen.

I first cloned a basic application from the official github repository of Google [12]. This application permits to take a picture using the camera and to display its data. Then, I modified the code to work with this project. Now, when the user starts the application, he first need to enter his password. Then, like the cloud-based protocols, he can either register to the website or connect to it.

If the user wants to register, he has to enter the IP address of its computer. This IP address will be given by the computer software. Then, an SSL connection is opened between the mobile application and the computer software. The latter automatically sends *c<sub>text</sub>*. Finally, the android application displays a pop-up to tell the user if the registration has succeeded. Concretely, the application writes *c<sub>text</sub>* into a file and store it in the smartphone storage.

If the user wants to connect, the application starts a QR code scan. When it finds one, it recovers the challenge and displays the response. This is done without any user interaction, contrary to the original application.

### 4.4 Implementation of the website:

//TODO

### 4.5 Note on SSL implementation:

//TODO

### 4.6 Implementation of the user interface:

//TODO

## 4.7 Performance

//TODO

# Chapter 5

## References

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