

Discussion: *Pork Barrel Politics in Multiparty Systems: How Government Job Relocations Boost Electoral Support for Incumbent Parties*

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Overall Summary and Strengths of the Paper

The study investigates whether the targeted allocation of government resources, a practice known as pork barrel politics, yields electoral rewards for incumbent parties within a multiparty system. The authors use the 2015-2019 relocation of Danish government jobs as a case study, analyzing its impact on the electoral performance of the incumbent Liberal Party. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) design, the paper finds that the Liberal Party's vote share increased by approximately 0.43 percentage points more in the districts receiving jobs compared to those that did not.

The paper's primary strengths lie in its methodologically rigorous approach and its choice of a compelling case study. The DiD design, supported by parallel pre-treatment trends, provides a strong basis for a causal claim. The case is particularly well-suited for this analysis because it involves a highly salient policy implemented by a single-party minority government, which clarifies the lines of responsibility often blurred in multiparty systems. The use of multiple robustness checks, including varying the treatment cutpoint and applying propensity score matching, further strengthens the credibility of the findings.

Discussion

The paper's argument is compelling, but there are several areas where it could be strengthened:

1. Justification and Conceptualization of the “Treatment”

The paper defines “treated” districts as those within a 12-kilometer radius of a relocated workplace. This definition is based on the assumption that this distance creates balanced groups and corresponds to a tax deduction threshold for transportation. However, this rationale feels somewhat disconnected from the theoretical mechanism of pork barrel politics, which may not be constrained by tax law definitions of commuting.

Potential Improvement:

While I find the empirics compelling, the authors should strengthen the theoretical justification for this specific distance. While the robustness check using different cutoffs is excellent (Figure 5), the main text would benefit from a more developed argument about the socio-economic sphere of influence. This could involve citing data on local economic multipliers, typical housing market effects, or a discussion of why 12 km represents a meaningful boundary for voters to feel prioritized or perceive local economic benefits

2. The Absence of a Dose-Response Relationship

The study finds that the electoral effect does not increase with the number of jobs relocated; even small relocations yielded benefits. This is a fascinating and counter-intuitive result that is mentioned only briefly in the main text. The authors suggest this implies voters reward the act of being prioritized rather than the magnitude of the economic benefit.

Potential Improvement: I think that this finding is a significant part of the paper’s potential contribution and should be given more prominence. Instead of being a secondary point, it could be framed as a core element of the causal story. The analysis could be moved from the appendix into the main body to explore this “symbolic pork” hypothesis more deeply. This reframes the conclusion from “pork barrel politics works in this context” to a more nuanced “symbolic gestures of distributive politics can be as effective as large-scale ones,” which is a more novel contribution.

3. Demonstrating the Causal Mechanism

(perhaps if extended to full paper)

The paper relies on Stein and Bickers’ (1994) three conditions for pork barrel effectiveness: awareness, attribution, and memory. It argues these conditions are met due to the policy’s salience and the clarity of responsibility under a single-party government. While plausible, this is an assumption.

Potential Improvement: The argument would be substantially strengthened by providing direct evidence of the causal mechanism. For instance, the authors could incorporate a qualitative or quantitative analysis of local media coverage from 2015-2019. Did newspaper articles in the treated districts mention the relocations and attribute them to the Liberal Party government? This would

provide empirical support that voters were indeed made aware and that credit was assigned as hypothesized, moving the claim from assumption to evidence-based.

4. Generalizability and the “Clarity of Responsibility”

The paper’s conclusion is that pork barrel politics can be effective in multiparty systems. However, the authors rightly note that their case – a single-party minority government – is an unusual institutional context in Denmark that enhances the clarity of responsibility. This specific condition may be the primary driver of the effect, limiting the generalizability of the findings to more common multiparty coalition governments where responsibility is diffused.

Potential Improvement: The conclusion should more explicitly frame the findings as being conditional on the “clarity of responsibility.” The paper demonstrates a mechanism that works under specific conditions within a multiparty system. The authors should emphasize this limitation and suggest that future research could test this mechanism by comparing their case to a similar distributive policy enacted by a multiparty coalition, where the electoral reward might be diluted or non-existent.

Small Points

- It’s “difference-in-**differences**” not “difference-in-difference”

Overall, this is a strong and well-executed paper that makes a valuable contribution to the literature on economic voting and electoral accountability. The suggestions above aim to enhance the theoretical framing, clarify the causal mechanism, and address the generalizability of the findings. By addressing these points and perhaps expanding the analysis into a full paper, the authors could place this work in a great journal.