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Interpretations and Commentary

Edited by
Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant

Kant and Education

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Introduction

The Highest Good—the Moral Endeavor of Education

Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant

The moral and political philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his philosophy of judgment or aesthetics continue to be discussed among many scholars of, e.g., philosophy, political theory, and aesthetics. The volume of publication is enormous and increasing. The impact of Kant's thinking and ideas continues to inspire and encourage dialogue among people with an increasing awareness of the interdependence of states, societies, and individuals, and the challenges we face in how to cultivate our humanity and ourselves as moral beings.

Kant, however, wrote little on education even though he considered it one of humanity's biggest challenges. In the present work it will be shown that Kant's writing with its focus on the complexity of human nature is interlinked. Thus his published work on education—*Lectures on Pedagogy* edited by his former student Friedrich Theodor Rink, the *Essays Concerning the Philanthropinum* and the "Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics" in his *Metaphysics of Morals* (MM: 6:477–484)—has to be seen in the light of his other writings.

The fact that Kant wrote little on education may explain why little has been written on his contribution in this area. And this "little" has focused largely on Kant's earlier work on moral theory, scarcely taking into account his writings on moral, political, or aesthetical issues developed over time, in particular his mature moral philosophy. Recently, however, works such as Barbara Herman's *Moral Literacy* (2008) and G. Felicitas Munzel's *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (1999) have added much to the discussion, as do several of the contributions to the present volume—such as those on the value and significance of Kant's views on education. This recent work has served to discourage some of the grosser caricatures of Kant's moral and practical philosophy, which have unfortunately characterized recent debate concerning his ethics in education theory.

The present anthology seeks to fill this perceived void in scholarship and to broaden and deepen discussion of the implications of Kant's moral and political philosophy and aesthetics for education, and also of the value and significance of his ideas on education. We believe this concerns both those interested in Kant scholarship and those interested in current discussion of moral, political, and aesthetic views on education.

However, before working through these collected essays, it is necessary to place some of Kant's ideas on education in the larger context of his work. We do so by showing that *the highest good,* an important notion in Kant's practical philosophy, is related to his ideas on moral law, virtue, dispositions, and judgment. We also demonstrate Kant's belief that it is through education that humans can cultivate themselves to be able to promote the highest good and make moral perfection their final destiny. He writes, for example, in *Lectures on Pedagogy* that the "human being should not merely be skilled for all sorts of ends, but should also acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone" (LP: 9:450). This aim we believe refers to the highest good, a notion that points to the idea that human beings shall be cultivated as autonomous moral beings and not merely "be skilled for all sorts of ends." However, even though Kant believed that human beings ought to cultivate themselves as moral beings and promote the highest good, he also thought that moral development progresses slowly and is an uncertain process because of the human propensity to act on the principle of self-love: the inclination to deviate from action consonant with and motivated by moral law. Nevertheless, Kant believed, despite their propensity to satisfy their desires and interests, human beings *must* promote the highest good. That is, it is not merely due to the human aptitude to set purposes in general before themselves, but because of humans' aptitude for higher moral purposes due simply to their rational nature (CPJ: 5:435).

In the first section of this introduction, we show how the moral law is connected to the notion of (general) happiness, and how Kant believed that human beings should promote general and not merely personal happiness; they should promote the highest good together. In section II, we show that Kant believed it necessary to cultivate human predispositions and virtue and the power of judgment, that is, their thinking in education, so that people can promote the final end—the highest good. And in section III, we give an account of each chapter in this book.

I. THE HIGHEST GOOD: GENERAL HAPPINESS AND MORAL LAW

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, for example, Kant argues that it is moral law that directs us toward the final end, and it is by acting upon moral law that we promote it. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* he shows that morality demands that we make the highest good our final end, that we promote general happiness in proportion to virtue. Later on in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* he contends that it is possible to promote the highest good in our world, and in his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* he argues that we should cultivate our humanity and promote general and not merely personal happiness. He

reaches this conclusion in part because we as imperfect rational beings have a propensity to act upon and be motivated by the principle of self-love, that is, a tendency to promote our own self-interest and realize our own ideas of what makes us happy. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* Kant asserts that we should cultivate our virtue and create the institutions needed to make the final end possible, while in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* he demonstrates that we cannot achieve or promote the highest good unless we cultivate our predispositions, in particular the moral predisposition. From here Kant argues that education becomes the most important challenge for us and for generations to come. He writes: "The human being shall make himself better, cultivate himself, and, if he is evil, bring forth morality in himself. If one thinks this over carefully, one finds that it is very difficult. That is why education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given to the human being" (LP: 9:446). Thus he argues that we cannot direct our action toward the final end and promote the highest good unless we, inter alia, freely choose to have moral law determine our will, cultivate our virtue and predispositions.

It is not easy to promote the highest good, and it may not be accomplished in our time. And it is not something that can be achieved by any individual by him or herself, but has to be promoted by the whole human species. Kant says: "But this much is certain, that individual human beings, no matter what degree of formation they are able to bring to their pupils, cannot make it happen that they reach their vocation. Not individual human beings, but rather the human species, shall get there" (LP: 9:445). That is, human beings have to direct their actions toward the final end, together; otherwise they just fall back into heteronomous action, action that purports merely to the satisfaction of their own desires and/or interests.

It may seem odd, however, that Kant thought that the final end would include the notion of happiness in proportion to virtue. He writes that "[a] good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself" (Gr: 4:394). One may read this passage and infer that nothing but the will is good, and that happiness therefore cannot be good, too. However, it is *not* correct to say that Kant believes that *nothing* but the will is good. He thinks that the will is *un*conditionally good and argues that it is "impossible to think of anything at all in the world . . . that could be considered good without limitation except a **good will**" (Gr: 4:393), and that an end, such as happiness, is either *objectively* or *subjectively* good. Such an end is subjectively good when human beings desire it and strive to achieve personal happiness. It is objectively good when they strive for general happiness.

Furthermore, it is objectively good when it is an object of practical reason and is promoted in proportion to virtue: we constrain ourselves by the moral law in promoting happiness and in particular general happiness; otherwise, it is subjectively good. Kant says:

> The principle of *one's own happiness* . . . is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false and experience contradicts the pretense that well-being always proportions itself to good conduct, nor yet merely because it contributes nothing at all to the establishment of morality, since making someone happy is quite different from making him good, or making him prudent and sharp-sighted for his own advantage is quite different from making him virtuous; it is the most objectionable because it bases morality on incentives that undermine it and destroy all its sublimity, since they put motives to virtue and those to vice in one class and only teach us to calculate better, but quite obliterate the specific difference between virtue and vice. (Gr: 4:442)

Hence we should not merely or necessarily satisfy our own personal ends. We should instead strive to achieve general happiness if we want to promote the highest good. Rather than simply choosing to satisfy our own desires, we should cultivate our capacity to set ends and choose between them, and respect our capacity as rational value-conferring beings. One reason for cultivating our capacity in this way is that since we as human beings have the capacity to set ends, confer value on them and choose between them, we also have to confer value on ourselves as rational beings; otherwise our ends are of no worth to us. And since our ends are not good in themselves, but because we confer value on them, we should promote our capacity to set ends and choose between them, and not merely or necessarily particular ends. Moreover, we should also respect ourselves as ends in ourselves and not merely as means to some end: we should respect our rational nature and cultivate our capacity to use our reason to distance ourselves from inclinations, and reflect upon and challenge them as reasons for our actions.

Being able to distance ourselves from our inclinations as reasons for our action and reflect upon them, sometimes challenge them, we can also choose *not* to act upon them. We take the above to mean that we ought to respect one another and our capacity to set ends, and that we therefore should treat one another as ends in ourselves, not merely as means to some desired end. Christine Korsgaard says:

> The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others—the ends that they choose—and, in general, to make the highest good our end. (Korsgaard 1996: 260–261)

That is, since we not only confer value on the objects of our action, but also on ourselves as value-conferring beings, we have to treat one another as ends in ourselves, on pain of inconsistency. Treating ourselves in this way in

turn requires that each one of us do whatever we can to "preserve the freedom of all to set their own ends and to promote the fulfilment of the morally permissible ends of all . . . and because happiness just consists in the fulfilment of ends, it follows . . . that at least under ideal circumstances maximal compliance with the fundamental principle of morality would itself result in maximally permissible human happiness" (Guyer 2000: 386–387). Simply put, general happiness and not merely personal happiness.

We see then that there is a connection between the moral law and happiness, and that the object of our actions should be happiness, and in particular general happiness. Stephen Engstrom says: "although the moral law does not depend upon or presuppose any material for its *validity*, it does depend upon or presuppose material for its *employment*" (Engstrom 1992: 752). That is, happiness, and in particular general happiness of virtuous persons, is the material for the employment of the moral law. It concerns the moral permissibility of these persons' actions and it guides their actions toward the highest good. Engstrom continues, "An action whose determining ground is the law itself is more than just permissible. It expresses a moral disposition and hence is the virtuous action of a good will" (1992: 756).

Therefore, human beings should not simply, according to Kant, let their wills be determined by sensuous inclinations, nor should they merely strive to satisfy their own personal ends. They should instead strive to act in accordance with and be motivated by the moral law—the Categorical Imperative—and cultivate their virtue and dispositions so that they are able to do so. This shift is from personal gains to a broader perspective from which all human actions are seen in the light of a common final end, namely, general happiness or the highest good. To strengthen this point Kant argues that human beings not only need to form an idea of a final end to which they strive, but also that they should promote it. Believing that happiness and in particular general happiness is a natural purpose for us, he also believed that it is the "necessary object of our will and inseparably bound up with the moral law" (CPr: 5:114). Kant writes:

> [A] free will must find a determining ground in the law but independently of the *matter* of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing further is contained in it than the lawgiving form. The lawgiving form, insofar as this is contained in the maxim, is therefore the only thing that can constitute a determining ground of the law. (CPr: 5:29)

He continues:

> The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will. But since this is merely formal (that is to say, it requires only that the form of a maxim be universally lawgiving), it abstracts as determining ground from all matter and so from every object of volition. Hence, though the highest good may be the whole *object* of a pure practical reason, that is,

> of a pure will, it is not on that account to be taken as its *determining ground*, and the moral law alone must be viewed as the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the object. (CPr: 5:109)

So it is not our ends that are good in themselves, but us. It is our capacity to set ends and choose between them and in particular our disposition as rational value-conferring beings that are good. Our ends are good to the extent our actions and in particular our norms of action are morally permissible. That is, it is the moral law that makes it possible for us to determine whether an action is morally permissible and in particular whether the norm of an action has moral worth. And our ends are good because of the good disposition of the human beings willing them.

General happiness can then be expected only if human actions are conducted in accordance with the moral law, are products of our freedom and our good will; and not motivated by sheer inclinations and our desire for personal happiness. Our practical reason should aim at the greatest possible good or happiness for the whole community of human beings. Having this aim can be expected only if human beings conduct their action in accordance with an ideal of reason, and it is "a product of human freedom" (Guyer 2000: 98). Therefore, human beings should cultivate their virtue and dispositions and in particular the moral disposition to act upon the moral law to make themselves worthy of happiness. Kant writes:

> The relation to happiness from the personal actions of human beings with regard to nature as well as to each other is . . . brought under determinate principles. He is worthy of happiness whose free actions are directed toward consensus with the universal grounds of free actions, who is thus capable of it from his own action. From the idea of the whole, the happiness of each member is determined. (NF: 19:237)

Happiness "need not [therefore] be willed as a merely natural, selfish goal, antithetical to morality, but can also be willed as one's own part of the whole that virtuous action aims to produce, namely a universal system of happiness" (Guyer 2000: 119–120). Happiness and in particular general happiness is, then, a result of free action, that is, of human beings who act in agreement with and are motivated by the moral law.

Kant believed that human beings are "capable of the greatest happiness . . . so far as it is accomplished through human freedom" (LE: 27:470), and that human progress is a result of human action. Again, Kant suggests human beings should strive to do what is right and promote general happiness; and they should develop their virtue to stand against their desire for merely personal happiness. Happiness, however, is only genuinely good when its condition is met, that is, when the moral law "commits us to the

realization of the good things that rational beings place value on" (Korsgaard 1996: 28).

Someone who promotes general happiness "does not demand any advantage for himself from his conformity to [the moral] law . . . rather, he would merely unselfishly establish the good to which that holy law directs all his powers" (CPJ: 5:452). We take this to mean that human beings have to develop their virtue and respect one another as ends in themselves, that they preserve their freedom to set their own ends, and that they promote the fulfilment of the morally permissible ends of all. Guyer continues:

> [B]ecause happiness just consists in the fulfilment of ends, it follows that virtue itself prescribes the fulfilment of the maximally possible set of human ends, thus that at least under ideal circumstances maximal compliance with the fundamental principle of morality would itself result in maximally permissible human happiness. (Guyer 2000: 386–387)

Human progress is in this respect not an easy task since we are bound by and limited by our inclination for personal happiness. Nevertheless, Kant thinks that we cannot abolish our inclinations; only regulate them and their role in the determination of our ends, by applying the moral law. In *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (Rel: 6:36), for example, he argues that we as imperfect rational beings *cannot* extirpate our natural inclinations or eradicate our propensity for self-love. Our natural inclinations are simply given to us. We should instead give them their proper place in our moral conduct as seen above. We can do this by subordinating them to an ideal of practical reason; by subordinating the principle of self-love to the moral law, we can have the moral law motivate our actions and strive for moral perfection.

We see then that Kant argues that human beings have to act upon the idea of freedom and that they should have their wills determined by the moral law, not merely by sensuous inclinations or external authorities of any kind. Also, humans should promote the highest good as the final end, and develop their predispositions for the use of their reason in order to accomplish this. Moreover, Kant believed that they would have to cultivate their virtue, their moral strength to act upon and be motivated by the moral law and create an education fitted for this. They would then be able to promote the "highest good in the world."

II. EDUCATION AND THE HIGHEST GOOD

How, then, Kant asks, "are we to seek [moral] perfection, and from whence is it to be hoped for?" His answer is: "From nowhere else but education" (LE: 27:471). Hence we have to cultivate our ability to use objects and one

another for our own purposes, but also our capacity as rational value-conferring creatures, learning to respect one another as ends in ourselves: to cultivate ourselves and our predispositions. In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Ant: 7:321–730), for example, Kant talks about three human predispositions: the technical, the pragmatic, and the moral; and states that we have to educate ourselves in such a sense that we are able to promote the highest good. The technical predisposition is our natural aptitude to manipulate things in our environment, the pragmatic our natural capacity "to use other human beings skilfully for [our] own purposes" (Ant: 7:322). The moral predisposition, on the other hand, is our ability to treat others and ourselves "according to the principle of freedom under laws" (Ant: 7:322).

Moreover, Kant believed that we as human beings have to cultivate our virtue, that is, our moral strength to act upon and be motivated by the moral law to be able to promote the highest good:

> *Virtue* is the strength of a human being's maxim in fulfilling his duty—Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which come into conflict with the human being's moral resolution . . . Since the moral capacity to constrain oneself can be called virtue, action springing from such a disposition (respect for a law) can be called virtuous (ethical) action, even though the law lays down a duty of right; for it is the *doctrine of virtue* that commands us to hold the right of human beings sacred. (MM: 6:394)

So we see, then, that we should not merely cultivate our technical and pragmatic dispositions. We should also cultivate our moral predisposition—in education and elsewhere—and act so that we respect our humanity, that is, our rational capacity and ourselves "*always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*" (Gr: 4:429). Kant continues by saying that we therefore have to "develop [our] predispositions toward the good" (LP: 9:446). We ought to discipline ourselves and our propensity to act for personal ends, and instead cultivate our humanity—in education and elsewhere—so that we can promote general happiness together.

As we constrain our propensity to act upon our sensuous inclinations, we may become conscious of what Kant calls negative freedom, that is, freedom from the effect of sensuous inclinations on our behavior. Such awareness, Kant says, may at first give rise to a delightful experience, namely, that we can resist acting upon our sensuous inclinations, are not merely slaves to our own passions. But this awareness may also cause sudden anxiety or frustration if we do not obtain immediate satisfaction. On the other hand we can also become aware of our positive desire to act in agreement with and be motivated by the moral law, so that we promote the highest good. This challenge is difficult since we should promote general

and not merely personal happiness, in particular when we want to cultivate our humanity.

We see, therefore, that Kant thinks that we as imperfect human beings should learn to strive to cultivate ourselves as moral beings, and not merely cultivate our technical and pragmatic predispositions. However, striving for moral perfection, that is, cultivating ourselves as moral beings, is an endless struggle not merely against our natural inclinations but also toward the highest good. It is a choice between developing our virtue on the one hand and domination by our inclinations on the other, a choice to develop our moral strength to master our inclinations as well as the inclinations of others in the choice of our ends, and it is the best that we as imperfect rational beings can strive to attain together in our communities. Kant writes, "The rule is this: Seek to maintain command over yourself, for under this condition you are capable of performing the self-regarding duties" (LE: 27:360).

Self-command, however, is not easy. We are constantly in a struggle with ourselves and with the impact of our sensuous inclinations. Also, as seen above, we have to struggle with one another and when pursuing different and incompatible ends. Kant calls the tendency "to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance, that constantly threatens to break up this society" *unsocial sociability* (Idea: 8:20). As human beings we have a natural tendency to reproduce ourselves, and come together and create various social setting in which we are or become mutually dependent. Kant calls this tendency the natural human sociability. On the other hand, *un*sociability takes form as a consequence of our technical and pragmatic predispositions, our capacity as rational beings to set our own ends, pursue them, and use one another and objects as means thereto. It is here in the *antagonism* between our tendencies to come together and our propensity for "thoroughgoing resistance, that constantly threatens to break up this society" that the value of our moral predisposition and its cultivation become important. Kant sees this antagonism as the driving force for developing not only our technical and pragmatic predispositions, but also our moral predisposition.

If, however, we merely cultivate our technical and pragmatic dispositions we do *not* cultivate our humanity. Allen Wood says:

> The picture is clear: In civilization, human relationships based on empirical desire consist mainly in the domination of one person by another. The domination operates largely through the illusory hopes of the dominated, who fancy themselves on the way either to freedom from the will of all others or else at least to achieving domination over someone else. Thus social relationships founded on natural human desires rest systematically on *deceit*. (Wood 1991: 334)

Therefore, we should not base our social relationships merely on our desires but on the moral law, and should strive to promote general happiness and

not merely personal happiness. When we act merely upon our desires in our natural tendency to unsociability, then the source of our social relations is the principle of self-love. Self-love gives rise to conceit and vices such as arrogance, defamation, and ridicule (MM: 6:465–468). Self-love gives rise to these vices because the principle of self-love "originates in the inclination *to gain worth in the opinion of others*" (Rel: 6:27), to "seek a self-worth superior to that of others" (Wood 2009: 116). If we instead subordinate the principle of self-love to the moral law, then we strike down our natural inclination to act out of self-love on the one hand and, on the other, strive to promote respect for one another and our rational nature. Simply put, cultivating our humanity.

To be able to promote the highest good means not merely to cultivate the three predispositions and the virtue, the moral strength to act upon and be motivated by the moral law. It also means to cultivate the power of judgment, that is, our thinking in education. And it is to Kant's views on education, the historical influences on his theory, the connection to his moral philosophy, and, finally, the implications on contemporary pedagogical theory we now turn.

III. KANT AND EDUCATION

This volume aims to fill the perceived void in Kant scholarship related to his writings on education and pedagogy. The essays contained within this volume discuss ideas taken up by us in parts one and two, and will examine either Kant's ideas on education through a historical analysis of his texts; or the importance and relevance of his moral philosophy, political philosophy, anthropology, judgment, thinking, and/or aesthetics (or some combination) for contemporary education theory.

First, we examine the historical influences on Kant. Chris W. Surprenant provides a general background to Kant's educational philosophy and his discussion of moral education. Kant's deontological ethics, along with Aristotle's virtue ethics and Mill's utilitarian ethics, are often identified as one of the three primary moral options between which individuals can choose. Surprenant argues that it is surprising, therefore, that little has been written on Kant's important contributions to moral education—moral instruction through catechism. By memorizing a series of moral questions and answers, an individual can acquire knowledge of basic moral principles in the same way that Martin Luther believed an individual should be habituated to the tenets of Christianity. However, a catechistic approach to moral education appears to violate a central tenet of Kantian morality: an individual is morally praiseworthy only if he performs virtuous acts out of respect for the moral law itself, not because he has been habituated to act in that manner. This first article demonstrates why Kant's contribution to the field of moral education is significant by showing how a catechistic

moral education establishes the foundation necessary for autonomous, moral action.

Following this discussion are two articles examining the educational philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and its influence on Kant's theory. First, Joseph Reisert argues that Kant's portrait of the morally upright person accords closely with Rousseau's depiction of the eponymous hero of his novel *Emile*. Like Kant, Rousseau teaches that virtue requires subordinating one's desires to a moral law given by reason and that such virtue is a necessary but not sufficient condition of realizing the highest good for human beings. Kant's account of moral education, however, diverges from Rousseau's in three respects: (1) Kant proposes a program of public instruction, while Rousseau advocates domestic education; (2) Kant proposes that pupils learn morality by studying a moral catechism; Rousseau rejects direct moral instruction as corrupting, insisting that the young discover morality through the (carefully supervised) practice of doing good; (3) Kant holds that moral exemplars reveal only that it is always possible to act uprightly, whatever the circumstances, whereas Rousseau shows that exemplary figures play a crucial role in introducing unphilosophical souls to wisdom. These differences stem from a fundamental disagreement about the role of sentiment in the acquisition and exercise of moral knowledge.

Next, Philip Scuderi claims that Rousseau's *Emile* is commonly viewed as a book about the education of a boy in order that he might grow to be a happy, free man. A careful reading, along with some consideration of Rousseau's other works, reveals that *Emile* is really an expression of the impossible conditions necessary for such an education. In order to understand properly Kant's response to the problems posed by *Emile*, we must first assess the work in light of this pessimistic standpoint. To that end, Scuderi focuses on three important themes in the book. These include Rousseau's convictions that in order to ensure moral rectitude, (1) the tutor must keep Emile ignorant, in respect of the proper bounds of human knowledge; and moreover (2) he must found Emile's education on deceptive, carefully orchestrated spectacles designed to mislead him. Finally Scuderi argues that (3) Rousseau holds no hope for the possibility that even this painstakingly calculated, restrictive plan for education can succeed.

We then move from Rousseau to Johann Bernhard Basedow. Robert Louden argues that Kant's public support for Basedow and his experimental school, the Philanthropin, is a significant, unexpected, and even today, often under-appreciated chapter in his writing career. But what exactly attracted Kant to Basedow? Louden examines Kant's Basedow-related writings as well as some of Basedow's own works in an attempt to locate Basedow's specific ideas and positions that Kant endorsed. The influence of Basedow on Kant's own philosophy of education is, Louden argues, both wide and deep. Kant's commitment to the project of transforming human beings through education definitely softened in his later years, and his

support for Basedow from 1776 to 1778 marks the only time in his life that he championed unequivocally a progressive social movement.

After examining the relevant, historical influences on Kant's educational philosophy, the volume turns to his theory itself. First, Manfred Kuehn examines the role of education in Kant's practical philosophy Kuehn argues that the subject of education plays a more important role in Kant's practical philosophy than commonly acknowledged. It is, according to Kant, also highly significant for morality, as is readily apparent from the last sections of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant believed that human beings are the only animals that need education. Furthermore, it is the education in the service of morality that is most important for him. Kuehn, therefore, concentrates on the necessity of human beings to "be educated to the good." He also argues that education has implications not just for morality, but that it is just as important for the historical and political evolution of human beings. Kuehn concludes by showing that the implications of education go far beyond the needs of any particular government or state, but that the well-being of humanity in the long run depends on it.

Following Kuehn, Richard Velkley considers Kant's thought on education in relation to the German Enlightenment, which is interpreted as the tradition of German philosophy from Leibniz to Hegel and Schelling. Velkley argues that the central aim of this tradition is to offer a satisfactory account of reason building on discoveries and insights of early modernity and reconciling them with fundamental human interests in freedom, moral virtue, aesthetic experience, natural teleology, and providential views of history. His chapter focuses on the place of Kant's accounts of culture and university education within this broad movement, and concludes with a comparison of the views of Kant and Schelling.

Next, Gary Herbert argues that the function of Kant's theory of education is determined by the purely transcendental nature of his moral theory. Herbert notes that Kant's metaphysics of morals is just that, a metaphysics. The moral theory it contains has nothing directly to do with moral exhortation or moral advice to people on how to act only from moral motives. It is concerned solely with our understanding the capacity of the laws of pure practical reason to manifest themselves in maxims, raising them to the status of moral laws. The applicability of Kant's moral theory to experience draws on the analogical template provided by his speculative philosophy. Education functions in ways analogically similar to the forms of sensuous intuition to promote "character" and to make the purely transcendental principles of morality and the good will—schematized as *persons* existing in reciprocally determinate relations of rights and obligations—applicable to experience. The child in whom *character* is promoted can meaningfully be recognized as a rational, i.e., autonomous, being, i.e., a *person,* capable of acting from respect for moral law. Herbert concludes, therefore, that such a being is one on whom moral demands can reasonably be made.

Jørgun Huggler examines Kant's philosophical understanding of 'culture' as a decisive background for his pedagogical thinking. Huggler argues that Kant understands culture, not as a break with nature, but as the development of man's specific nature. The driving force behind this understanding is human asocial sociality. With this motor cultural institutions are being developed, and in particular the politically organized communities ruled by law. However, inequality and domination are among the effects of the development. Nevertheless, Kant accepts these effects as costs, which necessarily must be paid by the project whose aim is the development of humanity as a species. On the other hand, culture may develop the individual toward harmony between inclinations and morality. Morality is constitutive for the notion of human beings as ends in themselves. Thus, Kant's thoughts on culture allow for a reflection on man as the end to which nature as a whole might be seen as a mean. In addition, they provide a conscious direction of human efforts to cultivate and create an enlightened society. In this context, the Kantian paradox concerning formation can be read in a twofold way. Does it consider sufficient or just necessary conditions for pedagogical intervention? If it is about necessary conditions, it may express a transcendental, regulative idea. In contrast, Huggler concludes, if the conditions are thought sufficient, the paradox makes the aims and means of pedagogy dependent on empirical circumstances in the actual situation.

In the next chapter, Lars Løvlie examines the practical aspects of transcendental thinking and its relevance for current educational theory and practice. Part of Løvlie's argument is that Kant's distinction between mind and world undergirds the so-called pedagogical paradox: that you cannot force people to be free. Those who are critical of Kant's distinction seem to overlook the ethical significance of the paradox and how it casts light on the basics of the pedagogical relation. The concepts of the freedom and dignity of the person depend on the distinction and define the limitations of pedagogical action—and its openness to reflective thinking. They point to the freedom of pedagogy as sustained by the place and work of ideas, analogies, and examples. The pedagogical paradox, analogies, and examples are nurtured by the distinction between mind and world, and by the standing yet impossible demand for closing the gap between the two. The chapter considers a reflective pedagogy based on the dialogue between the philosopher's analysis and common human understanding. The most significant feature of Kant's educational thinking is, at the end of the day, its deep humanism and resolute anti-dogmatism.

Paul Guyer examines Kant's conception of the role of examples in moral education. He argues that it is founded on the premise that our knowledge of the content of the moral law and of our freedom to fulfil it is a priori but latent, as much (synthetic) a priori knowledge is. Furthermore, Guyer argues that Kant believes children must bring this knowledge from latency to consciousness by means of examples. Hypothetical examples or thought-experiments may suffice to bring children to consciousness of the moral law

itself, along with the distinction between mere happiness and the worthiness to be happy. The contents of particular duties, particularly the imperfect duties, may also need to be taught by example, because all the ways in which human dignity could be injured or conversely promoted could never be fully enumerated—although Kant leaves it open whether hypothetical or real examples are necessary for this purpose. However, Guyer concludes, when it comes to our freedom to live up to the demands of morality, since it is our real freedom and not just the logical possibility of freedom about which we must become clear, only historical and not hypothetical examples will do, or at least they are what will be most persuasive for the growing child.

Next, Richard Dean argues that although Kant seems to regard moral education as an important element of both pedagogy and ethics, the connections between his views on moral education and his systematic moral philosophy must be developed. Dean believes that one might well think that providing every human with a moral education is a duty, but Kant does not explicitly say it is, let alone show how such a duty follows from the Categorical Imperative. Although Kant does not address these issues directly, his texts do provide the ingredients for comprehensive answers. Emphasizing not only the basic moral requirement of treating humanity as an end in itself, but also a complementary account of humanity as an "ideal" in a Kantian technical sense, clarifies the connections between moral education and Kant's overall system of moral philosophy. Providing a moral education is a duty, Dean concludes, but Kant has consistent reasons for not directly describing the duty in his main writings on ethics.

Following Dean, Alix Cohen argues that Kant's philosophy of education should be interpreted as showing that education can be morally relevant despite the fact that it cannot make the child moral. To support this claim, Cohen suggests that it is necessary to focus on the connection between Kant's account on education and his views on moral anthropology. For it brings to light that education cannot but work with nature (and in particular human nature, natural feelings, and predispositions) rather than against it in order to realize the vocation of humanity. She then goes on to argue that the moral dimension of education is best described as enabling the child to use his freedom in the right way, that is to say, autonomously. On this basis, Cohen concludes that while education can prepare him for the universal command of duty, nothing can relieve him of the essential burden of the task morality demands of him—having a good will.

In the chapter written by Paul Formosa, the argument is made that Kant develops, in a number of texts, a detailed three-stage theory of moral development that resembles the contemporary accounts of moral development defended by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. Formosa notes that the first stage in this process is that of physical education and disciplining, followed by cultivating and civilizing, with a third and final stage of moralizing. The outcome of this process of moral development is a fully autonomous

person. However, Kant's account of moral development appears to be in tension with other elements of his moral philosophy. Formosa identifies two such tensions, which he calls the knowledge and revolution tensions, and shows why these tensions are illusory. As such, Formosa concludes, a proper understanding of Kant's theory of moral development, far from exposing genuine tensions, helps rather to deepen our understanding of Kant's moral philosophy.

Next, James Scott Johnston examines the relationship between Kant and moral psychologists and educators, drawing on his moral theory. He examines Lawrence Kohlberg and his particular reading of Kant, which is central to his stage theory of moral development. Next, Johnston suggests, through a discussion of Kant, together with some of the newer Kant scholarship, that the story of Kant that Kohlberg gives us is misleading, and that a better story needs to be told. He demonstrates that Kant has neither a flawed nor a robust moral psychology. Instead, Johnston claims that Kant has no moral psychology whatsoever in his moral theory, but what he offers us instead is an empirical psychology, with empirical principles, that serves as a backdrop to his moral theory. This empirical psychology, however, is fundamentally separate from his moral theory. Johnston concludes by examining and discussing some implications of this separation for moral education.

Continuing with the theme of Kant's discussion and influence on contemporary education, Susan Meld Shell argues that Kant was a key player in the development of the modern university as an institution aiming both at the discovery of new scientific knowledge and the formation of an enlightened civic culture. Shell notes that Kant was a member (and later dean) of the faculty of the University of Königsberg for almost forty years, during a period of intense intellectual and political struggle over the meaning of Enlightenment and its relation to religious and secular authority. His professional and personal response set in motion a series of transformations culminating in the national research university as we have come to know it. It also left behind a number of unresolved tensions—between the transmission of a national culture and the advancement of new knowledge; between free inquiry and civil service; and between universal norms and local loyalties—with which we are still struggling. The focus of Shell's discussion is Kant's understanding of the humanities, an understanding, she argues, that has been insufficiently considered, as it bears on these larger issues.

Finally, Klas Roth examines the connection between Kant's theory and contemporary policy texts in the European Union. These contemporary policy texts outline the aim of education and the actions that people should take. They state that education should be used for the present and that people should make themselves efficacious, that is, usable for the knowledge-based society, through education, but not necessarily autonomous. Roth's article discusses some ideas on how to reconcile the goal in the policy texts—that people should make themselves efficacious—with the notion of freedom and autonomy in the practical philosophy of Kant. More specifically, he

argues that people should not merely make themselves efficacious, but also autonomous through education.

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1 Kant's Contribution to Moral Education

Chris W. Surprenant

Kant's deontological ethics, along with Aristotle's virtue ethics and Mill's utilitarian ethics, are often identified as one of the three primary moral options between which individuals can choose. It is surprising, therefore, that little has been written on Kant's important contributions to moral education—moral instruction through catechism. By memorizing a series of moral questions and answers, an individual can acquire knowledge of basic moral principles in the same way that Martin Luther believed an individual should be habituated to the tenets of Christianity. The difficulty with this position, however, is that a catechistic approach to moral education appears to violate a central tenet of Kantian morality: an individual is morally praiseworthy only if he performs virtuous acts out of a recognition that those acts are required of him (i.e., out of respect for the moral law itself), not because he has been habituated to act in that manner. The project of this chapter is to demonstrate why Kant's contribution to the field of moral education is significant by showing how a catechistic moral education establishes the foundation necessary for autonomous, moral action.

Any discussion of moral education must begin with a brief examination of its object—morality or virtue—and, for Kant, becoming virtuous requires an individual not only to adopt the correct principles or maxims, but also to adopt those maxims for the correct reasons. It is for this reason that he divides his discussion of moral education in the Doctrine of the Method of Ethics (MM: 6:477–491) into two parts corresponding with these two components of virtue. The first, "Teaching ethics" (MM: 6:477–484), outlines why virtue must be taught and the process by which individuals come to adopt virtuous maxims. Although this section contains Kant's discussion of moral education, the second section, "Ethical ascetics" (MM: 6:484–685), is critical to understanding his position on this topic because it outlines the components of virtue that cannot be taught. For example, virtue requires an individual to develop "a frame of mind that is both *valiant* and *cheerful* in fulfilling its duties . . . [because] what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way" (MM: 6:484). Although one can be taught the basic principles of virtue, one cannot be taught how to acquire this

disposition. Instead, it is acquired through what Kant calls "ethical gymnastics," or through the repetitive practice of combating natural impulses when those impulses conflict with virtue. "Hence," Kant concludes, "[the process of performing ethical gymnastics] makes one valiant and cheerful in the consciousness of one's restored freedom" (MM: 6:485), allowing an individual to overcome the forces of heteronomy, which provide a barrier to moral action.

Keeping in mind that the focus of moral education must be on assisting an individual in adopting moral maxims (the first component of virtue), rather than on the disposition with which those maxims are adopted (the second component of virtue), let us turn our attention toward Kant's discussion of ethical instruction in the "Doctrine of the Method of Ethics." Kant begins by examining why virtue must be acquired and why it must be taught. He writes:

> The very concept virtue already implies that virtue must be acquired (that it is not innate); one need not appeal to anthropological knowledge based on experience to see this. For a human being's moral capacity would not be virtue were it not produced by the *strength* of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure practical reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness of its supremacy (based on freedom). (MM: 6:477)

Since individuals are not born with the ability to resist heteronomous impulses, one must cultivate this ability, and, thus, cultivate a propensity for virtue. According to Kant, that a propensity for virtue "can and must be taught already follows from its not being innate" (MM: 6:477). His reasoning can be explained as follows: (1) because virtue is not innate, it must be acquired; (2) applying Kant's "ought implies can" principle, because individuals have a moral duty to become virtuous, it is possible for them to acquire virtue; (3) that which is not innate but can be acquired must be learned; (4) thus, it follows that virtue must be taught.

I. DIALECTIC AND DOGMATISM: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE ON MORAL EDUCATION

Let us assume Kant is correct in concluding that virtue is not innate and must be taught. Historically, others arriving at this same conclusion about virtue have argued that it must be taught either through a dialectic or dogmatic approach. One of the first formal theories of moral education can be found in the Platonic dialogues where Socrates elicits moral principles from his students through continuous questioning and refinement of ideas. Central to this process of dialectical education is that the questions do not come

from the teacher alone, but rather all of the participants are able to question the reasonableness of the ideas that have been proposed. To participate in the dialogue, however, an individual must enter the discussion with some preexisting knowledge of the issue being discussed—in this case, the principles of virtue. In the Platonic dialogues, this preexisting understanding of virtue can be traced to the Socratic belief that individuals are born with complete, theoretical knowledge, including knowledge of moral principles (*Meno*: 81c–d).

Individuals are not taught the principles of virtue through the dialectical process. Instead, by participating in the dialogue individuals are able to refine their understanding of how these principles should be applied (Gordon 1999: 34). Therefore, as Kant observes correctly, the foundation of an individual's moral education cannot be established through dialogue alone (MM: 6:479). Individuals participating in the dialogue enter this discussion either with or without preexisting knowledge of moral principles. If one enters the dialogue already possessing this knowledge, then the person may learn how best to apply these principles through the dialectic. However, if one does not have a preexisting understanding of moral principles when entering the dialogue, then the dialectic is unable to function in the appropriate manner. Kant writes, "The formal principle of such instruction does not . . . permit Socratic *dialogue* as the way of teaching for this purpose, since the pupil has no idea what questions to ask; and so the teacher alone does the questioning" (MM: 6:479). Without the ability of all participants to take part in the questioning process, moral discussions that resemble dialogues become nothing more than instances of dogmatic instruction.

Kant's rejection of the dialectic method as the starting point for one's moral education follows from the previous point that individuals are not born with an innate understanding of moral principles. If it were the case that individuals were born with some innate understanding of these principles, then it could be argued that the dialectical structure is more appropriate to serve as the basis for one's moral education. By arguing against dialectic teaching as the basis for moral education, Kant aligns himself more closely with Aristotle. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* emphasizes the importance of the state and family in implementing laws that compel individuals to act in a manner consistent with virtue. He writes:

> We acquire [virtues] by first exercising them. The same is true with skills, since what we need to learn before doing, we learn by doing . . . So too we become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions. What happens in cities bears this out as well, because legislators make the citizens good by habituating them [through the laws], and this is what every legislator intends . . . If one has not been reared under the right laws it is difficult to obtain from one's earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue, because the masses . . . do not find it pleasant to live temperately and

> with endurance . . . [Therefore,] the person who is to be good must be nobly brought up and habituated, and then spend his life engaged in good pursuits . . . And this would happen when people lived in accordance with a kind of intellect and a correct system with power over them. (NE: 1103a27–1103b6, 1179b28–1180a15)

While the laws compel an individual to perform acts consistent with those performed by the virtuous man, Aristotle asserts that a person is not virtuous unless he performs those actions from the appropriate state: "first, with knowledge, secondly, from rational choice, and rational choice of the actions for their own sake, and, thirdly, from a firm and unshakable character" (NE: 1105a31).

It is not clear, however, how habituation through compulsory action, what Kant refers to as Aristotle's dogmatic approach to moral education, is able to accomplish the goal of making individuals better in the way that he suggests. If one must be compelled or coerced to perform acts consistent with virtue, we would not consider that individual to be virtuous. Rather, that individual is said to have performed acts consistent with those of a virtuous man, but not from the appropriate state of character (NE: 1144a15; CPr: 5:152). Such a result appears unavoidable if dogmatic instruction lies at the foundation of one's moral education, especially in situations where this instruction is reinforced by threats of punishment or promises of reward.

This problem that Kant identifies in his critique of Aristotle is the same problem identified by R.S. Peters's "paradox of moral education" (1981: 45–60). As explained by Kristján Kristjánsson, this paradox contains two distinct, but interrelated paradoxes: a psychological paradox and a moral/political paradox.

> The *psychological paradox* is this: How can it be true at the same time that it is the aim of moral education to develop persons who conduct themselves by their intellects . . . *and* that can best achieved through inculcating in them from an early age certain ready-made habits of action and feeling? . . . The *moral/political paradox*, on the other hand, is this: How can it be true at the same time that the aim of moral education is to create individuals who, moved by their own conception of the good, cherish and assiduously apply their own unencumbered autonomy *and* that this can best be achieved through means that necessarily involve an extrinsic motivation? (2006: 103)

If the role of moral education is to provide individuals with the principles underlying right and wrong action and to develop their character in such a way so that they are able to learn how these principles should be applied (CPr: 5:159), then neither Socratic dialectic nor Aristotelian dogmatism alone can provide a complete moral education. The dialectic approach fails because of its content—it assumes that one has already acquired a basic

understanding of moral principles. Likewise, the dogmatic approach fails because of its form—it trains an individual to perform actions consistent with virtue, but these actions are not performed from the correct moral disposition. In the words of Otfried Höffe, "[The] criterion for morality is met only if one does what is morally correct for no other reason than because it is morally correct. An action is good without qualification only if it fulfills duty for the sake of duty. Only in such cases does Kant speak of morality" (1994: 143).

II. KANT'S MORAL CATECHISM

Kant's solution to the paradox of moral education is the introduction of a moral catechism. He writes:

> For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument for *teaching* the doctrine of virtue is a moral *catechism* . . . A pure *moral* catechism, as the basic teachings of duties of virtue, involves no such scruple or difficulty since (as far as its content is concerned) it can be developed from ordinary human reason, and (as far as its form is concerned) it needs only to be adapted to the rules of teaching suited for the earliest instruction . . . So the way of teaching by catechism differs from both the dogmatic way (in which only the teacher speaks) and the way of dialogue (in which both the teacher and pupil question and answer each other). (MM: 6:479)

By moral catechism, Kant has in mind something similar to Luther's long and short religious catechisms—both of which played an integral role in Kant's early religious education (Kuehn 2001: 47). The function of Luther's catechisms was to teach individuals the fundamental doctrines and prayers of the church through a series of questions and memorized answers. Unlike a religious catechism that is developed to instill within individuals particular tenets of a preexisting religious doctrine, Kant believes that a moral catechism "can be developed from ordinary human reason (as far as its content is concerned)" (MM: 6:479). That is, a student educated via a moral catechism is not memorizing answers that he could not, or did not, generate himself. For Kant, virtue requires an individual to use his reason freely to determine and adopt moral maxims, and then act on these maxims out of respect for the moral law itself (CPr: 5:29–30). Therefore, the question arises as to whether or not it is possible for an individual, initially educated via a moral catechism, to go beyond the first stage of repetition, ultimately arriving at these moral judgments through the use of his reason and not his memory. Simply put, does Kant provide a resolution to the paradox of moral education?

This potential problem becomes clearer once we turn to Kant's remark after §52 in the "Doctrine of the Method of Ethics," the "Fragment of

a moral catechism" (MM: 6:480–482). Although the portion of the catechism presented here is abbreviated, it illustrates clearly the first two steps an individual must take in order to become capable of attaining virtue. First, he must progress from his original state, one in which he is ignorant of moral principles (MM: 6:477), to one in which he possesses basic knowledge of these principles. Second, he must progress from this intermediate state, one where he can make moral determinations because he has learned moral principles and when they should be applied, to the point where he is able to generate and apply moral principles on his own through the development and use of his reason. If individuals educated under the catechism are unable to progress to this latter stage, their actions would be consistent with the letter of the law (i.e., legally praiseworthy), but not performed with the correct disposition (i.e., morally praiseworthy). Since the role of moral education is to assist an individual's progress toward becoming morally praiseworthy, for Kant's catechistic method to be successful it must allow for an individual to progress in this manner.

Catechistic education begins with the teacher eliciting an initial response from the student, or, "should the pupil not know how to answer the question, the teacher, guiding his reason, suggests the answer to him" (MM: 6:480). Then, this answer "must be written down and preserved in definite words that cannot easily be altered, and so be committed to the pupil's *memory*" (MM: 6:479). In the fragment of catechism that Kant provides, the teacher begins by asking the student a question that appears only tangentially related to morality: "Teacher: What is your greatest, in fact your whole, desire in life" (MM: 6:480)? To this question, Kant's student is silent, although it is unclear why anyone, even a child who possesses no understanding of moral principles, would be unable or unwilling to answer this question. One suggestion, offered by Thomas Fuhr, is that Kant's student is quiet because the question is too complex (2000: 104). However, even if one could not answer the question with an intelligent, well-thought-out reply, it is not unreasonable to expect a shallow reply relevant to the age and interests of that particular student. Through the silence of the student, Kant implies either that a shallow response is the equivalent of silence where moral development is concerned, or that the catechistic education can be successful even if the student cannot answer even the most basic questions concerning the principles that underlie his particular desires. The goal of the first few questions is to arrive at the conclusion that the student's greatest desire in life is to be happy, which Kant defines as "continuous well-being, enjoyment of life, [and] complete satisfaction with one's condition" (MM: 6:480). Although an individual may be silent and initially not recognize that this principle is the determining ground of all of his desires, Kant believes it to be a fact of human nature (CPr: 5:25).

Through the next series of questions in the moral catechism, a process that Kant describes as preparatory guidance, the student is guided toward recognizing the problems that result when happiness or desire is

the determining ground of his will. This guidance is tailored to the student once the teacher is able to understand the student's character (i.e., whether he possesses natural kindness toward others), whether the student is able to temper these natural feelings toward others through the use of his reason, and whether the student is able to apply these same reason-tempered feelings when considering what he deserves himself (MM: 6:480–481). Additionally, the teacher also guides the student toward understanding the principles that underlie his replies. For example, when given the power to make everyone and anyone happy, the student responds that he would not "give a lazy fellow soft cushions so that he could pass his life away in sweet idleness," or "give a violent man audacity and strong fists so that he could crush other people," even though both of these would allow someone else "to be happy in his own way." The teacher, guiding the student's reason through the phrasing of the question, follows up on this response by explaining the principle from which he is acting: "Teacher: You see, then, that even if you had all happiness in your hands and, along with it, the best will, you would still not give it without consideration to anyone who put out his hand for it; instead you would first try to find out to what extent each was worthy of happiness" (MM: 6:481).

Without providing the student with some degree of preparatory guidance, Kant believes that an individual could never cultivate his reason to the fullest extent required for virtue. He writes, "It certainly cannot be denied that in order to bring either a mind that is still uncultivated or one that is degraded onto the track of the morally good in the first place, some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by means of its own advantage or alarm it by fear of harm" (MM: 5:152). In other words, the role of the teacher in the initial stages of the moral catechism is to coerce the student into recognizing which responses are consistent with the demands of the moral law. Since the student at this stage of his training still acts according to his desires and from the maxim of attaining personal happiness, one must appeal to the student on this level in order for him to become legally praiseworthy.

This view concerning the appropriate role of the teacher is expressed by Kant throughout his writings, dating as far back as an announcement for his lecture program for the 1765–1766 winter semester. In this announcement, he writes:

> First of all, the understanding develops by using experience to arrive at intuitive judgments, and by their means to attain to concepts. After that, and employing reason, these concepts come to be known in relation to their grounds and consequences. Finally, by means of science, these concepts come to be known as part of a well-ordered whole. This being the case, teaching must follow exactly the same path. The teacher is, therefore, expected to develop in his pupil firstly the man of *understanding*, then the man of *reason*, and finally the man of *learning*. Such

> a procedure has this advantage: even if, as usually happens, the pupil should never reach the final phase, he will still have benefited from his instruction. (An: 2:305–306)

Although this passage is directed at education in general, it can be applied to his comments on moral education. Through the moral catechism, an individual develops into the man of moral understanding. That is, the teacher is able to guide the student toward an understanding of virtue through the use of familiar examples, with the ultimate goal of instilling the rules of what constitutes right and wrong behavior. "In formative training," Kant observes, "we should try to ensure that it is merely negative and that we exclude everything contrary to nature . . . The negative aspect, in both instruction and training of the child, is discipline; the positive aspect, in instruction, is doctrine." He concludes, "Discipline must precede doctrine. By discipline the heart and temperament can be trained, but character is shaped more by doctrine" (LE: 27:467).

III. RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF MORAL EDUCATION

For Aristotle, the first step in moral education is to compel an individual to perform acts that are consistent with acquiring certain virtues. By acting in this manner, an individual is not thought to be virtuous, but rather is acting as the virtuous person would act. To become virtuous, an individual must perform these actions from the correct character state. That is, he acts in a particular manner because he recognizes that performing that act is the right thing to do, not because he has been compelled to do so by a force external to himself. Aristotle, however, never explains how this transition occurs, and it is unclear how it would occur. While Aristotle's approach to moral education trains an individual to perform actions consistent with virtue, these actions are never performed from the correct moral disposition. Instead of training an individual to perform virtuous acts, Kant's catechistic approach to moral education aims to cultivate virtuous persons by developing the students' understanding of not only what principles are consistent with virtue, but also why those principles are consistent with virtue.

By developing a student's understanding of moral principles, the teacher is training his heart and temperament. Although this training is the primary goal of the moral catechism, it is only the intermediate goal of moral education. The ultimate goal, becoming morally praiseworthy, requires the student first to use his reason to determine the principles that he should adopt, and then to adopt these principles. Unlike the transition from the student's original condition to this intermediate stage, the teacher cannot make the student morally praiseworthy by means of instruction. Given that an essential component of virtue is that an individual has chosen the appropriate ends freely, it would be impossible for a teacher to compel or coerce

his student into becoming morally praiseworthy. On this point I agree with Christine Korsgaard. She writes, "Choosing ends on another's behalf is as impossible as it would be disrespectful, but putting others in a good position to choose ends for themselves, and to choose them well, is the proper work of parents, teachers, friends, and politicians" (1996: 220n36).

Although ends cannot be chosen for other individuals, more can be done than simply putting others in a good position to be virtuous. On this point, Kant adds:

> A human being's moral education must begin not with an improvement of *mores*, but with the transformation of his attitude of mind and the establishment of a character . . . This predisposition to the good is cultivated in no better way than by just adducing the *example* of good people (as regards their conformity to law), and by allowing our apprentices in morality to judge the impurity of certain maxims on the basis of the incentives actually behind their actions. And so the predisposition gradually becomes an attitude of mind, so that duty merely for itself begins to acquire in the apprentice's heart a noticeable importance. (Rel: 6:48)

The predisposition for morality that Kant refers to at the end of this passage is provided by the catechistic education, but it is unclear from this passage alone how this predisposition for the good becomes an attitude of mind solely through the introduction of examples of good people. His explanation for how this process occurs is provided in the second *Critique* and *Metaphysics of Morals*. Through the adduction of examples and discussion of hypothetical moral scenarios, a process that Kant refers to as "ethical gymnastics," an individual learns that he is cultivating his reason through these exercises. This process, Kant argues, "gradually produce[s] a certain interest in reason's law itself and hence in morally good actions. For, we finally come to like something the contemplation of which lets us feel a more extended use of our cognitive powers" (CPr: 5:159). The advantage of ethical gymnastics "lies especially in the fact that it is natural for a human being to *love* a subject which he has, by his own handling, brought to a science (in which he is now proficient); and so, by this sort of practice, the pupil is drawn without noticing it to an *interest* in morality" (MM: 6:483–484).

Acquiring an interest in morality itself is a two-step process. By participating in ethical gymnastics, an individual recognizes his own cognitive powers and their ability to help him master his natural impulses (MM: 6:485). Being able to perfect this aspect of his character provides the individual with satisfaction. Thus, one's initial interest in morality is not an interest in morality itself, but rather morality "is viewed only as the occasion for our becoming aware of the tendency of talents in us which are elevated above animality" (CPr: 5:160). Simply put, one's

interest in morality is actually an interest in obtaining the satisfaction an individual receives after recognizing that he has strengthened his own cognitive powers. Through the further development of these cognitive powers, however, an individual comes to recognize the connection between morality and freedom (CPr: 5:160). He understands that he is free only when he adopts moral maxims. In this way his interest shifts. No longer is his interest in morality secondary to his interest in receiving the satisfaction that he once associated with moral action. Instead, he becomes interested in morality for its own sake—for the sake of his freedom and personal development.

In this way, Kant provides a solution to the twofold paradox of moral education. Concerning the psychological paradox, Kant rejects the claim that the development of moral persons is achieved by inculcating within individuals certain ready-made habits of action. Instead of repeating actions that are consistent with the actions of a virtuous person, the moral catechism guides individuals toward understanding the principles central to virtue. This guidance takes place not through dogmatic instruction, but through directing a student's reason to arrive at the desired conclusions through a series of questions and answers. The student then commits these questions and answers to memory so that he may reflect upon the chain of reasoning that led him to these conclusions. In this way, the student's understanding is developed in a manner that is consistent with developing persons who conduct themselves by their intellects. As for the moral/political paradox, extrinsic factors never motivate an individual's moral development in Kant's system of moral education, be it within the catechistic stage or once catechistic instruction has ceased. All motivation is internal. While being motivated by internal forces is a necessary condition for becoming morally praiseworthy, it is insufficient. What Kant does not explain is how an individual develops his cognitive powers to move from the second to the third (and final) stage of moral development: that is, developing from the man of reason (who is motivated by satisfaction) into the man of learning (who is motivated by duty). By this point, however, the individual has moved well beyond the foundation established through the moral catechism, a foundation that made possible the first stages of development. Kant's resolution to the paradox may be incomplete, but his move away from Aristotle's coercive, action-based approach is significant as it demonstrates how individuals can be instilled with a basic foundation of moral principles without restricting their autonomy.

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2 Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education

Joseph R. Reisert

Although one could hardly find works more divergent in tone and timbre than Rousseau's *Emile* and Kant's mature works of moral philosophy, Kant's account of the morally upright person nevertheless accords almost perfectly with the depiction of Emile at the conclusion of Rousseau's philosophical romance. That similarity will seem less surprising when one recalls Kant's testimony to the moral revolution he underwent after reading Rousseau. In the handwritten notes he inscribed in a private copy of the "Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime," Kant confesses that he had formerly believed that knowledge constituted the "honor of mankind" and felt "contempt for the rabble who know nothing." But, he adds: "Rousseau brought [him] around," taught him "to honor human beings," and inspired him to work toward "establishing the rights of humanity" (ObsN: 2:216–217).

Despite the enthusiasm Kant himself expressed for Rousseau's *Emile*, and although his "Lectures on Pedagogy" follows Rousseau's educational program in some noteworthy particulars, Kant's account of moral education diverges from Rousseau's in three decisive respects: (1) Kant proposes a program of public education to be offered in schools, while Rousseau rejects such schooling and asserts the impossibility, in any modern state, of establishing a truly public education; (2) Kant proposes that pupils learn the elements of morality by studying a moral catechism; Rousseau rejects direct moral instruction, insisting instead that the young must discover the content of morality through the (carefully supervised) practice of doing good for others; (3) Kant holds that moral exemplars impart to students the knowledge that it is always possible to act uprightly, even in the most difficult of circumstances, whereas to Rousseau, exemplary figures enable those who observe them closely to feel in their hearts the inseparability of wretchedness and vice. All three differences stem from a more fundamental disagreement about the role of sentiment in the acquisition and exercise of moral knowledge.

I. KANT AND EMILE ON MORALITY AND HAPPINESS

Before examining the two curricula of moral education in any detail, it will be helpful to establish more specifically the points of similarity between

Rousseau's moral ideal in *Emile* and Kant's account.[1] The dignity of the "common understanding," which Kant claims Rousseau taught him to recognize (ObsN: 2:216–217), is exactly what Rousseau seeks to demonstrate in *Emile*, according to the perceptive judgment of Allan Bloom (1979: 9). To be sure, Rousseau honors and admires intellectual genius and acknowledges that "great men are not deceived about their superiority," but he insists there is no merit in a greatness one owes to the gifts of nature (Emile: 245). In *Emile*, however, Rousseau shows that virtue is not the exclusive province of "Socrates and minds of his stamp" (*Emile*: 154) by showing how an ordinary child, with only a "common mind" (*Emile*: 52, 245) can be educated to attain that same universal or cosmopolitan virtue as Socrates, "the wisest of men" (PE: 16).

By contrast with the ideal philosopher, who discovers wisdom through his own reason, Emile must be "led to [wisdom] in spite of himself" (*Emile*: 431). Under his tutor's dedicated guidance, he is brought first to recognize "the true principles of the just, the true models of the beautiful, and all the moral relations of beings, [and] all the ideas of order" (*Emile*: 253). But for a long time, his commitment to "the rights of humanity" derives only from the goodness of his inclinations (*Emile*: 441). During this period, Emile fits Kant's somewhat dismissive characterization of one who has not yet attained the standpoint of morality: he does "good to human beings from love for them and from sympathetic benevolence," and he is "just from love of order" (CPr: 5:82). However, the young Emile does not recognize the moral law as imposing obligation upon him, and he does not act uprightly for the sake of acting uprightly, but rather does the work of justice solely because it pleases him.

At the culmination of his education, however, Emile discovers he must learn to "conquer his affections" so as to follow always "reason and his conscience" rather than his inclinations (*Emile*: 444–445). His tutor Jean-Jacques instructs him to "attach [his] heart" only to the "imperishable beauty" of virtue, subordinating all his other attachments, including his attachment to life itself (*Emile*: 193) to the demands of virtue (*Emile*: 446). Only after Emile has begun to practice this self-commanding virtue does Jean-Jacques articulate what his pupil will have already sensed for himself, that a morally upright life is a condition of freedom. Jean-Jacques explains: "The eternal laws of nature and order do exist. For the wise man, they take the place of positive law. They are written in the depth of his heart by conscience and reason. It is to these that he ought to enslave himself in order to be free" (*Emile*: 473). Having perceived the genuine wisdom in his teacher's instruction, Emile chooses to embrace that teaching and proclaims his determination to remain free through steadfast adherence to the moral law.

In every respect but one, Jean-Jacques's 'eternal laws of nature and order' are identical to Kant's Categorical Imperative: they are known by reason; they oblige unconditionally; perfect obedience to them constitutes freedom; the moral agent perceives their commands in the inner forum of

conscience. In Rousseau's depiction of the moral laws as 'laws of nature' one hears an echo of the 'universal law' formulation of the Categorical Imperative (Gr: 4:421); in the suggestion that these laws constitute an order parallel but superior to the empirical legislation of any actually existing commonwealth, one might also detect a premonition of Kant's kingdom of ends, "a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws" (Gr: 4:433). But these are only hints or anticipations: unlike Kant, Rousseau does not much trouble himself to articulate in any systematic way the categories of action permitted or forbidden by reason and morality.

There is no Rousseauian *Metaphysics of Morals*, and Rousseau speaks only in general terms about the content of morality. In *The Social Contract*, he declares that "what is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human conventions," adding that there is "a universal justice emanating from reason alone"—but he is silent regarding its content (SC: 66). In *Emile*, he tells us only that "the love of justice" is "the love of mankind" because, "of all the virtues, justice is the one that contributes most to the common good of men" (*Emile*: 252–253). At the dramatic climax of the romance, Emile proclaims boldly that nothing will make him "forget the rights of humanity" (*Emile*: 441)—but again, Rousseau offers no enumeration of these rights. His most specific statement about the content of justice may well be the passage in the *Discourse on Inequality*, where he calls the Golden Rule the "sublime maxim of reasoned justice" (DI: 154).

The crucial difference between the Categorical Imperative and Rousseau's 'eternal laws of nature and order' is that Rousseau does not maintain, as Kant does, that the moral law can be derived from pure practical reason independently of experience. Indeed, he asserts the contrary: the moral relations among human beings cannot be identified except through a kind of enlightened moral sensitivity that combines affect and reason. Rousseau declares: "*justice* and *goodness* are not merely abstract words—pure moral beings formed by the understanding—but are true affections of the soul enlightened by reason" (*Emile*: 235). Like Kant, however, Rousseau defines virtue as "strength of soul," the state of mastery over one's inclinations that enables one to follow "his reason and his conscience" (*Emile*: 444–446). As Kant defines it, "virtue signifies a moral strength of the will" (MM: 6:405), which requires "subduing one's affects and governing one's passions" (MM: 6:407).

Kant and Rousseau seem to disagree about the relationship between virtue and happiness, but even with respect to this relationship, the divergence is less dramatic than at first appears. Emile's entire education is oriented to the goal of making Emile happy: that is the goal of nature, toward which the education of nature is oriented (Emile: 39). Kant agrees with Rousseau that "every person wishes to attain" happiness, though he stresses far more insistently than Rousseau that we cannot form a determinate account of human happiness (Gr: 4:418). It follows that there can be no laws that

infallibly lead to happiness, but only "empirical counsels . . . which experience teaches are most conducive to well-being on the average" (Gr: 4:418). Rousseau agrees; when he aims to offer instruction in living pleasantly, as he does for example in the short "essay on true taste in the choice of agreeable leisure" at the end of Book 4 of *Emile*, Rousseau gives only counsels of prudence: to be temperate so as to prolong enjoyments, to be active so as to avoid boredom, to surround oneself with people whose company one enjoys rather than those who are socially prominent, and to share one's pleasures rather than to seek the exclusive goods valued by opinion (*Emile*: 344–354). That advice, however, differs sharply from the moral imperative Jean-Jacques elucidates for Emile.

When Jean-Jacques introduces virtue to Emile, he explains that "there is no happiness without . . . virtue" (*Emile*: 444). Emile must rule over his passions, subordinating them to the demands of reason and justice, because to have only one's "unbridled desires as a law" leads only to wretchedness and wickedness (*Emile*: 444); Rousseau, in sum, regards virtue as a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for happiness. Kant's view is similar, although he is haunted by the possible happiness of the wicked in a way Rousseau is not (Gr: 4:393). In any case, Kant agrees with Rousseau that virtue is not a sufficient condition of happiness (in the world of appearance), as, he suggests, the Stoics and Epicureans had both maintained: the Epicureans erroneously derived the demands of morality from the empirical requirements of happiness, and the Stoics mistakenly held that virtue was itself happiness (CPr: 5:111). It should be clear from what has already been said, however, that the final moral teaching of *Emile* is neither Stoic nor Epicurean, in Kant's sense. Kant also agrees with Rousseau that the "highest good" is "virtue and happiness together," and that this highest good can only be attained by one whose attachment to virtue supervenes his desire for happiness (CPr: 5:110).

II. ROUSSEAU ON THE EDUCATION FOR HAPPINESS

Despite such agreement, Kant and Rousseau offer sharply divergent advice about how to teach morality and cultivate virtue. In *Emile*, Rousseau depicts the education an idealized tutor could provide to an ordinary pupil, assuming that the tutor had virtually unlimited resources and the leisure to devote the best part of his own life to the upbringing of a single child. Kant, quite reasonably, objects that "it is unnatural that a person should spend the greater part of his life in teaching one child how it should live" and that therefore the education depicted in *Emile* is "artificial" (ObsN: 2:211–212). He concludes that "schools are necessary" in order to avoid the sacrifice of one person's life to the education of a single other, but he also expresses the wish "that Rousseau had shown how schools could arise from [*Emile*]" (ObsN: 2:211–212).

Rousseau, however, dismisses as "laughable institutions" the schools known to him, such as the Academy of Geneva and the University of Paris (*Emile*: 40–41 and note). The problem with such institutions is that they transmit the corrupting "education" of society along with their lessons (*Emile*: 41). This education of the schools and of society fails, Rousseau insists, because it seeks to accomplish "two contrary ends" simultaneously: it attempts to make the young person both happy (i.e., good for himself) and moral (i.e., good for others) (*Emile*: 41). Society teaches both that one should do what is good for others—i.e., tell the truth, pay one's debts, and generally follow the Golden Rule—and that one will find happiness in following the inclinations that one is likely to feel in society, and especially in tasting the goods valued by opinion. Recipients of this contradictory education learn quickly that they must at least *appear* moral in order to secure the approval of others necessary to accomplish their ends. Those schooled in this instrumental social morality learn to prefer the appearance of morality to the reality. The product of this contradictory education, Rousseau declares, is the "bourgeois," a man who is "always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties." He will be "good neither for himself nor for others," insists Rousseau; he will be "nothing" (*Emile*: 41).

If that fate is to be avoided, Rousseau insists, the educator must pursue a single aim, either the pupil's own good or the good of others. Either one must design a wholly "public and common" education that systematically fights against the child's natural desire for happiness by teaching him always to prefer the welfare of others to his own happiness, or one must design a wholly private or domestic education that allows the child's nature to unfold according to its own inner tendencies, uncorrupted by society.

As examples of the "public" education as he envisions is it, Rousseau points to the laws of Sparta and the educational curriculum Socrates outlines in Plato's *Republic*. Rousseau insists that such an education cannot be undertaken in his time because no country and no city—not even Geneva—has the kind of "narrow and unified" society in which it might be attempted: "Public instruction no longer exists and can no longer exist, because where there is no longer [a] fatherland, there can no longer be citizens" (*Emile*: 39–40). But it is important to recognize that Rousseau firmly believes that public education of this sort had in reality been implemented successfully in the ancient republics. In theory, the public education is not difficult: No exceptional wisdom is needed of citizens who will regard the well-being of their community as the standard of justice and obedience to the positive law of their community as the highest virtue. In practice, what are required are customs and institutions that constantly reinforce the patriotic message that the welfare of the individual is subordinate to the welfare of the community. Such a regimen would be utterly monstrous if it were implemented in any regime that failed to live up to the standard of legitimacy Rousseau depicts in *The Social Contract*, which at least guarantees to all the citizens equal justice under law. Even in a regime such as Republican Rome, where

the institutions meet Rousseau's standard of political legitimacy (SC: 132), Rousseau concedes that the citizens' conceptions of justice and virtue necessarily fall short of the demands of universal justice (*Emile*: 39), and the extreme degree of self-sacrifice that such virtue regularly demands—Brutus's execution of his own sons, Regulus's voluntary departure from Rome to face torture in Carthage, Cato's suicide so as not to outlive republican freedom—are shocking to modern sensitivities.

Because he supposed that no contemporary political order could meet the test of legitimacy depicted in *The Social Contract*, the only viable alternative is the domestic education, which is what Rousseau depicts in *Emile*. Even in theory, the domestic education is difficult and its success doubtful. It is based on the optimistic hope that by enabling one's pupil to develop his body and mind in accordance with nature, so that he will live happily, one will also enable him to discover for himself the moral insight Rousseau attributes to Socrates, whose virtue enabled him to be the "happiest of men" (PE: 16). The natural education must also, Rousseau supposes, be counter-cultural: the pupil must not be seduced by society into thinking that the goods of opinion—money, power, and fame—constitute happiness. That is why Rousseau thinks education must be given privately.

Although it may not be obvious beneath the novelistic features of *Emile*, the education Rousseau proposes is carefully structured to follow the natural development of the child's capacities, as Rousseau understands these. Emile will be taught only lessons his mind and heart are sufficiently developed to grasp; however important the topic in itself—reading, science, or virtue—Emile will not be taught it until he is ready for it. At first, Rousseau supposes, a child is moved exclusively by pleasure and pain; as the intelligence develops, the child will discover the idea of utility and will be moved to seek what is advantageous and to avoid the harmful. Only at the final stage does the youth learn to act on the basis of judgments made "based on the idea of happiness or of perfection given . . . by reason" (*Emile*: 39).

Emile's earliest education is "purely negative"; its primary goal is to enable Emile's body and mind to develop free of the vices that flourish in society. Because Rousseau maintains that "there is no original perversity in the human heart" but that we only become wicked through the influence of society, he holds that to allow the child to develop freely is to enable him to preserve his natural goodness (*Emile*: 92). Rousseau warns that care must be taken even with infants and toddlers lest adults' haste to indulge them when they cry spoils them: "if one is not careful," warns Rousseau, "the first tears of children . . . soon become orders" (*Emile*: 66). The child's true needs should be met, but the child should neither be allowed to command others, nor be made to obey (*Emile*: 66, 91). Before the child is capable of understanding the moral relations among persons, he will be kept "in dependence only on things" (*Emile*: 85). His tutor will issue no commands and will never inflict punishment upon him—he will never, in short, make any moral claims upon his charge.

During Emile's childhood, up through the age of ten or so (related in Book 2 of *Emile*), his tutor will give him no "verbal lessons" or formal instruction of any kind; the child will learn only "from experience" (*Emile*: 92). What from the pupil's perspective will seem like perfect freedom, however, will in fact be carefully regulated by the tutor, so that in doing what he wants, he will discover for himself what the tutor wants him to learn. The only moral lesson Emile learns as a child is to respect the property of others, but he learns this lesson through the experience of having his garden—his property—destroyed by another (*Emile*: 98–99). If the child's exuberance should lead him to damage property or seek to injure persons, he will not receive punishment as such; he will suffer only the natural consequences of his actions—he will have to live with broken furniture or broken windows—from which experience he will learn the importance of respecting persons and property (*Emile*: 100–101). Rousseau professes not to care even whether Emile learns to read before age fifteen; what matters, above all, is that he be preserved from every situation that might lead him to contract moral vices (*Emile*: 117).

Children cannot be taught directly the commands of morality, Rousseau argues, because they lack the psychological and emotional maturity to perceive moral relationships and therefore will fail to understand the reasons behind moral prohibitions. All they will perceive in any moral command is that they will be punished for disobedience. But to threaten punishment for disobedience teaches the child to disobey in secret and to lie about his misdeeds (*Emile*: 90). Emile, therefore, will not be forbidden from telling lies, but the tutor will arrange matters so that his pupil never has any motive to disguise the truth. "The only kind of reason of which the first age is susceptible," maintains Rousseau, is the use of the senses (*Emile*: 124–125). Emile's tutor will arrange games for him that lead him to gain experience in the careful use of his senses, so that he will "know well the use of [his] strength, the relations of [his] body to surrounding bodies, and the use of the natural instruments that are within [his] reach" (*Emile*: 124).

In the next stage of his education, through the age of about fifteen (related in Book 3), Emile discovers the idea of the useful (*Emile*: 167, 177–178). Constantly he will be asking "what is it good for?" and, Rousseau maintains, he will be eager to learn skills and knowledge that would be useful to him if he were stranded on a desert island, like the hero of the only book he will read at this age, *Robinson Crusoe* (*Emile*: 184). He will learn a trade, woodworking, which will give him a taste for work and the means to secure his own livelihood in society (*Emile*: 197), and he will be led to "discover" the scientific method and some basic scientific knowledge (*Emile*: 168). He will receive no affirmative moral lessons, nor will he read works of history or moral philosophy. He will, however, gain a taste of the pleasure to be found in living moderately. At the end of this stage, Rousseau concludes that Emile will know "the essential relations of man to things but nothing of the moral relations of man to man"; he will, however, possess all

the self-regarding virtues: he will be "laborious, temperate, patient, firm, and full of courage" (*Emile*: 208).

Only with the blossoming of sensitivity and self-consciousness that accompanies our emergence into adolescence is a young person able to "sense his moral being" and to "study himself in his relations with men" (*Emile*: 214). Just as Emile was not taught the natural sciences but discovered them for himself, so also will he discover the principles of morality. As Rousseau conceives it, the cognitive and affective aspects of moral judgment cannot be separated; that is why the tutor will guide Emile into the moral order by cultivating his sensitivity and judgment. By witnessing the suffering of others and coming to feel that he may suffer just as others do, Emile will learn to feel the essential equality of all humankind (*Emile*: 223–225). Next, he will observe men "by means of their differences" (*Emile*: 235); the tutor's goal is that Emile come to know and feel that "man is naturally good" but that "society depraves and perverts men" (*Emile*: 237). To this end, he will read the biographies of the ancient heroes in Plutarch (*Emile*: 240). He will not want to be any of those heroes, but he will learn to pity them (*Emile*: 243). He will not want even to be Augustus Caesar, whose vast power did nothing to make him happy. Emile will see in Augustus a man whose "dearest friends made attempts on his life" and who was "reduced to tears" by "the shame or the death of all those closest to him" (*Emile*: 243). After biography, Emile will read fables, to profit from tales relating the mistakes of others. Finally, he will be afforded opportunities to exercise the "social virtues" by doing what he can to aid the oppressed and seek redress for those who are wronged (*Emile*: 250). By working disinterestedly for the good of others, Emile will be preserved from "regulating [his] ideas of good and bad according to [his] own interest" (*Emile*: 252); rather, in coming to love the happiness of all, "the true principles of the just, the true models of the beautiful, all the moral relations of beings, all the ideas of order are imprinted on his understanding" (*Emile*: 253).

At this stage, however, Emile is good but not yet virtuous. He does what is good for others because he takes pleasure in doing what his heart and his mind recognize as good. Rousseau delays teaching Emile virtue as long as possible, and introduces the idea of self-command only after Emile falls in love and feels for the first time the possibility of an acute conflict between duty and desire. The fundamental difficulty, as Rousseau sees it, is that moral wisdom cannot be reduced to or communicated as propositional knowledge. The teacher can say (and Jean-Jacques does say to Emile), "you must do what is right, even when it conflicts with your desires," but his saying so will not by itself enable the pupil to perceive and to feel the practical truth of this injunction. If the pupil absorbs this lesson as an external command—do what is right or others will not respect you or may punish you—he risks falling into the instrumental, "bourgeois" morality *Emile* was written to escape. The pupil must be brought to the point where he can wholeheartedly embrace the demands of morality, irrespective of

consequences. To that end, he must see and feel in his heart that there can be no happiness for him in society without virtue; he must be made to feel a "passion for virtue" (*Emile*: 445).

Inspiring Emile with this passion for virtue is the culminating achievement of the tutor's work of moral and emotional engineering. This passion will be the only passion to which he is subject, and it will be nurtured by the sense of freedom he will know when he first chooses to defy inclination in order to follow duty. But he will not appreciate the superiority of virtue until he practices it: and, not knowing, he must be made to practice it. To this end, his tutor contrives a conflict between Emile's desires and his duty; this conflict arises as follows: Jean-Jacques had agreed to continue teaching Emile even after the latter had reached maturity and began seeking a wife, but he had agreed to guide Emile only on the condition that the young man promise to obey any command he should issue. Shortly after Emile's beloved Sophie accepts his proposal of marriage, the tutor intervenes, commanding Emile that he must spend time away from Sophie, to learn about the world in order to choose where to settle, and to test whether the young couple's love will endure the separation.

Rousseau imagines that his Emile keeps this painful promise willingly and without resentment. Why? Because his tutor has been, and is, his friend (e.g., *Emile*: 325, 332, 435, 443).[2] Jean-Jacques has done everything in his power up to that moment to make Emile happy, and has succeeded. Emile knows and feels that his friend's happiness depends on his own (*Emile*: 326). Moreover, Emile must be able to recognize that his friend lives as happily as circumstances permit because he possesses the virtue with which he seeks to inspire Emile. With his ordinary mind, Emile does not see so far or so deeply as to perceive directly the necessity of subordinating all his desires to the moral law of reason. But years of close companionship with his tutor have taught him to know well the character of his friend, and he must feel that Jean-Jacques demands nothing of him that he would not demand of himself. Because he perceives both intellectually and emotionally grounds for trusting his tutor, he does trust him, and acts decisively to sacrifice his desire to duty. After sensing through his own actions the freedom found in obedience to morality, Emile chooses autonomously to embrace the moral law and his longing for happiness is sublimated into the passion for virtue—which, at least under the fortunate circumstances Rousseau imagines in *Emile*, promises him happiness as well.

III. KANT ON THE EDUCATION FOR VIRTUE

Kant's "Lectures on Pedagogy" evidently owe much to Rousseau's *Emile*. Kant agrees with Rousseau's fundamental doctrine, that man is naturally good—or as Kant expresses it, that human nature is "equipped" with "predispositions toward the good" (LP: 9:446). He agrees also that education

is necessary "because the development of the natural predispositions in the human being does not take place by itself" (LP: 9:447), and he accepts Rousseau's judgment that existing educational approaches are inadequate, particularly with respect to the goal of making men moral, and must be replaced (LP: 9:445).

Nevertheless, though it overlaps substantially with Rousseau's, Kant's account of the goal of education is also subtly different: Kant orients his program in the "Pedagogy" to "the idea of an education which develops all the human being's natural predispositions" (LP: 9:445), holding that it is a unconditional, moral duty "to make ourselves worthy of humanity by culture in general, by procuring or promoting the capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends" (MM: 6:392). In *Emile*, Rousseau depicts an education that develops the individual's powers to make it possible for him to live morally—and, so far as possible, happily—in society, but he explicitly warns that "extending our faculties" may also expand our desires beyond our ability to satisfy them (*Emile*: 80). Rousseau acknowledges no independent moral duty to seek one's own perfection; rather, the duty to cultivate our faculties derives for him from the duty to support oneself though labor and to do as much good to others as one is able to accomplish. Kant's "Pedagogy" aims to produce a man who is both learned and moral.

Kant departs more markedly still from Rousseau in his account of the sequence of education. Whereas Rousseau aims to pattern Emile's education after the "education of nature," the biological development of the human body and mind, Kant orders education functionally, in accordance with his idea of an education that fully develops all our natural powers—our lower, or subordinate powers being developed first, and our higher powers last. He envisions, first, a sort of "physical" education prior to schooling, which aims simply to prepare the child for school. Education proper then proceeds through four stages: (1) discipline, (2) the cultivation of skillfulness, (3) civilizing, or the development of prudence, and (4) moralization, by which the pupil learns "to choose nothing but good ends" (LP: 9:449–450).

Kant's recommendations in the "Pedagogy" remain closest to Rousseau's principles when he is discussing the physical education of pre-school children. Like Rousseau, he endorses the breast-feeding of infants (LP: 9:456), and warns against swaddling infants (LP: 9:458) or using leading-strings or other artificial devices to teach children how to walk (LP: 9:461). He characterizes this early education, as Rousseau does, as "merely negative" (LP: 9:459), and agrees that even very young children can be spoiled, if one responds too readily to their cries (LP: 9:461, 479). Like Rousseau, he advises parents do what is necessary, to refuse what is not, and to make every such denial "irrevocable" (LP: 9:464). In accord with the program of educating the senses Rousseau depicts in Book 2 of *Emile*, Kant recommends that parents encourage children to become practiced in use of the senses, through a variety of exercises. In a passage strongly reminiscent of Rousseau's portrait of Emile, Kant envisions a well-reared child who has

learned to walk confidently "on the narrowest footpath" and who is ready to "jump over chasms of which they already know by eye that they will get over safely" (LP: 9:467).

Kant diverges from Rousseau, however, when he endorses public education in schools over private and domestic education, observing that "in general, it appears that public education is more advantageous than domestic, not only as regards skillfulness but also with respect to the character of a citizen" (LP: 9:447). Like Rousseau, he seeks to design an educational program that will insulate students from corrupting influences. Unlike Rousseau, however, he worries that parents will not be able to develop the full range of their children's talents (LP: 9:445) and he fears that parents may care only about how their children will "get on well in the world' (LP: 9:448) or will simply impart their own vices to their children (LP: 9:453). Nor do political rulers necessarily want the best for their subjects: too often, they want "subjects merely as instruments for their own designs" (P: 9:448). Kant's solution is to encourage the creation of schools supported by "private efforts" (such as Basedow's Philanthropinum institutes) to be designed by "the most enlightened experts" (LP: 9:449). He anticipates that such schools will adopt improved methods over time, as their directors learn from experiments in educational practice (LP: 9:447, 451).

Explicitly rejecting Rousseau's supposition that an untamed "propensity towards freedom" is something "noble," Kant contends that children require discipline, which is what "prevents the human being from deviating by means of animal impulses from his destiny: humanity" (LP: 9:442). Indeed, he holds early discipline to be vitally important: though one who does not acquire culture in school may learn it later in life, "negligence in discipline can never be made good" (LP: 9:444). Thus in his view one of the advantages of schooling, as opposed to domestic education, is that it teaches children to "grow accustomed to sitting still and observing punctually what they are told" (LP: 9:442). At this stage, the pupil is to show "obsequiousness and passive obedience" (LP: 9:452), and he must "learn to work," that is, to engage in activity that is not "pleasant in itself" but is done "on account of another aim" (LP: 9:470). Indeed, the child is to be compelled to work, "even if [he] does not see immediately how this compulsion is useful" and, in a remarkable reversal of Rousseau, Kant dismissively observes that "it would only seriously pamper children's nosiness if one were always to answer their question 'What is this good for and what is that good for?'" (LP: 9:472).

The reasons Kant gives for insisting on the utility of subjecting children to discipline from an early age echo some Rousseauian themes. He fears that an undisciplined child may, like a prince who is never contradicted as a youth, grow to be a spoiled adult, and that he will never learn to subject his whims to reason (LP: 9:442–443). The school discipline Kant proposes resembles the sort of public education Rousseau envisioned, in that students are subjected to external rules in order that their desires be wholly subordinated to duty. Rousseau, however, doubts whether schools can successfully impart

stern morals when these are not also visibly embodied in the society at large. Under such circumstances, students could not but see the contrast between school and the world and perceive in the moral instructions of their schoolmasters the sorts of commands backed by threats that lead only to the instrumental morality of the bourgeois. Rousseau might also doubt whether the competition among students to distinguish themselves for academic merit, which Kant encourages (LP: 9:454), would not inspire in them an intellectual vanity inimical to the egalitarian demands of justice.

It is hard to disagree, though, with the practical superiority of Kant's educational program, at least with respect to the transmission of knowledge or the cultivation of skills. His plans for the cultivation of the powers of the mind represent a reasonable adaptation of the lessons by which Jean-Jacques introduces Emile to the sciences (from Book 3 of *Emile*) to the conditions of an educational institution (LP: 9:472–478).

The highest aim of education, however, is the formation of a moral character; such character consists, Kant explains, "in the firm resolution of willing to do something, and then also in the actual performance of it" (LP: 9:487). Like Rousseau's Emile, the man of Kantian character will "be himself and always one . . . [he will] act as he speaks; he must always be decisive in making his choice, make it in a lofty style, and always stick to it" (*Emile*: 40). Kant holds that school discipline prepares young people for morality by preventing them from falling into bad habits, but that discipline does not suffice for morality: "moral culture must be based on maxims, not on discipline" (LP: 9:480). As G. F. Munzel has shown, Kant holds that the establishment of character requires "a revolution in [one's] conduct of thought" akin to a "conversion experience"; it requires the "firm resolve" to keep the content of one's duty paramount in one's moral deliberations and entails a commitment to act only on the basis of moral maxims (Munzel 1999: 160–161).

Thus Kant proposes that children be taught "to act according to maxims whose fairness" they can themselves understand. Lying, as a moral fault, should be "met with contempt;" and children who do wrong should be shown "concepts of good and evil" so that they may recognize wrong as wrong, rather than seek only to avoid being caught violating rules in order to escape punishment (LP: 9:480). Unlike Rousseau, who doubts whether any such explanation about good and evil could have a lasting hold on anyone much younger than a teenager—and even then, only on one whose habits of moral judgment had been carefully cultivated in practice—Kant does not specify what experiences, if any, children must have undergone to benefit from such preaching. To the extent that he contemplates the cultivation of children's sentiments, Kant warns against allowing children to become so excessively sentimental that they merely "bemoan" injustice and suffering, instead of acting to remedy them (LP: 9:487).

Rather than cultivate moral sensitivity and discernment through the sort of beneficent activity Emile engages in, Kant proposes that the young be instructed in a "catechism of right" (LP: 9:490; CPr: 5:154–155; MM:

6:478–484). Kant's idea is to take advantage of the "propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon even the most subtle examination of practical questions" to train the young to think clearly about the content of their duties so that they will be able to recognize intellectually what duty demands in any circumstance they are likely to encounter (CPr: 5:154). Unlike Rousseau, who supposes that ordinary men can not become wholeheartedly attached to virtue until they are able to sense and feel, through the example of a person of virtue known well to them, that happiness is unattainable without virtue, Kant insists that moral exemplars are necessary only to reinforce the knowledge that it is always possible for one to do what the law commands—regardless of the consequences (Gr: 4:409). Rather than the Rousseauian "passion for virtue" grounded in our empirical desire for happiness, the good Kantian is to experience a "feeling of respect for the moral law" arising out of no empirical or pathological desire but from the rational recognition of the validity of the moral law itself (CPr: 5:75).

IV. CONCLUSION

The divergence between Rousseau and Kant is real, but should not be overstated. Like Kant, Rousseau acknowledges that the idea of duty can be a powerful motive; thus he writes in *Emile* that: "the force of duty and the beauty of virtue attract our approbation in spite of ourselves and overturn our insane prejudices" (*Emile*: 246). Nevertheless, Kantian moral education is a kind of intellectual training in moral reasoning through the study of a moral catechism—which might be approximated to the classroom study of legal cases, whereas Rousseauian moral education takes place in practice—through something like the work of law students in legal aid clinics. That we train professional attorneys through both classroom exercises and practical apprenticeship may suggest that the two approaches are complementary, not contradictory.

Rousseau resists the intellectual approach to moral education Kant favors, as he resists advocating schooling, because he is acutely sensitive—perhaps overly sensitive—to the corrupting power of opinion. He fears that the clever will become proud of their learning and in their intellectual pride will become unjustly dismissive of the sufferings of the poor (DI: 153–154), and he fears that moral instruction not in harmony with the manifest values of society will only provoke rebellion and resentment, delivering to vice those whom educators would save from it.

NOTES

1. Surprisingly, there are few detailed comparisons of the educational theories of Kant and Rousseau; one of the more extensive appears in Buchner 1904: 22–28. Buchner, however, does not see that Rousseau's conception of ethics

moves beyond the domain of sentiment. The account of Rousseau that follows takes its orientation from Ernst Cassirer's observation that "Rousseau's ethics is not an ethics of feeling but the most categorical form of a pure ethics of obligation that was established before Kant" (Cassirer 1989: 96).

2. I demonstrate this claim more fully in Reisert 2003: chaps. 5 and 6.

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3 Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception

Phillip Scuderi

I would hazard a guess that in the history of philosophy, no philosopher has garnered such name recognition as Rousseau, while yet being known more by reputation than by surefooted acquaintance with his writings. Most undergraduate students in philosophy will read an excerpt from *The Social Contract*, and this will prove their main contact with him. For many graduate students, even those interested in the history of philosophy, he is a figure who can easily fall through the cracks. Even in a full seminar devoted to him the professor must choose carefully which of his works to include. Of course other notable philosophers suffer this same fate, but with Rousseau the problem is exacerbated since his style is so often scattered, elliptical, veiled, polemic, or otherwise inscrutable by contemporary philosophical standards of writing. It is hard work to make sense of him, especially from limited exposure. The pieces fall into place more easily the more one reads.[1]

I once sat reading and drinking coffee when a passing philosopher—they tend to pass by, yes, when your coffee shop is located inside your campus library—stopped to exchange pleasantries and to ask me what I had been working on lately. "I'm rereading Rousseau's *Emile* at the moment." He replied, "Ah Rousseau! The great educator." He was only making polite conversation, so he may have found my slightly rabid response off-putting, but I couldn't restrain myself: I tried to explain in as few words as possible that Rousseau isn't *really* interested in education, but rather in the impossibility of education; that *Emile* isn't a straightforward exercise in pedagogical prescription, but, like nearly all of Rousseau's works, is borne of his profound frustration toward a problem whose solution he views as essential to stable happiness, but which he must also reluctantly admit is beyond our grasp. Our short, stilted conversation permitted me no time to support the thesis. In the first place, then, this chapter attempts to do just that. In the second place, it shows how a careful reading of Rousseau's stance toward education informs helpfully our reading of Kant's views toward both education and Rousseau himself. For Kant, to be sure, was well acquainted with Rousseau, and his epistemic and moral writings address many peculiarly Rousseauian concerns.

In keeping with this introduction, in which I have warned against too narrow a slice of Rousseau, I should ideally show in this chapter that his pessimism toward education is consistent with other pessimistic views expressed throughout his corpus. Constraints of space will permit only so much exploration, though I do offer some helpful comparisons to *The Reveries of the Solitary Walker*. For the most part, though, I focus on *Emile*, which suffices for my present purpose of showing that Kant inherits many problems (though seldom the same solutions) from Rousseau: problems concerning the extent of human knowledge, the proper scope of inquiry, and the best means of instruction. But it is difficult even to recognize and formulate these problems at all—much less the two men's attempts to solve them—without first getting clear about what is going on in *Emile*. To that end, I focus on three crucial themes in the book. These include Rousseau's convictions that in order to ensure moral rectitude, (1) the tutor must keep his pupil ignorant, in respect of the proper bounds of human knowledge; and moreover (2) he must found the pupil's education on deceptive, carefully orchestrated spectacles designed to mislead him. Last I argue that (3) Rousseau holds no hope for the possibility that even this painstakingly calculated, restrictive plan for education can succeed. At each step along the way, I examine some instances in which these themes reappear in Kant's works. His different treatment of them is instructive.

I. THE PRESERVATION OF IGNORANCE AND THE BOUNDS OF INQUIRY

Rousseau believes there is a common affliction that renders society unjust, men unfree, and Rousseau incessantly displeased with himself; it manifests at every level of society, and so is treated in nearly all of his works. The affliction is *amour-propre*, love of self mediated through the eyes of others. By contrast Rousseau speaks approvingly of *amour de soi*, a more basic self-love that only drives its bearer to fulfill the natural desires of the body and soul. So long as one exists in a state of pure *amour de soi*, one cannot be unfree. The trouble begins whenever someone starts to assess his own happiness by considering what other people think of him—i.e., by considering his reputation or esteem. Such considerations ultimately subordinate happiness to the wills of other people, thereby sabotaging freedom.

The education of Emile is designed at every step to minimize his exposure to *amour-propre* and so to preserve the possibility that he will be free and happy. This means that Emile must be kept ignorant of any knowledge that might open the door to *amour-propre*. His education therefore rejects the acquisition of knowledge as an end in itself. Ignorance, of a certain kind, is essential to Emile's moral stature.

The first three books of *Emile* are replete with examples in which the tutor carefully restricts Emile's access to knowledge. In Book 4, though,

the famous and crucial interlude by the Savoyard Vicar offers a particularly striking depiction of this theme. It warrants special attention because it both affirms the necessity of keeping Emile carefully sequestered away from a corrupt, threatening world, while it acknowledges the impossibility of doing so for long. At this point Emile has reached puberty, and his newfound sexual urges have already doomed him to *amour-propre*. His tutor relates to him a story in which a vicar expresses how he knows what he knows about nature, order, and God. The aim of the story is to provoke Emile into thinking about what form of religion he should adopt. Religion is a topic that earlier was shut off from him, as it deals in matters beyond both his reach and his understanding (*Emile*: 417). But now that his *amour-propre* is active and he cannot help but grasp at things beyond his reach, he must come to grips with religion and the available justifications for it. The Savoyard Vicar's tale marks a moment of transition in Emile's education: whereas before he acted naturally to preserve his own ignorance—i.e., he didn't need reasons not to exhibit curiosity but was simply uncurious owing to his "natural" (but of course carefully cultivated) sentiments—now he must think deliberately and consciously about why ignorance is so important.

For the Savoyard Vicar, sentiment, perception, and conscience (words that, in his tale, appear interchangeable) are the arbiters of truth; reason and argument are of little use unless they happen to align with sentiment. He *feels* truth directly, and that direct, sensitive connection to truth serves as the basis for his approach to nature. But sentiment, though it is inerrant and supersedes reason in case the two conflict, has its limits, and so needs reason in order to come to grips with the world. He argues that we should accept and attempt to live within the limits of sentiment. Since the actual mechanisms of nature, including the means by which God provides order to the world, are the types of things that could only be learned through reason, they fall outside the bounds of proper inquiry. On these matters we are better off ignorant, from which position we are better suited to admire nature: the point is not to explain order but to admire it (*Emile*: 457).

Is it possible to discover empirically necessary connections in nature? David Hume had already addressed the question. In section 1.3.14 of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, his express interest lay in showing the impossibility of doing so. The Savoyard Vicar, however, is uninterested in the question; whether possible or impossible, it doesn't matter to him. As he says, "I believe that the world is governed by a powerful and wise will. I see it, or rather, I sense it; and that is something important for me to know. But is this same world eternal or created? Is there a single principle of things? Or, are there two or many of them, and what is their nature? I know nothing about all this, and what does it matter to me?" (*Emile*: 437). It is enough to understand *that* a will structures and orders the world, without asking *how* it does so. If he were to grasp at explanations for nature's order, the very search for an answer would corrupt him, since to do so would involve exceeding his immediate interests, which depend largely on sentiment. "As

soon as this knowledge has something to do with my interests, I shall make an effort to acquire it. Until then I renounce idle questions which may agitate my *amour-propre* but are useless for my conduct and beyond my reason" (*Emile*: 437).

Sentiment and reason, which for the Savoyard Vicar are the two candidate faculties for attaining truth, are frequently opposed in this way, the one working in tandem with his interests and the other outstripping and ultimately subverting them. They work in different ways. Sentiment always takes objects in the singular and as given by nature, whereas reason characteristically seeks after relations between two or more objects. "To perceive is to sense; to compare is to judge. Judging and sensing are not the same thing. By sensation, objects are presented to me separated, isolated, such as they are in nature. By comparison I move them, I transport them, and, so to speak, I superimpose them on one another in order to pronounce on their difference or their likeness and generally on all their relations" (*Emile*: 430). By these lights, necessary connections in nature would count as relations between objects, and so would lie within the scope of reason, not of sentiment.

Why should seeking the relations between objects open the soul to *amour-propre*? If the Savoyard Vicar could only sense and not judge at all, he would be infallible but extremely limited. The judgments supplied by reason *are* fallible, though, and so the possibility for error arises only on account of reason. He says, "I know only that truth is in things and not in the mind which judges them, and that the less of myself I put in the judgments I make, the more sure I am of approaching the truth. Thus my rule of yielding to sentiment more than to reason is confirmed by reason itself" (*Emile*: 431–432). The possibility for failure is itself an invitation to *amour-propre*, because in the perfect state of freedom, wherein one's desires are a perfect fit for one's capacities, failure is impossible. There is a second problem with seeking relations between objects: once we permit ourselves to compare and contrast the objects of nature, we develop preferences in accordance with our judgments (e.g., we come to desire ever *larger* or *brighter* fruit). These preferences elicit desires that outstrip our capacities; this leads in turn to feelings of shame and vanity; and so again the outcome is *amour-propre* (DI: 45–6, 49).

In case sentiment and reason should conflict, sentiment always wins out. The Savoyard Vicar provides an example of conflict of this sort. He considers whether the motions of animals are spontaneous, and his sentiment reveals to him that indeed they are. "You will ask me again how I know that there are spontaneous motions. I shall tell you that I know it because I sense it" (*Emile*: 432). No argument, no appeal to reason will convince him otherwise: "It would be vain to try to use reason to destroy this sentiment in me. It is stronger than any evidence. One might just as well try to prove to me that I do not exist" (*Emile*: 432).

As hostile toward the faculty of reason as he is, the Savoyard Vicar nevertheless must make recourse to it, since that is what intelligent beings

do (*Emile*: 431). Very rapidly sentiment and reason begin to play off each other—first sentiment alighting upon particular objects, then reason judging as to their relations, and then sentiment reacting to those judgments. Thus objects in motion suggest via sentiment a will that moves the world—"If the earth turns, I believe I sense a hand that makes it turn" (*Emile*: 433)—as he observes multiple objects he judges a relation between them, in that they obey regular laws of motion; having completed this judgment, his sentiment alerts him that the will that moves the world is an *intelligent* will (*Emile*: 435). The sentimental mode is characteristically passive and receptive; the reasoning mode is active and productive. But since the two are nearly always intertwined (otherwise "we would never sense anything outside of us"—*Emile*: 431), we are nearly always active, and so nearly always flirting with *amour-propre*.

Through our reasoned judgment we move away from particulars and begin to form general and abstract ideas. The formation of such ideas is dangerous ground—"General and abstract ideas are the source of men's greatest errors" (*Emile*: 434). Let us keep Hume in mind, here. In *Treatise* 1.3.14, he had provided a similar argument, though in less dramatic form. He writes, "general or abstract ideas are nothing but individual ones taken in a certain light . . . in reflecting on any object, 'tis as impossible to exclude from our thought all particular degrees of quantity and quality as from the real nature of things" (*Treatise*: 109). Hume is noting that we cannot form a general idea of an object unless we can also form a specific idea of it. He proceeds to conclude that since we don't ever form ideas of particular powers or necessary connections, we shouldn't attempt to form general ideas of them, either. The Savoyard Vicar would agree in full: no judgment should ever yield a general or abstract idea of an object, unless sentiment has already presented it in the particular. Recall that he says, "the less of myself I put in the judgments I make, the more sure I am of approaching the truth" (*Emile*: 432). Hume has shown that the attribution of necessary connections to natural objects consists of *nothing else but* putting oneself in one's own judgments—the supposed connections are products of the mind alone.

Although it would be careless to read the Savoyard Vicar as a stand-in for Rousseau's voice, his argument here is consistent with certain themes present both in *Emile* and across his other works. Since at this point in the book Emile has already been opened to *amour-propre*, the Savoyard Vicar's story has a therapeutic function, helping him to restore unity of voice to himself and, to the extent possible, stemming the flow of *amour-propre* for a time.[2] Emile's entire education thus far has involved shielding him from the objects and situations likely to provoke *amour-propre*. In other words, the tutor's role consists as much in preserving Emile's ignorance as in teaching him. But Emile's innocence is now lost. Entropy, as it were, must run its course, as Emile's position grows ever more precarious with time. So the Vicar's story is also supposed to equip Emile with the reasons

he needs to justify his own perpetual ignorance. Thus the Vicar emphasizes how important it is that Emile refrain from delving too deeply into the mechanisms of nature.

The theme of the preservation of ignorance arises through Rousseau's writings: from the need, in *The Social Contract*, to ensure the mystery of the legislator for fear of alienating the will of the people; to Rousseau's final attempt at seclusion from the dangers of the world in *The Reveries*. But as I argue below, Rousseau can never find a forest so remote as to put a stop to the disastrous effects of his own *amour-propre*. Emile's fate is likewise sealed.[3]

Nowhere is this same theme more prominent in Kant than his provocative epistemological island metaphor within the third chapter of the Analytic of Principles of the first *Critique*:

> We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it and determined the place for each thing in it. But this land is an island, and enclosed in unalterable boundaries by nature itself. It is the land of truth (a charming name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never bring to an end. (CPu: A235–236/B294–295)

We can't gain any certain knowledge of the noumena out in the ocean: the fog banks and melting icebergs are too hazy for us to make them out. Yet we understand that if we transgress the proper bounds of inquiry, we shall cease to occupy the safe, orderly world of the island and instead be plunged into inescapable tumult and danger. If we look to the ocean we may become taken with it and mistake it for something we can know; this is to fall prey to sophistry (CPu: A339/B397). Kant worries that the possibility for this sort of error is ineliminable. The island echoes both Rousseau's time on the island of St. Pierre in Switzerland's Lake Bienne (Conf: 533–548), as well as the island in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, which the tutor assigns to Emile as his first book (*Emile*: 332–336).

Kant is universally taken to have followed Hume closely insofar as he believes that we can't discover necessary connections in nature through empirical means. There is a sense, though, in which he also follows after Rousseau, for he seems much more keenly aware than Hume of the moral consequences that hinge upon the matter. This is not to say that Hume was unconcerned with the moral fallout from his epistemological conclusions; in particular, in Book I of the *Treatise* he worries about the despair he feels upon realizing the fruitlessness of empirical inquiry into causes.[4] But Kant's warning is very strong indeed:

> Hence everything empirical, as an addition to the principal of morality, is not only quite inept for this; it is also highly prejudicial to the purity of morals . . . One cannot give too many or too frequent warnings against this laxity, or even mean cast of mind, which seeks its principle among empirical motives and laws; for human reason in its weariness gladly rests on this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions (which allow it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno) it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of quite diverse ancestry. (Gr: 4:426)

So while Hume, Rousseau, and Kant might all agree that there is an inherent limit to knowledge, Hume thinks that attempts to overcome that limit will lead to frustration and despair, whereas the latter two view such attempts as absolutely fatal to morality.

How does this commonality between Rousseau and Kant persist in spite of their differing understandings of human freedom? For Rousseau, freedom consists in an independence from alien wills and the exact match between one's capacities and one's desires; he states as a "fundamental maxim" that "the truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases" (*Emile*: 215). Freedom, therefore, is dependent upon the agent's relation to his environment. For Kant, by contrast, there is no freedom outside the will; the agent's relation to the environment and his capacity to enact his will are irrelevant contingencies, which, if taken as foundations for the law that governs the will, only reduce it to heteronomy (Gr: 4:441). Either notion of freedom leaves its adherent vulnerable to inappropriate seeking after empirical knowledge of causes. Rousseau's free man is free only so long as his empirical, material conditions remain suited to him, and vice versa; the search for necessary connections in nature distorts that fragile balance. Kant's moral agent is in danger of becoming confused and so winding up like Rousseau: a monstrous, heteronomous bastard, a crude assemblage of worldly parts that bear no ordered relation to one another. (Rousseau would be the first to agree with the charge.)

II. DECEPTION, SPECTACLE, AND FREEDOM

It is not enough simply to keep Emile from learning inappropriate things; the tutor must actively deceive him, even in the very act of instructing him. The goal is always to get Emile to learn without his realizing that an alien will (typically the tutor's will) desires him to do so, else he might come to view his instruction as an arbitrary imposition. If Emile ever realizes how carefully orchestrated his own education is, that realization will sabotage everything for which the tutor has worked, since then Emile would realize he is beholden to an alien will, and his freedom would conflict with his continuing education. So the tutor has no choice: either he can deceive his

pupil, hide from him the methods and the motives behind his lessons, or else destroy all hope of his being free and happy.

It takes just one perturbation, one glimpse behind the curtain, to undo all of Emile's fragile strength. Once he realizes his own contingency, he can no longer act smoothly on the basis of his own will. The tutor must therefore exhibit near-omnipotence in his control of Emile's environment to prevent the awakening of his imagination and the stirrings of *amour-propre*. At one point the tutor's orchestrations (in this instance directed not at Emile, but at a spoiled brat of a child) involve the cooperation of the entire village (*Emile*: 259–262). The most elaborate spectacle orchestrated for Emile involves a "trickster-Socrates," a magician who shames Emile publicly when he tries to guess his trick (*Emile*: 318–321). This story extends over several days and includes multiple trips to the fair to see the magician perform, as well as a trip by the magician to see Emile and the tutor at home. At no point in the elaborate proceedings does Emile realize that he is an unwitting character in the production of his own careful education. The lesson seems designed to teach him not to reveal what he knows (for once he has learned the trick, he must remain silent about it), as well as to avoid philosophy (both of which points will be repeated by the Savoyard Vicar).

When the magician calls at Emile's home, he shames the tutor in front of Emile in order to make him feel personally responsible for the tutor's failure—so that he must bear responsibility not only for his own mistake, but for the tutor's (supposed) mistake, too. His sense that he has let the tutor down is the very expression of *amour-propre*, of concern for how the self is perceived by others. After the magician reveals his trick, Emile mustn't tell others else "he would deserve to be annihilated" (*Emile*: 321). To reveal the trick would be to scorn the burden of the shame he has earned, which would mark the failure of his entire moral education.

How should we reconcile the tutor's deceptive spectacles with Rousseau's claim that "the naked truth has to be told to children" (*Emile*: 249)? We might say that what he means is that children should never be permitted to realize that they are getting anything other than the naked truth. I think a better interpretation is simply to recognize that Rousseau's task in *Emile* prompts him to adopt a vexed, unstable stance fraught with tension and occasional contradiction. This reading is in keeping with Rousseau's frequent self-acknowledgment of his own monstrous hybridity. Rousseau's contradictions are not mistakes or oversights, but rather they highlight his efforts to address insoluble yet irresistible problems of nature and humanity, order and disorder, morality and society.

A couple of passages in Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* seem to treat directly of Rousseau's use of deceptive spectacles—or in any event, as directly as Kant is wont to engage his predecessors. He considers the consequences if one were to trick the observer of beauty by substituting a fake flower for a real one (CPJ: 5:299), or if a landlord were to trick his guests by hiding a servant in a bush who emits false bird calls (CPJ: 5:302–303). "As

soon as one becomes aware that it is a trick, no one would endure listening to this song, previously taken to be so charming" (CPJ: 5:302). The recognition of staged artifice interferes with intellectual beauty, but not with the pure aesthetic judgment of taste. Intellectual interest in the beautiful is just our interest in grasping the world as suited to our will. The recognition of artifice therefore disrupts our ability to see the world as suited to our will; by revealing the world as subject to an alien will, it exposes a mismatch between our desires and our (newly limited) capacities, and so destroys Rousseauian freedom. By implication, the reader of *Emile*, who gets to see every behind-the-scenes detail of the tutor's methods, must become subordinated to the work, must open himself to *amour-propre*—must, that is, so long as his type of freedom is Rousseau's, not Kant's.

III. IMPOSSIBILITY AND CONTRADICTION

I have shown that the education of Emile involves scrupulously sheltering him from anything that might provoke *amour-propre*, as well as deceiving him so that he remains completely unaware of the fact that his nearly all-powerful tutor carefully stages his every activity. Many readers of Rousseau have been struck by the implausibility of such a laborious, delicate educative project. But perhaps Rousseau only means us to think of Emile's education as a regulative ideal: something we can strive for even if we know we can't ever attain it in practice. This reading is tempting, but it is at odds with the text. Rousseau gives us every reason to expect that the project is not merely implausible in practice, but impossible in principle. Its value lies in helping us to diagnose the features of human society in virtue of which the education of a pupil like Emile is impossible.

Some examples from the text will illustrate this point. In the very opening line of the preface Rousseau declares the work that follows "disordered and almost incoherent" (*Emile*: 157). He then says that we would be right to consider *Emile* "a visionary's reveries about education," and he claims, "I do not see as do other men" (*Emile*: 158). His ascription of incoherent, dreamlike qualities to *Emile* indicates that if *Emile* is comprehensible at all, then it is so only to Rousseau himself, who like a visionary or a dreamer has special insight that others do not. Later in Book 1 he returns to the same language of visions and dreams; Emile himself is to be "an imaginary pupil," and the conditions of "age, health, kinds of knowledge, and all the talent suitable for working at his education" are granted by stipulation: all of this, in order "to prevent an author who distrusts himself from getting lost in visions" (*Emile*: 177). Meanwhile the tutor himself is an impossibility: he can't be a child, can't be an adult, cannot work for money, must himself have been raised precisely to fit his future pupil, can take on only a single pupil in his life, must be nearly omniscient, and have total control over Emile (*Emile*: 176–178). We would do well to wonder how

such pie-in-the-sky stipulations of counterfactual conditions could serve to anchor Rousseau's project in possibility and prevent him from getting lost in visions, as Rousseau claims that it will do. For it would be bizarre in the extreme if Rousseau's acknowledgment of the impossibility of satisfying the conditions of Emile's education could somehow anchor his project—as though the mere acknowledgment of the project's tenuousness could somehow correct for that tenuousness. I take it that Rousseau above all is keenly aware of this difficulty, and that the ultimate failure to ground his project is an important point of *Emile*.

At the outset of Book 1, Rousseau claims that "our species does not admit of being formed halfway," and that any such person "would be the most disfigured of all" (*Emile*: 161). Someone who is half-free or half-pure is therefore not free or pure at all by his reckoning. We learn in Book 2 that true freedom consists in wanting only what one can do and doing only what one pleases; recall that he declares this his "fundamental maxim" (*Emile*: 215). He instantiates the maxim when he provides an image of a totally free Emile later in Book 2: "Leave him alone at liberty. Watch him act without saying anything to him . . . he will never undertake anything beyond his strength . . . his means are always appropriate to his designs" (*Emile*: 305). He acts only out of necessity in response to his environment, but is accustomed to the "yoke" of necessity and desires nothing more (*Emile*: 305–306). This stage is momentary in Emile's development: any younger, and his limited capacities could not match his desires; any older, and the imbalance will reverse itself. If we are not adolescent males who have enjoyed the lifelong efforts of the tutor Jean-Jacques to shelter and guide us along, then we cannot hope to be like Emile in that brief moment of freedom.

If we cannot hope to be like Emile or to make Emiles out of our pupils, then can we at least better ourselves by becoming more like Rousseau as he presents himself in *Emile*? Laurence D. Cooper has argued for this view (Cooper 2002), though it seems to me that we cannot successfully take Rousseau as our role model. I have noted above the ways in which he establishes in the preface that no one but he himself can really understand the *Emile*. But there are other considerations, too, which prevent us from closing the gap between Rousseau and ourselves. Consider his discussion in Book 1 of the evils of doctors and of medicine. He compares the practice of medicine to the quest for truth, and rejects them both on the grounds that they do more harm than good (*Emile*: 181). Rousseau is here, as often elsewhere, advocating ignorance; for he is claiming that we ought to respect limits to the scope of human knowledge. When we violate those bounds we lose our humanity and become as "cadavers" (*Emile*: 181). Suppose that Rousseau believes what he says, i.e., that morality compels us not to pursue knowledge too far lest we become corrupt. If this view is correct, then his every prescription becomes suspect, since it may simply be that he is being deceitful for fear of the consequences if he were to tell the truth.

His relationship to the reader of *Emile* is very much like that of the tutor to the character Emile: he is manipulative, deceptive, and spectacular, in the most literal sense of the word.[5] Just as the magician of Book 3 shames Emile by way of an elaborate spectacle, Rousseau repeatedly shames his reader—as, for example, when he insists upon the reader's debasement if he or she should happen to take medicine. And just as it would prove disastrous should Emile discover the hidden machinations of his own education, Rousseau takes every measure to ensure separation between himself and his reader, including (throughout his autobiographical works especially) extensive rumination on his own monstrous shortcomings and deformity.

Emile is not a prescriptive work—not even one that prescribes only to an idealized, purely theoretical pupil brought up under extraordinary circumstances. It is rather a statement of the extraordinary conditions that would be required to produce a healthy, autonomous man. By an act of dramatic reductio, Rousseau emphasizes that no such circumstances can come about. That our nature and our society should require such fundamental reworking in order to achieve what seems admirable in *Emile* only drives home the point that we are all hopelessly debased and monstrous in Rousseau's view (from which status he does not exclude himself). *Emile* is a fictive tale, an allegory of how things ought to be; but the peculiarities of its fictive structure prevent it from being actualized even in principle. If *Emile* shows us how things ought to be, but denies us the possibility of reaching that state—indeed, denies that state's very coherence outside Rousseau's own mind—then the proper response to the work is not one of hope but rather of despair.

If Kant had had some say in the education of Emile, he might have seen fit to have the tutor teach him to presuppose as a regulative ideal that the world is structured in such a way as not to plunge him headlong into irreparable *amour-propre* as soon as he leaves his auspices, else he would not be able to act at all. Kant always warns us that we can never gain empirical verification of freedom, God, the immortality of the soul, or even whether or not our acts are in accord with our moral duty (for the latter see Gr: 4:407). But he encourages us to try our best in any case, since by our very engagement with the world we must presume that it is suited for us to engage it, and in any case the merely empirical cannot impinge upon the command of reason. Kant offers hope and guidance where Rousseau expects inevitable catastrophe.

Emile is by no means unique within Rousseau's corpus; time and again we see him taking up impossible projects, identifying the unachievable conditions for their success, and raging against the implications of what he knows to be true. His *Reveries of the Solitary Walker* provides a striking example of just this situation. Here Rousseau has abandoned his interest in establishing a free society; it is enough for him to attempt to ensure his own personal autonomy and happiness by achieving perfect solitude and isolation. But his happiness requires as necessary conditions that he be perfectly self-sufficient and that he close off *amour-propre*, neither of which

is possible. Thus when he feels happiest alone in the forest, his very isolation from his enemies paradoxically reminds him of their existence (RSW: 65–66). The book ends notably with his fervent desire to return to Mme. de Warens. But even if he could return to her—she, who provided for him "this unique and brief time of my life when I was myself, fully, without admixture and without obstacle" (RSW: 89)—he would find her impossible to satisfy ("Ah, if I had sufficed for her heart as she sufficed for mine!"). Moreover, his ceaseless dependencies on the rest of the world for money and material sustenance undermine his time spent with her.[6] In his fit of nostalgia Rousseau contradicts himself: he claims to be "without admixture and without obstacle," but his happiness depends on the happiness of another, as well as on his obligations to society, so that his will is doomed to heteronomy. The contradiction is no accident: here, as ever, Rousseau is well aware of it, but cannot resolve it.

NOTES

1. It is only natural that each of Rousseau's works should help elucidate the others. He himself claimed repeatedly throughout his career that his works make up an internally consistent system—which claim alone, whether it be true or false, indicates that we should at least take his works to be informative of one another. In the introduction to his *Dialogues*, he maligns his critics who misunderstand him for having read his works too selectively, and who "want only some agreeable rapid reading, who sought and found only that in my *Confessions*, and who cannot tolerate a little fatigue or maintain their attention in the interest of justice and truth." (*Dialogues*: 7) Christopher Kelly and Roger D. Masters present a strong case in favor of accepting Rousseau's claims to consistency in their introduction to the same volume.
2. I'm grateful to Rebecca Kukla for pointing out the importance of The Profession of Faith's dramatic situation within Emile's education, during her 2008 seminar on Rousseau at the University of South Florida.
3. In *Emile and Sophie*, the sequel to *Emile*, we find Emile enslaved by pirates and Sophie unfaithful. While Emile's education prepares him to deal with these events as well as he can, the work impresses fully that the course of Emile's life is determined not by his own will, but is subordinated to and sabotaged by others'.
4. Douglas Jesseph at the University of South Florida helpfully reminded me of this connection.
5. Rebecca Kukla brought to my attention the ways in which the very act of reading *Emile* constitutes a participatory performance in a staged spectacle orchestrated by Rousseau.
6. The final paragraph of the book expresses his anxiety over poverty, as well as his own private debt to Mme. de Warens.

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4 "Not a Slow *Reform*, but a Swift *Revolution*"

Kant and Basedow on the Need to Transform Education

Robert B. Louden

> The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection. . . . How, then, are we to seek this perfection, and from where is it to be hoped for? From nowhere else but education. . . . The Basedow institutes of education create a small but fervent hope in this regard. (*Moralphilosophie Collins* 27: 470–471)

I. INTRODUCTION

Kant's ardent support for Johann Bernhard Basedow and his experimental school, the Philanthropin, which opened in Dessau on December 27, 1774, is a significant, unexpected, and, even today, often under-appreciated chapter in his life. But what, specifically, attracted Kant to Basedow? To answer this question, one needs to examine the following four Kantian texts (or "text-groups"):

1) The final section of the *Friedländer* anthropology transcription, "On Education [*Von der Erziehung*]" (Ak: 25:722–728), to which Academy editors Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark assign a date of "winter semester 1775/76" (Ak: 25:465), in part because of the specific remarks that Kant makes about Basedow's new school (see esp. Ak: 25:723–724, nn. 145, 147). The *Friedländer* transcription is unique among Kant's numerous anthropology lectures in being the only one that concludes with a discussion of education.
2) Kant's two short *Essays regarding the Philanthropin* (1776–1777), initially published in the *Königsbergische gelehrte und politische Zeitung* and reprinted in Academy (Ak) volume 2: 445–452. Both essays (the first was published anonymously and not explicitly attributed to Kant until 1860 by Rudolph Reicke; the second was undersigned "K") are essentially fund-raising appeals for the school. However (as befits a Kantian fund-raising solicitation), each essay contains numerous arguments concerning the special merits of Basedow's school.

3) *Correspondence* between Kant and others associated in various ways with the Philanthropin, written between 1776 and 1778, including not only correspondence from Basedow himself but also Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746–1818) and Christian Heinrich Wolke (1741–1825), both of whom served as directors of the Institute, as well as other correspondents who sent Kant reports about the school and/or were involved with the ongoing fund-raising effort. The Philanthropin correspondence is reprinted in Academy volume 10.
4) Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy*, first published in 1803 by his former student and colleague Friedrich Theodor Rink and reprinted in Academy (Ak) volume 9:437–499. When Kant first lectured on practical pedagogy at the University of Königsberg in the winter semester of 1776–1777 (a course that the philosophy faculty was required to teach, and which was rotated among its faculty members), his text for the course was one of Basedow's most important and popular books: *Methodenbuch für Väter und Mütter der Familien und Völker* (Method Book for Fathers and Mothers of Families and Nations, Altona and Bremen, 1770; 2d ed., 1771; 3d ed., 1773). The third edition, which is a reprint of the second, is the one that Kant most likely used for his course. Kant also taught this course again in summer semester 1780, winter semester 1783–1784, and winter semester 1786–1787. However, from 1780 on Kant used (at the behest of his superiors) his colleague Samuel Bock's book, *Lehrbuch der Erziehungskunst zum Gebrauch für Christliche Eltern und künftige Jugendlehrer* (Königsberg and Leipzig, 1780). Although Kant only explicitly mentions Basedow and the Philanthropin three times in the *Pedagogy* (Ak: 9:448–449, 451, 467), Weisskopf, in his extensive study, argues convincingly that there exist numerous parallel passages in Kant's *Pedagogy* and Basedow's *Methodenbuch* (Weisskopf 1970: 167–168, 571, 602, 613, 634, 662). I will discuss some of these passages below.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine the relevant parts of the aforementioned Kantian texts, along with pertinent material from some of Basedow's own writings. My goal is to learn more about *what* it was specifically about Basedow's pedagogic proposals that most interested Kant. This *what* question is not necessarily the same as the *why* question (*Why* was Kant attracted to Basedow's pedagogic proposal?) Manfred Kuehn, for instance, speculates that Kant's "unparalleled efforts on behalf of the Institute of Dessau" were due to his own miserable experience as a student at the *Collegium Fredericianum*, a Pietistic school. Kant "was horrified when he remembered his school years [1732–1740] at the *Collegium Fredericianum*"; Basedow's approach was "radically different from the Pietistic education Kant himself had suffered through," and Kant's "active support of the *Philanthropinum* must have seemed like a slap in the face" to Pietists and colleagues close to his old school (Kuehn 2001: 45, 227, 229). This may

be true, but it is speculation on Kuehn's part. Nowhere does Kant himself say anything like this. And alternative answers to the *why* question are easy to come by. For instance, one might also conjecture that Kant's admiration for Basedow's renowned talent and skill as a teacher of young children stems from his own awkward experience as a *Hofmeister* (private tutor) in the homes of several families near Königsberg from 1748 to 1754, after he completed his university studies. In later life Kant is said to have remarked that "in the whole world there was never a worse tutor" than he (Jachmann 1804: 10). But this psychological explanation also is speculation. In the following account, I prefer to sidestep the shaky psychological soil of the *why* in favor of the more solid terrain of the *what*. What specific pedagogical ideas, proposals, and arguments of Basedow's did Kant endorse?

II. WHO WAS BASEDOW?

Before examining Kant's Basedow-related texts, a few words about Basedow's life and writings are in order. For although there exists an extensive secondary literature about Basedow and the Philanthropin in German, and while many different editions and collections of his writings are also still available in the original German, to the best of my knowledge none of his writings has ever been translated into English. This is all the more surprising, given that there are entries on Basedow in many different English-language encyclopedias, that he features prominently in many late-nineteenth-century English-language accounts of the history of education, and that he is the subject of at least one short monograph in English (Lang 1891).

Basedow was born in Hamburg in 1724[1] (the same year as Kant) into an unhappy family environment. His father was a wigmaker, strict and overbearing; his mother melancholy and unsteady. As a result, he ran away from home at age fifteen and worked for a year as a servant for a physician's family in Holstein. After a year he returned to Hamburg and eventually enrolled in the Hamburg Gymnasium, where he studied under Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694–1768), author of the "Wolfenbüttel Fragments," an influential deistic challenge to Christianity that, with Lessing's help, was published posthumously and anonymously. In 1746 Basedow enrolled in the University of Leipzig, where he studied theology and philosophy under Christian August Crusius (1715–1775), an important opponent of Leibniz and Wolff who also influenced Kant.[2] Basedow left in 1749 without a degree to work as tutor for another family in Holstein, and it was here that his interests and talents in teaching techniques were first awakened, specifically when he worked out a new method for teaching foreign languages. In 1752 Basedow received his *Magister* degree from the University of Kiel, and in 1753 he was appointed professor of moral philosophy, rhetoric, and German at the *Ritterakademie* in Sorø, Denmark. He remained at Sorø for eight years, but his deistic religious leanings increasingly annoyed the

administration and in 1761 he was transferred to the Gymnasium in Altona, outside Hamburg, where he was once again dismissed for his unorthodox religious views in 1768. But in 1768 his first significant work on education was published—*Vorstellung an Menschenfreunde und vermögende Männer über Schulen und Studien und ihren Einfluß in die öffentliche Wohlfahrt, mit einem Plane eines Elementarbuchs der menschlichen Erkenntnis* (Presentation to Friends of Humanity and Men of Means regarding Schools, Studies, and their Influence in Public Welfare, with a Plan of an Elementary Book of Human Knowledge)—and it met with a tremendous response. As a result, in 1771 Prince Franz Leopold Friedrich invited Basedow to Dessau to organize an experimental school. The school opened in 1774, but was continually plagued by financial difficulties and personality conflicts. Joachim Heinrich Campe [tutor of Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt and author of *Robinson der Jüngere* (1779—*The New Robinson Crusoe*)] served briefly as director in 1776–1777, but left after less than a year to start his own school in Hamburg. Basedow then briefly resumed his unsteady directorship of the Institute, but resigned completely in 1778, at which point Christian Heinrich Wolke became director. The school continued to exist until 1793, but did not attract much attention during its final years. For the remainder of his life, Basedow continued to write on theological and educational issues, and also worked as a private tutor. He died in Magdeburg in 1790 at the age of sixty-six.

Most profiles of Basedow's life underscore his difficult personality. By nearly all accounts, he was quarrelsome, uncooperative, boastful, impractical, . . . and inclined to drunkenness. This point is relevant in assessing the short and turbulent life of the Philanthropin: if Basedow had possessed better administrative skills, things might well have turned out differently. Basedow himself recognized at least part of the problem when he confessed in a 1783 autobiographical text: "In business I am or was rash and argumentative, and in social intercourse often sorrowful and melancholy" (as cited by Pinloche 1896: 157). But the most famous assessment of Basedow's personality comes from Goethe, who spent some time with him in 1774, shortly before the Philanthropin opened. In *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, he notes that although Basedow's "great intellectual gifts were admired, he was not the man, either to edify souls or to lead them," and while acknowledging that Basedow could speak "in a lofty and convincing way of his plans" to found a new school, his fund-raising efforts were frequently hampered by his rude manners and "the most incomprehensible way he injured the feelings of the men whose contributions he wished to gain; indeed, he offended them unnecessarily because he could not hold back his opinions and whims [*Grillen*] on religious topics" (ApS: 239–240). Hamann and Herder, in an exchange of letters, also contributed frequently cited criticisms of Basedow. Hamann, fearing that he himself could "do nothing" for his son's education, confessed that "I had, one Sunday, the horrid idea of packing him off, neck and heels,

to the *Pontifex Maximus*, at Dessau," to which Herder replied: "as concerns Basedow, whom I know personally, I would not give him any calves to educate, much less human beings" (Hamann 1957: 3: 236, 251). Kant also made a minor contribution to this genre when he stated in a 1791–1792 anthropology transcription: "Basedow's shortcoming was that he drank too much Malaga" (Ak: 25:1538; cf. 1561).

Reble lists 108 different works in his bibliography of Basedow's writings (while noting that Basedow's publications contain "frequent repetitions") (ApS: 267–274, 253). His major pedagogical writings include not only the previously mentioned *Vorstellung an Menschenfreunde* (1768) and the *Methodenbuch* (1770), but also the famous *Elementarwerk* (1774, 4 vols., with illustrations by Daniel Chodowiecki; 2d ed., 1785), often referred to as the "*Orbis Pictus* of the eighteenth century," whose aim (as Basedow explained in his subtitle) was to offer "a well-ordered supply of all necessary knowledge for the instruction of youth from birth up to college age; for the instruction of parents, school teachers, and private tutors, for the use of every teacher to perfect knowledge." Other major publications include *Praktische Philosophie für alle Stände* (1758), *Philalethie* (1764), and *Methodischer Unterricht in der überzeugenden Erkenntnis der biblischen Religion* (1764).

III. FRIEDLÄNDER: "ON EDUCATION"

> "[Basedow's institute] is the greatest phenomenon which has appeared in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity." (Ak: 25:722–723)

Kant knew about Basedow long before the Philanthropin opened in 1774. For instance, at one point in the *Praktische Philosophie Herder* transcription (1763–1764) he states: "*syncretism*, here one tries to develop contradictory doctrines as if they were in agreement. It seldom catches on; is usually futile and often damaging—Basedow is syncretic—" (Ak: 27:78). But the final section of the *Friedländer* anthropology lecture is Kant's first extensive discussion of Basedow's educational doctrines. Key themes emphasized in this text include the following:

1) The need for a coherent plan of education. At the very beginning of his discussion, Kant announces that "the present-day Basedow institutes are the first to have come about in accordance with the complete plan" of education (Ak: 25:722).
2) The need for a developmental approach to education; viz., one that stresses age-appropriate methods: "how shall a child be brought up [*gezogen werden*] so that its nature develops?" (Ak: 25:723).

3) The advantage of learning foreign languages "early and in an easy way;" viz., by conversation, so that students "are not tormented for long by the grammatical method, in order subsequently to gain time to utilize their industry for other things" (Ak: 25:724).
4) Postponing religious instruction until the child is intellectually mature enough to grasp what is at stake: "at what time should one begin with religion? At that point when the child can understand that there must be a creator. If children are accustomed earlier to religion, where they learn to repeat prayers, then this has no effect" (Ak: 25:728).

Basedow repeatedly stresses each of these four themes in his own writings (see, e.g., ApS: 76 ff., 112 ff., 128 ff., 139 ff.), and in drawing attention to them Kant clearly indicates that in each case he endorses Basedow's position.

IV. ESSAYS REGARDING THE PHILANTHROPIN

> It is infinitely important to get to know an institute in which an entirely new order of human affairs commences. (1st *Essay*, Ak: 2:447)

Kant's first *Essay regarding the Philanthropin* was published on March 28, 1776—i.e., toward the end of the winter semester at the University of Königsberg, where his *Friedländer* anthropology course was winding down, a course in which, as we have seen, the concluding lecture was entitled "On Education." Basedow's school had been in operation for sixteen months by now, though it still had only thirteen students, not including Basedow's own son and daughter. In an attempt to improve matters, Basedow published the first issue of his *Philanthropisches Archiv* on February 1, 1776, addressed to "*Guardians of Humanity, particularly those who wish to begin an Improvement of the Schools, and to Fathers and Mothers who wish to send their Children to the Dessau Philanthropin*," and Kant opens his *Essay* simply by citing the title of Basedow's text (Ak: 2:447). In this text, Basedow invites interested parties to the upcoming public examination, to be held at the school on May 13–15, 1776:

> We promise under pain of mockery that upon the aforesaid 13th of May (1776) there will be at the Philanthropin so much worth seeing, hearing, investigating, and considering, by the intelligent guardians of humanity, in regard to schools, that it will be worth their while for some of them to be sent to us, by the order of the German Diet, from Copenhagen, Saint Petersburg, and the most distant regions; for it is a duty, by the arithmetic of morals [*moralische Rechenkunst*], in respect to such good works as must be of great use, to act upon probabilities. God, thou father of posterity, secure us, we beseech thee, a hearing

> with the wise cosmopolitans [*bei den weisen Weltbürgern*] (as cited by Raumer 1843 2:259).

Accordingly, in his *Essay* Kant too stresses that "the 13th of May is an important day" (2: 448), and for further details he also refers readers to the publication of Basedow's *Für Kosmopoliten etwas zu lessen*, etc. (Dessau, 1775) (Ak: 2:447). Neither of these publications is listed in Warda's catalog of the books in Kant's personal library (1922), and so we have no physical proof that Kant actually owned either of these two works.[3] But it is unlikely that he would cite the titles of these works in his essay if he were not familiar with them.

At any rate, some key themes stressed in the first *Essay* include the following:

1) Basedow's school is "fitting to nature as well as to all civil purposes" (Ak: 2:447). This theme relates to Kant's earlier point (in *Friedländer*) that Basedow's school has been designed in accordance with a rational plan. The Philanthropin takes its cue from nature rather than tradition and religious authority.
2) It is "the essential calling of every friend of humanity [*jedes Menschenfreund*] to cultivate with care this still tender sprout [*diesen noch zarten Keim*] as much as he can" (Ak: 2:448). Money was always an issue at the school, and Kant served as an unofficial fund-raiser from 1776 to 1778.
3) The Philanthropin is a "unique means of having good schools everywhere," and thus a means of insuring "the rapid expansion of the good" (Ak: 2:448). There were no degree requirements for teachers in Basedow's day, and they did not receive any kind of uniform education. The Philanthropin was also intended to be a school for the training of teachers.
4) "It is to be recommended strongly to all teachers in private as well as in public instruction to use Basedow's writings and the schoolbooks edited by him" (Ak: 2:448). Schools in Basedow's day also lacked common texts, and he believed strongly that a more standardized curriculum was needed.

The second Philanthropin *Essay* was first published on March 27, 1777—i.e., soon after the end of the winter semester at the University of Königsberg, where Kant had just finished teaching his first pedagogy course. We may thus assume that by this time Kant was well familiar with Basedow's *Methodenbuch*, since this was his text for the course.

Key themes in the second *Essay* include the following:

1) "Everything in them [viz., existing schools] works against nature"—instead, a new educational method is necessary, one "which is wisely

derived from nature itself and not slavishly copied from old habit and unexperienced ages" (Ak: 2:449).

2) "We animal creatures are made into human beings only by education [*nur durch Ausbildung*]" (2: 449). Here Kant echoes one of his most famous claims from *The Lectures on Pedagogy*: "The human being can only become human through education [*durch Erziehung*]" (Ak: 9:443; cf. 441).
3) It is futile to expect the "salvation of the human species from a gradual improvement of the schools. They must be transformed. . . . Not a slow *reform*, but a swift *revolution* can bring this about" (Ak: 2:449). Basedow had long been on record for claiming that fundamental, radical change was needed in schools. For instance, section § 9 in his 1768 *Vorstellung an Menschenfreunde* is entitled: "*Proof, that the Improvement of Schools and Studies is important, and cannot happen through small Change or mere Decree* . . . Not through salves and plaster will wounds be healed, which because of all-consuming pus have a bottomless depth" (ApS: 12; cf. 28).
4) The need for private benefactors to support educational reform, and the folly of over-reliance on government aid. At the end of his *Essay* (Ak: 2:451–452) Kant signals agreement with Anton Friedrich Büsching's observation in the *Wöchentliche Nachrichten* that "because the governments of European states have no money left over for schools, it is thus very gratifying everywhere when affluent private persons help out, and thereby become benefactors of the human race" (1776: 131). On this point Kant is disagreeing, at least in part, with Basedow's heavy reliance on the support of the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau. As he argues in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, the improvement of schools "depends mainly [*hauptsächlich*] on private efforts and not so much on the assistance of princes, as *Basedow* and others thought. For experience teaches that princes first of all have not so much the best for the world [*das Weltbeste*] in mind but rather the well-being of their own state (Ak: 9:448–9).

V. CORRESPONDENCE, 1776–1778

> "I hope only that all is well with you, who have become so important to the world, and with the institution you have founded, deserving the gratitude of all posterity." Kant to Basedow, June 19, 1776 (Ak: 10:181)

In addition to providing additional documentation about what he admired most about Basedow's school, Kant's correspondence regarding the Philanthropin also gives us insight into his personal involvement and eventual disengagement with it. The best-known letter in this group is Kant's letter to Christian Heinrich Wolke of March 28, 1776. Kant opens the letter

by exclaiming his "great sympathy for your excellent Philanthropin" (Ak: 10:178), and then reports that his friend Robert Motherby, an English merchant based in Königsberg, would like to enroll his six-year-old son George in the school. The father's own educational principles, Kant adds, "are in harmony with those upon which your institution is founded" (Ak: 10:178), but it is clear that Kant himself also endorses them:

> His education thus far has been merely *negative*, which I believe [*ich glaube*] is the best one can give to a child in those years. He has been allowed to develop his nature and his healthy reason in a manner appropriate to his years, without compulsion [*ohne Zwang*] . . . he has never experienced force [*niemals die härte erfahren*] (Ak: 10:178).

Kant also speaks at some length regarding the child's religious education thus far:

> In matters of religion, the spirit of the Philanthropin is in complete harmony with that of the boy's father, so much that he wishes that even the natural cognition [*natürliche Erkenntnis*] of God . . . should not be aimed at devotional exercises directly, but only after he has realized that on the whole they have merely the value of means toward animating an effective conscience and fear of God, so that one complies with one's duties as though they were divine commands. For it is folly to regard religion as nothing more than a wooing of favor in an attempt to ingratiate oneself with the highest being. (Ak: 10:179; cf. 6:153, 9:494)

A third area of educational methodology touched on briefly in this letter and famously associated with Basedow is foreign language education. Kant relates that it would also please the boy's father if the Philanthropin were to teach the boy English "according to the easy and reliable method [used] there" (Ak: 10:180). Kant concludes his letter by emphasizing that he "has the greatest sympathy for the noble labors to which you have dedicated yourself," and then adds an intriguing P.S.: "The enclosed paper should give a small proof of the respect your Institute is coming to have in these regions" (Ak: 10:180). The enclosure was in fact Kant's first *Essay regarding the Philanthropin*, published anonymously on the same day the letter to Wolke was written.

Unfortunately, the Academy edition includes only one letter of Kant to Basedow, written on June 19, 1776. It is a brief note, in which Kant begins by informing Basedow that Motherby "regards every day his son does not spend at the Philanthropin as a total waste [*reine Verlust*]," and that the boy will be departing for Dessau in "four to five days" (Ak: 10:181). But there are several other letters regarding the Philanthropin. On July 7, 1776, August Rode, a former member of Kant's *Tischgesellschaft* in Königsberg, wrote to Kant from Dessau with a detailed report on the current situation at the school. Overall, things were going well. The school's public examination that Kant

himself helped publicize in his first *Essay* (Ak: 2:448) was well attended. Since the examination, two new teachers have been hired, and seven more students have also arrived (Ak: 10:182–183). However, financial support is still an issue. Motherby has not yet arrived, and there is no confirmation yet concerning *Kommerzienrat* Fahrenheid's plan to send five young people to the school. Perhaps in the meantime Kant could arrange for the councillor to send a gift of 1,000 Thaler to the Philanthropin (Ak: 10:183)?

A letter from Kant's former student Friedrich Wilhelm Regge of Tilsit, dated April 29, 1777 (Ak: 10:190–192), reveals a different side of Kant's activity on behalf of the school. Kant successfully recommended Regge for a teaching position at the school, but unfortunately Regge died in 1778, leading Campe to remark "The good Regge! What a pity that so much good was buried with him. I wished for such an assistant, but with better health" (Campe to Kant, March 13, 1778, 10:211). There are also two letters to Kant from Johann Ehrmann, one of the new teachers who joined the staff in 1776 (Ak: 10:192–193, 194–195), thanking Kant for his "services to the world and also to our Institute" (Ak: 10:193). Unfortunately, as Kant himself remarked in a letter to Campe dated August 26, 1777, his efforts did not always have their desired effect. His appeal to readers in his second *Essay regarding the Philanthropin* to subscribe to the *Pädagogischen Unterhandlungen*, edited by Campe and Basedow (see Ak: 2:451), had resulted only in twenty-five new subscriptions, and the majority of the clergy and teachers in rural areas remained firmly opposed to the school (Ak: 10:199).

More telling of things to come is Kant's letter to Campe of October 31, 1777, which opens as follows: "With the greatest regret I have learned of the decision, that the worry for the survival [of the school] has wrung from you, to leave the Philanthropin to its fate and to escape with your life before its collapse [*Untergang*]" (Ak: 10:201). Kant then suggests to Campe that he apply for the position of *Oberhofprediger* and *Generalsuperintendent* of East and West Prussia. A formal application would not be necessary—one of Campe's friends in Berlin need "only give a hint [*nur einen Wink geben*] to the Minister," and Kant could also guarantee that the general public would be enriched with "universal pleasure" by receiving "such a famous and beloved teacher" (Ak: 10:202). Campe, in his reply to Kant of March 13, 1778, says that he was "very moved" by Kant's "lovely proposal," but that as a result of "the great weakening in soul and body" he had suffered as a result of his experience in Dessau, he has decided not to take on a demanding administrative position but rather to establish a small school in Hamburg (Ak: 10:210).

Though Kant still supported the educational ideals of the Philanthropin after Campe's resignation, he begins now to look for a way to free himself from his unofficial role as a fund-raiser for the school. In summer 1778 an opportunity presents itself. *Hofprediger* Wilhelm Crichton, who in the past had expressed reservations about the Philanthropin, was appointed editor of the *Kantersche Zeitung*, and in his letter of July 28, 1778, Kant appeals

to the preacher's vanity by saying that while "I am heartily ready and willing" to continue the fund-raising effort, "it seems to me that the influence would be much greater if Your Reverence would be willing to espouse this cause and lend your name and pen to its furtherance" (Ak: 10:218). In his letter to Wolke of August 4, 1778 (now the school's official director, after Basedow's short-lived second effort), Kant writes: "you are the last anchor, on whom all hope of the participants is based." He then explains that his "more flattering means have seized this man [viz., Crichton] and pulled him to your side" (Ak: 10:220), thus indicating to Wolke that the influential minister would now be taking over fund-raising efforts in the Königsberg area on behalf of the school. Still, Kant and Wolke appear to have remained on good terms. The last letter regarding the Philanthropin is a short note that Wolke sent to Kant on October 28, 1778: "Here dearest friend the latest installment of our *Journal* . . . Warm greetings to Motherby and other friends" (Ak: 10:226)!

VI. LECTURES ON PEDAGOGY

> "The only experimental school which here to an extent made a start in paving the way was the Dessau Institute. We must let it keep this glory regardless of the many mistakes of which one could accuse it." (Ak: 9:451)

There are only three explicit references to Basedow and his school in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, and in each case Kant speaks in the past tense. The first reference occurs in the context of a discussion of educational funding and the unsatisfactory education of princes, where Kant concludes that improvements in education will need to depend "mainly on private efforts and not so much on the assistance of princes, as *Basedow* and others thought [*meinten*]" (Ak: 9:448). The second (cf. epigraph for this section) occurs when Kant argues for the continued need and importance of experiments in education: the only school that "to an extent made [*machte*] a start . . . was [*war*] the Dessau Institute" (Ak: 9:451). And the third is located in a discussion of the importance of physical education, where Kant notes that the Philanthropin "led the way with its example [*mit seinem Muster voranging*]" (Ak: 9:467).

Why the persistent use of the past tense? An easy answer would be to note that the Philanthropin closed in 1793, while the *Lectures* were published 1803. However, Rink's text is based on Kant's classroom lectures, and Kant last taught his pedagogy course in winter semester 1886–1887—six years before the school closed. Did Kant revise his *Lectures on Pedagogy* after 1887, even though he knew he would not teach the course again, and even though he had no plans to publish them himself? This is highly unlikely. A second possibility is that Rink, in preparing Kant's notes for publication

in 1803, changed Kant's verb tenses from present to past in order to reflect current realities. This second possibility is more plausible than the first, and it is an explanation that I myself favored until recently. However, even though Rink's editing of Kant's texts has been roundly criticized by generations of Kant scholars,[4] I find it hard to believe that he would change Kant's own language in three different places without indicating to readers that he had done so. The editorial changes that Rink is normally suspected of making in Kant's texts are a bit milder: e.g., inserting a few section headings and perhaps re-arranging the original order of certain parts of the text.[5] A third possibility, which I now favor, is that Kant himself, in 1786–1787, uses the past tense when referring to the Philanthropin in order to indicate to his audience that his own passion for the school has waned, that he is no longer an unofficial fund-raiser for it, and to convey his sense that the Institute's best days are behind it.

However, regardless of whether one accepts this third hypothesis (and I see no way to prove it), it is clear that by the time the *Lectures on Pedagogy* appeared in 1803, Kant's views about not only the Philanthropin but also the prospects for transforming human beings via educational reform had cooled considerably. For instance, in addressing the question of how human progress is to be achieved in *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), he notes that "to expect that this will eventually happen by means of education [*Bildung*] of youth in the home, then in schools [*Schulen*] on both the lowest and highest level, . . . is a plan which is scarcely likely to achieve the desired success" (Ak: 7:92). Rather, he continues, "progress is to be expected only on the condition of a wisdom from above (which bears the name of providence if it is invisible to us)" (Ak: 7:93). This starkly religious appeal [it is essentially a variation on Kant's famous claim that belief in the existence of God is "morally necessary" in order for the highest good to be possible (Ak: 5:125)] is a clear rejection of his secular claim in the second *Essay regarding the Philanthropin* that the "salvation [*Heil*] of the human species" can only come about through a transformation and "swift *revolution* . . . of the schools" (Ak: 2:449).

But even though Kant only refers explicitly to Basedow and the Philanthropin three times in the *Pedagogy*, readers who are familiar with Basedow's *Methodenbuch* will readily detect its influence in numerous parts of these *Lectures*. Weisskopf, for instance, draws attention to several parallel passages in the two texts. In the following two cases, he argues that the influence of Basedow is "obvious [*offensichtlich*]" (1970: 167):

> 1. It is very strange, for example, when parents demand that their children should kiss their hands after they have beaten them with a switch. That way one accustoms them to feigning and falsehood. For the switch is not such a beautiful gift that one would call for thanks, and one can easily imagine with what sort of heart the child will then kiss the hand. (*Päd*: 9:461)

> There are parents who force their children to kiss the switch or the hand by which they have been punished. This ceremony, at such a time, is mostly hypocritical and deceitful, for a child can, in the instant that it feels the pain of punishment, scarcely love. (Basedow 1965: 87)

> 2. Every transgression of a command by a child is a lack of obedience, and this brings on punishment. Even in the case of a careless transgression of the command, punishment is not superfluous. (*Päd*: 9:482)
>
> Actual commands should be rare, but disobedience must bring on a sensible punishment each time, and it can be gotten rid of neither through pleas nor through promises of improvement. (Basedow 1965: 84)

Additionally, Weisskopf argues that there is another passage in Kant's *Pedagogy* where a dependency on Basedow's *Methodenbuch* is "probable [*wahrscheinlich*]," and four others where it is "possible [*möglich*]." (1970: 167–168; cf. *Päd*: 9:481, 455, 473, 478–479; Basedow 1965: 83, 106, 102, 101)

But the influences of Basedow's *Methodenbuch* on Kant's *Pedagogy* do not end here. Weisskopf focuses on specific similarities in actual word usage. If one looks rather at general themes and ideas, further similarities between the two works are evident. For instance, Schwarz argues that the following "mutual claims [*gemeinsame Forderungen*]" in the two works are evident:

> Education must begin at birth; diet and physical exercise are particularly important; small children must obey blindly, otherwise punishment has to follow; disgust and fear must be combated, patience, courage, and truthfulness practiced; worldly prudence prepares children; intuition [*Anschauung*] is an important instructional principle; only that which is useful should be memorized; reading novels is reprehensible; instruction must be adapted to the age of the child; moral education comes before everything; early instruction in natural religion supplements this branch of education. (1915: 76–7)

Clearly, Basedow's influence on Kant's philosophy of education was both wide and deep.

VII. CONCLUSION

Kant was certainly not Basedow's only admirer. On the contrary, the Philanthropin was a cause célèbre that attracted the support of many liberal intellectuals. Reble, for instance, estimates that there were around a hundred visitors at the public examination of the school on May 13–15, 1776, including

> such well known names as canon von Rochow[6] from Reckahn, bookseller Nicolai[7] from Berlin, former army chaplain Campe, abbot Resewitz from Kloster Berge in Magdeburg, commissioner Struensee from Halberstadt, director Breymann from the *Ritterakademie* in Brandenburg, chamberlain von der Reck from Berlin, chaplain Baldamus from Ballenstedt, senior court chaplain Pauli from Bernburg, general superintendent Jakobi from Halberstadt, chaplain Zollikofer from Leipzig, and others. (ApS: 263; cf. Raumer 1843 2: 259–260)

Other prominent intellectuals who supported Basedow but who were not present at the public examination include Moses Mendelssohn, who "helped Jewish children enter Basedow's Philanthropin" (Beck 1969: 325),[8] Jean Frédéric Oberlin, Isaak Iselin, and Johann Casper Lavater (Lang 1891: 16),[9] as well as Anton Friedrich Büsching, who, in one report in his *Wochentliche Nachrichten*, declared: "If I had to find instruction and education for my sons, I would send them without reservation [*ohne Bedenken*] to Dessau in the so-called Philanthropinum" (1775: 15).

And of course conservative writers did not ignore Basedow either. For instance, Epstein notes that "conservatives attacked with special venom the progressive education introduced by Basedow and his disciples. They asserted that the *Philanthropine* were corrupters of youth which produced men strong on *Aufklärung* but useless for any kind of constructive work in society" (Epstein 1966: 79). Conservative authors who attacked Basedow discussed by Epstein include Johann Georg Schlosser, Justus Möser,[10] Ernst Brandes, and Karl von Eckartshausen (1966: 37–38, 80–81, 333–334).

But while Kant was by no means the only German Enlightenment intellectual to write about Basedow's influential experiment in education, the Philanthropin constitutes a unique chapter within his own biography. This is the only time in his life when he stuck his neck out, albeit briefly, to unequivocally champion a progressive social movement.

NOTES

1. Earlier accounts (e.g., Raumer 1843: 2: 243; Painter 1886: 275; Quick 1896: 273) often list 1723 as the year of Basedow's birth.
2. In his *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* (1755), Kant refers to Crusius variously as "one of the most penetrating philosophers of our age" (1: 396), "the celebrated Crusius" (1: 397), and "the most distinguished and penetrating Crusius" (1: 398).
3. Warda does list three works of Basedow's (1922: 43, 45), but what is even more surprising is that Basedow's *Methodenbuch* is not among them. Kant used the *Methodenbuch* as the text for his first pedagogy course in winter semester 1776–1777. Warda's catalog of Kant's library therefore cannot be regarded as complete.
4. The most notorious accusation concerns Rink's editing of Kant's *Lectures on Physical Geography*, first published in 1802 and reprinted in Academy

volume 9 (151–436). Adickes argues that the first part of Rink's text (Ak: 9:156–273) stems from Kant's 1775 geography lecture notes, while the latter part (Ak: 9:273–436) derives from 1758–1759 lectures (1913: 10). However, in Rink's defense it should also be noted that he explicitly states on the title page that Kant's notes have been "in part arranged by" the editor—"*zum Theil bearbeitet von D. Friedrich Theodor Rink*" (Ak: 9:151).

5. Kant's original *Handscfhrift* on which Rink's *Pedagogy* text is based has been lost, and so there is no way to prove definitely any of these charges. But I think Rink is probably guilty as charged.
6. See also Rochow's report on the public examination in ApS 224–228.
7. See also Kant, *On Turning Out Books. Two Letters to Mr. Friedrich Nicolai from Immanuel Kant* (Ak: 8:431–438).
8. Mendelssohn was born in Dessau, and was a friend of Kant's. He visited Königsberg in 1777, prompting Kant to remark, in a letter to Marcus Herz of August 20, 1777: "Today Herr Mendelssohn, your worthy friend and mine (for so I flatter myself), is departing. To have a man like him in Königsberg on a permanent basis, as an intimate acquaintance, a man of such gentle temperament, good spirits, and enlightenment—how that would give my soul the nourishment it has lacked so completely here, a nourishment I miss more and more as I grow older!" (Ak: 10:211).
9. Oberlin College was named for Oberlin, an Alsatian clergyman and philanthropist. Lavater, a Swiss theologian, corresponded with Kant briefly in the mid-1770s. In a draft of a letter to Lavater written after April 28, 1775, Kant states: "righteousness is the sum of all religion," and "all wooing of favors by the performance of rituals" is forbidden in a sound religion (Ak: 10:180). Five letters from Basedow to Iselin are included in AS 497–502.
10. Kant criticizes Möser in his first letter to Nicolai. See *On Turning Out Books*, 8:433–436.

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5 Kant on Education, Anthropology, and Ethics

Manfred Kuehn

As Lewis White Beck noted in a paper on "Kant and Education" some time ago, "Kant's experience as an educator can be summarized under four headings: his work as a house tutor, his work as a propagandist and money raiser for the Dessau Philanthropin, his career as a university professor, and his lectures on pedagogy to university" (Beck 1978: 188–215). It should perhaps be noted at the outset that while Kant engaged in all these activities, he did not particularly like most of them.[1] He himself is supposed to have noted jokingly that "there probably never was a worse tutor than I." One of Kant's earliest biographers also claimed that he said: "he considered the ability to engage usefully with children and to be able to lower oneself to being attuned to their concepts as a great art, but he declared also that he was never able to do so" (Jachmann 1804: 11ff.). Part of the reason for his distaste at educating young children must have been this inability, or perhaps better, his dislike of attuning himself to children's concepts. University lectures also appeared to him more as heavy work than as a joyful activity. Thus he wrote as early as 1759: "For my part, I sit daily at the anvil of my lectern and guide the heavy hammer of repetitious lectures, continuously beating out the same rhythm. Now and then I am stirred up somewhat by a nobler inclination, a desire to extend myself somewhat beyond this narrow sphere, but the blustering voice of Need immediately attacks me and, always truthful in its threats, drives me back to hard work without delay—*intenat angues intonat ore*" (Letters: 10:18ff.). Kant's teaching was driven by an external need. It does not itself seem to have been a felt need for him. His lectures on pedagogy were not his own idea either. They had to be offered at the University of Königsberg by official Prussian decree. Who taught them was determined by rotation among the professors. Kant *had* to teach the course four times in 1776, 1780, 1783–1784, and 1786–1787 (LP: 9: 437–499).[2] The first lecture course was based on Johann Bernhard Basedow's *Methodenbuch für Mütter und Väter aller Völker* (1770–1771). The others had to be based on Friedrich Samuel Bock's *Lehrbuch der Erziehungskunst zum Gebrauch für christliche Eltern und künftige Jugendlehrer* (Königsberg and Leipzig: J. H. Hartung, 1780).[3] While we do not know whether Kant

liked the experience of teaching pedagogics to his students, we may very well doubt that he was less excited about it than was his colleague Bock—especially after he was forced to teach in accordance with Bock's text. We would probably not go too far, if we said that Kant was a reluctant practical educator, and that more theoretical concerns were uppermost in his mind. The so-called *Lectures on Pedagogy*, edited by Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1803, seem to be a late outcome of these lectures. Though based on some of Kant's notes, it remains difficult to determine how precisely many of the notes published by Rink correspond to Kant's own notes.[4]

The only labor of love, as far as practical education is concerned, was probably his work on the "Essays regarding the Philanthropinum" which appeared in the *Königsberger gelehrte und politische Zeitung* on March 28, 1776, and March 27, 1777. They were written to persuade the people of Königsberg to subscribe to publications by the Philanthropinum (EP: 2:447–452; see also Kuehn 2001: 227–229). Not surprisingly, Kant had actually little to say about the educational practices employed in Dessau and much more about how the Institute is an important sign for the future. There is no question for Kant that the educational institute founded by Basedow's institute is a real innovation and at the same time "fitting to nature as well as civil purposes" (EP: 2:447) It is "a phenomenon of our age, which, although overlooked by ordinary eyes, must be much more important in the eyes of every intelligent spectator sympathetic to the welfare of humanity than that shiny nothing on the ever-changing stage of the great world, which, if it does not set it back, at least does not advance the good of the human species a hear breadth further" (EP: 2:450).

Accordingly, Kant seems to have been most interested in education as a means to the "welfare of humanity," that is to "civil purposes." In particular, Kant is interested in how education is "fitting to nature" and how nature and nurture supplement each other. Put differently, Kant was interested in education from both an anthropological and a cosmopolitan point of view. Since Kant believed that human beings are the only animals that need education (LE: 9:441), it may be argued that he considered educability as an essential human trait. In any case, this is what I will argue in the remainder of this chapter. I will also try to show what consequences the necessity of education for human animals has for a proper understanding of the historical, political, and moral dimension of Kant's critical philosophy, claiming that education plays a more important role in Kant's practical philosophy than commonly acknowledged. For moral education is, according to Kant himself, very important for morality and the progress of the human race.[5]

In various places, Kant identifies three stages in education, namely (1) nurture, (2) discipline and (3) cultivation.[6] He also finds that human beings can be considered from two different points of view, namely as animals and as intelligent beings.[7] Education may also be considered

from these two perspectives. Thus nurture, for Kant, has only to do with our animality. Discipline also largely concerns our animality, since through discipline we are changed from mere animals to human beings. It transforms us from just being "wild" to being "free" (LP: 9:441). The kind of discipline Kant has in mind here must take place in early childhood. Since I agree with Beck that Kant's ideas about the early education of children make him look "like a Dr. Spock of the eighteenth century, and what he says . . . is only of antiquarian interest," I will concentrate in this chapter just on the last stage of education, namely that of cultivation (Beck 1978: 198).[8]

Yet, even this topic would still be too wide for a chapter. Kant differentiates in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* of 1798 three different aspects of this last stage:

> The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the Characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to *cultivate* himself, to *civilize* himself, and to *moralize* himself by means of the arts and sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself over *passively* to the impulses of comfort and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity be *actively* struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature. (Ant: 7:324; see also LP: 9:449ff. and Ant: 7:326).

While human beings are the only animals that need education, it is the education in the service of morality that is most important for Kant (LP: 9:441). Accordingly, I will concentrate on the necessity of human beings to "be *educated* to the good" (Ant: 7:325). This education is closely connected with the acquisition of character, as we will see.

Beck, for obvious reason, did not pay sufficient attention to the importance of the anthropology lectures in his important paper on education in Kant's work.[9] I will assume that these lectures constitute a fifth heading of Kant's experience as an educator and therefore also of his reflections on education. It is perhaps even the most important heading of all. In fact, I believe that it is the anthropology (and its connection with ethics) that provides "the unifying thought of Kant's educational theory," and not so much his philosophy of history, as (Beck 1978: 199f.) suggests.[10]

To this end, I will first represent and discuss the development of Kant's views on the relationship between education and the formation of character. I will then, in section II, take a brief look at Kant's theory of the temperaments as the natural foundation of character and virtue, why Kant later came to reject this view and what consequence this had for his views on the goal of moral education. Finally, I will consider his views on the importance of moral and political education in his mature position.

I. EDUCATION AND THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER

The short remarks at the end of the *Anthropology* in the relatively short second part of the book, called "Anthropological Characteristic," are traces of a longer discussion in the anthropology lectures Kant gave between 1772–1773 and 1774–1775, usually under the title "Of the Character of the Human Being." In the *Anthropology*, this part is, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, subdivided into "The Character of the Person," "The Character of the Sexes," "The Character of the Peoples," and "The Character of the Species." The quoted remarks are found in "The Character of the Species," that is, in the very context in which they should be found, if educability is an essential characteristic of human beings.

In the earliest sets of lecture notes (Collins and Parow, both dated 1772–1773), Kant discusses the character of the human being in four respects:

1. In accordance with the body or its complexion
2. In accordance with the connection of the soul and body or in accordance with the temperament
3. In accordance with the powers of the soul (*Gemüthskräfte*) or its particular nature (*das Naturell*)
4. In accordance with the particular application of the powers of the soul in accordance with the character (Apr: 25,1:426; see also AC: 25,1: 218 and AF: 25,1: 526).

All of these aspects of character are essentially related to moral education.

This fourfold division is still present in the 1781–1782 lecture, where Kant distinguishes between our external character, i.e., what he used to call "complexion," and three senses of internal character, namely "talent," "sensible character" (*Sinnesart*), and "rational character," something he also calls "*Denkungsart*" (AM: 25,2:1156). In the last set of published student notes from 1784–1785, the four different aspects of the human character are replaced by a discussion of the difference between human beings and animals (AM: 25,2:1415).[11]

It is perhaps interesting that in the section on "The Character of the Person" in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* Kant basically follows the division of human predispositions as found in the 1772–1773 and 1775–1776 lectures. Leaving out complexion or external character altogether, he divides the discussion into "natural aptitude" or the particular nature or natural predisposition of a human being, temperament, and character (Ant: 7:285–302). It is even more interesting that he here sharply differentiates between natural aptitude and temperament on the one hand, and character on the other: "The first two predispositions indicate what can be made of the human being; the last (moral) predisposition indicates what he can make of himself" (Ant: 7:285). Character "does not depend on what nature makes of the human being, but on what the human being *makes of himself* for the former belongs to temperament (where the subject is for the most part passive),

and only the latter enables one to recognize that he has a character" (Ant: 7:292). In other words, character is never given, it is always "acquired" (Ant: 7:294). Nor is it gradually acquired, but it is "like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to oneself; which makes the resolution and the moment when this transformation took place unforgettable to him, like the beginning of a new epoch" (Ant: 7:294). Acquiring a character means that the individual has made "truthfulness his supreme maxim, in the heart of his confession to himself as well as in his behavior toward everyone else" (Ant: 7:295).[12] One may well ask what education can contribute to such a conversion, and it is no surprise that Kant explicitly rules out the fragmentary and gradual approach of education as source of this rebirth. This makes education problematic in the moral context.

This sharp distinction between moral character on the one hand and natural dispositions and temperaments on the other is not present in Collins and Parow. Accordingly, we find in Collins the explicit claim that character is "nothing but the peculiarity of the higher faculties" or our cognitive nature (AC: 25,1:227). Indeed, Kant claims the "human being cannot give to himself another character than the one he has from nature, and all that he can do is to mitigate what is bad [in him]" (AC: 25,1:228). And this is the result of education or *Bildung*. Our bodily character can be educated by training that allows us to endure all adversity. Our temperament can be educated by discipline, our natural aptitude by giving us more information, and our character by providing us with examples (AC: 25,1:231). A similar view can be found in 1775–1776 (Friedländer), where Kant distinguishes between four different stages of education, namely "the development of nature, the guidance of freedom, the instruction of the understanding, and the development of reason and character" (AF: 25,1:723). As late as 1781–1782 Kant seems to have believed that character is the result of education: "in the education of children we should be careful to create in them a character," and this even if we may not always be able to produce a good character (AM: 25,2:1169). Indeed, he believes that nature may exclude some people from ever obtaining a character because it has not given them the necessary "firmness in principles" (AM: 25,2:1170). Character, like virtue in Aristotle, either simply arises from nature or it can be the result of gentle (or not so gentle) modifications of nature by education. But the most it can be is nature transformed. One might say that early on Kant is a naturalist about character. His mature view shows him to be an anti-naturalist about character.

To sum up: whereas there is a very close connection between all aspects of character and education for Kant until 1781–1782, his mature view seems to exclude such a close connection. Character is here the result of an instantaneous rebirth or a decision to live only in accordance with self-imposed rational principles. This is highly significant because Kant's anthropological concept of character links up in important ways with his ethical theory (Kuehn 2006: xviii–xxix and Kuehn 2009: 18–20). The concept that primarily corresponds to character in his ethical theory is virtue. It

will therefore be important that we take a close look at the concept of virtue in Kant's mature work. However, before we do so, it might be useful to consider how precisely Kant thought early on that virtue was rooted in anthropological characteristics.

II. TEMPERAMENTS AS THE NATURAL FOUNDATION OF CHARACTER AND VIRTUE

As we have seen, for the early Kant, our ability to acquire a character or to reach moral perfection depended on both education and the way we are actually constituted. It may therefore worth our while to examine somewhat more closely the story Kant has to tell about our constitution and its relevance for moral education. This story has to do mainly with his doctrine of the temperaments. It takes up significant space in all his anthropology lectures and it is also present in his published *Anthropology* where Kant speaks of "natural dispositions" that precede any external influence of education or habit. He introduces them analogically in his last work as psychological categories "borrowed from the constitution of the blood" (Ant: 7:286). But he also thinks that they may have "well also have corporeal factors in the human being, as covertly contributing causes" (Ant: 7:286). Kant's theory depends on a tradition that can be traced back at least to Hippocrates (460–370 BC) who believed that our moods, emotions, and thus our behavior were caused by bodily fluids also called "humors." He identified four humors, namely black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood. It was further developed by Galen (AD 131–200) who identified the four temperaments of sanguine, melancholic, choleric, and phlegmatic in accordance with the four bodily humors, viewing the different mixtures as reasons for different behaviors in humans.

While Kant obviously still considered the theory relevant in 1798, his acceptance of it actually predates Kant's anthropology lectures. It was already present in his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* of 1764 and his *Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*.[13] I will therefore begin the discussion from here. Comparing "the casts of mind of human beings" that determine which of the three species of the finer feelings of benevolence, complaisance, or honor dominates in a human being, Kant finds that "each of them stands in closer kinship with one of the temperaments as they are usually divided," namely the melancholic, the sanguine, the choleric, and the phlegmatic (Obs: 2:219). He is aware that he leaves out of the picture "the cruder feelings . . . of self-interest and vulgar sensuality, etc." (Obs: 2:219). But the latter seem to be feelings Kant never respected and always tried to eliminate, in any case. His earliest account of the temperaments and their consequences for morality went as follows:

The phlegmatic character type is almost completely out of luck as far as morality goes. While he thinks that no one ever is "entirely without traces of finer sentiment," the phlegmatic person comes close (Obs: 2:220). He

even lacks some of the cruder incentives, and since he does, "no ingredients of the sublime or the beautiful," i.e., neither true virtue nor adopted virtue, neither principles nor finer feelings can be found in him. He therefore does not even need to be discussed in the context of the *Observations*. The phlegmatic person is more or less—but definitely rather more than less—determined to have a non-moral or immoral character. He has no choice. Nor does he care, as he is insensitive to the finer things in life. He would rather read *Robinson Crusoe* than *Grandison*. Bored with "beautiful music," he cares neither about the style of writing nor about "the enchantments of love" (Obs: 2:224f.). There is no hope for him. The melancholic, on the other hand, is favored by nature. He has "above all a feeling for the sublime" (Obs: 2:220); and "genuine virtue from principles therefore has something about it that seems to agree most with the melancholic frame of mind in a moderate sense" (Obs: 2:219). "He is steadfast. For that reason he subordinates his sentiments to principles" (Obs: 2:220); he does not care about what others think; rather, "he is a strict judge of himself and others and is not seldom weary of himself as well of the world" (Obs: 2:221). Not surprisingly, Kant thought of himself as a melancholic. The choleric "has a dominant feeling for that sort of the sublime, which one can call the magnificent" (Obs: 2:222). His moral luck is not as great as that of the melancholic, but he is still lucky. Honor and pride may not lead to true virtue as surely as does steadfastness, but it may get him close. The sanguine person, by contrast, "has a dominant feeling for the beautiful" or those finer feelings that lead to adopted virtue. Since he does not appreciate laws and considers them "commonly too strict" (Obs: 2:222).

So whether or not we are capable of true virtue is for the Kant of the *Observations* determined to the largest extent by the nature of our temperament. But it is by no means the only thing that determines us in this regard. It also matters whether we are male or female, as "all male qualities" tend more toward the sublime, and thus toward principles and true virtue, whereas women tend toward the beautiful, that is the finer feelings and adopted virtue. Accordingly and perhaps not surprisingly, given what we have heard already, the "virtue of a women is a beautiful virtue. That of the male sex ought to be noble virtue" (Obs: 2:231). And if that were not enough, there are of course determinants that come from nationality or race. Though he declines to investigate in the context of the *Observations* whether "national differences are contingent and depend upon the times and types of government, or are bound by a certain necessity to the climate," it is clear that human beings are either sociologically or biologically determined in their basic outlook (Obs: 2:243n). I will not quote the infamous passage in which Kant denied, primarily based on information he got from the reading of Hume, the possibility that black people could ever accomplish anything great in art or the sciences and also claimed that black people are determined by nature to fall short of the achievements that white people are capable of.

I do not wish to defend Kant on any of this, and especially not on the last point. But it is true that this deterministic account of human nature and

our predispositions toward all kinds of achievements and especially morality, does apply for him to all human beings. These claims survive in the early lectures on anthropology in which he argued that we are predisposed by nature to become what we are. Feelings and inclinations are rooted in our animality, and trying to overcome these preconditions is so difficult as to be almost impossible. Furthermore, given this account of the human condition, it is not surprising that he concluded "there are very few people who conduct themselves in accordance with principles." It is not even clear whether in 1764 he deems acting in accordance with principles to be a good thing (Obs: 2:217). This changes in the anthropology lectures. Maxims become increasingly important. They are the result of education and lead to self-constraint. They modify our temperament.

Virtue or moral perfection, in this context, can only mean the development of the "germs" of goodness that a human being has by nature" (AC: 25,1:228). As Kant said in 1772–1773:

> All characters of human beings are moral, for ethics (*die Moral*) is just the science of all the ends *which have been determined by the nature of the will and which are prescribed by the objective laws of the will.* We endeavor to direct our faculties in accordance with them. Character is a certain subjective rule of the highest faculty of desire (*Oberbegehrungs Vermögen*). Its objective rules contain morality. Accordingly, the special constitution of the highest faculty of desire creates human character. *But each will and each highest faculty is peculiar in its constitution, and has its own subjective laws, which precisely constitute the character.* . . . He who has a bad character, can never reach the opposite or the good character because the true germ is missing, which must have been placed into our nature for that end. (AP: 25, 1:438)

No virtue without sources or "germs" placed in us by nature. This is precisely what Kant later rejected.[14]

Furthermore, and this is perhaps even more important, his view on maxims also changes. Early on, he thinks that our maxims are the result of education and are used to modify the human nature or the temperament that is given to us. This is precisely the view that he later overturned and rejected. Maxims are freely adopted. His main reason for changing his mind is his realization that morality is about freedom and that it is incompatible with the kind of determinism implicit in the account of human nature that he gave in the *Observations* and the early lectures on anthropology. Morality cannot merely be "a self-constraint (for then one natural inclination could strive to overcome another),"—and only the melancholic would naturally be inclined to strive for this vigorously. This must also be "a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom" (MM: 6:394).[15]

While Kant did not mean to deny in the *Observations* or in the early lecture notes on anthropology that we are in some sense free, he was in this work far removed from his mature position on freedom. The kind of freedom

that he presupposed in the *Observations* and the anthropology lectures is a characterized by a kind of compatibilism that is close to that of Leibniz, Wolff, and Hutcheson. Very much like Hutcheson, Kant saw no necessity for a principle of inner freedom that would place human beings outside the realm of nature and into a "kingdom of ends" that would be incompatible with natural laws. He thought our actions would be both determined by fixed laws in "the very inclination of his volitions and desires," yet also be free. Only if the agent is "compelled to perform his action against his will" through forces that exist "outside the desires and spontaneous inclinations of the subject" is he not free (Obs: 2:400). To act freely simply means to act voluntarily; and this is most definitely not "the principle of inner freedom" required by the Categorical Imperative.

But, as we have seen already, Kant argued in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* that we must make a sharp distinction between the temperament, "where the subject is for the most part passive," and the character of the person, which he creates himself. Temperament, he says, "has a fancy price (*Affektionspreis*) . . . but character has an inner worth, and is beyond all price" (Ant: 7:292). Put differently, the temperament of a man or women has no moral value at all. It has nothing to do with virtue. Virtue now depends on our moral disposition or on "maxims of the will" we have adopted in accordance with the laws of freedom. As a result of this change, Kant's definition of virtue also changes. It consists no longer just in the rational constraint of the particular natural temperament one may have. Rather, it is, as he put it in the *Metaphysics of Morals*

> the strength of a human being's maxims in following his duty.—Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which come into conflict with the human being's moral resolution; and since it is man himself who puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims, virtue is not merely a self-constraint (for then one natural inclination could strive to overcome another) but also a self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom and so through the mere representation of one's duty in accordance with its formal law. (MM: 6:394)

In other words, virtue for the mature Kant, depends not just on *overcoming* our natural inclinations and natural inclinations, but also on a very specific kind of self-constraint, in accordance with "a principle of inner reason." This principle is the Categorical Imperative, which is "a necessary law for all rational beings," not just for humans (Gr: 4:426). It cannot be the result of education, but must be seen as an a priori principle. So it might appear that the importance of education in ethics decreased in Kant's thinking between 1772 and 1798, just as the importance of the concept of autonomy in ethics increased, but it never completely disappeared.

One might argue that education could play only a preliminary role in Kant's mature theory. Education, according to this view, can provide us

with the materials for such maxims. Which maxims we should adopt and why we should adopt them are entirely different questions. Education can also call our attention to the importance of moral resolution and freedom. It can, in Socratic fashion, remind us that we have "a pure moral interest" (CPr: 5:156) and the inner worth of virtue beyond all price (Ant: 7:291). And this is what Kant emphasizes at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Educators should give examples that show why virtue has a real worth. It has a high value only because it costs us so much, and not because it brings any advantage (CPr: 5:153). They should also exercise the students' judgment in order to facilitate moral judgments (CPr: 5:159ff.). This is not nothing, but it does seem to diminish the importance of education for morality in Kant's system. It now seems to have a merely preparatory role.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

It is certainly true that education can only have a preparatory role, if we consider "pure" morality, that is, if we restrict our consideration to Kant's discussion of moral education within the context of his analysis of the conceptual framework of morality. Education does, however, assume a much more important role, if we look at his doctrine of "applied morality," that is, of morality as it must be viewed within the context of civil society.[16]

Virtue—even for the mature Kant—is a specifically human achievement. Neither God nor the angels can be virtuous, for instance, and this just because it is "the strength of a human being's maxims in following his duty" in overcoming "the obstacles it can overcome" (Kuehn 2010: 7–27); see also (Kuehn 2010: 24–26). Virtue consists no longer simply in *restraining* what is natural; it now consists in *overcoming* what is natural, but it is still acquired. The "very concept of virtue" implies this. We need no "appeal to anthropological knowledge based in experience" to show this, for "a human being's moral capacity would not be virtue, if it were not produced by the *strength* of his resolution in conflict with powerful opposing inclinations" (MM: 6:477). It is thus the result of practical reason. But this does not mean that virtue cannot be taught.

In fact, Kant insists that virtue "can and must be taught," as this "follows from it not being innate" (MM: 6:477). Yet it cannot be taught conceptually, that is, imparted as knowledge, as Plato and Socrates might have thought. We must train and exercise in order to become virtuous. Kant proposes the method of the catechism for this, which is interesting, but not what I would like to pursue in this context because it reminds me a little too much of Dr. Spock. What is more interesting to me is what this necessity of the teaching of virtue shows about what is important "in the eyes of every intelligent spectator sympathetic to the welfare of humanity." Asked differently, the question is about the relationship between educating individual members of the human species and the education of the human race. As Beck pointed out already in his "Kant on Education," there is no doubt that

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's essay "On the Education of the Human Race" of 1780 looms large in the background of Kant's view on education (Beck 1978: 197ff.); see also (Kuehn 2009: 68–93).

Kant was very optimistic about the efficacy of reason in the human species, while being very pessimistic about the rationality of human individuals. In fact, he considered their actions, apart from the occasional "wisdom that appears here and there among individuals, as expressions of "folly, childish vanity, childish malice and destructiveness" (Idea 8:18). Things human follow "an idiotic course" (Idea: 8:18). And it was his attempt to explain what seems to "a planless conglomeration of human actions" (Idea: 8:29) that led him to postulate as possible a hidden plan in nature that gives to every individual "a natural but to each of them unknown goal" (Idea: 8:17). His "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" of 1784 is his attempt to lay down the principles that must be followed in the telling of this story.

It is very clear that education had to play an important role for him in this undertaking and that anthropology was crucial in this enterprise. Let us recall, Kant summed up his anthropology as follows: "The sum total of pragmatic anthropology . . . [is the] human being is destined by his reason *to live in a society with human beings* and *in it* to *cultivate* . . . *civilize*, and *moralize* himself by means of the arts and the sciences" (Ant: 7:324f.) Arguing against Rousseau, he tries to show that civil society is the "highest degree of artificial improvement of the human being's good predisposition to the final end of its vocation" (Ant: 7:327). We are, he says in the last two sentences of the published *Anthropology*, generally good in our volitions and a "species of rational beings that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant progress toward the good." He further claims that this progress towards a cosmopolitically united system cannot, he claims, be achieved by free consent of individuals, but only by government, and he leaves it at that.

In his lectures on anthropology he is more explicit. Thus in the lecture notes Friedländer of the Winter of 1775–1776, that is, around the same time that Kant was also writing about Basedow's institute, he argued that human beings develop their talents only in civil society and that only in a perfect civil society can they develop perfectly, and then asked whether the perfection of any individual depended on the perfection of the state or whether the perfection of the state depended on the perfection of every human individual. His answer was that it was probably the second alternative that was true, and that *therefore* education, and especially moral education, was of paramount importance (AF: 25,1:690ff.). In 1777–1778, he asked the same question, though the answer seems less definite: "when human society becomes more perfect, then humanity will also become more prefect" (AP: 25,2:843). In 1781–1782, he is more definite again, claiming that "cultivated subjects" are necessary for a "perfect civil constitution." That is why "enlightenment," international law, and a better education are necessary (MM: 25, 2:1201f.). And in 1784–1785 he argues that there are three means of perfecting humanity: "1. Education. 2. Legislature 3. Religion. All three must be public and in accordance with human nature" (AM: 25, 2:1427). All three must also be

negative. "The final end of humanity will only be reached when we have a perfect civil constitution, that is *when we* are in the highest stat of cultivation, civilisation and moralisation, when we are at the stage where the well-being of humanity is no longer interrupted by wars other kinds of evil. When the highest culture, civilization and moralisation has been reached, there will be universal peace." We might not be able to tell how this will come about "because our reason here approaches the limits of eternal reason" (AM: 25,1:1429). But we may hope and educate.

In 1798, in a section entitled "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" of *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant identified a *signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognostikon* or historical sign that there is a tendency toward progress in the human race, namely the French Revolution (CF: 7:84). But this sign also meant that the perfection of the human race cannot be achieved by gradual improvements in education, that is "bottom up." It needs to be "top down," i.e., it must come from the government (CF: 7:92). This does not mean, however, that education is less important. In fact, it means that the government needs to educate proper educators. This means (or can be taken to mean) that university professors are called upon to take a more active role in education.

But be that as it may, it shows again why for Kant educability is not just one of the essential characteristics of human beings, but the most important one of all. It has not just moral, but also political implications that go far beyond the needs of any particular government or state. The well-being of humanity in the long run depends on it.

NOTES

1. All translations of Kant's texts are my own unless otherwise noted in the bibliography.
2. It is clear that some of Kant's objections to teaching theology to small children are directly related to claims made by Bock. See also the review in *Allgemeinen deutschen Bibliothek* 47 (1781): 298–301.
3. Bock was Kant's colleague. He lived from 1716 to 1785. The two were rivals of some sort, and did not always get along. See Kuehn 2001: 159, 207, 391.
4. The so-called *Lectures on Pedagogy*, edited by Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1803, seem to be an outcome of these lectures, though it is difficult to determine how much the notes published by Rink correspond to Kant's own notes. See also Weisskopf 1970. I agree with Beck's estimation of the fruits of Weisskopf's labors: "there is a high degree of pedantic overkill in Weisskopf's relentless persecution of Rink" (Beck 1978:195). While the *Lectures on Pedagogy* should not be taken to be of primary importance, they should not be discounted altogether either. The consensus seems to be that these lectures notes do not correspond very closely to Kant's own lectures. But be that as it may, I can only agree with Beck that there is nothing in these particular lectures that cannot be also found in other lecture notes and other publications by Kant, so I also agree with him that they are not essential for understanding Kant's views on education.

5. This is perhaps most readily apparent from what he says toward the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.
6. See very beginning of the lectures on education (LE: 9:442). In his lectures on anthropology, he concentrates, for the most part on the latest, stage, namely "*Bildung*." See, for instance AC: 25:231f.
7. See AF 25:475, for instance.
8. Kant identifies three stages in education: (1) nurture, (2) discipline, and 3) cultivation. Beck actually characterizes only his remarks on the very first stage as antiquarian. I think Kant's remarks on nurture and discipline are equally dated.
9. The lectures on anthropology were published only after his death. For Kant's Anthropology, see also Frierson 2003: 1–9 and 31–67. My account of the "application" of morality to human beings is, however, rather different from Frierson's. It has little to do with the "applications of moral laws," and everything with the difference between the Categorical Imperative as a law of all rational beings and virtue as a specifically human achievement.
10. Beck did not, however, have available to him the two volumes of the Academy edition that contain the lecture notes by Kant's students. My claim is that Kant's philosophy of history depends in important ways on Kant's anthropology.
11. We see what is characteristic for the human species, when we compare humans and animals. Human beings belong to animals in the system of nature. When I consider the human being in the system of the world, however, he belongs among the rational beings. This division is already present in earlier lectures. See AF: 25,1:475, but there is no dichotomy between human beings as members of the system of nature and the system of rational beings. The dichotomy itself reminds of the *Groundwork*, of course.
12. Somewhat annoyingly, Kant does not pursue this topic further, but launches into a discussion on the merits of physiognomy—just as in his earlier lecture notes. See AC: 25,1:228, for instance.
13. It consists of reflections he made in an interleaved copy of the "Observations" probably between "January 1764" and "the End of 1765."
14. This, by the way, also seems to mean that Kant later rejected the idea that black people are destined by their nature. In the end, we are all free to overcome our nature.
15. The theory of the temperaments, as presented at the end of the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,* has, accordingly, no longer any importance for Kant's moral theory.
16. For a fuller discussion of the relation of virtue and civil society, see Surprenant 2006 and 2010. This chapter should be seen as an attempt to support his conclusions in a different way. For Kant's "impure ethics," see Louden 2000.

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6 Educating through Perplexity
Kant and the German Enlightenment

Richard Velkley

My intent is to relate some of Kant's central ideas on university education to what I call, in a rather unorthodox usage, the German Enlightenment. I employ that term to cover a large area, from Leibniz through Hegel and Schelling, but with justification, as I believe I can show. Kant, as the figure who inaugurates a new phase in the German Enlightenment, is the only German philosopher in my title, but I will also have extended remarks on Schelling who, with Hegel, is the end of this movement's highly productive phase, before the advent of the Neo-Kantian and Neo-idealist epigones.

I. WHAT IS REASON?

The German Enlightenment is the response to the first great crisis in the foundations of the modern era. The crisis can be identified with the appearance of a set of questions and perplexities about the soundness of the basis of the modern Enlightenment. The most searching criticisms came not from traditionalists but arose among the Enlightenment's philosophical adherents. These critics held that the modern philosophical revolution initiated by Machiavelli, Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke contained some essential and irreversible insights, but they also thought that the new principles of natural science, political right, and human knowledge, in their original formulations, were practically deficient as well as theoretically unsatisfying. The most frequently voiced doubts and questions are rather familiar. They relate to conflicts between the new science and prescientific experience; to uncertainty about the beneficence of progress and of humanitarian projects that have little to say about virtue; to fears about the abstractness of universalism and its endangerment of the poetry of the local and traditional; and to skepticism about whether the modern notions of reason are able to give satisfactory accounts of their own purposes. For some critical observers, but not the sympathizers of the Enlightenment, these difficulties seemed to show that the world as construed by reason can only be alien to the human, and that recourse to feeling and faith is the only way to achieve purpose and meaning. Misology and rejection of science loomed on the horizon.

It is to address this danger that the German thinkers from Leibniz to Hegel and Schelling sought to refound the Enlightenment. Their concerns are strikingly relevant to us today. For some decades the core ideas of the Western Enlightenment have been challenged in intellectual circles and in the universities by modes of thinking derived from the Enlightenment's recent great critics, Nietzsche and Heidegger above all. However the debates connected with this challenge, about the university's purpose and curriculum, about multiculturalism and logocentrism, are now significantly muted compared to how they were fifteen or twenty years ago. This is not due to philosophical resolution but to growing weariness and apathy about philosophic questions of purpose. Scholarship seems to be turning to microscopic cultural and historical research and rarefied technical studies.

Whether its politics is called conservative, liberal, or leftist does not really matter, for the avoidance of the largest and most important questions is the common denominator. An understandable fatigue about debates over the Western Canon and Eurocentrism should not result in the euthanasia of reason, to borrow a phrase from Kant. Many aspects of the present situation indicate that the problems of the first crisis of the Enlightenment are still with us, even if this fact is not widely recognized. The German Enlightenment's insights as well as its oversights and errors can instruct us, for there are few other periods in Western history in which the question "What is human reason?" has been investigated so deeply. The gestures of postmodernism and the end of history, which claimed that this question is dead or is no longer necessary because it has been answered, have had their day. In a return to genuine thinking we must begin with the recognition that in our lack of answers we are still faced with the fundamental perplexities.

II. PROJECTS OF RECONCILIATION

First it will be helpful to recall three rather familiar features of the German Enlightenment from Leibniz to Hegel and Schelling. They are its institutional form, its political character and situation, and its international significance beyond German borders, especially in these United States of America. As is frequently noted, German philosophy has been chiefly university philosophy, and German philosophers have been more often than not professors. Leibniz, the true originator of this Enlightenment, was not a professor, but he founded the Berlin Academy of Sciences, and his thought, chiefly through Christian Wolff, became the basis of the first major university philosophy of German origin. It prevailed until Kant and his heirs replaced it with other university philosophies. German philosophy has been arguably the greatest academic institutional success of modern philosophy. This is connected to its central aim of offering a satisfactory account of reason that builds on the earlier modern accounts of reason and reconciles them with fundamental human interests in freedom, moral virtue, aesthetic

experience, natural teleology, and providential views of history. All of this is to support harmonious relations between theoretical and practical life, and to provide a unitary basis for the pursuit of the arts and sciences. Frequently there is also an attempt to reconcile antiquity and modernity, and thereby to reform university education. Schelling's "Lectures on the Method of Academic Study" of 1802, to which I will return, is a classic statement of such philosophic rethinking of the university (Schelling VMS).

Leibniz established this mode of philosophizing, which superseded the subordination of philosophy to revealed theology in the scholastic "summa" of the medieval university, and provided a "theodicy" of modern Enlightenment. Nietzsche observed that all of German philosophy is "theodicy," a justification of human reason as at home in the universe. Theodicy from Leibniz to Hegel followed the strategy of noting that the interests of reason have common enemies. Both freedom as the basis of moral life and theoretical inquiry are undermined by the doctrinal extremes of fatalism and fanaticism, dogmatism and skepticism. In arguing that what has common enemies also has common premises, the philosophers hoped to demonstrate the ultimate unity of the sobriety of critical reason and the sublimity of sacred awe, and to overcome the apparently unbridgeable gulf between them. This is a problematic project. Yet one has to admit that it sustained the awareness of both aspects of human experience by attempting to fathom their relation and their implications.

Starting with Kant, German philosophy in its Idealist form combined such concerns with support for the great revolutionary movements in Europe and the Americas. While promoting the ideas of freedom, humanity, universal rights, and progress through science, the later German Enlightenment sought to give a more elevated interpretation of all such concerns, and to create a higher culture of freedom. The impulse given by Rousseau to the criticism of merely instrumental or utilitarian views of reason and of the Enlightenment was the heart of this elevation. Its essence was the claim, resting on a transformation of Rousseau's thought, that the modern principle of self-determination must develop an implicit foundation, namely, a sublime source of motivation for virtue in freedom as the ground of human dignity. In spite of, or perhaps rather because of, its ambiguous yet mostly favorable interpretation of the French and Anglo-American democratic Enlightenments, German Idealist philosophy won an early reception in this country and struck deep roots into its intellectual life, especially in education.

It is well known that the German universities and German ideas of education were models for many of the leading American institutions of learning. Often one emphasizes only the graduate seminar and advanced specialized research as the core of that contribution. But more essentially, through the latter part of the nineteenth century until the First World War, one looked to the German Enlightenment for its conception of the humane mission of the university. Thus in 1904 University of Chicago President

William Rainey Harper used the language of German Idealism to assert that the university "has for its function to lead the souls of men and nations into close communion with the common soul of all humanity" (Harper 1904: 347).

Conceptions like Harper's were sustained by an international tradition of philosophic thought in which Hegel was a living authority and not a "Great Book." This tradition was, of course, soon to collapse. It could be argued that the German Enlightenment tradition was the true backbone of the American secular university, as promoting the universal aims of modern natural science and democratic reform, under the guidance of an ideal of intellectual and spiritual maturity.

III. IS THERE A UNIFYING TELOS?

A few more remarks on the philosophical concerns of the German Enlightenment will help lay the background for Kant. Modern philosophy since Descartes struggles with the question of how to reconcile the modern account of nature with the human experience of the human, and also with the probably insurmountable problem of how to relate self-consciousness to any account of nature or being. I do not see that any form of natural teleology will get one beyond that difficulty. This is not to assert that natural teleology can simply be replaced by some form of humanly constructed teleology. Modern philosophy's efforts to address such difficulties have been for the most part, if not always, theoretical, and not merely constructions designed to bring an end to religious and civil conflict. On the other hand it is surely the case that modern theoretical proposals have been part of practical projects to supply new unifying foundations intended to overcome premodern conflicts of theory and practice.

Leibniz searched for a synthesis of ancient and modern accounts of nature that would ground the unity of being and knowing, or of body and mind, in a teleological metaphysics. He thus set the terms of the metaphysical problem for Kant's criticism of reason, which exposed an antinomy in the theoretical striving to acquire knowledge of the unconditioned, or a unified account of being and knowing. Moral self-determination then occupies the place of discredited metaphysical knowledge. The self-legislative practical reason alone can establish the final end of all uses of reason, which Leibniz had still sought to discover in the natural order. Even before Kant had fully developed his critique of theoretical metaphysics, he had found in Rousseau the notion that human reason is dialectical unless it abandons its subordination to a presumed natural order of ends, and determines its own teleology for itself. Kant was at the same time following Rousseau's criticism of the Early Modern Enlightenment as offering, in the guise of a passionate telos for reason, actually no telos at all. These two thinkers thus defined the teleological project for their successors: to show that reason out

of its own freedom and spontaneity can institute a comprehensive unifying structure for all human pursuits, and thus modern Enlightenment. But one has to add that Rousseau remains skeptical about the prospects of universal Enlightenment, even as reformed by him.

This German teleological project, shared by the major thinkers from Kant through Hegel and Schelling, involved a new interpretation of the human soul, subject, or self, in terms of the dialectical striving of an antinomic reason to arrive at unity with itself. Struggling on a path of manifold forms of perplexity and alienation, which make up human history, the self strives after a satisfactory recognition of its own essence, in the complete realization of free activity. Thus human reason must be seen as dynamic and erotic; but in this modern version of Platonic eros, the striving of reason does not culminate in the contemplation of a supersensible world of ideas or the divine intellect, but in an ultimate self-legislation or self-intuition that realizes a projected ideal. The new erotic reason as realizing its own ideal achieved a degree of systematic integration and totality never before attempted or imagined. In Kant's case this was achieved only through a radical separation of free self-legislative reason from the mere givenness of nature, which separation was a source of difficulties for him and a major stimulus to post-Kantian criticisms. I shall now relate such considerations to some notions of the university in the later phase of the German Enlightenment, the phase that Kant began.

IV. CRITIQUE, CULTURE, AND THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

Kant's notion of the university and its function within the advancement of Enlightenment must be related to his account of reason as forming a system. One has to start again from the teleological character of reason, which decides the central concern of philosophy. Kant writes that "philosophy is the idea of a complete wisdom, which shows us the final end of human reason." The final end is reason's self-determination according to a highest principle of legislation. Hence philosophy can also be defined as "the science of the highest maxims of the use of our reason," where "maxim" is understood as "the inner principle of choice among various ends." And accordingly, the philosopher is understood as the legislator of human reason (Ak: 9:24; KrV: A839/B867). Philosophic legislation must be able to establish unity within reason, for only a unified reason can function as a satisfactory final end. Reason thus unified forms a systematic connection of knowledge. This conception of philosophy as legislation presupposes that reason inherently tends to disunity and internal conflict, resulting from its ambition to achieve an unattainable wholeness of satisfaction from nature. This "natural dialectic of reason" makes the self-criticism of reason the necessary first concern of philosophy. Indeed, if not subjected to criticism, reason is exposed to self-destruction. The principal lesson of criticism is

the necessity for a boundary that divides the striving of free rationality to realize itself according to ideas of the unconditioned, from the determination of the laws of natural phenomena according to the categories of the understanding. Since the highest legislation of reason has the character of free self-restraint, its essence is moral; and Kant says it is with ancient precedent that he regards moral philosophy as the highest part of philosophy (KrV: A840/B868; Ak: 5:107–110).

But Kant is surely giving to moral virtue a function and significance it never had before, as enforcing a restraint on human reason's tendency to seek grounding in a superhuman being, natural or divine, and therewith as providing the final settlement of reason's theoretical striving. All of Kant's successors continue to develop, in various ways, his identification of the grounds of morality or practical life in freedom with the solution to the theoretical problem of reason. Hence unlike Socrates and Plato, his most admired ancients, Kant seems to assert that something like moral virtue can fully satisfy the erotic strivings of our reason. He in fact does not go this far. Moral virtue cannot be the whole good, and so Kant proposes a rather problematic doctrine of the highest good in which happiness complements moral virtue. But the more central point is that Kant, unlike his Idealist successors and critics, rests with a largely negative account of rational freedom, or more precisely, an account of rational freedom in which its positive character as unconditioned autonomy consists in the overcoming of internal contradiction in maxims. This is the source of the familiar critiques of Kantian morality as formalistic. There would seem to be little sense of wholeness derivable from the Kantian view of reason. On the other hand, Kant is optimistic about the universal availability of the principles of self-constraining reason. All human beings are conscious of their a priori validity, and the Socratic task, Kant says, is simply to remove the obstacles to their operation (Ak: 4:404). Yet universal access is not the same as universal efficacy, about which there is no theoretical or practical certainty, but only hope.

Kant argues that the motive of respect for the rational law has certain advantages of efficacy over narrowly self-interested pleasure and passion as motives. Yet it has competitors of a subtler sort in theology and metaphysics, and in misleading ideals of culture generally, as in false moral doctrines of popular, poetic, or philosophic origin. These might appeal to our higher nature as striving for totality, but lead it into dialectic. Put simply, the realm of culture tends to put forward delusory ideas of wholeness that compete with pure morality as the only tenable foundation for seeking wholeness. Yet culture, as the entire realm of rational skills, disciplines, and sciences developed for all "arbitrary" ends other than explicitly moral ones, has an indispensable negative benefit, as preparation for moral legislation. While originally based on primary needs and their satisfaction, culture demands renunciation of inclination and acceptance of the rule of law; it elevates humanity above a condition of chaos worse than animality. At the same time, on the basis

of the very same law-projecting reason, culture creates its delusory ideas of wholes. Foremost among these are the speculative doctrines of the Schools, with their injurious influence on the sound moral understanding.

Accordingly culture acquires a higher level negative task, of placing restraints not just on mere nature but also on its own creations. Religion, speculative thought, science, and the arts are in need of discipline, and the source of that discipline is the critical philosophy. The critical philosopher shows the ends and limits and exposes the defective principles and arguments in all the other realms of culture. This is also philosophy's role within the university, as the so-called lower faculty that prepares for and disciplines the professional faculties of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, which more immediately serve the practical ends of the state (Ak: 7:17–20). But as such, the critical and negative arguments of philosophy are subordinated to the final end pointed out by moral reason. As thus propaedeutical or instrumental to moral reason, by elaborating the limits of reason, theoretical philosophy has its most urgent justification. One discerns here the great conversion that occurred when Kant read Rousseau's *Emile* in 1764: Kant discovered that the sole dignity of philosophy consists in securing the rights of humanity.

University dissemination of critical thought is the core of Kantian Enlightenment. Morality itself, however, is not the object of its instruction. The exercise of morality, being a radically internal and free affair of self-determination, cannot be enforced or much influenced by external precept or example. The critical clarification of the grounds of morality is indeed central to philosophical teaching, but only as presupposing a firm grasp of the a priori moral principle in pure reason. One cannot expect Kant to give central importance to the study of the classics, political history, and poetry as sources of knowledge of moral and practical principles. Although Kant characterizes metaphysics as the perfection of culture, the teaching of metaphysics is not for Kant an introduction to the theoretical life as the highest or best way of life. By the term "metaphysics" Kant does indeed mean the critically purified form of metaphysics in which morality is supreme. The culture of such metaphysics includes the metaphysical foundations of natural science, the metaphysical clarification of morality itself, and the critical propaedeutic which precedes both. But moral self-determination itself, the telos of the whole, is not part of that culture, at least not directly. All of culture as defined by critical philosophy has a circular structure of justifying what it presupposes; the philosopher begins and ends with a duty that he shares with all of humanity, a duty to respect and promote free moral rationality.

The assumption of a final end already actual, but not yet clarified, in human reason, illuminates Kant's tendency to relegate the teleological justifications of his thinking to the final pages of his writings, and to underplay the role of rhetorical persuasion. The intent of his first *Critique* was unclear to his philosophical contemporaries, not to mention the wider public. Although the critical philosopher's teaching and writing are wholly aimed

toward defeating the speculative enemies of common reason, his arguments are hardly intelligible to the common reasoner. Indeed the immediate addressees of Kant's arguments are the teachers of philosophy in the Schools, whose critically reformed pedagogy will ultimately contribute to the "purification of the way of thinking" of the public. Unlike the manifest political and scientific benefactions of earlier modern Enlightenment, the effect of Kantian Enlightenment is largely hidden and inscrutable to the public, even though its purpose is perhaps more ostentatiously humanitarian then the earlier Enlightenment's purposes. It's most apparent benefaction is the insistence on freedom in the public use of reason, which is placed notably above participation in legislation, the securing of life and property, and technological progress as concerns of Enlightenment. Of course Kant's reservations about promoting popular involvement in government may have had prudential grounds in the Prussia of Frederick the Great and his successor.

Although the student of philosophy, unlike the general public, can be expected to grasp the basic intent of Kant's teaching, his education is an instrument for a purpose far beyond himself, the progress of humanity of which he can have, strictly speaking, no experience. The student grasps his education's practical benefits as ideas, pointing to the merely thinkable actualization of institutions in the remote future. If one can say that the function of Kantian philosophic education is to lead the student back into the cave of common moral reason away from the false light of speculative philosophy, from whence to begin a new ascent, one must also say that the student in a sense never gets to his destination. On the basis of critically secured practical reason, the pupil is given the task of advancing human progress toward a moral world. But this is an infinite project and every generation experiences itself as infinitely far from the ideal goal. The role of the university within an enlightened education has other restrictions, as well. Kant does not expect university education to produce philosophic minds, except by rare good fortune, since philosophy cannot be taught except as a historical study. Nor does the university undertake what he regards as actually the most positive aspect of the culture of the human faculties, the aspect most important to bringing sensibility into greater harmony with moral self-legislation. This is aesthetic culture, which Kant understands as having a universal educative task. I shall now take up this theme in connection with Kant's German successors.

V. THE UNITY OF REASON AND AESTHETIC EDUCATION

The thought of Kant's successors cannot be grasped except as objections to and revisions of his doctrines. There is a way of summing up much of their dissent from Kant: the end of reason as proposed by Kant has a defective unity that fails to establish the integration of reason and nature, or the

concrete wholeness of human life. Jacobi, Maimon, Reinhold, and Fichte begin the criticism of Kant by questioning the distinction between appearances and things in themselves; among them Fichte goes furthest toward an identification of theoretical and practical reason, thus rejecting Kant's manner of subordinating theory to practice. In an obvious way, such criticisms could point toward giving university education a more central role in the development of reason, since theoretical inquiry will no longer have a merely negative function. The post-Kantians revive, after a fashion, speculative knowledge of things in themselves; at the same time, they deny that morality is merely a fact of common reason beyond the limits of inquiry. Now morality itself is an object of speculative inquiry that can be more central to the content of university studies, where it will be related more immediately to political, aesthetic, and religious considerations. Furthermore, the greater positive integration of practical with theoretical inquiry entails a more direct relation of university study to the development of the individual, as a concrete being and not solely as a representative of the species and its rational progress.

This theme of the need for greater unity, integration, wholeness, individuality, and concreteness than Kant provides, runs through Fichte, Schiller, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, Schelling, and Hegel. In some cases these thinkers believe they find the key to unity in Kant's own treatment of the aesthetic. Kant ascribes a crucial function to aesthetic culture, as pointing to a transition from nature to freedom, or as refining the inclinations through the free and disinterested play of the faculties, thus preparing them for the rule of moral reason. This is the closest Kant comes to giving an account of the unity of reason and sensibility in the human being, and he himself accords to it decisive systematic importance. Kant goes so far as to propose that reflection on fine art as the product of genius suggests speculative thoughts about unity of reason, imagination, and sense. This road is traveled much further by Schiller, who regards the aesthetic as the highest human activity, accomplishing a true unity of reason and sense. He is much indebted to the accounts in Rousseau and Kant of the fragmenting and discordant features of modern culture and progress. But he employs rather Fichtean notions of the productive power of reason and imagination to argue that aesthetic play is the source of a genuine completion of our humanity, and thus the basis for a theodicy of Enlightenment. To this vision of a unifying aesthetic education, Humboldt adds the emphasis on diversity of experience as constitutive of individuality, again departing from the abstractness of the Kantian form of legislation. Yet these and the other post-Kantian Idealist corrections of Kant preserve his emphasis on a culture having a telos based on freedom.

The most thorough and searching elaboration of such ideas and of their import for university education is to be found in the writings of Schelling. First it should be underlined that according to Schelling, and to Humboldt who is much indebted to him (Humboldt HGS: 3:219–221, 3:342–349,

10:250–260), the ultimate end of scientific inquiry is not solely practical and not solely theoretical, but it is rather the knowledge of the Absolute, or the *Urwissen,* which is at once both theoretical and practical. The state should demand nothing from the activity of pure science, and instead supply only encouragement and material means for its free pursuit. At the same time, all the sciences look to philosophy as their authoritative source of principles. Furthermore, the human benefit of pure science is liberation from narrowly technical and one-sided forms of knowledge, in a *Bildung* that culminates in grasping the unity of the whole in Absolute Knowing. The latter, accomplished through intellectual intuition, is the ultimate unity of the real and the ideal, or the subjective and objective. It is the infinite ground of all being and its knowledge cannot be subordinated to finite human aims. The striving for such knowledge is accordingly not a universal affair: Schelling asserts that the empire of science is not a democracy, still less an ochlocracy, but an aristocracy in the noblest sense (Schelling VMS: 5–32).

At first glance, such notions may seem premodern. Yet the ideal embodiment of the organic unity of the Absolute in philosophic knowledge is accompanied by the Absolute's historical realization in the state, as the real embodiment of its organic unity (Schelling VMS: 74). While philosophy is not merely a means to such realization, its pursuit is a necessary moment in a process that has both theoretical and practical expressions. In both manifestations, the Absolute standpoint overcomes the human fragmentation, specialization, and mechanistic deformation of nature wrought by modern philosophy. The disclosure of the errors of Newtonian physics is particularly central to this reform of modernity, in a new natural philosophy that explicates the foreshadowing of consciousness and rational freedom in prehuman natural potentialities (Schelling VMS: 64–69). It is not Schelling's view that the meaning and content of the theoretical life lie only in a reflection on the historical process as the realization of the Absolute in the state. Rather, the philosophy of history and the philosophy of nature together are the principal sciences whose single ground is the Absolute, and the philosopher's concern is to understand that ground (Schelling VMS: 70–79). His activity is seen as an aspect of the historical process of Enlightenment without losing thereby its distinctive nobility and theoretical character. One cannot miss the similarity of this to the speculative philosophy that Hegel formulated in cooperation with his Jena colleague.

Last, I turn to Schelling's account of the relation of art to Absolute knowledge, which is one of the most remarkable features of his philosophy, including the "Lectures on the Method of Academic Study," and very fateful for both later philosophy and the university. The philosopher is in need of art as his true organon, to help him to grasp the Absolute, for art is its mirror and objective symbol. Hence the philosophy of art should become part of the university curriculum. Philosophy and art meet each other at the peak of human consciousness, where they relate as original and image

(Schelling VMS: 142). More precisely, the philosopher learns from the productivity of artistic genius an absolute legislation, for genius is the expression of an unconscious activity obeying its own unarticulated laws. Genius thus discloses a unity of freedom and necessity lying at the heart of all of nature's productive processes, of which philosophy seeks comprehension (Schelling VMS: 143). This theoretical side of the relation of philosophy to art is accompanied, however, by a more practical side, corresponding to the historical realization of the Absolute in the state. Religion, Schelling writes, cannot exist without sensuous and symbolic expression of the highest ideas, and the highest form of the state cannot exist without religion. The study of great religious art is essential not only to individual culture, but also to the realization of the Absolute in political form (Schelling VMS: 146). University instruction in the philosophy of art thus contributes, in ways not contemplated by Kant, to the education of the philosopher and to the well-being of the state.

Most radically un-Kantian of all, philosophy has a crucial task of providing the conditions for the creation of a new mythology of reason, the ultimate expression of the Absolute in a form at once philosophical, religious, poetic, and political (Schelling SSW I/3: 627–629). Philosophy must return to its ancient and original sources in mythology to prepare humanity for this, its last and greatest work (Frank and Kurz 1975: 110–112). Here is another legislation seeking to reconcile ancient and modern. It is clear, however, that the philosopher cannot alone legislate or create this mythology. Schelling asserts that it will be the work of a new race or tribe of human beings, and not the product of individual thinkers or artists; how this will come about lies beyond present understanding, and is a problem to be solved only in the future destiny of the human species. In Schelling's version, the German Enlightenment culminates not in a moral religion within the limits of critical reason, but rather in a poetic religion of the speculative Absolute. This aspires to satisfy the rational need for insight into being and at the same time to celebrate the infinite mystery of humanity's origin. Hegel's departure from this consists in claiming that the philosophical religion of the Absolute is a present reality, and that the human spirit has no need of a new mythology to realize it. One must look to the thought of a later period—to Nietzsche and Heidegger—for the revival of the idea of a new poetic philosophic mythology, only this time without a rational theodicy.

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7 Bringing Morality to Appearances
Kant's Theory of Education

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The theory of education Kant proposed in *Ueber die Pädagogik* has attracted a substantial amount of criticism regarding both its internal consistency and the paradoxical relationship it appears to create between education and morality. The book's somewhat heavy-handed approach to education is intended by Kant to put education in the service of morality by promoting *character* in the child. It does so, however, by relying on discipline and punishment. Kant suggests, "In the first period of childhood the child must learn submission and positive obedience" (LP: 9:453). The discipline is needed "that (children) may become used to sitting still and doing exactly as they are told" (LP: 9:442). "Discipline changes animal nature into human nature" (LP: 9:441), Kant says, but not without suitable punishments. "(D)isobedience," he says, 'is always followed by punishment" (LP: 9:483). *Natural punishments* are best, he says, since they are brought on by one's own behavior, "for instance, when a child gets ill from overeating" (LP: 9:483).

For the more mature child, Kant says, physical punishment should be replaced with what he calls *moral punishment*. "It is *moral* when we do something derogatory to the child's longing to be honored and loved (a longing which is an aid to moral training); for instance, when we humiliate the child by treating him coldly and distantly," and he adds, "this kind of punishment is the best, since it is an aid to moral training" (LP: 9:483). Kant explains, "Supposing a child tells a lie, for instance, he ought not to be punished, but treated with contempt, and told that he will not be believed in the future, and the like" (LP: 9:480).

Whether it is corporal punishment for the younger child or a show of contempt for the somewhat more mature child, in either case, the objective would seem to be to manipulate his behavior and make him behave. That would appear to disregard Kant's persistent claim that motivations are moral precisely to the extent that they are not determined in any way by sensuous inclinations. Manipulating the child by playing on his fears and desires would make his moral character the work of his disciplinarian, not the autonomous product of the child's own will. Lewis White Beck claims that Kant seems to be unaware of the logical inconsistency involved in his theory of education. Beck writes:

> When Kant is dealing with education, however, he relaxes some of this rigor; he does not even seem to see that his strict moral philosophy has, and can have, no place for moral education. But in both the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Pedagogy* Kant seems to take it as self-evident that moral education is both obligatory and possible, and the only question about it is one of proper practice. (Beck 1979: 22; Beck 1960: 235)

Samuel Ajzenstat makes an even stronger objection.

> For Kant self-control has moral significance only when it is truly *self*-control, not, at bottom, control by some other; for it to be possible requires that there be a radically self-determining stratum of self, independent of external causality—educational or otherwise . . . The idea of such a self hardly seems to sit well with the idea of moral education or with the idea that its own coming to be is any process of causal development. (Ajzenstat 1979; cf. Munzel 2003; Moran 2009: 479)

Oddly enough, Kant appears to have been fully aware of the logical inconsistency he has been accused of committing and, paradoxically, he appears as well to have considered his educational theory as the solution to the problems his critics have raised. Kant put great weight on the capacity of his educational theory to transform morality into a genuine part of human experience. Kant writes:

> One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child's capability of constraint exercising his free will—for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright. Without this all education is merely mechanical, and the child, when his education is over, will never be able to make a proper use of his freedom. (LP: 9:453)

Without any pretense that what he says contains any element whatsoever of irony, Kant tells us that the fundamental objective of education is teaching "a man how to live as a free being" (LP: 9:455), and to promote in the child the realization that, throughout life, he will have duties that "consist in his being conscious that man possesses a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that it is his duty so to act as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind" (LP: 9:488). This constitutes the "formation of character" (LP: 9:487). As the child's education progresses through its various stages, from discipline, through the learning of culture and discretion, and, finally, to moral training (LP: 9:449–450),

the child must gradually "be allowed to think for himself, and to enjoy a certain amount of freedom, although still obliged to follow certain rules" (LP: 9:454). "(W)e must allow the child from his earliest childhood perfect liberty in every respect . . . provided that in acting so he does not interfere with the liberty of others" (LP: 9:454).

So we have, on the one hand, Kant's claim that his proposals for educating the child, relying as they do on corporal punishments for the younger child and moral punishments, e.g., contempt, for the more mature child when their actions stray from the narrow path of morality, will promote in the child a sense of freedom and, through that, moral character. On the other hand, we have the criticism of Beck and others that Kant's proposal is an impossibility because its reliance on punishments, discipline, and showing of contempt removes all self-determination from the actions of the child so that the child cannot reasonably be said to have acted freely and from moral character, no matter how well his behavior conforms to demands.

The criticisms of Beck, Ajzenstat, et al. notwithstanding, I believe there is no inconsistency in Kant's explication of his theory of education and no contradiction between it and his moral theory. There are several related reasons for my disagreement. First, the criticisms of Beck, Ajzenstat, et al. ignore the fact that Kant's moral theory is a "*metaphysics*" of morals. It is concerned solely with the capacity of the laws of pure practical reason conceptually to influence maxims, raising them to the status of moral laws. Its task is to establish the possibility of morality *as an idea*.

Second, the freedom required of the person who acts solely from duty to the moral law is not in any sense a *liberty* from external authority. Autonomy is not liberty. The freedom Kant promotes is an autonomy that identifies its agent as one who owns and imputes to himself his own actions and, by that measure, is accountable and justifiably punished when he commits a wrong. Punishment is not incompatible with freedom considered as autonomy. On the contrary, it may well be recognition of one's autonomy (Herbert 1995).

Finally, there are two fundamental tasks for Kant's moral theory and they must not be confused. The first, as was indicated above, is to establish the possibility of morality as an idea, explaining how it is possible for the will conceptually to manifest moral law. The second is to explain how human beings whose actions are grounded primarily in their needs and inclinations can meaningfully be recognized as persons who are accountable for what they do, who have duties to others, and, finally, who have character sufficient to allow us to expect them to act reliably in this way. This second question is the one addressed by Kant's theory of education. If the two questions are confused, we will never resolve the dilemma involved in showing how the human mind, affected as it is by sensuous inclinations, could ever show receptivity to pure moral interests.

I. THE SPECULATIVE BACKDROP

A clue to understanding the relationship of Kant's moral theory to his theory of education, and hence the function of his theory of education, can be obtained by considering seriously the analogically similar tasks of speculative and practical reason. Kant is fond of repeating that practical reason "must in its general outline be arranged in conformity with that of the speculative" (CPr: 5:16). The main objective of each is to relate the transcendental to appearances.

Speculative reason provides an analogical template for the relationship of Kant's moral theory to his theory of education in practical reason when it considers how concepts, i.e., categories, organize in understanding the objects of sensuous intuition. "The categories of the understanding," Kant says, "do not represent conditions under which objects are given *in intuition*. Objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of the understanding; and the understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions" (CPu: A89/B122). So, for example, one may see a log burning in a fireplace and later see a pile of ashes in the place formerly occupied by the log. But one cannot *see* that what was once a log is now a pile of ashes. The identity of the two conspicuously different sense objects is not itself something that appears in sense. Rather, one *judges* that the two things that one sees are, in fact, one, only by subsuming both under the category *substance*, through the construction in thought of a judgment of experience. In this way, Kant says, we transform perceptions into experiences.

According to Kant, the subsumption of these two sensuous intuitions, i.e., the log and the ashes, under one category, *substance*, is not really possible on the basis of the explanation given. There is nothing in the indeterminate category *substance* to explain how one would know when one has applied the concept correctly to objects of sense. Kant writes:

> Substance, for instance, when the sensible determination of permanence is omitted, would mean simply a something which can be thought only as subject, never as predicate, of something else. Such a representation I can put to no use, for it tells me nothing as to the nature of that which is thus to be viewed as a primary subject. (CPu: A147)

To know that one has correctly applied the concept to appearances, one needs a rule or *schema* of the understanding for applying the concept to appearances without erasing the differing identities of the sense objects. The rule is that we must reconceive the concept according to the form of intuition under which the sense intuitions appear in experience, i.e., time, so that the concept (*substance*) and the intuitions to which it applies have some commonality, presumably, on the logic (in this case) that two things identical to a same third will be identical to each other. The concept of

substance is reconceived temporally as "the representation of the real . . . as abiding while all else changes" (CPu: A143). This *schematizing* of the concept, as that which endures through time, enables one to comprehend a reality that cannot be seen, e.g., that the log and ashes are different representations in time of the one unchanging reality to which they refer.

The schematism Kant employs in his speculative theory (described here with maximum brevity), I would argue, is an analogical template for the relationship of his moral theory and his theory of education. What I intend to show is that it is only through the schematizing activity of understanding that the transcendental concept of the autonomous will is able to manifest itself in sensuous appearances and in that way make Kant's moral theory applicable to events occurring in experience.

Even though Kant himself suggests this analogical similarity, he also makes clear that employing a "schema of sensibility" (CPr: 5:69) in practical reason (i.e., reconceiving the concept of the will according to the form of the intuition, time) would have the effect of erasing the autonomy, and hence the morality, of the will, because

> every event, and consequently every action that takes place as a point of time, is necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time. Now, since time past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act. (CPr: 5:94)

It is almost universally agreed, therefore, that the schematism cannot be employed in practical reason without reconceiving the will as a causally determined being without moral significance. This, I think, is undeniable. So, however we understand the schematized autonomous will, it must not involve a "schema of sensibility."

II. THE MORAL THEORY

There is nothing especially revolutionary about the claim that Kant's moral theory is entirely transcendental and without any immediate applicability to sensible experience. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant insists that "the metaphysics of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible *pure* will and not the actions and conditions of human volition generally" (Gr: 4:391). It must "work out for once" the principles of "a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical" (Gr: 4:389). Kant's moral theory has nothing to do with moral exhortation or moral advice to people on how to act only from moral motives. Rather, it is concerned solely with our understanding the capacity of the laws of pure practical reason to influence maxims of the

will, raising them to the status of moral laws. The function of Kant's theory of education is determined by the purely transcendental nature of his moral theory. In a way similar to the function of the forms of sensuous intuition in Kant's speculative philosophy, education provides objects for the application of the concepts of morality to appearances.

Kant acknowledges at the outset that "complete conformity of the will with the moral law is . . . holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence" (CPr: 5:122). What Kant writes in this passage applies only to the *idea*. It is not intended as a description of anything one might find in experience. A holy will is a will whose only incentive is the moral law. Kant adds, "This *holiness of will* is, however, a practical ideal which must necessarily serve as a model which all finite rational beings must strive toward even though they cannot reach it" (CPr: 5:33). The human will (as an *idea*) suffers this limitation because

> the human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission from the side of his sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as well. (CPr: 5:61)

Those needs and the inclinations they inspire distinguish the concept of the human will from the concept of the holy will.

However, if it is true that the human will cannot attain holiness (without ceasing to be human), it is also true that it is more than a mere animal will. When the will acts without being determined by inclination, Kant says, it has *negative freedom*. Without negative freedom no will can ever be judged responsible for what it wills. An animal will, by contrast, never rises above inclination; it is a mere thing, a creature of causal necessity. It is, Kant says, "that to which nothing can be imputed" (MM: 6:223).

In defining these differences, again, Kant is not describing anything that appears in experience. He is merely describing the conceptual differences between the idea of a will totally determined by inclinations, the idea of the will that has a "capacity for choice that can "be affected, but not determined" by impulses" (MM: 6:213; cf. CPr: 5:32), and the idea of the will neither affected nor determined by inclinations. It is a necessity that every will falls into one of those three categories. The human will differs conceptually from the animal will in that it has what Henry Allison has called "motivational independence" (Allison 1990: 97).

For a human will to be affected but not determined by inclinations, it must exhibit more than negative freedom. The lever that makes negative freedom a possibility for the human will (something more than "blind chance" [CPr: 5:95]) is its capacity for *positive* freedom, i.e., autonomy.

The question, then, is what conceptually would a will have to be to be autonomous? Kant's familiar answer is that an autonomous will would

have to be one that acts *from duty* to the moral law, not merely *in accordance with* duty (Gr: 4:397). That happens when the maxims on which one acts derive not from an individual's inclinations but, rather, when they have the universality of a law. A merely subjective maxim is one that holds for everybody everywhere. To discover the laws of morality that would provide access to freedom for those who follow them, then, one must apply a test of universalizability to maxims. Kant's well-known rule is that a maxim would fail the test of universality only if it were to annul itself if everyone were to act on it. Those maxims that would not annul themselves were everybody to act on them are, for no greater reason than that, laws of reason.

The prerequisites for elevating a maxim to the status of a moral law are not morally demanding (in the looser sense in which we use the term "moral"). Maxims must simply be able to be willed universally in order to elevate themselves to the status of moral laws. "[N]othing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Gr: 4:402). The result is that there is no problem figuring out how reason is able to legislate to the will without compromising the will's autonomy. The will *is* practical reason when its maxims satisfy the demands of universality.

There is nothing practical (in our more ordinary use of the term *practical*) about the moral law or Kant's *metaphysics of morals* as it has been developed so far. The necessity that one obey the law is nothing more than this—that acting solely from duty to the moral law is a necessary precondition of the morality of what is willed. It is a necessity only in that "Were there no freedom, the moral law would *not be encountered at all* in ourselves" (CPr: 5:4). There is also nothing in this that would command (in the more ordinary sense of the word *command)* the moral behavior of individuals in the empirical world, and nothing in the world of experience that would confirm the existence of autonomy in individuals.

The autonomy Kant attributes to the will is not something that he simply *assumes* as an attribute of human beings, even though Kant occasionally uses that term (Seidler 1986: 7 and 9; LaVaque-Manty 2006: 369). On the contrary, he writes, "it may not be invented and assumed at one's discretion" (CPr: 5:47). Kant *assumes* autonomy only in the analytical sense that autonomy is knowable as a transcendental precondition of the possibility of morality. The existence of the moral law—as an idea—is proof of the reality of autonomy as an idea (CPr: 5:48). Its reality is proved but, of course, only for the idea of a will that acts from duty to the moral law. Kant writes,

> the moral principle, conversely itself serves as the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove but which speculative reason had to assume as at least possible (in order to find among its cosmological ideas what is unconditioned in its

> causality, so as not to contradict itself), namely the faculty of freedom, of which the moral law, which itself has no need of justifying grounds, proves not only the possibility but the reality in beings who cognize this law as binding upon them. (CPr: 5:47)

Kant concludes by claiming, "*duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law*" (Gr: 4:400). In the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Kant writes, "Respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive" (Gr: 5:78). What he means by this comment is clarified by an earlier remark: "Respect for the law is *not* the incentive to morality; instead it is morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive" (Gr: 5:76). That is, respect for the moral law is not a motive that could be counted on reliably to produce moral behavior among actual people. In fact, it would be as difficult to find an example in actual human beings of respect for the moral law as it would be to find evidence of autonomous willing. Rather, it is a necessary condition of our understanding of the idea of the moral will. *It means only that one cannot have acted from a moral will without having acted with respect for the moral law.* Kant's moral theory remains entirely transcendental, a *metaphysics* of morals, with no direct applicability to human behavior.

III. SCHEMATIZING THE AUTONOMOUS WILL

Following analogically the structure of Kant's speculative philosophy, a schema is needed to show how the principles of morality apply meaningfully to appearances. Near the end of *The Metaphysics of Morals,* in Kant's "Doctrine of Virtue," he indicates as much by writing,

> Nevertheless, just as a passage from the metaphysics of nature to physics is needed—a transition having its own special rules—something similar is rightly required from the metaphysics of morals; a transition which, by applying the pure principles of duty to cases of experience, would *schematize* these principles, as it were, and present them as ready for morally practical use." (MM: 6:468)

We have no sensible experience of moral lawfulness, i.e., of moral necessity, that we can use to comprehend what this practical application of the moral law to the actual world would be. To explain the relationship of moral law to the concept of the individual will, in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant schematizes the moral law as "the typic of pure practical judgment" (CPr: 5:67). Kant explains:

> Here, however, we have to do not with the schema of a case in accordance with laws but with the schema of a law itself . . . since the determination

> of the will . . . through the law alone without any other determining ground connects the concept of causality to conditions quite other than those which constitute natural connection. (CPr: 5:69)

The will's duty to the moral law is "like" the lawfulness one finds in the laws of nature, except, of course, things do not obey the laws of nature out of duty. But since we can have no sense experience of all people acting from duty, we can best understand it by thinking of it as like the law of universal causality that governs nature.

This is not especially helpful because we still have no knowledge of the will as it would function in the real world. We know only the law operating transcendentally on an object, the will, that is, itself, transcendental. Most important, there is nothing here that shows how one autonomous will could relate in a morally determinate way to other autonomous wills. That explanation Kant does not provide until his *Metaphysics of Morals*.

Other human beings appear in one's sensuous experience originally only as sensible objects. As such, no moral relationship with them is possible. It is only through a relationship of autonomy with them (cf. LaVaque-Manty 2006: 369) that morality can be conceived as the structure of the relationship of multiple wills rather than the transcendental structure of the idea of the single will. For that to happen, the autonomous will must be reconceived according to what I will call *intelligible time*, not a concept of time that determines the temporal sequence of events in the sense world over which we have no control whatsoever but, rather a concept of time according to which agents are, in fact, in control of both past and future times (CPr: 5:98). The will must be reconceived as the owner of both its past actions and its future actions. It is in that sense that its actions can be said to be imputable to it and it can be considered accountable. An autonomous will, so schematized, is what Kant refers to as a "person." "A *person*," Kant says, "is a subject whose actions can be *imputed* to him" (MM: 6:223). It is only in this schematized form, as person, that the autonomous will can be related externally to other autonomous wills. It does so not through sense, but through *recognition* of others as autonomous wills, too, who can be held responsible for what they have done in the past and what they promise to do in the future.

Kantian rights and obligations arise through this reciprocity of autonomous wills, as reciprocally dependent relations. A *right* is "the capacity for putting others under obligation" (MM: 6:239). One can have rights, i.e., obligate others, but only to the extent that those others are recognized as persons, i.e., as autonomous wills, to whom actions can be imputed, and also to the extent that one has revealed oneself to those autonomous wills as a being to whom they could be obligated, that is, a being who is capable of having rights, i.e., a person. One does that by doing what only *persons* would do, i.e., by acknowledging one's ownership of one's own past and future actions and, hence, one's responsibility for them. The relationship works both ways. Kant writes:

> When I declare (by word or deed), I will that something external is to be mine, I thereby declare that everyone else is under obligation to refrain from using that object of my choice, an obligation no one would have were it not for this act of mine to establish a right. This claim involves, however, acknowledging that I in turn am under obligation to every other to refrain from using what is externally his. (MM: 6:255)

Through mutual recognition between autonomous wills, persons create and sustain the grounding preconditions of their own rights (MM 6:239); this point is confirmed by Kant in his essay "On The Relationship of Theory to Practice." Here, he writes, "[T]he concept of an external right as such proceeds entirely from the concept of *freedom* in the external relation of people to one another and has nothing at all to do with the end that all of them naturally have (their aim of happiness) and with the prescribing of means for attaining it" (TP: 8:289).

Mutual recognition is, in this sense, the *transcendental precondition* of all rights and, hence, the practical possibility of obligation, and hence, the possibility of morality in appearances. It is to affirm this conception of rights that Kant states, "*Freedom* (independence from being constrained by another's choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" (MM: 6:237). This remark has frequently been invoked to elevate freedom as a fundamental human right and as a basic part of human dignity. This is correct, I think, but not if human dignity is understood to mean that one is due a basic minimum of goods, a minimum of liberty, or, in the utilitarian sense, a certain amount of happiness. The fact that a human being is in need—even desperate need—is not sufficient to establish his rights; it does not imply that any entitlements are due him by virtue of the basic human dignity he possesses independent of his imputability, and, by implication, it does not imply that one has any obligation to him. Kant indicates as much in a passage from *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Kant writes:

> The concept of Right, insofar as it is related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right) has to do, *first*, only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other. But, *second*, it does not signify the relation of one's choice (*Willkür*, will) to the mere wish (*hence also to the mere need*) of the other, as in actions of beneficence or callousness, but only a relation to the other's *choice* (*Willkür*, will). (MM: 6:230)

Freedom, for Kant, is a precondition of dignity only in the sense that dignity means that one acknowledges oneself as the autonomous owner of one's own actions, recognizes that one is responsible for them, and, hence,

is rightfully punished should one violate the rights of another. Punishment is, in this sense, the recognition of the autonomy and dignity of a miscreant. It is in this sense that Kant makes the somewhat shocking remark that "the law of punishment is a categorical imperative" (MM: 6:331). Even though this tells us how, through recognition, one will is related to another, it is still a metaphysics. To move morality to actual experience, Kant's theory of education is essential.

IV. BRINGING MORALITY TO APPEARANCES

Kant's explanation of the organization of sensuous intuitions under the forms of sensuous intuition is the analogical template for understanding his theory of education. We are told by Kant that "morality is a matter of character" (LP: 9:486), and also that the fundamental objective of education is the "formation of character," i.e., keeping promises, acting with dignity, and respecting the rights of others (LP: 9:487). Promoting character requires that the child "be allowed to think for himself, and to enjoy a certain amount of freedom, although still obliged to follow certain rules . . . [W]e must allow the child from his earliest childhood perfect liberty in every respect . . . provided that in acting so he does not interfere with the liberty of others" (LP: 9:454). Freedom is fundamental to character and dignity because it is only a person whose choices are freely made who can keep promises and be held accountable for what he does. Character is to the child what space and time, the a priori forms of sensuous intuition, are to objects. Just as only the spatially and temporally determinate object can become an object to which the categories of understanding can be imputed, so also it is only a person of character who can be obligated, i.e., whose past and future actions can be imputed to him. Character transforms the child into a moral subject to whom the categories of free causality can meaningfully be applied. The existence of an inner, unobservable autonomy is not something we need to verify. It is enough to know it as a necessary condition of the attributes of *character* which we can observe. Animal wills, by definition, do not exhibit character.

So, in *Ueber die Pädagogik,* we get from Kant a whole litany of proposals for promoting character in the mature child. First, we are told, "The child should learn to act according to 'maxims,' the reasonableness of which he is able to see for himself" (LP: 9:480). To act in accordance with a maxim is to act conscious of the rule implicit in one's action, i.e., of the example one's action sets for others. One cannot do that without being above the causally determined flow of sensuous appearances. The mere thought that one could have omitted a nefarious past deed had he chosen to do so, even though one cannot omit the deed once it is done, is enough to verify that one has acted from maxim that one has chosen.

"The second principal feature in the formation of a child's character," Kant says, "is *truthfulness*. This is the foundation and very essence

of character" (LP: 9:484). A commitment to truthfulness, suggests, once again, self-consciousness and imputability in one's behavior and recognition of the other as a person to whom one has obligations.

"A third feature in the child's character is *sociableness*. He must form friendships with other children, and not be always by himself" (LP: 9:484). Sociability suggests one's capacity for recognizing others as beings to whom one can be obligated. Again, it identifies one as the kind of being who could conceivably be held accountable to the moral law.

Kant adds, "If we wish to *form the characters* of children," we must have "certain rules, in everything; and these must be strictly adhered to. For instance, they must have set times for sleep, for work, and for pleasure; and these times must be neither shortened nor lengthened" (LP: 9:481). This would identify one as the kind of being who could be held accountable.

Finally, Kant says, "Above all things, obedience is an essential feature in the character of a child, including absolute obedience to his master's commands, and obedience to what he feels to be a good and reasonable will" (LP: 9:481). Obedience, so far from suggesting a loss of autonomy, is evidence of one's capacity for acting from duty to law, not from the prospects of happiness or one's own pleasures.

V. CONCLUSION

Kant's metaphysics of morals is just that, a metaphysics. Its applicability to experience draws on the analogical template provided by his speculative philosophy. Education functions in ways similar to the forms of sensuous intuition to promote "character" and to make the purely transcendental principles of morality applicable to experience.

It is not that people can be made moral, or that they can be taught to have motivations that would cause them to be moral, or that one might expect people autonomously to choose to be moral. Rather, education promotes in children the character on which these concepts and structures can meaningfully be imposed as moral demands, just as, analogically, the forms of sensuous intuition present understanding with spatially and temporally determinate representations on which the categories of understanding can be imposed meaningfully. It is the properly educated person who can be treated as if he is a rational, i.e., autonomous, being capable of acting from respect for moral law and, therefore a being on whom moral demands can reasonably be made.

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8 Culture and Paradox in Kant's Philosophy of Education

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I. NATURE, CULTURE, AND MORALITY

In Kant's lecture notes on education, cultivation is a central issue. However, reflections on culture are present almost everywhere in Kant's work.[1] Cultivation marks a task and it is in this sense a normative, positive concept. A remark in the second part of Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* gives a highly revealing ethical background to his pedagogical views. He declares it to be a duty to cultivate and to perfect oneself, if a person has any (material) possibility for this "development and increase of his natural perfection" (MM: 6:444ff.). However, this duty toward oneself is only conditional or imperfect; it is not absolute, dependent as it is on the chances bestowed on the person.

Culture is not first and foremost a comparative sociological concept. However, because of the concept of culture's multifaceted relations to nature, anthropology, society, history, politics, education, institutions, aesthetics, and moral duty and religion, it is normative and descriptive as well. It concerns human nature in relation to other people, viz., the reality that man lives in, i.e., the reality he relates to and transforms through his actions. The development of skills and habits and of social and political achievements (institutions) is related to outer and inner processes of refinement through civilization and through beauty in nature and culture, and to the demand for development of oneself as a moral person. In addition, the concept is important for Kant's understanding of Enlightenment and of what it means to become enlightened.

In the multiple relationships, the concept of culture plays an intermediary part. Without neglecting the differences between the domains of theoretical and practical philosophy, respectively nature and freedom, culture makes up an interface. Kant stresses the need for cultivation and the duty to cultivate. With respect to what man should do and should be, the standards will not be met without an effort. Intriguingly, according to Kant, the problem of culture is twofold. Culture is dependent on the achievements of man as an individual, on the one hand, and of the species (humankind), on the other. Culture is thus both the outcome of the perfectibility of man as an individual and as a species.

In relation to the issue of Kant's short essay, "An Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?'" Michel Foucault argued that the major critical works are 'manuals' (1984: 32–50). That is a truly paradoxical remark. Nevertheless, Foucault's puzzling utterance seems appropriate, if one asks very general questions concerning the relations between principles and historical, pedagogical, and political reality in Kant's philosophy. Foucault emphasizes that Kant connects his own philosophy with the current situation he writes in. But as the French author notes, Kant is rather ambiguous. His theories can be said to have been set forward in a unique moment in history. His reflections on that moment are of particular importance to Foucault. On the other hand, they, the 'manuals,' also express a more universalistic transcendental endeavor, which is predominant, indeed. Thus, Kant's understanding of culture is very important for interpreting the educational framework (disciplination-cultivation-civilization-moralization) on which his pedagogical lecture notes are based. How principles and reality are related in his pedagogical thinking seems to be deeply dependent on his understanding of the ambiguities of culture (Cf. Jepsen 2010: 51–79).

Inquiring into the concept of culture, Kant developed the theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, the differences are important (cf. Ant: 7:317–332, CBHH: 8:116ff.). Culture is not contrary to nature, and culture is not the enemy of morality. Culture is a consequence of and an expression of man's particular nature. Culture develops this nature from brutishness and lawlessness into a state that enables the moral stance. Thus, culture is the way human nature must be developed in order to be able to meet the demands of practical reason, viz., to make it possible that the phenomenal world can be given the moral order.

If culture is understood as a break with nature, this fracture will, in a certain sense, be the beginning of vice. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the door is now open for anything 'unethical' in an unqualified sense. In Kant's "Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History," the fall of man, when he *breaks with nature* (!), is understood as ambiguous. Insofar as the issue is *nature*'s history, it begins with the good, since nature is the work of God. In moral terms a fall has occurred, because cultivation leads to vices unknown to nature. If, in contrast, focus is on the history of *freedom*, this history does not begin with the good, but with the evil, since it is the work of humans (CBHH: 8:115). The history of freedom must be conceived in the perspective of progress.

As a fundamental anthropological fact, Kant asserts that man is *unfinished* by nature. In addition, this is a basic assumption in his pedagogical thinking as well as in his philosophy of history as it is exposed in "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint" (Idea 8:19ff.). 'Nature intended' that man must develop his humanity through activity and reason. Everything that man may come to possess, beyond his brutish existence, be it bliss or perfections, must be acquired by himself, through his reason.

Culture implies to Kant the ability to set and reach ends: an ability to give prescriptions to one's own volitions and acts, independent of the given (heteronomous) inclinations. In relation to *nature*, he understands *culture* as a successor to "savagery" and "brutality," for instance in his "Pedagogical Lecture Notes" (PLN: 9:444ff.). Culture is a new reality that people in their society with other people obtain (and have to become entitled to) by training their own abilities, so that they can shape their life according to their own objectives and with their own forces. In this context 'community' means the interaction with other people as a prerequisite for the development of the person as an individual (whereas the political community, on the other hand, is a product of culture understood as a collective historical process).

The keywords for the new reality of culture, in its difference to nature, are: formation, work, community, control, ability, competence, and availability. They denote necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the development of personal self-control. However, the ability to do this or that according to one's own choice and the ability to shape one's own life are not equal to *moral* autonomy. Culture is not identical with morality. Although it somehow contains the idea of morality, it does not drive this idea beyond cultivation and its technical refinement, to be civilized, i.e., to possess *das Sittenähnliche* which on the surface is like decency (Idea: 8:26). Culture points beyond itself, beyond the given reality. But culture in the capacity of culture cannot transcend itself. Thus, culture is an ability derived from human nature. It exceeds the bounds of nature, but is not yet (in capacity of being culture) a moral freedom, positively determined by the practical reason.

As a supplement to his claim that man is born with the need for development, Kant explains the driving force in individual human development as well as in societal and historical development from a particular philosophical-anthropological theory. Human nature is antagonistic. In his historico-philosophical writings, Kant describes this nature as man's *ungesellige Geselligkeit*, man's *asocial sociality* (Idea: 8:20) (Cf. Belwe 1999: 18–34). Humans have a propensity to company, but also a tendency to individualize themselves/or to seek solitude (Idea: 8:21). This contrast between sociality and being asocial becomes clear in intercourse with others.

The innate aptitude for reason requires, as mentioned, a human community in order to be able to develop. Kant's emphasis on the discomfort of being together as a driving factor in the development of culture is remarkable. Resistance against others is what arouses the human forces and enables a man to overcome his propensity to laziness. It is by means of pride, desire for dominance, or greed that he is driven to obtain a rank among his companions, comrades he does not like but cannot do without (Idea: 8:21). "Work and discord" are compensation for laziness, the "*Idea*" states (Idea: 8:21): an opinion that is echoed in the *Mutmaßlicher Anfang* (CBHH: 8:118).

It is this discord that forces people away from the passive pleasures of brutish life and to cultivate themselves actively, civilize themselves and also, at a preparatory, habitual level, to moralize themselves through art and

science (CPJ: 5:433ff.; cf. Idea: 8:21, 22; Anth: 7:321–327). Thus, this resistance leads man from brutality and coarseness to culture, as it develops human talent. Over time, through enlightenment and by forming his tastes, it makes a man able to formulate explicit moral principles and to transform the enforced acceptance of engaging in a society into a positive moral value (Idea: 8:21).

Even wars contribute to culture (Idea: 8:24; CBHH: 8:121; CPJ: 5:433). Nevertheless, nature's provision is that man, using his own reason, in the end will be driven from *Zwietracht* to *Eintracht*, from discord to concord (cf. Ant: 7:322; Idea: 8:21). The discord caused by asociality drives man toward perfection, although undeniably at the expense of many of his pleasures in life. However, this is what forces the common culture to its highest: a political constitution that is ruled by law, and ultimately to a civil society imbedded in a reign of cosmopolitanism, i.e., a world community ruled by international law (Idea: 8:23–31; cf. CPJ: 5:432).

The antagonistic properties rooted in human nature drive culture forward through the interaction between the individual and his fellow men. Conversely, human culture is a development of forces that do not evolve by themselves, automatically or instinctively, and therefore, as underlined by Wolfgang Bartuschat (1984) (Cf. Bartuschat 1984: 69–93), esp. 69, risk being neglected rather than developed. Man is born with reason as a natural capacity that can be developed in the oscillation between sociality and asociality. The personal and universal ability to think and the ability for ethical differentiation are not produced by culture, but they are developed in that way.

The understanding (*Verstand*) as the faculty or ability of unbiased thinking, the ability of judgment (*Urteilskraft*) for expanded thinking in line with others, and of reason (*Vernunft*) for consistent and coherent thinking—in short, the elements assumed in enlightened thinking—are all displayed through the cultural development (cf. CJ: 5:294ff.). *Sensus communis* in Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Critique of Judgment) is not the vulgar, but the cultured and yet very natural cultural sense. The faculty of judgment (*Beurteilungsvermögen*) assesses the general communicability of feelings. Hence, it understands the preconditions for human relationships. In that capacity, it is the common sense (CPJ: 5:293ff.).

Thus, at the individual level, culture is a development of human nature. It belongs to nature, but is driven ahead both by the individuation and by the development of human physical, mental and spiritual forces and consciousness. The fact that man can form his inclinations and actually does it, so that they can comply with the commands of reason, is due to the susceptibility of nature. But how can the relation between man and nature be thought of as teleological? How can man, being a part of nature, think of nature as having an end? How can he conceive of himself as that end, and nature as means for such an end?

One might think that the quest for happiness gives a direction for the development of human nature. However, Kant argues that man cannot

understand his relationship with nature from his good fortune. He may not be able to let the desires define any ultimate end. Nature and the human desires are so diverse that the concept of happiness cannot be aggregate of what the instincts seek concretely empirically. Instead 'happiness' only serves as a abstract idea in referring to a state that fits with what the instincts desire. Although happiness is a gift nature can bestow upon man, man's notions of this happy state change in an arbitrary manner. Nature is not shaped in consistent harmony with the idea of happiness. Nature does not comply; it often destroys our happiness. If nature shall be thought of as complying with man, this, according to Kant, must be considered from a position that exceeds the empirical view of nature.

Thus, man, nominally the lord of nature, has to understand what it means that he is the end of nature as a system. He must have the will to relate nature and himself in a teleological conception, which, in its complete independence from nature, can never be found in nature itself (CPJ: 5:431). He must use nature to develop his own skills and aptitudes. Nature as such does not actualize man as the ultimate end. Man has to develop himself, if he wants to become that end. Only culture, not bliss, is what human beings in this life (*hier auf Erden*, CPJ: 5:429) can value as the ultimate purpose of nature. Indeed, for the human species, belonging to nature, only culture can be the ultimate project (CPJ: 5:431).

In particular, man has to discipline his will, in order to deliver it from the "despotism of the desires" (*Despotism der Begierden*, CPJ: 5:432) and from the bonds of instinct. Here we need an educational formation (*Ausbildung*), which makes us sensitive to ends more superior than those of nature, i.e., ends that are hidden in us, but are needed to give the development of mankind a conscious orientation and regulation. Here the fine arts and science can contribute because of their capabilities for communication (CPJ: 5:433).

Thus, at the end of nature (*Zweck der Natur*), which takes humans as the *ultimate end* of the whole natural creature, i.e., man as what Kant calls *Endzweck*, a purpose should be included, which does not belong to nature itself. For nature only contains purposes involved in the relationship between means and ends, i.e., conditional ends, not ultimate purposes that are objective per se. It is morality that declares that human beings are ends in themselves (*Selbstzweck*). It is this elevation of man from a location outside nature that determines a vision of nature in general, where nature is seen in purposive or teleological terms. This vision sets nature as a means for man who, in contrast, is considered an ultimate end. Thus, man is not thought to belong to nature, but considered a *noumenon* (CPJ: 5:435). The physical nature, of which man is dependent and even the nature of man himself, has to be developed and cultivated so that it becomes useful to the ultimate determination of man.

For Kant, a teleological understanding of nature is not unproblematic. Our *ability of judgment* can consider and think about nature as being determined for a purpose that is beyond nature. But this is an *as if* (*als*

ob) account of the judgment (*Urteilskraft*) as reflective about possibilities (5:179ff.; cf. CPJ: 5:429); not a teleology that is found in nature as such.

However, our considerations show that Kant could not or would not be content with a bare empirical-anthropological view of the relationship between nature and culture. The bridge that he let culture erect between nature and morality has a transcendental foundation. Culture emerges as an important concept in the *Critique of Judgment* § 83, because Kant immediately beforehand presented man as an ultimate end for nature, *einen letzten Zweck der Natur* (CPJ: 5:427). But nature does not contain any 'ultimate end.' In his capacity as part of nature, nothing could ever be such an ultimate end (CPJ: 5:426).

So to solve this difficulty, Kant points beyond nature itself. However, to point to a supersensible substrate (cf. CPJ: 5:196, 421ff.) is not an objective necessity, but rather a subjective necessity for our reflective faculty of judgment (*Urteilskraft*). The reflective ability of judgment has no independent legislation that gives it its own domain beside the theoretical reason's constitution of nature as bound by laws, which are a priori to empirical knowledge, or practical reason's constitution of the moral laws. However, the reflective ability of judgment has an independent a priori principle, namely the idea of nature's formal purposefulness (CPJ: 5:184). The faculty of judgment cannot (subjectively) think nature as suitable for the human being without subjecting nature as a whole to purposefulness in relation to an end, which lies outside and beyond nature itself. Thus, this reflection is granted necessity and subjective universality.

Culture begins, Kant jestingly says in the article "Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History," when man with help from reason (1) develops a capacity for differentiation as regards choosing his food, (2) carefully selects his sexual partner, (3) has acquired a conscious attitude toward the future, including his own death, (4) and finally acquires the awareness that man himself must be the real end of nature, *eigentlich der Zweck der Natur.* The first step already initiates a break with the instincts that dominate the animal. According to Kant, the last step is the definitive break with his fellow animal creatures, *seine Mitgenossen an der Schöpfung.* When man says to the sheep, "Nature has not given the fur you are wearing to you but to me" (CBHH: 8:114), skins it, and even puts the coat on, then he has developed an awareness, which, however dimly it may be understood, places him in company with no natural being, but with creatures of reason.

With these small steps, man's thinking has, as Kant says, gone in a whole new direction. Man is released from Mother Nature, when he claims that he is a purpose (*Zweck*) and thereby insists to be universally acknowledged as such and not to be used merely as a means by anybody. By this, he has obtained eine *Gleichheit mit allen vernünftigen Wesen*: equality with all rational beings (CBHH: 8:114).

Reason as a natural ability can be used as a tool for arbitrary inclinations. In contrast, these new specific human 'understandings' let man

abandon nature. Only as a natural creature can man make nature a means and himself the master of nature. However, thereby he has already broken with nature understood as nature. Culture has begun. By this step, nature will suddenly be conceived as superior to its own *natural* being, since it is now understood as a *tool* that can be used by rational beings (i.e., man) for this or that. Similarly, *culture* becomes ambiguous in a way that nature qua nature is not.

II. THE AMBIGUITY OF CULTURE

The sphere of culture is characterized by ambiguity and conflict. Culture is not an innocent phenomenon. In contrast to uncultivated nature, culture sets new forms of differences and inequality among men. It is man's duty to cultivate himself, if and only if he has the means for doing so. Thus, in contrast to morality, culture is not every man's business. Culture is, however, connected with humanity, understood as the common human life in compassion and communication, goodwill and mutual esteem, and with the tasks of the human species, such as forming political institutions and furthering enlightenment. But culture and the objects of cultivation cannot be identified with *humanity* in the moral sense, i.e., to be a moral person, a moral creature of absolute value, the *homo noumenon*. In the sense of a human worth, equal for all, cultivation is not a condition of human worth.

Kant has learned about culture's burden from Rousseau, viz., the risk that culture can deprave man. But it is not culture alone that corrupts. Because of mechanical self-love, related to self-preservation, reproduction, and desire for company, the human's animal faculties can lead to coarse vices like gluttony, lust, and wild lawlessness in relation to others. For Kant (as for Rousseau in *Émile,* Book 4) culture's specific vices are connected with the human inclination to *l'amour propre*, the transformation of self-love (*l'amour de soi*), and its wish for pleasure and avoiding pain, in a selfish, egoistical comparison with others: the propensity to desire prestige among others. Hence, jealousy and competition can lead to hidden or open hostility. Nevertheless, this is also a driving force in the development of culture. Kant's work in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* is explicit about this view (Rel: 6:27).

Like Rousseau, Kant is interested in the relationship between culture and *equality*. Humans use nature as a means in relation to the ends they set for themselves as autonomous creatures. Culture is the development of the capacity and skill of a rational being to use nature to various human ends (CPJ: 5:430ff.). This flexible capability is developed differently by different persons. Thus, the concept of culture embraces the general oppositions to nature and morality, but it equally embraces a more specialized meaning, for instance when we speak of refined culture and art. People have different skills or have, to varying degrees, developed a *Geschicklichkeit* (skill,

ability, or competence), which, by Kant, is understood as "the most prominent subjective condition for the general ability to advance towards ends" (CPJ: 5:431). Thus, culture generates inequality. But Kant did not propagate a utopia of nature. Nor did he use nature as a critical corrective to society's decay. Rather, culture is a prerequisite for the further development of human nature. Culture develops abilities and makes persons responsive to morality, although culture is not the source of morality.

Man is a developing creature by virtue of his asocial sociality. Thus, at a general level, culture is also undergoing development. Historically, cultural evolution has led mankind to build political societies. However, according to Kant culture is a process that removes man from nature through a refinement that is problematic for the relationship between humans, since it implies an increase in inequality, including an élite's refinement of its own skills at the expense of the masses'. The élite oppresses the majority, which, without much sophistication, has to provide the needs for the members of the élite in a situation that, for the masses, is characterized by pressure, sour work, and little pleasure. Only then the élite is able to develop "Cultur, Wissenschaft und Kunst": results that are not determined by need (CPJ: 5:432). Kant did not see this refinement as a source of decadence. Kant imagines that culture slowly spreads to all classes, but he agrees that it is a painful process, involving violence and dissatisfaction (CPJ: 5:432).

Despite many analogies to Rousseau, Kant insists that the process, which instigates inequality, should be seen as a progression. However, he sees it as referring to a level that does not belong to individuals, but rather to human nature in general. The issues of inequality and luxury are localized on a general level, where the capacities of the human species develop toward a realization of the end of nature, even though that end is not shared by us as individuals (CPJ: 5:432). This step, which Kant (in the *Critique of Judgment* as well as in his "Pedagogical Lecture Notes") refers to in a generic perspective, seems to require explanation. Nature finds its own way in culture. As expressed in "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Standpoint," nature forms the species from its natural "roughness" (*Rohigkeit*) (Idea: 8:20) through *antagonisms* (Idea: 8:20). Nature and humankind seem to aim at an end that cannot be reduced to the conscious ends of individuals. This process of cultivation pushed forward by nature does not happen completely behind people's backs. If man leaves roughness behind him, if abilities and talents, which were not known before, spread inside him, they can be used against the "whole army of troubles" (Idea: 8:20) that awaits the person who has left nature behind. Culture is onerous, but it also liberates new sides of human nature.

At a personal level, this liberation can be acknowledged in the aesthetical experience. Art offers much to think about, Kant maintains (CPJ: 5:313ff.). This, however, presupposes a developed taste. Kant's elucidation of the analytics of the judgment of taste in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* demonstrates that the aesthetical evaluation of refined cultural products must be

in dialogue with usual formal standards of beauty (CPJ: 5:231ff.). On the other hand, his reflections on art point out that art as such is beyond these standard notions. The concept of art implies that something can be understood symbolically, i.e., understood not simply for what it is, but taken to mean something else (CPJ: 5:352ff.). The appraisal of the beauty of art takes the form of a reflection that may involve the relationship with the beauty of nature as well as awareness of morality. In *Critique of Judgment* this account is prepared in the analysis of the *sublime* (CPJ: 5:250–71).

More specifically (CPJ: 5:197), the beautiful satisfies because it liberates man from the boundaries of the senses, and it elevates him so that he becomes open to the influence of moral law. Thus, beauty becomes a symbol of the ethically good (CPJ: 5:353), although the movement also goes the other way round, since the moral ideas and the cultivation of moral feelings contribute to the development of taste (CPJ: 5:356) and the interest in the beauty of nature (CPJ 5:300). But the validity of this elevation above the sensible is universal, not because of objective reasons, but because of *common* human (inter-subjective) conditions. Kant justifies this notion of validity-for-all in a transcendental argument and he draws far-reaching consequences of it. An aesthetical transition between sensuality and habitual moral interest is made possible through communicability of taste and detachment of delight from sensual pleasures (CPJ: 5:354).

Thus, an aesthetical conception complements the empirical-anthropological analysis used by Kant in other contexts, by showing that a transition is possible (cf. Düsing 1990). Beside delight in aesthetical phenomena, the possible concert of understanding and imagination gives hope for the establishment of political and legal institutions (Idea: 8:22). Amid all the antagonisms, we may imagine that nature has a hidden intention with the human species, and exactly this "as if"-notion may be useful in making the goal of our historical efforts conscious. Now, regarding nature's part in this plan, the development of a perfect rule is an endless task. Ultimately, it also involves the task of creating international relations regulated by law (Idea: 8:24). In 1784 Kant hoped for perpetual peace in the distant future; in "Toward Perpetual Peace" (1795–1796) he found that hope realistic and believed it to be based on reason itself.

Thinking about what culture is doing to us, and about the tasks that it confronts us with, and about what it has promised us, leads Kant to question the relationship between culture and political freedom. In addition to the development of vices and inequality, culture leads to political *domination*. Man, Kant writes in "*Idea,*" is an animal that needs a master. His brutish and egoistical inclinations let him abuse his freedom in his relations to others, and although he desires lawfulness, he needs a master in order to let him obey a general will in which everybody can be free (Idea: 8:23).

The problem is, then, according to Kant's views, how to find such a lord and master, since that master himself would be a specimen of the human race, i.e., an animal in need of a master. In *Idea*, Kant plainly rejects the

possibility of a definitive solution to the problem of domination. However, Kant provides three requirements for an improvement: an understanding of the nature of a political constitution, a deep historical experience must be acquired, and a good will for its acceptance must be prepared (Idea: 8:23). In the article "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice," Kant provides an analysis of the political constitution that seems closer to outlining a solution to the problem. The constitution must take the form of a *pactum unionis*, as in Rousseau's *Social Contract*. The citizens should be free to seek their fortune and be equal before the law. In principle they should be actively co-legislative, and the laws should reflect the will of the entire people, or with Kant's moderation, have content *as if* they were expressions of such legislation by the people. In the same text, Kant refuses to judge the current political affairs solely in accordance with this idea. Nor will he accept such an evaluation of politics from a moral point of view. However, he strongly emphasizes the need for procedural continuity, i.e., the slightest bit of rule of law is regarded as better than none at all (TP: 8:289–306).

As we have seen, culture is both a regress and a path forward. This only applies to the consideration of the species. But in culture itself, reflective judgment has opportunity to think about history's meaning and ends. In itself, such an examination might help to bring the world a bit forward. This consideration must note the significance of a regular procedure for an improvement of state constitutions in our part of the world, says Kant (Idea: 8:29ff.). It is true that historians may judge the civil constitution of each state with its laws and the (outer) relationship among states on the basis of the good they contained, as they for a time served to lift and lead their people and the arts and sciences to brilliance. At the same premises, their deficiencies contained the seeds for their own decline. However, it is crucial how one reflects philosophically on the history as a process of long duration. Empirical and transcendental perspectives differ. Reflecting on that difference, one can try to discuss criteria for progress toward an end reserved for a distant future. The idea of this end is what makes sense for the particular option, reserved for man, namely, to develop deliberately the abilities of humanity and to give future generations new chances through information and education. Kant tried to transform educational endeavors and enlightenment into a conscious project.

I have highlighted the role of the faculty of judgment, perhaps a bit at the cost of morality. In comparison to other expositions of the issue, in particular W. Bartuschat's seminal article of 1984, I have wished to point to the fact that, for Kant, the political-legal sphere of culture and the community within plays its own distinctive role in relation to nature and morality. However, some qualifications should be mentioned. On the individual level, for Kant, indeed the further aim of cultivation is to make our will receptive to practical reason, by cultivating our volition in such a way as to render the moral law a motive (or a *Triebfeder*) for its duty-bound acts, i.e.,

man is not just acting in resemblance to duty (*Pflichtgemäß*), but motivated by duty (*aus Pflicht*). Culture is regarded in the facilitating role necessitated by the *conditio humana*. According to Kant, man is a double creature of which one part, the ultimate end (*Endzweck*), challenges the second part, i.e., the sensual man, to strive toward moral 'autonomy.' This moral goal goes beyond culture, beyond the social and political community. It seems obvious that Kant must reject a society that would prevent personal moral development. However, the political society's part in the task of moral education appears to be far less clearly stated in Kant.

Nevertheless, Kant's work on religion situates his Enlightenment ideas within a universal-historical way of thinking, where moralization is the last resort, the ultimate ratio. To actualize the good and reduce the evil to an unused option is a collective project. Hence, to fight evil is understood as the central task of the church. Thus, the rational form of faith is ethical. The rational type of a belief of reason, where moral duty is interpreted as divine command, is, however, not the only factor forming a religion; the church has historically been dependent on statutory/conventional beliefs that give rise to superstitions and (papist) priests' abuse of power. The true Enlightenment, which in Kant's article "Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?'" (WE: 8:35) was defined as the termination of a self-inflicted incapability of managing one's own affairs under the guidance of one's own thoughts, is in the volume on religion presented with the challenge of distinguishing reason from superstition. Even here the task is autonomy: the ability not to build on foreign authority.

Thus, Kant's reflections alternate between implicit and explicit understandings of culture. A clarification of this central concept of his philosophy must take both his moral and his empirical-pragmatic anthropology into account. The notion of the faculty of judgment plays a crucial role in linking these two approaches. With the ability of reflective judgment, the question of harmony between language and experience is important. Rousseau warned that language could exceed the experience and thereby get young people to relate their feelings and understanding to fiction rather than to reality, although he also realizes the alliance between language and insight (*Emile*: Books 2 and 4). Kant, however, emphasizes and values the aesthetical development that frees man from nature's confinements and opens and raises awareness of the possibility of a moral dimension. This step is a prerequisite for developing the relationship between individual and society, as it is necessary to connect the perspectives of theoretical and practical reason and to create hope of a harmony between inclination and duty.

Kant understood schools as institutions not only for play and instruction, but also for discipline and work. Their institutional function is based on compulsion (LP: 9:472). The desire to accumulate educational experience scientifically that is expressed in his Pedagogical Lecture Notes is a part of the assumptions and expectations contained in his general philosophy of culture. Only a conscious and theoretically informed experimental approach to

educational institutions can hope to bring humankind closer to perfection step by step and to avert leading to what is worse than status quo. Kant wanted to optimize the transfer and evaluation of experiences and insights from the older generation to the younger and to make the practice of education regulated by the desire for advancing toward higher 'cosmopolitan' ends. Nature has given us no instinct for that. Planning education depends on good judgment. This implies a serious divide between ends and educational reality. Once more we are facing the dangers of vicious circles.

In this context, the famous Kantian 'paradox' concerning formation (LP: 9:453ff.) can be read in a twofold way. Does it consider *sufficient* (cf. Nordström 2009) or just *necessary* (cf. v. Oettingen 2006) conditions for pedagogical intervention? If it is about necessary conditions, it may express a regulative transcendental idea. In contrast, if the conditions are sufficient, the paradox makes the aims and means of pedagogy dependent on empirical circumstances in the actual situation. It seems that we can relate this tension to Kant's conception of culture and his understanding of Enlightenment. For the sake of enlightenment and even for the basic task of discipline, cultivation and moralization, pedagogical interventions are necessary, here and now indeed, in a society whose rulers, parents, and teachers as a matter of fact remain unenlightened. Thus, these interventions take place in opaque situations that make it likely that the necessity hardly can be met by adequately developed educational visions, means, or institutional and societal surroundings. This empirical aspect, in its difference to the principled ends of achieving autonomy and the cosmopolitan outlook for humankind, seems to be an important and interesting aspect of Kant's educational philosophy.

NOTES

1. All translations from Kant's *Gesammelte Schriften* are my own.

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9 Kant's Invitation to Educational Thinking

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I. INTRODUCTION

Can a philosopher of the late eighteenth century contribute to contemporary educational thinking? Kant does, first because his liberal thinking is an antidote to a communitarianism that too easily overlooks the place of universalism in modern society; second, because his concept of a person serves to rectify the picture of the individual as a self-sufficient maker of his or her own person; third, because his transcendental thinking can help us see the limits and possibilities of education. Educational policy is now wedged between a tradition-bound, grassroots populism on the one hand and a top-down, bureaucratic governance on the other. Management by regulations now tends to promote a self-regard and political cynicism that erodes both the idea of public duties and common values based on the rational discussion among citizens. It seems, then, that in a modern individualized society, it is worth having another look at Kant's ideas of humanity, freedom, and ethical self-governance.

Recent times have renewed Kant's ideas on cosmopolitanism and inspired a deeper look at the principles governing his call for "publicity" and independent thinking or *Mündigkeit*, in his famous "What Is Enlightenment" of 1784. This is the general setting and challenge for contemporary educational thinking. My intention is limited and will discourage educationists who are averse to transcendental thinking. Such thinking is not co-extensive with current practical thinking in education, not even with the "reflective practitioner" who tries to improve her teaching methods and find out what works best for the students (Schön 1983).

Neither is it co-extensive with theoretical thinking in the human sciences as represented in educational research. Kant's transcendental thinking takes its bearings from a phenomenology or rather a reconstruction of basic moral intuitions as rendered in everyday life, literature, and history. It is a thinking that can be rectified by more relevant concepts, more adequate descriptions, and better arguments, and is in that sense theoretical.

Readers interested in Kant's educational thinking usually expect to find it in his lectures held for students at the University of Königsberg in the 1770s

and 80s. These were edited and published in 1803 by his friend Friedrich Theodor Rink, with the title *Über Pädagogik* or *Lectures on Education*. The *Lectures* is strikingly liberal in its outlook and well tempered in its practical advice, offering a blueprint for a liberal bourgeois education wedded to humanity and freedom, deeply inspired by Rousseau and also by contemporary experimental schools, particularly the so-called Philantropin in Dessau, founded in 1774 by the blustering Johann Bernard Basedow. The Philantropin had students from different walks of life and religious creeds, and it taught not only Latin but also the sciences, sports, and handicrafts. Kant was enthusiastic about its principles and practices and solicited subscriptions to its monthly publication, the *Pedagogical Conversations* (Buchner 1908: 242ff.).

But Kant's invitation to educational thinking reaches significantly beyond the *Lectures* and other writings on method in education. We must visit the critical works and other relevant texts to get the gist of his thinking; and also pay attention to the way he writes—his literary strategies. The rhetoric of the texts is a valuable conduit to what I take to be Kant's invitation to a transcendental educational thinking, which precedes and undergirds pedagogical method without being reduced to it. For my purposes the point of transcendental thinking lies in Kant's distinction between mind and world, the intelligible and the empirical domain. In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* the distinction seems to split human nature in two parts, the one unrelated to the other. That would give moral thinking no say in everyday moral life, which is an absurdity plainly contradicted by Kant's writings on anthropology, religion, and politics. My approach is limited. I will keep the distinction between mind and world because of the light it throws upon the troubled relation between the inner and the outer, the personal and the public, the teacher and the student. Kant's general distinction is repeated in the basic relation between adult and child, in the generic opposition between generations. The "contradiction" was acutely felt by the readers of Rousseau's *Emile*. After its publication in 1762 pedagogy lost its innocence and became part of a cultural and political struggle.

By the invention of childhood the life of the child was set against that of the adult. The boundary made between children and grown-ups naturally fostered discussions about the limitations of education, that is, about the validity of the aims and actions of educators. There were limits to education not caused by the imperfections of the three-year-old, but by a new constellation in thinking. This constellation created a new vocabulary and new fault lines between the extremes of indoctrination and self-determination, and made it impossible to discuss education without taking on the idea of freedom of thought and action. Kant sharpens the problematic by highlighting the contradiction between young and old from the perspective of individual freedom within the bounds of reason. This, incidentally, is the raison d'être of the so-called pedagogical paradox and its possible

resolution. The first section of my chapter concerns the paradox and turns on the limits of education. The second section relates to a liberal philosophic rhetoric and the undecidability inherent in literary devices found in Kant's texts, notably the "As-if" and the ubiquitous example.

II. THE PEDAGOGICAL PARADOX

What set me on the course for this chapter was the observation that modern education is a contradictory enterprise, expressed in the pedagogical paradox, which says that you cannot force people to be free (Von Oettingen 2006; Kristjánsson 2007). Add the further observation that among modern philosophers Kant was the one who both saw the importance of the paradox and furnished us with the conceptual means to appreciate its importance. The paradox is pragmatic or performative in the sense that there is a clash between what is said and what is actually done; in the speech act "Be spontaneous!" the summons to act freely is contradicted by the implicit command to be free. Examples abound in the field of education, as when a teacher invites students to a free dialogue but insists on determining the rules for the dialogue herself; or when the candidate who sits for an oral exam is told to talk freely, when everyone knows that the examiners wield the criteria for the correct answers. Or in more general terms, if we celebrate the fact that young people are capable of autonomous moral judgment, but take for granted that the teacher is the authority who determines what autonomy is and how it should be practiced. Paternalism is the political and cultural version of the paradox, as when the CEO assures his employees that his decisions are for the best of their welfare; or the art pundits who want to foster art appreciation among the public by didacticizing on true taste in painting or music.

The pedagogical paradox is related to Kant's distinction between mind and world, and is historically a product of eighteenth-century liberal thinking. In an imaginary society totally immersed in tradition and dogma the paradox would not exist, simply because the distinction between inner voice and outer authority, between self-determination and other-determination, would be non-existing. Much the same holds for indoctrination in sectarian groups; or less obviously, in democratic institutions where gag rules and bureaucratic sanctions serve to stifle critical voices. Instrumentalists who think according to the means-ends–model only will find the paradox beside the point; for them education is a matter of giving lessons and controlling the outcome of teaching. Communitarians tend to argue that the paradox simply resolves itself over time, so why fret over it in the first place? A case in point is G. W. F. Hegel, who mentions the immense contradiction—*ungeheuerste Widerspruch*—between the child's need for and, at the same time, rejection of parental authority, but he resolves it within family "love" and finally by the child's coming of age (*Philosophy of Right*: §158, §177). Since

the contradiction comes to naught when the child becomes a member of adult society, it seems that the problem can altogether be dispensed with.

The contrast between Hegel and Kant on education is striking. While Hegel thinks that the will of the child should be broken so that "its original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature" (*Philosophy of Right*: §151 Addition), Kant contends that "Breaking the child's will brings about a slavish way of thinking" (Ak: 9:480). But the most perplexing case of the pedagogical paradox rejected is indeed Rousseau, the philosopher of children's freedom, who denied its relevance for education. In *Emile* the philosopher who invented childhood turned a deaf ear on the paradox. When the time has come for Emile to choose a wife, he is free to make the choice according to his own feelings and wishes. But his tutor declares that he is going to pick Emile's wife, Sophie, for him: the marriage to Sophie is Emile's own choice, but his tutor is making it for him. Kant found important clues to his own ethics in *Emile*, but in contrast to his great inspiration he recognized the pedagogical paradox in educational thinking partly as a consequence of his distinction between the mind and the world.

Kant's treatment of education surely engenders its own problems. In contrast to Rousseau he worked out the idea of subjective freedom in a cognitivist fashion that seems to disregard the education of the sentiments. But it is precisely Kant's formal scheme and the distinction just mentioned that make us see the significance of the pedagogical paradox. With the distinction he draws between thinking and sensing, the intelligible and the empirical, we are better able to define the boundaries of the self and the place of self-determination in ethics. There is the famous opening sentence in *Emile*, that "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man" (*Emile*: 37). That sentence can be turned into the question of the child's autonomy and dignity against the prejudices of a given culture. It surely gives a different "negative pedagogy" from that of Rousseau, but better informed by Kant's acute sensitivity for protecting the child's integrity from even the best intentions and aims of the adults. We all know that there are psychological limits to intervention in children's lives, but Kant is particularly clear about the limits of a pedagogy that has moral autonomy as its foremost aim.

III. TRANSCENDENTAL THINKING

Excellent studies have tried to bridge the gap between Kant's philosophy and educational practice, and without these attempts we would of course not have a substantial Kantian pedagogy worth its name (Munzel 1999; Koch 2003; Koch and Schönherr 2005). But even the best attempts to resolve the pedagogical paradox (Kristjánsson 2007; Cuypers 2009; Nordstrøm 2009; Surprenant 2010) do not eliminate it (Hügli 1999: 192). It seems that the contradiction is resting at the heart of pedagogy itself. There are three

possible reasons for this. First, the paradox is, as already mentioned, based on the basic asymmetry between the old and the young generations; second, and as important, the invention of autonomy[1] in Western culture and its place in the modern constitutional democracy; third, the never-ending gap between theory and practice in moral and political education, as witnessed by the ever-recurring discussions on the topic. The paradox is not part of the traditional curriculum making. This is because it is not goal related and does not give marching orders, but rather requires a reserve or reticence on the part of the educator. It suggests a practice of non-intervention—another paradox—to have its effects.

Non-intervention has indeed been the point of negative education since Rousseau. He told us in *Emile*: Don't saddle your student with books, don't burden him with moral precepts, and don't reason with him. The primary rule is "not to gain time but to lose it" (*Emile*: 93). It is a method of non-interference, of what *not* to do when you want to educate. In *The Education of Man,* Friedrich Fröbel, the father of the Kindergarten, follows suit. He tries to open up the world of the child, and admonishes the teacher to "listen to the quiet insistence of its [the child's] life, the silent demand of its mind' (1973: 91). Or more radically, as Jean-Luc Nancy has it in *The Experience of Freedom*: "*Auto-nomy*, which has always represented the very regime of freedom, must be understood on this basis: as a legislation by the *self* in which the *self* does not pre-exist, since its very existence is what is prescribed by the law, and this law itself is not based on any right, since it founds with its own *juris-diction* the possibility of a 'right' in general" (Nancy 1993: 107).

The point of negative education is that autonomy cannot be preceded by anything but itself. That is exactly the point of transcendental educational thinking. It asks what is the so-called condition of possibility of autonomy; or what is the nature of self-determination before its implementation, before we make it part of the curriculum and before we set out to teach it. Self-determination comes into being by a person's own jurisdiction, literally by giving voice to one's own moral intuition and its principles. We have Rousseau's famous story about the Savoyard priest, in Book 4 of *Emile*, in which the priest wants to "reveal" to his interlocutor what he thinks "in the simplicity of my heart", and by "following the order of nature against all laws of men" (*Emile*: 266f.). Rousseau's order of nature adumbrates the transcendental point of view that there is thinking to be done before we fill in our ideas with the content of the law and the curriculum. The story agrees with Kant's original intuition, even if the concept of self-determination as worked out in the *Groundwork* is formalized well beyond Rousseau's ethics of the heart. I will try to show how transcendental thinking as a veritable archaeology of the mind can contribute to educational thinking. But let me first address the Kantian version of negative education as intimately linked to the pedagogical paradox.

IV. KANT ON EDUCATION

Negative education is a theme in the *Lectures* and informs Kant's practical advice for teaching; and the pedagogical paradox is the key expression of it. He approaches the paradox by furnishing every advice on *Erziehung* or upbringing with a tag that says caution: discipline the child but don't make his mind slavish; impose rules on him but remember to allow for his free judgment; praise him but don't foster his vanity; constrain him but let him savor his freedom. The negative principle presents itself in two quotations on moral education, but impacts the whole of his pedagogy. In one Kant writes, "The human being can only become human through education. He is nothing except what education makes out of him" (Ak: 9:443). In another he emphasizes that "Maxims must originate from the human being himself . . . Morality is something so holy and sublime that one must not degrade it and place it on the same level with discipline" (Ak: 9:481). First of all, the Kantian version of negative pedagogy does not picture the child as the Romantic noble savage or as the classical barbarian outside the citadel of culture. Two cherished metaphors serve to derail transcendental thinking at its inception, and Kant is careful not to draw the boundaries according to them. For him the child always already partakes in a common humanity or *Menschheit* and the task of tutors is to make the child aware of his or her unique place in the community. He rather draws the boundary between the child's world and the reality that impacts her.

But the main point here is how pedagogy is presented in terms of the pedagogical paradox. This is the key paragraph:

> One of the biggest problems of education is how one can unite submission under lawful constraint with the capacity to use one's freedom. For constraint is necessary. How do I cultivate freedom under constraint? I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom, and I shall at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. Without this everything is a mere mechanism, and the pupil who is released from education does not know how to use his freedom. (Ak: 9:453)

At first glance this quote seems to say that freedom is restricted—that there is freedom only under constraint or compulsion from without, which leaves the definition of freedom to the educators. But as pointed out by Georg Cavallar, the German text says "*Freiheit* bei *dem Zwange*" and not "*Freiheit* durch *Zwang*" (Koch and Schönherr 2005: 69). While the latter expression throws the door open for an unrestrained intervention from authorities in the life of the child, the former makes freedom and constraint irreducible to each other. Freedom depends on the capability of children, in this case people under the age of sixteen, to make independent use of their own reason or thinking. Kant says: "The human being can either be merely trained, conditioned, mechanically taught, or actually enlightened . . . But to have trained one's

children is not enough, rather, what really matters is that they learn *to think"* (Ak: 9:450). By the independent use of their wits children do, of course, rely on social constraints that chime with their thinking and feeling, which make up the virtues and capabilities as the social products of education. Here it seems necessary to emphasize two basic and self-evident facts: pedagogy disappears as a practice the moment we skip the child in its real interaction with parents and teachers. Pedagogy disappears, too, as a theoretical activity the moment we exclude the inquiry and descriptions of children and childhood that belong to the modern sciences. That said, my point of view is transcendental rather that practical or scientific in the sense just mentioned. The focus is not on educational practice itself or on the child as an object of study, but rather on making out the significance of the generic concepts or ideas of pedagogy. In short, it is about pedagogy in the mind of the educationist, and in this sense a reflection, not only on the ideas or ideals of his or her trade, but on the conditions of possibility of the profession itself.

V. HUMANITY AS AN END IN ITSELF

Let me pursue the farfetched, but crucial, idea that a human being is "born" free; that freedom simply belongs to the birthright of the child. In the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant mentions the "inner freedom of the innate dignity of man" (Ak: 6:420), and in the treatment of the third antinomy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*[2] he puts it like this: "Reason is at all times and in all situations present and the same, but is itself not in the time" (CPu: A56/B584); reason belongs to man's "intelligible character", and for it there is "no before and after" (CPu: A553/B511). What is not in history appears within Kant's general descriptions of humanity or *Menschheit*, expressed in the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative: *"So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means"* (Ak: 4:429). The person as an end-in-itself does not pass in and out of history as an accidental feature, but is rather an abiding characteristic of the human being as such.

The effect of the imperative is to introduce limiting conditions on the purposes and actions of educators. It makes human classification unwarranted, which means you cannot just exclude three-year-olds, the mentally retarded, and people suffering from Alzheimer's from the ken of humanity. Or more concretely put, the imperative positively obliges educators to respect the freedom of children, and not "domesticate them for the purposes of the state, the church, society or the future workplace" (Koch 2005:16). Being an end-in-oneself does not belong to the class of actual skills or competences; it cannot be measured in tests, and it does not fit into league tables. Here we notice the intention of making the transcendental or metaphysical treatment of morals practically relevant. The relevance goes both ways: it prevents the unreasonable intrusions in

the child's life and lets the educationists see how universalist thinking can be realized in individual cases. Giving thought to the idea that the children are "not in the time" is to allot them the freedom they have as ends-in-themselves.

The idea of an intelligible character outside history clearly goes counter to the most cherished and productive prejudice among educationists: that personal autonomy is the product of a happy socialization and can only be explained in terms of the growth or development of self-determination over the years. The developmental theories of people like Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg makes for the common agreement that all there is to pedagogy is aligning teaching with the stages of children's natural growth. But for critical pedagogy the stress lies, as already indicated, elsewhere: not on the facts of growth but on the idea of autonomy or self-government that the Kantian educationist ascribes to children regardless of age. The critical view is counterintuitive also because the argument that children cannot be led to self-determination by reprimand or reward curtails the current belief in extrinsic motivation. The idea of the child as an end-in-itself threatens to dissipate the faith in the regime of means-ends–thinking in education. If moral reason stands both at the beginning and at the end of pedagogy, the means-ends–model is left without meaning. Transcendental reflection just seems to tear down the very edifice of practical pedagogy: its aims, situatedness, and implementation. Yes, it seems preposterous to say that children are autonomous when we know that they are dependent persons in need of care, supervision, and instruction.

But let us return to the distinction between the intelligible and the empirical domains. The domains are not mutually excluding but compatible in the sense of existing together as figures of thought. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant actually dissolves—*auflöst*—the contradiction between the intelligible and the empirical, sensing and thinking, by making man a citizen of both worlds. Each domain allows for truth within its proper limits (CPu: A559/B587). That means there is no dilemma here between a "realist" and an "idealist" position in education; there is not a conflict that forces us to choose the one over the other. They exist together apart.

Kant's invitation to educational thinking lets the stress fall on the idea of childhood rather than on the child as an object of scientific studies; its focus is on the freedom of the child in the mind of the practicing teacher. In his *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* Kant uses Rousseau's *Emile* as an example of a "true idea of reason" that is, as the highest or most perfect idea of pedagogy (Ak: 28:994). In other words, despite his rejection of Rousseau's naturalism he sees *Emile* as offering an idea of childhood that went beyond a historical description, as for instance in Philippe Ariés' *Centuries of Childhood*, published in the early 1960s. Like the idea of persons as ends-in-themselves, the idea of childhood is part of a moral worldview that

works "negatively" as a limiting force on the belief that everything there is to pedagogy is the pursuit of knowledge, skills, and competences. Kant never thought of making a friend out of his pupil, as Rousseau does in *Emile,* by ending the book with a hope for a lasting friendship between him and his imagined student. We are still left with the putative distinction between the children's world and that of the adults. That, incidentally, means that we still have to deal with its pendant, the pedagogical paradox. The question now is why it is fruitful to think in geographical terms of the inner self and the boundaries that protect it from inroads from without. What is there to be protected? The answer is: human dignity.

VI. CARE OF DIGNITY

In the *Groundwork* dignity is related to the idea of autonomy, to the idea that as a rational moral being I should act only according to the laws of my reason (Ak: 4:413). The source of dignity is the moral sovereignty of the rational person. Kant has been roundly criticized for drawing strict lines between domains that are related, social, and pragmatic, and should be described in terms of beauty (Schiller), mutual recognition (Hegel), or a method of inquiry (Dewey). These are relevant objections, but I believe that Kant's distinction between mind and world is pedagogically powerful and can be accommodated to a phenomenological and dialectical pedagogy. In our daily life we think and act in terms of a boundary between inner and outer, myself and the other, and this social geography makes us talk of being violated, invaded, or overrun by persons and events from without. In general the boundaries drawn between inner and outer throw an interesting light on human vulnerability and generally on the fault lines in the social geography. There is the account in Rousseau's *The Confessions* about the young boy's violent reactions against being unjustly accused of breaking the teeth of a comb, left on a stove to dry. The attempt on the part of the adults to force a confession from him brought "a revolution in his ideas" and "a confusion in his heart and brain," as Rousseau recalls it. It is the story of an invasion of the mind, an injustice to the self, and a violation of his dignity. Rousseau tells us that this incident later made his blood boil "at the sight or the tale of any injustice" whoever suffered it (*Emile*: 28ff. and 30). This, incidentally, is a case of universalization from feeling rather than from reason, suggesting a possible bridge between Kant's rule-dependent approach and the Rousseauian intuitive grasp of trespasses on a person's dignity.

In the words of his close friend Hippel, Kant himself told about the "terror and fear that would overcome him as soon as he thought back to the slavery of his youth," referring to the discipline he was exposed to as a boy student at the Pietist Collegium Friedericianum in Königsberg. As Manfred Kuehn writes: "Pietists were not just interested in controlling the body, they also wanted to control the mind by implanting certain religious and moral

principles" (2001: 45). That was precisely what the young Kant could not bear. Our reactions to obvious cases of harassment or bullying turn on the same theme. We work against bullying in schools and in the workplace because we deem it to be a violation both of the dignity of the other and of the dignity in our own person. We get involved also if we are not the sufferers, but react as participants or fellow citizens of an invisible moral community that puts limitations on such transgressions. There are less obvious cases of overstepping the borders of the other. Even the parent or teacher who practices empathy must observe the crucial line between closeness and distance in relation to the child, which means that she "respects the 'in-between' as a meeting place without occupying it" (von Wright 2000: 196). If the pedagogical paradox expresses the conflict of closeness and distance, the idea of dignity helps us to flesh it out in existential terms. Von Wright points to the fine-tuned feeling for the child's integrity in the teacher who knows that watching her own limits is a way of protecting the child's.

In Kant's cluster of moral ideas, dignity is defined as the inner value that characterizes both me and the other when we act according to maxims that make us ends and not only means of action. In the *Groundwork* autonomy is described as the ground of dignity, in the sense that only a person within the ambit of reason, and thus conscious of being the origin of her own moral principles, can show unconditional respect for herself and others. When Kant goes into practical details in the *Metaphysics of Morals,* we get examples that invoke the boundary between inner and outer. On servility, for example, he says that "Kneeling down or prostrating oneself on the ground, even to show your veneration for heavenly objects, is contrary to the dignity of humanity, as is invoking them in actual images; for you then humble yourself, not before an *ideal* represented to you by your own reason, but before an *idol* of your own making" (Ak: 6:437ff.). The stress here is not on kneeling in church as an act of reverence, but on the difference between an ideal of independent thinking and the current theological and political views. The appeal is to a person who observes the limits to self-humiliation, and is thus part of the moral care of self. The idea of dignity refers to the child's right to an inner integrity of feeling and thought free from the intrusion of others. It reminds the teacher of her duty to preserve that integrity also in herself. Dignity is not a skill or competence, but an idea that in all its ramifications, social and professional, serves as a standing check against the lopsided view of education as only a matter of management, efficiency, and achievement.

In the *Lectures* Kant emphasizes a subtle point in the following example:

> Reverence and the respect for the rights of human beings must be instilled into the child at a very early age . . . For example, if a child meets another, poorer child and haughtily pushes it out the way or away from itself, gives it a blow and so forth, then one must not say: 'Don't do that, it hurts the other one. You should have pity! It is a poor child,' and

> so forth. Rather one must treat it as haughtily and noticeably, because its behaviour was contrary to the rights of humanity (Ak: 9: 489).

This example of "artificial" punishment takes the form of a repetition of the offender's misdeed in the interaction between him and the teacher as the representative of humanity. The offender is invited to understand his wrongdoing by being put in the shoes of the victim. In this example we are presented to the principle of reciprocity in the demand for taking the point of view of the other and by decentering from one's own. Whatever the psychological effect of punishment as a moral reminder, the example repeats the insult to the victim in another key, from a relationship between two children to that between master and student. The incident is transformed into a pedagogical situation, which implies the imperative that you should treat your next of kin as an end-in-himself, that is, care for and defend his dignity. In the very trespassing on the other's self-esteem, the offender also does violence to himself as a member of humanity. That Kant ascribes humanity to all persons regardless of age can explain his advice on moral punishment: that it is not for hurt or for revenge, but for reminding the offender of the humanity in his own person. Punishment goes both ways: it reaffirms both the victim's dignity and that of the perpetrator.

The distinction between the two domains, the intelligible and the empirical, can cast light on the limitations of pedagogy, and how we think as educationists. The idea of childhood belongs to the intelligible domain much as dignity does. The difference is that dignity is an ascription valid for all human beings regardless of time and place. Childhood has a limited time slot, as it were, but is in this sense still constitutive of pedagogy. This is possible to say because childhood is in the mind of the educationists rather than in the world of facts, not a scientific concept in the head of the historian or the social scientist, and not about the child as an object of research. Childhood does not count as a skill or competence in the repertoire of the educationist and cannot be defined as the individual outcome of education. As constitutive of educational thinking it is rather a riddle that we have to continue thinking through. But the idea of "pure" childhood still has its practical impact. Rousseau's *Emile* is not only a "true idea" of pedagogical reason, as Kant would have it (Ak: 28:994), but also an extended example of how the idea of childhood is introduced and worked out by an eccentric author on the basis of wide readings. Rousseau's greatest feat was to make childhood into a household idea in modern education, included in the practice of the Kindergarten. Try and ask yourself: Is the practice of the kindergarten possible without the concept of childhood? I daresay that without the concept preschool teaching has surrendered the professional check on its practices and could easily slide into an institution of discipline and habituation only.

There are other examples of the work of ideas. The idea of children as always already moral beings endowed with rights, and with the innate readiness to distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong, is expressed

in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 14 says that the state should respect the right of the child to "freedom of thought, conscience and religion." We accept the fact that many states do not follow the Convention and that practicing this freedom depends on age and the support of the parents. Still we can stand by the principle of children's rights as an idea that should be realized. In general, ideas call for a reserve on the part of the teacher in its double meaning: a holding back of one's prejudices and actions and having a sense of the moral resources that children bring into life. Now the pedagogical paradox is a standing invitation to educationists to give thought to the limits of intervention in children's lives. The paradox nurtures the thinking that takes place before the teacher steps into the classroom.

VII. THE USES OF IDEAS

In the *Lectures* Kant presents the idea as a concept of perfection. He writes:

> An outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal, and it does no harm if we are not immediately in a position to realize it. One must be careful not to consider the idea to be chimerical and disparage it as a beautiful dream, simply because in its execution hindrances occur. . . . An idea is nothing other than the concept of a perfection which is not yet found in experience (Ak: 9: 445).

Consider the trivial example that we take for granted—that all parents are or should be capable of properly caring for their children—knowing well that parents do not always live up to the principle. What we have is an idea of good parenting that retains its credibility and force despite failures to satisfy it in real life. In fact, the force of the idea may just be more keenly felt in cases where parents do not live up to principles of good parenting. In some way, then, ideas are practical even when their realization is impossible, and we may here speak of the possibility of entertaining a thought that is impossible in terms of its realization. We should in fact welcome this impossibility, for a realization of the perfect pedagogy would land us just in the tyranny of mind control that tortured Kant during his years at his Pietist school. We can hardly do without ideas of perfection, for then we would have no general aims of education, no hopes for a better future, not even a picture of best classroom practices.

But how do ideas work in the Kantian scheme? His answer in the *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* is that the idea introduces a perfect measure against which maxims and actions can be judged, as in the case of virtues: "Human virtue is always imperfect. For this reason we must have a standard, in order to see how far this imperfection falls short of the highest degree of virtue" (Ak: 28:994). Ideas of perfection work as measures for judging the actual cases of comportment that regularly take place in our daily dealings with others. Kant extends on this in the *Groundwork*

by adding that from ideas of perfection (of virtue) we have to strip "any admixture of the sensible and of any spurious adornment of reward or self-love (Ak: 4:426n). To the list of ideas already mentioned we may add "perfect friendship," which we get by writing off in thought all that can stop us from sacrificing everything for the welfare of a friend (Ak: 28:993). Ideas are not figments of the brain, then, but inherent parts of a common moral and political household. In addition to ideas as standards of judgment they can be treated as ideals to be sought for in the future. At the very end of *Toward Perpetual Peace* we find the idea of peace as "regulative" in the sense of a projected future to be approached in time. Kant thinks that the hope for universal peace can actually serve as a motivation to bring it about (Ak: 8:386). In that sense ideas have force and are brought into play by our ability to imagine and project our dreams onto an impossible future situation.

In the Nordic state school system contrafactual values have traditionally been included, as stated in the first general aims section of the present Norwegian Education Act, among them values of care, justice, and love of your neighbour. They refer to an understanding of humanity that is embedded in tradition and thus an expression of national identity. But to this communitarian interpretation we have to add the Kantian argument: that general aims of education can be treated as ideas of perfection. In that case they have to be reconstructed by each generation of educationists in discussion. That the Kantian approach is nearly absent in today's educational discourse can be explained by the inability of going beyond a taxonomy that translates the general aims of education into the particular pieces of knowledge or skills that can be taught and tested in the classroom. There is the professional inability to think abstractly and look beyond the restricted vocabulary of the social sciences. In Kant's pedagogy persons are moral agents rather than objects of study, they are insiders and participants in common everyday life. Without the presupposition of presence or being there, pedagogy would indeed be rid of its raison d'être. Kant's version of critical pedagogy is based on transcendental reflection; even so it comes close to the life problems that ordinary people can recognize as their own. Pedagogy is itself a child of its time, dependent on its historical setting. Kant lived in a time of enlightened despotism, John Dewey wrote in the era of the industrial state, and we are living in the technetronic society. Kant gave us a template for a liberal educational thinking that does not exclude the later contribution of the social and biological sciences, but insists on the independent discourse that deals with common people who keep on asking who they are, where they are heading, and what they ought to do for the young. That brings me to the bearings of Kant's rhetoric on educational thinking.

VIII. INVITATION TO THINKING

Kant's philosophy may seem abstract because of its formalism and technical in the sense of belonging to a small circle of specialists. But there

are other important aspects to take into consideration: his rhetoric. Of particular interest is his use of analogies and examples, but first we should attend to a general feature of his texts: that from the very beginning they invite the reader to join the author in a common pursuit. A well-intended invitation to thinking presupposes the reader's capability to meet the challenge. This is apparent in the summons to independent thinking in "What Is Enlightenment?" that we should make use of our "own understanding without direction from another" (Ak: 8:35). It is also manifest in the basic work on morals, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. He starts the treatise by warning both against the intellectual jack-of-all-trades—the *Tausendkünstler*—and the brooding type or *Grübler*, a probable critical rejoinder to the contemporary and much-read moral philosophers or *Populärphilosophen*. Then he asks the question that we have already seen gives the pedagogical paradox its edge: "is it not thought to be of the utmost necessity to work out (*voranzuschicken*) for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may only be empirical and that belongs to anthropology?" (Ak: 4:388). The question in the "is it not" is a summons to his readers to enter transcendental thinking.

But is the common reader ready to embark upon such a particular journey as is involved in transcendental thinking? We are led to an answer by way of the idea of a "good will." Again Kant tells us to subtract or cancel in thought all those aspects of will-formation that belong to our ordinary life, and suggests or rather reminds us that we then arrive at the thought of an unconditioned good will. He admits, with tongue in cheek, that the idea of the absolute worth of a mere good will might be taken for a high-flying fantasy by "common understanding" (Ak: 4:394). But might we not agree with him that the idea of an absolute, content-free good will is hardly more farfetched than the ideas of absolute justice, hospitality, or friendship? Now doubt as to a common moral ground gives way to belief: "We have . . . to explicate (*entwickeln*) the concept of a will that is to be esteemed in itself and that is good apart from any other purpose, as it *already dwells in natural sound understanding* and needs not so much to be taught (*gelehret*) as only to be clarified (*aufgeklärt*)" (Ak: 4:397, my emphasis). This is an invitation to a transcendental phenomenology, a move to disclose or unveil the common or *gemeinschaftliche* moral ground of people who reflect on their humanity. The appeal to common sense and to the moral intuition of the reader is a presupposition of Kant's practical philosophy, and is further developed when he makes the important move from the moral to the "aesthetic" mode of reasoning in the *Critique of Judgment*.

IX. ANALOGICAL THINKING

Kant's division between the intelligible and empirical world raises several questions. The basic one is how the two realms interact. One answer is found

in the use of ideas mentioned above. Another is thinking in analogies or the so-called As-if. The best-known instance of the As-if appears in the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative: *"Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature*" (Ak: 4:421). Hans Vaihinger, himself a Kant scholar and founder and chief editor of the journal *Kant-Studien*, surveyed Kant's uses of the As-if in his book *The Philosophy of "As if,"* and proposed that Kant's ethics rested on a fictional basis (1965: 49). That is, he directs us to Kant's use of linguistic strategies by talking about fictions rather than ideas. Fictions are not figments of the brain, but ideas put to use in all areas of thinking, including the sciences; they are linguistic or pragmatic devices. Or as Wolfgang Iser has it: "Fictions . . . must always be indicated or known, for fictions are means of solving problems—for the Romans to extend the laws, and for moderns to extend the human mind (1993: 97). And we may add: for educationists to extend their educational thinking. Can educationists extend their minds by taking Kant's transcendental thinking as approximations to what cannot be said explicitly; and can the deliberate use of fictions as part of practical pedagogy succeed? It seems so. The distinction between mind and world is, after all, not a fact about the world, nor is it a dogma, but a heuristic device, an experimental tool in the sense of making space for the question of morality beyond given authority and utility.

In the effort to ground morals, not only in an empirically based moral anthropology, but in human freedom, Kant's texts provide what might be called bridging fictions. Bridging fictions do not replace the use of ideas, but work like metaphors or conduits between thinking and practice. There is a structural likeness between the pedagogical paradox and the As-if as a figure of thought. They are nurtured by the opposition between the subjective and the objective, and the standing but impossible demand for bridging the gap between the two. The most significant feature is the lack of closure inherent both in the paradox and the As-if figure of thought. They represent a deep and resolute anti-dogmatism. Educational thinking offers a plethora of resolutions of the pedagogical paradox. Without them modern pedagogy could not be launched. But the freedom of pedagogy lies in the suspension or deferral of closure. Both the paradox and the As-if–figure prepare for resolutions without ever closing the gap that summons the reader to "reflective judgment." The As-if points beyond the formal strictures of Kant's moral theory and towards its aesthetic ramifications in the *Critique of Judgment* (Nerheim 1991).

X. THE USE OF EXAMPLES

Kant's use of examples is another pedagogically interesting case of suspension of closure. On the face of it Kant presents moral upbringing as basically a matter of rule-following. The idea of inventing moral rules, even if that helps us find new ways of resolving moral quandaries, goes counter to its foundation in reason and duty. In *Lectures* the all-importance of rules is emphasized: "Rules must be found in everything that is to cultivate the understanding. It

is very useful also to abstract the rules so that the understanding may proceed not merely mechanically but rather with the consciousness of a rule" (Ak: 9:474ff.). But we also note that when Kant goes practical and gives us the 'how' of teaching, he invariably turns to examples: 'One must teach them [the children—LL] the duties that they have to fulfil as much as possible by examples and orders" (Ak: 9:488). And admonishing parents not to indulge in admiration for nice clothing neither for themselves nor for their children, Kant adds that "here as everywhere example is all-powerful and reinforces or destroys good teaching" (Ak: 9:486). But the example is generally not a particular case or exemplar of a rule. As particular cases of a practical rule the range of meaning of examples is restricted, even if they can play up to and illustrate rules. Examples do not bolster rules and may even put them to doubt. The example of the bully mentioned above rather makes for complex interpretations determined by tradition and the context of use; it is an artificial or literary rendering of a scene culled from a common life. If examples are not rules, what is the difference between them? To put it like this: moral rules relate to one's moral duties and have a command character, while moral examples require interpretations and application. Examples from moral life can be conventional or didactic, as Kant's piece about the bully. But they can also be rendered in the extended form of parables or fables or narratives—genres with a complex rhetoric. Kant's examples challenge the reader's hermeneutic capability in the interface between moral precepts and real life situations. They work as metaphors that bridge or literally carry us from an imagined situation to its moral and pedagogical significance. The example as bridging device does not determine one's actions, but contributes at its best to open-ended practical deliberations and discussions. As in the case of the As-if, that point of view can be further worked out within the ambit of the aesthetic mode as it is provided in the *Critique of Judgment*.

NOTES

1. This is the title of Schneewind's book *The Invention of Autonomy* (1998).
2. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPu) can be found in volumes 3 and 4 of the Akademie edition. For convenience, I have used the standard references to the "A" and "B" versions.

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10 Examples of Moral Possibility

Paul Guyer

I. INTRODUCTION: KANT'S ATTITUDES TOWARD EXAMPLES

Kant was notoriously critical of the use of examples in moral theorizing. He was equally emphatic about the necessity of examples in moral education. Is there a contradiction here? Not necessarily; after all, theorizing is reflection on practice, not practice itself, so the two activities are not identical. And one might be tempted to say that we should not base moral theory on examples of moral conduct, because we never have perfect examples of such conduct, but that imperfect examples will be better than none in education—where, after all, we can use them to illustrate the nature of moral failings as well as moral successes. Kant's position is more complex than that. It is indeed part of his criticism of the use of examples of actual conduct for moral theorizing that we rarely if ever have perfect examples of moral conduct, and would be more than likely to infer the wrong principle of morality from actual examples of human conduct if that were how we tried to arrive at the principle of morality. This view is part and parcel of his view that the moral law is synthetic a priori, and thus while not innate in the sense that Locke had attacked, that of being present to consciousness from birth, it is nevertheless inherent in every human being and will reveal itself in reflection upon prospective action from quite early on in individual development. However, precisely because Kant does insist upon a distinction between innateness and apriority, he can and does suppose that even though the moral law is a priori children still need a skillful series of questions—what Kant calls a "catechism"—to achieve a clear *consciousness* of it—and this catechism involves the use of examples, as we will see. Second, although Kant is insistent that duty should never become a matter of mere habit, because he thinks of habit as unreflective and possibly inappropriate response to particular circumstances, he also recognizes that duties of virtue in particular, precisely because they are indeterminate, can to some extent be taught only by example, not by rule. Finally, Kant recognizes that children (and even adults) may need persuasion that they are *capable of living up* to the moral law, or that fulfillment of the moral law is a real possibility for them, not just a logical possibility, and for that they need examples, indeed actual examples, of genuine moral conduct.

This last claim immediately raises two questions. First, does Kant not reject the use of examples of actual human conduct in moral theorizing precisely because we can never be sure we have an example of perfect human conduct? That turns out not to be a problem, however, but a solution, because Kant thinks that human beings must learn the threats to the possibility of fulfilling the moral law as well as the sheer possibility of doing so, and thereby learn that they can develop virtue only by constantly struggling against those threats to morality. This is something humans learn best from actual examples of moral conduct amid the imperfections of human life, not from abstract ideas of holy wills or Stoic sages.

But, second, does Kant not hold that human beings are immediately conscious of their freedom along with their consciousness of the moral law—is that not what he calls the "fact of reason" (CPr: 5:31–32, 42–43, 47–48)? If humans are inherently conscious of the moral law and their obligation under it, why would they need anything else to be conscious of their freedom to act in accordance with it, which seems to be all that recognition of the possibility of being moral requires? The answer to this question is that although the fact of reason would obviously be self-evident to a fully rational being, the human being, particularly the maturing child and adolescent, but even the human adult, is not a fully rational being, but is a being with sensory as well as intellectual powers as well as needs; and such a being needs sensible or palpable as well as purely intellectual evidence of the possibility of being moral. As Kant puts it in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, "because of the natural need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and grounds of reason something that *the senses can hold on to*, some confirmation from experience or the like" (Rel: 6:109) is needed even for the a priori concepts and self-evident facts of pure practical reason. For humans, seeing is believing, or at least sensory evidence is deeply conducive to our convictions about how the world ought to be as well as to those about how it is.

I will explore these thoughts further in what follows. After a brief discussion of Kant's rejection of examples for moral theorizing, I will consider his positive account of the role of examples in moral education, narrowly and broadly construed—that is, the education of the growing child and the continuing education of the mature human being; here we will see that Kant does allow some role for examples not only for proving the possibility of being moral but also in moral instruction, indeed about both the most general principle of morality as well as more specific duties of virtue, which can never be fully spelled out and can therefore be taught only by example. We will next consider the role of examples in giving us the palpable evidence of the possibility of being moral that we need, both as children and adults: while outside his accounts of moral education Kant looks for palpable evidence of the possibility of the realization of the object of morality, namely the highest good, as well as for palpable evidence of our freedom to strive for compliance with the moral law, in his account of the moral education of children he discusses only the former, and no doubt for good reason. Finally,

we will see that Kant looks to examples to teach us not only the possibility of being moral but also the limits or at least the obstacles to our freedom to be moral, so that we may learn the possibility of *virtue* for mixed beings like ourselves rather than an impossible purity or holiness of will that might be possible for purely rational beings but is not possible for human beings.[1]

II. KANT'S REJECTION OF EXAMPLES IN MORAL THEORIZING

Kant famously rejects founding moral *theory* on examples at the start of Section II of the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*. In Section I, he had argued that an initial formulation of the fundamental principle of morality can be readily arrived at by reflection on common notions of the good will and duty, and then confirmed his deduction of the principle by stating that it is what "human reason . . . actually has always before its eyes and uses as a norm for its appraisals," by means of which it "knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and evil." "Inexperienced in the course of the world" as you may be, when confronted with a possible path of action you nevertheless ask yourself "can you will that your maxim become a universal law?" and know that "If not, then it is to be repudiated" (Gr: 4:403–404). This is an expression of Kant's conviction of our a priori knowledge of the fundamental principle of morality. The appeal to "common moral cognition" of Section I is not the same as appeal to empirical example, and in Section II Kant argues that the attempt of "popular moral philosophy" to infer the fundamental principle of morality from empirical examples or "experience of people's conduct" is doomed. He first asserts that "it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one's duty," indeed that if one scrutinizes actual conduct closely enough one is very likely to find a "covert impulse of self-love" or at least not be able to exclude such an impulse, and thus "there have at all times been philosophers who have . . . ascribed everything to more or less refined self-love" (Gr: 4:406–407). In other words, if you attempt to base your conception of the fundamental principle of morality on examples of actual conduct, you will end up with the idea that what this principle enjoins is the maximal gratification of self-love. But, and this is Kant's deeper point, we already know that this conclusion is wrong. We know that because we already know the moral law, and know that this is not it.

This leads to Kant's more abstract argument against examples, which does not depend upon an empirical claim that we cannot find a perfect example of moral conduct. The argument is rather than we could not recognize an example of morality, even an example of imperfect morality, *as* an example unless we already knew the moral law:

> Nor could one give worse advice to morality than by wanting to derive it from examples. For every example of it represented to me must itself first be appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether it is also worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model; it can be no means authoritatively provide the concept of morality. Even the Holy One of the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before he is cognized as such. (Gr: 4:408)

The last line of this quotation suggests that Kant's conception of the dependence of our recognition of examples of morality on our prior cognition of the principle of morality is part and parcel of his Enlightenment antivoluntarism,[2] and Kant makes the larger context of this argument clear by repeating it in Part Two of the *Religion*:

> [E]ven if there had never been one human being capable of unconditional obedience to the law, the objective necessity that there be such a human being would yet be undiminished and self-evident. There is no need, therefore, of any example from experience to make the idea of a human being morally pleasing to God a model for us; the idea is present as a model already in our reason. (Rel: 6:62)

We can recognize an example of moral conduct only if we already know the moral law that such conduct exemplifies; only thus can we know what the example exemplifies, a fortiori how fully it exemplifies what it does, and where it falls short if it does.

As we will see in a moment, however, this argument against trying to ground the derivation of the moral law on empirical examples does not entirely preclude a role for examples in the moral education of children: what is inherent may nevertheless need to be brought to consciousness or clarity by a process of education that can involve the use of examples. But before we turn to that specific point, there is a more general question that needs to be raised, namely, did not Kant himself use examples in his own derivation of the proper formulation of the moral law in Section I of the *Groundwork*? Did he not persuade us of the constraints on any possible moral law, which lead to the recognition that the requirement that we act only on universalizable maxims is the only candidate for this law[3] by giving us examples of the cold-hearted or grief-stricken men who are nevertheless able to fulfill their duties to be beneficent or refrain from suicide not from inclination but from a moral law that does not refer to inclination (Gr: 4:398)? He did, but it is important to note that these are thought-experiments, not empirical examples of actual human conduct.[4] Their power of persuasion does not depend upon there ever having been anyone motivated entirely without inclination by the moral law alone, but it does depend upon the fact that we inherently know the moral law and thus know how to construct or follow such examples. Thought-experiments of this sort are

immune from the first point that Kant makes at the outset of the next section of the *Groundwork* and confirm his second point.

III. THE USE OF EXAMPLES IN TEACHING THE MORAL LAW

We may now return to the question of whether examples may be used in educating children to the content of the moral law itself, or perhaps more loosely the moral law and its relations to the most other fundamental concepts of morality, such as duty, worth, and happiness. The basis for Kant's recognition of the value of examples for this purpose, as already suggested, is his distinction between innateness and apriority: Kant does not assume that what is (synthetic) a priori is innate in the sense of being present to conscious without any instruction.[5] He had made this distinction as early as his inaugural dissertation on *The Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds*, where he had argued that the concepts of space and time, even though a priori, are not innate but must be "*acquired*, not, indeed, by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the matter and not the form of human cognition), but from the very action of the mind . . . in accordance with permanent laws" (ID: 2:406). But there is nothing to say that for a child to learn the actions of its own mind and the laws in accordance with which those actions take place does not require the guidance of a teacher, and indeed the use of examples, and Kant hardly assumes that because geometry and arithmetic, which describe the structure of space and time, are a priori, they do not need to be taught. They do need to be taught, and are taught by the use of examples—the construction of figures, the addition of sums—that illustrate their general principles. The same is true in the case of the general principle and concepts of morality, even though they are a priori.

Kant gives an example of the use of examples at this general level of moral education in the Doctrine of Method of Ethics in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, in the form of a "Fragment of Moral Catechism" (MM 6:480–484). Here what Kant suggests is that the teacher has his pupil both use himself as an example and also consider thought-experiments or hypothetical examples as the theorist did in Section I of the *Groundwork*. He has the teacher begin by asking the student "What is your greatest, in fact your whole, desire in life?", then prompting the student to respond that it is his own happiness, which proposal the student immediately rejects in favor of the idea that he would want to share his happiness with others "and make them happy and satisfied too." Thus far the teacher is asking the student to use his own responses as examples to reach a formulation of the moral law. The teacher then introduces hypothetical examples of the character and conduct of others, asking the student whether he would really choose "to give a lazy fellow soft cushions so that he could pass his life away in sweet idleness" or "see to it that a drunkard is never short of wine," from which

the student again recoils, quickly coming to see that only those who are worthy of happiness should be granted happiness and that duty is the condition of worthiness to be happy (MM: 6:481–482). From these examples, the student immediately realizes the difference between happiness and the worthiness to be happy. From this point, Kant describes the teacher leading the student to a recognition of the conception of the highest good and the postulate of the existence of God as the condition of its possibility rather than to a formulation of the moral law (MM: 6:482), but we can suppose that by similar means the teacher can lead the student toward a formulation of the moral law itself. In all this, it seems that the student is coming to a clear formulation of the moral law and its status as the condition of worthiness to be happy from the examples offered to him by the teacher.

How should the role of these examples be understood? The premise of Kant's account is that "The teacher, by his questions, guides his young pupil's course of thought merely by presenting him with cases in which his predisposition for certain concepts will develop (the teacher is the midwife of the pupil's thoughts)" (MM: 6:478). "Cases" (*Fälle*) are nothing other than examples, from which the student will draw inferences based on his "predispositions," which are nothing other than concepts and principles that he knows a priori but of which he needs to become conscious. Now, Kant's use of the term "midwife" is an unmistakable reference to Socrates' description of his own role in his debates with his Athenian interlocutors (*Theatetus*: 149a). However, Kant goes on to say that "The formal principle of such instruction does not, however, permit Socratic *dialogue* as the way of teaching for this purpose, since the pupil has no idea of what questions to ask, and so the teacher alone does the questioning" (MM: 6:479). But of course in many Socratic dialogues Socrates's interlocutor does not get to ask many questions, either, and the model for Kant's catechism seems to be precisely a dialogue like *Meno*, in which Socrates shows how easy it is to elicit the correct answers to geometrical questions even from a slave-boy by presenting him with the right figures in order to demonstrate that our knowledge of geometry is what Kant would call a priori: the right examples can get children to express their a priori knowledge, whether of geometry or morals. Of course, it is crucial to Socrates's procedure that the slave-boy not be drawing his inferences from observation of the empirical realization of the figures before him, lines drawn in the sand or on a board with all their imperfections, for then he would be getting inaccurate answers: these figures get him to drawn on his inherent understanding of equality, triangularity, and so on. In Socrates's words, the boy "will know" the geometrical results that Socrates gets him to see "without having been taught but only questioned" because he can "find the knowledge within himself" (*Meno*: 85d). Likewise, Kant's moral teacher's catechism, with its examples, gets his pupil to draw on his a priori knowledge of the moral law. Of course, Kant does not go on to say that "finding knowledge within

oneself" is "recollection," as Socrates does, but it is a matter of bringing what is a priori to consciousness by means of examples in the sense of thought-experiments.

So far from precluding the use of examples in teaching the most general content of morality, the moral law, and its relation to such other fundamental concepts as duty, happiness, and the worthiness to be happy, Kant supposes that our a priori knowledge of this principle and these concepts must be elicited from the maturing child by means of examples. This is entirely consistent with what we might think of as the relation between his epistemology and his pedagogy.

IV. THE USE OF EXAMPLES IN TEACHING THE DUTIES OF VIRTUE

The second role of examples in moral education is to teach the pupil the requirements of her imperfect duties to herself and others.

This role of examples must be distinguished from Kant's use of examples of duty in his confirmation of his formulations of the moral law in Section II of the *Groundwork*, which is a use of examples in moral theory rather than moral pedagogy. There Kant's aim is to "enumerate a few duties in accordance with the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and to other human beings and into perfect and imperfect duties" in order to confirm the correctness of his formulations, although he also notes that "the division here stands only as one adopted at my discretion (for the sake of arranging my examples)," his definitive division of duties being reserved "for a future *Metaphysics of Morals*" (Gr: 4:421 and 421n). In other words, what he offers here is only supposed to be an example of examples to confirm his formulation of the moral law, although as it turns out his definitive division of duties in the actual *Metaphysics of Morals* is grounded on the same basic division of duties into perfect and imperfect duties to self and others. Be that as it may, Kant's point here is that the correctness of his formulations of the moral law, first the formulation of it as the requirement that we act only on universalizable maxims (Gr: 4:421) and second the formulation of it as the requirement always to treat humanity as an end and never merely as a means (Gr: 4:429), can be confirmed by showing that examples of each of the classes of duty commonly recognized can be explained on the basis of these principles.

But all this, as I said, is a use of examples in moral theorizing, not in moral pedagogy. We come to the latter when Kant says in the *Lectures on Pedagogy* that "In order to ground a moral character in children . . . One must teach them the duties that they have to fulfill as much as possible by examples and orders [*Beispiele und Anordnungen*]" (LP: 9:488). Now the final word in this quotation, although it could be translated by "directions" or "instructions" as well as by "orders," might suggest that Kant means to claim that perfect as well as imperfect duties need to be and can be taught

by example, for perfect duties, such as the prohibition of suicide or theft, can certainly be the subject of "orders": "Under no circumstances commit suicide," and the like. However, Kant's continuation of the passage suggests that what he has in mind is primarily the imperfect duties to ourselves and others. He continues "The duties which a child has to perform are after all only ordinary duties to itself and to others." That is still general, allowing for perfect as well as imperfect duties, but Kant goes on "Therefore we have to consider more closely":

> a) duties to oneself. These do not consist in buying fine clothes for oneself, having splendid meals and so forth, although everything must be clean. Nor do they consist in trying to satisfy one's desires and inclinations, for on the contrary one must be very moderate and temperate. Rather they consist in the human being having a certain dignity within himself which ennobles him before all creatures, and it is his duty not to deny this dignity of humanity in his own person. But we deny the dignity of humanity when we, for example, take to drinking, commit unnatural sins, practice all kinds of immoderation, and so forth, all of which degrade the human being far below the animals. (LP: 9:488–489)

Here we are dealing with an end that is also a duty, namely, preserving the dignity of humanity in oneself, and we can be given examples of things that damage this dignity and should be avoided as well as things that promote it, but no complete list—each of the lists that Kant does give ends with "and so forth." Perhaps some of the prohibitions are relatively determinate—Kant may have in mind a determinate list of "unnatural sins." But other prohibitions are not determinate—Kant does not after all ban all use of alcohol, only drinking to excess—and how can what constitutes drinking to excess be taught except by example? More generally, Kant offers no complete list of the things that can damage the dignity of humanity in oneself, let alone a complete list of things that could promote it. The child can be offered only examples of actions that can damage or promote his own dignity, and has to figure out how to go one from there, how to assimilate new situations that might present themselves to him to the examples that he was given by his teacher. That's what "and so forth" implies.

Similarly, Kant says that "duties to others" must also be taught by example. So, first, he says that "Reverence and respect for the rights of human beings must be instilled into the child at a very early age, and one must carefully see to it that the child puts these into practice." But even in the case of reverence and respect the child cannot be given a complete list of ways to show reverence and respect, but only examples of how to demonstrate these.

> For example, if a child meets another, poorer child and haughtily pushes it out of the way or away from itself, gives it a blow and so forth, then

> one must not say "Don't do that, it hurts the other one. You should have pity! It is a poor child," and so forth. Rather one must treat it just as haughtily and noticeably, because its behavior was contrary to the rights of morality. (LP: 9:489)

There are actually two separate points here, both of great importance. One is that children cannot be taught their duties by pronouncements of abstract principles, but by eliciting in them the feelings that their actions would produce in others, which feelings they will eventually come to understand as mandated by the a priori principles of morality that they will eventually come to recognize. But second, and more germane to the present argument, is that children cannot be given a complete list of ways in which to damage or respect the dignity or rights of others; they can be given examples of actions that would hurt the rights of others or actions that would preserve them, and then they have to figure out how to go beyond those examples. Once again, "and so forth" cannot be avoided.

This is even clearer in the case of the positive duty of beneficence, Kant's example of imperfect duty to others in the *Groundwork*, which Kant here explicitly says is "only an imperfect obligation." Kant suggests that children must learn how to fulfill this duty from examples: "For example, if someone who should pay his creditor today is touched through the sight of someone in need and gives him the sum which he owes and should now pay–is this right or not" (LP 9:490)? Well, obviously not, and given his "predisposition" or inherent knowledge of the moral law and of the kinds of duties it implies, the child will immediately draw this inference. But can the child be given a complete list of the constraints imposed by perfect duty on the fulfillment of imperfect duty, or a mechanical procedure for determining when and to what extent to fulfill imperfect duties? Again, obviously not—the very nature of imperfect duty precludes this. Any instruction about how to fulfill imperfect duty is going to have to begin with "For example" and end with "and so forth." So the use of examples is in fact ineliminable from instruction about duties, certainly imperfect duties.

We have now seen two ways in which the use of examples seems to play an indispensable role in instruction about the content of morality. First, in spite of the apriority of the moral law, consciousness of that law and its related concepts must be elicited from children by careful use of examples, just as mathematical knowledge must be elicited from them by the careful use of examples in spite of the apriority of mathematics. Second, the concrete requirements of duty, certainly of imperfect duty, can only be taught by examples, because of the impossibility of formulating rules that would cover every relevant situation, specify precisely how duties should be fulfilled, how they can impact each other—and so forth. Still, neither of these is clearly what Kant regards as most important about the use of examples in moral education. There can be little doubt that what Kant regards as most important is the use of examples to bring home to children both the possibility of their being moral and

the constraints against which they will have to struggle—lifelong—in order to be moral. And for this purpose, Kant seems to hold, examples of actual human conduct will be most effective.

V. EXAMPLES OF MORAL POSSIBILITY

The crucial role of examples in moral education is to teach children that they are in fact free to be moral but that they must also struggle with the limits of human nature in order to be so. Kant stresses both of these points in his central remarks on moral pedagogy in the Doctrine of Method of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and emphasizes the second point in a variety of contexts from his criticism of the ideal of the Stoic sage who is simply immune to the blandishments of desire as a form of "moral enthusiasm" (e.g., CPr: 5:86) to his interpretation of Jesus Christ as an example not of the immunity of the will to desire but of the inevitable struggle between good and evil in the human being, combined with the possibility of good triumphing over evil (Rel: 6:64–65). Indeed, even before he comes to the discussion of moral pedagogy in the second *Critique*'s Doctrine of Method, Kant states that the "proper moral condition" of the human being, "in which he can always be, is *virtue*, that is, moral disposition *in conflict*, and not *holiness* in the supposed *possession* of a complete *purity* of dispositions of will," and adds that the inculcation of an ideal of simply transcending or eliminating natural desires will only lead to delusion:

> By exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, minds are attuned to nothing but moral enthusiasm and exaggerated self-conceit; by such exhortations they are led into the delusion that it is not duty—that is, respect for the law whose yoke (though it is a mild one because reason itself imposes it on us) they must bear, even if reluctantly—which constitutes the determining ground of their actions, and which always humbles them inasmuch as they observe the law (*obey* it). (CPr: 5:84–85)

What the moral pupil must learn is that the human condition requires a constant struggle to subordinate desire to morality—to subordinate the principle of self-love to the principle of morality, in the terms of the *Religion* (Rel: 6:35–636)—and that this is possible, but not that morality requires what is impossible, namely the sheer elimination of desire. Much as a rational being might *wish* that (Gr: 4:428), the difference between wish and will is precisely that the former is not constrained by possibility while the latter is. The Doctrine of Method then adds that all of this—both the purity of the moral law itself as well as the fact that our commitment to it can only take the form of virtuous struggle and not humanly impossible holiness of will—cannot in fact be taught by mere exhortation, but only by example.

Since what must be taught is the real rather than merely logical possibility of virtue, that is, both the real possibility of our freedom to comply with the moral law and the real obstacles of our own desires that we inescapably encounter in doing so, it is crucial that this aspect of moral education, that is, education about moral possibility, employ actual and not just hypothetical examples of human conduct. Kant signals this point at the outset of his discussion of the use of examples in the Doctrine of Method:

> I do not know why educators of young people have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon even the most subtle examination of the practical questions put to them and why they have not, after first laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism, searched through the biographies of ancient and modern times in order to have at hand instances for the duties presented, in which, especially by comparison of similar actions under different circumstances, they could well activate their pupils' judgment [*Beurteilung*] in marking the lesser or greater moral import of such actions. (CPr: 5:154)[6]

In this passage, we may see Kant's division of labor for the use of examples in moral education at work: as we have already seen from the illustration of the moral catechism that he later offered in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, that stage of moral education is focused on elucidating the student's a priori concepts of the moral law and its relation to happiness, which can be done by hypothetical examples or thought-experiments; but what is now to be made clear beyond doubt—even though it is again in some sense already known by us a priori as the "fact of reason"—is the real possibility of our living up to the demands of morality, in the form of virtue though not holiness, and for that we need examples of actual human conduct, not thought-experiments. Thus the teacher must turn to ancient and modern biographies, not ancient and modern myths and fictions. (It might seem as if in his original account of it Kant supports the "fact of reason" with thought-experiments, not actual examples: You know that you could resist your temptation to enter into a house of ill-repute if threatened with death for doing so; don't you think you could resist your temptation to give false testimony against an innocent person when threatened with death for not doing so [CPr: 5:30]? Maybe Kant thinks that such thought-experiments can work to confirm adults in their conviction of their own freedom, but not children; or maybe the adult's strongly felt response to such a question bridges the gulf between a mere thought-experiment and an actual example.)

Indeed, in his ensuing exposition of the use to be made of such biographical and hence real examples of moral conduct, Kant emphasizes the importance of leading children to understand the struggle required to be moral even before he makes clear that they can learn the very possibility

of being moral from such examples. He continues the long sentence last quoted by saying that if they were to use such examples, educators

> would find that even someone very young, who is not yet ready for speculation, would soon become very acute and thereby not a little interested, since he would feel the progress of his faculty of judgment; and, what is most important, they could hope with confidence that frequent practice in knowing good conduct in all its purity and approving it and, on the other hand, marking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, even though it is carried on only as a game of judgment in which children can compete with each other, yet will leave behind a lasting impression of esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other, which by mere habituation, repeatedly looking on such actions as deserving approval or censure, would make a good foundation for uprightness in the future conduct of life. (CPr: 5:154–5)

(It is a theme in Kant's lectures on pedagogy that children have a natural impulse to play games, and the wise teacher does not simply try to constrain that impulse, although he must sometimes do so in order to teach them the necessity of work, but also tries to turn those games to educational purpose (e.g., LP: 9:467–468).) Thus far, this sentence might still be talking about the first stage of moral education, learning what is moral, that is, bringing to consciousness the child's a priori but latent understanding of morality, for which fictional examples might do. But Kant immediately continues to stress the danger of fictional examples and by implication the importance of real examples, namely, that the former can all too easily be used to recommend an unachievable holiness of will rather than really possible virtue, which could lead not merely to frustration but to actual neglect of our real moral duties:

> But I do wish that educators would spare their pupils examples of so-called *noble* (supermeritorious) actions, with which our sentimental writings so abound, and would expose them all only to duty and to the worth that a human being can and must give himself in his own eyes by consciousness of not having transgressed it; for, whatever runs up into empty wishes and longings for inaccessible perfection produces mere heroes of romance who, while they pride themselves on their feeling for extravagant greatness, release themselves in return from the observance of common and everyday obligation, which then seems to them insignificant and petty. (CPr: 5:155)

Most of us will live most of the time in undramatic circumstances, and most of what morality will require of us will be pretty ordinary: paying back our debts, cultivating our talents, and being generous to others but only when we can do these without neglecting our other obligations, and

so forth (again). So children must learn that. But they must also learn that even that will require controlling other desires they will inevitably have, though there is no magic that will simply free them of such desires. That is something in particular that they need to learn from actual examples of human virtue, not saintly holiness or Stoic sagacity.

Only once he has made this point clear does Kant turn to the role of example in teaching the real possibility of human freedom to comply with the moral law. He proposes that the moral educator use a "story of an honest man whom someone wants to induce to join the calumniators of an innocent but otherwise powerless person (say Anne Boleyn, accused by Henry VIII of England)" (CPr: 5:155). Kant's earlier thought-experiment about a person threatened by a prince if he will not betray an innocent person has now become a real example. (Perhaps we should not underestimate the effect on the philosopher of living under an unconstrained monarch, even if a supposedly enlightened one such as his own Friedrich II.) The story is developed, as first the subject is offered gifts if he will do as he is asked, then threatened with increasingly serious punishments, loss of friendship, of wealth, then "loss of freedom and even of life itself." As the level of threat is increased while the subject "remains firm in his resolution to be truthful, without wavering or even doubting," the "young listener will be raised step by step from mere approval to admiration, from that to amazement, and finally to the greatest veneration and a lively wish that he could be such a man (though certainly not in such circumstances)" (CPr: 5:156). But the point is precisely that the child's "lively wish" will not be a *mere* wish, because there really was someone who resisted Henry's threats if he did not testify against Anne—Henry Norris, the "groom of the stole," who "would rather die a thousand deaths than calumniate an innocent person" (Hume *The History of England*: 234–236).[7] That Henry Norris could resist the demands of such a powerful monarch as Henry VIII will give the child palpable evidence that he too could resist the blandishments of his own desires and fears in order to fulfill the demands of morality that he has come to venerate—even though, of course, he, and we, hope that he will never find himself in such dire straits as Henry Norris did.

Having suggested the positive role that examples of actual moral conduct can play in convincing children of the real possibility of their own virtue, Kant reiterates the danger of hoping, as he thinks many in his own sentimental times do, "to have more influence on the mind through melting, tender feelings or high-flown, puffed-up pretensions, which make the heart languid instead of strengthening it, than by a dry and earnest representation of duty" (CPr: 5:157). He emphasizes again that if the concepts of morality "are to become subjectively practical . . . the representation of them must be considered in relation to human beings and to the individual human being" (CPr: 5:157–158), not in relation to fanciful images of saints or sages. "In a word, the moral law demands obedience from duty and not from a predilection that cannot and ought not to be presupposed at all"

(5:158). That is what the child must learn, and the child can learn not only what the moral law demands but also that it is really possible to live up to this demand from real examples of virtuous human conduct.

VI. CONCLUSION

Kant's conception of the role of examples in moral education is founded on the premise that our knowledge of the content of the moral law and of our freedom to fulfill it is a priori but latent, as much (synthetic) a priori knowledge is, and that children must bring this knowledge from latency to consciousness by means of examples (and even adults may need to be reminded of it by example). Hypothetical examples or thought-experiments may suffice to bring children to consciousness of the moral law itself, along with the distinction between mere happiness and the worthiness to be happy. The contents of particular duties, particularly the imperfect duties, may also need to be taught by example, for the simple reason that all the ways in which human dignity could be injured or conversely promoted could never be fully enumerated—although Kant leaves it open whether hypothetical or real examples are necessary for this purpose. But when it comes to our freedom to live up to the demands of morality, since it is our real freedom and not just the logical possibility of freedom of which we must be convinced, only historical and not hypothetical examples will do, or at least they are what will be most persuasive for the growing child. Thus the *Critique of Practical Reason*, for example, which begins with the fact of reason, ends with the story of Anne Boleyn and one man who refused to join in betraying her.

NOTES

1. My argument in this chapter may thus be considered a clarification of the treatment by Munzel (1999: 289), who runs together Kant's position in the *Groundwork* that examples "put the feasibility of what the law commands beyond doubt" (her quote from Gr: 4:409) with his position in the lectures on pedagogy that we must teach children "the duties they are to fulfill, as far as possible through examples" (her quote from LP: 9:488). My argument is that these are two quite different roles for examples in moral education.
2. I would go so far as the characterize anti-voluntarism as the defining attitude of the Enlightenment; see, for example, Cooper 1999, Book I, Part III, section 2.
3. For a full account of Kant's "criterial" strategy for the derivation of the moral law, see Kerstein 2002: chapter 4.
4. They are what Onora O'Neill calls "hypothetical" rather than "ostensive" examples (1986: 5–29).
5. We can have analytic a priori cognition of the relations among the predicates of constructed concepts such as "bachelor," and of course those concepts have to be learned before we can have that a priori knowledge. What is at

issue here is whether there is a sense in which we need to learn synthetic a priori principles and the concepts they involve.

6. Here I have departed from Gregor's usual rendition of *Beurteilung* as "appraisal" to make clear the connection between this part of Kant's sentence and the continuation of it that will be quoted shortly.
7. Kant often uses examples from British history, and since the earliest translation of Hume's history into German was published between 1763 and 1771, Hume's history may well have been the source for Kant's reference to Anne Boleyn and the story of at least one man who refused to calumniate an innocent.

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11 Moral Education and the Ideal of Humanity

Richard Dean

Immanuel Kant gives moral education a central role in his *Lectures on Pedagogy*, and acknowledges its moral significance by appending a section on "Teaching Ethics" to *The Metaphysics of Morals*, his most detailed discussion of moral duties. Given its importance, it is surprising how little attention Kant gives to explaining the basic rationale for moral education. One might well think that providing every human with a moral education is a duty, but Kant does not explicitly say it is, let alone show how such a duty follows from the Categorical Imperative. There is even a prima facie puzzle, which Kant does not specifically address, about how it is possible for education to have an influence on a person's moral character at all, given the Kantian position that each person is ultimately free and responsible for her own moral choices and basic priorities.

Although Kant does not elucidate these issues directly, his texts do provide the ingredients for comprehensive answers. Emphasizing not only the basic moral requirement of treating humanity as an end in itself, but also a complementary account of humanity as an "ideal" in a Kantian technical sense, clarifies the connections between moral education and Kant's overall system of moral philosophy. Providing a moral education is a duty, but Kant has consistent reasons for not directly describing the duty in his main writings on ethics.

I. MORAL EDUCATION AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Although Kant seems to regard moral education as an important element of both pedagogy and ethics, the connections between his views on moral education and his systematic moral philosophy must be developed.

Kant emphasizes moral education throughout *Lectures on Pedagogy*, and even appears to make moral development the most important goal of education. Kant says that the point of education is to allow a person to bring out his "predisposition" or "his destiny: humanity" (LP: 9:441–442). It is only through education that we can achieve "the perfection of human nature," or "unfold humanity from its germs" of potential and "make it happen that

the human being reaches his vocation" (LP: 9:444–445). This perfection of human nature includes good moral character. The germs that must be cultivated are "only germs for the good" rather than "grounds of evil," and the predisposition that must be cultivated is a "predisposition toward the good" (LP: 9:446, 448). He says that to develop human nature, we must "see to it that humanity becomes not merely skillful but also moral" (LP: 9:449). But Kant seems to go further than just saying that moral development is one part of education, appearing to hold that it is in fact the most important part. He divides education into physical education, and "practical or moral education," and he regards practical, moral education as more distinctive of humanity. By "physical education," Kant does not mean what we would mean, but rather education or training that relies on habituation or discipline, like the training of animals (LP: 9:455, 475). In contrast, practical education is training that relies on developing the student's commitment to principles or "maxims." Through this "moral formation," the student "receives value in view of the entire human race" (LP: 9:455).

Given the importance of moral education, we might expect Kant to regard the provision of moral education to children, and perhaps to some adults, as a moral duty. After all, it is not as if Kant's lectures on education are compartmentally separated from his moral philosophy. The content of moral teaching that he recommends in the lectures includes the basic structure of duties that he outlines in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (LP: 9:488–492), and an appendix on teaching ethics is attached to that work (MM: 6:477–684). Yet there is no real attempt to fit moral education into Kant's ethical system as a moral duty, nor is any alternative account developed of how to regard the normative status of moral education, if it is not a moral duty.

An initial obstacle to integrating his positions on moral education and moral philosophy is that it may appear impossible for a consistent Kantian to admit that anyone can have an influence on another human agent's moral character at all. This is suggested not only by Kant's basic position that each agent must take herself to be free to act on autonomously self-legislated moral principles (Gr: 4:446–463), but also by his remark in *The Metaphysics of Morals* that no one can have a duty to make another person's moral perfection her end,

> For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do. (MM: 6:386)

On the other hand, Kant does think that we have a duty not to tempt others to immoral behavior (MM: 6:394) and that we should not show contempt for a vicious person, so as not to discourage her from reforming herself (MM: 6:463–464). The resulting impression may be that Kant is simply

confused or inconsistent about whether one person can have an effect on another's moral character.

A familiar type of Kantian response helps dissipate this impression, but not without raising further interpretive questions. The familiar response is that Kant thinks we inevitably must view human beings from two standpoints, both as parts of nature subject to causal laws and as autonomous beings capable of free choice (Gr: 4:450–458). When viewing someone as a responsible moral being we must attribute freedom to her actions, regardless of the influences or education to which she has been exposed. But when viewing her as a physical being who is part of nature, we must acknowledge the effect that causal forces, including education, have on her. This response is cogent (at least given some basic Kantian assumptions), but does not specify the circumstances or purposes that should lead one to view other humans from one or the other perspective. Can we have duties to others insofar as we view them as natural physical beings, or only insofar as we view them as free? The answer seems relevant for arriving at any duty of education.

More significantly, the "two perspectives" approach does not provide any basic rationale (moral or otherwise) for providing others with moral education, regardless of whether others are viewed as part of nature or as autonomous. There must be some such rationale for moral education, but Kant never clearly states one. He repeatedly uses phrases such as "must," "should," and "is supposed to," in *Lectures on Pedagogy* when discussing how moral education is to proceed, but he never explicitly states that these terms indicate a specifically moral duty to provide moral training to anyone. Similarly, although he spends several pages describing moral education in the appendix to *The Metaphysics of Morals*, the discussion does appear in an appendix rather than in the main text cataloguing duties, and he does not explain the relationship between moral teaching and (other?) duties. If teaching ethics is moral duty, then why does Kant not simply say so, and list it alongside other significant duties? And if teaching ethics is not a moral duty, then Kant's moral philosophy does not seem to leave any room to say that it is a project that we must take on. Only the Categorical Imperative, and the more specific duties that follow from it, provide inescapable reasons for action. If we are not morally obligated to provide moral education to children, then it appears to be an optional project, which will strike many readers as odd.

So, there are several lacunae in Kant's discussion of moral education, particularly regarding the possibility of and the basic reasons for providing children with such education. Even if it is granted that it is possible to influence others' moral character, more detail is needed about when we ought to take into account an individual's empirical nature, and when we ought to regard her as a purely rational and autonomous agent when deciding how to treat her (such as what kind of moral training to provide). And, most basically, a clarification is needed of the normative grounds for providing

moral education. If, as seems plausible, it is a moral requirement, then an explanation is needed of how the duty follows from the Categorical Imperative and why Kant does not include it in his description of duties in *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

Although filling in all of these gaps appears to be a challenging task, it is possible to go a surprisingly long way toward meeting the challenge simply by noting one basic technical point in Kant's critical philosophy. Kant describes "humanity" (*die Menschheit*) as an "ideal," as well as saying it is the one thing that must be treated always as an end in itself. Examining this claim that humanity is an ideal, and its connection to the Categorical Imperative's requirement of treating humanity as an end in itself, illuminates the moral grounds for providing children with moral education, explains why moral education is not a duty that is listed in the main text of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, and specifies the role we should assign to particular humans' empirically observable characteristics when deciding how to treat them.

II. HUMANITY AS AN IDEAL AND AS AN END IN ITSELF

In Kant's ethical system, specific moral duties are all based on the more fundamental principle of morality, the Categorical Imperative. Kant gives different formulations of the Categorical Imperative, but in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, which is Kant's most complete and systematic discussion of specific duties, he usually relies on the humanity formulation. The humanity formulation says "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (Gr: 4:429). If morally educating children is a duty, we might expect to find a description in *The Metaphysics of Morals* of how the duty follows from the either the humanity formulation or some other formulation of the Categorical Imperative. The absence of such a discussion raises questions about whether there is a moral requirement to provide moral education, and what justification there could be of such a requirement.

The answer to these questions depends on first noticing the basic structure of Kant's overall ethical system. Kant divides ethics into two parts, a part that he calls a "metaphysics of morals," which is "purely rational," and an empirical part that he calls "practical anthropology" or "moral anthropology" (Gr: 4:388, 410–412; MM 6:216–217, 375–377). Kant thinks the purely rational part should precede the empirical part when engaging in moral philosophy, and so a basic set of moral requirements should be worked out through using reason alone, before one turns to empirical examples, observations, application, or generalization (Gr: 4:388–389, 406–411). Kant says the "empirical part should always be scrupulously separated from the rational one . . . and that practical anthropology should always be prefaced by a metaphysics of morals" (Gr: 4:388). In fact, Kant's ethical writings deal almost entirely with

the rationally derived part of moral philosophy, since this purely rational part includes not only the different formulations of the Categorical Imperative, the basic moral principle that underlies all specific moral requirements, but also the moral rules or requirements that are rationally derived from those principles. Since the entire project of *The Metaphysics of Morals* is to work out a system of rules of justice and of virtue based on the Categorical Imperative, this entire work is still meant to be part of "a system of pure rational concepts" (MM: 6:375), which is "completely cleansed of everything empirical" (Gr: 4:389).

Kant takes care to emphasize that he really means to exclude empirically observed characteristics of humans, in developing the basic system of duties in *The Metaphysics of Morals*. He titles the second part of the book "Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue," and he says near the end of the book that since a discussion of metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue "has only to do with its pure rational principles," nothing in the work was meant to show how to treat different individuals "in accordance with differences in their qualities or contingent relations—differences of age, sex, birth, strength or weakness" (MM: 6:468). He elaborates that different treatment based on a person's level of moral purity, social cultivation, wealth, or other individual characteristics also has played no role in the system of duties developed in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (MM: 6:468–469). Kant admits that guidance on "applying" moral rules to actual individuals is "rightly required from the metaphysics of morals; a transition which, by applying the pure principles of duty to cases of experience, would schematize, as it were, these principles and present them as ready for morally practical use" (MM: 6:468), but Kant says that such issues of application "cannot be presented as sections of ethics and members of the division of a system (which must proceed a priori from a rational concept), but can only be appended to the system" (MM: 6:469). This statement, near the end of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, reiterates what Kant says near the beginning of the book: "a metaphysics of morals cannot be based upon anthropology but can still be applied to it" (MM: 6:217). So the duties developed in Kant's major ethical writings, not only *Groundwork* but also *The Metaphysics of Morals*, are meant to apply only to what Kant calls "humanity as such" rather than to specific individual human beings. At 6:468 of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, he explicitly contrasts duties to "humanity as such" with duties to actual individuals, saying that because particular ways of treating different individuals "do not involve principles of obligation of human beings as such toward one another, they can not properly constitute a part of the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue," and he uses this terminology of duty to "humanity as such" throughout *The Metaphysics of Morals* to describe the duties described in the book (see MM: 6:386, 395, 451, 464, and 466). So the "humanity" that the humanity formulation demands be treated as an end in itself, and that figures in the duties developed in Kant's major works

on moral philosophy is "humanity as such," and these duties to humanity as such must be grasped or produced by pure reason, without the aid of empirical observation or experience.

To see what Kant might mean by saying we have duties to "humanity as such," it is useful to note some things that he could not mean. He could not mean that basic moral requirements tell us how to treat some particular human individuals (as opposed to other individuals). That is exactly what he rules out repeatedly, as part of "anthropology" rather than morals. This is not to say that we do not have moral obligations to individuals, but rather that, according to Kant, any obligations we have to individuals must depend on a conceptually prior account of treating humanity as an end in itself, in which the relevant concept of humanity is in some sense derived from reason alone. If our duty is not, first off, to individual human beings, then it may seem it must be to humanity as a biological species. And Kant does sometimes mention the human species, when discussing duties, saying that the reason to avoid inflicting humiliating punishments on criminals is that this would "make a spectator blush with shame at belonging to a species that can be treated that way" (MM: 6:463), and that we ought to "regard humans as in a rightful condition" (MM: 6:460) because our empirical knowledge that some humans behave wrongly does not justify thinking of vice as a basic characteristic "belonging to their species" (MM: 6:461). But he cannot mean that it is the human species that must be treated as an end in itself. Our knowledge of humanity as a biological species is obtained empirically, like our knowledge of human individuals. And treating our species as an end calls to mind intuitively repugnant attempts to purify or elevate the species through strategies like eugenics. A strategy followed by many commentators on Kant's ethics appears more promising. The standard readings of "humanity" in the humanity formulation take humanity to be some set of traits associated with rational nature. Exactly what set of traits these are is controversial. The humanity formulation has been taken to be attributing special moral status to the power of choice or to set ends (Korsgaard 1996: 106–132; Wood 1999: 118–120), or as the capacity for legislating and acting on moral principles (Hill 1992: 38–57), or as the will of a being who actually is committed to acting on moral principles or cultivating a good will (Dean 2006). Whether this approach, or one of the particular variants, is satisfying depends on whether an account can be constructed of how this version of humanity can be a concept produced by reason. Only a non-empirically acquired concept of humanity is suited to play a fundamental role as an end in itself in a metaphysics of morals.

In fact, Kant does offer a suitable concept of humanity, which he says is produced by reason alone. He writes, "lawgiving reason, which includes the whole species (and so myself as well) in its idea of humanity as such, includes me as giving universal law" (MM: 6:451). But in other works, specifically the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*, he

provides a fuller account of an idea, and an ideal, of humanity as a concept that is produced by reason.[1] Kant's description of an ideal of humanity is consistent with what we ordinarily mean by speaking of an ideal—it provides us with a standard to live up to—but also depends on technical Kantian points about the role of pure reason versus experience. Kant says that both ideas and ideals are concepts produced by pure reason, and that the difference between an idea and an ideal lies in their specificity. An idea is a "necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience" (CPu: A327/B384). This may seem like "only an idea" from the standpoint of speculative reason, something that does not exist in our range of experience (CPu: A328/B384). Nevertheless, an idea serves an important purpose, not in speculative reasoning but in practical reasoning or deliberating about what to do. In the practical use of reason, an idea provides rules to guide us in "bringing about what the concept contains" (CPu: A328/B385). The example Kant gives is of the idea of virtue. "Virtue, and therewith human reason in its complete purity, are ideas" (CPu: A569/B597). So the idea of virtue is also an idea of humanity in a perfect form, and we ought to aim at bringing about this idea through our commitment to act morally—we are to aim at conforming to the idea. In Kant's terminology, an ideal is like an idea in that it is a concept produced by pure reason, but it differs in its specificity. An idea is general, but an ideal is an idea that is thought of "in individuo, that is, as an individual thing, determinable or even determined by the idea alone" (CPu: A568/B596). The idea of virtue is general, and includes only an idea of a being who regulates her choices with moral requirements, and so has a good will. From this general idea of virtue, reason also can produce a more specific ideal of virtue, which is a concept of what a human being would have to be like in order to actually be virtuous. So, in order to be virtuous, a human would have to possess "everything that our reason links with the morally good: goodness of soul, or purity, or fortitude, or serenity, etc." (CPJ: 5:235). The ideal includes particular traits, which might not be possessed by every kind of virtuous being, but which must accompany virtue in the concept of a human who is virtuous. We do not know, for example, that some other type of being would need fortitude in order to be virtuous, but the concept of a fully virtuous human would have to include fortitude. This ideal of a morally good human being is, like the more general idea of virtue, not encountered in our experience. But it still has "practical power as a regulative principle" of our actions (CPu: A569/B597–598). Kant says that ideals "supply reason with a standard which is indispensable to it, providing it, as they do, with a concept that is entirely complete of its kind" (CPu: A569–570/B597–598).

So the idea and the accompanying ideal of a good human being are concepts provided by pure reason, and they are well suited in other ways to play the role of a concept of humanity in a Kantian "metaphysics of morals" or rationally derived system of moral principles and duties. An

ideal provides regulative principles for practical reasoning, by providing an ideal toward which we ought to strive, so it is suited to play a central role in a system of moral requirements. And Kant's terminology of humanity as an "end in itself" also fits well with humanity as a Kantian ideal. In *Critique of Judgment*, Kant defines an end (or "purpose"—the same German word, *der Zweck* can be translated as either) as the concept of an object "insofar as the concept also contains the basis for the object's actuality" (CPJ: 5:180). This also is what an ideal is—a concept that is to be brought into actuality by playing a role in practical reasoning. So an ideal is a type of end. And humanity is an end *in itself* because it is an end that everyone's power of reason presents to her as playing a necessary role in practical reasoning, regardless of her inclinations. This is consistent with the ideal of a morally good human, which is an ideal which everyone's own power of reason presents as demanding practical compliance (one must seek to achieve the ideal), regardless of whether striving for this ideal satisfies one's contingent interests. So an examination of the humanity that is an ideal presented by pure reason, as described in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*, suggests that it is the same humanity that is an end in itself and plays a central role in the purely rational system of morality developed in the *Groundwork* and the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

If there seems to be room to doubt that Kant uses "humanity" univocally in speaking of the ideal of humanity and humanity as an end in itself, a look at the actual duties described in the second half of the *Metaphysics of Morals* helps quell those doubts. The proposed equivalence of humanity as an end in itself and as an ideal of reason helps make sense of Kant's basic categories of moral duties. Duties of self-perfection, of beneficence to others, and of respect all can usefully be seen as relying on humanity conceived as an ideal of a good human being.

It is easy to see the duty of self-perfection as a matter of striving toward an ideal, both in an everyday sense and in Kant's technical sense. Kant says that it is "in itself a duty for a human being to make his end the perfection belonging to humanity as such" (MM: 6:386), which sounds like living up to an ideal of humanity. This duty is a matter of seeking "several qualitative perfections" (MM 6:386), which fits with his position that the ideal of humanity includes several specific traits that a good human being would necessarily possess, as does his statement that the duty of moral self-perfection (which is a "duty regarding the end of humanity in our own person") involves acquiring "a multitude of virtues, made up of several different qualities" (MM: 6:447). The overall point of this passage seems to be to contrast the idea of virtue with the ideal of virtuous humanity. It is consistent with viewing humanity as an ideal toward which we should strive, but which we will never encounter in experience (even in ourselves). On this point, Kant writes, "It is a human being's duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it (in

this life)" (MM: 6:446). The duty of self-perfection highlights the connection between Kant's technical sense of "ideal" and an ordinary use of "ideal" as describing a model or a standard to live up to. In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant calls the ideal of humanity an "archetype" for our own moral character, and says "we have no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine man within us, with which we compare and judge ourselves, and so reform ourselves, although we can never attain to the perfection thereby prescribed" (CPu: A569/B597). Kant similarly uses "ideal" and "prototype" interchangeably in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, to describe an ideal of a virtuous human that should serve as a model for us (Rel: 6:61, 62, and 66). In different works, Kant mentions both the "wise man (of the Stoics)" and Jesus as models of moral wisdom and virtue, but makes clear in both cases that, as morally perfect individuals, they exist "in thought only" or "in our morally legislative reason," and that any apparent examples of virtue that we encounter in experience only remind us of the ideal of virtue that is provided by reason (CPu: A569/B597, Rel: 6:61–63). Kant's position that the ideal of humanity grounds a requirement of self-perfection is consistent throughout several works.

Keeping in mind that it is a rationally generated ideal of "humanity as such" that plays a role in Kant's metaphysics of morals also helps to explain some of his comments about particular duties of respect for others. Kant says that some actual humans do not deserve respect (MM: 6:463 and 466) but that we nevertheless have a duty to treat every human respectfully (MM: 6:462 and 463). This would be paradoxical, if the duties in the *Metaphysics of Morals* were based first and foremost on the moral status of actual, individual humans. But instead, the duty is primarily to humanity as such, or to humans insofar as they fall under the rationally given concept of a good human being. We ought to treat actual humans with the respect owed to humanity as such, even if we have empirical evidence that some individual human fails to live up to this ideal concept. This fits with some of Kant's particular statements about duties of respect. Defaming someone, even if the particular individual actually has acted wrongly, "diminishes respect for humanity as such, so as to finally cast a shadow of worthlessness over our race itself, making misanthropy (shying away from human beings) the prevalent cast of mind" (MM: 6:446). Humanity as such is capable of proper practical reasoning and so of morality, and even if some individual seems to fall short of this ideal, we can not treat her with contempt because contempt relies on a "supposition that he could never be improved, and this is not consistent with the idea of a human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good" (MM: 6:464). We have duties to treat every actual human with respect, but the basis of this respect in the *Metaphysics of Morals* lies in the respect owed to humanity in its ideal form.

Humanity as an ideal concept of a morally good human being also adds a useful interpretive concept in discussing Kantian duties of beneficence to others. Kant himself justifies duties of helping others mainly by employing the universalizability formulation of the Categorical Imperative, saying that since everyone will necessarily need help from others at some point, it would be a contradiction to will never to help others when they are in need (MM: 6:453 and Gr: 4:423). Kant also thinks the humanity formulation leads to a duty of beneficence, because "the ends of any person who is an end in himself must, if this idea is to have its full effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends" (Gr: 4:430). Commentators have proposed that this is because to respect others' power to set ends, I must treat their ends as valuable (Korsgaard 1996: 127–128, 260–261). But in addition, if it is the ideal of humanity that is an end in itself, we can add another reason for treating others' contingent ends as worth pursuing. Kant repeatedly says that the highest good is happiness in proportion to virtue (CPu: A808–815/B836–843, CPr: 5:108–120 and CPJ: 5:450), and even defines virtue as the worthiness to be happy (CPr: 5:110 and CPu: A810/B838). So insofar as we view human beings as virtuous, as we must in a metaphysics of morals that employs a concept of humanity in ideal form, we must view them as worthy of happiness. This provides a reason to assist them in attaining their ends.

So, although a full discussion of the interpretive benefits of taking humanity as an ideal is beyond the scope of this chapter, it does seem to accord well with many of the central elements of Kant's moral philosophy. An additional advantage of taking humanity as both an end in itself and an ideal in Kant's technical sense is that this allows for an explanation of the main issues involved in integrating his discussion of moral education and his moral theory.

III. THE MORAL STATUS OF MORAL EDUCATION

Viewing humanity as an ideal as well as an end in itself, and noting the role of this ideal of "humanity as such" in Kant's moral theory, allows us to resolve the puzzles about the justification of the requirement of providing moral education. Humanity plays a central role in moral theory because it is a concept produced by pure reason that is both a necessary end and a regulative ideal. As a concept of pure reason, humanity can play a role in a purely rational metaphysics of morals. But a complete moral system also will provide rules of application to actual individuals, who may fail to live up to the ideal in various ways. So although empirically discovered differences in level of moral development, character, or possession of various virtues are not part of the basic metaphysics of morals, they must be considered in a complete application of the moral rules that are part of a metaphysics of morals.

This provides the conceptual space for accommodating a duty of moral education in Kant's moral system. Providing moral education is a moral requirement, but a requirement that only becomes apparent when considering the application of moral rules to empirically known circumstances. Kant's theoretical writings on the basic structure of moral duties, encompassing his major works on ethics, do not include a duty of moral education because for purposes of developing a rational system of moral requirements, we must employ a concept of humanity that treats humans as already virtuous and committed to morality. But of course we can observe empirically that many humans lack virtues and good character—children because they have not yet had a chance to develop them, some adults because they are morally flawed. We must ask how to treat them, in light of the rational system of morality that is conceptually prior to application. So the appendix to the *Metaphysics of Morals* on teaching ethics appears just where it ought to, as an important addendum but not as part of the main body of the book, which deals only with the rational concept of humanity as such. The discussion of moral development in lectures on pedagogy occupies this same conceptual space. The discussion is important, since it tells us how in fact we ought to treat actual people of different ages and levels of development. It is just not part of an ideal theory, which ignores specific differences.

But if moral education is not a part of the system of duties that comprise a metaphysics of morals, it still seems to be a duty. Providing moral education is something we ought to do, and ought to do on the same grounds that we ought to comply with the duties specified in a metaphysics of morals. The rational concept of humanity provides a regulative ideal and a necessary end within the metaphysics of morals, but this same rational concept of humanity is meant to guide our actions when applying the metaphysics of morals and dealing with actual individuals. Noting the subjective conditions of various humans is not meant to undermine, or make room for exceptions to, basic moral requirements—Kant's picture is not that morally imperfect humans can be mistreated because they fall outside the scope of the metaphysics of morals. He writes, "anthropology, which issues from merely empirical cognition, can do no damage to anthropometry, which is laid down by a reason giving laws unconditionally" (MM: 6:406). Instead, he specifies a different purpose for "moral anthropology," which is meant to take into account "the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals" (MM: 6:217). This moral anthropology is meant to assist in gaining adherence to the moral requirements of a metaphysics of morals, making our actual world closer to an ideal one. He says moral anthropology "would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction) and with other similar teachings and precepts based on experience" (MM: 6:217). The main question, when applying purely rational moral requirements to clearly imperfect rational agents like us, is how to make us better approximate the ideal of humanity as such.

This fits with Kant's statements in *Lectures on Pedagogy* on the status of moral education. In effect, when considering individual humans who are not yet morally perfect, or when considering our species, which overall is far from morally perfect, we must aim to guide them toward approximating the ideal of human moral perfection that is provided by our own power of reason. Kant mentions ideas, in his technical sense, in the lectures, saying "An idea is nothing other than the concept of a perfection which is not yet to be found in experience (LP: 9:444) and he says "an outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal" (LP: 9:444). He adds that education should proceed "in a manner appropriate to the idea of humanity and its complete vocation" (LP: 9:447). In describing the details of moral education, Kant notes that each person "has an ideal of humanity before his eyes" and that he reprimands himself when he "compares himself" with this ideal and falls short of it (LP: 9:489). He recommends comparing a child to "concepts of its own reason," rather than to other people, and says this will teach humility because the relevant concepts are concepts of "moral perfection" (LP: 9:491). Thinking in terms of realizing an ideal of human moral perfection also illuminates Kant's frequent references in the lectures to fulfilling humanity's destiny and cultivating the human species' predisposition to perfection (LP: 9:441, 9:442 and 9:444–449). We know through experience that our species overall fails to live up to a moral ideal of humanity, but we ought to contribute what we can to the species' progress toward that ideal. One concise statement of Kant's position is in *Lectures on Ethics*, where he says that in moral education our end ought to be "the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has a predisposition" (LP: 9:448). Although in some of his writings, Kant is pessimistic about the extent to which humans can consciously bring about the moral progress of the human species (UH: 8:17–31 and CBHH: 8:109–123), and even is skeptical about the possible role of education in bringing about this progress (Ant: 7:327), in the *Lectures on Pedagogy* he has a more optimistic view. He says that although most people cannot be counted on to adopt human progress as an end, "It is only through the efforts of people of more extended inclinations, who take an interest in the best world and who are capable of conceiving the idea of a future improved condition, that the gradual approach of human nature to its purpose is possible" (LP: 9:449).

So, although the duty of moral education has the same basis as the duties that Kant lists in his central works on moral philosophy (the normative force of humanity as an ideal or end), it is not described alongside those duties because it arises only from empirical observation of the ways in which human beings fall short of the ideal and so require moral training. We ought to take account of their empirically observed shortcomings, not to decide that they fall outside the scope of our moral duties, but to decide how best to gain their compliance with moral principles and bring them to approximate the ideal of humanity that is available to each of us through our own power of reason. That is the ultimate point of education, in Kant's view.

NOTES

1. For some of the textual references and ideas here, I am indebted to "Why Respect Humanity?" by Richard Smyth, which so far as I know remains unpublished.

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12 Enabling the Realization of Humanity
The Anthropological Dimension of Education

Alix Cohen

Kant's account of moral education raises numerous difficulties, many of them because of the problematic relationship between the empirical and the intelligible dimensions of human beings. On the one hand, his system does not allow for a causal influence from the empirical world (i.e., moral education) to the intelligible world (i.e., moral character).[1] On the other hand, if the empirical environment has no bearing on moral character, it entails that moral education is not only irrelevant but also vain. Yet according to Beck, Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy* presuppose that empirical factors are neither irrelevant nor vain to the process of human moralization:

> [W]hen Kant is dealing with education, however, he relaxes some of this rigor; he does not even seem to see that his strict moral philosophy has, and can have, no place for moral education. But in both the *Critique of Practical Reason* and *On Education* Kant seems to take it as self-evident that moral education is both obligatory and possible, and the only question about it is one of proper practice. (Beck 1978: 201)

On this basis, Beck concludes that Kant's "insights into the strengths and necessity of education, and his insights into its insufficiency and inefficacy, were never reconciled" (Beck 1978: 204).[2] However, I will suggest that he misrepresents Kant's account. As he acknowledges, for Kant, "The teacher, accordingly, cannot make the child moral; only the child himself can do that" (Beck 1978: 201). Therefore, instead of construing the *Lectures on Pedagogy* as assuming the opposite, as Beck does, I will argue that they should be interpreted as showing that education can be morally relevant *despite the fact that it cannot make the child moral*.

To support this claim, I will suggest that it is necessary to focus on the connection between Kant's account of moral education and his views on moral anthropology. For these two areas of Kant's philosophy have many commonalities, in particular insofar as they both aim at the development of the natural predispositions that make human beings morally efficacious. In fact, when Kant defines the role of moral anthropology, he does so with a direct reference to education: "moral anthropology . . . would deal with

the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts based on experience" (MM: 6:217). On this basis, I will argue that education should be conceived on the model of anthropology rather than history.[3] This will enable me to unravel some of the difficulties traditionally associated with Kant's account of moral education and to conclude that the moral dimension of education is best described as enabling children to use their freedom in the right way, that is to say, autonomously, so that they can realize their vocation as human beings.

I. KANT'S SOLUTION TO THE GREATEST PROBLEM FOR THE HUMAN SPECIES

Kant often observes that "education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given to the human being" (LP: 9:446). Yet he also claims this is the case of politics and in particular the establishment of just institutions: "[t]he greatest problem for the human species, to which nature compels him, is the achievement of a civil society universally administering right" (Idea: 8:22). However, education and politics can both be "the hardest problem" for the human species because they actually face the same problem, namely an infinite regress.[4] For "the human being is educated only by human beings, human beings who likewise have been educated." (LP: 9:444)[5] Similarly for politics, the human being "needs a *master* . . . But where will he get this master? Nowhere else but from the human species. But then this master is exactly as much an animal who has need of a master" (Idea: 8:23). How can we form a good educator / legislator so that in turn, he can form us? Unable to escape this vicious circle, those in charge of politics and education have hindered rather than helped humanity's progress:

> Parents care for the home, princes for the state. Neither have as their final end the best for the world and the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has the predisposition. (LP: 9:448)

Kant proposes to escape this vicious circle by taking education away from parents and princes and entrusting it to nature instead: "The germs which lie in the human being must only be developed further and further. For one does not find grounds of evil in the natural predispositions of the human being" (LP: 9:448). This suggestion has surprised many commentators. Louden, for example, remarks that "[one] surprise in Kant's writings on education is his refreshing appeal to a kind of naturalism . . . a conviction that natural processes are good and departures from them are bad" (Louden 2009: 287). However, Kant's reliance on nature should not be surprising. To begin with, it appears as early as the *Observations on the*

Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime: "It is never the fault of nature if we do not appear with a good demeanor, but is rather due to the fact that we would pervert her . . . [W]hatever one does contrary to the favor of nature one always does very badly" (Obs: 2:240–242). It is thus an ongoing thread in Kant's work that one should not go against nature since it "has arranged nothing in vain" (LP: 9:456).[6]

Yet relying on nature for the education of the human species may seem paradoxical since there is a clear sense in which the process of education is contrary to nature by definition: "Vices arise, for the most part, from the civilized state doing violence to nature, and yet it is our own vocation as human beings to emerge from our crude state of nature as animals" (LP: 9:492). To get around this apparent paradox, Kant suggests that education should have two complementary dimensions, one negative and the other positive. The former consists in letting nature run its course, thereby not interfering with it unless it is necessary: "the first stage of education must be merely negative; i.e., one should not add some new provision to that of nature, but merely leave nature undisturbed" (LP: 9:459).[7] The latter consists in actively cultivating our natural predispositions, and in particular the powers of the mind, whether lower (imagination, memory, attention, wit, etc.) or higher (understanding, judgment, reason, feeling of pleasure and displeasure, etc.).[8] These two dimensions of education amount to developing, cultivating, and improving our capacities, and hindering what hinders them from performing their natural function. Kant's reliance on nature should thus be understood as the acknowledgment of the necessary anthropological dimension of education. For although education does aim to alter human nature so that human beings can realize their potential, to do so, it should work with nature rather than against it since our natural predispositions are the only means we have at our disposal to realize our vocation.[9]

> [N]ature has after all placed the germs in these plants, and it is merely a matter of proper sowing and planting that these germs develop in the plants. The same holds true with human beings. Many germs lie within humanity, and now it is our business to develop the natural dispositions proportionally and to unfold humanity from its germs and to make it happen that the human being reaches his vocation. (LP: 9:445)

Once education is over, however, it is not the end of the cultivation of the human being's natural dispositions: "After this time [approximately the sixteenth year] auxiliary means of culture no doubt can still be used and a hidden discipline exercised, but no more education proper takes place" (LP: 9:453). Education is replaced by our own deliberate cultivation—an exercise of self-help. This cultivation is not merely optional, it is in fact a duty, what Kant calls the duty to oneself that prescribes the cultivation of both our natural and our moral perfection: "Cultivate your powers of mind and body so that they are fit to realize any ends you might encounter," and "strive with all

one's might that the thought of duty for its own sake is the sufficient incentive of every action conforming to duty" (MM: 6:392–393). The ways in which these duties can be achieved best are identified by moral anthropology, for it spells out the means to, positively, empower the capacities that are helpful to the performance of duty and, negatively, hinder the hindrances to it. For instance, it advises to refrain from destroying natural beauty in order to preserve our disposition for disinterested love; or to socialize with the less fortunate in order to cultivate our capacity for sympathy.[10]

From the perspective of education however, it is the responsibility of the educator to make the most of children's natural capacities and to develop them to their full potential. To achieve this purpose, one would expect moral education to consist in encouraging children to perform the very actions that foster the capacities helpful to moral agency: for instance, to get acquainted with natural beauty so as to develop their capacity for disinterested love; or to encourage them to practice charity so as to further their capacity for sympathy. However, it is not the case. The idea that acquaintance with beauty prepares children for morality does not even appear in the *Lectures on Education*. More surprisingly, while Kant suggests in the *Metaphysics of Morals* that the development of sympathy is a crucial means to moral efficacy, in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, he claims that "One must not so much soften the hearts of children in order for them to be affected by the fate of others, but rather make them upright" (LP: 9:490).[11] How can we account for this apparent discrepancy in Kant's account? In the following section, I will suggest that it can be explained away by examining closely the role of feelings in moral education.

II. THE ROLE OF FEELINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION

Crucially for Kant, while adults should use their natural inclinations and feelings to help the realization of duty and hinder what hinders it, in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, he asserts that children should not: "[t]he child should not be full of feeling but rather full of the idea of duty" (LP: 9:490). Although, as already pointed out, Kant generally recommends relying on nature to educate children, he forbids the use of their natural feelings for two reasons. First, exploiting their feelings may mislead them into believing that those feelings are a suitable source of motivation and perhaps even the only source of motivation, thereby making them prudent rather than moral.[12] Children must understand that the right actions ought to be done for the sake of duty, and so they must learn the difference between moral and non-moral motives—namely, the former stems from reason and the latter from feelings. The only way of ensuring that they do is for them to grasp the distinctive nature of actions done for the sake of duty: "Everything in education depends on establishing the right principles throughout and making them comprehensible and acceptable to children" (LP: 9:492).

Education, therefore, cannot rely on feelings, which is why Kant adds that children must "have the inner value of actions and deeds replace words and emotions, understanding replace feeling" (LP: 9:493).

Second, there is always the risk that once their feelings have been cultivated, children find themselves unable to control them. Thus, "[t]he formation of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure . . . must be negative and the feeling itself must not be coddled" (LP: 9:477). It is crucial that children learn discipline, which is the means to teach them self-mastery: "Discipline amounts to corrective training, but by this the child is not taught anything new; there is merely a restriction of lawless freedom. Man must be disciplined, for he is by nature raw and wild" (LE: 27:466). For instance, children should "grow accustomed to sitting still and observing punctually what they are told, so that in the future they may not put into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them" (LP: 9:442). As a result, negatively, by combating their passions and controlling their emotions through discipline, their capacity for self-mastery is cultivated and their freedom is thereby safeguarded.[13] Positively, discipline enables children to become aware of their freedom, and in particular their ability to determine themselves independently of sensuous impulses.[14]

Of course, such a moral discipline is only appropriate to the later stages of the child's development.[15] Thus appealing to prudence or instinct is necessary in the first stage, for "a mind that is still uncultivated . . . some preparatory guidance is needed to attract it by means of its own advantage or to alarm it by fear of harm" (CPrR: 5:152). But while the appeal to prudence may be a necessary first step, it should not last at the risk of leading the child onto the wrong path:

> One talks a lot about having to present things to children in such a way that they might do it from inclination. In some cases this is certainly good, but there is also a great deal which one must prescribe to them as duty . . . Even if the child is unable to understand the duty, it is nevertheless better this way. (LP: 9:482)

However, while Kant maintains here that the thought of duty is always better than the reliance on natural inclinations, there seem to be noteworthy exceptions: "The inclinations to be honored and loved are to be preserved as far as possible" (LP: 9:482). This statement seems not only at odds with the general claim that education should not rely on feelings, more important, it seems counter-intuitive for education to encourage the supposedly negative emotion of honor rather than a positive one such as sympathy. So how are we to understand the fact that the feeling of honor should be preserved, while the feeling of sympathy should not?

To answer this question, it is necessary to turn to Kant's general account of honor according to which "*love of honor* is the constant companion of virtue" (Ant: 7:257). This feeling of "esteem that the human being is

permitted to expect from others because of his inner (moral) worth" should be distinguished from the mania for honor, which "is striving after the *reputation of honor*, where semblance suffices." (Ant: 7:272) According to Kant, the latter is of no use to morality since it does not require real worth but merely the appearance of worth. The former, however, is beneficial to virtue and in particular to the child's moral education. For harming his love of honor may be more effective than harming him physically: not only does it fulfill the retributive aspect of punishment, it also motivates the child to become worthy of honor.[16] By the same token, shame can be used to stop children from lying: "The *feeling of shame* . . . seems to be a natural means . . . of promoting truthfulness and betraying falsehood" (LE: 27:60).[17] Education should thus "make use of this shameful feeling as an antidote against lying" (LE: 27:60).

Consequently, what makes the feelings of honor and shame appropriate means for moral education is that they prompt the child's conception of his self-esteem, which "refers to inner worth" (LE: 27:357). His awareness of his dignity, coupled with the feelings of shame and honor, yield an active desire to become actually worthy of his own conception of himself and negatively to avoid demeaning it.[18] Of course, there are other means the educator can use to make the child aware of his dignity: "The dignity of the human being could also be made perceptible already to the child with regard to itself; for example, in cases of uncleanliness, which after all is unbecoming for humanity" (LP: 9:489). But in the later stages of education, honor and shame are particularly efficient not only in strengthening the child's awareness of his worth through the development of his self-esteem, but also and more important in motivating him to become worthy of honor and love. It is in this sense that, for Kant, they "are aids to morality" (LP: 9:482).

Therefore, the task of the educator consists in using some of the child's natural tendencies to make him aware of his dignity as a moral being, thereby leading him away from his impulses in the direction of duty: "The child could be led by means of mere instincts, but as soon as it grows up the concept of duty must step in" (LP: 9:483). However, a final question remains: how does the concept of duty "step in" at the motivational level? How can one learn to act for duty's sake from acting out of love of honor or fear of shame?

As already suggested, first, the child's natural predispositions must be cultivated for him to be a moral agent, that is, an agent capable of autonomous reasoning. Second, his awareness of the moral law and his feeling of respect for the law need to be developed and strengthened, while his capacity for moral judgment requires sharpening.[19] But contrary to what is often argued, there is no further mysterious educational jump from the development of these capacities to morality.[20] Acting for the sake of duty is a matter of moral character; it cannot be learned in the same way as we learn how to apply the Categorical Imperative or how to form maxims—it is neither a skill, nor a matter of judgment. In this respect, education cannot make

the child moral; he alone can do that.[21] Does it entail that education cannot be morally relevant? Far from it. Rather, it entails that moral education amounts to learning to be free: "*Practical* or *moral* education is the education by which the human being is to be formed so that he can live as a freely acting being" (LP: 9:455). It enables the child to use his freedom in the right way, that is to say, autonomously.

III. CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to show that despite its paradoxical nature, Kant's account of education actually assigns moral worth to its rightful place, namely, the choice of the kind of person one wants to be: it is a choice no one can make on the child's behalf. To support this claim, I first spelled out the sense in which the essential task of education consists in developing the child's natural predispositions so that he can realize his potential—what I called the anthropological dimension of education. In the second section, I argued that moral education consists in effect of, on the one hand, making the child aware of his independence from nature, which is a pre-condition of morality, and on the other hand, enabling him to make good use of his freedom by acting autonomously, which requires the consciousness of the moral law and an awareness of his own worth. As a result of this process, the child is as prepared as he can be for the universal command of duty. However, nothing can relieve him of the essential burden of the task morality demands of him—having a good will. Education can only bring him to the place where he is able to make the right choice for the right reasons. Therefore, although, strictly speaking, nothing can help human beings with the essential burden of the task morality demands of them, that of having a good will, education can nevertheless be morally relevant.

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NOTES

1. The only possible causal connection between agents and their environment seems to be from the latter to their *empirical* character, rather than their intelligible character. Louden in fact begins with this argument before turning to the stronger argument about empirical factors cutting through the causal network: "Education does primarily concern empirical character, not intelligible character. The same is true of all the other preparatory steps for morality examined by Kant in other fields of impure ethics" (Louden 2000: 53).

2. Beck's remark on moral education should be read in light of more general worries about the Kantian system—for instance, Wood's acknowledgment of "the great distance separating Kant's anthropology . . . from what Kant's metaphysical theory of freedom and nature might lead us to expect" (Wood 1999: 206), or Frierson's worries about what he calls the asymmetry thesis (Frierson 2003: 23). The problem discussed here is neither specific to Kant's theory of education (as suggested by Beck), nor to Kant's theory of moral anthropology (as suggested by Frierson), nor to Kant's anthropology in general (as suggested by Wood); it is a problem intrinsic to all the forms taken by the relationship between the empirical and the intelligible.
3. Many commentators routinely emphasize the parallels between Kant's views on education and his philosophy of history. Beck in particular notes that "Kant's philosophy of history is a much more important base for his educational theory than his epistemology and *Anthropology* is" (Beck 1978: 197). However, I will suggest that it is a mistake to neglect the contribution of anthropology to education. Of course, I do not mean to deny that Kant's account of the stages of education parallels the stages of the historical development of the human species. My claim is rather that moral anthropology and moral education face the same apparent contradiction. Namely if moral anthropology is to be morally relevant, it should function under the presupposition that empirical factors do impact on our ability to make choices. And yet Kant's system rules out the possibility of this impact. I have argued elsewhere that moral anthropology can nevertheless be morally relevant to the extent that it makes us morally efficacious by identifying the helps and hindrance to the realization of duty. See Cohen (2009a: 8–13). Here, I will suggest that moral anthropology offers a viable model to think about moral education.
4. The fact that politics and education face the same infinite regress is the reason why Kant notes that "[t]wo human inventions can probably be regarded as the most difficult, namely the arts of government and education" (LP: 9:446). Kant's hero, Rousseau, often stumbled upon this issue. In *The Social Contract*, he concludes that "Gods would be necessary to give laws to men" (SC: 180). Similarly, he is incapable of explaining where Emile's governor could come from: "It would be necessary that the governor had been raised for his pupil . . . It would be necessary to go from education to education back to I know not where. How is it possible that a child be well raised by one who was not well raised himself? Is this rare mortal to be found? I do not know" (*Emile*: 50).
5. To put it slightly differently, "insight depends on education and education in turn depends on insight" (LP: 9:446).
6. See also "everything in the world is good for something . . . nothing in it is in vain; and by means of the example that nature gives in its organic products, one is justified, indeed called upon to expect nothing in nature and its laws but what is purposive in the whole." (CPJ: 5:379) Kant's account of 'Nature's intentions' for the human species has been the object of numerous debates with which I cannot engage here due to restrictions of space. As is well known, Kant often portrays nature as having providential aspects, and in particular as designed to help human beings fulfil their moral destiny. For my present purposes, it is sufficient to note that his conception of human nature characterizes it as consisting of natural predispositions that aim at the preservation of the species: "one can assume as a principle that nature wants every creature to reach its destiny through the appropriate development of all predispositions of its nature, so that at least the species, if not every *individual*, fulfills nature's purpose" (Ant: 7:329).
7. See LE: 27:467, "In formative training, we should try to ensure that it is merely negative, and that we exclude everything that is contrary to nature."

Of course, the idea of negative education has strong Rousseauian tones (*Emile*: 93–4, especially: "The first education ought to be purely negative."). As Louden notes, Rousseau's negative plan of education is referred to frequently in various versions of the *Lectures on Anthropology*, e.g., Collins 25:26, Parow 25:254, Friedländer 25:724, Menschenkunde 25:891 (Louden 2000: 194).

8. See LP: 9:475–476.
9. In the same spirit, Kant disapproves of the use of tools, instruments, and more generally artificial devices in education: "all tools [e.g., leading-strings, go-carts] [should] be dispensed with as far as possible. [. . .] For tools only ruin natural skill" (LP: 9:466). Similarly, "All artificial devices of this kind [machines, corsets, weights] are so much the more detrimental in that they run contrary to the end of nature in an organized, rational being, according to which it must retain the freedom to learn to use its powers" (LP: 9:463). Even as far as punishment is concerned, nature is the best provider—e.g., when a child becomes ill from over-eating (LP: 9:483).
10. See MM: 6:443 and 456–457. For a detailed account of the role of moral anthropology, see Cohen (2009a: 89–105).
11. "*Sympathetic joy* and *sadness* (*sympathia moralis*) are sensible feelings of pleasure or pain (which are therefore to be called "aesthetic" [*ästhetisch*]) at another's state of joy or sorrow (shared feeling, sympathetic feeling). Nature has already implanted in man susceptibility to these feelings. But to use this as a means to promoting active and rational benevolence is still a particular, though only a conditional, duty. It is called the duty of humanity (humanitas)" (MM: 6:456).
12. As Sullivan notes, "it is a mistake to try to base morality on any feelings, even on what may seem to be moral emotions such as feelings of nobility. All such tactics . . . turn morality into prudence" (Sullivan 1989: 289; cf. CPrR: 5:151).
13. "If one wants to form a good character, one must first clear away the passions" (LP: 9:486). See also passions "do the greatest damage to freedom" (Ant: 7:265–266).
14. The child's ability to determine himself independently of sensuous impulses is what Kant calls the culture of discipline in the *Critique of Judgment*: it "is negative and consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain natural things and renders us unable to do our own selecting . . . in fact we are free enough to tighten or to slacken, to lengthen or to shorten [desires], as the purposes of reason require" (CPJ: 5:432).
15. Famously for Kant, education has three stages: care, discipline, and formation (LP: 9:441). What is suitable for one stage of the child's development will not be so for another.
16. See LP: 9:482. One cannot help but think of the passage of the *Confessions* where Rousseau is unfairly accused of breaking Mademoiselle Lambercier's comb, thereby making him unworthy of both love and honor. In fact, it would be fascinating to contrast it with the episode of the ribbon theft in light of Kant's account of the role of love and honor in the development of morality.
17. See also, "Nature has given the sense of shame to the human being so that he betrays himself as soon as he lies" (LP: 9:478).
18. Note that these feelings should only be used in the later stages of education: shame, just as the love of honor, "should not occur in the first stage of education" (LP: 9:465). For a certain level of development is necessary for the conception of the child's own worth to be operative.

19. Since this dimension of moral education, which includes moral catechism and ethical gymnastics, is the issue that is most discussed in the literature (e.g., Louden 2000: 47–53, or Munzel 1999: 307–321), I do not develop it further here.
20. Contrast with Surprenant: "Kant's resolution of the paradox [of moral education] may be incomplete." For, "What Kant does not explain is how an individual develops his cognitive powers to move from the second to the third (and final) stage of moral development. That is, developing from the man of reason (who is motivated by satisfaction) into the man of learning (who is motivated by duty)" (Surprenant 2010: 173).
21. Contrast with Beck (1978: 204), already quoted in the introduction, and Louden (2000: 59): "Kant does believe that efficacious moral education is education that somehow cuts through the surface causal network in order to affect the grounding of character."

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13 From Discipline to Autonomy
Kant's Theory of Moral Development

Paul Formosa

Issues surrounding moral development and education form one of the major themes of Kant's philosophical output (see Herman 1998; Munzel 2003; Shell 2000; and Surprenant 2010). But Kant's keen interest in this area seems to raise a number of significant tensions in his work. These tensions arise because, depending on which strand of thought we focus on, education and development seem either essential or superfluous for morality. I shall examine two versions of this tension here, which I shall call the knowledge and revolution tensions. The knowledge tension arises because Kant makes strong claims about the ability of a boy of ten, but even as young as eight or nine (TP: 8:286), to correctly differentiate right from wrong in even complex cases (CPr: 5:155–157). But if we *already* know what we morally ought to do, if our moral knowledge is *already* complete and sound, then what role does this leave for moral development and education (see Moran 2009: 471)? The revolution tension arises because, as Lewis White Beck argues (1978: 203–204), Kant "expects and emphasizes the gradual progress toward the good through the historical process, including that of education" and also "teaches that there is a supernatural, superhistorical dimension to morality and the transition to it" in which "education" can "play only a preliminary role." But, Beck argues, these two elements, gradual moral progress through education and a sudden revolutionary transition to morality, were "never reconciled."

In this chapter I shall seek to resolve these two tensions by, in section one, briefly outlining the contemporary theories of moral development advanced by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. The aim of briefly illustrating these two theories is not to defend or criticize these views, since this has already been undertaken in an extensive literature, but rather to use these theories as models for extracting Kant's own distinct, but structurally similar, theory of moral development. This task is undertaken in section two in which I extract Kant's theory of moral development from a number of texts. Finally, in section three, I draw on Kant's theory to resolve the knowledge and revolution tensions.

I. KOHLBERG AND RAWLS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Kohlberg develops a theory of moral development, or justice reasoning, which consists of six stages following an invariant sequence (see Crain 1985: 118–136; Gibbs 2003; Kohlberg et al. 1983). The six stages cover three levels of reasoning, preconventional, conventional, and postconventional, with two stages per level. Stage one is "punishment and obedience" reasoning. At this stage prohibitions, which are given by some higher power (such as a parent), are seen as fixed and absolute, and the reason for obedience is typically to avoid punishment. Stage two is "individualism and exchange," which is a stage of self-interested reasoning combined with an "if you scratch my back I'll scratch yours" mentality. Stage three is that of "good interpersonal relationships" and at this stage motives, intentions, and feelings, and not merely consequences, become more important. Children at this stage tend to make judgments in terms of role ideals and what counts as being a "good boy or girl." Stage four, "social order", involves seeing oneself not merely as involved in local affective ties, but also as a member of a society governed by laws and norms whose social order is worth maintaining. At stage five, "social contract and individual rights," people ask not merely what maintains social order but what constitutes a good social order, and realize that morality and the legal order can come into conflict. Stage six is that of "universal principles" and at this stage persons come to understand the basis of principles of universal justice.

Rawls develops a three-stage account of moral development, with each stage having its own "psychological law," which approximately corresponds with the three levels of Kohlberg's account (Rawls 1999: 404). Rawls's account is based on the assumption that the child matures in a "well-ordered society realizing the principles of justice as fairness" (Rawls 1999: 404). The first stage is the "morality of authority." At this stage the child simply finds himself subject to injunctions set by his parents.[1] He cannot question the legitimacy of these injunctions since he lacks, at this age, the very concept of justification. The operative psychological law here is that the child recognizes the "evident love of him" that his parents have and as a result "comes to love them," and "if he loves and trusts his parents" then "he will tend to accept their injunctions" (Rawls 1999: 407, 429). The child will then tend to obey these injunctions out of fear of losing some of his parent's love and affection.

The second stage is that of the "morality of association." This stage commences when the child begins to be aware that he occupies various social roles, such as being someone's son, friend, or classmate. At this stage morality is understood as consisting of standards of conduct for the particular roles and stations that one occupies. By living up to these standards one is a *good* son, friend, or classmate who realizes certain *ideals*, such as being a "good sport" (Rawls 1999: 409). Eventually the emerging adolescent comes to see that his various roles and associations fit into a general

system of cooperation, which he recognizes as just, as benefiting all members, and as maintained by the evident good will of others. The operative psychological law here is that persons living under a social arrangement that is "just and publicly known by all to be just" will develop "ties of friendly feeling and trust toward others" (Rawls 1999: 429).

The third stage is that of the "morality of principles." While at the upper end of the morality of association a person "understands the principles of justice . . . his motive for complying with" these principles "springs largely from his ties of friendship and fellow feeling for others, and his concern for the approbation of the wider society." On reaching the third stage of development one moves beyond this level of motivation by becoming "attached to these highest-order principles [of justice] themselves" (Rawls 1999: 414). The operative psychological law here is that by coming to understand that the basic institutions of one's society are just and publically known to be so, a person acquires a "corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are the beneficiaries of these [just] arrangements" (Rawls 1999: 429–430).

II. KANT ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The human being is not born as, but must grow and develop into, an autonomous person. How does this development unfold? By keeping the theories of Kohlberg and Rawls in mind, it shall become clear that Kant also understands moral development as occurring by progression through three distinct, but overlapping, stages: first disciplining (including physical education), second cultivating and civilizing, and third moralizing. While physical education and discipline should be applied almost as soon as the child is born, cultivating and civilizing, as well as moralizing, should be commenced only when the child becomes a youth "in approximately the tenth year, for by then he is already capable of reflection." When the youth enters manhood, which occurs when he is around sixteen, "education by discipline comes to an end" and the young man must be "appraised of his real duties, of the worth of humanity in his own person, and of respect for it in others" (LE: 27:469). We shall now investigate this process in detail.

Stage 1: Disciplining and Physical Education—The Morality of Authority

Initially the baby's guardians must choose everything for it on its behalf. They must choose what the baby is to eat and drink, where it is to sleep, and what it is to wear. Kant calls this initial stage that of "*physical* education," which is "actually only maintenance" or care (LP: 9:456). Toward this end Kant provides recommendations on the baby's diet, the temperature of its baths, and the hardness of its bed. He also warns against swaddling babies

and the use of leading-strings and go-carts to teach children how to walk (LP: 9:456–466; see also LaVaque-Manty 2006). At this "first stage" education "must be merely negative, i.e. one should . . . merely leave nature undisturbed. The only art permitted in the educational process is that of hardening" (LP: 9:459). The aim of physical education is thus to maintain and nurture the child by providing for its needs without perverting its nature by making it overly accustomed to "ease" (LP: 9:464).

Discipline must also "be applied very early" (LP: 9:442). Discipline takes different forms depending on the age of the child. The earliest forms that Kant mentions relate to the baby's crying. Parents should not run to the child "as soon as it cries," unless the baby is "being harmed" or suffering some ill, since this "only makes them cry more often" (LP: 9:479). Similarly, as children grow older parents should ignore them when "they want to get something by screaming" (LP: 9:464). This is important because otherwise children become "accustomed to having all their whims fulfilled" (LP: 9:460). But it is cruel to refuse a child something simply in order to exercise his patience. As such, parents should give children "that which they ask for in a friendly manner, provided it is useful to them" (LP: 9:464).

Kant lists three principles that should guide disciplining. The first principle is to allow from "earliest childhood" the child to "be free in all matters (expect in those where it might injure himself, as, for example, when it grabs an open knife)" and except where the child gets "in the way of other's freedom, as for example, if it screams" too loudly. This principle should be applied from the earliest stages of childhood. The second principle, which applies when the child is a little older, is that the "child must be shown that it can only reach its goals by letting others also reach theirs" (LP: 9:454). In this way the child learns to do what its guardians expect of him and to treat the freedom of others as a constraint on his own freedom. The third principle, which applies when the child is still older, is that parents should "prove to it [the child] that restraint is put on it in order that it be led to the use of its own freedom . . . this third point is the last to be grasped by the child" (LP: 9:454). Initally the child is mechanically prevented from harming himself and others. Next he comes to accept a limitation on his freedom insofar as he interferes with the freedom of others. Finally he is led to understand why his freedom is constrained in this way. This final phase marks the transition from being a child to becoming a youth with capacities for reflection.

The aim of disciplining is to get the child "to tolerate a constraint of his freedom" in order that in the future he may be led "to make good use of his freedom" (LP: 9:453). Children who lack discipline follow "every whim" and put "into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them." Kant therefore calls a lack of discipline "savagery" (*Wildheit*), that is, "independence from laws" (LP: 9:442). It is for this reason that Kant says it is through "discipline or training" that "animal nature [changes] into human nature" (LP: 9:441) and "the culture of training (discipline) . . . consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires" (CPJ:

5:432). Through disciplining, the child learns to accept norms that restrict his freedom so that it is compatible with the freedom of others. As a result, the child learns to govern himself in accordance with these norms, and this requires that he learns how to control his whims and desires. In this way, through disciplining, his will is liberated from the "despotism of desires" and he thereby acquires "human choice" (MM: 6:213).

At this stage of development the child's obedience of injunctions is based on the fear of punishment and an 'if you scratch my back I'll scratch yours' mentality. Kant explains:

> The obsequiousness of the pupil is either *positive*, when he must do what is prescribed to him, because he cannot himself judge, and the mere capacity of imitation still continues in him; or *negative*, when he must do what others want if he wants others to do some favour for him in return. With the first, he may come in for punishment; with the second, others may not do what he wants. (LP: 9:453; see also CPr: 5:152)

Initially the child is subject to rules that he learns by imitation and obeys from fear of punishment ("he may come in for punishment"). He cannot obey these rules for their own sake since he is not yet able to understand their basis. This corresponds to stage one, punishment and obedience, in Kohlberg's account. The child also learns that if he does not do what others ask of him, then others will be reluctant to do what the child asks of them ("others may not do what he wants"). This corresponds to stage two, individualism and exchange, in Kohlberg's account. Together this stage also closely resembles Rawls's morality of authority, with its focus on the obedience of parental injunctions in order to avoid the punishment of withdrawn parental love.

This leads Kant to argue that it is wrong "in the first stage of education" to admonish the child by saying "Shame on you! This is not proper!" since the "child does not yet have concepts of shame and propriety" (LP: 9:465). As such, to "talk to children about duty is futile labor. In the end they regard duty as something the transgression of which is followed by the rod" (LP: 9:484). For this reason morality must initially be enforced by punishment. Kant divides punishment into physical, natural, and moral punishment. "One punishes *morally* by harming the inclinations to be honored and loved, which are aids to morality." This is done by, for example, temporarily treating the child "frostily and coldly" (LP: 9:482). Natural punishment occurs when the child brings bad consequences on himself as a result of his behavior; for example, when he feels ill from eating too much. Kant considers moral and natural punishments to be best. Physical punishments "must be merely supplements to the insufficiency of the moral [and natural] punishment," and should never be "carried out with signs of rage" (LP: 9:483). Furthermore, physical punishment must be used with great caution since it can lead to a servile and slavish disposition in the child, which is directly counter to the aims of moral development (LP: 9:464, 482).

Stage 2: Cultivating and Civilizing—The Morality of Association

In the next stage of development the focus shifts from negative discipline to positive instruction and practical education through cultivating, civilizing, and moralizing. The aim of practical education is to form the human into a "freely acting being" (LP: 9:455). However, I shall treat culture and civilization as a single stage, since both exhibit a similar developmental logic, and treat moralization as a distinct stage because of its differing developmental logic.

Culture is acquired through the acquisition of skills and knowledge (LP: 9:449). This includes cultivating the child's lower and higher faculties of the mind, that is, his understanding, judgment, and reason, as well as his wit, imagination, and memory (LP: 9:472). Through cultivation the student obtains the skills and knowledge to achieve all sorts of ends. Certain skills are "good in all cases, for example reading and writing; others only for some purposes" (LP: 9:449–450). Culture also includes a component of physical education, which involves "either the use of voluntary movement or the use of the organs of sense" (LP: 9:466). Sports and games are important tools for developing coordination and the ability to move one's body at will and make skillful use of one's senses.

The aim of culture is to equip us with skills and knowledge to use as means to various ends, whereas the aim of civilization is to equip us with the capacity to judge the worth of ends. In becoming civilized we learn not only which ends are worth pursuing but also what culture it is prudent to acquire. This leads Kant to closely link civilization and prudence (LP: 9:455). Prudence also requires that we become "well suited for human society, popular and influential. This requires . . . *civilizing*. Its prerequisites are manners, good behavior and . . . [the ability] to use all human beings for one's own final purposes" (LP: 9:450). Civilizing involves learning to govern oneself in accordance with the norms of politeness as defined by the taste of one's age, as well as acquiring the art of "dissimulation, that is, holding back one's faults" in order to maintain "propriety" and a favorable "external appearance" (LP 9:486).

The "beautiful arts and sciences" also play a civilizing role "by means of a universally communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement [which] make[s] human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, [and which] very much reduce[s] the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare[s] humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power" (CPJ: 5:433). By becoming civilized we learn to discipline ourselves in accordance with polite norms of social interaction. While this does not make us moral, it does *prepare* the way for morality by strengthening our capacity to control our sensible tendencies and to govern ourselves in accordance with ideals about how a person *ought* to act. However, at this stage the governing ideal is that of a conventionally successful, prudent, loved, and honorable member of society, and not the moral ideal set

by our own reason. Even so, this is still a "higher step" on the path from discipline to autonomy (Ant: 7:323–328).

At this stage of development "the idea of morality still belongs to culture; but the use of this idea which comes down only to a resemblance of morals in love of honor and in external propriety constitutes only being civilized" (Idea: 8:26). This is why Kant says that the youth "can be disciplined by honor, whereas a child is disciplined only by obedience" (LE: 27:469) and why shame can be used in admonishing youths but not children since "shame can only occur when the concept of honor has already taken root" (LP: 9:483–484). At this stage the key motives for abiding by moral norms are love of honor and external propriety, prudence, a desire for social approbation, pleasure in social intercourse, and a desire to fit in with one's fellows. A person who acts from these motives will usually *appear* to act in conformity with morality. As such, acting from a sense of honor and external propriety resembles morality, even though acting in this way lacks moral worth. This stage of development, with its focus on living up to socially learnt role ideals and its concern for social approbation and the maintenance of social order through acting honorably and with propriety, clearly resembles Rawls's morality of association and Kohlberg's stages three 'good interpersonal relationships' and four 'social order'.

Stage 3: Moralizing—The Morality of Principles

Moralization aims to bring the pupil to "acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends" (Ant: 9:450), and this requires "not only [that] he does good, but that he does it because it is good" (Ant: 9:475). This stage of "moral formation, in so far as it is based on principles which the human being should comprehend himself, comes last" (LP: 9:455). It requires not only the capacity to correctly judge moral particulars and to correctly understand the normative basis of such judgments in the requirements of practical reason, but also the acquisition of a disposition or character to always act in accordance with such judgments. As such, normative instruction and character formation are the two core components of moralization. Punishment has no role whatsoever at this stage (LP: 9:481).

Kant outlines three methods for forming character. Since character "consists in the aptitude for acting according to maxims" (LP: 9:481), the first method for acquiring character is to become accustomed to acting from maxims. In order to develop this aptitude students must learn to "follow exactly" their self-given maxims (LP: 9:481). This is because the "grounding of character . . . consists in the firm resolution of willing to do something, and then also in the actual performance of it . . . For a man who resolves to do something but who does not do it cannot trust himself any longer" (LP: 9:487). As such, if "someone resolves always to get up early in order to study . . . [and] always from one day to the next puts off his resolution—then in the end he does not trust himself any more" (LP: 9:487–488).

If you cannot trust yourself to do what you will to do then you cannot be autonomous. This is because you cannot, with any confidence, set plans for yourself about how you want your life to go, since you cannot trust yourself to put those plans into action. This not only means that others cannot rely on you, but that you cannot even rely upon yourself. A "second principle feature in the grounding of character in children is truthfulness," which is "essential in a character" since a "human being who lies has no character at all" (LP: 9:484). A habitual liar is like a person who cannot follow his own maxims: you "cannot figure them out, and one can never really know what they are up to" (LP: 9:481). This aspect of character should be developed through the "withdrawal of respect" in response to acts of lying. A "third feature in the character of the child must be *sociability*" (LP: 9:484; see also Formosa 2010). This is developed by children forming friendships with other children through peer interaction.

Kant also argues that in "order to ground a moral character in children . . . One must teach them the duties [to themselves and to others] that they have to fulfill" (LP: 9:488). Children are to be taught these duties through a three-step process: first by learning a moral catechism that states general principles, then by developing judgment through casuistry,[2] and finally by understanding the normative basis of moral principles and judgments. Catechism is a method of instruction by questions and answers. Kant has both pedagogical and moral reasons for favoring this method. Pedagogically, Kant takes it to be a general principle that the "biggest aid to understanding something is to produce it" (LP: 9:477). Since few students are autodidacts, most students require the assistance of a teacher who acts as a guide by asking them the right questions. But the teacher should "proceed Socratically by attempting to be 'the midwife of his listeners' knowledge." As such, the teacher should not "carry rational knowledge into them" but rather attempt to "extract" it "from them" (LP: 9:477).[3] In this way students both cultivate their reason and become confident in thinking for themselves, and achieving this outcome is the moral reason for preferring the catechetical method. However, Kant notes that this method has two drawbacks. First, it can be "slow" and second it does not work well in large groups since "it is difficult to arrange things such that when one extracts knowledge from one child the others also learn something in the process" (LP: 9:477).

The teacher's questions should focus on the duties we have to ourselves and to others, the foundation of these duties in the "dignity of humanity," and the role that this dignity plays in limiting the worth of our own happiness (LP: 9:488–489; MM: 6:480–484). This means that students must learn to value themselves, not in comparison with other human beings, which only arouses envy, but according to the idea of the absolute worth of humanity (LP: 9:491; MM: 6:480). In presenting these duties it is important to focus on the moral worth that comes from acting from duty. Teachers should only make "casual mention" of any advantages or disadvantages that arise from acting from duty "merely as an instrument, for the taste

of those who are weak by nature" (MM: 6:482–483). Kant takes this to be not only the morally correct method but also an effective one since he thinks that "morality must have more power over the human heart the more purely it is presented" (CPr: 5:156, 153; TP: 8:286).

Kant argues that in "this catechistic moral instruction it would be most helpful to the pupil's moral development to raise some casuistical questions in their analysis of every duty" (MM: 6:483). However, in using concrete examples to illustrate specific duties Kant stresses that examples should be drawn from ordinary life and history (LP: 9:490; CPr: 5:154). Kant warns against the use of examples of "so-called *noble* (supermeritorious) actions, with which our sentimental writings so abound" because they inspire "empty wishing and longings for inaccessible perfection," which produces "mere heroes of romance who . . . release themselves . . . from observance of common and everyday obligation" since these seem "insignificant and petty" (CPr: 5:155). Kant's examples, in contrast, tend to focus on the sublimeness of observing common and everyday obligations, such as keeping promises, paying debts, giving to the poor, returning deposits, and so on.

As a result of this method, students will ideally develop an ennobling sense of their own worth and the worth of all other persons, an awareness of their moral obligations, and trust in their capacity to do what they will to do. This produces a solid basis for their future autonomy, which is the aim of practical education. On achieving this aim and becoming a fully autonomous person the highest stage of moral development, moralization, is reached. This highest stage resembles, although it is broader in scope, Rawls's morality of principles and Kohlberg's stage six 'universal principles,' since it involves a commitment to universal moral principles themselves. At this stage of development persons not only know *what* their duties are, but also understand *why* these duties are binding, and they have acquired a trustworthy disposition to always act in accordance with these duties for their own sakes.

However, this highest stage of moral development is, for three reasons, very rarely achieved: first, because education is not organized along the lines that Kant advocates; second, because the innate radical evil of human nature grounds a propensity to evil, which works against moralization (Formosa 2007 and 2009); third, because this propensity to evil is exacerbated by the moral corruptness of a civilized society, which encourages us to value ourselves in comparison with others and not in comparison with the moral law. In the rare cases where it is achieved, Kant thinks that it is unlikely to be "firmly established" before a person is "forty" years of age (Ant: 7:295).

III. RESOLVING THE KNOWLEDGE AND REVOLUTION TENSIONS

The knowledge tension arises because Kant, on the one hand, outlines a developmental story that includes positive instruction in the moral duties

that we are subject to and, on the other hand, makes strong claims about the moral knowledge of youths as young as nine or ten and adults with even the most common reason (CPr: 5:155–157; TP: 8:286). Development and positive instruction seem either essential or superfluous for moral knowledge depending on which of these two claims we focus on.

The key to resolving this tension is to appreciate the force of Kant's claim that there is a strong correlation between the historical progress of a society and the moral development of its members. This leads Kant (Rel: 6:93–95) to argue that only within moral communities under conditions of national, international, and cosmopolitan justice can the moralization of individuals occur (at least widely) and the radical evil of human nature be overcome. But we are still far from historically realizing this state. Just as Rawls bases his developmental story on the assumption that the child of that story grows up in a well-ordered society, Kant bases his developmental story on the assumption that the child of that story grows up in a historical period identical to Kant's own. That is, "in a time" of "disciplinary training, culture, and civilization, but not by any means in a time of moralization" (LP: 9:451; see also Idea: 8:26).

As such, when Kant makes claims about the moral knowledge of a ten-year-old youth or a man with the most common reason, he makes these claims in the context of the historical assumption that the youth or man in question has *already* been (at least partly) socialized into a disciplined, cultured, and civilized society. Discipline, cultivation, and civilization, unlike moralization, come in degrees. Some people are highly disciplined, cultured, and cultivated and others, such as a youth and a man with the most common reason, are less so. But even in these latter cases the youth and man in question have *already* been socialized at least *partly* into a society that enforces its laws and cultural norms. They are therefore not lawless "savages," in Kant's sense, since they have been somewhat socialized to act in accordance with norms through the application of disciplining, cultivating, and civilizing techniques.

As part of that socialization process they will also have learned what counts as morally right and wrong in their society and, as a result of this, they will be able to make correct moral judgments (on the assumption that their socially learned conception of right and wrong matches the requirements of morality, which, in a civilized state, Kant thinks will generally be the case). This explains why someone who has not yet completed the process of moral development, or not yet even received formal instruction in moral duties, is able to make correct moral judgments. But it is one thing to be able to make correct moral judgments as a result of socialization, and another thing to have a correct understanding of the normative basis of those judgments and to have a character defined by an aptitude to always act on the basis of that understanding. Without this proper understanding and firm character, which those who have yet to be moralized lack, one's moral judgments will tend to be based on social conventions that merely

resemble morality, rather than on practical reason itself, which grounds morality proper.

But does this really defuse the knowledge tension? After all, Kant's preferred teaching methodology for ethics involves *extracting* judgments from the youth's own reason and not from his memory. Does this mean that Kant thinks we have the sort of innate rational knowledge that would make education and development superfluous? No. On Kant's view we have various predispositions and capacities, including rational ones. But these predispositions and capacities must be correctly cultivated and developed through education, practice, and communicative social interactions. As such, as Allen Wood argues, on Kant's view we "can develop our reason only by communicating with others" (1999: 301). Therefore we can extract correct moral judgments from a pupil's reason, rather than from his memory, only if his reason has *already* been (at least somewhat) cultivated and developed. There is thus no real tension between Kant's views about moral knowledge and moral development.

This leads naturally to a consideration of the revolution tension. This tension seems to arise because, to paraphrase Beck, Kant emphasizes both the necessity of education for moralizing us and also the insufficiency of education for achieving this outcome. But is there really a tension here between gradual developmental progress through education and the sudden moral revolution that completes that process? In some passages there does seem to be such a tension. For example, Kant writes "that a human being should become not merely *legally* good, but *morally* good . . . [and this] cannot be effected through gradual *reform* but must rather be effected through a *revolution* in the disposition of the human being" (Rel: 6:47). This dispositional revolution requires the repudiating of one's originally evil disposition, which takes the form of a conditional commitment to morality, by adopting a good disposition, which takes the form of a firm and unconditional commitment to moral principles (Formosa 2007). But "education, examples and teaching generally cannot bring about this firmness and persistence in principles *gradually*, but only . . . by an explosion which happens one time" (Ant: 7:295).

A person's disposition is their highest-order maxim that defines the overall practical orientation of their character (Formosa 2007). However, all maxims, dispositional maxims included, are (directly or indirectly) self-given or subjective principles. Just as Kant holds that no one can force you to adopt a maxim, as opposed to force you to act in a certain way (MM: 6:218–221), equally no one can force you to adopt a disposition. For this reason education can only lead you to the view that you *ought* to adopt a good disposition, but it cannot actually *give* you a good disposition. This explains why the educational process of development, although *necessary* for moralizing one's character (Ant: 7:327) since without it one's rational predispositions remain uncultivated, is not *sufficient* for moralizing one's character. It cannot be sufficient because what is required is a revolution in

one's character, in one's way of thinking and reasoning, and this requires the adoption of a new disposition, which is something one must do for oneself. As such, Kant's claim that education is *necessary* for bringing about the highest stage of moral development is not in tension with his claim that education is *not sufficient* for bringing about this dispositional revolution. This insight resolves the revolution tension.

IV. CONCLUSION

Kant develops a detailed three-stage theory of moral development that structurally resembles, although it differs in details from, the contemporary accounts defended by Kohlberg and Rawls. On Kant's theory this process begins with physical education, which takes the form of maintenance and care, and disciplining, which helps the child to overcome the despotism of desires by learning to accept a normative constraint on his freedom. This stage of development comprises a morality of authority in which the obedience of norms is based on a fear of punishment and an interest in maintaining exchange relationships. Next, the positive stage of practical education begins by cultivating and civilizing. This equips the youth with a capacity to both reach various ends and to judge the worth of those ends. This comprises a morality of association in which the obedience of norms is based on a sense of honor and shame, a desire for social approbation, and prudence. The final and highest stage of development, moralization or a morality of principles, is realized through the acquisition of both the rational knowledge of one's moral duties and a character practically orientated toward always obeying these duties for their own sake. However, Kant's account of moral development appears to be in tension with other elements of his moral philosophy. But these (specifically the knowledge and revolution) tensions have been shown here to be illusory. As such, a proper understanding of Kant's theory of moral development, far from exposing genuine tensions, helps rather to deepen our understanding of Kant's moral philosophy.

NOTES

1. Since both Rawls and Kant write exclusively in the masculine when they discuss moral development, I will do the same here in order that my discussion melds with the quotations that I use. However, I assume that Rawls thinks that the stages and means of development are the same for both sexes. Whether Kant also thinks this is less clear.
2. Kant stresses that examination of "practical questions" through concrete examples should follow "after first laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism" (CPr: 5:154).
3. Kant (MM: 6:411, 478–481) contrasts the "*dogmatic*" method, in which the teacher alone lectures, with the "*erotetic*" method, which is based on questions and answers. This latter method is divided into dialogue and catechism. Confusingly, Kant makes two different distinctions between dialogue and

catechism. According to the first, in a dialogue the pupil asks the questions and the teacher answers, or both question each other, whereas in a catechism only the teacher asks questions. According to the second, if the pupil is expected to draw his answer "merely from his memory, the method is called the *catechistic* method proper" but if it is "assumed" to be "already present naturally in the pupil's reason and needs only to be developed from it, then the method is called that of *dialogue* (Socratic method)." Kant's preferred method is therefore catechistical in the first sense, since he thinks (at least) initially that the teacher must do all the questioning because the student does not know what questions to ask, and dialogical (or Socratic) in the second sense, since he thinks that the student's answers should be drawn from his reason and not from his memory (as in the catechistic method proper).

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14 Kant as Moral Psychologist?

James Scott Johnston

Many moral educators are inclined to think Kant has a moral psychology at the bottom of his moral theory, and for good reason: on Kant's view, the moral law cannot incorporate itself into moral maxims unless a context is in place for this to occur. This context is a socio-psychological one in which norms, rules, conventions, attitudes, etc., are extant. Indeed, it would be correct to say that Kant has an *empirical theory* of human nature, which is necessary to compliment his moral theory.[1] However, this is *not* the sense in which moral educators have thought Kant's moral law is susceptible of a developmental account of morals. In discussions of moral education, Kant's moral pedagogy is sometimes run together with a moral psychology to which he did not subscribe. This should not surprise us, as moral educators, in their quest for a full account of moral pedagogy, often turn to a developmental account of moral conduct.

Thinkers as diverse as William Frankena (1958), John Rawls (1970), and particularly Lawrence Kohlberg (1971, 1973, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986), have developed Kantian accounts of moral education that stretch Kant's claims beyond their textual limits. And while this may not seem to be much of a concern for general readers, for Kant scholars it is worrisome, and for (at least) three reasons: first, some moral educators and psychologists, having assessed Kant's 'moral psychology,' have judged him to be lacking a full account of moral theory and moral education; second, some have fabricated an account of moral psychology in Kant's name; third, otherwise sympathetic readers have come to see Kant as insisting upon an empirical principle rather than the moral law at base of his moral theory.

R. M. Hare has done much to turn moral educators toward this false understanding of Kant. Beyond Hare's predominance in the discourse of moral education in the 1950s and 1960s, he was a, if not the, major explicator of Kant to educationists. Hare is a strong formalist in his reading of Kant: that is to say, he reads Kant as endorsing an absolute moral principle (the Categorical Imperative), which we then use in creating maxims of moral worth (1965, 1993).[2] The Categorical Imperative functions as a test of one's moral worth in carrying out a specific act. If we are able to rationalize our principle as gaining the consent of all, our principle has

moral worth. Now this reading of Kant is otiose among many Kant scholars.[3] However, it found itself in full force among the moral educators, psychologists, and others that drew consciously on a Kantian understanding of principle-based ethics, including John Rawls, William Frankena, and Lawrence Kohlberg in the 1970s and 1980s.[4] Subsequent moral educators have followed these in ascribing to Kant a moral psychology he did not have.[5]

Though Frankena and Rawls have influenced philosophical accounts of moral education and (in the case of Rawls) accounts of education and social justice, it is the moral psychologist Kohlberg who has done the most to popularize Kant's moral theory (both for educators and the general public) for educationists. Because of his eminent status in the field of educational psychology and educational theory and the close association of his theory of moral development with Kant's moral theory, it is Kohlberg whom I will address here. Kohlberg is justly famous for his developmental stage theory of morality.[6] Ironically however, Kohlberg has also reinforced the false estimation that Kant was doing moral psychology—even though Kohlberg sometimes claimed otherwise—when he discussed the formulation of moral maxims. This has led to wholesale criticisms of the "Kant-Kohlberg" approach to moral development; an approach that Kant is unwittingly included in, and on his own textual admissions, an unwilling partner. In section I of this chapter, I will concentrate on Kohlberg, and in particular, his reading of Kant. In section II, I will raise certain objections to his reading of Kant as moral psychologist, drawing specifically on statements from the *Groundwork*, the *Doctrine of Virtue*, and Barbara Herman's notion of "Rules of Moral Salience" (RMS) (1993).

I. KOHLBERG ON KANT

Certainly, Kohlberg seems close in spirit (if not in letter) to Kant. While Piaget for example, can only loosely be called Kantian in his developmental approach, Kohlberg certainly thought of himself as Kantian.[7] Yet Kohlberg was not exclusively Kantian—at least not if we adhere to the reading of Kant as a thoroughgoing formalist. Like Piaget before him (and Rawls contemporaneously), Kohlberg was constructivist in his moral theory, meaning that "justice reasoning [the highest form of reasoning in Kohlberg's estimation] would be the cognitive factor most amenable to structural developmental stage analysis insofar as it would clearly provide reasoning material where structuring and equilibrating operations . . . could be seen" (1984a: 304). In this constructivist rendering, morals, like reasoning, judgments, and other cognitive processes, are (in part) developmental. Like Piaget, Kohlberg is concerned not primarily with the defense of a universal theory of justice or moral law, rather an empirical-psychological hypothesis regarding the growth of moral reasoning. It is well known that Kohlberg saw his theory of moral stages as developmental and functional, and

praised, among others, Durkheim, Mead, Piaget, and Dewey for advances in moral psychology and sociology (1973: 30). Therefore, the question of how close Kohlberg actually was to Kant may be asked. It will do to see how close he actually came to a proper understanding of Kant and (perhaps more important) what reading of Kant he chose and why.

Kohlberg's project is manifold: but his overarching aim is to elucidate the cross-cultural, universal senses of justice that all peoples in all societies, nations, etc., have, irrespective of geography, race, culture, and other contingencies, and weave these together into a coherent story of how these are developed. "There are marked individual and cultural differences in the definition, use, and hierarchical ordering of these universal value-concepts, but the major source of this variation both within and between cultures is developmental. Insofar as they are developmental, they are not morally neutral or arbitrary" (1971: 41). Kohlberg calls these "'the international emergences of social interaction' (Piaget) to denote their social, as opposed to their biological origins . . . the concepts of role-taking and justice, then, provide concrete meaning to the assumption that moral principles are neither external rules taken inward nor natural ego-tendencies of a biological organism" (1971: 53).[8]

These senses of justice are manifest in Kohlberg's final two stages of moral development—the famously "post-conventional" stages of moral judgments. What makes these stages distinct from the "socialization" stages is their foundation in universal principles. "The universalizability or impartiality criterion of moral judgment [also] implies that moral reasoning, as we have studied it, constructs judgments of justice. A universalizable judgment that appeals to norms implies a fair or impartial application of the norms" (1984a: 305). The first of the two post-conventional stages, stage 5, corresponds roughly to Rawls's understanding of the principles of Justice as Fairness—"equality of liberty" and "equality of opportunity"; there are rights and freedoms universal for all human beings and these are the job of society to protect and make manifest (Rawls, 1971: 13). The *welfare of all* is the eventual aim. Stage 5 moral reasoning is shared by relatively few persons, irrespective of geography, society, or national membership. Stage 6 is even rarer: nevertheless, it is stage 6 that Kohlberg famously considers the truly moral stage that corresponds to the intuitions of the philosophers.[9] "[O]nly stage 6 thinking is fully moral, that each higher stage is a closer approximation to the characteristic which philosophers such as Hare have taken as defining distinctively moral language. In this sense, we are arguing that the educational aim of stimulating moral development to stages 5 and 6 is the aim of giving the individual the capacity to engage in moral judgment and discourse, rather than the aim of imposing a specific morality upon him" (1971: 54).

Of course, Kohlberg does not think all philosophies (or philosophers) operate on similar levels. There are more or less moral philosophies, depending in turn on the formalism and prescriptivism of the principles

involved. It is here, in terms of the *formality* of moral principles and the place of these formal principles in moral judging, that Kohlberg draws most heavily on Kant.

> From Kant to Hare, formalists have stressed the distinctive universal and prescriptive nature of adequate moral judgments. Increasingly prescriptive nature of more mature moral judgments is reflected in the series of differentiations we have described, which is a series of differentiations of "is" from "ought" (or of morality as internal principles from external events and expectations) . . . this series of differentiations of the morally autonomous or categorical "ought" from the morally heteronymous "is" also represents a differentiation of the sphere of value-judgments. (1971: 46)

At this point, it will do to make a distinction between Kantian ethics and rule-following ethics of the sort that philosophers label *deontology*. (Kohlberg makes use of these distinctions throughout his works.) Kantian ethical theories have their basis in Kant's moral theory and subscribe, loosely or tightly, depending upon the particular thinker in question, to Kant's statements, particularly those in his *Groundwork*. Kantian ethics generally invoke Kant directly, and they require that the understanding of moral judging be of a similar approach to, if not closely allied with, Kant. Kantian ethicists in Kohlberg's senses (and likely in Kohlberg's mind) then, are figures such as R. M. Hare and John Rawls. Indeed, it is clear from the various passages where Kohlberg runs together Kant's moral theory with deontology, that he considers the two synonymous.[10]

Kohlberg considers himself *both* a deontologist *and* a proponent of the Kantian school of moral thought (though he does not commit fully to Kant's moral theory). Kohlberg understands what makes a Kantian a Kantian is the turn to a universal procedure for determining principles. "A moral principle is a universal mode of choosing, a rule of choosing which we want all people to adopt in all situations" (1971: 58). Kohlberg's stage 5 and particularly, stage 6 are stages in which moral actors make judgments with recourse to such principles: "[t]he Kantian doctrine prescribing the single principle of the categorical imperative" (1971: 58). In one place, Kohlberg calls this a "strong conception of principle."

> [This] "strong" conception of principle implies a single logically or intuitively self-evident or rational maxim for choice; from it one can deduce any concrete morally right action in a situation, given the facts of the situation as the minor premise of the deduction. Such a strong conception of principle is one which not only is universalizable to all men and all situations but also is absolutely definitive of right action in any situation. We have so far never encountered a live human being who made moral judgments in terms of principles in this sense. (1971: 59)[11]

How then do moral actors use these principles? When faced with a moral situation, those operating at Stage 5 and 6 adopt what Kohlberg calls a "law-making" perspective (1971: 59). Rather than judging egocentrically, or in terms of the laws and conventions of community, society, or state, they universalize their judgments, making the generalization of their principle the pivot point of their action. "In this sense, the fundamental aspect of principled morality is the adoption of a law-making perspective. That welfare [stage 5] and justice [stage 6] are guiding principles of legislation as well as of individual moral action, points to the fact that a principle is always a maxim or rule for making rules or laws as well as a maxim of individual situational conduct" (1971: 60). "Welfare" and "justice" operate very much as duties, in Kant's sense.[12]

It remains to see how Kohlberg actually uses Kant's statements in the *Groundwork*. This is tricky: Kohlberg does not incorporate all of the claims that Kant puts forth in that text. Indeed, it is precisely because Kohlberg subscribes to what I consider are *outdated and formalist* readings of Kant that he misleads his readers into thinking Kant was a fellow traveler in matters moral. Kohlberg uses the formalist reading common to deontological interpretations of Kant, specifically by R. M. Hare, as his understanding of the central claim of the *Groundwork*. As I noted earlier, Hare is a strong formalist in his reading of Kant: that is to say, he reads Kant as endorsing an absolute moral principle (the Categorical Imperative), which we then use in creating maxims of moral worth that functions as a test of one's moral worth in carrying out a specific act (1952).[13] If we are able to rationalize our principle as gaining the consent of all, our principle has moral worth. Here is Kohlberg invoking Hare directly:

> We cited earlier Hare's characterization of the distinctive formal features of morality as "prescriptivity," and "universality." . . . Hare's characterization echoes Kant who defined prescriptivity as the sense of the categorical imperative . . . to be categorical, an imperative must be universal: "so act as to make the maxim of thy conduct the universal will."[14] Empirically, we have found these two features linked, so that a stage 6 judgment of right which is prescriptive or independent of the inclinations of the self and beliefs of others is also a judgment of a right which is right for all mankind. . . . Hare has recently argued with vigour the necessity of defining truly moral judgement and "moral principles" solely in formal terms. To do so would, of course, involve a much less controversial claim for a conception of mature morality. (1971: 57–58)

To follow Hare and Kohlberg means yoking moral judgment to the universality of the principle. Doing so not only elevates this principle to the pinnacle of moral thought and practice, it necessitates the abstraction of this principle from all contexts in which moral judgments are made and moral

actors operate. Ironically, Kohlberg thinks that this abstraction occasions *the* central problem for Kant: that of excessive absolutism: Kohlberg claims,

> Kant, for different reasons, insisted on a purely formal conception of principle, but to attain such a conception, he made the principled form "universality" into a content, for example, into the commandment that one universalize one's actions. When one attempts a purely formal definition of principle, however, one only ends up with the old rules of conventional morality expressed in more universal and prescriptive form. Kant's claim that it was wrong to tell a lie to save a victim from a murder is a case in point. In the formalist conception, principles are still conceived of as rules of action, that is, as rules prescribing classes of acts in classes of situations. (1971: 60)[15]

In contrast, Kohlberg claims his own understanding of principles is confined to the realm of *guidelines* rather than transcendental absolutes. Moral actors, regardless of their contexts, do not operate in the vacuum Kohlberg thinks Kant endorses. "In our conception, however, principles are guides for perceiving and integrating all the morally relevant elements in concrete situations. Neither philosophers nor all the people we have interviewed have ever come up with morally relevant elements in concreted situations which are not the elements of human interests (welfare) or human rights (justice)" (1971: 60). Indeed, invoking Kant's infamous case of not telling a lie to a murderer to save the life of another, Kohlberg comments, "Put in different terms, most of us feel a cold chill at the notion that mature moral obligation is fundamentally directed to an abstract maxim or principle as Kant held. Moral obligations are towards concrete other people in concrete situations" (1971: 61). In what seems a volte-face given Kohlberg's statements on the importance of moral commands at stages 5 and 6 of moral reasoning (the "strong" conception of principles), Kohlberg asserts; "The case is always higher than the principle; a single human life is worth more than all the principles in philosophy to the mature man. Principles simply tell us how to resolve the concrete claims, when claims compete in a situation, when it is one man's life against another" (1971: 61).

Kohlberg therefore provides us with a *qualified* endorsement of Kant's central moral claim: the claim of an absolute (formal) principle at the heart of ethics. His two cheers for Kant does not extend to the supposedly abstract nature of this principle, however; for Kohlberg, those operating at stage 6 always do so with the context in which the moral judgment is made firmly in mind, and they operate according to universal principles only as guidelines, never as firm and final commands. Furthermore, those at stage 6 always place the case in which moral judgments are made higher than the specific principle ascertained and followed. Never is the principle allowed to overtake the situation necessitating the moral judgment.

II. KANT ON MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND CONTEXT

What stands out in Kohlberg's account of the psychological development of morality (aside from the Kantian pedigree) is the insistence that moral theory must bend to moral psychology for its operation and enactment. And while Kant makes the connection between moral judging and training (the "Method" of Practical Reason and Virtue) in a number of places in his own work, his moral theory remains transcendental, unlike in Kohlberg's account. While Kantian moral psychologists and educators emphasize the developmental aspects of moral theory, the moral law itself is what counts as moral for Kant, and he makes this clear throughout his writings.

As I noted earlier, some of the commentators on Kant, in education as elsewhere, attribute to him a moral psychology premised on Kohlberg's writings. However, the moral psychology many of these commentators attribute to Kant is un-Kantian: Kant's intention was never to exemplify a model for constructing moral maxims through appeals to a Categorical Imperative (CI) procedure, in which spurious reasons and inclinations (including emotions) were banished (e.g., Wood 1999: 337ff.).[16] The discussion of the universal law in Section One of the *Groundwork* is developed for the purpose of providing a proof of the necessity of a thoroughly moral principle—one separate from subjective connections. Kant never claimed his examples were to be used as a technique to make specific moral decisions. Yet the understanding of his examples as techniques has until recently prevailed, and this is how moral educators and psychologists continue to understand him.

Though Kohlberg is certainly right that Kant was *not* a moral psychologist, the question arises; if we are to judge Kant by Kohlberg, must we place Kant's moral theory in the context of a moral psychology of development as Kohlberg does (and Kant's critics often do)? Does, in other words, the strong role played by Kant in Kohlberg's moral psychology suggest that Kant, too, had a moral psychology that led to the Categorical Imperative? The answer is surely no. This is not however a result of agreeing with Kohlberg and his reading of Kant. Kohlberg's characterization of Kant leads us to suppose that Kant endorsed the conclusion that there are principles of reason, immutable and universal, that develop regardless of contexts, societies, and cultures;[17] that represent the highest stages of moral reasoning; and that operate in a procedural mechanism to test out our maxims in (moral) situations. I have suggested that the ascription of this characterization to Kant is terribly misleading. More, however, seems required to dispel the characterization: if Kant is not a moral psychologist, what does this mean for our understanding of his moral theory? Why did he not choose to be? And what is it about Kant's not choosing to be a moral psychologist that imperils Kohlberg's use of him?

There are (at least) two problems with Kohlberg's use of Kant's moral theory. The first concerns the overall expression of Kant's project: Kohlberg thinks that Kant valued a universal principle (the Categorical Imperative) for its own sake, and elevated this principle above all else, resulting in an abstract and formal law that had little bearing on specific cases; indeed, as Kohlberg claimed, it was capable of inducing a "cold chill" (1971: 61). Second, Kohlberg overemphasizes the Categorical Imperative's role in the formation of moral judgments in his account of Kant's moral theory. The overemphasis has its corollary in the claim that Kant was firm in his denigration or dismissal of context.[18] I think because of this, Kohlberg misunderstands the reasons for Kant's statements regarding the impossibility of moral psychology to have any influence on the principles of moral theory, which are prefaced by his insistence that empirical matters (such as education) are a means to help develop what is truly necessary; a respect for the moral law.

Kohlberg's is a psychological theory of the development of the moral sense of the individual in the contexts of various societies and cultures. Kant's moral theory is invoked in this development for the purpose of providing a philosophically robust-because-universal ethics of principle. Kohlberg considers Kant's moral law to stand as the paradigm instance of operating autonomously. The rightness of Kantian ethics is not so much argued as presupposed. Nor is it necessary for Kohlberg to defend Kantian ethics: Kohlberg thinks others, particularly R. M. Hare (whom Kohlberg draws on) have done this. The central insight that Kant provides—that there are universal moral principles and that these are coeval with our human reason—is enough for Kohlberg's needs, though he claims Kant elevated autonomy to objectionable heights, and rendered moral theory excessively rigorous and formalistic as a result.

According to Kohlberg, Kant did *not* propose a theory of the development of the moral sense. His aim rather, was to prove that there existed a "supreme practical principle . . . that can serve as a universal law" (Gr: 4:429). This, though correct, is no compliment: Kohlberg most obviously wishes Kant *had* developed a moral psychology, and Kohlberg, along with others (we see this also with R. M. Hare and John Rawls), *do* go on to discuss moral psychology and do so from the standpoint of Kantian moral theory.[19] These thinkers and not Kant provide the bridge used to get back and forth from Kant to moral psychology, and the association of Kant with moral psychology is the result.

Kant's understanding of his program differs from Kohlberg's characterization. First, there is the issue of Kant's allegiance to his own statements in the *Groundwork*, particularly his statements on the nature of the Categorical Imperative. Kant famously says that only the Categorical Imperative has the purity and absoluteness to be a command of reason, and only those following moral principles have good wills. This suggests that only those that follow Categorical Imperatives in making their maxims are moral (Gr:

4:390, 399–400). Furthermore, Kant's first instantiation of the Categorical Imperative, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is unsparing in its inflexibility: "I ought *never* to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (Gr: 4:402, my italics). While this has been used to claim Kant was a moral absolutist, I believe that this assumption is false and contrary to his understanding. Kant *nowhere* insists that the only elements in making moral judgments are principles. Nor does he insist that we abstract from a situation or context, find the right principle, and make this the maxim of moral worth.

Some have thought Kant gives us a testing mechanism to determine maxims of moral worth (Kohlberg 1984a; O'Neill 1975; and Rawls 1971). This mechanism is the universalization or CI procedure that results in the maxim being consented to by all. This misreading follows from misunderstanding the import of the first derivation of the Categorical Imperative—the FUL. I have already claimed that Kant does *not* subscribe to a simple mechanistic characterization of moral judgment wherein we attempt to obtain the consent of all. Indeed, such an attempt is absurd. The best we could hope for is a characterization that claims we formulate our maxim *as if* we could obtain the consent of all. In fact, "Common human reason" supplies what is essential for us to be moral (especially with regards to maxims that are conceptually coherent), but a proof is necessary for the philosophical demonstration of the moral law and this Kant provides in his *Groundwork* (Gr: 4:404). Kant makes this point clear in the following passage toward the end of Section I of the *Groundwork*:

> Thus, then, we have arrived, within the moral cognition of common human reason, at its principle, which it admittedly does not think so abstractly in a universal form but which it actually has always before its eyes and uses as the norm for its appraisals. Here it would be easy to show how common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if, without in the least teaching it anything new, we only, as did Socrates, make it attentive to its own principle. (G 4:403–404)

We can conceive of ourselves as self-determining self-legislators who are capable of willing without contradiction and forming a principle for doing so because the moral law *is* the supreme principle *if* we choose to incorporate moral principles into our maxims. Again, this is not the same as saying that we simply abstract this principle from our situation, or consciously appeal to this principle in forming moral judgments. Furthermore, in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant famously denies that reason (pure and practical) involves itself in (empirical) psychology (CPu: A849) or transcendental psychology (which he refutes in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first *Critique*).

When Kant comes to discuss the respect for moral law, and claims that this is *moral motivation* to pursue a moral course in life, he insists in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that this respect (understood as "conscience") is the sole force impelling human beings toward acting morally.

> Every man has a conscience and finds himself observed, threatened, and in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge; and this authority watching over the law in him is not something that he himself (voluntarily) makes, but something incorporated in his being. It follows him like a shadow when he plans to escape. He can indeed stun himself or put himself to sleep by pleasures and distractions, but he cannot help coming to himself or waking up from time to time; and when he does, he hears at once its fearful voice. He can at most, in extreme depravity, bring himself to heed it no longer, but he still cannot help hearing it. (CPr: 6:438)[20]

We should immediately note that conscience is *not* a simple *feeling* or *emotion*; it is rather a *judge* (not a judgment of an object) that the human personality makes of herself. Kant also calls this the "moral feeling" in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (MM: 6:464–465). It is the respect for the moral law, which, when violated or not attended to, results in a "fearful voice." We may say that conscience keeps people on the straight and narrow; however, this is *not* because it is an empirical, moral motivator of the will.

How conscience arises, and what its connection to will is, Kant leaves undetermined in the *Groundwork*. His full account is in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, and there, "moral feeling" (which is consciousness of one's duty), arises as respect. Kant writes:

> Respect . . . is . . . something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote. . . . Accordingly it is not correct to say that a human being has *a duty of self-esteem*; it must rather be said that the law within him unavoidably forces from him *respect* for his own being, and this feeling (which is of a special kind) is the basis of certain duties, that is, of certain actions that are consistent with his duty to himself. It cannot be said that he has a duty of respect toward himself, for he must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think of any duty whatsoever. (MM: 6:402–403)

Respect is a condition *of* duty to be regarded *as* duty. It is the law that commands respect; and not respect that commands the law. Absent respect, persons cannot regard themselves with dignity or even personhood. However, the moral law (and a fortiori respect) does not spring fully formed in a child; it must be revealed through training. A child must be instructed to

reveal the moral law within her; manifested in practice as forming and acting on maxims of moral worth and (in Kant's language) acting from duty. (This is why Kant strenuously insists that teachers avoid subtly encouraging their charges to concentrate on the instrumental gain of doing one's duty; the "moral feeling" of respect will be dampened or extinguished as a result (MM: 6:480)). Only in a circular accounting of motivation and act, where conscience (respect for moral law) serves to remind us of our duties (partly by way of feeling responsible) and our duties reinforce our conscience, can moral feeling be said to motivate our actions. Moral feeling (respect) cannot therefore be considered an emotional state on a par with other emotional states. It is a product of the moral law.

So where, then, is the locus of moral psychology in Kant? I suggest the closest approximation is an empirical theory of moral contexts, and this is to be found in Barbara Herman's notion of "Rules of Moral Salience" that supply the empirical context from which maxims of moral worth are formed. Herman maintains that moral agents have "acquired knowledge of the sorts of actions that it is generally not permissible to do and of the sorts of actions that, in the normal course of things, have no moral import" (1993: 77). A person already understands "that normal prudential or instrumental justifications of actions will not do. . . . This is the mark of his 'conscience'" (1993: 77). Thus, Herman argues, there is a "moral core" that people learn in and through their upbringing and education: one that allows them to "identify morally significant elements in the situation . . . [they] encounter" (1993: 77). This "moral core" constitutes the stock of the Rules of Moral Salience. Herman writes:

> I think of the [Rules of Moral Salience] as an interpretation, in rule form, of the respect for persons (as ends-in-themselves) which is the object of the Moral Law [the FUH]: their function is to guide in the recognition of those areas where the fact that persons are moral persons ought to instruct agents' deliberations and actions. (1993: 82)[21]

Presumably, the Rules of Moral Salience would also signal areas off-limits to deliberation (such as the instrumental value of persons—say, as sex slaves or sex objects).

Herman believes that these rules build up through one's upbringing and education. They help create a moral language and ultimately, a moral culture. Additionally, they "instruct about the sorts of actions that need moral justification and the sorts of circumstances to which morality requires a response" (1993: 86). Herman continues, "these rules need to establish not just salience but also a deliberative presumption for justifying reasons. Prior to deliberation the agent must both identify her proposed action as of a particular moral kind . . . and determine the nature of her interest in the action . . . that is to ground a possible rebuttal of the presumption" (1993: 151).

Herman is not saying the Rules of Moral Salience operate as prima facie duties, rather as a stock of rules that serve to signal our need for deliberation when (moral) deliberation is required. (They also, in my opinion, manage much of our day-to-day decision-making.) In this sense, the Rules of Moral Salience limit the realm of possible maxims that we form and operate by to those that are likely to have moral worth, through exclusion of those that are inconceivable. These latter are maxims that, to use Onora O'Neill's terminology, are "contradictions in conception" (1975). When we formulate maxims of moral worth, we incorporate moral principles into our wills—our choices. We do this against a backdrop of moral conventions, norms, or rules. To choose is a conscious decision; but the appeal is seldom if ever to an abstract formula of universal law. It is rather to our duties.

We are always already embedded in contexts composed partly of these principles—Herman's Rules of Moral Salience. However, this point is *not* developed sufficiently by Kant in the *Groundwork*. This, I argue, has led many to take Kant's statements in Sections I and II as final statements on how we operate morally. Kant *does* discuss the contexts and means for making moral judgments, but he does this more fully elsewhere, particularly in the Doctrine of the Method sections in both the *Critique of Practical Reason* and the *Doctrine of Virtue*. On Kant's own argument, the *Groundwork* is designed to supply a proof for the claim that there are universal moral principles, and to show that we can be moral. It is *not* a "how-to" manual for constructing moral judgments.[22]

If the reading of the context of moral judgments consists in Rules of Moral Salience, the role for moral educators is to facilitate; to draw out; to help children develop their capacities to form maxims of moral worth from the context of already existing empirical, ethical precepts, and through formation of maxims of moral worth, to develop their (moral) character. A teacher's role is vital, yet limited. Teachers cannot *teach* the virtues, or duties, or the moral law, if this means simply transmitting these as values we hold to children; nor can these be transmitted from one to another in the manner of skills or habits. While children certainly do develop habits of forming moral maxims, the incorporation of moral principles into subjective maxims is *not* a habit. Virtues, duties, and moral principles are precisely the elements of Kant's moral theory that *cannot* be habituated. Habits, as conventions, are elements that may form the Rules of Moral Salience within which we operate. But these are contextual elements and are not coeval with the moral law, or our duties and virtues. *The fundamental flaw in attempts to render Kant's moral theory into a moral psychology for the purposes of moral education is to mistake the moral law, duties, and virtues as elements that can be habituated, applied, and developed*. This is to mistake them for the contextual elements that *are* habituated and applied, but nevertheless, *do not* count as specifically moral.

III. CONCLUSION

It is unfortunate that educators have confused Kant's moral theory with moral psychology and judged the feasibility of his project on the basis of this confusion. Kant does not have a moral psychology at the heart of his program; a program that is fully transcendental. The closest approximation to a moral psychology Kant has is an empirical theory of principles that operate at the periphery of Kant's moral theory, yet are vital as context in the form of "Rules of Moral Salience" that guide the formation of moral judgments. Other chapters in this volume will no doubt discuss the particulars of moral pedagogy—the method or training of the moral being that takes these empirical principles into account. However much empirical psychology we wish to claim is understood in this training, the fact remains that Kant's moral theory is at its core, a transcendental project involving proof of the moral law, obedience of the commands of Practical Reason (Duties), the respect for the moral law (conscience), and strength of resolve needed to carry out of one's duties in all (including adverse) circumstances (virtue).

NOTES

1. For more on this reading of Kant, see Wood (1999). Wood charges critics with avoiding or ignoring Kant's empirical claims regarding human nature. He includes moral psychology, history, and culture as ingredients in Kant's "theory" of human nature. Louden also concurs (2000, especially Chapters 1 and 2).
2. Hare is not a Kantian; he is a "rule utilitarian," who advocates a distinct understanding of universalist ethics, which he calls "Universal Prescriptivism."
3. See for example, Wood (1999: 337ff.). For Wood, there is no "CI procedure" that we then use to adjudicate moral maxims. Wood has Rawls and O'Neill in mind, here. To be fair to both, this view was in place long before 1975—the year O'Neill wrote *Acting on Principle*; however, it was O'Neill who cogently articulated it.
4. It shares affinities with Rawls's own view of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which in this iteration, is a procedure in which we bring our moral maxim to the test of the moral law (Rawls 2000: 143–151).
5. Though Kohlberg did not think Kant was a moral psychologist, readers (very often critical of Kohlberg), have transferred Kohlberg's claims back onto Kant, rendering Kant a half-hearted moral psychologist with a devilish formalism and rigorism at base of his theory (e.g., Carr 1983 and 2007).
6. Kohlberg has had a vast influence on moral psychologists, educators, and philosophers, including Kurt Baier, John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Ernst Tugendhat. Kohlberg's research on the post-conventional stages of moral development influenced the analytic-inspired philosophy of education in the 1970s and 1980s, including that of R. S. Peters and R. F. Dearden.
7. I say Piaget is loosely Kantian because he does not use Kant to ground his own work in principles. Kohlberg does this. Furthermore, Piaget dismisses Kant's understanding of respect as the visualization of the embodiment of the moral law in the parental figure. Piaget locates the development of mutual

respect in the "conventional" stage of moral development—roughly at the age of seven to eight. This arises as a result of the progression of forms of play.

8. Kohlberg is right about "external rules not taken inward," for Kant.
9. Kohlberg posits a 'soft' seventh stage, which, while not corresponding to a separate stage per se, is an outgrowth of stage 6. Kohlberg claims this stage is "hypothetical" and is based in part "on an orientation based on ethical and religious thinking involving a cosmic or religious perspective on life" (1984b: 213).
10. Deontology is a term coined by F. H. Muirhead in the 1920s, denoting rule-bound or principle-based ethics. For Kohlberg, Kant's ethics are the aboriginal manifestation of this categorization. Some working in the school of Kantian moral thought are now considered deontologists (see, for example, Nagel 1986 and 1991). Barbara Herman has challenged this ascription to Kant (1993). As she sees it, Kant was *not* a deontologist; this was a misleading ascription applied to Kant in the early twentieth century by J. H. Muirhead that forced Kant into a Procrustean bed of formalism. Indeed, the rise of the formalist reading of Kant has a long pedigree, and Hegel, in particular, is likely responsible for generating this ascription. For more on the history of the misunderstanding of Kant's notion of autonomy, see Ameriks 2000)
11. No doubt, the allusion is to Kant's inconceivably harsh requirements for moral maxim-following, and the possibility of a good will, thereby.
12. Needless to say, neither "welfare" nor "justice" was Kant's duties, which consisted in duties to oneself and others, as laid out in the Doctrine of Virtue.
13. Rawls, who is otherwise opposed to Hare's formalism, also considers Kant's Categorical Imperative as procedural (2000: 143).
14. It should go without saying that Kohlberg (and Hare) completely misunderstand the Formula of Universal Law (FUL); it is the will that must be universal, not the command of reason (FUL). Imperatives are commands; we do not command a command to be universal; we command our wills.
15. Kohlberg is referring to Kant's essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy," published in response to an earlier rebuke from the French essayist Benjamin Constant. Kant (infamously) claims a murderer must be told the truth if he asks whether his intended victim is in one's house (*ORLP* 8: 425–430).
16. Of course, this critique of the CI procedure extends to O'Neill (1975) and Rawls (1999). However, I don't have the space to detail the various arguments against these thinkers; I concentrate solely on Kohlberg, here.
17. Though Kohlberg does find the preponderance of Stage 5 and 6 individuals to be in Western, liberal-democratic nations.
18. See also Rawls 1971 and Habermas 1990 and 1993. To be fair to Kohlberg (and Rawls and Habermas), the metaphysical understanding of the Categorical Imperative is downplayed in favor of the "constructivist" or developmental aspects of respect. Speaking of himself, Rawls, and Habermas, Kohlberg says, "All of these theories rely on Kant's original intuitions of the formal principle of unversalizability and the substantive principle of respect for persons as central features of morality. None, however, rests on Kant's metaphysical assumptions about noumenal moral selves but assumes that moral principles (are) but constructions arising through human interaction and communication" (1985: 542).
19. Or at least attempt to do so; I doubt very much whether any of these attempts could be successful for the reasons discussed above (see Hare 1952 and 1997).
20. Also, see MM: 6:464 where consciousness of our duty is called "respect for the moral law," and "moral feeling."

21. Herman is not saying this "moral core" is coeval with the moral law, or the Categorical Imperative, or practical reason. This "core" is rather a set of closely associated empirical principles that in some ways correspond to (though they do not replace) moral principles. They help guide us in seeing moral and non-moral situations.
22. The reading of the *Groundwork* as a moral manual has given many critics pause. Kant scholars often are required to fight a rearguard action on this point before they can regroup to demonstrate the positive characteristics of Kant's moral theory.

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15 Kant on the Humanities

Susan Meld Shell

The Appendix to Part One of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* includes a brief reference to the humanities (*humaniora*) understood as a certain sort of "cultivation of the forces of the mind" [*Kultur der Gemüthskräfte*]. That reference is sufficiently puzzling to warrant quoting it and the surrounding passages in full:

> The propaedeutic to all fine art, insofar as concerns the highest grade of its perfection, seems to lie not in prescriptions but in the cultivation of the forces of the mind through that prior knowledge which is called the humanities [*humaniora*]: presumably because **humanity** [*Humanität*] signifies, on the one hand, the universal **feeling of participation** [*Theilnehmungsgefühl*], and on the other hand, the capacity **to communicate** [*mittheilen*] both intimately and universally, properties which, bound together, constitute the sociability adequate to mankind [*Menschheit*], by which the latter distinguishes itself from animal limitedness. The age and peoples whose strong drive toward **lawful** sociability through which a people constitutes an enduring commonwealth, wrestled with the great difficulties that surround the difficult task of uniting freedom (and hence also equality) with a compulsion (more respect and submission from duty than from fear): such a people had first to discover the art of reciprocal communication between the most educated [*ausgebildetesten*] part [*Theil*] with the crudest, discover, that is to say, the attuning [*Abstimmung*] of the enlargement and refinement of the former with the simplicity and originality of the latter, and in this way that mean, between the highest culture and a sufficient [*genugsam*] nature, that also constitutes the right standard, given by no universal rule, for taste as universal human sense. (CPJ: 5:355–356)

As Kant then adds:

> A later age will with difficulty make these models dispensable [*Schwerlich wird ein Späteres Zeitalter jene Muster entbehrlich machen*]: because it will be ever further from nature so that finally, without

> having any lingering examples of it, they will be in a position in which they can hardly conceive [*einen Begriffe . . . machen*] of the happy/fortunate union in one and the same people of the lawful compulsion of the highest culture with the force and correctness of a free nature that *feels its own value*. (CPJ: 5:356, emphasis added)

Without the models furnished by the *humaniora*, later ages will hardly be able even to conceive [*eine Begriffe . . . machen*] of the politically embodied union of free nature and lawful culture: echoing Rousseau, Kant laments the disappearance of "peoples" in the original sense before the onslaught of progress in the arts and sciences,[1] while proffering ancient models (as conveyed by the *studia humaniora*) as a remediating link with what has been left behind. And yet Kant does not leave matters here. As he goes on to insist:

> Taste, however, is fundamentally a capacity for judging the sensualization [*Versinnlichung*] of ethical ideas (by means of a certain analogy of reflection over both), from which, along with the greater receptivity to the feeling (that is called moral) that is grounded in the latter, is derived that pleasure which taste declares to be valid for mankind in general, not merely for the private feeling of each: [this being so] it is clear that the true propaedeutic to the grounding of taste is the development of ethical ideas and the culture of moral feeling; for only when sensibility is brought into accord with this can genuine taste assume a determinate, unalterable form. (CPJ: 5:356)

The *true* propaedeutic of taste is the cultivation of *morality* (so little, in the last analysis, can the latter be grounded in the former). The beautiful may "symbolize" the morally good; appreciation of the beautiful, however, cannot in itself make men moral. What, then, is the task of the "humanities" and why will later ages find it "difficult" [*schwerlich*] to dispense with them? What vital task, in Kant's view, will the humanities continue to perform, despite the inability of the aesthetic as such to improve men ethically?

The answer, as I hope to show below, not only helps illuminate Kant's understanding of the task of higher education generally; it also may provide a clue to the predicament the humanities now face in a university increasingly devoted to the ideals of "science" and the aims and methods of "big business."

I. A (VERY) BRIEF HISTORY OF THE "HUMANITIES"

The Latin term *humaniora* is the nominative plural form of *humanor*, which literally means "more human or humane." The *studia humaniora* are thus, in the first instance, studies that are (or are concerned with that which is) more human or humane. The word's etymology, including its specific emergence

as a term of art for humanistic studies, is, in fact, contested, along with that of "humanism," to which it is etymologically related.[2] Werner Jaeger's definition of *humaniora* draws heavily on Cicero's use of *humanitas* as a rough translation of the Greek *paidaea* (which literally means education of the young, but which had by late antiquity, acquired the secondary meaning of the learning and accomplishments of a civilization, as in "Greek paidaea") (Jaeger 1929: 178). According to Jacob Burckhardt's account, "humanism," for its part, emerged in the Italian Renaissance as an effort to revive the arts of classical (and especially Roman) learning. Heidegger's influential *Letter on Humanism* appeared just after the Second World War. Classic German thought, in Heidegger's view, seeks both to restore and to improve upon Greek and Italian humanistic models, while falling short of the "originary" power of their contemporary Hölderlin, whose poetry, in Heidegger's view, interrogates the meaning of the "human" more profoundly (Heidegger *Gesamtausgabe* I, Vol. 9: 313–364).

In thus calling "humanism" into question, Heidegger implicitly drew upon Burckhardt's and Jaeger's claims, as Hendrik Birus has more recently shown. In fact, however, the term "humanism," is a relatively recent one, first popularized, as appears, in the early nineteenth century by Friedrich Immanuel Neithammer (1766–1848), a German educational reformer who was also a close associate of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in a work entitled *The Dispute between Philanthropinism and Humanism in the Educational Theory of our Time* (1708).[3] Neithammer seems to have drawn the term "humanism" from the scholastic and still current terms "humanist" and "*humaniora*, which were themselves taken, as was generally acknowledged, from Cicero and related classical sources. Neithammer's influential formulation, on Birus's account, was an attempt to combine the best of "Philanthropinism"—a late-eighteenth-century educational movement largely inspired by Rousseau—with a classicizing return to Greece and Rome that Birus associates especially with German Romanticism.

In fact—though Birus doesn't stress this—both the "naturalism" of the Philanthropinists and the "classicism" of the German Romantics were deeply marked by different, and at times conflicting, strains of Rousseauian thought. Neithammer's "humanism" was the intellectual stepchild (or so I would claim) of a Kantian intellectual revolution conducted two decades earlier. Kant's understanding of education generally, and higher education in particular, not only absorbs both Rousseauist "naturalism" and Rousseauist "republicanism" into a single whole; it also does so in an institutional setting in which an older struggle between "ancients and moderns" had yet to be fully resolved. The Prussian university establishment of Kant's time was at once an organ of the Frederickean and post-Frederickian state, and an arena of intellectual and political conflict between modern science (in both rationalist and empiricist forms) and scholasticized and otherwise religious appropriations of classical learning.[4] Indeed, Kant's early writings evinced all three tendencies when, at around the age of forty, "Rousseau

turned [him] around," and thereby set in motion a moral and intellectual "revolution" the force of whose impact, not least on higher education, has perhaps not yet been fully spent.

That the term "humanist" had *already* taken a Rousseauist turn when Niethammer published his essay on "humanism" is strongly suggested by perusal of the original *Oxford English Dictionary*, which lists as one meaning of the term *humanist*: "a class of thinkers originating in Germany toward the end of the 18th century, originating chiefly through the diffusion of the writings of Rousseau."[5] Indeed, Niethammer himself links his *own* notion of "humanism" with a concept of the "humanities" that draws less on scholastic appropriations of Cicero (i.e., the *studia humaniora* as they had conventionally come to be known in German universities in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries) than on an understanding of "humanity" (and "the humanities") that had already undergone serious transformation under the influence of Kant, Herder, and others for whom Rousseau was a central formative influence.[6]

Kant's own rethinking of the theoretical and practical task of "the humanities" not only significantly pre-dates Niethammer; it also also presages, as Kant's own play on the term *humaniora* and "human" in the above-quoted passage shows, our present employment of the term "humanities" to designate a distinct sphere of knowledge that rounds out or completes the spheres that are occupied, in today's universities, by the "natural" and "social" sciences, respectively. The study of the humanities for Kant involves classical learning to be sure, but it also involves a kind of cultivation of the "forces of the mind" that allows men to be "more human," as the original Latin has it, i.e., to fulfill their destiny as human beings,[7] albeit in a way, drawn partly from the teachings of Rousseau, that also seems (as we shall see) peculiarly "modern." Kant's Rousseau-marked institutional reprisal of the *studia humaniora* left a shadow from which the contemporary university has yet to fully emerge.

II. THE HUMANIORA IN KANT'S LECTURES ON LOGIC OF THE 1780S AND 1790S

Kant's lectures on logic, which were delivered over a period of some forty years (beginning in 1756), were typically attended by a large audience of students, including some as young as fourteen and fifteen (the normal age of metriculation at the University of Königsberg). As required by statute, Kant used a published text: George Friedrich Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunflehre* (1752), although by the 1790s students seem not to have felt it necessary to have a copy.[8]

A comparison of Kant's treatment of the *humaniora* in the various *Lectures on Logic* that he delivered in the 1780s and the 1790s sheds additional light on Kant's pivotal claim, in the *Critique of Judgment*, as to the importance of the humanities as a present and future field of study.

a. Lectures of the early 1780s

The logic *Lectures* of the 1780s that are currently available are all roughly contemporaneous with the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). In the *Vienna Logic* (dated around 1780) Kant links the "humanist" (i.e., one who studies the *humaniora*), the "linguist," and the "philologist."[9] Both the humanist and the linguist, according to Kant, engage in what he (along with Meier) calls "philology," itself a branch of "polyhistory": or "learnedness that extends without determinate limits." Philology involves both the study of ancient languages (the province of the "linguist"), and the use of them as "models of taste" (the province of the "humanist"). The humanist is thus a linguist, or learned expert on ancient languages, who is also learned in aesthetics. He differs in this from the "belle lettrist," who attempts to elicit models of taste from works composed in living languages. Although the belle lettrist might seem to deserve the title of "humanist" for he too is concerned with "taste," he lacks the humanist's access to unchanging models to which dead languages alone give access. Only the genuinely humanistic study of taste—i.e., one that is also learned in ancient models—can, it seems, yield the universal standard necessary to the bi-optic union of aesthetic learning and philosophy.[10] Without this union, all learnedness is incomplete, i.e., lacking in a necessary "second eye" that "sees how all its cognitions are related to a common end" (*Vienna Logic*: 24:881). Both philosophy and "learnedness" require each other, if human learning is to be "complete." And genuine humanism (as distinguished from belle lettrism on the one hand, and "mere learnedness" on the other) is the mediating link between philosophy and a learnedness that is merely "historical."

At the same time, the humanist in the best (or non-cycloptic) sense must himself be "guided by" philosophy. Humanism is the condition, as it were, of that union of philosophy and history absent which human learning remains unfocused and without determinate horizon. As Kant goes on to observe in illustration of such bi-optic (or "paralactic") guidance:

> The character of humanity consists in sociability. The *humaniora* are liberal arts [*freye Künste*]. Liberal arts are merely play; a bread-winning art [*Brotkunst*] is work. What belongs to fine art, however, is not yet wholly liberal, for the painter, etc., is still mechanical. The poetic art and oratory are more liberal. A humanist is one who treats beautiful things and cultivates his spirit in the study of the ancients, in order to drive out its wildness. There arises thereby that urbanity that we are aware of in the ancients, and historical cognition is of importance in this respect, that it drives out rusticity. (*Vienna Logic*: 24:818–819)

In these lecture notes from around 1780 one senses an anticipation of the *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784). As in the latter, published, work, everything hinges, where philosophically guided history is concerned, on bringing a common human horizon into focus through

due attention to man's "true ends" (*Vienna Logic*: 24:818; cf. 8:25). And here, as in the later published essay, cultivation of the human spirit involves a civilizing dampening of human "wildness" through the ambiguous advance of human sociability (*Vienna Logic*: 24:819; cf. 8:20). As Kant famously puts it in the later essay, "man has an inclination to become social: because he feels himself in such a condition to be more [than] human, i.e., [more than] the development of his natural capacities" (Idea: 8:20, my translation). While recalling Cicero's use of *humanitas* to describe a civilized condition absent which no man is fully human, Kant's essay adds a further paradoxical suggestion: the human being who is all that nature "intends" (i.e., all that he can be) is both more, and more than, human.[11] Nature's parsimonious design was that in everything that exceeds "the mechanical ordering of his animal existence" man "should bring forth everything from himself" rather than procure these things ready-made (Idea: 8:19). Nature wishes, it would seem, for us to free ourselves from the "limits" of our own animal nature.

At the same time, the *Vienna Logic* gives no sign of certain claims first publicly advanced in the *Critique of Judgment* (1789), and specifically associated with Kant's discovery of "a priori" principles of reflective judgment (sometime near the end of the 1780s). As with the famous formula of "a-social sociability" that informs the *Idea for a Universal History*, the laws of nature and those of freedom continue to coexist in an unresolved tension of "either/or." Kant, it seems, is still willing only to "suggest" what a "philosophic head" that is also "well versed in history" might achieve from "another [genuinely bi-optic] point of view" (Idea: 8:30). He has not yet arrived at the philosophical/historical position staked out in the *Critique of Judgment* and later works in which nature and freedom find a "reflective" common ground that falls short of constitutive "objectivity" without ceasing to be genuinely universal with respect to the "subjectively human." These earlier lectures cannot presuppose the "critical deduction" of a priori judgments of taste, which he will later describe as involving the free yet necessary *harmony* of understanding and sensibility (CPJ: 5:287–291). The "play" of taste and the "business" of critique (*Vienna Logic*: 24:818, 812) are not joined in a "reflective" standpoint that brings "the unity of the supersensible" within the human horizon (CPJ: 5:176). Logical thoroughness and popular grace still remain separate and discrete perfections, in the *Vienna Logic*, perfections that instruction in "history, geography," "anthropology," and a "reading of the ancients" (i.e., the *humaniora*) are said to "unite" without the nature of this union being specified any more precisely (*Vienna Logic*: 24:811; cf. Idea: 8:30).

The *Hechsel Logic* (which bears the written date of 1782) dwells especially on the need for some [not yet apparent] universal "method" if systematic popular instruction in the sciences is to be (fully) achieved. It thereby implicitly addresses the issue of the unity of human knowledge that the extant manuscript of the *Vienna Logic* leaves hanging. As Kant puts matters:

> *Method* is the unity of a whole of cognition according to principles. A unity of cognition can be empirical, which experience teaches, insofar as it is in accord with purpose, i.e., is a unity in accord with rules that can be drawn from experience. But there is also a unity in accordance with universal experience, where we can produce a thoroughgoing connection, and can produce a system, in that we discover the nature of the whole through the connection of the manifold. Insofar as the unity of cognition rests on empirical rules, it is called manner [,] in Latin *modus*. But the unity of the manifold insofar as it rests on principles of reason is called method [or way of teaching (*methodus*; *Lehrart*)]. There must be a certain connection of cognitions in that they constitute a whole [;] there must be a rule of unity. If mere modernity is the rule of unit, then it is called *fashion*, where the rule is accepted by the multitude. Horace says, You should be *suaviter in modo*, i.e., pleasant in manner, *sed fortiter in re*, i.e., thorough in method. The first is aesthetic perfection, the second logical. Both perfections basically a concern with manner. (*Heschel Logic*: 114, CUP: 415–416)[12]

The way of modernity is the way of fashion, or a rule of unity that is merely "empirical," and/or "purposive," without grounding in a rational principle, i.e., in a "method" as distinguished from a "mode." As Horace says, one should be pleasant in manner, but thorough in method, (translating Horace's *res*, as Kant here does, with the German "method"). Instruction by experience can be *gründlich* or thorough, but only instruction through principles can be genuinely "methodical." And yet, as Kant (or his transcriber) immediately grants, "methodically observed is something different from methodically expounded." Learning from experience is not the same as teaching, although each may have its method:

> One can distinguish method or the mode of cognition from exposition or style. The mode of cognition is that mode of connection of cognition whose unity constitutes the cognition itself. How is the nature of the manifold in a cognition to be made more comprehensible and broken into sections [;] these two expressions are often confused. One needs method for thought, style for exposition. It is not a matter of indifference how one expounds, but the most important thing is how one is to think. The method of thought has to be grounded on certain cognitions that are suited to the cognition of unity. (*Heschel Logic*: 114, CUP: 416)

The "mode of cognition" is one in which the unity of how something is known is precisely what is grasped in the knowing. In the case of such truly *gründlich* knowledge, the "what" and the "how" are one and the same. In making such knowledge available to students not yet in a position to grasp this articulated unity "systematical[ly]", however, "exposition" is required to make the "nature of the manifold more comprehensible" by "break[ing

it] down into sections" (*Heschel Logic*: 114, CUP: 416). Hence the confusion between the "mode of cognition" in the former sense and what might be called the mode of instruction—a problem that must have preoccupied Kant in writing his *Critique*, and that would soon lead him to publish the *Prolegomena* in which the (synthetic) order of knowledge and the (analytic) order of instruction are reversed for purposes of "discovery" and for the explicit use of "future teachers" rather than "mere learners [*Lehrlinge*]" (P: 4:256–257).[13] The difficulty at hand is manifested by the breach that separates the mode of knowledge, where the "logic" that is "propaedeutic" to the sciences is concerned, from the mode of its (and their) discovery. In the former, architectonic case, the "what" (here designated by the term "locus") also indicates the "where" [*Ort*] and hence "how" it is related to cognition as a unified whole:

> A *locus* is nothing other than a universal kind of cognition under which a given cognition can be brought. [For example] I am acquainted with movement as something belonging to natural science, also insofar as it belongs to metaphysics in its effects, and this is then the metaphysical place [*metaphysische Ort*] of motion <the editor gives "metaphysische Art" as a possible alternate reading>. . . . Every universal cognition has places, for a particular cognition and every system has determinate places for the parts of the system. (*Heschel Logic*: 113, CUP: 414)

In the latter case, which involves the relation of the object to both a "subject" and "a final purpose," the "method" is more elusive:

> Logic has neither to do with the observation of things and objects, from which no rules for method can be gained, nor with the observation of the end of cognition. . . . It ignores the subject . . . and the final end. . . . [I]t asks only if cognition is in conformity with the condition of the understanding, and what are the rules in conformity with which one can determine the conformity; hence the doctrine of/teaching concerning method [*Methodenlehre*] is what belongs in logic. This [teaching] should be the last thing in any science, for much is required to show the way one is to proceed in a science, and any sciences are so tangled together that one simply does not know how to distinguish them. (*Heschel Logic*: 114, CUP: 416)

The partially historical character of science, progress in which requires "observation," makes the unity of the whole inherently elusive. Method can only come "at the end," method whose attainment may involve many false steps. Where science is concerned, the order of knowledge is almost necessarily at odds with the order of discovery. Hence the peculiar importance of the relation between the method and the mode of exposition, for scientist as well as student:

> Method can be critical, scholastic, also popular. In scholastic [the authors cite "Socratic" as alternative reading] method the exposition is composed methodically, i.e., where the parts of the method and the meticulousness of the observation shine forth. This method reigns in all the sciences. Popular method does not have the purpose of furthering science but instead of furthering interest, without aiming at knowledge. It is distinct from scholastic method then. . . . Exposition can be popular but not the method. (*Heschel Logic*: 115, CUP: 417)

Solution to the problem of education thus hinges on discovery of a proper method of exposition—a method, that is to say, that is not itself popular in the negative sense of being guided by "interest" rather than "aiming at knowledge." Such a genuinely methodical popularity would succeed where many, including Descartes himself, have failed, to the benefit of science and popularity alike:

> There has never been a lack of those who have thought about making method popular. A treatise on method would put a crowning touch on the world. Cartesius sketched such a treatise, which is affected, however. To discover this will be most difficult, but then it will order all our cognitions and lead us to discoveries. (*Heschel* Logic: 115, CUP: 418)

A *true* treatise on method is, it seems, the ultimate desideratum. As Kant here puts it, science, to become popular, would have to be "surrounded by a wall" so that it might accommodate "universal taste." Such a wall would partly hide science's scholastic form, which "does not really conform to present taste" (*Heschel Logic*: 115, CUP: 418). The best method, from the standpoint of (current) "exposition" and "popularity," is "analytic" rather than "synthetic," although the latter is "the most perfect." In the case of analysis, one begins with common concepts, from which one draws a general principium, ascending from lower cognitions to the high. And yet "the true method of exposition" remains "synthetic," for it is only thus that one arrives at systematic knowledge, absent which "I cannot know whether I have a complete whole" (*Heschel Logic*: 116, CUP: 419).

In the end, then, the problem of how to combine science with popularity (for which a "treatise on method" would be required) remains unresolved, for reasons internal to science itself. That treatise "would put the crowning touch on the world" but would also be "most difficult" (*Heschel Logic*: 115, CUP: 418). True popularity cannot avoid either systemicity of comprehension or a concern with ends that logic per se does not engage. Such a popular method would be "natural" (as distinguished from "affected") in the precise sense of being "in conformity with ends." Both "Socratic" and "catechistic" dialogue can be "natural" in this sense, but only the former, in which the questioner pretends to learn along with his pupil, permits the pupil to arrive at knowledge of the order of his

own reason (*Heschel Logic*: 116–117, CUP: 420–421). Only Socratic education is "philosophic" in the sense delineated in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A836–840/B864–868). Here the listener "figures out everything for himself" so that "the teacher could himself be completely ignorant" if "only he knew how to ask cleverly." Religion and morality especially should be taught by such a method, "for here the pupil commits nothing to memory, but instead learns the order of his own reason." In the case of "our catechism," by way of contrast, the pupil "think[s] out nothing," and things remain "historical" and thus "mechanical" (*Heschel Logic*: 117, CUP: 421).

In short, the "crowning" method whose current absence Kant regrets would combine philosophy and history (including the history of philosophy itself) in a way that is guided by philosophy in a way that is genuinely binocular. The best he can here do is indicate, as it were between the lines, a certain "erotomatic" approach in which the teacher "pretends" to learn along with his pupil—an approach whose lack of full sincerity is likely to have disturbed Kant, however faithful it may have remained to Rousseau's own "Socratic" model (cf. *Emile*: 175).

Both the *Vienna Logic* and the *Hechsel Logic* deal with overlapping issues to which several published writings of the early 1780s were also devoted: in particular: analytic exposition as a step toward popularizing philosophy, and the "idea" of history "from a cosmopolitan standpoint" as a vehicle of both learned and popular enlightenment. Kant's related search for a crowning universal method was itself superseded, one suspects, by his subsequent discovery of a critically reflective standpoint (first articulated in the *Critique of Judgment*) that enabled him to articulate more precisely the relation between philosophy and history (and with it, that between knowledge and popularity) that had previously eluded him.

b. Lectures on Logic from the 1790s

Kant's Lectures on Logic dating from the 1790s show the influence of discoveries, both philosophic and historical, first publicly elaborated in the *Critique of Judgment* (1789). These changes are reflected not only in his apparent abandonment of his former search for a "crowning" method of the sciences; they are also registered in an explicit inclusion of modern authors in the *humaniora* (formerly, and conventionally, reserved to a study of the classics, an inclusion that is accompanied by a new attentiveness on Kant's part to the university as a specifically modern institution. Thanks, in part, to the university's "factory-like" [*fabrikenmäßig*] character, a claim expanded on in the *Conflict of the Faculties* (7:22ff.),[14] the general "extension" of cognition is no longer compared to gold leaf that has no depth, nor does Kant dwell (as in the *Vienna Logic*) on the distinction between "free" scientists and those who "work" as members of "learned guilds" (*Vienna Logic*: 24:819).

> *Quantity of Cognition*. Here it is not a matter of multitude but of degree. [*Non multa, sed multum*.] The external extensive quantity of cognition indicates the universal extension of it among many men—This is the situation today—*Enlightenment*—the degree of culture—which, according to the talents of the subject, makes man capable of his ends as man and as citizen. (*Vienna Logic*: 24: 713)

The modern university manages with factory-like efficiency (*Vienna Logic*: 24:713) what the ancient philosophic schools accomplished for ancient Greece and Rome but the medieval guild apparently did not. Inclusion of the humanities, in particular, as part of the modern division of labor, promises to achieve a marriage of science and popularity that the *Hechsel* lectures had sought in a single "method" not yet disclosed (*Heschel Logic*: 115, CUP 418). Where the *extension* of is concerned, as Kant now puts it, one need not worry, as did D'Alembert, that the quantity of learning will exceed our ability to deal with it.[15]

> For the burden does not press us down, but instead the volume of space for our cognitions constrains us. Critique of reason, of history and historical writings, a universal spirit that deals with human cognition wholesale [*en gros*] and not merely retail [*en detail*], will always make the extension smaller without diminishing anything in the content. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:43; also, see Ak: 16:189)

New methods will make possible a wholesale production of knowledge that makes "the multitude of books dispensable." One who brings "persisting ideas" to bear on history thus renders the service of a "genius" (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:44–45).

In sum: the mass production of knowledge, under the genius-like, yet critical, direction of historical "ideas" (now in the plural) suggests a resolution to the problem of (higher) education that Kant had earlier left unresolved. Accordingly, the goal of university studies now takes on a newly determinate meaning. As he charges his student audience with respect to the "extension" and "demarcation" of their own cognition:

> One must 1. determine his horizon *early*, but of course only when one can determinate it oneself, which uually does not occur before the 20th year. 2. not alter it lightly or often . . . 3. not measure the horizon of others by one's own, and not consider as useless what is no use to *us*. . . . 4. neither extend [one's horizon] too far nor restrict it too much . . . [for] he who believes of some things that they do not concern him often deceives himself; as when, e.g., the philosopher believes that history is dispensable for him [.]

In addition, one should also seek

> 5. to determine in advance the absolute horizon of the whole human race (as to past as well as future time). . . . 6. to determine in particular, the position that our science occupies in the whole. . . . 7. In determining his own particular horizon one should carefully consider for which part of cognition one has the greatest capability and pleasure, what is more or less necessary in regard to certain duties [or cannot coexist therewith]; and finally 8. . . . to always seek to expand one's horizon rather than narrow it. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:44; also, see *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:713)

In terms that could almost be taken from the handbook of a contemporary college counselor (find what you are good at, what you enjoy, and what is good for others, while always trying to broaden your horizon), Kant lays out the principles that will be developed, by Humboldt, Schleiermacher, and others, under the name of *Bildung* and that continue to inform present-day notions of "liberal education." Each student is charged with combining work, pleasure, and duty in a manner that each can and must determine for himself. (There is no hint here of calling or vocation [*Beruf*] in the more traditional religious sense of being "summoned" by an external authority.) At the same time, each is constantly brought back to a consideration of his place in a historically progressive whole whose rational order and limits have been sketched out in advance.

Kant's subsequent description of the *humaniora* gives special emphasis to their "civilizing" function:

> One part of philology is constituted by the *humaniora*, by which is understood acquaintance with the ancients, which furthers the *unification of science with taste*, which rubs off coarseness and furthers the communicability and urbanity in which *humanity* consists. . . . If we separate the mere philologist from the humanist, however, the two would differ in that the former seeks the tools of *learnedness* among the ancients, the latter the tools for the *cultivation of taste*. . . . As philologist, [the polyhistor] is *cultivated*, as humanist *civilized*. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:46)

The *humaniora* are particularly advantageous to the "cognition of taste" and "participation in the sensations of others"—i.e., "the ability to communicate" one's "thoughts and feelings" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:714). That ability is mainly formed through an acquaintance with ancient models because, as Kant continues to aver, only a dead language (no longer subject to the flux of fashion) is suitable to learned study. And without learnedness, as *well* as "popularity," extensive knowledge is "mere rhapsody" (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:48). But susceptibility to "learned" inquiry is not the only characteristic that lends a special status to the Greek and Roman classics (as distinguished from the works that furnish models to the mere belle lettrist):

> Humanity is always at the same time popular. Only dead languages can become models of taste . . . for [living languages] simply change too often, and words whose meaning was noble have a lower meaning. . . . If the ancients were to be lost, one has to fear the spread of barbarism. In Hindustan there is a language [Sanskrit] that was once in use there. [The language] is quite perfect but is only spoken by a few Brahmins. (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:714–715)

As a "dead" language, Sanskrit is also suitable for learned study. Only, as Kant immediately adds, *Sanskrit is today only spoken by a few Brahmins*.[16] It does not, in other words, infuse the larger society with civilizing benefits continually bestowed on modern Europe by the ancient Greek and Roman authors. It is not the sheer survival of languages in a "dead" and hence perfected form (as some philologists might believe and Kant himself had formerly implied), but the wide diffusion of such a language among a broad reading public, that accomplishes the essential task of "preventing barbarism." What counts is not lexical fixity per se, but fixity with regard to language that is at once both elevated and popular—i.e., a product of republican communities that were also, and not only incidentally, societies proficient in the art of "reciprocal communication" between the most educated and the crudest.[17] To be sure, the philosopher Pythagoras had earlier established "through the law of silence" an elite "federation of philosophers" who abjured direct communication with the people. That secret society was devoted, as it seems, "to *purifying* religion of the delusions of the people, moderating tyranny, and introducing into states greater lawfulness." Owing to "tyrants' fear," however, this federation of philosophers was subsequently destroyed (prior to the "practical" Socratic turn that initiated "the most important epoch in Greek philosophy") (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:29). In short: the defeat of philosophic goals that expressed, and continues to express, the universal "interests of humanity" was linked, as Kant here suggests, to a disjunction between the cognitive and the aesthetic (or between *Gründlichkeit* and popularity)[18] that the ancient *humaniora* overcame, and for which they continue to provide a remedy.

In what, precisely, does that remedy consist? Unlike "concepts," which can be communicated by "rules," the beautiful can be elucidated "only by examples," of which classic works of ancient Greece and Rome provide an especially, and perhaps uniquely valuable source, for reasons (absent from the Logic lectures of the early 1780s), and which take for granted the critical account of taste that Kant first presents in the *Critique of Judgment*. To put Kant's new argument in a nutshell: the enlivening harmony of a rule-governed understanding and a free imagination that is characteristic of taste mirrors the peculiar civic harmony that prevailed in ancient Greece and Rome. It is no wonder, then, that the accompanying civic "attunement" between "the highest culture [*Kultur*] and a sufficient [*genugsam*] nature," constitutes a "mean" that also serves as "the right standard, given

by no universal rule, for taste as universal human sense" (CPJ: 5:355–356; cf. *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:707, and CPJ: 5:355–356). Accordingly, the role of the humanities today is as much *cultural* (according to Kant's new formulation) as it is *civic*. As he now puts it (apropos the extension of knowledge): "This is the situation today—*Enlightenment*—the degree of culture—which, according to the talents of the subject, makes man capable of his ends as man and citizen" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:713). The foe to be vanquished, where humane studies is concerned, is no longer rusticity (as in the earlier lectures) but "barbarity," here associated less with "ignorance"—an ignorance also accompanying the primitive—but also, and above all, with "the corruption of taste" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:695). Taste, for its part, lies in the "freedom of imagination agreeing with the concept of the understanding" (like "two friends that cannot stand each other," but also "cannot part from each other"). Understanding "would accomplish nothing" without imagination, which ends in intuition; while understanding aids imagination by "bringing [lawful] unity into its products." As with enlivening accomplished through the feeling associated with aesthetic taste, so with the "enlivening" of the (ancient) body politic: wherever the "republican spirit" prevailed, the educated classes supply the rule; the popular classes, freely bending to that rule, contributed a genius-like originality (cf. CPJ: 5:355–356; and *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:707).

In sum: Kant finds a potential answer, in the unity of learnedness and popularity made possible by the "factory-like" efficiencies of the modern university, to the objection he had once raised against Rousseau's proposed education of both "men and citizens."[19] Kant's earlier quest for a universal method of teaching (*Lehrart, methodus*) has been superseded by the admission that where beauty is concerned there is only a "mode" of teaching, a mode that involves "critically" eliciting from the imagination of the student an ideal that is conceptually suitable without being conceptually containable. As the *Critique of Judgment* puts it:

> The division of critique into a doctrine of elements [*Elementarlehre*] and a doctrine of method [*Methodenlehre*], a division that proceeds science, does not permit itself to be applied to the critique of taste, because . . . the critique of taste is not determinable through principles. . . . For beautiful/fine art there is only a *mannier* (modus), not *Lehrart* (method). The master must show [*vormachen*] what the student should bring forth and how. And the principles under which the master ultimately brings his procedure can serve more to bring its chief moments occasionally to the student's memory than to prescribe to him. Still, in so doing one must have regard for a certain ideal that art must have before its eyes, though it never fully achieves it in the execution. Only by awakening the imagination of the student toward suitability for a given concept, through the already noted inadequacy of the expression

> for the idea, which the concept itself never achieves, because the idea is aesthetic, and through sharp criticism, can one prevent his immediately taking the examples laid before him as prototypes [*Urbilden*] and models for imitation, as if, so to speak, it were not subject to any higher norm or subject to his own judgment, thus stifling the genius and together with it also the freedom of the imagination even in its lawfulness, without which no beautiful art, or even correct judgment of taste is possible. (CPJ: 5:354–355)

In contrast to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which he had specifically invoked the *Urbild* of philosophy as the "archetype" against which to assess all efforts "to philosophize," Kant now cautions against the dangers posed by archetypes to an "originality" that is also necessary even, and perhaps especially, not only to the student of taste but also to the would-be philosopher. The process of education is less like the pursuit of an "archetype" than it is like an "awakening."

> Everything in nature, both in the lifeless and the living world, takes place *according to rules*, although we may not always be acquainted with these rules. . . . The exercise of our forces also takes place according to certain rules that we follow, *unconscious* of them at first, until we gradually arrive at cognition of them through experiments and lengthy use of our forces, indeed, until we finally become so familiar with them that it costs us much effort to think them *in abstracto*. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:11)

Both in the individual and in the species, the mind moves from sensual concreteness whose lawfulness remains unconscious, to a conscious lawfulness that is merely abstract, willfully enacted of which one is conscious, toward (finally) a concrete lawfulness that has become fully conscious of itself:

> Cognition of the universal *in abstracto* is *speculative* cognition, cognition of the universal *in concreto* is *common* cognition. Philosophical cognition is speculative cognition of reason, and thus it begins where the common use of reason starts to make attempts at cognition of the universal *in abstracto*. . . . Among all peoples . . . the *Greeks* first began to philosophize. For they first attempted to cultivate cognitions of reason, not with images as their guiding thread but *in abstracto*. . . . As in philosophy, so with *mathematics*, the Greeks were the first to cultivate this part of reason in a accordance with a speculative, scientific method, by demonstrating every theorem from elements. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:28)

The first philosophers were thus "were poets," i.e., clothers of "supersensible thoughts" in "images," poetry being "older than prose" (*Jäsche Logic*:

9:28; *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:698). Like other kinds of poetry philosophy begins with the "sensualization of ideas" (cf. CPJ: 5:536). The subsequent overrunning of Greek (and Roman) culture by barbarism was arrested only through slavish Arab imitation of Aristotle's thought by the Arabs that gave way, in turn, to European abstraction and over-subtlety, that was pushed aside by the Reformation, and a related insistence on "thinking for oneself." The subsequent "improvement" of philosophy in modern times derives partly from renewed attentiveness to the observation of nature on the one hand, and a new combination of natural science with mathematics on the other—i.e., with a return to Greek attentiveness to nature plus a novel "modern" juncture of experiential observation and mathematical abstraction that the ancient Greeks had kept apart (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:31).

But this modern improvement, as Kant hastens to insist, allows of no prediction as to the future. The natural sciences may now be "flourishing." But, as he also pointedly adds, "modern philosophers cannot now be called excellent and lasting." Henceforth "everything goes forward, as it were, in flux." Only the future can decide the outcome of the critical attempts of [his] time "with respect to philosophy and, in particular, metaphysics." Our age remains modern in the primary (and pejorative) sense of being "modish" and in flux (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:32–33). We may be methodical in our pursuit of scientific knowledge; still, the way forward for "humanity" involves a harmonization of understanding and imagination for which the *humaniora* (duly expanded to include certain "moderns") would seem to be essential. To the extent that education is guided by philosophy, it must also begin "poetically," absent which the "hard work" of "abstracting" from the unconsciously acquired "concreteness" of "common healthy understanding" will give way to "dry pedantics" (as happened in the "barbaric" Middle Ages). "Schools" are not enough. The "needs of human nature" themselves demand that one seek to unite the two perfections of cognition—logical and aesthetic (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:37–38).

The ability to unite those two perfections, i. e., to "descend [*Herablassung*] to the public's power of comprehension" without slighting "scholastic perfection," is itself (as Kant now puts it) "a great and rare perfection," among whose many merits is its ability to formulate "a proof of complete insight into a thing"—an ability lacking in examinations of cognition that remain "scholastic; " for:

> The merely scholastic examination of a cognition leaves doubt as to whether that examination is not one-sided and whether the cognition itself has a value admitted by all human beings. The school has its prejudices, just as does the common understanding. One improves the other here. It is therefore important that a cognition be examined by men whose understanding does not depend on any school. (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:48; also see *Hoffmann Logic*: 24:944)

Every faculty of philosophy—even Kant's own—runs the risk of becoming a mere school of prejudice. The history of philosophy, like human history generally, is a series of "ruins." Still, those ruins furnish an "object" on which the student, by "thinking for himself," can freely exercise his own talents (*Jäsche Logic*: 9:26). At the same time, unlike the "objects of the imagination" that occupy the poet,[20] the object here in question is both "active" and productive of "new cognition" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:710). The "true philosopher," who teaches "wisdom" through "doctrine" *and* "example," is both "artist" and "legislator" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:698); he thus embodies that effort to get "understanding and imagination to agree in reference to a common enterprise" that is "no longer play," as Kant puts it, without becoming "dry" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:710).

III. CONCLUSION

Kant's treatment of the *humaniora* captures the contemporary notion of "the humanities" at a moment of early crystallization; and it anticipates, to a remarkable degree, tensions with which its later iterations have variously struggled. "Liberal education" of the sort that we today generally have in mind involves both a humanistically informed science and a scientifically informed humanism, without our being able to secure their unity by means of a single "crowning method."

The great danger of modern times, for Kant, is that pseudo-enlightenment that combines the advance of modern science with the re-barbarization of our social life—a re-barbarization for which the *humaniora* provide an apparently crucial remedy.[21] That the rise of the "humanities" in the present-day sense coincided with the emergence of the modern (liberal) nation-state is thus, in Kantian terms, no accident. As the "humanities" have extended more and more beyond the narrow confines of "classics" to embrace new disciplines devoted to the study of national art and literatures, they have continued to pursue the elusive goal of joining rigor with popularity, and universal norms with an appreciation for the historically contingent and particular, for which Kant prepared the way. Neither philosophy nor civil community, in Kant's view, can thrive without a reconciliation of the "lawful compulsion of the highest culture" with the "force and correctness of a free nature that feels its own value." At the same time, while the aim of liberal education has always been the education of "free men," it can no longer be restricted, as Kant already knew, to those who needn't work to earn a living. Hence the value of the modern university, whose factory-like organization produces "wholesale" what earlier ages managed only piecemeal.[22] To be sure, Kant did not fully anticipate the difficulties, both theoretical and practical, that the "mass-production" of enlightenment might entail. Nor did he foresee the precise form and direction that

humane studies would take (although a late venture in support of cultivating the study of national languages and literatures suggests that several features would not have altogether surprised him.)[23] Whether more recent forays in the direction of "global education" would have pleased him is more difficult to fathom.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Rousseau *Emile*: 468–470.
2. Heidegger's postwar *Letter on Humanism*, which provocatively posed the question of the term's origin and (related) meaning(s), was proceeded by the work of Walter Ruegg (among others), who argued that the term was an invention of the nineteenth century, as Hendrik Birus notes (1994).
3. As Birus observes: "If we seriously investigate the possibility, opened up by Heidegger himself, of 'restoring a historical meaning to the word *humanism*' (*Gesamtausgabe* I, Vol. 9), we arrive at an astonishing result. A study of the word's usage through history does not lead to the Renaissance, let alone to the Romans or even earlier times. . . . Neither the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* nor Du Cange's *Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis* supply the entries *humanismus* or *humanista*. As late as the early writings of Marx, the literature of the 14th and 15th centuries was never called 'humanism'; this label only began to gain currency rapidly with Georg Voigt's *The Revival of Classical Antiquity or the First Century of Humanism* (1859). The concept 'humanism' became popular among the Young Hegelians with Arnold Ruge's discussion of the *Complete Works* of Wilhelm Heinse in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* 1840. Ruge used the term 'humanism' to designate the post-1770 enthusiasm for antiquity and the cult of genius and equated the term with 'secularism,' 'liberation' and 'enlightenment' and, a little later, even with 'democratism.' Ultimately he joined Feuerbach in celebrating 'humanism' as 'Christianity fulfilled,' as 'the non-transcendental religion [*die Religion des Diesseits*], the culture of Truth and of the Idea.' Here we recall Hegel, who, though he does not use the word 'humanism,' does present Goethean *Humanus* (from the fragmentary epic *Die Geheimnisse*, v. 245f.) as the 'new saint' of post- romantic art. He embodies the depths and heights of the human heart as such, mankind in its joys and sorrows, its strivings, deeds, and fates [. . .] [It is] the human spirit [. . .] self-determining and considering, meditating, and expressing the infinity of its feelings and situations: nothing that can be living in the human breast is alien to that spirit any more" (1994: 10–12).
4. The more recent influence of authors such as Winckelmann upon an appreciation for the classics must here be passed over for reasons of space. Winckelmann is certainly a figure with whom Kant was familiar.
5. As the *OED* goes on to say (quoting *The Faiths of the World*, by J. Gardner [1858]), "the system of these thinkers, a system "usually called *humanism*, sought to level all family distinctions, all differences of rank, all nationality, all positive obligation, all positive religion, and to try to train mankind to men as the highest . . . accomplishment." Evidently, "humanism" was associated, at least in the mind of one prominent English Victorian, with a Rousseau-inspired German movement that existed prior to the appearance of Niethammer's influential essay.
6. On Niethammer's relation to Kant's thought in particular, see Ameriks 2000: 64–66; and Frank 1995: 69–71.

7. Compare Cicero 1996 (as cited by Birus [20]): "though others may be called men, only those are men who are perfected in the arts appropriate to humanity."
8. See Translator's Introduction, in Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, tr. and ed. J. Michael Young 1992: xxiii. The translations of Kant's lectures on logic that follow are taken from this edition unless otherwise noted. The Translator's Introduction also contains a very useful account of the many textual difficulties attending the extant manuscripts of Kant's lectures on logic. For this reason, they must be treated with a good deal of interpretive modesty. Still, as I hope to show, the extant texts reveal patterns sufficiently consistent to permit some general conclusions about Kant's emerging understanding of the humanities during the crucial final decades of his long career as a philosopher and professor at the University of Königsberg, his own alma mater. All references to Kant's work cite the standard Akademie Edition (referenced in the Bibliography below).
9. As Birus notes, drawing on Renaissance scholar Paul Oskar Kristeller, "the origin of the designations *humanist* and *humanistic* lay in the context of these *studia humanitatis*, which had developed since the end of the 14th century into a canon of scholarly disciplines: grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry and moral philosophy; and the study of each of these subjects also encompassed the reading and interpretation of standard ancient writers in Latin and, to a lesser extent, in Greek." (See also Kristeller "The Humanist Movement," in: Kristeller 1961: 9f. Birus directs very helpful attention to the absence of this "scholastic" link in Heidegger's speculations on the origin of the term "humanist": Birus overlooks, however, the significance of Kant's critical reworking of the term's conventional "scholastic" meaning.
10. Although Kant draws on Meier's terminology in pressing for a unified "horizon" of knowledge, he adds his own "bi-optic" twist in insisting on the guidance of a second, "philosophic" eye.
11. Lewis White Beck translates *mehr als Mensch* [5: 20] as "more than human" rather than as "more a human being." Cf. Kant, *On History* 1963; and "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim," tr. Allen W. Wood, in *Anthropology, History, and Education* 2007: 111.
12. All textual references to the *Hechsel Logic* also cite the corresponding pages of Young's translation, from which the English version is drawn. The original version of the text, edited by Tillmann Pinder, on which Young relies, has subsequently been published under the title: *Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II* (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik), vols. 8 and 9 of the series Kant-Forschungen, 1998.
13. As the Forward to the *Prolegomena* makes clear, even future teachers should not expect the work to serve them in the exposition of a science that is "present to hand," but only to aid "discovery" of the science "for the first time." As for those "learned men [*Gelehrte*]" for whom the "history of philosophy" and "philosophy" are identical—the *Prolegomena* "are not intended for them" at all (4:255, my translation).
14. On Kant's increased reliance on the institution of the university, in the aftermath of the French Revolution, as a vehicle of intellectual and political progress, see Shell 2009.
15. See Denis Diderot, *Encyclopédie*, vol 5, 1755: 635–648a, as cited by *The Encyclopedia of Diderot & D'Alembert: Collaborative Translation Project*, at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=did;cc=did;q1=extension;rgn=main;view=text;idno=did2222.0000.004.

16. Kant's listing of Sanskrit among languages suitable for learned study may reflect the influence of Sir William Jones's celebrated paper, first published in 1786, arguing for the perfection of Sanskrit as a fully developed archaic language and its link to ancient Greek and Latin. Still, as Kant continues to insist, inquiry guided by abstract rules and concepts began in Greece: "among all peoples Greeks . . . first began to philosophize. For they first began to cultivate cognitions of reason, not with images as the guiding thread but *in abstracto*. By way of contrast, 'even today' the Chinese and 'some Indians,' who deal with things derived from reason' (such as God and the immortality of the soul) make no distinction between a concrete and an abstract use of concepts" (Jäsche Logic: 9:27).
17. Cf. *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24: 714–715, 739; and *Blomberg Logic*: 24:183, 186. While both texts stress the salutary effects of ancient republican freedom, only beginning with the *Critique of Judgment* does Kant draw special attention to the *reciprocal* communication thereby encouraged between the popular classes and the most refined, a reciprocal communication that resembles the inner harmony (between imagination and understanding—the two "active" faculties of the mind) of which judgments of taste are the subjective register.
18. See also *Busolt Logic*: 24: 620. (To my knowledge, this work has not been translated.)
19. Cf. Kant, *Bemerkungen*: "It is unnatural that a man spends most of his life teaching a child how he should himself live one day. That is why courtly private tutors such as *Jean Jacques* are artificial. In a state of simplicity, a child receives only a few services; as soon as he has some strength, he does the small, useful activities of an adult, such as occurs with the peasant or the artisan, and gradually he learns how to do the rest. It is nevertheless fitting that a man spends his life teaching so many children how to live that the sacrifice of his own life is not regretted. Schools are thus necessary. But for schools to be possible, one must extend/propagate [*ziehen*] *Emile*. Would that Rousseau had shown how [such] schools could here come about" [20: 24]. Education is an exercise in *propaganda* in the highest sense. For a fuller consideration of this passage, see Shell 2009.
20. See also *Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:705–706: "Imagination and understanding are the only two active faculties of cognition of the human mind. But the senses are wholly passive, they necessarily require an object [;] imagination provides objects for itself."
21. On the modern threat of re-barbarization, or a return to "force [*Gewalt*] without freedom and law" a return that Kant particularly associates with "the corruption of taste" (*Dohna-Wundlacken Logic*: 24:695), see *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7:326, 331). On contemporary European rulers as "enlightened" barbarians, see *Toward Perpetual Peace* (8: 354–355).
22. It is noteworthy in this regard that Kant's first offer of regular university employment was as professor in "poetry and rhetoric."
23. Kant, *Nachschrift eines Freundes* (8: 445); for a fuller consideration, see Shell 2010.

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16 Freedom and Autonomy in Knowledge-Based Societies

Klas Roth

Contemporary policy texts in the European Union (EU) declare the aim of education, and what people should do. These texts state that education should be used for the present and that people should make themselves efficacious, that is, usable for the knowledge-based society, through education, but not necessarily autonomous. Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, believed that individuals "should be educated not only with regard to the present but rather for a better condition of the human species that might be possible in the future; that is, in a manner appropriate to the idea of humanity and its complete vocation" (LP: 9:447), and I think that this requires that they make themselves both efficacious and autonomous. The project of this chapter is to discuss some ideas on how to reconcile the goal in the policy texts—that people should make themselves efficacious—with the notion of freedom and autonomy in the practical philosophy of Kant. More specifically, I will argue that people should not merely make themselves efficacious, but also autonomous through education.

In the first section I give a brief account of the stated goals of education as presented in the policy texts of the European Union and show why the implementation of these policies is problematic. In the second section I argue that since we have to act under the idea of freedom we should optimize our possibilities to cultivate ourselves and in particular our ability to act upon the moral law. In the third I argue that we should be free to make ourselves both efficacious and autonomous, that is, act upon and be motivated by principles of practical reason.

I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WHY IT IS PROBLEMATIC

The European Commission declares the following overall aim of the European Union, that it: "become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (2002: 7). The European Commission also asserts that human beings need to develop

necessary "skills for [building] the knowledge society" (2002: 16) through education to achieve the aim outlined above. That is, policy texts in the EU demand of educational institutions that they further the beliefs and values of their presumptive citizens, and make them, inter alia, competitive and employable (see Johansson 2007 and Roth 2010a for discussions on this and similar topics).

Therefore, human beings are compelled to develop their competences to use knowledge and information to make themselves as competitive, efficient, and employable as possible (see the *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2006, in which it is recommended that future citizens in the EU develop certain key competences through education; see also Peters 2004; Olssen et al. 2004; Peters and Besley 2006; Peters 2007 for discussion on education in knowledge-based societies and similar issues).

One implication of this conclusion is that "people and their competences are seen as yet another category of goods or services and are consumed and valued only as long as they . . . are considered useful and valuable for some specific aim: serving to achieve society's aims or to gratify the desires of other consumers" (Roth 2010a: 340). On this topic, I am inclined to agree with Zygmunt Bauman. He adds:

> *Members of the society of consumers are themselves consumer commodities*, and it is the quality of being a consumer commodity that makes them bona fide members of that society. Becoming and remaining a sellable commodity is the most potent motive of consumer concerns, even if it is usually latent and seldom conscious, let alone explicitly declared . . . 'Making oneself a sellable commodity' is a ["do it yourself"] job, and individual duty. (Bauman 2007: 57)

Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere:

> [P]resumptive citizens of the European Union have to desire the declared overall aim and strategic goal of the Union, acquire "the right kinds of beliefs and values" and have them serve as reasons for their actions and as parts of what they desire so that they "*wish to do* what *is needed* to enable the system to reproduce itself." They must also develop "the right kind" of competences to achieve desired goal(s) and have the means to perform "the right kinds" of action leading to these goals. (Roth 2010a: 341)

That is, presumptive citizens are required to incorporate the desired ends in their subjective norms of action, meaning that they need to develop their competences so that they can use or produce information and knowledge as efficiently as possible on the market. The above, if correct, can be seen as an effect of an economic system, here a capitalist mode of rational decision-making, which regulates not only the production and distribution of goods

and services "but also the conditions under which citizens come to realize their own ends and under which their own personal and practical identities are constructed; since their actions are affected by the language of capitalism, it seems that they basically constitute themselves (or are constituted) as market commodities" (Roth 2010a: 342) and not as autonomous citizens reflecting their values and beliefs and action in practice.

Thus the European Union appears to create "conditions for shaping, directing and co-ordinating the desires, knowledge, values and actions of those concerned within member states so that they can aim at achieving the desired goal and strategic target for 2010 mentioned above" (Roth, 2010a: 339). This goal may imply that making people into autonomous citizens in civil society within the European Union is a subordinate end—if it is a valuable end at all.

However, if people incorporate the desired ends in their subjective norms of action of the sort "I will do x in order to achieve y," then they may make themselves efficacious, but not necessarily autonomous. That is, they may make themselves efficacious by following the norms that policy-makers suggest, but not autonomous by being the legislators of the principles underlying those actions. Moreover, human beings will not necessarily respect themselves—or others—as authors of norms of action, except perhaps the policy-makers. Furthermore, people will neither necessarily respect others as citizens, as ends in themselves with the capacity to reflect upon norms of action or the reasons why they want to make themselves efficacious in the desired way, nor call this desire into question when necessary. Thus, if individuals are encouraged only to make themselves efficacious, but not autonomous through education, then they would not necessarily optimize their freedom so that they unify themselves, that is, make themselves both efficacious and autonomous through education or elsewhere in society.

We see then the function ascribed to educational institutions is to encourage people to make themselves efficacious and valuable on the market by performing the appropriate actions. That people should aim at making themselves efficacious, but not necessarily autonomous, as is the case in the European Union, is, however, problematic. In the following sections I therefore argue that people should be free to make themselves efficacious and autonomous through education or elsewhere in society.

II. ACTING UNDER THE IDEA OF FREEDOM

> For we are dealing with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they *ought* to do may be *dictated* in advance, but of whom it may not be *predicated* what they will do. (CF: 4:83)

Since human beings act under the idea of freedom (Gr: 4:452), and are characterized by self-consciousness and the reflective structure of their minds

(Korsgaard 1996 and Roth 2010c), they cannot avoid awareness of what reasons they have for acting as they do.[1] Furthermore human beings cannot avoid reflecting upon and questioning such reasons or constructing reasons for their actions. Therefore, when policy-makers and others are confronted with an end for action, they cannot avoid the possibility that people reflect upon the desired end, the suggested means for achieving it, or the reason(s) for desiring it. Additionally, since individuals can reflect on the norms for their actions, policy-makers cannot avoid that people call into question any of the beliefs and values they are encouraged to embrace, or norms of action they are expected to act in accordance with. That is, policy-makers can dictate in advance what people *ought* to do, but they cannot predict what people actually *will* do since "we are dealing with beings that act freely." We may, for example, want to make ourselves both efficacious and autonomous, and not merely efficacious.

Moreover, since human beings act under the idea of freedom, they can aim to satisfy some external end or interest and thereby gain worth in the opinion of others, satisfy their own desires, or both. However, if we merely choose to satisfy some desired end (such as those outlined in the policy texts of the European Union), then we are merely acting upon subjective principles of action that presupposes "an *object* (matter) of the faculty of desire as the determining ground of the will" (CPr: 5:21). That is, if we choose to act only to realize goals set for us by others, then we would subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love (Rel: 6:27, 36–3, and 43).[2] When we subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love, we treat specific ends as natural reasons for our action instead of regarding them as objects for reflection and as reasons that could be questioned as *legitimate* reasons for action. Moreover, if we subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love, then we would also transform the moral law, that is, the Categorical Imperative, into a hypothetical imperative, that is, transform a more reflective mode of thought into an instrumental one—"I will do x in order to achieve y," thereby threatening "to corrupt morality at its very foundation" (Wood 2008: 117).

Furthermore, when we subordinate the moral law to the principle of self-love, we seek to gain worth in the eyes of others, that is, seek to gain status among other human beings. By acting in this manner, we fail to recognize each other as legislators of our own actions, and, instead, recognize others as subjects affected or determined by external forces or by inner sensuous impulses or desires. On this point Christine Korsgaard writes:

> If you follow the tendency of self-love unreflectively, not asking yourself why it matters that you should get what you want [or that you should gain worth in the opinion of others, *my remark*], your state tends to degenerate into the state Kant calls "self-conceit," in which you act as if it mattered that you get what you want just because you are *you*. But if you identify yourself with your humanity or power of rational choice,

> the principle of treating humanity in your own person and that of any other as an end in itself more or less directly follows. But this means that, although Kant doesn't put it this way, there is a sense in which the moral principle is not a principle which stands over and above the tendency to self-love, checking and correcting and limiting it. Instead, it is a kind of definition of it, a filling out who the *me* is that is the object of my self-love. The thought leading to the Formula of Humanity[3] identifies *me* with my *humanity*. (Korsgaard 1998: 54)

If, instead, we would want to become both efficacious *and* autonomous, then we have to struggle against this tendency to act from self-love and degenerate into a state of self-conceit. Individuals must also respect the moral law and have it motivate their actions. That is, the action must be determined by individuals themselves and not merely caused by some external force.

Furthermore, we must take up the reason for our action, by adopting a principle for it by which we take control of our beliefs and actions (Korsgaard 2008: 1–20). Therefore, when we ascribe to others or ourselves the idea that we act upon the moral law, we must ascribe freedom to others as well. Moreover, we also have to determine others and ourselves as autonomous human beings capable of legislating norms of action, not just as moral agents subject to moral demands or requirements. Korsgaard continues:

> Kant tells us that the operation of moral thought checks the initial or primitive tendency of self-love, by thwarting the inclination, and it strikes down the tendency to self-conceit, by reminding the agent that his interests have no claims prior to the law. These effects are painful, and the latter even humiliating. At the same time, however, there is a positive side to the experience, a sense of release, of obstacle removed, of independence, as the agent puts inclination aside and steps forward, so to speak, in the confidence of true self-mastery. The complex mix of affect thus produced is respect, which is what serves as the incentive to moral action: the alternative action, the morally correct one, is presented to consciousness as worth doing. (Korsgaard 1998: 55)

Hence, making ourselves both efficacious and autonomous is difficult. Doing so requires us to struggle with our heteronomous impulses and the opinions of others, and have the moral law motivate our action. Moreover, that we can become autonomous suggests that we are not bound by some external authority or our inner sensuous impulses or desires, but only by the moral law. By extension, the moral law *may* undermine the legitimacy of norms declared by external authorities, and when agents expose themselves to such norms or inner sensuous impulses or desires, or a combination of both, they fail to determine themselves as autonomous agents. Korsgaard puts it this way: "A free will—a fully self-determining will—would be one

that is not moved by any *alien* cause. That is, it would not be subject to determination by any law that is outside of itself" (Korsgaard 2008: 12). Thus, a free will, and, in particular, a fully self-determining will capable of taking control of its movements, is both efficacious and autonomous. It is capable of autonomy and affecting the world by engaging "in practical activity that is directed to producing some state of affairs in the world" (Korsgaard 2008: 13).

Korsgaard argues that by making ourselves "autonomous" we, as human beings acting under the idea of freedom not only will ends, and are committed to realizing them, but also are willing to engage in practical deliberation concerning the legitimacy of those ends, and the suggested means and purposes for achieving them. Furthermore, by making ourselves autonomous we engage in (or should engage in) creating the conditions necessary for making ourselves both efficacious and autonomous in a society (Korsgaard 2008: 1–20; also, see Roth 2010b, Roth 2011 and Surprenant 2010). That is, by acting under the idea of freedom we regulate the function of our desires and external authorities in the determination of our ends by applying the moral law. Freedom, however, does *not* consist in our ability to determine our ends independently of domination by other persons and our own inclinations and desires, but only in *how* we regulate desires and external authorities by the moral law in the determination of our ends (Guyer 2003: 74). By regulating, inter alia, our desires we resist being affected by them in ways that threaten our freedom to make ourselves autonomous, and, instead, strive to optimize our freedom to be autonomous by acting in accordance with and be motivated by the moral law.

Resistance, Kant says: "awakens all the powers of the human being, [and] brings [individuals] to overcome [their] propensity to indolence" (Idea: 8:21). Furthermore, he writes that people should not blindly accede to "every demand the government puts forth," but should employ "*negative* resistance" whenever it is required (MM: 6:322). Moreover, resistance is also related to the value and importance of self-discipline in "freeing" ourselves from "the despotism of desires" (CPJ: 5:432). It prepares the way for culture and, eventually, even for morality by not only disciplining, cultivating, or civilizing ourselves, but also in making us autonomous. Kant writes:

> The **compulsion** through which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated is called **discipline**. It is different from **culture**, which would merely produce a skill without first cancelling out another one that is already present. In the formation of a talent, therefore, which already has by itself a tendency to expression, discipline will make a negative contribution, but culture and doctrine a positive one. (CPu: A709–710/B737–738)

Even though discipline prepares the way for culture, discipline does not suggest that it is enough that we "become civilized through culture particularly

through the cultivation of social qualities, and the natural tendency of his species in social relations to come out of the crudity of mere personal force and to become a well-mannered (if not yet moral) being destined for concord, is now a higher step" (Ant: 324). That is, it is not enough that we discipline ourselves, as suggested by policy-makers in the European Union in order to render us merely efficacious in knowledge-based societies. We must also, according to Kant, make ourselves moral, that is, cultivate our ability to act upon and be motivated by principles of practical reason and in particular the categorical imperative.

For Kant, this move from discipline to culture to morality is one of the greatest challenges for mankind, and education. He writes, "We are *cultivated* in a high degree by art and science. We are *civilized*, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already *moralized*" (Idea: 8:26). Kant's view that we are cultivated and civilized through education seems to be reinforced by the aim of policy-makers in the European Union—an aim that expresses the idea that followers ought to make themselves efficacious through education and in other ways so that they become competitive and employable, but not necessarily autonomous. That is, we would not then necessarily encourage one another to think for ourselves, consistently and from the standpoint of the other, activities that for Kant are necessary for anyone wishing to become autonomous in practice (CPJ: 5:294–295). Such activities require that we constitute ourselves efficacious and autonomous through principles of practical reason.

III. MAKING OURSELVES EFFICACIOUS AND AUTONOMOUS THROUGH PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICAL REASON

In the *Groundwork*, Kant argued that action contains not only an end, but also means and purpose(s), and hence is substantive and productive. Moreover, he also demonstrated that action not only contains certain parts, namely an end, but also one or several means needed in order to achieve the end, and one or several purposes for realizing the end. He also showed that such parts constitute a principle—a hypothetical imperative, which has both formal and substantive components. It is substantive in that ends as well as means and purposes differ, and hence are hypothetical since norms of action that contain ends not only vary and are contingent among people, but also depend upon certain conditions such as, for example, social, political, and historical circumstances.

Moreover, since the hypothetical imperative is non-substantive in the sense that its form does not change even though ends, means, and purposes vary, it is constitutive of the will. That is, the principle both describes an action and is normative. It is normative for the actor in the sense that if he wills an end he must will the means to that end. The actor constitutes

himself as the *cause* of that end, that is, he or someone else does not only use the principle for the action as a description of the action, but the principle also functions as a norm for him. It directs his action and serves as the internal regulative norm for his action. It guides the operation of his practical judgment and his understanding of himself, of who he is as a person. Hence, the principle is constitutive of a person's rational activity, that is, a "person is called 'reasonable' or 'rational' when her beliefs and actions conform to the dictates of" such a principle "or when she consciously and deliberately guides her thoughts and actions by it" (Korsgaard 2008: 2). Kant writes:

> Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power. This proposition is, as regards the volition, analytic; for in the volition of an object as my effect, my causality as acting cause, that is, the use of means, is already thought. (Gr: 4:417)

For Kant, the relation between means, ends, and persons is indispensible in the sense that if the person failed to adopt the means to a certain end, he would not be believed to will the object of that end. That is, if the person determines himself to be the cause of some end, and does not act so that he achieves the end in question, then he has failed. Moreover, Kant's conception of action means that the determining ground of his action is not the end or the object of his action but rather the principle upon which he acts. That is, the person determines himself to be the cause of some state of affairs, and that when he determines himself to be the cause of some end, he binds himself to the principle, and acts in such a way that he achieves the end-in-view. Korsgaard writes:

> What the argument [above] establishes is . . . that the hypothetical imperative is a constitutive principle of willing. What makes willing different from merely desiring or wishing or thinking-it-would-be-nice-if is that the person who wills an end determines himself to bring the end about, that is, to cause it. And to determine yourself to be the cause of an end is to determine yourself to set off a chain of causes that will lead to the achievement of the end. Thus the person who wills an end *constitutes himself* as the cause of that end. (Korsgaard 2009: 68)

We see that the principle is a constitutive principle of action, and in particular of willing, which means that we cannot coherently reject it, and continue to think of ourselves or others as efficacious beings, that is, beings capable of bringing something about, with ourselves as the cause (see Herman 2007: 230–253; Korsgaard 2008: 1–20; Reath 2006: 173–195; and Roth 2010c, for discussions of the hypothetical and categorical imperative in constitutive terms). Kant argued that action is productive and instrumental but

also, as we have seen, that the principle—the hypothetical imperative—is constitutive of willing.

Moreover, Kant argued that it is not necessarily specific ends-in-view (such as those in policy texts) that ought to be valued, but that the most valued end is the people's humanity, our rational nature (Gr: 4:429). That is, Kant argued that not only do human beings have the capacity to set themselves an end and to confer value on it; they must also value themselves as rational, value-conferring creatures. That is, they have to value themselves as creatures whose reflective consciousness permits them to distance themselves from the end(s) they confer value on, the desired means, or the purpose(s) they believe they have or need to have for wanting to achieve a specific desired end. Moreover, as value-conferring creatures they have to respect one another as ends in themselves, who ought to be free to also reflect upon each means and substantive ends, and at times also challenge and change them. Kant writes, "The capacity to set oneself an end—any end whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)" (MM: 6:392).

Therefore, human beings are not only capable of setting an end, using means in order to achieve it, and having a purpose for achieving it, but also of conferring value on the desired end as something worthy to achieve. Human beings also have to confer value on their humanity, their rational nature. Since rational nature is self-conscious and reflective in its structure, a person has to confer value on his rational capacity, his capacity to distance himself from any object he proposes to himself as an object of his rational choice. He also has to confer value on his capacity to reflect upon and challenge that object as one valued as a worthy end as well as the suggested norms of action. Otherwise, he will not acknowledge himself or any other as a rational, value-conferring being worthy of respect, but perhaps merely as a means to some further end.

The above suggests that the principles not only describe the operation and guide the exercise of the will; they also govern the understanding of the person and his understanding of himself. For the way he makes himself a person depends on the principles upon which he acts, and is motivated by. The principles unify the understanding the person has of himself. That is, the person determines himself efficacious if he acts upon and is motivated by the hypothetical imperative, and he determines himself autonomous if he acts upon and is motivated by the Categorical Imperative; the latter "is the principle that one must follow in order to exercise the power of free volition, and as such is not coherently rejected by any agent who regards himself as free and rational" (Reath 2008: 129).

The hypothetical imperative and the Categorical Imperative are principles by which we take control of our representations of ourselves, others, and the world, and by which we appraise such representations. Hence, we must have or create an understanding of ourselves as persons that not only are willing, but view ourselves as the cause of some end, and as persons that

take control of our beliefs, values, and norms of action and appraise them when necessary. Barbara Herman writes:

> Now for a rational agent to will something she must have a conception of herself as willing (e.g., of herself as an acting cause for her ends). Then, in willing an action—any action—an agent is moved by a perceived connection of the action to her representation of herself willing an end, which is to say, according to a representation of the will's constitutive principle (as a power to produce effects). If the principle constitutive of the will's own activity were the moral law, then *it* would be what we (always and necessarily) represent to ourselves in and as a condition of rational choice. When we represent it accurately, we in fact see the moral law as the ultimate justificatory or good-constituting principle of our action. (Herman 2007: 246)

Therefore, should we acknowledge and respect ourselves as rational value-conferring beings, and not only value the objects of our rational choice; then we would have to acknowledge and respect one another in the same way, on pain of inconsistency. That is, we have to respect one another as creatures that can think for ourselves, consistently and from the standpoint of the other. This means, according to Kant (Gr: 4:429), that we have to treat humanity, that is, our rational nature, in our "*own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*." This is hard work, that is, it is hard work to treat humanity never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end. And it is in practice that we demonstrate whether we are the authors of our own action, and whether we render ourselves both efficacious *and* autonomous. And the degree to which we achieve this, that is, make ourselves both efficacious and autonomous, demonstrates how far we actually take control of our action, and appraise the norms of our action, and also relate to them reflexively and challenge them whenever needed.

Should we *not* determine ourselves as a cause of our action, nor render ourselves autonomous, that is, efficacious and as beings capable of realizing the reflective structure of our minds in our judgments in practice, then we would instead be the plaything of forces seemingly outside our control, and degenerate our humanity, and in particular our autonomy, into heteronomity. In other words we would allow ourselves to be affected by forces external to us, and constrain ourselves by another's choice, specific ends that someone else had conferred value upon, such as the ones discussed above.

However, despite the focus on developing competence to handle and/or producing knowledge through education, and becoming competitive, employable, and flexible in knowledge-based societies, it is inevitable in principle that we as human beings render ourselves efficacious and autonomous in practice, because of our rational nature. This suggests not only that we are "*condemned* to choice and action" as Korsgaard (2009: 1) so

eloquently puts it, but also to autonomy, and *how* we choose to be depends upon the principles on which we choose to act. To determine ourselves as human beings and in particular our willing, we have, as seen from above, to act not only upon the instrumental principle—the hypothetical imperative, but also upon the moral law—the Categorical -Imperative. Hence we not only embrace certain desired ends and act in such a way that we achieve them, but we can also realize our self-awareness and the reflective structure of our minds in practice in our judgments together.

To be an agent—a human being—in this unified sense requires that we act under the idea of freedom, and value not only some desired external ends, but also ourselves as rational value-conferring creatures able to distance ourselves from any external end, reflect upon it, challenge it whenever needed. It also requires that we create the conditions needed for developing our humanity and ourselves and not only specific capacities for certain desired ends in knowledge-based societies. That is, it entails that we create the conditions for self-determination, and that we act in such a way that we make ourselves both efficacious *and* autonomous in education and elsewhere in society if we want to be agents in this unified sense.

NOTES

1. That is, knowing the reason you have for acting does not mean or suggest that you know or will know with certainty which reason you have or will have for acting. You may, for example, be mistaken about the reason you thought you have/had for acting.
2. Self-love, for Kant, refers to the policy of determining one's choices by "material principles" (such as the ones expressed by policy texts) or ends that are suggested by desires alone (CPr: 5:22).
3. That is, the following principle: *So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means* (Gr: 4:429).

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