

IMMANUEL KANT

Anthropology, History, and Education

The purpose of the Cambridge edition is to offer translations of the best modern German editions of Kant's work in a uniform format suitable for Kant scholars. When complete the edition will include all of Kant's published works and a generous selection of his unpublished writings, such as the *Opus postumum*, *Handschriftlicher Nachlaß*, lectures, and correspondence.

Anthropology, History, and Education contains all of Kant's major writings on human nature. Some of these works, which were published over a thirty-nine year period between 1764 and 1803, have never before been translated into English. Kant's question "What is the human being?" is approached indirectly in his famous works on metaphysics, epistemology, moral and legal philosophy, aesthetics and the philosophy of religion, but it is approached directly in his extensive but less well-known writings on physical and cultural anthropology, the philosophy of history, and education which are gathered in the present volume. Kant repeatedly claimed that the question "What is the human being?" should be philosophy's most fundamental concern, and *Anthropology, History, and Education* can be seen as effectively presenting his philosophy as a whole in a popular guise.

THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS
OF IMMANUEL KANT IN TRANSLATION

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Natural Science

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Lectures on Anthropology

IMMANUEL KANT

*Anthropology, History, and
Education*

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Contents

	<i>page</i>	ix
General editors' preface	I	xiii
Preface	I	xiii
<i>General introduction</i> by Robert B. Louden	I	
1 <i>Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime</i> (1764) Translated by Paul Guyer	18	
2 <i>Essay on the maladies of the head</i> (1764) Translated by Holly Wilson	63	
3 Review of Moscati's work <i>Of the corporeal essential differences between the structure of animals and humans</i> (1771) Translated by Günter Zöller	78	
4 <i>Of the different races of human beings</i> (1775) Translated by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller	82	
5 <i>Essays regarding the Philanthropinum</i> (1776/1777) Translated by Robert B. Louden	98	
6 <i>A note to physicians</i> (1782) Translated by Günter Zöller	105	
7 <i>Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim</i> (1784) Translated by Allen W. Wood	107	
8 Review of J. G. Herder's <i>Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity. Parts 1 and 2</i> (1785) Translated by Allen W. Wood	121	
9 <i>Determination of the concept of a human race</i> (1785) Translated by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller	143	
10 <i>Conjectural beginning of human history</i> (1786) Translated by Allen W. Wood	160	

11	Some remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's <i>Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning hours</i> (1786) Translated by Günter Zöller	176
12	<i>On the philosophers' medicine of the body</i> (1786) Translated by Mary Gregor	182
13	<i>On the use of teleological principles in philosophy</i> (1788) Translated by Günter Zöller	192
14	From Soemmerring's <i>On the organ of the soul</i> (1796) Translated by Arnulf Zweig	219
15	<i>Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view</i> (1798) Translated by Robert B. Louden	227
16	Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's <i>Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian dictionary</i> (1800) Translated by Günter Zöller	430
17	<i>Lectures on pedagogy</i> (1803) Translated by Robert B. Louden	434
	Editorial notes	486
	Glossary	528
	Bibliography	565
	Index	584

General editors' preface

Within a few years of the publication of his *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1781, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) was recognized by his contemporaries as one of the seminal philosophers of modern times – indeed as one of the great philosophers of all time. This renown soon spread beyond German-speaking lands, and translations of Kant's work into English were published even before 1800. Since then, interpretations of Kant's views have come and gone and loyalty to his positions has waxed and waned, but his importance has not diminished. Generations of scholars have devoted their efforts to producing reliable translations of Kant into English as well as into other languages.

There are four main reasons for the present edition of Kant's writings:

1. *Completeness*. Although most of the works published in Kant's lifetime have been translated before, the most important ones more than once, only fragments of Kant's many important unpublished works have ever been translated. These include the *Opus postumum*, Kant's unfinished *magnum opus* on the transition from philosophy to physics; transcriptions of his classroom lectures; his correspondence; and his marginalia and other notes. One aim of this edition is to make a comprehensive sampling of these materials available in English for the first time.
2. *Availability*. Many English translations of Kant's works, especially those that have not individually played a large role in the subsequent development of philosophy, have long been inaccessible or out of print. Many of them, however, are crucial for the understanding of Kant's philosophical development, and the absence of some from English-language bibliographies may be responsible for erroneous or blinkered traditional interpretations of his doctrines by English-speaking philosophers.
3. *Organization*. Another aim of the present edition is to make all Kant's published work, both major and minor, available in comprehensive volumes organized both chronologically and topically,

so as to facilitate the serious study of his philosophy by English-speaking readers.

4. *Consistency of translation.* Although many of Kant's major works have been translated by the most distinguished scholars of their day, some of these translations are now dated, and there is considerable terminological disparity among them. Our aim has been to enlist some of the most accomplished Kant scholars and translators to produce new translations, freeing readers from both the philosophical and literary preconceptions of previous generations and allowing them to approach texts, as far as possible, with the same directness as present-day readers of the German or Latin originals.

In pursuit of these goals, our editors and translators attempt to follow several fundamental principles:

1. As far as seems advisable, the edition employs a single general glossary, especially for Kant's technical terms. Although we have not attempted to restrict the prerogative of editors and translators in choice of terminology, we have maximized consistency by putting a single editor or editorial team in charge of each of the main groupings of Kant's writings, such as his work in practical philosophy, philosophy of religion, or natural science, so that there will be a high degree of terminological consistency, at least in dealing with the same subject matter.
2. Our translators try to avoid sacrificing literalness to readability. We hope to produce translations that approximate the originals in the sense that they leave as much of the interpretive work as possible to the reader.
3. The paragraph, and even more the sentence, is often Kant's unit of argument, and one can easily transform what Kant intends as a continuous argument into a mere series of assertions by breaking up a sentence so as to make it more readable. Therefore, we try to preserve Kant's own divisions of sentences and paragraphs wherever possible.
4. Earlier editions often attempted to improve Kant's texts on the basis of controversial conceptions about their proper interpretation. In our translations, emendation or improvement of the original edition is kept to the minimum necessary to correct obvious typographical errors.
5. Our editors and translators try to minimize interpretation in other ways as well, for example, by rigorously segregating Kant's own footnotes, the editors' purely linguistic notes, and their more explanatory or informational notes; notes in this last category are treated as endnotes rather than footnotes.

We have not attempted to standardize completely the format of individual volumes. Each, however, includes information about the context in which Kant wrote the translated works, a German–English glossary, an English–German glossary, an index, and other aids to comprehension. The general introduction to each volume includes an explanation of specific principles of translation and, where necessary, principles of selection of works included in that volume. The pagination of the standard German edition of Kant's works, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–), is indicated throughout by means of marginal numbers.

Our aim is to produce a comprehensive edition of Kant's writings, embodying and displaying the high standards attained by Kant scholarship in the English-speaking world during the second half of the twentieth century, and serving as both an instrument and a stimulus for the further development of Kant studies by English-speaking readers in the century to come. Because of our emphasis on literalness of translation and on information rather than interpretation in editorial practices, we hope our edition will continue to be usable despite the inevitable evolution and occasional revolutions in Kant scholarship.

PAUL GUYER
ALLEN W. WOOD

The present volume in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation contains seventeen works by Kant published over a thirty-nine-year period, including Kant's most popular early work, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764), the last work Kant himself saw to publication, *Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian Dictionary* (1800), and the last work edited on Kant's behalf during his lifetime, *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803). The volume contains all of Kant's published works in cultural and physical anthropology, in the philosophy of history and in the philosophy of education. The works vary in character and length from short reviews of the works of others and postscripts to the works of others through extensive essays published in leading journals of the time to book-length studies that codify Kant's considered views in a larger area of philosophy.

The philosophical center of the present volume is occupied by Kant's two works in the philosophy of history, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784) and *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), and by Kant's book publication of his lectures on anthropology, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798). This core is supplemented by Kant's three sequentially conceived contributions to the contemporary debate about the unity of the human species and its division into races, *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775), *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785), and *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788); by a number of smaller works on physical and cultural specifics of the human being, and by Kant's two work groups in the philosophy of education, *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* (1776/7) and *Lectures on Pedagogy*. The thematic unity of the present volume lies in its complete documentation of Kant's sustained philosophical reflection on the human being from an anthropological, biological, historical, and pedagogical point of view. The one work contained in this volume that does not fit squarely into this framework is an occasional piece in the critique of metaphysics, *Some Remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning Hours* (1786).

This volume represents the joint effort of the two editors, who also translated major portions of the volume, and of several other translators. With the exception of Mary Gregor's translation of Kant's Latin oration on philosophy and medicine (*On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body*, 1786), the translations contained in this volume are new and have been undertaken specifically for this edition. All translations contained in the volume, including the previously prepared one, have been edited in light of the translation policy of accuracy and transparency that is characteristic of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.

The responsibility for the volume was divided among the editors and translators as follows.

Robert B. Louden edited *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* (translated by Robert B. Louden), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (translated by Robert B. Louden), and *Lectures on Pedagogy* (translated by Robert B. Louden).

Günter Zöller edited the remaining fourteen works in cultural and physical anthropology, the philosophy of history, and the critique of metaphysics: *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (translated by Paul Guyer), *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (translated by Holly Wilson), *Review of Moscati's Work Of the Corporeal Essential Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans* (translated by Günter Zöller), *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (translated by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller), *A Note to Physicians* (translated by Günter Zöller), *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (translated by Allen W. Wood), *Review of J. G. Herder's Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity. Parts 1 and 2* (translated by Allen W. Wood), *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (translated by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller), *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (translated by Allen W. Wood), *Some Remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning Hours* (translated by Günter Zöller), *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* (translated by Mary Gregor), *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (translated by Günter Zöller), *From Soemmering's On the Organ of the Soul* (translated by Arnulf Zweig), and *Postscript to Mielcke's Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian Dictionary* (translated by Günter Zöller).

In addition, the two editors were involved in the editing of each other's translations, except for the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which was the sole responsibility of Robert B. Louden.

The general introduction to the volume is by Robert B. Louden. The introductions and explanatory notes to the individual works were written by the respective editor, except for the works translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, who also wrote the introductions and explanatory notes to those works. The bibliography and the glossary were compiled by Günter Zöller.

In addition to Kant's own works, and in line with the guidelines of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation, this volume contains editorial material designed to aid the reader with basic information about the linguistic, historical, and philosophical specifics of Kant's writings.

The *general introduction* addresses the thematic diversity as well as unity of the seventeen works by Kant contained in this volume.

The *editors' and translators' introductions* to each of the individual works by Kant detail the circumstances of their composition and original publication.

The *linguistic footnotes*, lettered alphabetically to distinguish them from Kant's own footnotes, which are marked by asterisks, specify the German original of key words and phrases in Kant's text and provide English translations of the Greek or Latin used in Kant's works. When occurring within a footnote by Kant, the linguistic notes are inserted parenthetically. In the linguistic footnotes the spelling of Kant's German original has been modernized to facilitate the consultation of current dictionaries.

The numbered *editorial endnotes* provide factual information and explanation, especially on names of historical and mythological figures.

The *German-English and English-German glossary* helps the reader to track the key words used in Kant's original and in the translations of this volume. The spelling of Kant's German original has been modernized to facilitate the consultation of current dictionaries.

The *bibliography* is in two parts. The first part lists the German editions of the works contained in this volume that appeared during Kant's lifetime as well as English, French, Italian, and Spanish translations of the works contained in the volume. The second part lists selected publications in English, German, French, and Italian on the works by Kant contained in this volume.

Finally there is an *index of names and subjects*.

All of the translations and much of the editorial material of the present volume are based on the Academy edition of Kant's Collected Works: *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Prussian Academy Sciences (vols. 1–22), the Academy of Sciences of the GDR (vol. 23) and the Academy of Sciences of Göttingen (vols. 23ff.) (Berlin, later Berlin/New York: Reimer, later de Gruyter, 1900ff). Throughout this volume, this edition is referred to as "Academy edition" and abbreviated as "AA," followed by the number of the volume and, separated by a colon, of the page or pages in question (e.g., AA 7: 127). The pagination of the Academy edition is indicated in the margins of the translations contained in the present volume to facilitate cross-references to other editions and translations. Citations and quotations from Kant's correspondence refer to the pagination and the numbering of the second edition of the

correspondence in volumes 10 through 13 of AA (1922). The *Critique of Pure Reason* is cited by the original pagination of the first and second editions, indicated by “A” and “B,” respectively.

The editors would like to thank Paul Guyer, Holly Wilson, and Allen W. Wood for undertaking translations for this volume. Günter Zöller would like to express his indebtedness to the late Mary Gregor, who had graciously agreed to his request for reuse of her translation of Kant’s Latin oration on philosophy and medicine in the present volume. He would like to thank Arnulf Zweig for kindly providing his translation of Kant’s statement on Soemmering’s work, *On the Organ of the Soul*, which had originally been prepared for Zweig’s own edition of Kant’s correspondence in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Günter Zöller would also like to thank Robert Louden, who had been involved in this volume as a translator from its inception, for joining him in the capacity of coeditor. Finally Günter Zöller would like to thank Andrew Kelley, Claudia Schmitt, Michael Weiß, and Dagmar Langen for valuable research assistance in the preparation of this volume. Robert B. Louden would like to thank Matthew David Mendham, Carsten Nielsen, Christian Nimtz, Frederick Rauscher, Bettina Schöne-Seifert, and Jens Timmermann for help and advice on his *Education* translations; and Karl Ameriks, Alix Cohen, Patrick Frierson, Hilary Gaskin, Patrick Kain, Manfred Kuehn, Aramis López, David Bruce B. Louden, Pauline Marsh, Frederick Rauscher, Judith Schlick, Claudia Schmidt, Niko Strobauch, and Allen Wood for help and advice on his *Anthropology* translation. He would also like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Board of Trustees of the University of Maine System for their support via research fellowships in 1991–2, 1996–7, and 2001–2.

Atlanta, Georgia and Portland, Maine
April 2006

General introduction

The present volume in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in Translation* differs from all of the other volumes in the series in that it is not devoted solely to one major work of Kant (e.g., *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*), does not focus on writings from a specific period of his writing career (e.g., *Theoretical Philosophy*, 1755–70; *Opus postumum*), is not confined to one specific subfield or area of his philosophy (e.g., *Practical Philosophy*, *Religion and Rational Theology*), and does not focus on a distinct genre of writing or mode of presentation (e.g., *Correspondence*, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, *Lectures on Ethics*). At the same time, *Anthropology, History, and Education* is no mere miscellany of occasional pieces that stands awkwardly outside of Kant’s central philosophical concerns. Rather, these writings (whose original publication dates span thirty-nine years of Kant’s life) are linked together by their central focus on human nature – the most pervasive and persistent theme in all of Kant’s writings. Kant repeatedly claimed that the question “What is the human being?” should be philosophy’s most fundamental concern (*Jäische Logic* 9: 25; cf. letter to Stäudlin of May 4, 1793, 11: 429, *Metaphysik Pölitz* 28: 533–4),¹ and over the years he approached the question from a variety of different perspectives. In addition to addressing this question indirectly under the guises of metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of religion, Kant broached the question directly in his extensive work on anthropology, history, and education gathered in the present volume.

However, ultimately Kant’s different perspectives on human nature are themselves linked together by an underlying moral concern, since on his view “the sciences are *principia* for the improvement of morality” (*Moralphilosophie* Collins 27: 462). Knowing ourselves and the world in which we live is subordinate to the moral imperative of making ourselves and our world morally better. Theoretical inquiry itself serves the ends of morality. Ultimately, we seek knowledge of ourselves and our world in order to further the goal of creating a moral realm, a realm in which each human being as a rational being is viewed as “a lawgiving member of the universal kingdom of ends” (*Groundwork of the Metaphysics*

of Morals 4: 438). The study of the human being as envisioned by Kant was not at all a Weberian value-free social science whose ends are either indigenous to theory or entirely arbitrary, but rather from the start was a deeply value-embedded and morally guided enterprise. In this broader sense, the writings in *Anthropology, History, and Education* may also be viewed as central contributions to what Kant called “the second part” of morals, “*philosophia moralis applicata*, moral anthropology, to which the empirical principles belong” (*Moral Mrongovius II* 29: 599). In order to successfully apply *a priori* moral philosophy to human beings, we need accurate empirical information about the subjects to which the theory is being applied. The Kantian study of human nature is intended to supply this needed information.

ANTHROPOLOGY

The term “anthropology” within the context of Kant’s writings connotes above all his book, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) (Anth). But this late work, published two years after Kant’s retirement (Anth), is itself the capstone to a lifelong interest in the study of human nature. Kant first offered a formal course in anthropology in the winter semester of 1772–3, and thereafter taught the course annually until his retirement in 1796. However, the roots of his anthropology course lie much further back. As early as 1757, in his *Sketch and Announcement of a Lecture Course on Physical Geography*, he wrote that his geography course (first offered in summer semester 1756) would include a discussion of “the inclinations of human beings which flow from the climate in which they live, the variety of their prejudices and ways of thinking, in so far as this can all serve to make the human being more known to himself, along with a short sketch of their arts, business, and science” (2: 9).

Feelings of Beauty and Sublimity. Another important source for Kant’s anthropology is his 1764 work, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, which is included in the present volume. Though traditionally viewed as Kant’s first work on aesthetics, anthropological and moral themes definitely dominate the latter part of the essay, where Kant discusses differences between the two sexes, as well as among different cultures and nations, in their capacities for the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime. This discussion of sexual, cultural, and national differences is later expanded on not only in the many different student and auditor transcriptions of Kant’s popular anthropology course that have surfaced over the years,² but also in the final part of *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. However, despite Kant’s opening claim

of examining such topics “more with the eye of an observer than of the philosopher” (2: 207), not to mention his frequently stated assertion that “the science of the human being (anthropology)” is to be based on “observation and experience” (*Collins* 25: 7; cf. Kant’s letter to Marcus Herz, late 1773, 10: 145), contemporary readers should be forewarned that what we often find in these discussions are not objective, empirically based accounts of human difference but rather the prejudices of an era.

Nevertheless, the more empirically oriented Kant of the 1760s who was determined to consider “historically and philosophically what happens before specifying what ought to happen” (*Announcement of the Organization of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–66*, 2: 311) – multiple traces of whom survive the over-emphasized “critical turn” of 1770 (see, e.g., *Inaugural Dissertation* 2: 395–6) – was certainly a great success with his contemporaries. Herder, in a frequently cited passage, praises the author of the *Observations* for being

altogether an observer of society, altogether the accomplished philosopher. . . . The great and beautiful in the human being and in human characters, and temperaments and sexual drives, and virtues and finally national characters: this is his world, where he has observed up to the finest nuances, analyzed down to the most hidden incentives, and worked out many a tiny caprice – altogether a philosopher of the sublime and beautiful of humanity! And in this humane philosophy a German Shaftesbury.³

Similarly, when Kant informed his former student that he was “now working on a Metaphysics of Morals (*eine Metaphysik der Sitten*) . . . which I hope to be finished with this year”⁴ (Kant to Herder, May 9, 1768; 10: 74), Herder effused: “You send me news of your forthcoming Moral [Philosophy]. How I wish it were finished. May your account of the Good contribute to the culture of our century as much as your account of the Sublime and the Beautiful have done” (Herder to Kant, November 1768, 10: 77).

Goethe also had high praise for Kant’s *Observations*. In a letter to Schiller he writes: “Do you know Kant’s *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*? . . . It is full of the most delightful observations about human beings, and one already sees how his principles are developing. Surely you know all about it.”⁵

“Philosophical Physicians” and Physiological Anthropology. The writings of physicians constituted another important source for much anthropological writing during the Enlightenment, including Kant’s. Kant’s ongoing interest in the medical theories and debates of his day is sometimes attributed solely to his own well-documented hypochondria.⁶ But while this undoubtedly played a causal role, it is also the case that many, many

Enlightenment intellectuals were deeply fascinated by medicine. Peter Gay writes:

For men of the Enlightenment, medicine . . . was the most highly visible, and the most heartening, index to general progress: nothing after all was better calculated to buoy up men's feeling about life than growing hope for life itself. But beyond this, for the *philosophes* medicine had a more than visceral, it had intellectual meaning. It was in medicine that the *philosophes* tested their philosophical position; medicine was at once the model of their new philosophy and the guarantee of its efficacy. . . . Nothing could be plainer than this: medicine was philosophy at work; philosophy was medicine for the individual and society.⁷

Many of the leading medical authors of the Enlightenment were themselves known as "philosophical physicians."⁸ Perhaps the best known (and certainly the most radical) was Julian Offray de La Mettrie (1709–51), who in the opening of his *L'Homme machine* [Man a Machine (1748)] declared confidently that in studying human nature we should be

guided by experience and observation alone. They abound in the annals of physicians who were philosophers, but not in those of philosophers who were not physicians. Physician-philosophers probe and illuminate the labyrinth that is man. They alone have revealed man's springs hidden under coverings that obscure so many other marvels.⁹

Kant of course was no philosophical physician in this blunt empiricist sense. In addition, he rejected the materialism and determinism, and the ensuing reductionist view of human nature, embraced by many of the philosophical physicians. Alluding to La Mettrie in the final sentence of his famous essay *What is Enlightenment?* (1784), for instance, he warns that we must learn "to treat the human being, who is now *more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity" (8: 42).

But as several of the shorter selections in the present volume indicate, Kant did, in a more restricted sense, endorse the Enlightenment coalition between philosophers and physicians. For instance, early in his *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), he states: "I see nothing better for me than to imitate the method of the physicians" (2: 260). And at the end, while insisting that "it is the physician whose assistance one chiefly has to seek" in treating maladies, he also adds: "Yet, for honor's sake I would rather not exclude the philosopher, who could prescribe the diet of the mind – but on the condition that, as also for most of his other occupations, he requires no payment for this one" (2: 271). Similarly, at the beginning of *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* (1786 or 1788), he notes that while physicians attend to the body by physical means, the business of philosophers is "to assist the afflicted body by a mental regimen" (15: 939). And in *A Note to Physicians* (1782), he encourages

physicians "with enlarged concepts" not just to study the symptoms of and remedies for diseases and epidemics, but also to investigate their respective epidemiologies (8: 6). Finally, in his *Review of Moscati* (1771), he congratulates the "astute anatomist" for his insight into early human life – an insight at "which Rousseau as a philosopher did not succeed" (2: 423).

Physicians, as disectors "of the visible in the human being," and philosophers, as "dissectors of the invisible in the human being," thus can and should work together "towards a common goal" (Kant to Samuel Thomas Soemmering, August 10, 1795, 12: 30; see also, in the present volume, *From Soemmering's On the Organ of the Soul* 12: 31–5). But again, while Kant's early as well as late writings exhibit a strong and informed interest in the medical debates of the day, at bottom his own view of human nature is quite different from that of most of the philosophical physicians. This comes out most clearly in his rejection of the approach advocated by one of the most influential of the German philosophical physicians, Ernst Platner (1744–1818). In 1772 – the same year Kant inaugurated his annual anthropology course – Platner published *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (Anthropology for Physicians and Philosophers). Although the book received many positive reviews in leading journals (one of which was written by Kant's former student, Marcus Herz, himself a practising physician in Berlin),¹⁰ Kant was extremely critical of several of Platner's key assumptions. In a well-known letter to Herz describing his new anthropology course, written shortly after Herz's review of Platner appeared, Kant abruptly criticizes what he regards as Platner's "eternally futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought"; adding that "my plan [for the new discipline of anthropology] is quite different" from Platner's (Kant to Herz, late 1773, 10: 145).

Twenty-five years later, in the Preface to his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant summarizes the differences between Platner's physiological approach and his own pragmatic approach by noting that physiological anthropology "concerns the investigation of what *nature* makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what *he* as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself" (7: 119). In the Introduction to an earlier transcription (1781–2) of his anthropology lectures, he also criticizes Platner for having merely "written a scholastic anthropology" (*Menschenkunde* 25: 856). The "scholastics," he notes, did produce "science for the school," but it was of "no use to the human being." Pragmatic anthropology, on the other hand, aims to promote "enlightenment for common life" (25: 853). Similarly, at the beginning of the *Mrongovius* anthropology lectures (1784–5), he states: "There are two ways of studying: in school and in the world. In school one learns scholastic knowledge, which belongs to professional scholars; but

in dealings with the world one learns popular knowledge, which belongs to the entire world" (25: 1209). Kant's pragmatic anthropology aims at this latter popular knowledge (a knowledge explicitly not restricted to Platner's target audience of "physicians and philosophers") – a kind of knowledge intended to be "useful not merely for school, but rather for life, and through which the accomplished apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny, namely the *world*" (*Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775) (2: 443).

Essentially, the physiological anthropology championed by Platner and others is the predecessor of *physical* anthropology; while Kant's pragmatic anthropology, with its emphasis on free human action, is the progenitor of various philosophical and existentialist anthropologies. For instance, Max Scheler, an important voice in this latter tradition who also influenced Martin Heidegger, holds that the human being is not only an animal being but also "a 'spiritual' being" (*ein 'geistiges' Wesen*) that is "no longer tied to its drives and environments, but rather 'free from the environment' ('umweltfrei') or, as we shall say, 'open to the world' ('welt offen')."¹¹

Race, culture, and colonialism. Controversies concerning the classification of human beings and their relationships to one another constitute another key source for the development of eighteenth-century anthropology and social science. How do peoples of the New World compare to those of the Old? What to make of human beings' different physical characteristics and intellectual abilities? To what extent are such differences hereditary, and to what extent are they due to contingencies of (e.g.) climate? Does a universal human subject and moral agent endure underneath biological and cultural differences? What (if anything) do human beings share in common?

In Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, the section entitled "On the Character of the Races" is less than one page long and rather innocent looking (see 7: 320–1). And in his Preface, he remarks that "knowledge of the races of human beings as products belonging to the play of nature" (7: 120) is not strictly speaking even a part of pragmatic anthropology, but only of physiological anthropology. Race [which on Kant's view is not a social construction but a natural kind – albeit one that develops "only over the course of generations" (*On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* 8: 164)] is a prime example of what nature makes of the human being, rather than of what the human being "can and should make of himself" as a free acting being (see 7: 119). Nevertheless, the race issue looms large in three separately published essays included in this volume [*Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775), *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785), *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788)], and other versions of Kant's classroom lectures on anthropology and geography contain much more

explicit and controversial discussions of race (see, e.g., *Menschenkunde* 25: 1187–8, *Physical Geography* 9: 311–20). Additionally, related discussions of "civilized (i. e., western) Europeans" and "uncivilized natives" also feature prominently in several of the history writings included in this volume [see, e.g., *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784) 8: 21–2; *Review of J. G. Herder's Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity* (1785) 8: 64–5].

Building on the work of Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–88), "the great author of the system of nature" (*Anth* 7: 221), Kant argues that all "animals which produce fertile young with one another . . . belong to one and the same physical species" (*Of the Different Races* 2: 429). This puts him squarely in the camp of the monogenists: "All human beings on the wide earth belong to one and the same natural species" (*Of the Different Races* 2: 429; cf. *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* 8: 100) – *contra* Voltaire, Henry Home (Lord Kames) and other polygenists who held that the human races originate from different genetic sources, and thus are not members of the same species.

Kant then proceeds to identify "race" with certain sets of invariably inherited characteristics that do not belong to the species as such:

hereditary differences . . . which persistently preserve themselves in all transplantings (transpositions to other regions) over prolonged generations among themselves and which also always beget half-breed young in the mixing with other variations of the same phylum are called *races* (*Of the Different Races* 2: 430; cf. *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* 8: 99–100, *On the Use of Teleological Principles* 8: 165).

In emphasizing the hereditary nature of race, Kant parts ways with those who understood race solely as a function of climate. But at the same time, he also argues that climate did play a decisive causal role earlier on:

The human being was destined for all climates and for every soil; consequently, various germs (*Keime*) and natural predispositions (*Anlagen*) had to lie ready in him to be on occasion either unfolded or restrained, so that he would become well suited to his place in the world and over the course of generations would appear to be as it were native to and made for that place.

(2: 435; cf. 8: 93, 8: 166)

On this view, racial characteristics are present in the human species because they help us to reach our collective destiny. Originally the same "germs and natural predispositions" for various skin colors were present in each of our ancestors, with some predispositions rather than others being actualized depending on the specific climate in which they lived. At one point, we were all potentially black, red, yellow, and white. Racial differences emerged gradually with the dispersal of human beings to different climatic conditions. "The end of Providence is this: God wants

that human beings should populate the entire earth. All animals have their special climates, but human beings are to be found everywhere. Human beings are not to stay in a small region, but to spread out across the entire earth" (*Friedländer* 25: 679). Again, though, on Kant's view the role of climate in determining skin color is both partial and temporary. Once the appropriate "race germ" is actualized by the requisite climatic conditions, there can be neither a reversion to the original condition nor a change to another race: "after one of these predispositions was developed in a people, it extinguished all the others entirely" (*Determination* 8: 105). At this point, as Arthur Lovejoy notes, "the other germs obligingly retire into inactivity."¹²

And what was the original human skin color? Kant is often accused of holding the view that all the races derive from an ideal "stem genus" that just happens to be white, and that "other skin colors are *degenerate*, ugly variants – reflecting the morally 'fallen' and inferior mental status of their carriers – of the white original."¹³ But the evidence is mixed at best. In his 1775 essay, he does speculate that the phyletic species (*Stammgattung*) was "white" – albeit "brunette" rather than blond (2: 441). However, in his 1785 essay, *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race*, he states that it is "impossible to guess (*unmöglich zu erraten*) the shape of the first human phylum (*der erste Menschenstamm*) (as far as the constitution of the skin is concerned); even the character of the whites is only the development of one of the original predispositions" (8: 106). And in *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* he asserts explicitly that the germs and natural predispositions for different skin colors had "to have been *united* in the first human couple" (8: 173). So his considered view on the matter appears to be that, as regards skin color, the original humans were "none of the above" – not white, black, yellow, or red.

Strictly speaking, skin color on Kant's view is the only true mark of race. With the sole exception of skin color, "no other characteristic property is *necessarily hereditary* in the class of whites than what belongs to the human species in general; and so with the other classes as well" (*Determination of the Concept*, 8: 94). At the same time – as is true of so much of the sorry history of race discourse – Kant's discussions of race abound with value judgments concerning the alleged level of intellect, talent, and cultural development of the different races. For instance, in his *Geography* lectures he proclaims: "Humanity is in its greatest perfection in the white race. The yellow Indians already have a lesser talent. The Negroes are much lower, and lowest of all is part of the American peoples" (9: 316; cf. *Menschenkunde* 25: 1187).

Kant's firm belief that certain peoples are "incapable of any culture" (*On the Use of Teleological Principles* 8: 176; cf. *Pillau* 25: 843, *Menschenkunde* 25: 1187) and lack a sufficient "drive to activity" (8: 174 n.) in turn leads him to ask "why they exist at all."¹⁴ The most notorious

example here is his critique of the Tahitians – a people whom Diderot, following Rousseau and others, viewed as being "close to the origins of the world,"¹⁵ i.e., in a more natural and happier state, uncorrupted by the false progress of European civilization. In his *Review* of Part 2 of Herder's *Ideas*, Kant writes:

Does the author really mean that if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by more cultured nations, had been destined to live for thousands of centuries in their tranquil indolence, one could give a satisfying answer to the question why they exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as good to have this island populated with happy sheep and cattle as with human beings who are happy merely enjoying themselves? (8: 65; cf. *Idea for a Universal History* 8: 21, *Groundwork* 4: 423, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 378, *Reflexion* 1500 (*Refl.*), 15: 785).

While there is certainly plenty to object to in this passage, its underlying message has often been misunderstood. First of all, Kant's main animus is directed not at Tahitians *per se* but at human beings everywhere who are "merely enjoying themselves." On his view, our central vocation is to develop our rational capacities and talents. People who ignore this fundamental moral obligation to develop their rational capacities and talents (and Kant thinks there are *a lot* of them) come in for some very heavy-handed criticism. The Poles and the Russians, for instance, "do not appear to be properly capable of civilization" (*Menschenkunde* 25: 1185); and the Spaniard "remains centuries behind in the sciences; resists any reform; [and] is proud of not having to work" (*Anth* 7: 316). So the fundamental issue, in Kant's mind, is not one of civilized Europeans versus uncivilized Tahitian natives, but rather one of earnest cultivators of rational humanity versus those who are content to remain uncultivated. And in so far as Kant sees this battle being played out collectively by different peoples and cultures (which, alas, he often does), it is not so much Europe versus the "savages" or whites versus blacks as certain parts of *western* Europe versus . . . the rest of humanity.

At the same time, while he is clearly convinced that we "must search for the continual progress of the human race in the Occident" rather than elsewhere (*Refl.* 1501, 15: 788–9), one should not infer from this that Kant believes that the Tahitians' only hope is to make contact with white Europeans and adopt the Ways of the West. For the moral duty to cultivate one's humanity is fundamentally a duty *to oneself*. And on Kant's view "it is a contradiction for me to make another's *perfection* my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this" (*The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 386). In other words, I can't perfect you, and you can't perfect me. People must rather try to perfect *themselves*, employing the concepts of self-perfection that are alive within their own cultural traditions and practices.¹⁶

Also, it follows from Kant's fundamental opposition to treating people as means rather than as ends in themselves (see *Groundwork* 4: 428–31) that he is a staunch opponent of all practices of colonialism and conquest by force. Regardless of whether there is a satisfactory answer to the question of why a given people "exist at all," it is Kant's view that no people, under any circumstances, ever has the right to take possession of land that has already been settled by other people without the latter's consent. As he states in *The Metaphysics of Morals*:

It can still be asked whether, when neither nature nor chance but just our own will brings us into the neighborhood of a people that holds out no prospect of a civil union with it, we should not be authorized to found colonies, by force if need be, in order to establish a civil union with them and bring these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition (as with the American Indians, the Hottentots and the inhabitants of New Holland); or (which is not much better), to found colonies by fraudulent purchase of their land, and so become owners of their land, making use of our superiority without regard for their first possession. . . . But it is easy to see through this veil of injustice (Jesuitism), which would sanction any means to good ends. Such a way of acquiring land is therefore to be repudiated. (6: 266; cf. 6: 353, *Perpetual Peace* 8: 359)

No good end (and clearly Kant did think that "civilizing savages" was a good end) can justify means that involve the violation of people's rights.

HISTORY

The writings on history included in this volume¹⁷ were all composed in the mid-1780s, and appeared originally as independent essays and reviews in journals. Like the other texts in *Anthropology, History, and Education*, in the past they have often been viewed as incidental pieces standing outside of Kant's central philosophical concerns. As Lewis White Beck remarked in his Editor's Introduction to Kant, *On History*, Kant's strong focus on unchanging concepts and categories in the three *Critiques* naturally suggests to many readers that he was "a philosopher, with a philosophy that seems singularly unlikely to encourage a philosopher to take history seriously."¹⁸ But it is now generally recognized that the basic issue of how the realms of nature and morality link up with each other – more specifically, of how the second arises from the first – is central to all three *Critiques*, and that Kant's philosophy of history is essentially an attempt to address these two questions. At bottom, Kant's philosophy of history is a theory about the human species' movement over time from nature to morality and freedom – or (less controversially), a theory about its movement from nature toward external and tangible "veevers" and "resemblances" of morality that themselves serve as preparations for

true moral change (cf. *Perpetual Peace* 8: 375–6 n., *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* 8: 26).¹⁹ History on Kant's view is "nothing other than the transition from the crudity of a merely animal creature into humanity, from the go-cart of instinct to the guidance of reason – in a word, from the guardianship of nature into the condition of freedom" [*Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786) 8: 115].

Like other Enlightenment intellectuals, Kant clearly understands history as the story of human progress. But his specific conception of the nature of historical progress sets him apart from many of his contemporaries. First of all, he does not identify progress with increasing happiness. The value of human life is "less than zero" when assessed merely in terms of happiness (*Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 434 n.). Grounding his philosophy of history in the teleological assumption that "nature does nothing superfluous and is not wasteful in the use of means to its ends" (*Idea* 8: 19) – in the thought that we need to assume a heuristic concept of purpose in order to make sense out of the natural world (cf. *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 398) – he adds that if we assume that nature's purpose in endowing human beings with reason was to enable them to achieve happiness, we would then have to conclude that nature had "hit upon a very bad arrangement" (*Groundwork* 4: 395). For mere instinct is a far more effective instrument in achieving this goal. Rather, the creation of culture and (out of culture) morality is nature's purpose here. History is the story of our "steps from crudity toward culture" (*Idea* 8: 21). And what is culture? In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant defines culture succinctly as "the production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends in general (thus those of his freedom)" (5: 431; cf. *Lectures on Pedagogy* 9: 449).²⁰ It is then subdivided into the capacity to make use of products of nature for one's ends (the culture of skill) and the ability to liberate the will "from the despotism of desires" (the culture of training, discipline) (5: 432).

Second, Kant's assumption of progress is not as complacent or naïve as that of other Enlightenment theorists. On his view, we are not irrevocably fated or causally determined to achieve progress; rather, we pursue it as free beings who can and do change their minds:

No one can guarantee that now, this very moment, with regard to the physical disposition of our species, the epoch of its decline would not be liable to occur. . . . For we are dealing with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they *ought* to do may be *dictated* in advance, but of whom it may not be *predicted* what they will do. (*Conflict of the Faculties* 7: 83)

Whether or not we will continue to progress depends, at least to some extent (see below), on our own free choices.

Finally, a third reason for describing Kant's view of progress as atypical of the Enlightenment is that in his view progress is not a metaphysical

principle operating in history, a “general law of nature,”²¹ or even an empirically verifiable fact. Rather, it is an *a priori* principle that we are to use to structure a historical narrative – an “idea” that should serve “as a guiding thread for exhibiting an otherwise planless *aggregate* of human actions, at least in the large, as a *system*” (*Idea* 8: 29; cf. 17, 18). In the language of the first *Critique*, the assumption of progress is to be regarded as a *regulative* as opposed to *constitutive* ideal. But regulative ideals, he warns, “even though one may never concede them objective reality (existence), are nevertheless not to be regarded as mere figments of the brain; rather they provide an indispensable standard for reason” (A 569/B 598). Similarly, in the third *Critique* Kant argues that the assumption of purposiveness in nature, while “not a principle for the determining but only for the reflecting power of judgment,” is nevertheless a principle that “is in fact indispensable for us” in our researches into nature (5: 379, 398). On Kant’s view, the idea of progress is merely a heuristic device, albeit a humanly necessary one.

Means of progress. What then are the means of progress, the instruments which nature uses to achieve her goals with respect to the human species? First and foremost, there is our “unsociable sociability,” a bi-directional inclination rooted in human nature that leads us both to associate with others (sociability) and then to compete constantly and fight against each other within social contexts (unsociability) (cf. *Idea* 8: 20–1). But as a result of the human being’s competitive nature, his insatiable desire for power and status,

all talents come bit by bit to be developed, taste is formed, and even, through progress in enlightenment, a beginning is made toward the foundation of a way of thinking which can with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transform a *pathologically* compelled agreement to form a society into a *moral* whole. Without these qualities of unsociability . . . all talents would . . . remain eternally hidden in their germs; human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth than that of their domesticated beasts. . . . Thanks be to nature, therefore, for the incompatibility, for the spiteful competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or even to dominate! For without them all the excellent natural predispositions in humanity would eternally slumber undeveloped. (*Idea* 8: 21)

Like Adam Smith and other Enlightenment theorists, Kant is thus convinced that social progress is often the result of the unintentional behavior of self-interested individuals. Each individual is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. . . . By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.”²² But note the

extremely large claims Kant makes on behalf of our unsociability. It is held to be the primary driving force behind *all* branches of human culture, art, science, and politics; indeed, even to lie behind the hoped-for transformation of human life into a cosmopolitan moral whole. “All culture and art that adorn humanity, and the most beautiful social order, are fruits of unsociability, through which it is necessitated by itself to discipline itself, and so by an art extorted from it, to develop completely the germs of nature” (*Idea* 8: 22).

The growth and spread of the arts and sciences in turn helps prepare human beings for the deeper moral transformation that is nature’s ultimate goal:

Beautiful arts and sciences, which by means of a universally communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement make human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, very much reduce the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare human beings for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power.

(*Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 433)

Similarly, the growth of representative government and the rule of law also help prepare the way for morality by making us less partial toward our own interests, disciplining our emotions, and instilling less violent behavior patterns:

Within each state human malevolence is veiled by the coercion of civil laws, for the citizens’ inclination to violence against one another is powerfully counteracted by a greater force, namely that of the government, and so not only does this give the whole a moral veneer (*causae non causae*) but also, by its checking the outbreak of unlawful inclinations, the development of the moral predisposition to immediate respect for right is actually greatly facilitated. . . . Thereby a great step is taken toward morality (though it is not yet a moral step).

(*Perpetual Peace* 8: 375–6 n.)

Other means employed by nature to promote human progress are equally unsavory. On Kant’s view, the development of skills within the human species (which, as we saw earlier, is essentially what he means by “culture”) requires inequality among people. The vast majority of human beings who provide the daily necessities of life for the lucky few live lives of “oppression, bitter work, and little enjoyment”; but in doing so they provide the latter elite group “who cultivate the less necessary elements of culture” with the necessary leisure to improve and refine their skills and to develop new specializations (*Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 432). At the same time, calamities and miseries “grow equally great on both sides, on the one side because of violence imposed from without, on the other because of dissatisfactions from within” (5: 432). Even war

itself – so long as humankind remains at its present stage – is viewed by Kant as “an indispensable means of bringing culture still further” (*Conjectural Beginning of Human History* 8: 121; cf. 5: 433).

And what strategies does nature have for moving human culture beyond its present stage? Here political and legal reforms play a key role. Nature’s purpose can be fulfilled only within communities that have just civil constitutions – societies governed by the rule of law which ensure to their citizens “the greatest freedom, hence one[s] in which there is a thoroughgoing antagonism of [their] members, and yet the most precise determination and security of the boundaries of this freedom so that the latter can coexist with the freedom of others” (*Idea* 8: 22; cf. 5: 432). However, while the formation of civil society and the rule of law will help curb violence between individuals, the problem of the abuse of freedom by nation-states in mutual conflict still remains. Wars between nations comprise an ongoing international parallel to the violence between private individuals that the legal authority of nation-states was intended to bring under control. Unless and until the violence between nations can be brought under legal control, domestic life is not secure either. Ultimately a second tier of government is necessary: “only in a universal association of states (analogous to that by which a people becomes a state) can rights come to hold conclusively and a true condition of peace come about” (*Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 350; cf. *Idea* 8: 24, *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 433).

Kant is not so naïve as to believe that this “universal cosmopolitan condition, as the womb in which all the original predispositions of the human species will be developed” (*Idea* 8: 28) will come about easily and smoothly through intentional human planning. Rather, it too is part of nature’s hidden plan. The misery of continual wars (not to mention their growing expense) are themselves means by which nature drives nations “to what reason could have told them even without so much sad experience: namely, to go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter into a federation of nations” (*Idea* 8: 24). And the spirit of trade – more generally the desire for open lines of communication and free exchange of ideas – will also help eventually to nudge governments toward an international federation:

If one hinders the citizen who is seeking his welfare in any way he pleases, as long as it can subsist with the freedom of others, then one restrains the vitality of all enterprise and with it, in turn, the powers of the whole. Hence the personal restrictions on the citizen’s doing and refraining are removed more and more, and the general freedom of religion is ceded; and thus gradually arises, accompanied by delusions and whims, *enlightenment*, as a great good that must raise humankind even out of the selfish aims of aggrandizement on the part of its rulers, if only the latter understand their own advantage.

(*Idea* 8: 28; cf. *Perpetual Peace* 8: 368)

The hope is that enlightenment will spread gradually and voluntarily among all peoples, as communication and contacts between cultures increase. What is envisaged is not the soulless despotism of a single world-state, but rather a federation of independent and sovereign nation-states, a federation which still allows sufficient room for local attachments, customs, and cultural differences, while also providing the necessary legal and political mechanisms to insure peace. The explicit but long-term goal of this gradual process is the eventual creation of a new cosmopolitan order “where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt in all” (*Perpetual Peace* 8: 360).

EDUCATION

The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection . . . How, then, are we to seek this perfection, and from whence is it to be hoped for? From nowhere else but education.

Moralphilosophie Collins 27: 470–1

In Kant’s writings on history, human progress is viewed primarily as the unintended result of our (selfish, competitive, and violent) actions. “The great artist *nature*” forces us to progress whether we want to or not (*Perpetual Peace* 8: 360). In his writings on education – chiefly, the *Lectures on Pedagogy* (1803, edited by his former student Friedrich Theodor Rink) and the two *Essays Concerning the Philanthropinum* (1776–7)²³ – the stress is much more on how the species achieves progress through the intentional development of its own capacities and talents.

Here too though, nature steps in at two important junctures. First, the biological fact of human dependence is itself what makes education necessary. Other animals “use their powers as soon as they have any in a regular manner”; but “the human being is the only creature that must be educated” (*Lectures on Pedagogy* 9: 441). “It is the human being who is supposed to first develop his predispositions toward the good. Providence has not placed them already finished in him; they are mere predispositions and without the distinction of morality” (9: 446). At birth human beings are not free-floating, autonomous moral agents but radically dependent creatures who must be educated slowly into morality.

Second, the proper educational method must itself be derived from nature. (On this point Kant follows the Philanthropinist Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723–90), who in turn follows Rousseau, who in turn follows Locke.) Schools must not (as they did in Kant’s day) work “against nature.” Rather, they must develop new methods which are “wisely derived from nature itself and not slavishly copied from old habit and unexperienced ages” (*Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* 2: 449). In Kant’s writings on education there are refreshing appeals made both to experimentalism (“since experiments matter, no one generation can present a

complete plan of education" (9: 451)) and to naturalism ("the first stage of education must be merely negative, i.e., one should not add some new provision to that of nature, but merely leave nature undisturbed" (9: 459)) – appeals that are not as easy to detect in his more canonical philosophy texts.

The class for which Kant's pedagogy lectures were prepared was taught only four times, whereas his anthropology course was offered annually for twenty-four years. But one should not infer from this that his interests in the former subject were only temporary or minor – or that they were unconnected to the broader investigations into human nature that one finds in his writings on history and anthropology. Again, the strongest connecting link between these three fields of his work lies in their concern with the perfection of the human species: "behind education lies the great secret of the perfection of human nature" (*Lectures on Pedagogy* 9: 444). And his first articulation of this concern is to be found in the two short essays on Basedow's Philanthropin Institute in Dessau.

Kant's strong endorsement of Basedow's Institute ["the greatest phenomenon that has appeared in this century for . . . the perfection of humanity" (*Friedländer* 25: 722–3)] rests on a number of factors – e.g., Basedow's views on foreign-language education and interdenominational religious instruction both appealed to Kant, as did his basic commitment to a more Rousseauian child-centered approach to teaching. But above all, there was the commitment to instilling cosmopolitan dispositions in students. The primary goal of the Dessau Philanthropinum, Basedow declared, was to educate students to become "citizens of our world,"²⁴ and in the conclusion to his own *Lectures on Pedagogy* Kant also exhorts educators to stress the inculcation of "cosmopolitan dispositions" in young people. In attempting to develop these dispositions in students, he adds, "an interest in the best for the world (*das Weltbeste*) must come to pass. One must make children familiar with this interest so that they may warm their souls with it. They must rejoice at the best for the world even if it is not to the advantage of their fatherland or to their own gain" (9: 499). Basedow and Kant are thus united in their conviction that education everywhere should serve not merely parental or national purposes but rather the species-wide goal of human perfection. The problem with these former approaches to education is that

1) parents usually care only that their children get on well in the world, and
2) princes regard their subjects merely as instruments for their own designs.
Parents care for the home, princes for the state. Neither have as their final end the best for the world and the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has the predisposition. However, the plan for education must be made in a cosmopolitan manner. (9: 448)

Kant often summarizes "the perfection to which humanity is destined" with the single cryptic word "moralization" (*Moralisierung*). All of humanity's other achievements in the arts and sciences, politics and law, and culture generally are themselves held to be merely preparatory steps toward this final goal:

The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being . . . , is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings, and in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to moralize himself by means of the arts and sciences.

(*Anth* 7: 324; cf. *Idea* 8: 26, *Pedagogy* 9: 450)

Moralization – and despite humanity's notable achievements in other areas, Kant warns that as of yet "we have done almost nothing at all" (*beinahe gar nichts*) to reach this final stage of development (*Menschenkunde* 25: 1198) – refers to an internalization, on the part of all people, of the norms expressed in the different formulas of the categorical imperative (see *Groundwork* 4: 421–37). As he remarks tersely in the *Lectures on Pedagogy*, in order to become moralized human beings everywhere must "acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone" (9: 450). Moralized agents have acquired – in large part as a result of their participation in a variety of requisite civic, cultural, political, and educational institutions – deep-seated dispositions to act on universalizable maxims, to treat people as ends in themselves rather than as means, and to regard everyone as a lawgiving member in a universal kingdom of ends. "This is the destined final end, and the highest moral perfection, to which the human race can attain, and for which, after the lapse of many centuries, we may still have hope" (*Moralphilosophie* *Collins* 27: 471).

The Kant of *Anthropology, History, and Education* is often a less familiar Kant, a Kant who does not always say what we expect or want him to say, a Kant who at times does not sit comfortably with the more familiar Kant. But if the questions of metaphysics, moral philosophy, and religion do indeed all refer back to the more fundamental question "What is the human being?" (cf. *Jäsche Logic* 9: 25; Kant to Stäudlin, May 4, 1793, 11: 429; *Metaphysik Politz* 28: 534), this is a Kant we also need to read.²⁵

ROBERT B. LOUDEN

Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Kant's little book *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* was submitted to the Dean of the University of Königsberg for approval of publication on October 8, 1763, and its first edition was published in Königsberg by Johann Jacob Kanter with the date of 1764. Kant's then friend Johann Georg Hamann reported on February 1, 1764 that he was at work on a review of the work (which would appear in the *Königsberger gelehrte und politische Zeitungen* on April 30, 1764), so the work was actually published no later than January, 1764.

The book was thus written at the end of the period of exceptional productivity in which Kant had composed *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762), the *Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (also 1762, although not published until 1764, when it was published by the Berlin Academy of Sciences as the runner-up to Moses Mendelssohn's essay *On Evidence in the Metaphysical Sciences*, which was awarded the first prize in the Academy's 1762 competition on the question of whether philosophy could employ the mathematical method), the *Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), and the *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy* (1763). But unlike these difficult writings in professional philosophy, which show Kant breaking away from central tenets of the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff and taking at least some of the crucial steps toward the "critical philosophy" that he would fully develop in the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 and his subsequent mature works, the *Observations* is a work of popular philosophy, reflecting more the popular lecturer, man of letters, and "elegant Magister" or man about town that Kant also was as he approached his fortieth birthday. At this time Kant was still a *Privatdozent*, or lecturer paid by the head rather than salaried professor, and was thus dependent for his livelihood upon the popularity of his lectures. The *Observations* might thus be considered to be in the line of pamphlets that Kant published to advertise his lectures, from *An Attempt at some Reflections on*

Optimism of 1759 to the Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766, or at least as a work that Kant published to keep himself before the public eye rather than to advance his purely academic reputation.

The title of the work would have led the reader of 1764 as well as it might lead the reader of today to expect a work in aesthetics, similar as it is to the title of Edmund Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* of 1757, which had been made widely known in Germany by Moses Mendelssohn's review of the following year. But the work contains little by way of detailed aesthetic theory, and thus does little to anticipate Kant's mature work in that area, the first half of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* of 1790, other than employing the basic distinction between the beautiful and the sublime that Kant would also use in the later work. Instead, the *Observations* is really a work in what Kant would later call "anthropology from a pragmatic point of view," although he would not begin offering his lectures on anthropology until 1772–3 and would not publish his handbook for those lectures until 1798, after he had ceased delivering them. By "anthropology from a pragmatic point of view" Kant meant the study of those features of human psychology that affect human action, as well as of the variations in human conditions such as gender, nationality, and race that also affect human action. The *Observations* uses the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime, which is briefly expounded in its first section, to study varieties of moral attitudes and characters among human beings, discussed in detail in its second section, and then to characterize differences between the genders, in its third section, and among nationalities and races, in its fourth. The interest of the work thus lies not in what it reveals of Kant's eventual aesthetic theory, which is very little, but in what it displays of his emerging moral theory, which is significant, as well as what it suggests about the strengths and weaknesses of Kant's views about gender, nationality, and race.

In the first section of the book, Kant characterizes the feeling of beauty as pleasure in an object that is "joyful and smiling," while the feeling of the sublime arouses "satisfaction, but with dread" (AA 2: 208). Kant does not classify the varieties of the sublime with his later distinction between the "mathematical" and the "dynamical" versions, but instead deploys a threefold distinction between the "terrifying," "noble" and "magnificent" sublime, distinguished only by differences among characteristics of the objects that induce these feelings. At one point in the second section, however, Kant does state that "[t]he mathematical representation of the immeasurable greatness of the universe, metaphysical considerations of eternity, of prophecy, of the immortality of our soul contain a certain sublimity and dignity" (AA 2: 215). His distinction between "mathematical representation" and "metaphysical considerations" here

might be thought to anticipate the later distinction between the mathematical and dynamical sublime, which are distinguished by whether it is theoretical or practical reason that stands in a specially challenging yet ultimately satisfying relation to the play of our imagination.

The second section of the book is most significant, however, for what it reveals about Kant's developing moral theory. The key claim is that while acting out of feelings of love and sympathy toward others is beautiful, acting out of principle is sublime. In particular, Kant argues that while lovable qualities of feeling and temperament such as sympathy are valuable if they harmonize with virtue, they are by themselves *blind*, that is, it is contingent whether in any particular circumstances they actually point an agent in the direction of the morally correct action (AA 2: 215–16). "True virtue," however, "can only be supported by principles which, the more general they are, the more sublime and noble they become" (AA 2: 217). At this stage, Kant is not yet ready to ascribe both the recognition and the motivational force of entirely general principles of action to pure (practical) reason. Rather, he says "[t]hese principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance." But he does characterize this feeling as "**the feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature.**" Here Kant is clearly anticipating his eventual view that the foundation of morality and the "ground of a possible categorical imperative" is the dignity of every human being as an end in itself that is never to be used merely as a means to anyone else's ends (*Groundwork*, AA 4: 428–9). And it might well be wondered whether the persuasive power of Kant's later appeal to pure reason as the source of the idea that every human being is an end in itself does not ultimately rest upon the presence of the feeling of the beauty and dignity of human nature present in every human breast, or at least almost every one.

The remainder of the second section of the *Observations* relates Kant's distinction between beautiful and sublime moral characters to the traditional division of characters into phlegmatic, melancholic, sanguine, and choleric; the most interesting point here is his characterization of the melancholic, not as someone who deprives himself of the joys of life, but as someone who "subordinates his sentiments to principles," and who therefore makes his desires "the less subject to inconstancy and alteration the more general this principle to which they are subordinated is [...]. All particular grounds of inclinations are subjected to many exceptions and alterations insofar as they are not derived from such a higher ground" (AA 2: 220). Here Kant clearly anticipates his mature model of morality: it does not require the elimination of natural feelings and desires, but their governance in accordance with universal principles of reason.

In the third section Kant argues that the moral character of women is beautiful because they tend to be governed by feelings of love and sympathy, while that of men is sublime because they are capable of governing themselves by principle. Here Kant makes some of his now unacceptable remarks about women, such as that women who engage in scientific inquiry might as well "also wear a beard" (AA 2: 230). But Kant's views here should not be dismissed as completely piggish, because he also makes explicit that very few men actually govern themselves by principle, and that they would thus do well to emulate the sympathy and sensitivity of women more than they actually do. He thus at least suggests the possibility of a gender-neutral conception of moral character that includes both firmness of principle and sensitivity to the actual feelings of those who are affected by one's actions, and which makes the latter something that must be respected by moral principles. However, there seems to be little that is redeemable in the fourth section of the work, in which Kant classifies the character of the various European nationalities in a way that now seems silly but largely harmless to us, but classifies the intelligence and characters of different human races in ways that are largely although not entirely reprehensible. Even by the standards of his own time, let alone by those of our time, Kant was not always entirely enlightened, especially when his views (as on matters of race) could only be second-hand because of the social and geographical limits of his own experience.

Even more important than the anticipations of his later moral philosophy that are to be found in the second section of the *Observations* are the further notes, mostly on moral philosophy, that Kant wrote in his own interleaved copy of the first edition of the book in 1764–5. These notes were transcribed by Gerhard Lehmann in volume 20 of the Academy edition (published in 1942), pp. 1–102, and, in a much better version, by Marie Rischmüller in *Bemerkungen in den "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen". Kant-Forschungen*, vol. III (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991). A selection of the most significant of these notes has been included in Immanuel Kant, *Notes and Fragments*, edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chapter 1, pp. 1–24.

The *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* was first published in English in the two-volume *Essays and Treatises on Moral, Political and Various Philosophical Subjects by E. Kant* (London: William Richardson, 1799). The translator was anonymous, and has been variously conjectured to have been A. F. M. Willich, John Richardson (who had studied with Kant's student Johann Sigismund Beck), or the publisher William Richardson himself. A more recent English translation was made by John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960). I am in debt to Goldthwait's edition for

some references and no doubt for many turns of phrase, but have aimed to produce a version that conforms to the the syntactical standards of the Cambridge edition and to the glossary of the Cambridge edition, especially of the present volume and *Notes and Fragments*.

The first edition of the *Observations* was followed by a second edition, also published by Kanter, in 1766, and by a third edition, published in Riga by Friedrich Hartknoch, in 1771, which exists in three different versions, marked by three different vignettes on the title page. (Hartknoch would subsequently publish the *Critique of Pure Reason*.) In Kant's lifetime, there were three more editions, in 1797 (Graz), 1797–8 (Königsberg and Leipzig), and 1799 (Halle), in none of which Kant seems to have had a hand. The second and third editions introduce more errors than corrections, and it is not clear whether Kant was personally involved in their production. The editor of the *Observations* in the Academy edition, Paul Menzer, therefore chose to base his text on the first edition, and it is Menzer's text that is translated here. The translation of *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen* was undertaken by Paul Guyer.

Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime

2: 205

M. IMMANUEL KANT

Königsberg, by Johann Jakob Kanter, 1764

FIRST SECTION. ON THE DISTINCT OBJECTS OF THE FEELING FOR THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL

2: 207

The different sentiments of gratification or vexation rest not so much on the constitution of the external things that arouse them as on the feeling, intrinsic to every person, of being touched by them with pleasure or displeasure. Hence arise the joys for some people in what is disgusting to others, the passion of a lover that is often a mystery to everyone else, or even the lively repugnance that one person feels^a in that which is completely indifferent to another. The field for observations of these peculiarities of human nature is very extensive and still conceals a rich lode for discoveries that are as charming as they are instructive. For now I will cast my glance only on several places that seem especially to stand out in this region, and even on these more with the eye of an observer than of the philosopher.

Since a human being finds himself happy only insofar as he satisfies an inclination, the feeling that makes him capable of enjoying a great gratification without requiring exceptional talents is certainly no small matter. Stout persons, whose most inspired author is their cook, and whose works of fine taste are to be found in their cellar, get just as lively a joy from vulgarities and a crude joke as that of which persons of nobler sentiment are so proud. A comfortable man, who likes having books read aloud to him because that helps him fall asleep; the merchant to whom all gratifications seem ridiculous except for that which a clever man enjoys when he calculates his business profits; he who loves the opposite sex only insofar as he counts it among the things that are to be enjoyed; the lover of the hunt, whether he hunts fleas, like Domitian,¹ or wild beasts, like A–: all of these have a feeling which makes them capable of enjoying gratification after their fashion, without their having to envy others or even being able to form any concept of others;

2: 208

^a empfindet.

but for now I do not direct any attention to this. There is still a feeling of a finer sort, thus named either because one can enjoy it longer without surfeit and exhaustion, or because it presupposes, so to speak, a susceptibility of the soul which at the same time makes it fit for virtuous impulses, or because it is a sign of talents and excellences of the intellect; while by contrast the former can occur in complete thoughtlessness. I will consider one aspect of this feeling. Yet I exclude here the inclination which is attached to lofty intellectual insights, and the charm of which a **Kepler** was capable when, as **Bayle** reports, he would not have sold one of his discoveries for a principedom.² This sentiment is altogether too fine to belong in the present project, which will touch only upon the sensuous feeling of which more common souls are also capable.

The finer feeling that we will now consider is preeminently of two kinds: the feeling of the **sublime** and of the **beautiful**.³ Being touched by either is agreeable, but in very different ways. The sight of a mountain whose snow-covered peaks arise above the clouds, the description of a raging storm, or the depiction of the kingdom of hell by **Milton** arouses satisfaction, but with dread;⁴ by contrast, the prospect of meadows strewn with flowers, of valleys with winding brooks, covered with grazing herds, the description of Elysium,⁵ or **Homer's** depiction of the girdle of Venus⁶ also occasion an agreeable sentiment, but one that is joyful and smiling. For the former to make its impression on us in its proper strength, we must have a **feeling of the sublime**, and in order properly to **enjoy** the latter we must have a **feeling for the beautiful**. Lofty oaks and lonely shadows in sacred groves are **sublime**, flower beds, low hedges, and trees trimmed into figures are **beautiful**. The night is **sublime**, the day is **beautiful**. Casts of mind that possess a feeling for the sublime are gradually drawn into lofty sentiments, of friendship, of contempt for the world, of eternity, by the quiet calm of a summer evening, when the flickering light of the stars breaks through the umber shadows of the night and the lonely moon rises into view. The brilliant day inspires busy fervor and a feeling of^a gaiety. The sublime **touches**, the beautiful **charms**. The mien of the human being who finds himself in the full feeling of the sublime is serious, sometimes even rigid and astonished. By contrast, the lively sentiment of the beautiful announces itself through shining cheerfulness in the eyes, through traces of a smile, and often through audible mirth. The sublime is in turn of different sorts. The feeling of it is sometimes accompanied with some dread or even melancholy, in some cases merely with quiet admiration and in yet others with a beauty spread over a sublime prospect. I will call the first the **terrifying sublime**,

2: 209

the second the **noble**, and the third the **magnificent**. Deep solitude is sublime, but in a terrifying way.*⁷ For this reason great and extensive wastes, such as the immense deserts of Schamo in Tartary, have always given us occasion to people them with fearsome shades, goblins, and ghosts.

The sublime must always be large, the beautiful can also be small. The sublime must be simple, the beautiful can be decorated and ornamented. A great height is just as sublime as a great depth, but the latter is accompanied with the sensation^a of shuddering, the former with that of admiration; hence the latter sentiment can be terrifyingly sublime and the former noble. The sight of an Egyptian pyramid is far more moving, as **Hasselquist** reports,⁸ than one can imagine from any description, but its construction is simple and noble. St. Peter's in Rome is magnificent. Since on its frame, which is grand and simple, beauty, e.g., gold, mosaics, etc., are spread in such a way that it is still the sentiment of the sublime which has the most effect, the object is called magnificent.⁹ An arsenal

* I will only provide an example of the noble dread which the description of a total solitude can inspire, and to this end I will extract several passages from **Carazan's dream** in the *Bremen Magazine*, Volume iv, page 539. The more his riches had grown, the more did this miserly rich man bar his heart to compassion and the love of others. Meanwhile, as the love of humankind grew cold in him, the diligence of his prayers and religious devotions increased. After this confession, he goes on to recount: One evening, as I did my sums by my lamp and calculated the profit of my business, I was overcome by sleep. In this condition I saw the angel of death come upon me like a whirlwind, and he struck me, before I could plead against the terrible blow. I was petrified as I became aware that my fate had been cast for eternity, and that to all the good I had done, nothing could be added, and from all the evil that I had done, nothing could be subtracted. I was led before the throne of he who dwells in the third heaven. The brilliance that flamed before me spoke to me thus: Carazan, your divine service is rejected. You have closed your heart to the love of humankind, and held on to your treasures with an iron hand. You have lived only for yourself, and hence in the future you shall also live alone and excluded from all communion with the entirety of creation for all eternity. In this moment I was ripped away by an invisible force and driven through the shining edifice of creation. I quickly left innumerable worlds behind me. As I approached the most extreme limit of nature, I noticed that the shadows of the boundless void sank into the abyss before me. A fearful realm of eternal silence, solitude and darkness! Unspeakable dread overcame me at this sight. I gradually lost the last stars from view, and finally the last glimmer of light was extinguished in the most extreme darkness. The mortal terrors of despair increased with every moment, just as every moment my distance from the last inhabited world increased. I reflected with unbearable anguish in my heart that if ten thousand thousand years were to carry me further beyond the boundaries of everything created, I would still see forward into the immeasurable abyss of darkness without help or hope of return. – In this bewilderment I stretched my hands out to actual objects with such vehemence that I was thereby awakened. And now I have been instructed to esteem human beings; for even the least of them, whom in the pride of my good fortune I had turned from my door, would have been far more welcome to me in that terrifying desert than all the treasures of Golconda.

2: 210

^a *Empfindung*.

^a In the second and third editions: for

must be noble and simple, a residential castle magnificent, and a pleasure palace beautiful and decorated.¹⁰

A long duration is sublime. If it is of time past, it is noble; if it is projected forth into an unforeseeable future, then there is something terrifying in it. An edifice from the most distant antiquity is worthy of honor. Haller's description of the future eternity inspires a mild horror, and of the past, a transfixed admiration.¹¹

2:211

SECOND SECTION. ON THE QUALITIES OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL IN HUMAN BEINGS IN GENERAL

Understanding is sublime, wit is beautiful. Boldness is sublime and grand, cunning is petty, but beautiful. Caution, said Cromwell, is a virtue for mayors.¹² Truthfulness and honesty is simple and noble, jocularity and pleasing flattery is fine and beautiful. Civility is the beauty of virtue. An unselfish urge to serve is noble, refinement (*politesse*) and courtliness are beautiful. Sublime qualities inspire esteem, but beautiful ones inspire love. People whose feelings run primarily to the beautiful seek out their honest, steady and serious friends only in case of need; for ordinary company, however, they choose jocular, clever, and courtly companions. One esteems many a person too highly to be able to love him. He inspires admiration, but he is too far above us for us to dare to come close to him with the familiarity of love.

2:212

Those in whom both feelings are united will find that they are more powerfully moved by the sublime than by the beautiful, but that without variation or accompaniment by the latter the former is tiring and cannot be enjoyed as long.* The lofty sentiments to which conversation in a well-chosen company is sometimes elevated must intermittently dissolve into a cheerful joke, and laughing joys should make a beautiful contrast with moved, serious countenances, allowing for an unforced alternation between both sorts of sentiment. Friendship has primarily the character of the sublime, but sexual love that of the beautiful. Yet tenderness and deep esteem give the latter a certain dignity and sublimity, while flighty jocularity and intimacy elevate the coloration of the beautiful in this sentiment. In my opinion, tragedy is distinguished from comedy primarily in the fact that in the former it is the feeling for the sublime

while in the latter it is the feeling for the beautiful that is touched. In the former there is displayed magnanimous sacrifice for the well-being of another, bold resolve in the face of danger, and proven fidelity. There love is melancholic, tender, and full of esteem; the misfortune of others stirs sympathetic sentiments in the bosom of the onlooker and allows his magnanimous heart to beat for the need of others. He is gently moved and feels the dignity of his own nature. Comedy, in contrast, represents intrigues, marvelous entanglements and clever people who know how to wriggle out of them, fools who let themselves be deceived, jests and ridiculous characters. Here love is not so grave, it is merry and intimate. Yet as in other cases, here too the noble can be united with the beautiful to a certain degree.

Even the vices and moral failings often carry with them some of the traits of the sublime or the beautiful, at least as they appear to our sensory feeling, without having been examined by reason. The wrath of someone fearsome is sublime, like the wrath of Achilles in the *Iliad*.¹³ In general, the hero of Homer is terrifyingly sublime, that of Virgil, by contrast, noble. Open, brazen revenge for a great offense has something grand in it, and however impermissible it might be, yet in the telling it nevertheless touches us with dread and satisfaction. When Shah Nadir was attacked at night in his tent by some conspirators, as Hanaway reports, after he had already received several wounds and was defending himself in despair, he yelled: **Mercy! I will pardon you all.** One of the conspirators answered, as he raised his saber high: **You have shown no mercy and deserve none.**¹⁴ Resolute audacity in a rogue is extremely dangerous, yet it touches us in the telling, and even when he is dragged to a shameful death yet he ennobles himself to a certain degree when he faces it spitefully and with contempt. On the other side, a cunningly conceived scheme, even when it amounts to a piece of knavery, has something about it that is fine and worth a laugh. A wanton inclination (*coquetterie*) in a refined sense, namely an effort to fascinate and to charm, is perhaps blameworthy in an otherwise decorous person, yet it is still beautiful and is commonly preferred to the honorable, serious demeanor.

2:213

The figure^a of persons who please through their outward appearance^b touches now upon one sort of feeling, now upon the other. A grand stature earns regard^c and respect, a small one more intimacy. Even brownish color and black eyes are more closely related to the sublime, blue eyes and blonde color to the beautiful. A somewhat greater age is associated more with the qualities of the sublime, youth, however,

^a Gestalt.

^b Ansehen.

^c Ansehen.

with those of the beautiful. It is similar with difference in station, and in all of those relations mentioned here even the costumes must match this distinction in feeling. Grand, sizable persons must observe simplicity or at most splendor in their dress, while small ones can be decorated and adorned. Darker colors and uniformity in costume are fitting for age, while youth radiates through brighter clothing with lively contrasts. Among the stations of similar fortune and rank, the cleric must display the greatest simplicity, the statesman the greatest splendor. The paramour can adorn himself as he pleases.

Even in external circumstances of fortune there is something that, at least in the folly of humankind, matches these sentiments. People commonly find themselves inclined to respect birth and title. Wealth, even without merit, is honored even by the disinterested, presumably because they associate with the representation of it projects for great actions that could be carried out by its means. This respect is even sometimes extended to many a rich scoundrel, who will never undertake such actions and has no conception of the noble feeling that can alone make riches estimable. What magnifies the evil of poverty is contempt, which cannot be entirely overcome even by merits, at least not before common eyes, unless rank and title deceive this coarse feeling and to some extent work to its advantage.

In human nature there are never to be found praiseworthy qualities that do not at the same time degenerate through endless gradations into the most extreme imperfection. The quality of the **terrifying sublime**, if it becomes entirely unnatural, is **adventurous**.^a Unnatural things, in so far as the sublime is thereby intended, even if little or none of it is actually found, are **grotesqueries**. He who loves and believes the adventurous is a **fantast**, while the inclination to grotesqueries makes for a **crank**. On the other side, the feeling of the beautiful degenerates if the noble is entirely lacking from it, and one calls it **ridiculous**. A male with this quality, if he is young, is called a **dandy**, and if he is middle-aged, a **fop**. Since the sublime is most necessary for the greater age, an **old fop** is the most contemptible creature in nature, just as a young crank is the most repulsive and insufferable. Jokes and cheerfulness go with the feeling of the beautiful. Nevertheless a good deal of understanding can show through, and to this extent they can be more or less related to the sublime. He in whose cheerfulness this admixture cannot be noticed **babbles**. He who babbles constantly is **silly**. One readily notices that even clever people occasionally babble, and that it requires not a little intelligence^a to call the understanding away from its post for a brief time

^a In so far as sublimity or beauty exceed the known average, one tends to call them **fictional**.

^a *Geist*.

without anything thereby going awry. He whose speeches or actions neither entertain nor move is **boring**. The bore who nevertheless tries to do both is **tasteless**. The tasteless person, if he is conceited, is a **fool**.^{*}

I will make this curious catalogue of human frailties somewhat more comprehensible through examples, for he who lacks Hogarth's burin must use description to make up for what the drawing lacks in expression.¹⁵ Boldly undertaking danger for our own rights, for those of the fatherland, or for those of our friends is **sublime**. The crusades and ancient knighthood were **adventurous**; duels, a miserable remnant of the latter out of a perverted conception of honor, are **grotesqueries**. Melancholy withdrawal from the tumult of the world out of a legitimate weariness is **noble**. The solitary devotion of the ancient hermits was **adventurous**. Cloisters and graves of that sort for the entombment of living saints are **grotesqueries**. Subduing one's passions by means of principles is **sublime**. Castigation, vows, and other such monkish virtues are **grotesqueries**. Holy bones, holy wood, and all that sort of rubbish, the holy stools of the Great Lama of Tibet not excluded, are **grotesqueries**. Among the works of wit and fine feeling, the epic poems of Virgil and Klopstock are among the **noble**, those of Homer and Milton among the **adventurous**. The *Metamorphoses* of Ovid are **grotesqueries**, the fairy tales of French lunacy are the most wretched grotesqueries that have ever been hatched. Anacreontic poems commonly come very close to the **ridiculous**.

The works of the understanding and acuity, to the extent that their objects also contain something for feeling, likewise take some part in the differences under consideration. The mathematical representation of the immeasurable magnitude of the universe, metaphysical considerations of eternity, of providence, of the immortality of our soul contain a certain sublimity and dignity. Yet philosophy^a is also distorted by many empty subtleties, and the semblance of thoroughness does not prevent the four syllogistic figures from deserving to be counted as scholastic grotesqueries.

Among moral^b qualities, true virtue alone is **sublime**. There are nevertheless good moral^c qualities that are lovable and beautiful and, to the

* One quickly notices that this honorable company divides itself into two compartments, the cranks and the fops. A learned crank is politely called a **pedant**. If he adopts the obstinate mien of wisdom, like the **dunces** of olden and recent times, then the cap with bells becomes him well. The class of fops is more often encountered in high society. It is perhaps better than the former. At their expense one has much to gain and much to laugh at. In this caricature one makes a wry face at the other and knocks his empty head on the head of his brother.

^a *die Weltweisheit*.

^b *moralischen*.

^c *sittlichen*.

extent that they harmonize with virtue, may also be regarded as noble, even though they cannot genuinely be counted as part of the virtuous disposition. Judgment about this is delicate and involved. One certainly cannot call that frame of mind virtuous that is a source of actions of the sort to which virtue would also lead but on grounds that only contingently agree with it, and which thus given its nature can also often conflict with the universal rules of virtue. A certain tenderheartedness that is easily led into a warm feeling of **sympathy** is beautiful and lovable, for it indicates a kindly participation in the fate of other people, to which principles of virtue likewise lead. But this kindly passion is nevertheless weak and is always blind. For suppose that this sentiment moves you to help someone in need with your expenditure, but you are indebted to someone else and by this means you make it impossible for yourself to fulfill the strict duty of justice; then obviously the action cannot arise from any virtuous resolution, for that could not possibly entice you into sacrificing a higher obligation to this blind enchantment. If, by contrast, general affection towards humankind has become your principle, to which you always subject your actions, then your love towards the one in need remains, but it is now, from a higher standpoint, placed in its proper relationship to your duty as a whole. The universal affection is a ground for participating in his ill-fortune, but at the same time it is also a ground of justice, in accordance with whose precept you must now forbear this action. Now as soon as this feeling is raised to its proper universality, it is sublime, but also colder. For it is not possible that our bosom should swell with tenderness on behalf of every human being and swim in melancholy for everyone else's need, otherwise the virtuous person, like Heraclitus constantly melting into sympathetic tears,¹⁶ with all this goodheartedness would nevertheless become nothing more than a tenderhearted idler.*

The second sort of kindly feeling which is to be sure beautiful and lovable but still not the foundation of a genuine virtue is **complaisance**:¹⁷ an inclination to make ourselves agreeable to others through friendliness, through acquiescence to their demands, and through conformity

* On closer consideration, one finds that however loveable the quality of sympathy may be, yet it does not have in itself the dignity of virtue. A suffering child, an unhappy though upright woman may fill our heart with this melancholy, while at the same time we may coldly receive the news of a great battle in which, as may readily be realized, a considerable part of humankind must innocently suffer dreadful evils. Many a prince who has averted his countenance from melancholy for a single unfortunate person has at the same time given the order for war, often from a vain motive. There is here no proportion in the effect at all, so how can one say that the general love of mankind is the cause?

^a Kant's text has a comma here.

of our conduct to their dispositions. This ground for a charming complaisance is beautiful, and the malleability of such a heart is kindly. Yet it is so far from being a virtue that unless higher principles set bounds for it and weaken it, all sorts of vices may spring from it. For without even considering that this complaisance towards those with whom we associate is often an injustice to those who find themselves outside of this little circle, such a man, if one takes this impulse alone, can have all sorts of vices, not because of immediate inclination but because he gladly lives to please. From affectionate complaisance he will be a liar, an idler, a drunkard, etc., for he does not act in accordance with the rules for good conduct in general, but rather in accordance with an inclination that is beautiful in itself but which insofar as it is without self-control and without principles becomes ridiculous.

Thus true virtue can only be grafted upon principles, and it will become the more sublime and noble the more general they are. These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance. I believe that I can bring all this together if I say that it is the **feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature**.¹⁷ The first is a ground of universal affection, the second of universal respect, and if this feeling had the greatest perfection in any human heart then this human being would certainly love and value even himself, but only in so far as he is one among all to whom his widespread and noble feeling extends itself. Only when one subordinates one's own particular inclination to such an enlarged one can our kindly drives be proportionately applied and bring about the noble attitude that is the beauty of virtue.

In recognition of the weakness of human nature and the little power that the universal moral feeling exercises over most hearts, providence has placed such helpful drives in us as supplements for virtue, which move some to beautiful actions even without principles while at the same time being able to give others, who are ruled by these principles, a greater impetus and a stronger impulse thereto. Sympathy and complaisance are grounds for beautiful actions that would perhaps all be suffocated by the preponderance of a cruder self-interest, but as we have seen they are not immediate grounds of virtue, although since they are ennobled by their kinship with it they also bear its name. Hence I can call them **adopted virtues**, but that which rest on principles **genuine virtue**. The former are beautiful and charming, the latter alone is sublime and worthy of honor. One calls a mind in which the former sentiments rule a **good heart** and people of that sort **good-hearted**; but one rightly ascribes a **noble heart** to one who is virtuous from principles, calling him alone a **righteous person**. These adopted virtues nevertheless have a great

similarity to the true virtues, since they contain the feeling of an immediate pleasure in kindly and benevolent actions. The good-hearted person will without any ulterior aim and from immediate complaisance conduct himself peaceably and courteously with you and feel sincere compassion for the need of another.

Yet since this moral sympathy is nevertheless not enough to drive indolent human nature to actions for the common weal,^a providence has further placed in us a certain feeling which is fine and moves us, or which can also balance cruder self-interest and vulgar sensuality. This is the **feeling for honor** and its consequence, **shame**. The opinion that others may have of our value and their judgment of our actions is a motivation of great weight, which can coax us into many sacrifices, and what a good part of humanity would have done neither out of an immediately arising emotion of goodheartedness nor out of principles happens often enough merely for the sake of outer appearance, out of a delusion that is very useful although in itself very facile, as if the judgment of others determined the worth of ourselves and our actions. What happens from this impulse is not in the least virtuous, for which reason everyone who wants to be taken for virtuous takes good care to conceal the motivation of lust for honor. This inclination is also not nearly so closely related as goodheartedness is to genuine virtue, since it is not moved immediately by the beauty of actions, but by their demeanor in the eyes of others. Since the feeling for honor is nevertheless still fine, I can call the similarity to virtue that is thereby occasioned the **simulacrum of virtue**.

If we compare the casts of mind of human beings in so far as one of these three species of feeling dominates in them and determines their moral character, we find that each of them stands in closer kinship with one of the temperaments as they are usually divided,¹⁸ yet in such a way that a greater lack of moral feeling would be the share of the phlegmatic. Not as if the chief criterion in the character of these different casts of mind came down to the features at issue; for in this treatise we are not considering the cruder feelings, e.g., that of self-interest, of vulgar sensuality, etc., at all, even though these sorts of inclinations are what are primarily considered in the customary division; but rather since the finer moral sentiments here mentioned are more compatible with one or the other of these temperaments and for the most part are actually so united.

An inward feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature and a self-composure and strength of mind to relate all of one's actions to this as a general ground is serious and not readily associated with a fickle wantonness nor with the inconstancy of a frivolous person. It even

2: 219

approaches melancholy, a gentle and noble sentiment, to the extent that it is grounded in that dread which a restricted soul feels if, full of a great project, it sees the dangers that it has to withstand and has before its eyes the difficult but great triumph of self-overcoming. Genuine virtue from principles therefore has something about it that seems to agree most with the **melancholic** frame of mind in a moderate sense.

Goodheartedness, a beauty and fine susceptibility of the heart to be moved with sympathy or benevolence in individual cases as occasion demands, is very much subject to the change of circumstances; and since the movement of the soul does not rest upon a general principle, it readily takes on different shapes as the objects display one aspect or another. And since this inclination comes down to the beautiful, it appears to be most naturally united with that cast of mind that one calls **sanguine**, which is fickle and given to amusements. In this temperament we shall have to seek the well-loved qualities that we called adopted virtues.

The feeling for honor is usually already taken as a mark of the **choleric** complexion, and we can thereby take the occasion to seek out the moral consequences of this fine feeling, which for the most part are aimed only at show, for the depiction of such a character.

A person is never without all traces of finer sentiment, but a greater lack of the latter, which is comparatively called a lack of feeling, is found in the character of the **phlegmatic**, whom one also deprives even of the cruder incentives, such as lust for money, etc., which, however, together with other sister inclinations, we can even leave to him, because they do not belong in this plan at all.

Let us now more closely consider the sentiments of the sublime and the beautiful, especially insofar as they are moral, under the assumed division of the temperaments.

He whose feeling tends towards the **melancholic** is so called not because, robbed of the joys of life, he worries himself into blackest dejection,^a but because his sentiments, if they were to be increased above a certain degree or to take a false direction through some causes, would more readily result in that than in some other condition. He has above all a **feeling for the sublime**. Even beauty, for which he also has a sentiment, may not merely charm him, but must rather move him by at the same time inspiring him with admiration. The enjoyment of gratification is in his case more serious, but not on that account any lesser. All emotions of the sublime are more enchanting than the deceptive charms of the beautiful. His well-being will be contentment rather than jollity. He is steadfast. For that reason he subordinates his sentiments to principles. They are the less subject to inconstancy and alteration the more general is this principle to which they are subordinated, and thus

2: 220

^a *gemeinnützig*.

2: 221

the more extensive is the elevated feeling under which the lower ones are comprehended. All particular grounds of inclinations are subjected to many exceptions and alterations insofar as they are not derived from such a high ground. The cheerful and friendly Alceste¹⁹ says: I love and treasure my wife, because she is beautiful, flattering, and clever. But what if, when she becomes disfigured with illness, sullen with age, and, once the first enchantment has disappeared, no longer seems more clever than any other to you? If the ground is no longer there, what can become of the inclination? By contrast, take the benevolent and steady Adraste, who thinks to himself: I will treat this person lovingly and with respect, because she is my wife. This disposition is noble and generous. However the contingent charms may change, she is nevertheless always still his wife. The noble ground endures and is not so subject to the inconstancy of external things. Such is the quality of principles in comparison to emotions, which well up only on particular occasions, and thus is the man of principles by contrast to one who is occasionally overcome by a goodhearted and lovable motivation. But what if the secret language of his heart speaks thus: I must come to the help of this human being, for he suffers; not that he is my friend or companion, or that I hold him capable of sometime repaying my beneficence with gratitude. There is now no time for ratiocination and stopping at questions: He is a human being, and whatever affects human beings also affects me.²⁰ Then his conduct is based on the highest ground of benevolence in human nature and is extremely sublime, on account of its inalterability as well as the universality of its application.

I continue with my comments. The person of a melancholic frame of mind troubles himself little about how others judge, what they hold to be good or true, and in that regard he relies solely on his own insight. Since his motivations take on the nature of principles, he is not easily brought to other conceptions; his steadfastness thus sometimes degenerates into obstinacy. He looks on changes in fashion with indifference and on their luster with contempt. Friendship is sublime and hence he has a feeling for it. He can perhaps lose an inconstant friend, but the latter does not lose him equally quickly. Even the memory of an extinguished friendship is still worthy of honor for him. Talkativeness is beautiful, thoughtful taciturnity sublime. He is a good guardian of his own secrets and those of others. Truthfulness is sublime, and he hates lies or dissemblance. He has a lofty feeling for the dignity of human nature. He esteems himself and holds a human being to be a creature who deserves respect. He does not tolerate abject submissiveness and breathes freedom in a noble breast. All shackles, from the golden ones worn at court to the heavy irons of the galley-slave, are abominable to him. He is a strict judge of himself and others and is not seldom weary of himself as well as of the world. In the degenerate form of this character,

2: 222

seriousness inclines to dejection,^a piety to zealotry, the fervor for freedom to enthusiasm. Insult and injustice kindle vengefulness in him. He is then very much to be feared. He defies danger and has contempt for death. In case of perversion of his feeling and lack of a cheerful reason he succumbs to the **adventurous:**^b inspirations, apparitions, temptations. If the understanding is even weaker, he hits upon **grotesqueries:**^c portentous dreams, presentiments, and wondrous omens. He is in danger of becoming a **fantast** or a **crank.**

The person of a **sanguine** frame of mind has a dominant **feeling for the beautiful.** His joys are therefore laughing and lively. When he is not jolly, he is discontent and he has little acquaintance with contented silence. Variety is beautiful, and he loves change. He seeks joy in himself and around himself, amuses others, and is good company. He has much moral sympathy. The joyfulness of others is gratifying to him, and their suffering makes him soft. His moral feeling is beautiful, yet without principles, and is always immediately dependent upon the impressions that objects make on him at the moment. He is a friend of all human beings, or, what is really the same, never really a friend, although he is certainly good-hearted and benevolent. He does not dissemble. Today he will entertain you with his friendliness and good sorts, tomorrow, when you are ill or misfortunate, he will feel genuine and unfeigned compassion, but he will quietly slip away until the circumstances have changed. He must never be a judge. The laws are commonly too strict for him, and he lets himself be bribed by tears. He is a bad saint, never entirely good and never entirely evil. He is often dissolute and wicked, more from complaisance than from inclination. He is liberal and generous, but a poor payer of his debts, since he has much sentiment for goodness but little for justice. Nobody has as good an opinion of his own heart as he does. If you do not esteem him, you must still love him. In the greater deterioration of his character, he descends to the **ridiculous**, he is dawdling and childish. If age does not diminish his liveliness or bring him more understanding, then he is in danger of becoming an old **fop.**

2: 223

He whom one means by the **choleric** constitution of mind has a dominant feeling for that sort of the sublime which one can call the **magnificent.** It is really only the gloss of sublimity and a strikingly contrasting coloration, which hides the inner content of the thing or the person, who is perhaps only bad and common, and which deceives and moves through its appearance.^d Just as an edifice makes just as noble an impression by means of a stucco coating that represents carved stones, as

^a *Schwermut.*^b The original text has a period here.^c The original text has a period here.^d *Schein.*

if it were really made from that, and tacked-on cornices and pilasters give the idea of solidity although they have little bearing and support nothing, in the same way do alloyed virtues, tinsel of wisdom, and painted merit also glisten.

The choleric person considers his own value and the value of his things and actions on the basis of the propriety or the appearance^a with which it strikes the eye. With regard to the inner quality and the motivations that the object itself contains, he is cold, neither warmed by true benevolence nor moved by respect.* His conduct is artificial. He must know how to adopt all sorts of standpoints in order to judge his propriety from the various attitudes of the onlookers; for he asks little about what he is, but only about what he seems. For this reason he must be well acquainted with the effect on the general taste and the many impressions which his conduct will have outside of him. Since in this sly attention he always needs cold blood and must not let himself be blinded by love, compassion, and sympathy, he will also avoid many follies and vexations to which a sanguine person succumbs, who is enchanted by his immediate sentiment. For this reason he commonly appears to be more intelligent than he actually is. His benevolence is politeness, his respect ceremony, his love is concocted flattery. When he adopts the attitude of a lover or a friend he is always full of himself, and is never either the one or the other. He seeks to shine through fashions, but since everything with him is artificial and made up, he is stiff and awkward in them. He acts in accordance with principles much more than the sanguine person does, who is moved only by the impressions of the occasion; but these are not principles of virtue, but of honor, and he has no feeling for the beauty or the value of actions, but only for the judgment that the world might make about them. Since his conduct, as long as one does not look to the source from which it stems, is otherwise almost as useful as virtue itself, he earns the same esteem as the virtuous person in vulgar eyes, but before more refined ones he carefully conceals himself, because he knows well that the discovery of the secret incentive of lust for honor would cost him respect. He is thus much given to dissemblance, hypocritical in religion, a flatterer in society, and in matters of political party he is fickle as circumstances suggest. He is gladly a slave of the great in order to be a tyrant over the lesser. *Naïveté*, this noble or beautiful simplicity, which bears the seal of nature and not of art, is entirely alien to him. Hence if his taste degenerates his luster becomes *strident*, i.e.,

2: 224

* Although he also holds himself to be happy only in so far as he suspects that he is taken to be so by others.

^a *Schein*.

it swaggers repulsively. Then he belongs as much because of his style as because of his decoration to the *gallimathia*^{21.a} (the exaggerated), a kind of grotesquerie, which in relation to the magnificent is the same as the adventurous or cranky is to the serious sublime. In cases of insults he falls back upon duels or lawsuits, and in civil relationships on ancestry, precedence, and title. As long as he is only vain, i.e., seeks honor and strives to be pleasing to the eye, then he can still be tolerated, but when he is conceited even in the complete absence of real merits and talents, then he is that which he would least gladly be taken for, namely a *fool*.

Since in the *phlegmatic* mixture there are ordinarily no ingredients of the sublime or the beautiful in any particularly noticeable degree, this quality of mind does not belong in the context of our considerations.

Of whichever sort these finer sentiments that we have thus far treated might be, whether sublime or beautiful, they have in common the fate of always seeming perverse and absurd in the judgment of those who have no feeling attuned to them. A person of calm and self-interested industry does not even have, so to speak, the organs to be sensitive to the noble feature in a poem or in a heroic virtue; he would rather read a Robinson than a Grandison²² and holds Cato²³ to be an obstinate fool. Likewise, that seems ridiculous to persons of a somewhat more serious cast of mind which is charming to others, and the fluttering *naïveté* of a pastoral affair is to them tasteless and childish. And even if the mind is not entirely without a concordant finer feeling, yet the degrees of the susceptibility to the latter are very variable, and one sees that one person finds something noble and appropriate which comes across to another as grand, to be sure, but adventurous. The opportunities that present themselves in the case of non-moral matters to detect something of the feeling of another can give us occasion also to infer with reasonable probability his sentiment with regard to the higher qualities of mind and even those of the heart. He who is bored with beautiful music arouses a strong suspicion that the beauties of a style of writing and the fine enchantments of love will have little power over him.

2: 225

There is a certain spirit of trivialities (*esprit des bagatelles*), which indicates a sort of fine feeling, but which aims at precisely the opposite of the sublime:^b having a taste for something because it is very *artificial* and labored, verses that can be read forwards and backwards, riddles, watches in finger rings, flea chains, etc.; a taste for everything that is measured and painfully *orderly*, although without any utility, e.g., books that stand neatly arranged in long rows in the book case, and an empty head that looks upon them and rejoices, rooms that are adorned like optical

^a *Gallimathias*.

^b The original text has a period here.

cabinets and are everywhere washed clean combined with an inhospitable and morose host who occupies them; a taste for everything that is rare, however little intrinsic value it may otherwise have; the lamp of Epictetus,²⁴ a glove of King Charles the Twelfth;²⁵ in a certain way coin-collecting also belongs here.^a Such persons are very much under the suspicion that they will be grubs and cranks in the sciences, but in ethics will be without feeling for that which is beautiful or noble in a free way.

To be sure, we do one another an injustice when we dismiss one who does not see the value or the beauty of what moves or charms us by saying that he does not **understand** it. In this case it is not so much a matter of what the **understanding** sees but of what the feeling is sensitive to. Nevertheless the capacities of the soul have such a great interconnection that one can often infer from the appearance of the sentiment to the talents of the insight. For to him who has many excellences of understanding these talents would be apportioned in vain if he did not at the same time have a strong sentiment for the truly noble or beautiful, which must be the incentive for applying those gifts of mind well and regularly.*

2: 226

It is indeed customary to call **useful** only that which can satisfy our cruder sentiment, what can provide us with a surplus for eating and drinking, display in clothing and furniture, and lavishness in entertaining, although I do not see why everything that is craved with my most lively feeling should not be reckoned among the useful things. Nevertheless, taking everything on this footing, he who is ruled by **self-interest** is a person with whom one must never argue concerning the finer taste. In this consideration a hen is better than a parrot, a cook pot more useful than a porcelain service, all the sharp heads in the world are not worth as much as a peasant, and the effort to discover the distance of the fixed stars can be left aside until people have agreed on the most advantageous way to drive the plow. But what folly it is to get involved in such a dispute, where it is impossible to arrive at concordant sentiments because the feeling is not at all concordant! Nevertheless, even a person of the crudest and most vulgar sentiment will be able to perceive that the charms

2: 226

* One also sees that a certain fineness of feeling counts toward a person's merit. That someone can have a good meal of meat and cakes and nevertheless sleep incomparably well is interpreted as a sign of a good stomach, but not as a merit. By contrast, he who sacrifices a part of his mealtime to listening to music or who can be absorbed in a pleasant diversion by a painting or happily reads some witty stories, even if they be only poetic trivialities, nevertheless has in everyone's eyes the standing of a more refined person, of whom one has a more advantageous and favorable opinion.

^a The colon and semicolons in this sentence replace periods in the original.

and attractions of life which seem to be the most dispensable attract our greatest care, and that we would have few incentives left for such manifold efforts if they were to be excluded. At the same time, practically no one is so crude not to be sensitive that a moral action is all the more moving, at least to another, the further it is from self-interest and the more those nobler impulses stand out in it.

If I observe alternately the noble and the weak sides of human beings, I reprove myself that I am not able to adopt that standpoint from which these contrasts can nevertheless exhibit the great portrait of human nature in its entirety in a moving form. For I gladly grant that so far as it belongs to the project of great nature as a whole, these grotesque attitudes cannot lend it other than a noble expression, although one is far too shortsighted to see them in this connection. Nevertheless, to cast even a weak glance on this, I believe that I can note the following. There are very few people who conduct themselves in accordance with **principles**, which is on the whole good, since it is so easy to err with these principles, and then the ensuing disadvantage extends all the further, the more general the principle is and the more steadfast the person who has set it before himself is. Those who act out of **goodhearted drives** are far more **numerous**, which is most excellent, although it cannot be reckoned to individuals as a special personal merit; for these virtuous instincts are occasionally lacking, but on average they accomplish the great aim of nature just as well as the other instincts that so regularly move the animal world. Those always who have their dear self before them as the sole focal point of their efforts and who attempt to make everything turn on the great axis of **self-interest** are the **most common**, and nothing can be more advantageous than this, for these are the most industrious, orderly, and prudent people; they give demeanor and solidity to the whole, for even without aiming at it they serve the common good, supply the necessary requisites, and provide the foundations over which finer souls can spread beauty and harmony. Finally, the **love of honor** is distributed **among all** human hearts, although in unequal measure, which must give the whole a beauty that charms to the point of admiration. For although the lust for honor is a foolish delusion if it becomes the rule to which one subordinates the other inclinations, yet as an accompanying drive it is most excellent. For while on the great stage each prosecutes his actions in accordance with his dominant inclinations, at the same time he is moved by a hidden incentive to adopt in his thoughts a standpoint outside himself in order to judge the propriety of his conduct, how it appears and strikes the eye of the observer. In this way the different groups unite themselves in a painting of magnificent expression, where in the midst of great variety unity shines forth, and the whole of moral nature displays beauty and dignity.

2: 227

2: 228

THIRD SECTION. ON THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE SUBLIME AND THE
BEAUTIFUL IN THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
THE TWO SEXES²⁶

He who first conceived of woman under the name of the **fair^a sex** perhaps meant to say something flattering, but hit it better than he may himself have believed. For without taking into consideration that her figure is in general finer, her features more tender and gentle, her mien in the expression of friendliness, humor, and affability more meaningful and engaging than is the case with the male sex, and without forgetting as well what must be discounted as the secret power of enchantment by which she makes our passion inclined to a judgment that is favorable for her, above all there lie in the character of the mind of this sex features peculiar to it which clearly distinguish it from ours and which are chiefly responsible for her being characterized by the mark of the **beautiful**. On the other hand, we could lay claim to the designation of the **noble sex**, if it were not also required of a noble cast of mind to decline honorific titles and to bestow rather than receive them. Here it is not to be understood that woman is lacking noble qualities or that the male sex must entirely forego beauties; rather one expects that each sex will unite both, but in such a way that in a woman all other merits should only be united so as to emphasize the character of the **beautiful**, which is the proper point of reference, while by contrast among the male qualities the **sublime** should clearly stand out as the criterion of his kind. To this must refer all judgments of these two genders, those of praise as well as those of blame. All education and instruction must keep this before it, and likewise all effort to promote the ethical perfection of the one or the other, unless one would make unrecognizable the charming difference that nature sought to establish between the two human genders. For it is here not enough to represent that one has human beings before one: one must also not forget that these human beings are not all of the same sort.

2: 229

Women have a stronger innate feeling for everything that is beautiful, decorative and adorned. Even in childhood they are glad to be dressed up and are pleased when they are adorned. They are cleanly and very delicate with respect to everything that causes disgust. They love a joke and can be entertained with trivialities as long as they are cheerful and laughing. They have something demure about them very early, they know how to display a fine propriety and to be self-possessed; and this at an age when our well brought up male youth is still unruly, awkward, and embarrassed. They have many sympathetic sentiments, goodheartedness and compassion, they prefer the beautiful to the useful, and gladly

transform excess in their support into parsimony in order to support expenditure on luster and adornment. They are very sensitive to the least offense, and are exceedingly quick to notice the least lack of attention and respect toward themselves. In short, they contain the chief ground for the contrast between the beautiful and the noble qualities in human nature, and even refine the male sex.

I hope I will be spared the enumeration of the male qualities to the extent that they are parallel with the former, and that it will be sufficient to consider both only in their contrast. The fair^a sex has just as much understanding as the male, only it is a **beautiful understanding**, while ours should be a **deeper understanding**, which is an expression that means the same thing as the sublime.

For the beauty of all actions it is requisite above all that they display facility and that they seem to be accomplished without painful effort; by contrast, efforts and difficulties that have been overcome arouse admiration and belong to the sublime. Deep reflection and a long drawn out consideration are noble, but are grave and not well suited for a person in whom the unconstrained charms should indicate nothing other than a beautiful nature. Laborious learning or painful grubbing, even if a woman could get very far with them, destroy the merits that are proper to her sex, and on account of their rarity may well make her into an object of a cold admiration, but at the same time they will weaken the charms by means of which she exercises her great power over the opposite sex. A woman who has a head full of Greek, like Mme. Dacier,²⁷ or who conducts thorough disputations about mechanics, like the Marquise de Chastelet,²⁸ might as well also wear a beard; for that might perhaps better express the mien of depth for which they strive. The beautiful understanding chooses for its objects everything that is closely related to the finer feeling, and leaves abstract speculation or knowledge, which is useful but dry, to the industrious, thorough, and deep understanding. The woman will accordingly not learn geometry; she will know only so much about the principle of sufficient reason or the monads as is necessary in order to detect the salt in satirical poems which the insipid grubs of our sex have fabricated. The beauties can leave Descartes's vortices²⁹ rotating forever without worrying about them, even if the suave Fontenelle wanted to join them under the planets,³⁰ and the attraction of their charms loses nothing of its power even if they know nothing of what Algarotti³¹ has taken the trouble to lay out for their advantage about the attractive powers of crude matter according to Newton. In history they will not fill their heads with battles nor in geography with fortresses, for it suits them just as little to reek of gunpowder as it suits men to reek of musk.

2: 230

^a schönen.

^a schöne.

2: 231

It seems to be malicious cunning on the part of men that they have wanted to mislead the fair sex into this perverted taste. For well aware of their weakness with respect to the natural charms of the latter, and that a single sly glance can throw them into more confusion than the most difficult question in school, as soon as the woman has given way to this taste they see themselves in a decided superiority and are at an advantage, which it would otherwise be difficult for them to have, of helping the vanity of the weak with generous indulgence. The content of the great science of woman is rather the human being, and, among human beings, the man. Her philosophical wisdom is not reasoning but sentiment. In the opportunity that one would give them to educate their beautiful nature, one must always keep this relation before one's eyes. One will seek to broaden her entire moral feeling and not her memory, and not, to be sure, through universal rules, but rather through individual judgment about the conduct that she sees about her. The examples that one borrows from other times in order to understand the influence that the fair^a sex has had in the affairs of the world, the various relationships in which it has stood to the male sex in other ages or foreign lands, the character of both so far as it can be illuminated by all this, and the variable taste in gratifications constitute her entire history and geography. It is a fine thing^b to make looking at a map that represents either the entire globe or the most important parts of the world agreeable to a woman. This is done by depicting it to her only with the aim of illustrating the different characters of the peoples that dwell there, the differences in their taste and ethical feeling, especially with regard to the effects that these have on the relationships between the sexes, together with some easy explanations from the differences in regions, their freedom or slavery. It matters little whether or not they know the particular divisions of these countries, their industries, power and rulers. Likewise they do not need to know more of the cosmos than is necessary to make the view of the heavens on a beautiful evening moving for them, if they have somehow understood that there are to be found still more worlds and in them still more beautiful creatures. Feeling for paintings of expression and for music, not insofar as it expresses art but rather insofar as it expresses sentiment, all of this refines or elevates the taste of this sex and always has some connection with ethical emotions. Never a cold and speculative instruction, always sentiments and indeed those that remain as close as possible to the relationships of their sex. This education^c is so rare because it requires talents, experience, and a heart full of feeling, and

a woman can do very well without anything else, as indeed she usually educates^a herself quite well on her own even without this.

The virtue of the woman is a **beautiful virtue**.^{*} That of the male sex ought to be a **noble virtue**. Women will avoid evil not because it is unjust but because it is ugly, and for them virtuous actions mean those that are ethically beautiful. Nothing of ought, nothing of must, nothing of obligation. To a woman anything by way of orders and sullen compulsion is insufferable. They do something only because they love to, and the art lies in making sure that they love only what is good. It is difficult for me to believe that the fair sex is capable of principles, and I hope not to give offense by this, for these are also extremely rare among the male sex. In place of these, however, providence has implanted goodly and benevolent sentiments in their bosom, a fine feeling for propriety and a complaisant soul. But do not demand sacrifices and magnanimous self-compulsion. A man should never tell his wife if he risks part of his fortune for the sake of a friend. Why should he fetter her cheerful talkativeness by burdening her mind with an important secret that he alone is obliged to keep? Even many of her weaknesses are so to speak **beautiful faults**. Injury or misfortune move her tender soul to sadness. A man must never weep other than magnanimous tears. Any that he sheds in pain or over reversals of fortune make him contemptible. The **vanity** for which one so frequently reproaches the fair sex, if it is indeed a fault in her, is only a **beautiful fault**. For even leaving aside that the men who so gladly flatter woman would do badly if she were not inclined to take it well, she actually enlivens her charms by it. This inclination is an impulse to make herself agreeable and to show her good demeanor, to let her cheerful wit play, also to glisten with the changing inventions of her dress, and to elevate her beauty. In this there is nothing that is at all injurious to others, but rather, if it is done with good taste, there is so much refinement that it would be quite inappropriate to scold it with peevish criticism. A woman who is too inconstant and deceptive in this is called a **silly woman**,^b yet this expression does not have as harsh a sense as it does when applied with a change of the final syllable^c to a man, so that, indeed, if one understands the other, it can sometimes even indicate an intimate flattery. If vanity is a fault that in a woman is well deserving of forgiveness, nevertheless **conceitedness** in them is not only blameworthy, as in humans in general, but entirely disfigures

* Above, p. 33 (2: 217), this was in a strict judgment designated as adopted virtue; here, where on account of the character of the sex it deserves a favorable justification, it is called in general a beautiful virtue.

^a ausbildet.

^b Narrin.

^c I.e., Narr, a fool.

2: 232

^a schöne.

^b Es ist schön.

^c Unterweisung.

2: 233

the character of their sex. For this quality is exceedingly stupid and ugly and entirely opposed to engaging, modest charm. Such a person is then in a slippery position. She would let herself be judged sharply and without any indulgence; for whoever insists on haughtiness invites everyone around her to reproach her. Every discovery of even the least fault is a true joy to everyone, and the expression **silly woman** here loses its mitigated sense. One must always distinguish between vanity and conceitedness. The former seeks approbation and to a certain degree honors those on whose account the effort is made; the second already believes itself to be in complete possession of that approbation, and making no effort to acquire it, it also wins none.

If some ingredients of vanity do not at all disfigure a woman in the eyes of the male sex, still the more visible they are, the more they divide the fair sex from each other. They then judge each other quite sharply, because the charms of one seem to obscure those of the other, and those who still make strong pretensions to conquest are actually rarely friends with each other in the true sense.

Nothing is so opposed to the beautiful as the disgusting, just as nothing sinks more deeply beneath the sublime than the ridiculous. Thus a man can be sensitive to no insult more than that of being called a **fool**, and a woman to none more than being called **disgusting**. The English *Spectator* holds that no reproach can be more upsetting to a man than when he is held to be a liar, and none more bitter to a woman than being held to be unchaste.³² I will leave this for what it is worth insofar as it is judged with the strictness of morality. Only here the question is not what intrinsically deserves the greatest reproach, but rather what is actually felt^a as the harshest one. And here I ask every reader whether, if in thought he places himself in this position, he must not agree with my opinion. The maiden Ninon Lenclos³³ made not the least claims to the honor of chastity, and nevertheless she would have been implacably offended if one of her lovers had gone so far in his judgment; and one knows the dreadful fate of Monaldeschi³⁴ on account of such an expression in the case of a princess who hardly wanted to represent herself as a Lucretia.³⁵ It is intolerable that one should not be able to commit evil even if one wants to, because then even its omission would always be only a very ambiguous virtue.

2: 234

To distance oneself as far as possible from this sort of disgustingness takes **purity**, which is indeed becoming for every person, and which in the case of the fair sex is of the first rank among the virtues and can hardly be taken too far by it, although in the case of a man it can sometimes be exaggerated and then becomes ridiculous.

^a *empfunden*.

The **sense of shame** is a secrecy of nature aimed at setting bounds to a most intractable inclination, and which, insofar as it has the call of nature on its side, always seems compatible with good, moral qualities, even if it is excessive. It is accordingly most necessary as a supplement to principles; for there is no case in which inclination so readily becomes a sophist cooking up complaisant principles as here. At the same time, it also serves to draw a secretive curtain before even the most appropriate and necessary ends of nature, so that too familiar an acquaintance with them will not occasion disgust or at least indifference with respect to the final aims of a drive onto which the finest and liveliest inclinations of human nature are grafted. This quality is especially proper to the fair sex and very appropriate for it. It is also a coarse and contemptible rudeness to put the delicate modesty of the fair sex to embarrassment or annoyance by that sort of vulgar jokes that are called **obscenities**. However, since no matter how far one might try to go around this secret, the sexual inclination is still in the end the ground of all other charms, and a woman, as a woman, is always the agreeable object of a well-mannered entertainment, it can perhaps thus be explained why otherwise refined men occasionally allow themselves the liberty of letting some fine allusions shine through the little mischief in their jokes, which leads one to call them **loose** or **waggish**, and which, since they are neither accompanied by invasive glances nor intended to injure respect, makes them believe themselves to be justified in calling the person who receives them with an indignant or standoffish mien a **stickler for honorableness**. I mention this only because it commonly is regarded as a somewhat bold feature in refined society,⁴ and because in fact much wit has all along been squandered upon it; but as far as strict moral judgment is concerned, it does not belong here, since in the sentiment of the beautiful I have to observe and explain only the appearances.

The noble qualities of this sex, which nevertheless, as we have already noted, must never make the feeling of the beautiful unrecognizable, announce themselves by nothing more clearly and surely than by the **modesty** of a kind of noble simplicity and *naïveté* in great excellences. From this shines forth a calm benevolence and respect toward others, combined at the same time with a certain **noble trust** in oneself and an appropriate self-esteem, which is always to be found in a sublime cast of mind. Insofar as this fine mixture is both engaging in virtue of its charms and moving in virtue of respect, it secures all other shining qualities against the mischief of censure and mockery. Persons of this cast of mind also have a heart for friendship, which in a woman can never be valued enough, because it is so rare and at the same time must be so totally charming.

2: 235

^a *vom schönen Umgange*.

Since our aim is to judge of sentiments, it cannot be disagreeable to bring under concepts, so far as possible, the variety of the impression that the figure and facial features of the fair sex makes upon the masculine. This whole enchantment is at bottom spread over the sexual drive. Nature pursues its great aim, and all refinements that are associated with it, however remote from it they seem to be, are only veils, and in the end derive their charm from the very same source. A healthy and **coarse taste** that always remains close to this drive, is little troubled by the charms of demeanor, of the facial features, of the eyes, etc., in a woman, and as it is really concerned only with sex, often it sees the delicacy of others as empty flirtation.

2: 236

If this taste is not exactly fine, still it is not on that account to be despised. For the greatest part of humanity follows by its means the great order of nature in a very simple and certain manner.* By this means most marriages are brought about, and indeed among the most industrious part of humanity, and because the man does not have his head full of enchanting mien, languishing glances, noble demeanor, etc., and also understands nothing of these, he is thus all the more attentive to domestic virtues, thrift, etc., and to the dowry. As far as the somewhat finer taste is concerned, on account of which it might be necessary to make a distinction among the external charms of the woman, this is directed either to that which is **moral** in the figure and the expression of the face or to the **amoral**. With respect to the latter sort of agreeable qualities, a woman is called **pretty**^a a well-proportioned build, regular features, a lovely contrast between the colors of eyes and face: all beauties that also please in a bouquet of flowers and earn a cold approbation. The face itself says nothing, although it may be pretty, and does not speak to the heart. As for the expression of the features, the eyes and the mien that are moral, this pertains either to the feeling of the sublime or of the beautiful. A woman in whom the agreeable qualities that become her sex are salient, especially the moral expression of the sublime, is called **beautiful** in the proper sense; one whose moral design, so far as it makes itself known in the mien or facial features, announces the qualities of the beautiful, is **agreeable**, and if she is that to a higher degree, **charming**. The former lets a glimmer of a beautiful understanding shine through modest glances beneath a mien of composure and a noble demeanor, and as in her face she portrays a tender feeling and a benevolent heart, she overpowers both the inclination and the esteem of a male heart. The

* As all things in the world also have their bad side, the only thing that is to be regretted about this taste is that it degenerates into dissoluteness more readily than any other. For although the fire that one person has ignited can be extinguished by another, there are not enough difficulties that could restrict an intractable inclination.

^a In the original text there is a period here.

latter displays cheer and wit in laughing eyes, a bit of fine mischief, coquetry in her jokes and a roguish coyness. She charms, while the former moves, and the feeling of love of which she is capable and which she inspires in others is fickle but beautiful, while the sentiment of the former is tender, combined with respect, and constant. I will not get too involved with detailed dissections of this sort; for in such cases the author always seems to portray his own inclination. I will still mention, however, that the taste that many ladies have for a healthy but pale color can be understood here. For the latter commonly accompanies a cast of mind of more inward feeling and tender sentiment, which belongs to the quality of the sublime, while the red and blooming color indicates less of the former, yet more of the joyful and cheerful cast of mind; but it is more suitable to vanity to move and enchain than to charm and attract. By contrast, persons without any moral feeling and without an expression that indicates sentiments can be very pretty, yet they will neither move nor charm, unless it be that **coarse taste** that we have mentioned, which occasionally becomes somewhat more refined and then also chooses after its fashion. It is bad that pretty creatures of that sort easily succumb to the fault of **conceitedness** because of the awareness of the beautiful figure that the mirror shows them, and from a lack of finer sentiments; for they then make everyone cold to them, except for the flatterer, who is after ulterior motives and fashions intrigues.

2: 237

Through these concepts one can perhaps understand something of the very different effect that the figure of one and the same woman has on the taste of men. I do not mention that which in this impression is too closely related to the sexual drive and which may agree with the particularly **voluptuary** illusion with which the sentiment of everyone is clothed, because it lies outside the sphere of finer taste; and it is perhaps correct, as M. de Buffon suspects, that that figure which makes the first impression at the time when this drive is still new and beginning to develop remains the archetype to which in future times all feminine forms^a must more or less conform, which can arouse the fantastic longing by means of which a somewhat crude inclination is made to choose among the different objects of a sex.³⁶ As far as a somewhat finer taste is concerned, I maintain that the sort of beauty that we have called the **pretty figure** is judged fairly uniformly by all men, and that opinions about it are not so various as is commonly held. The **Circassian** and **Georgian** maidens have always been considered to be extremely pretty by all Europeans travelling through their lands. The **Turks**, the **Arabs**, and the **Persians** must be of very much the same taste, for they are very eager to beautify their populations with such fine blood, and one also notes that the Persian race has actually succeeded in this. The merchants

^a *Bildungen*.

2: 238 of Hindustan likewise do not fail to extract great profit from a wicked trade in such beautiful creatures, by supplying them to the sweet-toothed rich men of their country, and one sees that as divergent as the caprice of taste in these different regions of the world may be, that which is held to be especially pretty in one of them is also taken to be such in all the others. But where what is moral in the features is mixed into the judgment on the fine figure, there the taste of different men is always very different, in accordance with the difference in their ethical feeling itself as well as with the different significance that the expression of the face may have in every fancy. One finds that those forms^a that on first glance do not have a marked effect because they are not pretty in any decided way usually are far more engaging and seem to grow in beauty as soon as they begin to please on closer acquaintance, while in contrast the beautiful appearance that announces itself all at once is subsequently perceived more coldly, presumably because moral charms, when they become visible, are more arresting, also because they become effective only on the occasion of moral sentiments and as it were let themselves be discovered, each discovery of a new charm, however, giving rise to a suspicion of even more; whereas all the agreeable qualities that do not at all conceal themselves can do nothing more after they have exercised their entire effect all at the beginning than to cool off the enamored curiosity and gradually bring it to indifference.

2: 239 Among these observations, the following remark naturally suggests itself. The entirely simple and crude feeling in the sexual inclinations leads, to be sure, quite directly to the great end of nature, and in satisfying its demands it is suited to make the person himself happy without detour; but because of its great generality, it readily degenerates into debauchery and dissoluteness. On the other side, an extremely refined taste certainly serves to remove the wildness from an impetuous inclination and, by limiting it to only a very few objects, to make it modest and decorous; but it commonly fails to attain the great final aim of nature, and since it demands or expects more than the latter commonly accomplishes, it very rarely makes the person of such delicate sentiment happy. The first cast of mind becomes uncouth, because it applies to all the members of a sex, the second brooding, because it really applies to none, but is rather occupied only with an object that the enamored inclination creates in thought and adorns with all the noble and beautiful qualities that nature rarely unites in one person and even more rarely offers to one who can treasure her and who would perhaps be worthy of such a possession. Hence arises the postponement and finally the complete renunciation of the marital bond, or, what is perhaps equally bad, a sullen regret of

a choice that has already been made, which does not fulfill the great expectations that had been raised; for it is not uncommon for Aesop's cock to find a pearl when a common barley corn would have suited him better.

Here we can remark in general that, as charming as the impressions of tender feeling may be, nevertheless we have cause to be cautious in the refinement of it, unless we want to bring upon ourselves much discontent and a source of evils through excessive sensitivity. I would recommend to nobler souls that they refine their feeling as much as they can with regard to those qualities that pertain to themselves or those actions that they themselves perform, but that with regard to what they enjoy or expect from others they should preserve their taste in its simplicity: if only I understood how it is possible to bring this off. But if they were to succeed, then they would make others happy and also be happy themselves. It should never be lost sight of that, in whatever form it might be, one should not make very great claims on the happinesses of life and the perfection of human beings; for he who always expects only something average has the advantage that the outcome will seldom disappoint his hopes, although sometimes unsuspected perfections will also surprise him.

In the end, age, the great ravager of beauty, threatens all of these charms, and in the natural order of things the sublime and noble qualities must gradually take the place of the beautiful ones in order to make a person worthy of ever greater respect as she ceases to be attractive. In my opinion, the entire perfection of the fair sex in the bloom of years should consist in the beautiful simplicity that has been heightened by a refined feeling for everything that is charming and noble. Gradually, as the claims to charms diminish, the reading of books and the expansion in insight could, unnoticed, fill with Muses the place vacated by the Graces, and the husband should be the first teacher. Nevertheless, when finally the old age that is so terrible to all women arrives, she still belongs to the fair sex, and that sex disfigures itself if in a sort of despair over holding on to this character longer it gives way to a morose and sullen mood.

2: 240 A person of years, who joins society with a modest and friendly being,^a who is talkative in a cheerful and reasonable way, who favors with propriety the enjoyments of youth of which she no longer takes part, and who, with concern for everything, displays contentment and satisfaction in the joy that surrounds her, is always still a more refined person than a man of the same age and is perhaps even more lovable than a maiden, though in a different sense. To be sure, the platonic love asserted by an ancient philosopher when he said of the object of his

^a Bildungen.

^a Wesen.

inclination: **The Graces reside in her wrinkles, and my soul seems to hover about my lips when I kiss her withered mouth,** may be somewhat too mystical; yet such claims must then be relinquished. An old man who acts infatuated is a fop, and the similar pretensions of the other sex are then disgusting. It is never the fault of nature if we do not appear with a good demeanor, but is rather due to the fact that we would pervert her.

In order not to lose sight of my text, I will here add several considerations on the influence that one sex can have in beautifying or ennobling the feeling of the other. The woman has a preeminent feeling for the **beautiful**, so far as it pertains to **herself**, but for the **noble** insofar as it is found in the **male sex**. The man, on the contrary, has a decided feeling for the **noble** that belongs to **his** qualities, but for the **beautiful** insofar as it is to be found in the **woman**. From this it must follow that the ends of nature are aimed more at **ennobling** the man and **beautifying** the woman by means of the sexual inclination. A woman is little embarrassed by the fact that she does not possess certain lofty insights, that she is fearful and not up to important business, etc.; she is beautiful and engaging, and that is enough. By contrast, she demands all of these qualities in the man, and the sublimity of her soul is revealed only by the fact that she knows how to treasure these noble qualities insofar as they are to be found in him. How else would it be possible for so many grotesque male faces, although they may have merits, to be able to acquire such polite and fine wives! The man, in contrast, is far more delicate with regard to the beautiful charms of the woman. By her fine figure, her cheerful *naïveté* and her charming friendliness he is more than adequately compensated for the lack of book-learning and for other lacks that he must make good by his own talents. Vanity and fashion may well give these natural drives a false direction, and make out of many a man a **sweet gentleman**, but out of the woman a **pedant** or an **Amazon**, yet nature still always seeks to return to its proper order. From this one can judge what powerful influences the sexual inclination could have in ennobling especially the masculine sex if, in place of many dry lessons, the moral feeling of woman were developed in good time to make her sensitive to what belongs to the dignity and the sublime qualities of the opposite sex, and thereby prepared to regard the ridiculous fops with contempt and to yield to no other qualities than to merits. It is also certain that the power of her charms would thereby gain overall; for it is apparent that their enchantment is often effective only on nobler souls, while the others are not fine enough to be sensitive to them. Thus when he was advised to let the **Thessalians** hear his beautiful songs, the poet **Simonides** said: **These louts are too dumb to be beguiled by a man such as me.**³⁷ It has always been regarded as an effect of intercourse with the fair sex

2: 241

that male manners become gentler, their conduct more refined and polished, and their demeanor more elegant; but this is only an incidental advantage.* What is most important is that the man become more perfect as a man and the woman as a woman, i.e., that the incentives of the sexual inclination operate in accordance with nature to make the one more noble and to beautify the qualities of the other. If things come to the extreme, the man, confident of his merits, can say: **Even if you do not love me I will force you to esteem me**, and the woman, secure in the power of her charms, will answer: **Even if you do not inwardly esteem us, we will still force you to love us.** In the absence of such principles one sees men adopt feminine qualities, in order to please, and woman sometimes (although much more rarely) work up a masculine demeanor, in order to inspire esteem; but whatever one does contrary to the favor of nature one always does very badly.

2: 242

In marital life the united pair should as it were constitute a single moral person,³⁸ which is animated and ruled by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife. For not only can one trust the former more for insight grounded in experience, but the latter more for freedom and correctness in sentiment; yet further, the more sublime a cast of mind is, the more inclined it also is to place the greatest goal of its efforts in the satisfaction of a beloved object, and on the other side the more beautiful it is, the more does it seek to respond to this effort with complaisance. In such a relationship a struggle for precedence is ridiculous, and where it does occur it is the most certain mark of a crude or unequally matched taste. If it comes down to talk of the right of the superior, then the thing is already extremely debased; for where the entire bond is really built only on inclination, there it is already half torn apart as soon as the ought begins to be heard. The presumption of the woman in this harsh tone is extremely ugly and that of the man in the highest degree ignoble and contemptible. However, the wise order of things brings it about that all these niceties and delicacies of sentiment have their full strength only in the beginning, but subsequently are gradually dulled by familiarity and domestic concerns and then degenerate into familiar love, where finally the great art consists in preserving sufficient remnants of the former so that indifference and surfeit do not defeat the entire value of the enjoyment on account of which and which alone it was worth having entered into such a bond.

2: 243

* This advantage is itself very much diminished by the observation that has been made that those men who have become involved too early and too frequently in those parties to which the woman has given the tone commonly become somewhat ridiculous, and are boring or even contemptible in male society, because they have lost the taste for an entertainment that is certainly cheerful, but must also have real content, that is humorous but must also be useful because of serious conversations.

2: 242

FOURTH SECTION. ON NATIONAL
CHARACTERS* INSOFAR AS THEY REST UPON
THE DIFFERENT FEELING OF THE SUBLIME
AND THE BEAUTIFUL³⁹

2: 244

Among the peoples of our part of the world the **Italians** and the **French** are, in my opinion, those who most distinguish themselves in the feeling of the **beautiful**, but the **Germans**, the **English**, and the **Spaniards** those who are most distinguished from all others in the feeling of the **sublime**. **Holland** can be regarded as the land where this finer taste is fairly unnoticeable. The beautiful itself is either enchanting and touching, or laughing and charming. The former has something of the sublime in it, and in this feeling the mind is thoughtful and enraptured, while in the feeling of the second kind it is smiling and joyful. The first sort of beautiful feeling seems especially appropriate to the Italians, the second sort to the French. In the national character that has in it the expression of the sublime, this is either of the terrifying kind, which inclines a bit to the adventurous, or it is a feeling for the noble, or for the magnificent. I think I have grounds sufficient to attribute the first kind of feeling to the Spaniard, the second to the Englishman, and the third to the German. The feeling for the magnificent is not by its nature original, like the other kinds of taste, and although a spirit of imitation can be associated with any other feeling, yet it is more characteristic of that for the glittering sublime, since this is really a mixed feeling out of that for the beautiful and that for the noble, where each, considered by itself, is colder, and hence the mind is free enough in the connection of them to attend to examples, and also has need for their incentive. The German will accordingly have less feeling in regard to the beautiful than the Frenchman, and less of that pertaining to the sublime than the Englishman, but his feeling will be more suited for the cases where both are to appear as combined, just as he will also luckily avoid the errors into which an excessive strength of either of these kinds of feeling alone could fall.

I touch only fleetingly the arts and the sciences the selection of which can confirm the taste of the nations that we have imputed to them. The Italian genius has distinguished itself especially in music, painting,

* My intention is not at all to portray the characters of the peoples in detail; rather I will only outline some features that express the feeling of the sublime and the beautiful in them. One can readily guess that only a tolerable level of accuracy can be demanded in such a depiction, that its prototypes stand out in the large crowds of those who make claim to a finer feeling, and that no nation is lacking in casts of mind which unite the foremost predominant qualities of this kind. For this reason the criticism that might occasionally be cast on a people can offend no one, as it is like a ball that one can always hit to his neighbor. I will not investigate here whether these national differences are contingent and depend upon the times and the type of government, or whether they are connected with a certain necessity with the climate.

2: 245

sculpture, and architecture. There is an equally fine taste for all of these fine^a arts in France, although here their beauty is less touching. The taste with regard to poetic or rhetorical perfection runs more to the beautiful in France, in England more to the sublime. In France, fine jests, comedy, laughing satire, enamored dalliance, and the light and naturally flowing manner of writing are original;^b in England, by contrast, thoughts with deep content, tragedy, epic poetry, and in general the heavy gold of wit, which under the French hammer can be beaten into thin little leaves of great surface-area. In Germany, wit still glimmers very much through a screen. Formerly it was strident; by means of examples and the understanding of the nation, however, it has become rather more charming and nobler, but the former with less *naïveté* and the latter with a less bold thrust than in the peoples mentioned. The taste of the Dutch nation for a painstaking order and decorousness that leads to worry and embarrassment also leaves little feeling for the unaffected and free movements of genius, the beauty of which would only be disfigured by the anxious avoidance of errors. Nothing can be more opposed to all the arts and sciences than an adventurous taste, since this distorts nature, which is the prototype of everything beautiful and noble. Thus the Spanish nation has also demonstrated little feeling for the fine arts and sciences.

The characters of mind of the peoples are most evident in that in them which is moral; for this reason we will next consider their different feeling in regard to the sublime and the beautiful from this point of view.*

The **Spaniard** is serious, taciturn, and truthful. There are few more honest merchants in the world than the Spanish. He has a proud soul and more feeling for great than for beautiful actions. Since in his mixture there is little to be found of generous and tender benevolence, he is often hard and also even cruel. The *Auto da Fe* endures not so much because of superstition as because of the adventurous inclination of the nation, which is moved by a venerable and terrifying rite, in which one sees **San Benito**, painted with figures of the devil, consigned to the flames that have been ignited by a raging piety.⁴⁰ One cannot say that the Spaniard is haughtier or more amorous than anyone from another people, yet he is both in an adventurous way that is rare and unusual. To leave the plow standing and walk up and down the field with a long sword and cape until

* It is hardly necessary for me to repeat my previous apology here. In each people the finest portion contains praiseworthy characters of all sorts, and whoever is affected by one or another criticism will, if he is fine enough, understand it to his advantage, which lies in leaving everyone else to his fate but making an exception of himself.

^a *schöne*.

^b In the original, there is a period here, and the remainder of this sentence is printed as if it were a new sentence, but it lacks a verb.

2: 246

the stranger who is passing by has gone, or in a bullfight, where for once the beauties of the land are seen unveiled, to announce himself to his mistress with a special greeting and then in order to wage a dangerous fight with a wild animal to honor her, these are unusual and strange actions, which greatly diverge from what is natural.

The **Italian** seems to have a feeling which mixes that of a Spaniard and that of a Frenchman: more feeling for the beautiful than the former and more for the sublime than the latter. In this way, I think, the other features of his moral character can be explained.

The **Frenchman** has a dominant feeling for the morally beautiful. He is refined, courteous, and complaisant. He becomes intimate very quickly, is humorous and free in conversation, and the expression of a **man or a lady of good manners** has a meaning that is comprehensible only to one who has acquired the refined feeling of a Frenchman. Even his sublime sentiments, of which he has not a few, are subordinated to the feeling of the beautiful and acquire their strength only through accord with the latter. He very much likes to be witty, and will without reservation sacrifice something of the truth for the sake of a witticism. By contrast, where he cannot be witty,* he displays just as thorough an insight as someone from any other people, e.g., in mathematics and in the other dry or profound arts and sciences. A *bon mot* does not have the same fleeting value with him as elsewhere; it is eagerly spread about and preserved in books, as if it were the most important occurrence. He is a peaceful citizen and avenges himself against the oppressions of the tax collectors by satires or remonstrances to the courts, which, after they have in accordance with their intention given the fathers of the people a beautiful patriotic aspect, accomplish nothing further than being crowned with a glorious rebuke and praised in ingenious laudatory poems. The object to which the merits and national capabilities of this people are most devoted is woman.[†] Not as if she were loved or

* In metaphysics, morals, and religious doctrines one cannot be too careful with the writings of this nation. They are commonly dominated by much beautiful dazzle, which cannot stand up to a cold examination. The Frenchman loves to be bold in his pronouncements; yet to attain the truth, one must not be bold, but careful. In history he loves anecdotes which leave nothing more to be wished except that they were true.

[†] In France, the woman gives all society and all intercourse their tone. Now it is not to be denied that society without the fair sex is rather tasteless and boring; only if the lady should give it the beautiful tone, the man on his part should give it the noble tone. Otherwise intercourse becomes just as boring, although for the opposite reason: because nothing is so disgusting as pure sweetness. In the French taste it is not: Is the gentleman at home? but rather: Is Madame at home? Madame is at her toilette, Madame has the vapors (a kind of beautiful crankiness); in short, all conversations and all amusements occupy themselves with Madame and for Madame. However, the woman is not the more honored by all of this. A person who flirts is always without the feeling of true respect as well as of tender love. I would certainly not want, indeed who (continued on page 55)

2: 247

2: 247

esteemed here more than elsewhere, but rather because she provides the best opportunity for displaying in their best light the favorite talents of wit, cleverness and good manners; incidentally a vain person of either sex always loves only himself or herself, while the other is only his or her plaything. Now since the French do not at all lack noble qualities, but these can only be animated through the sentiment of the beautiful, the fair sex could here be able to have a more powerful influence in awakening and arousing the noblest actions of the male sex than anywhere else in the world, if one were intent on favoring this direction of the national spirit a little. It is a pity that the lilies do not spin.

The fault which is closest to this national character is the ridiculous or, in a more polite expression, the lighthearted. Important things are treated like jokes, and trivialities serve for serious occupation. Even in advanced age the Frenchman still sings amorous songs, and is still as gallant as he can be towards the woman. In these remarks I have great authorities from this very same people on my side, and retreat behind a Montesquieu and d'Alembert in order to secure myself from any concerned indignation.

The **Englishman** is at the beginning of every acquaintance cold and indifferent toward a stranger. He has little inclination toward small niceties; by contrast, as soon as he is a friend he is ready to perform great services. In society, he makes little effort to be witty, or to display a refined demeanor, but he is understanding and resolute. He is a poor imitator, does not much ask how others judge, and simply follows his own taste. In relation to the woman he does not have the French refinement, but shows more respect to her and perhaps takes this too far, as in the marital state he commonly concedes an unrestricted authority to his wife. He is steadfast, sometimes to the point of being stiff-necked, bold, and resolute, often to the point of audacity, and acts according to principles, commonly to the point of being headstrong. He easily becomes an eccentric, not out of vanity, but because he troubles himself little about others and does not readily do violence to his own taste out of complaisance or imitation; for this reason he is rarely as much beloved as the Frenchman, but, once he is known, he is commonly more highly esteemed.

The **German** has a feeling that is a mixture of that of an Englishman and that of a Frenchman, but seems to come closer to the former, and the greater similarity with the latter is merely artificial and imitative. He has

2: 248

(continued from page 54) knows how much, to have said what Rousseau so impudently asserted: that a woman never becomes anything more than a big child. Yet the acute Swiss wrote this in France, and presumably, as such a great defender of the fair sex, felt indignant that it was not treated there with more real respect.

a happy mixture in the feeling of the sublime as well as the beautiful; and if he is not equal to an Englishman in the former or to the Frenchman in the latter, he surpasses them both insofar as he combines them. He displays more complaisance in intercourse than the former, and even if he does not bring quite as much agreeable liveliness and wit to society as the Frenchman, yet he displays there more moderation and understanding. In love, as in all other sorts of taste, he is also rather methodical, and since he combines the beautiful with the noble, he is in the sentiment of both sufficiently cool to occupy his head with considerations of demeanor, of splendor, and of appearance.⁴ Hence family, title, and rank are matters of great importance to him in civic relationships as well as in love. Far more than the previous ones he asks **how people might judge him**, and if there is something in his character that could arouse the wish for a major improvement, it is this weakness, in accordance with which he does not dare to be original, although he has all the talents for that, and that he is too concerned with the opinion of others, which deprives the moral qualities of all bearing, making them fickle and falsely contrived.

The **Dutchman** is of an orderly and industrious cast of mind, and since he looks only to what is useful, he has little feeling for what in a finer understanding is beautiful or sublime. For him a great man means the same as a rich man, by a friend he understands his business correspondents, and a visit that brings him no profit is very boring for him. He makes a contrast to both the Frenchman and the Englishman and is to a certain extent a very phlegmatic German.

2: 249

If we try to apply the sketch of these thoughts to a particular case, in order to assess, e.g., the feeling of honor, the following national differences are revealed. The sentiment for honor is in the Frenchman **vanity**, in the Spaniard **haughtiness**, in the Englishman **pride**, in the German **pomp**, and in the Dutchman **conceitedness**. At first glance these expressions seem to mean the same thing, but in the richness of our German language they mark very noticeable differences. **Vanity** strives for approval, is fickle and changeable, but its outward conduct is **courteous**. The **haughty person** is full of falsely imagined great merits and does not much seek the approval of others; his conduct is stiff and **pompous**. **Pride** is really only a greater consciousness of one's own value, which can often be quite correct (on account of which it is also sometimes called a noble pride; but I can never ascribe a noble haughtiness to someone, since the latter always indicates an incorrect and exaggerated self-appraisal); the conduct of the proud person toward others is **indifferent** and cold. The **vainglorious person** is a proud one who is

⁴ *des Aussehens.*

at the same time vain.* The approval, however, which he seeks from others, consists in testimonies of honor. Hence he likes to glitter with titles, ancestry, and pageantry. The German is particularly infected by this weakness. The words "gracious," "most gracious," "high-born," and "well-born" and more of that sort of bombast make his speech stiff and awkward and very much hinder the beautiful simplicity that other peoples can give to their style of writing. The conduct of a vainglorious person in social intercourse is **ceremony**. The **conceited person** is a haughty person who expresses distinct marks of the contempt of others in his conduct. In behavior he is **coarse**. This miserable quality is the most distant from the finer taste, because it is obviously stupid; for challenging everyone around one to hatred and biting mockery through open contempt is certainly not the means for satisfying the feeling for honor.

In love the German and the English have a fairly good stomach, somewhat fine in sentiment, but more of a healthy and **robust taste**. In this point the Italian is **brooding**, the Spaniard **fantastic**, the Frenchman **dainty**.

The religion of our part of the world is not the matter of an arbitrary taste, but is of honorable origin. Hence only the excesses in it and that in it which properly belongs to human beings can yield signs of the different national qualities. I classify these excesses under the following headings: **credulity**, **superstition**, **fanaticism**, and **indifferentism**.⁴¹ The ignorant part of every nation is for the most part **credulous**, although it has no noticeable finer feeling. Persuasion depends simply upon hearsay and merely apparent authority, without any sort of finer feeling containing the incentive for it. One must seek the examples of whole peoples of this kind in the north. The credulous person, if he is of adventuresome taste, becomes **superstitious**. This taste is even in itself a ground for believing something more readily,[†] and of two people, one of whom is infected by this feeling but the other of whom is of a cool and moderate cast of mind, the former, even if he actually has more understanding, is nevertheless more readily seduced by his dominant inclination into believing something unnatural than the latter, who is saved from this excess not by his

* It is not necessary for a vainglorious person also to be haughty, i.e., to have an exaggerated, false conception of his merits; he may perhaps not appraise himself as worth more than he is, but only has a false taste in manifesting his value outwardly.

[†] It has also been noted that the English, though such a clever people, can nevertheless readily be ensnared at first into believing something wondrous and absurd by a brazen announcement, of which there are many examples. Yet a bold cast of mind, prepared by diverse experiences, in which many strange things have nevertheless been found to be true, quickly breaks through the trivial reservations by means of which a weaker and more distrustful head is quickly stopped and so sometimes saved from error without any merit of its own.

2: 251

insight but by his common and phlegmatic feeling. The person who is superstitious in religion gladly places between himself and the supreme object of veneration certain powerful and astonishing human beings, so to speak giants of holiness, whom nature obeys and whose imploring voices open or close the iron gates of Tartarus, who, while they touch the heavens with their heads, still have their feet on the earth beneath. In Spain, accordingly, the instruction of sound reason will have great obstacles to overcome, not because it must drive away ignorance there, but rather because it is opposed by an odd taste, to which what is natural is vulgar, and which never believes itself to have a sublime sentiment if its object is not adventurous. **Fanaticism** is so to speak a pious brazenness and is occasioned by a certain pride and an altogether too great confidence in oneself to come closer to the heavenly natures and to elevate itself by an astonishing flight above the usual and prescribed order. The fanatic talks only of immediate inspiration and of the contemplative life, while the superstitious person makes vows before pictures of great wonder-working saints and places his trust in the imaginary and inimitable merits of other persons of his own nature. Even the excesses, as we have noted above, bear signs of the national sentiment, and thus at least in earlier times fanaticism* was mostly to be encountered in Germany and England and is as it were an unnatural outgrowth of the noble feeling that belongs to the character of these peoples, and it is in general nowhere near as harmful as the superstitious inclination, even though it is violent at the beginning, since the inflammation of a fanatical spirit gradually cools off and in accordance with its nature must finally attain to an orderly moderation, while superstition stealthily roots itself deeper into a quiet and passive quality of mind and entirely robs the shackled person of the confidence of ever freeing himself from a harmful delusion. Finally, a vain and frivolous person is always without stronger feeling for the sublime, and his religion is without emotion, for the most part only a matter of fashion, which he conducts with decorum and remains cold. This is practical indifferentism, to which the French national spirit seems to be most inclined, from which it is only a step to sacrilegious mockery and which fundamentally, when one looks to its inner worth, is little better than a complete denial.

2: 252

If we now take a quick look through the other parts of the world, we find the Arab to be the noblest human being in the Orient, although with a feeling that very much degenerates into the adventurous. He is hospitable, generous, and truthful; but his tale and history and in

* Fanaticism must always be distinguished from enthusiasm. The former believes itself to feel an immediate and extraordinary communion with a higher nature, the latter signifies the state of the mind which is inflamed beyond the appropriate degree by some principle, whether it be by the maxim of patriotic virtue, or of friendship, or of religion, without involving the illusion of a supernatural community.

general his sentiment always has something marvelous woven into it. His inflamed power of imagination presents things to him in unnatural and distorted images, and even the spread of his religion was a great adventure. If the Arabs are as it were the Spaniards of the Orient, then the Persians are the Frenchmen of Asia. They are good poets, courtly and of rather fine taste. They are not such strict observers of Islam and allow their cast of mind, inclined to gaiety, a rather mild interpretation of the Koran. The Japanese can be regarded as it were as the Englishmen of this part of the world, although hardly in any other attribute than their steadfastness, which degenerates into the most extreme stiff-neckedness, their courage and their contempt of death. Otherwise they demonstrate few marks of a finer feeling. The Indians have a dominant taste for grotesqueries of the kind that comes down to the adventurous. Their religion consists of grotesqueries. Images of idols of enormous shape, the priceless tooth of the mighty ape Hanuman, the unnatural atonements of the Fakirs (heathen mendicant monks), etc., are in this taste. The voluntary sacrifice of the wives in the very same pyre that consumes the corpse of her husband is a repulsive adventure. What ridiculous grotesqueries do the verbose and studied compliments of the Chinese not contain: even their paintings are grotesque and represent marvelous and unnatural shapes, the likes of which are nowhere to be found in the world. They also have venerable grotesqueries, for the reason that they are of ancient usage,* and no people in the world has more of them than this one.

The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who have been transported elsewhere from their countries, although very many of them have been set free, nevertheless not a single one has ever been found who has accomplished something great in art or science or shown any other praiseworthy quality, while among the whites there are always those who rise up from the lowest rabble and through extraordinary gifts earn respect in the world.⁴² So essential is the difference between these two human kinds, and it seems to be just as great with regard to the capacities of mind as it is with respect to color. The religion of fetishes which is widespread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry, which sinks so deeply into the ridiculous as ever seems to be possible for human nature. A bird's feather,

2: 253

* In Peking, when there is an eclipse of the sun or moon, they still carry on the ceremony of driving away with a great noise the dragon that would devour these heavenly bodies, and they preserve a miserable custom from the most ancient times of ignorance, even though one is now better informed.

a cow's horn, a shell, or any other common thing, as soon as it is consecrated with some words, is an object of veneration and of invocation in swearing oaths. The blacks are very vain, but in the Negro's way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other by blows.

Among all the savages there is no people which demonstrates such a sublime character of mind as that of **North America**. They have a strong feeling for honor, and as in hunt of it they will seek wild adventures hundreds of miles away, they are also extremely careful to avoid the least injury to it where their ever so harsh enemy, after he has captured them, tries to force a cowardly sigh from them by dreadful tortures. The Canadian savage is moreover truthful and honest. The friendship he establishes is just as adventurous and enthusiastic as anything reported from the oldest and most fabulous times. He is extremely proud, sensitive to the complete worth of freedom, and even in education tolerates no encounter that would make him feel a lowly subjugation. **Lycurgus** probably gave laws to such savages, and if a law-giver were to arise among the six nations, one would see a Spartan republic arise in the new world; just as the undertaking of the Argonauts is little different from the military expeditions of these Indians, and **Jason** has nothing over **Attakakullakulla** except the honor of a Greek name.⁴³ All of these

2: 254

savages have little feeling for the beautiful in the moral sense, and the generous forgiveness of an insult, which is at the same time noble and beautiful, is as a virtue completely unknown among the savages, but is always looked upon with contempt as a miserable cowardice. Courage is the greatest merit of the savage and revenge his sweetest bliss. The other natives of this part of the world show few traces of a character of mind which would be disposed to finer sentiments, and an exceptional lack of feeling constitutes the mark of these kinds of human beings.

If we consider the relationship between the sexes in these parts of the world, we find that the **European** has alone found the secret of decorating the sensuous charm of a powerful inclination with so many flowers and interweaving it with so much that is moral that he has not merely very much elevated its agreeableness overall but has also made it very proper. The inhabitant of the **Orient** is of a very false taste in this point. Since he has no conception of the morally beautiful that can be combined with this drive, he also loses even the value of the sensuous gratification, and his harem is a constant source of unrest for him. He falls into all sorts of amorous grotesqueries, among which the imaginary jewel is one of the foremost, which he tries to secure above all others, whose entire value consists only in one's smashing it, and of which one in our part of the world generally raises much malicious doubt, and for the preservation of which he makes use of very improper and often disgusting means. Hence a woman there is always in prison, whether she be a maiden or have a barbaric, inept, and always suspicious husband.

In the lands of the **blacks** can one expect anything better than what is generally found there, namely the female sex in the deepest slavery? A pusillanimous person is always a strict master over the weaker, just as with us that man is always a tyrant in the kitchen who outside of his house hardly dares to walk up to anyone. Indeed, Father Labat reports that a Negro carpenter, whom he reproached for haughty treatment of his wives, replied: **You whites are real fools, for first you concede so much to your wives, and then you complain when they drive you crazy.**⁴⁴ There might be something here worth considering, except for the fact that this scoundrel was completely black from head to foot, a distinct proof that what he said was stupid. Among all the savages there are none among whom the female sex stands in greater real regard than those of **Canada**. In this perhaps they even surpass our civilized part of the world. Not as if they pay the women their humble respects; that would be mere compliments. No, they actually get to command. They meet and take council about the most important affairs of the nation, about war and peace. They send their delegates to the male council, and commonly it is their vote that decides. But they pay dearly enough for this preference. They have all the domestic concerns on their shoulders and share all of the hardships with the men.

2: 255

If finally we cast a few glances at history, we see the taste of human beings, like a Proteus, constantly take on changeable shapes. The ancient times of the Greeks and Romans displayed clear marks of a genuine feeling for the beautiful as well as the sublime in poetry, sculpture, architecture, legislation, and even in morals. The regime of the Roman emperors altered the noble as well as the beautiful simplicity into the magnificent and then into the false brilliance of which what survives of their oratory, poetry, and even the history of their morals can still instruct us. Gradually even this remnant of the finer taste was extinguished with the complete decay of the state. The barbarians, after they had on their part established their power, introduced a certain perverted taste that is called the Gothic, and which ends up in grotesquerie. One saw grotesqueries not only in architecture, but also in the sciences and in the other practices. The degenerated feeling, once led on by false art, adopted any unnatural⁴⁵ form other than the ancient simplicity of nature, and was either exaggerated or ridiculous. The highest flight that human genius took in order to ascend to the sublime consisted in adventures. One saw spiritual and worldly adventurers and often a repulsive and monstrous sort of bastard of both. Monks with the missal in one hand and the battle flag in the other, followed by whole armies of deceived victims in order to let their bones be buried under other regions of the sky and in a more sacred ground, consecrated warriors, sanctified by solemn oaths to violence and misdeeds, subsequently a strange sort of heroic fantasists, who called themselves knights and sought out adventures, tournaments,

duels, and romantic actions. During this period religion together with the sciences and morals was distorted by wretched grotesqueries, and one notes that taste does not readily degenerate in one area without exhibiting distinct signs of its corruption in everything else that pertains to the finer feeling. The monastic vows made out of a great number of useful people numerous societies of industrious idlers, whose brooding way of life made them fit for concocting thousands of scholastic grotesqueries, which went thence out into the larger world and spread their kind about. Finally, after the human genius had happily lifted itself out of an almost complete destruction by a kind of palingenesis, we see in our own times the proper taste for the beautiful and noble blossom in the arts and sciences as well as with regard to the moral, and there is nothing more to be wished than that the false brilliance, which so readily deceives, should not distance us unnoticed from noble simplicity, but especially that the as yet undiscovered secret of education should be torn away from the ancient delusion in order early to raise the moral feeling in the breast of every young citizen of the world into an active sentiment, so that all delicacy should not merely amount to the fleeting and idle gratification of judging with more or less taste that which goes on outside of us.

Essay on the maladies of the head

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In late 1763 and early 1764 a Polish religious fanatic by the name of Jan Pawlikowicz Zdomozyskich Komarnicki, who traveled in the company of a little boy and a herd of cows, sheep, and goats, took his sojourn outside of Königsberg and attracted widespread attention. After a serious illness and a visionary experience provoked by twenty days of fasting, the “goat prophet,” as he became known in Königsberg, had vowed to undertake a seven-year pilgrimage, of which two years remained to be served at that time. Kant’s former student and friend, Johann Georg Hamann, published a report about Komarnicki in the *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* (Königsberg Learned and Political Newspaper), of which he was the editor (issue No. 3 of 1764). The report referred to the “goat prophet” as an “adventurer” (*Abenteurer*) and gave a critical portrayal of the man’s religious comportment. Hamann’s report was followed by an anonymous assessment: “According to the judgment of a local scholar, the most remarkable thing in the above note about the inspired faun and his lad, for such eyes as gladly spy out raw nature, which commonly becomes very unrecognizable under the discipline to which human beings are subjected, is – the *little wild one*, who grew up in the woods, has learned to bid defiance to all hardships of weather with a joyful liveliness and whose face displays no vulgar frankness and has nothing about it of the stupid embarrassment which is an effect result of servitude or of the forced attentiveness in finer education; and, to be brief, who seems to be (when one takes away that in which a few people have already corrupted him, by teaching him to ask for money and to enjoy sweets), a *perfect child* in that understanding in which an experimental moralist could wish it, one who would be reasonable enough not to count the words of Herr Rousseau among the beautiful phantoms until he had tested them. At least this admiration, of which not all observers are capable, is less to be laughed at than that in which the notorious Silesian child with the golden tooth was held by many German scholars,

until a goldsmith relieved them of the trouble of tiring themselves any longer out in explaining this wonder.”¹

On the basis of one of the earliest biographies of Kant, by his former student, Ludwig Ernst Borowski,² this short evaluative text can be attributed to Kant. It is remarkable for focusing not on the spectacle of the “goat prophet” and his religious fanaticism but on the anthropological and pedagogical significance of the “perfect child.”

Kant’s text was followed by a brief note by the editor, Hamann, that gave a preview of further contributions to the journal to be expected by the anonymous author: “At the same time we are able to announce here the first original essay in our next issues, and we look forward to several contributions for the contentment of our readers due to the kindness of this astute and learned supporter.” The next five issues of the journal (Nos. 4–8 from 13, 17, 20, 24, and 27 February 1767, pp. 14–30) contained in installments the anonymous publication of the announced “essay” by Kant, *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes* (Essay on the Maladies of the Head) in which Kant turned his attention from the pedagogical experiment with the child to the psychopathology of the “goat prophet” and his like by providing an exhaustive taxonomy of mental illnesses that is as much an exercise in classification as in labeling.

Kant’s further thinking about the anthropological basis of psychopathology is to be found in Kant’s works, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), both of which are also contained in the present volume.

The translation of *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 2: 257–71 and was undertaken by Holly Wilson. The translation provides extensive documentation of the German original of Kant’s diagnostic vocabulary of mental illnesses. As a rule, a given term is indicated in a linguistic footnote at its first occurrence and then rendered consistently throughout the translation. In addition, all such terms are listed in the glossary.

Essay on the maladies of the head

2: 259

The simplicity and frugality of nature demands and forms only common concepts and a clumsy sincerity in human beings; artificial constraint and the luxury of a civil constitution hatches punsters and subtle reasoners,^a occasionally, however, also fools and swindlers, and gives birth to the wise or decent^b semblance by means of which one can dispense with understanding as well as integrity, if only the beautiful veil which decency spreads over the secret frailties of the head or the heart is woven close enough. Proportionately as art advances, reason and virtue will finally become the universal watchword, yet in such a way that the eagerness to speak of both can well dispense instructed and polite persons from bothering with their possession. The universal esteem which both praised properties are accorded nevertheless shows this noticeable difference that everyone is far more jealous of the advantages of the understanding than of the good properties of the will, and that in the comparison between stupidity^c and roguery no one would hesitate a moment to declare his preference for the latter; which is certainly well thought out because, if everything in general depends on art, fine cleverness^d cannot be dispensed with, but sincerity, which in such relations is only obstructive, can well be done without. I live among wise and well-mannered citizens, that is to say, among those who are skilled at appearing so, and I flatter myself that one would be so fair as to credit me with as much finesse that even if I were presently in possession of the most proven remedies for dislodging the maladies of the head and the heart, I would still hesitate to lay this old-fashioned rubbish in the path of public business, well aware that the beloved fashionable cure for the understanding and the heart has already made desirable progress and that particularly the doctors of the understanding, who call themselves logicians, satisfy the general demand very well since they made the important discovery:

^a Vernünftler.

^b sttsam.

^c Dummeit.

^d Schlaugkeit.

2: 260

that the human head is actually a drum which only sounds because it is empty. Accordingly, I see nothing better for me than to imitate the method of the physicians, who believe they have been very helpful to their patient when they give his malady a name, and will sketch a small onomastic^a of the frailties of the head, from its paralysis in *imbecility*^b to its raptures^c in *madness*,^d but in order to recognize these loathsome maladies in their gradual origination,^e I find it first necessary to elucidate their milder degrees from *idiocy*^f to *foolishness*, because these properties are more widespread in civil relations and lead nonetheless to the former ones.

The *dull head*^g lacks wit; the *idiot*^h lacks understanding. The agility in grasping something and remembering it, likewise the facility in expressing it properly, very much depend on wit; for that reason he who is not stupidⁱ can nevertheless be very dull, insofar as hardly anything gets into his head, even though afterward he may be able to understand it with a greater maturity of judgment; and the difficulty of being able to express oneself proves nothing less than the capacity of the understanding, it only proves that wit is not performing enough assistance in dressing up the thought with all kinds of signs of which several fit it most aptly. The celebrated Jesuit *Clavius*^j was run out of school as incapable (because according to the testing procedure of the understanding employed by tyrannical schoolmasters,^k a boy is useful for nothing at all if he can write neither verses nor essays^l). Later he came upon mathematics, the tables turned, and his previous teachers were idiots compared to him. The practical judgment concerning matters, such as the farmer, the artist, or the seafarer, etc., need it, is very different from judgment one possesses about the techniques with which human beings deal with one another. The latter is not so much understanding as craftiness,^m and the lovable lack of this highly praised capacity is called *simplicity*.ⁿ If the cause of this is to be sought in the weakness of the power of judgment, then such

2: 261

^a *Onomastik*.^b *Blödsinnigkeit*.^c *Verzuckungen*.^d *Tollheit*.^e *Abstammung*.^f *Dummköpfigkeit*.^g *der stumpfe Kopf*.^h *Dummkopf*.ⁱ *dumm*.^j *Orbile*; word coined after the name of Horace's teacher, Orbilius Pupillus, to designate a school tyrant.^k *Schulkhrien*; a *chreia* (Greek) is a collection of useful sayings; the term was also used for expository writing according to a rhetorical model taught in school.^l *Verschmitztheit*.^m *Einfalt*.

a human being is called a *ninny*,^a *simpleton*,^b etc. Since intrigue and false devices have gradually become customary maxims in civil society and have very much complicated the play of human actions, it is no wonder when an otherwise sensible^c and sincere man for whom all this cunning is either too contemptible to occupy himself with it or who cannot move his honest and benevolent heart to make himself such a hated concept of human nature were to get caught everywhere by swindlers and give them much to laugh about – so that in the end the expression “a good man” designates a simpleton no longer in a figurative manner but directly, and occasionally even designates a cuckold.^d For in the language of rogues no one is a sensible^e man but the one who holds everyone else for no better than what he himself is, namely a swindler.

The drives of human nature, which are called passions^f when they are of a high degree, are the moving forces^g of the will; the understanding only comes in to assess both the entire result^h of the satisfaction of all inclinations taken together from the end represented and to find the means to this end. If, e.g., a passion is especially powerful, the capacity of the understanding is of little help against it; for the enchanted human being sees very well indeed the reasonsⁱ against his favorite inclination, but he feels powerless^j to give them active emphasis. If this inclination is good in itself and the person is otherwise reasonable, except for the overweighing penchant obstructing the view of the bad consequences, then this state of fettered reason is *folly*.^k A *foolish person* can have a good deal of understanding even in the judgment concerning those actions in which he is foolish; he must even possess a good deal of understanding and a good heart before being entitled to this milder appellation for his excesses. The *foolish person* can even be an excellent adviser for others, although his advice has no effect on himself. He will become shrewd only through damage or through age, which however only displaces one folly to make room for another one. The amorous passion^l or a great degree of ambition^m have always made foolish persons of many reasonable people.

^a *Tropf*.^b *Einfaltspinsel*.^c *verständiger*.^d *H* – ; the translation assumes that Kant's elliptic designation is a discrete abbreviation for *Habnrei*.^e *verständiger*.^f *Leidenschaften*.^g *Bewegkräfte*.^h *Fazit*.ⁱ *Gründe*.^j *obnmächtig*.^k *Torheit*.^l *verliebte Leidenschaft*.^m *Ehrbegierde*.

2: 262

A young girl compels the formidable *Alcides*³ to pull the thread on the distaff, and Athens' idle citizens send *Alexander* with their silly praise to the end of the world. There are also inclinations of lesser vehemence and generality which nevertheless do not lack in generating folly: the building demon, the inclination to collect pictures, book mania.^a The degenerate human being has left his natural place and is attracted by everything and supported by everything. To the foolish person there is opposed the *shrewd man*,^b but he who is without folly is a *wise man*.^c This *wise man* can perhaps be sought for on the moon; possibly there one is without passion and has infinitely much reason. The insensitive person is safe from folly through his stupidity; to ordinary eyes, however, he has the mien of a wise person. *Pyrrho* saw a pig eating calmly from his trough on a ship in a storm while everyone was anxiously concerned and said pointing to it: "Such ought to be the calm of a wise person."^d The insensitive one is *Pyrrho's* wise person.

If the predominant passion is odious in itself and at the same time insipid enough to take for the satisfaction of the passion precisely that which is contrary to the natural intention of the passion, then this state of reversed^d reason is *foolishness*.^e The foolish person understands the true intention of his passion very well, even if he grants it a strength that is able of fettering reason. The *fool*,^f however, is at the same time rendered so stupid by his passion that he believes only then to be in possession of the thing desired when he actually deprives himself of it. *Pyrrhus*^g knew very well that bravery and power^g earn universal admiration; he followed the drive for ambition^b and was nothing more than for what *Kineas* held him, namely a foolish person. However, when *Nero*^h exposes himself to public mockery by reciting wretched verses to obtain the poet's prize and still says at the end of his life: *quantus artifex morior!*,ⁱ then I see in this feared and scorned ruler of Rome nothing better than a fool. I hold that every offensive folly is properly grafted onto two passions, arrogance and greediness. Both inclinations are unjust and are therefore hated, both are insipid in their nature, and their end destroys itself. The arrogant person expresses an unconcealed presumption of his advantage over others by a clear disdain for them. He believes that he is honored when he is hissed at, because there is nothing clearer than that his

^a der *Baugeist*, die *Bilderneigung*, die *Büchersucht*.

^b der *gescheute Mann*.

^c *Weiser*.

^d *verkehrten*.

^e *Narrheit*.

^f *Narr*.

^g *Macht*.

^h *Ehrsucht*.

ⁱ Latin for "What an artist dies with me!"

2: 263

disrespect for others stirs up their vanity against the presumptuous person. The greedy person believes that he needs a great deal and cannot possibly do without the least of his goods; however, he actually does without all of them by sequestering them through parsimony. The delusion of arrogance makes in part *silly*, in part *inflated fools*,^a according to whether silly^b inconstancy or rigid stupidity has taken possession of the empty head. Stingy avarice has from times immemorial given occasion for many ridiculous stories which could hardly be more strangely concocted than they actually occurred. The foolish person is not wise; the fool is not clever. The mockery that the foolish person draws on himself is amusing and sparing, the fool earns the sharpest scourge of the satirist, yet he still does not feel it. One may not fully despair that a foolish person could still be made shrewd. But he who thinks of making a fool clever is washing a moor.^c The reason is that in the former a true and natural inclination reigns which at most fetters reason, but in the latter a silly phantom reigns that reverses reason's principles.^d I will leave it to others to decide whether one has actual cause to be troubled about *Holberg's* strange prediction, namely that the daily increase in fools is a matter of concern and gives rise to fears that they could eventually get it into their heads to found the fifth monarchy.^e Supposing, however, that they were up to this, they might nevertheless not get too excited at that because one could easily whisper in the other's ear what the well-known jester of a neighboring court yelled to the students who ran after him as he rode through a Polish town in fool's attire: "You gentlemen, be industrious, learn something, because if we are too many, then we all can no longer have bread."

I come now from the frailties of the head which are despised and scoffed at to those which one generally looks upon with pity, or from those which do not suspend civil community to those in which official care provision takes an interest and for whom it makes arrangements. I divide these maladies in two, into those of impotency^f and into those of reversal.^f The first come under the general appellation of *imbecility*,^g the second under the name of the *disturbed mind*.^b The imbecile finds himself in a great impotency of memory, reason, and generally even of sensations.ⁱ This ill is for the most part incurable, for if it is difficult to

^a *teils alberne, teils aufgeblasene Narren*.

^b *läppische*.

^c *Mohren*.

^d *Grundsätze*.

^e *Ohnmacht*.

^f *Verkehrtheit*.

^g *Blödsinnigkeit*.

^h *Gemüt*.

ⁱ *sinnlichen Empfindungen*.

2: 264

remove the wild disorders of the disturbed brain, then it must be almost impossible to pour new life into its expired organs. The appearances of this weakness, which never allow the unfortunate person to leave the state of childhood, are too well known for it to be necessary to dwell long on this.

The frailties of the disturbed head can be brought under as many different main genera^a as there are mental capacities^b that are afflicted by it. I believe to be able to organize them all together under the following three divisions: first, the reversal of the concepts of experience in *derangement*,^c second, the power of judgment brought into disorder by this experience in *dementia*,^d third, reason that has become reversed with respect to more universal judgments in *insanity*.^e All remaining appearances of the sick brain can be viewed, it seems to me, either as different degrees of the cases mentioned or as an unfortunate coalition^f of these ills among one another, or, finally, as the engraving of these ills on powerful passions, and can be subordinated under the classes cited.

With respect to the first ill, namely derangement, I explain its appearances in the following way. The soul of every human being is occupied even in the healthiest state with painting all kinds of images of things that are not present, or with completing some imperfect resemblance in the representation of present things through one or another chimerical trait which the creative poetic capacity^g draws into the sensation. One has no cause at all to believe that in the state of being awake our mind^h follows other laws than in sleep. Rather it is to be conjectured that in the former case the lively sensible impressions only obscure and render unrecognizable the more fragile chimerical images, while they possess their whole strength in sleep, in which the access to the soul is closed to all outer impressions. It is therefore no wonder that dreams are held for truthful experiences of actual things, as long as they last. Since they are then the strongest representations in the soul, they are in this state exactly what the sensations are in being awake. Now let us suppose that certain chimeras, no matter from which cause, had damaged, as it were, one or other organ of the brain such that the impression on that organ had become just as deep and at the same time just as correct as a sensationⁱ could make it, then, given good sound reason, this phantom would

2: 265

- ^a *Hauptgattungen*.
- ^b *Gemütsfähigkeiten*.
- ^c *Verrückung*.
- ^d *Wahn*.
- ^e *Wahnwitz*.
- ^f *Vereinbarung*.
- ^g *schöpferische Dichtungsfähigkeit*.
- ^h *Geist*.
- ⁱ *sinnliche Empfindung*.

nevertheless have to be taken for an actual experience even in being awake. For it would be in vain to set rational arguments^j against a sensation or that representation which resembles the latter in strength, since the senses provide a far greater conviction regarding actual things than an inference of reason.^k At least someone bewitched by these chimeras can never be brought by reasoning to doubting the actuality of his presumed sensation. One also finds that persons who show enough mature reason in other cases nevertheless firmly insist upon having seen with full attention who knows what ghostly shapes and distorted faces, and that they are even refined enough to place their imagined experience in connection with many a subtle judgment of reason.^l This property of the disturbed person, due to which, while being awake and without a particularly noticeable degree of a vehement malady, he is used to representing certain things as clearly sensed of which nevertheless nothing is present, is *derangement*.^d The deranged person is thus a dreamer in waking. If the usual illusion^e of his senses is only in part a chimera, but for the most part an actual sensation, then he who is in a higher degree predisposed to such reversal is a *fantast*.^f When after waking up we lie in an idle and gentle distraction, our imagination draws the irregular figures such as those of the bedroom curtains or of certain spots on a near wall, into human shapes, and this with a seeming^g correctness that entertains us in a not unpleasant manner but the illusion^h of which we dispel the moment we want to. We dream then only *in part* and have the chimera in our power.ⁱ If something similar happens in a higher degree without the attention of the waking person being able to detach the illusion in the misleading^j imagination, then this reversal lets us conjecture a fantast. Incidentally, this self-deception in sensations is very common, and as long as it is only moderate it will be spared with such an appellation, although, if a passion is added to it, this same mental weakness^k can degenerate into actual fantastic mania.^l Otherwise human beings do not see through an ordinary delusion^m to what is there but rather what their inclination depicts for them: the natural history collector sees cities in florentine

^a *Vernunftgründe*.

^b *Vernunftschluß*.

^c *Vernunfturteil*.

^d *Verrückung*.

^e *Blendwerk*.

^f *Phantast*.

^g *scheinbaren*.

^h *Blendwerk*.

ⁱ *Gewalt*.

^j *täuschenden*.

^k *Gemütschwäche*.

^l *wirkliche Phantasterei*.

^m *Verblendung*.

stone, the devout person the passion story in the speckled marble, some lady sees the shadow of two lovers on the moon in a telescope, but her pastor two church steeples. Fear turns the rays of the northern light into spears and swords and in the twilight a sign post into a giant ghost.

The fantastic mental condition is nowhere more common than in hypochondria. The chimeras which this malady hatches do not properly deceive the outer senses but only provide the hypochondriac with an illusory sensation of his own state, either of the body or of the soul, which is, for the most part, an empty whim. The hypochondriac has an ill which, regardless which place it may have as its main seat, nevertheless in all likelihood migrates incessantly through the nerve tissue to all parts of the body. It draws above all a melancholic haze around the seat of the soul^a such that the patient feels in himself the illusion of almost all maladies of which he as much as hears. Therefore he talks of nothing more gladly than of his indisposition, he likes to read medical books, he recognizes everywhere his own misfortunes;^b in society he may even suddenly find himself in a good mood, and then he laughs a lot, dines well and generally has the look of a healthy human being. As regards his inner fantastic mania, the images in his brain often receive a strength and duration that is burdensome for him. If there is a ridiculous figure in his head (even if he himself recognizes it as only an image of fantasy) and if this whim coaxes an unbecoming laugh out of him in the presence of others without him indicating the cause of it, or if all kinds of obscure representations excite a forceful drive in him to start something evil, the eruption of which he himself is anxiously apprehensive about, and which nevertheless never comes to pass: then his state bears a strong resemblance to that of the deranged person, except that it is not that serious. The ill is not deeply rooted and lifts itself, insofar as the mind^c is concerned, usually either by itself or through some medication. One and the same representation affects the sensation in quite different degrees according to the different mental state of human beings. Therefore there is a kind of fantastic mania that is attributed to someone only because the degree of the feeling through which he is affected by certain objects is judged to be excessive for the moderate, healthy head. In this regard, the *melancholic*^d is a fantast with respect to life's ills. *Love* has quite a number of fantastic raptures, and the fine artifice of the ancient governments^e consisted in making the citizens into fantasists regarding the sense of public well-being.^f If someone is more excited by a moral sensation

^a *Sitz der Seele.*

^b *Zufälle.*

^c *Gemüt.*

^d *Melancholicus.*

^e *Staaten.*

^f *Empfindung der öffentlichen Wohlfahrt.*

than by a principle,^a and this to a larger extent than others could imagine according to their own insipid and often ignoble feeling, then he is a fantast in their opinion.^b Let us place *Aristides*⁸ among usurers, *Epictetus*⁹ among courtiers and *Jean Jacques Rousseau*¹⁰ among the doctors of the Sorbonne. I think I hear loud derision and a hundred voices shout: *What fantasts!* This two-sided appearance of fantasy in moral sensations that are in themselves good is *enthusiasm*,^c and nothing great has ever been accomplished in the world without it. Things stand quite differently with the *fanatic* (*visionary*, *enthusiast*).^d The latter is properly a deranged person with presumed immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the powers^e of the heavens. Human nature knows no more dangerous illusion.^f If its outbreak is new, if the deceived human being has talents and the masses are prepared to diligently accept this leaven, then even the state^g occasionally suffers raptures. Enthusiasm leads the exalted person to extremes, *Muhammad* to the prince's throne and *John of Leyden*¹¹ to the scaffold. To a certain extent, I can also count the disturbed *faculty of recollection*^h among the reversedness of the head,ⁱ insofar as it concerns the concepts of experience. For it deceives the miserable person who is afflicted by it through chimerical representations of who knows what a previous state, which actually never existed. Someone who speaks of the goods that he alleges to have possessed formerly or of the kingdom that he had, and who otherwise does not noticeably deceive himself with regard to his present state, is a deranged person with regard to recollection. The aged grumbler, who strongly believes that the world was more orderly and the human beings were better in his youth, is a fantast with regard to recollection.

Up to this point the power of the understanding is not actually attacked in the disturbed head, at least it is not necessary that it be; for the mistake actually resides only in the concepts. Provided one accepts the reversed sensation as true, the judgments themselves can be quite correct, even extraordinarily reasonable. A disturbance of the understanding on the contrary consists in judging in a completely reversed manner from otherwise correct experience; and from this malady the first degree is *dementia*,^j which acts contrary to the common rules of the understanding

^a *Grundsatz.*

^b *Vorstellung.*

^c *Enthusiasmus.*

^d *Fanatiker* (*Visionär*, *Schwärmer*).

^e *Mächten.*

^f *Blendwerk.*

^g *Staat.*

^h *Erinnerungsvermögen.*

ⁱ *Verkehrtheit des Kopfes.*

^j *Wabnsinn.*

2: 269

in the immediate judgments from experience. The *demented person*^a sees or remembers objects as correctly as every healthy person, only he ordinarily explains the behavior of other human beings through an absurd delusion^b as referring to himself and believes that he is able to read out of it who knows what suspicious intentions, which they never have in mind. Hearing him, one would believe that the whole town is occupied with him. The market people who deal with one another and by chance glance at him are plotting against him, the night watchman calls out to play pranks at him, in short, he sees nothing but a universal conspiracy against himself. The *melancholic* is a gloomy person who is demented with respect to his sad or offensive conjectures. But there are also all kinds of amusing dementia, and the amorous passion flatters itself or is tormented with many strange interpretations that resemble dementia. An arrogant person is to a certain measure a demented person who concludes from the conduct of others staring at him in scorn that they admire him. The second degree of the head that is disturbed with respect to the higher power of cognition is properly reason brought into disorder, insofar as it errs in a nonsensical manner in imagined more subtle judgments concerning universal concepts, and can be called *insanity*.^c In the higher degree of this disturbance all kinds of presumed excessively subtle insights swarm through the burned-out brain: the contrived length of the ocean, the interpretation of prophecies, or who knows what hotchpotch of imprudent brain teasing. If the unfortunate person at the same time overlooks the judgments of experience, then he is called *crazy*.^d But there is the case where there are many underlying correct judgments of experience, except that, due the novelty and number of consequences presented to him by his wit, his sensation is so intoxicated that he no longer pays attention to the correctness of the connection of these judgments. In that case often a very glittering semblance of dementia arises that can exist along with great *genius* to the extent that slow reason is no longer able to accompany the excited wit. The state of the disturbed head that makes it un receptive to outer sensations is *ementia*,^e insofar as rage rules in the latter it is called *raving*.^f Despair is a temporary dementedness^g in someone who is hopeless. The raging vehemence of a disturbed person is generally called *frenzy*.^h The frantic, in so far as he is demented,ⁱ is *mad*.^j

^a *der Wahnsinnige.*
^b *ungereimten Wahn.*
^c *Wahnwitz.*
^d *aberwitzig.*
^e *Unsinnigkeit.*
^f *Raserei.*
^g *Unsinn.*
^h *Tobsucht.*
ⁱ *unsinnig.*
^j *toll.*

The human being in the state of nature can only be subject to a few follies and hardly any foolishness. His needs always keep him close to experience and provide his sound understanding with such easy occupation that he hardly notices that he needs understanding for his actions. Indolence moderates his coarse and common desires, leaving enough power^a to the small amount of the power of judgment which he needs to rule over those desires to his greatest advantage. From where should he draw the material for foolishness, since, unconcerned about another's judgment as he is, he can be neither vain nor inflated? Since he has no idea at all of the worth of goods he has not enjoyed, he is safe from the absurdity of stingy avarice, and because not much wit finds entrance to his head, he is just as well secured against every craziness.^b In like manner the disturbance of the mind^c can occur only seldom in this state of simplicity. Had the brain of the savage sustained some shock, I do not know where the fantastic mania should come from to displace the ordinary sensations that alone occupy him incessantly. Which dementia^d can well befall him since he never has cause to venture far in his judgment? Insanity,^e however, is surely wholly and entirely beyond his capacity. If he is ill in the head, he will be either idiotic or mad, and this, too, should happen most rarely, since he is for the most part healthy because he is free and in motion. The means of leavening for all of these corruptions can properly be found in the civil constitution,^f which, even if it does not produce them, nevertheless serves to entertain and aggravate them. The understanding, insofar as it is sufficient for the necessities and the simple pleasures of life, is a *sound understanding*,^g however, insofar as it is required for artificial exuberance,^h be it in enjoyment or in the sciences, is the *refined understanding*. Thus the sound understanding of the citizen would already be a very refined understanding for the natural human being, and the concepts which are presupposed by a refined understanding in certain estatesⁱ are no longer suited for those who are closer to the simplicity of nature, at least in terms of their insights, and those concepts usually make fools out of them when they take them over. Abbot *Terrasson* differentiates somewhere the ones of a disturbed mind^j into those who infer correctly from false representations and those who infer

2: 270

^a *Macht.*
^b *Aberwitz.*
^c *Gemüt.*
^d *Wahnsinn.*
^e *Wahnwitz.*
^f *bürgerliche Verfassung.*
^g *gesunder Verstand.*
^h *gekünstelte Üppigkeit.*
ⁱ *Stände.*
^j *Gemüt.*

wrongly^a from correct representations.¹² This division seems to be in agreement with the propositions advanced earlier. In those of the first type, the fantasists or deranged persons, it is not the understanding that properly suffers but only the faculty that awakens the concepts in the soul of which the power of judgment afterward makes use by comparing them. These sick people can be well opposed by judgments of reason, if not to put an end to their ill, at least still to ease it. However, since in those of the second kind, the demented and insane persons, the understanding itself is attacked, it is not only foolish to reason with them (because they would not be demented if they could grasp these rational arguments^b), but it is also extremely detrimental. For one thus gives their reversed^c head only new material for concocting absurdities; contradiction does not better them, rather it excites them, and it is entirely necessary in dealing with them to assume an indifferent and kind demeanor, as though one did not notice at all that their understanding was lacking something.

I have designated the frailties of the power of cognition^d *maladies of the head*, just as one calls the corruption of the will a *malady of the heart*. I have also only paid attention to their appearances in the mind^e without wanting to scout out their roots, which may well lie in the body and indeed may have their main seat more in the intestines than in the brain, as the popular weekly journal that is generally well known under the name of *The Physician*, plausibly sets forth in its 150th, 151st, and 152nd issues.¹³ I can not even in any way convince myself that the disturbance of the mind^f originates from pride, love, too much reflection and who knows what misuse of the powers of the soul, as is generally believed. This judgment, which makes of his misfortune a reason for scornful reproaches to the diseased person, is very unkind and is occasioned by a common mistake according to which one tends to confuse cause and effect. When one pays attention only a little to the examples, one sees that first the body suffers, that in the beginning, when the germ of the malady develops unnoticed, an ambiguous reversedness^g is felt which does not yet give suspicion of a disturbance of the mind,^h and which expresses itself in strange amorous whimsⁱ or an inflated demeanor or in vain melancholic brooding. With time the malady breaks out and gives occasion to locate its ground in the immediately preceding state

2: 271

of the mind.^a But one should rather say that the human being became arrogant because he was already disturbed to some degree, than that he was disturbed because he was so arrogant. These sad ills still permit hope of a fortunate recovery, if only they are not hereditary, and it is the physician whose assistance one chiefly has to seek in this. Yet, for honor's sake, I would rather not exclude the philosopher, who could prescribe the diet of the mind^b – but on the condition that, as also for most of his other occupations, he requires no payment for this one. In recognition, the physician would also not refuse his assistance to the philosopher, if the latter attempted now and then the great, but always futile cure of foolishness. He would, e.g., in the case of the frenzy of a *learned crier*^c consider whether cathartic means taken in strengthened dosage should not be successful against it. If, according to the observations of *Swift*,¹⁴ a bad poem is merely a purification of the brain through which many detrimental moistures are withdrawn for the relief of the sick poet, why should not a miserable brooding piece of writing be the same as well? In this case, however, it would be advisable to assign nature another path to purification so that he would be thoroughly and quietly purged of the ill without disturbing the common wealth^d through this.

^a *Gemütt.*^b *Gemütt.*^c *gelehrten Schreiers.*^d *Gemeinwesen.*^a *verkehrt.*^b *Vernunftgründe.*^c *verkehrten.*^d *Erkenntniskraft.*^e *Gemütt.*^f *Gemütt.*^g *Verkehrtheit.*^h *Gemütt.*ⁱ *Liebesgrillen.*

Review of Moscati's work *Of the corporeal essential differences between the structure of animals and humans*

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* (*Königsberg Learned and Political Newspaper*) of 23 August 1771 (issue No. 67, pp. 265f.) contained an anonymous review of the German translation of a booklet by the Italian physician and anatomist, Pietro Moscati (1739–1824), professor of anatomy at the University of Pavia, entitled *Von dem körperlichen wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen der Struktur der Thiere und Menschen. Eine akademische Rede, gehalten auf dem anatomischen Theater zu Pavia* (Of the Corporeal Essential Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans. An Academic Oration Held in the Anatomical Theater of Pavia). The Italian original had appeared in 1770 in Milan under the title *Delle corporee differenze esenziali che passano fra la struttura de' bruti e la umana*. A second edition, containing an appendix in which Moscati replied to his critics, came out in Brescia in 1771. The German translation was by Johann Beckmann (1738–1811), professor of philosophy and later of economics at the University of Göttingen.

Kant's authorship the review of Moscati's work has been established circumstantially. The review states Moscati's main thesis that the erect position in the human being is artificial and unnatural and enumerates the evidence cited by Moscati for his thesis. In concluding, the reviewer distinguishes between the animal nature of the human being, which is geared toward self-preservation and the preservation of the species and includes the four-legged position, and the rational nature of the human being, which is geared toward society and elicits the two-legged position. The idea of an antagonism between animality and rationality is characteristic of Kant's anthropological outlook and also plays an important role in his work on the philosophy of history, *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, which is contained in the present volume.

The translation of *Recension von Moscatis Schrift: Von dem körperlichen wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen der Struktur der Thiere und Menschen* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 2: 421–5 and was undertaken by Günter Zöller.

Review of Moscati's work *Of the corporeal essential differences between the structure of animals and humans*

2: 421

Of the Corporeal Essential Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans. An Academic Oration Given in the Anatomical Theater in Pavia by Dr. Peter Moscati, Professor of Anatomy. Translated from the Italian by Johann Beckmann, Professor in Göttingen.

2: 423

Here we have again the natural human being on all fours, to which he is returned by an astute anatomist, which Rousseau as a philosopher did not succeed in doing. Dr. Moscati proves that the upright gait of the human being is contrived and against nature; that he is indeed built to maintain himself and move about in this position;^a but that, if he makes this his necessity and constant habit, discomforts and maladies result which demonstrate sufficiently that he was enticed by reason and imitation to deviate from the first, animal set-up. Inside the human being is not built differently from all animals that stand on four feet. Now if he stands up, then his intestines, especially the fetus in pregnant persons, come into a downward hanging situation^b and a half-inverted position. This is not able to bring about particularly bad consequences if it changes frequently with the lying position or the four-legged one, but by being constantly continued it causes malformations and a good number of maladies. Thus, e.g., the heart, since it is forced to hang, elongates the blood vessels to which it is attached, assumes an oblique situation by resting on the diaphragm and glides with its tip against the left side – a situation by which the human being, the adult human being that is, distinguishes himself from all animals and whereby he receives a propensity^c toward aneurysms, palpitations of the heart, narrow-chestedness, dropsy of the breast, etc. In this straight position the mesentery (*Mesenterium*) of the human being, pulled by the weight of the intestines, sinks down vertically, is elongated and weakened and set up for many a hernia. Because in the portal vein, which has no valves, the blood has to rise against the

2: 424

^a Stellung.

^b Lage.

^c Hang.

2: 425

direction of gravity, it will move slower and heavier than would be the case in the horizontal situation of the rump, from where hypochondria, hemorrhoids, etc. come about – not to mention that the difficult circulation of the blood, which has to rise up straight from the veins of the legs to the heart, brings with it not seldom tumors, varicose veins,^a etc. The disadvantage of this vertical position is especially visible in pregnant persons, with regard to the fetus as well as the mother. The child, which is thereby put on its head, receives the blood in very unequal proportions: in that the latter is driven in much greater quantity into the upper parts, into the head and the arms, due to which both are elongated and grow in quite different proportions than in all other animals. From the influx into the head arise hereditary inclinations to vertigo, to stroke, to headaches and madness.^b From the rush of the blood into the arms and the diversion from the legs arises the curious disproportion, not to be perceived in any other animal, that the arms of the fetus become longer beyond their due proportion^c and the legs shorter. To be sure, this misproportion improves again after birth through the constant vertical position, but it proves that the fetus had to suffer violence^d previously. The damages to the two-footed mother are a prolapsed uterus, untimely births, etc., which arise together with legions of other ills^e from the erect position and of which the four-footed creatures are free. One could add still others to these arguments^f for our animal nature being properly four-footed. Among all four-footed animals there is not a single one which could not swim, if by chance it were to get into the water. The human being alone drowns, if he has not especially learned to swim. The reason^g is that he has lost the habit of walking on all fours; for this is the motion through which he could preserve himself without any art on the water and by which all four-footed creatures that otherwise abhor water swim. As paradoxical as this proposition of our Italian physician may seem, in the hands of so astute and philosophical an anatomist^b it receives almost complete certainty. From this we see the following: the first foresight of nature was that the human being as an animal be preserved *for himself and his kind*; and for that the position which is most suited to his internal build, the situation of the fetus and the preservation in dangers is the *four-footed* one; but that there also has been placed in him a germ of

reason through which, if the latter develops, he is destined *for society*, and by means of which he assumes permanently the most suitable position for society, viz., the *two-footed* one. Thereby he gains, on one side, infinitely much over the animals, but he also has to live with the discomforts which result for him from the fact that he has raised his head so proudly above his old comrades. Costs 24 Groschen.

^a Geschwüste, Arterienkröpfe.

^b Wahnwitz.

^c geziemendes Verhältnis.

^d Gewalt.

^e Übeln.

^f Beweisgründe.

^g Ursache.

^b Zergliederer.

Of the different races of human beings

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Beginning with the summer semester of 1756, which was only his second semester of academic teaching, Kant regularly lectured on physical geography, thereby introducing this subject matter into the curriculum at the University of Königsberg. He offered the course some forty-eight times and, after adding a regular course on anthropology, which was also an academic novelty, beginning with the winter semester 1772/73, alternated between the two courses, lecturing on anthropology during the winter and on physical geography during the summer term. The two-part sequence of courses was designed to give Kant's students useful orientation about the two main fields of knowledge that have an immediate application outside of academia in life, the human being and nature. The course on physical geography was unusual in that Kant did not base it on an official textbook, as was generally required at Prussian universities at the time, but on his own collection of materials to which he added over the years.¹

On five separate occasions Kant published announcements of his lecture activity for a given semester in the form of a small scholarly essay of wider interest, followed by details about his courses and also including mention or description of his course on physical geography. The last of these invitational writings, dating from the summer semester of 1775, is entitled, *Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen zur Ankündigung der Vorlesungen der physischen Geographie im Sommerhalbjahre 1775 von Immanuel Kant der Log. und Met. ordentl. Prof. (Of the Different Races of Human Beings To Announce the Lectures on Physical Geography of Immanuel Kant, Professor Ordinarius of Logic and Metaphysics).*²

Two years later the essay appeared in a revised version, enlarged by numerous additions, in a volume, entitled *Der Philosoph für die Welt* (The Worldly Philosopher),³ published by Johann Jacob Engel (1741–1802), who was a member of Enlightenment movement in Berlin, where he also taught philosophy at the secondary school level. In the second edition the opening paragraph and the closing paragraph of the first edition as

Of the different races of human beings

well as the latter part of the title with their references to the announced lecture course on physical geography are omitted.

Kant's essay defends the unity of the human species amidst its differentiation into four principal subspecies ("races"). While Kant holds on to the immutability of the human species, and of all species in nature, he provides an account of the differentiation of the human species into various kinds of subgroups among which the four subspecies stand out. According to Kant, the main racial characteristic, which he identifies with one of four skin colors (white, red, black and yellow), is passed on unfailingly within a given subspecies and unfailingly results in a mixed skin color in the children of racially mixed parentage.

Kant maintains a twofold origin of racial differentiation in the human species: through substantial causes in the form of "germs" (*Keime*) and "predispositions" (*Anlagen*) that predetermine the possible differentiation of that species and through circumstantial causes that provoke a specific predetermined development, specifically the climatic conditions to which human beings adapt in various ways over time. Kant distinguishes four main types of climate (humid cold, dry cold, humid heat and dry heat) and correlates each of the four main human subspecies with one of them, drawing on geographical data to explain the gradual process of the human population of the earth.

Together with the two essays, *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785) and *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788), which are also contained in the present volume, *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* constitutes a trilogy of works by Kant on the natural history of the human species.⁴

The translation of *Von den verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 2: 427–43 and was undertaken by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller. Special care has been taken in rendering Kant's highly differentiated terminology for the differentiation of biological species. Each such term is accompanied by a linguistic footnote placed at its first occurrence in Kant's text and is also listed in the glossary.

Following the Academy edition, the translation provides the text of the second, revised edition, augmented by the opening paragraph and the closing paragraph of the first edition. The original versions of the passages that were changed in the second edition, which are recorded in the Academy edition,⁵ have been omitted.

2:427

Of the different races of human beings

2:429

I. OF THE DIFFERENCE OF THE RACES IN GENERAL

The lecture course that I am announcing will be more of a useful entertainment than a laborious business; for that reason, the investigation with which I accompany this announcement will indeed contain something for the understanding, but more like a game of the latter than a deep inquiry.^a

The natural division into species and kinds^b in the animal kingdom is grounded on the common law of propagation, and the unity of the species is nothing other than the unity of the generative power that is universally valid for a certain manifoldness of animals. For this reason, *Buffon's*^c rule, that animals which produce fertile young with one another (whatever difference in shape there may be) still belong to one and the same physical species,^c must properly be regarded only as the definition of a natural species^d of animals in general in contrast to all school species of the latter. The school division concerns *classes*,^e which divide the animals according to *resemblances*,^f the natural division concerns *phyla*,^g which divide the animals according to *relationships*,^h in terms of generation.ⁱ The former provides a school system for memory; the latter provides a natural system for the understanding. The first only aims at bringing creatures under titles; the second aims at bringing them under laws.

According to this concept, all human beings on the wide earth belong to one and the same natural species because they consistently beget

^a The first paragraph, which was contained in the first edition, is missing in the second edition.

^b *Gattungen und Arten.*

^c *physischen Gattung.*

^d *Naturgattung.*

^e *Klassen.*

^f *Ähnlichkeiten.*

^g *Stämme.*

^h *Verwandtschaften.*

ⁱ *Erzeugung.*

fertile children with one another, no matter what great differences may otherwise be encountered in their shape. One can adduce only a single natural cause for this unity of the natural species, which unity is tantamount to the unity of the generative power that they have in common: namely, that they all belong to a single phylum, from which, notwithstanding their differences, they originated, or at least could have originated. In the first case, human beings belong not merely to one and the same *species*, but also to one *family*,^a in the second case they are similar to one another but not related, and many local creations would have to be assumed – an opinion which needlessly multiplies the number of causes. An animal species which at the same time has a common phylum contains under itself not different *kinds* (since the latter signify precisely the differences of the phyletic origin^b); rather their divergences from one another are called *subspecies*^c if they are hereditary.^d If the hereditary marks of the phyletic origin agree with their point of origination,^e then they are called *regenerations*,^f however, if the subspecies could no longer provide the original formation of the phylum,^g then it would be called *degeneration*.^h

Among the subspecies, i.e., the hereditary differences of the animals which belong to a single phylum, those which persistently preserve themselves in all transplantings (transpositions to other regions) over prolonged generationsⁱ among themselves and which also always beget half-breed^j young in the mixing with other variations of the same phylum are called *races*. Those which persistently preserve the distinctive character of their variation in all transplantings and thus regenerate,^k but do not necessarily beget half-breeds^j in the mixing with others are called *strains*.^m Those which regenerate often but not persistently are called *varieties*.ⁿ Conversely, that variation which produces with others half-breeds but which extinguishes gradually through transplantings is called a special *sort*.^o

^a *Familie.*

^b *Abstammung.*

^c *Abartungen.*

^d *erblich.*

^e *Abkunft.*

^f *Nacharten.*

^g *ursprüngliche Stammbildung.*

^h *Ausartung.*

ⁱ *Zeugungen.*

^j *halbschlächtige.*

^k *nacharten.*

^l *nicht notwendig halbschlächtig zeugen.*

^m *Spielarten.*

ⁿ *Varietäten.*

^o *ein besonderer Schlag.*

2:430

2:431

In this way, *Negroes* and *whites*, while not different kinds of human beings^a (since they belong presumably to one phylum), are still two *different races*^b because each of the two perpetuates itself in all regions and both necessarily beget half-breed children or *blends* (mulattoes) with one another. By contrast, *blondes* and *brunettes* are not different *races* of whites, because a blond man can have entirely blond children with a brunette woman, even though each of these subspecies is preserved throughout extended generations in all transplantings. For this reason, they are *strains* of whites. Finally, the condition of the soil (humidity or aridity), likewise that of nutrition, gradually introduce a hereditary difference or *sort* among animals of one and the same phylum and race, chiefly with respect to size, proportion of the limbs (heavy or thin), as well as natural disposition, which, while resulting in half-breeds in mixing with foreign ones, disappears over the course of few generations^c on other soil and with different nutrition (even without a change of climate). It is pleasant to notice the different sort of the human beings in accordance with the difference of these causes in cases where that difference is noticeable in the provinces of one and the same country (like the Boetians, who inhabited a wet soil, differed from the Athenians, who inhabited a dry soil). To be sure, this difference is often recognizable only to an attentive eye but is derided by others. What belongs merely to the *varieties* and is thus in itself hereditary (although not persistently so), can still produce over time through marriages that always remain in the same families what I call the *family sort*,^d in which something characteristic finally takes root so deeply in the generative power that it approximates a strain and perpetuates itself like the latter. Reportedly this was noticeable in the old Venetian nobility, especially in the ladies. At least the noble women on the newly discovered island of *Tabiti* have an altogether larger build than the common ones. – The possibility of eventually establishing a lasting family sort by means of careful separation of the degenerative births from the consistent ones^e was the basis for the idea^f of M. de *Maupertuis*² of raising in some province a naturally noble sort of human beings in which understanding, excellence and integrity would be hereditary. In my opinion, this plan, while being in itself feasible, is just as well prevented by a wiser Nature because the great incentives which set into play the sleeping powers of humanity and compel it to develop all its talents and to come nearer to the perfection of their destiny,^g lie

precisely in the intermingling of the evil with the good. When Nature can work undisturbed (without transplanting or foreign mixing) through many generations, then she always produces finally a lasting sort, which marks ethnic groups^a forever and would be called a race if what is characteristic did not appear too insignificant and were not too difficult to describe to ground a special division on it.

2. DIVISION OF THE HUMAN SPECIES INTO ITS DIFFERENT RACES

2:432

I think one is only compelled to assume *four* races of the human species in order to be able to derive from these all the easily distinguishable and self-perpetuating differences. They are 1) the race of the *whites*, 2) the *Negro race*, 3) the *Hunnish* (Mongolian or Kalmuckian) race, 4) the *Hindu* or *Hindustani* race. Among the first race, which is located primarily in Europe, I count also the Moors (Mauretanian from Africa), the Arabs (following Niebuhr³), the Turkish-Tataric ethnic tribe^b and the Persians, as well as all other peoples from Asia who are not explicitly excluded from it by the remaining divisions. The *Negro race* of the northern hemisphere is indigenous^c only in Africa; that of the southern hemisphere (outside of Africa) is presumably native only in New Guinea (*Autochthones*^d), but are mere transplantings in some neighboring islands. The Kalmuckian race appears to be purest among the Khoschuts, to be somewhat mixed with Tartaric blood among the Torguts, and more so among the Dzungarians and is just the same race which in most ancient times carried the name of the *Huns*, later the name of the *Mongols* (in a wider sense) and now that of the Eleuts. The *Hindustani* race is very pure and most ancient in the country of that name, but is distinct from the people on the opposite side of the Indian peninsula. I believe to be able to derive all remaining hereditary ethnic characters^e from these four races: either as *mixed* or *incipient races*,^f of which the former originates from the mixing of different races, while the latter has not yet resided long enough in the climate to completely assume the respective character of the race. Thus the mixing of the Tataric with the Hunnish blood has produced *half-races*^g in the Karakulpacks, the Nagajens and in others. *Hindustani* blood, mixed with that of the old Scythians (in and around Tibet) and with either more or less of the Hunnish blood, has perhaps generated

^a *Arten von Menschen.*

^b *verschiedene Racen.*

^c *Zeugungen.*

^d *Familienstschlag.*

^e *Aussonderung der ausartenden Geburten von den einschlagenden.*

^f *Meinung.*

^g *Bestimmung.*

^a *Völkerschaften.*

^b *Völkerstamm.*

^c *einheimisch.*

^d Greek for “the ones who sprang from that land itself” or “sons of the soil.”

^e *Völkercharaktere.*

^f *vermischte oder angehende Racen.*

^g *Halbracen.*

2: 433

as a mixed race the inhabitants of the other side of the Indian peninsula, the Tung-chin and the Chinese. The inhabitants of the northern glacial coast of Asia are an example of an incipient Hunnish race, showing already the persistently black hair, the beardless chin, the flat face and slit and little-opened eyes – the effect of the glacial zone on a people which was driven out of milder regions into these residences in later times, just like the Laplanders, a subsidiary phylum^a of the Hungarian people, and already within a very few centuries quite well adapted^b to the peculiarity of the cold region, even though they originated from a well-built people in the temperate zone. Finally, the *Americans* appear to be a Hunnish race which has not yet fully adapted. For in the extreme northwest of America (where presumably also the population^c of this part of the world must have occurred from the northeast out of Asia, as indicated by the matching animal kinds^d in both), on the northern coasts of the *Hudson Bay*, the inhabitants are very similar to the Kalmucks. To be sure, further down south the face becomes more open and more elevated, but the beardless chin, the persistently black hair, the red-brown facial color, likewise the coldness and insensitivity of the natural disposition extend from the extreme north of this part of the world on over to Staten Island and are all remnants of the effect of a long residence in cold parts of the world, as we will see below. The prolonged residence of the ancestors of the Americans in northeast Asia and in neighboring northwest America has brought the Kalmuckian formation to perfection, whereas the more rapid expansion of their progeny toward the south of this part of the world brought the American formation to perfection. No further population has occurred out of America. For all the inhabitants on the islands of the Pacific, except some Negroes, are bearded. Rather they give some indications of originating from the Malayans, just like those on the Sunda Islands; and the type of feudal government which was encountered on the island of *Tahiti*, and which is also the usual political constitution of the Malayans, confirms this surmise.

The reason for assuming Negroes and whites to be basic races,^e is in itself clear. As far as the Hindustani and the Kalmuckian races are concerned, the olive-yellow color in the former one, which is at the base of the more or less brown color of the hot countries, is as little derivable from some other known national character as the original face of the second one, and both unfailingly reproduce themselves in mixed pairings. The same holds for the American race, which follows the Kalmuckian formation and is connected to the latter through one and the same cause.

^a *Abstamm.*^b *eingearitet.*^c *Bevölkerung.*^d *Tierarten.*^e *Grundracen.*

Through mixing with the white the East Indian yields the *yellow Mestizo*, just as the American with the white yields the *red Mestizo*, and the White with the Negro the *Mulatto*, the American with the Negro the *Kabugl*, or the black *Caribbean*; all of which are always recognizably marked blends and demonstrate their origination from genuine races

2: 434

3. OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE ORIGIN OF THESE DIFFERENT RACES

The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an organic body (plant or animal) are called *germs*,^a if this unfolding concerns particular parts; if, however, it concerns only the size or the relation of the parts to one another, then I call them *natural predispositions*.^b In birds of the same kind^c which yet are supposed to live in different climates there lie germs for the unfolding of a new layer of feathers if they live in a cold climate, which, however, are held back if they should reside in a temperate one. Since in a cold country the wheat kernel must be more protected against the humid cold than in a dry or warm climate, there lies in it a previously determined capacity or a natural predisposition to gradually produce a thicker skin. This care of Nature to equip her creature through hidden inner provisions for all kinds of future circumstances, so that it may preserve itself and be suited to the difference of the climate or the soil, is admirable. In the migration and transplanting of animals and plants it creates the semblance^d of new kinds; yet they are nothing other than variations and races of the same species the germs and natural predispositions of which have merely developed on occasion in various ways over long periods of time.*

Chance or the universal mechanical laws could not produce such agreements.^e Therefore we must consider such occasional unfoldings

2: 435

* We generally take the designations *description of nature* and *natural history* to mean the same. Yet it is clear that the cognition of natural things as they are now always leaves us desirous of the cognition of that which they once were and of the series of changes they underwent to arrive at each place in their present state. *Natural history*, which we still lack almost entirely, would teach us about the changes in the shape of the earth, likewise that of its creatures (plants and animals) that they have undergone through natural migrations and the resultant subspecies from the prototype of the phyletic species. It would presumably trace a great many of seemingly different kinds to races of the same species and would transform the school system of the description of nature, which is now so extensive, into a physical system for the understanding.

^a *Kerme.*^b *natürliche Anlagen.*^c *Art.*^d *Schem.*^e *Zusammenpassungen.*

as *preformed*.^a Yet even where nothing purposive shows itself, the mere faculty to propagate its adopted character is already proof enough that a particular germ or natural predisposition for it was to be found in the organic creature. For outer things can well be occasioning causes but not producing ones^b of what is inherited necessarily and regenerates.^c As little as chance or physical-mechanical causes can produce an organic body, just as little will they add something to its generative power, i.e., bring about something that propagates itself, if it concerns a special shape or relation of the parts.* Air, sun, and nutrition can modify the growth of an animal body but they cannot also provide this change with a generative power that would be capable of reproducing itself even without this cause; rather what is supposed to propagate itself must have laid previously in the generative power as antecedently determined to an occasional unfolding in accordance with the circumstances in which the creature can find itself and in which it is supposed to persistently preserve itself. For the animal must not be subject to a foreign intrusion into the generative power, which would be capable of gradually removing the creature from its original and essential destiny^d and of producing true degenerations that would perpetuate themselves.

The human being was destined for all climates and for every soil; consequently, various germs and natural predispositions had to lie ready in him to be on occasion either unfolded or restrained, so that he would become suited to his place in the world and over the course of the generations^e would appear to be as it were native to and made for that place. With these concepts, let us go through the whole human species on the wide earth and adduce purposive causes of its subspecies therein in cases where the natural causes are not easily recognizable and again adduce natural causes where we do not perceive ends. Here I only note that *air* and *sun* appear to be those causes which most deeply influence the generative power and produce an enduring development of the germs and pre-dispositions, i.e., are able to establish a race; by contrast, special nutrition can indeed produce a sort of human beings whose distinctive character, though, soon extinguishes with transplantings. In order to adhere to the generative power, something must affect not the *preservation* of life but its *source*, i.e., the first principles of its animal set-up and movement.

2: 436

2: 437

* Maladies are sometimes hereditary. However, this requires no organization but only a ferment of harmful fluids which propagate through infection. Moreover, they are not necessarily hereditary.

^a *vorgebildet*.

^b *Gelegenheits-, aber nicht hervorbringende Ursachen*.

^c *was notwendig anerbt und nachartet*.

^d *Bestimmung*.

^e *Zeugungen*.

^f *tierischen Einrichtung*.

The human being, transposed to the glacial zone, had to gradually degenerate into a smaller stature because in the latter – with the power of the heart remaining the same – the circulation of the blood occurs in a shorter time, thus the pulse becomes faster and the warmth of the blood increases. Indeed *Cranz*⁴ found the Greenlanders to be not only far below the stature of the Europeans, but also to have noticeably greater natural body heat. Even the disproportion between the total body height and the short legs in the northernmost peoples is suited for their climate, since these parts of the body suffer more danger in the cold because of their remoteness from the heart. Nonetheless most of the currently known inhabitants of the glacial zone appear to be only later arrivals there, like the Laplanders, who originated with the Finns from one and the same phylum, namely the Hungarian one, and have assumed their current residences only since the emigration of the Hungarians (from eastern Asia) and are nonetheless already adapted to a considerable degree to this climate.

If, however, a northern people is compelled over long periods of time to withstand the influence of the cold of the glacial zone, then even greater alterations must happen with it. In this desiccating region all unfolding through which the body merely wastes its fluids must gradually be restrained. For this reason, the germs of the hair growth are suppressed in time, so that only those remain which are required for the necessary covering of the head. Also, by virtue of a natural predisposition, the protruding parts of the face, the latter being the least susceptible to coverage, which suffer incessantly from the cold, will gradually become flatter in order to better preserve themselves due to Nature's care. The bulging elevation under the eyes, the half-closed and blinking eyes appeared as though prearranged for their protection^a in part against the desiccating cold air, in part against the light of the snow (against which the Eskimos also use snow goggles). Yet those features can also be viewed as natural effects of the climate which are noticeable even in milder regions, if only in far smaller measure. Thus there gradually comes about the beardless chin, the flattened nose, thin lips, blinking eyes, the flat face, the red-brown color together with the black hair, in a word, the *Kalmuckian facial formation*, which takes root over a long series of generations in the same climate until it becomes a persistent race which preserves itself even if such a people afterward acquires new residences in milder regions.

Without doubt one will wonder with what right I could derive the Kalmuckian formation, which is now encountered in its greatest completeness in a milder region, from the deep north or northeast. My reason^b is this: *Herodotus*⁵ reports from his time already that the *Argipeans*,

^a *zur Verwahrung . . . wie veranstaltet*.

^b *Ursache*.

who were inhabitants of a country at the foot of high mountains in an area which one can take for that of the Ural mountains, were bald and flat-nosed and covered their trees with white blankets (presumably he meant felt tents). Nowadays one finds this shape in greater and lesser measure in northeast Asia, but above all in the northwestern part of America, which one was able to discover from the Hudson Bay, where the inhabitants look like true Kalmuckians according to several recent reports. Now if one considers that in this area animals and human beings must have crossed between Asia and America in most ancient times, given that one encounters the same animals in the cold region of both parts of the world, and if one further considers that this human race showed itself to the Chinese in the area beyond the Amur river for the first time some 1,000 years before our chronology (according to Desguignes⁶) and gradually drove other peoples of the Tartarish, Hungarian, and other tribes out from their residences, then this phyletic origin from the cold part of the world will seem not entirely contrived.

But the most important point, namely the *derivation^a of the Americans* as an incompletely adapted race, a people that long resided in the northernmost region, is quite well confirmed through the suppressed hair growth on all parts of the body except the head, through the reddish rust iron color in the colder and the darker copper color in the hotter regions of this part of the world. For the red-brown color appears (as an effect of aerial acid^b) to be as suitable to the cold climate as the olive-brown color (as an effect of the alkaline-bilious nature^c of the fluids) to the hot region, not to mention the natural disposition of the Americans, which betrays a half extinguished life power* that can be viewed most easily as the effect of a cold region of the world.

2: 438

In a people which has grown sufficiently old in the greatest *humid heat* of the warm climate to have adapted completely to its soil, there must be effects entirely opposed to the previously discussed ones. The exact opposite of the Kalmuckian formation will be produced. The growth of the spongy parts of the body had to increase in a hot and humid climate; hence the thick turned-up nose and the thick lips^d. The skin had to be oiled, not merely to mitigate the too strong evaporation^e but

to prevent the harmful absorption of the putrefactive humid elements of the air. The abundance of iron particles, which otherwise are found in all human blood and which here are precipitated^a in the reticular substance^b through the evaporation of the phosphorous acid (of which all Negroes stink^c), causes the black color showing through the upper thin skin; and the heavy iron content in the blood appears also to be necessary for preventing the enervation^d of all parts. The oil of the skin, which weakens the nutrient mucus^e required for hair growth, hardly permits the production of a full head of hair. Incidentally, humid warmth is beneficial to the robust growth of animals in general and, in short, this results in the Negro, who is well suited to his climate, namely strong, fleshy, supple, but who, given the abundant provision of his mother land, is lazy, soft and trifling.

The native of Hindustan can be viewed as originating from one of the oldest human races. His country, which leans against a towering mountain range to the north and is traversed by a long series of mountains from the north to the south down to the tip of his subcontinent (among which I also count northward *Tibet*, perhaps the common place of refuge of humankind^f during the last great revolution of our earth and its nursery thereafter), possesses the most perfect parting of the waters (runoff to two oceans) in a fortunate region, which no other part of the Asian landmass that lies in this fortunate region has. Thus it could be dry and habitable in most ancient times, while both the eastern Indian peninsula as well as China (in which the rivers run parallel rather than part), must still have been uninhabited in those times of the floodings. Thus a fixed human race could establish itself here over long periods of time. The olive-yellow color of the skin of the Indian, the true gypsy color^g which lies at the base of the more or less dark brown of other eastern peoples, is also just as characteristic and persistent in regeneration^b as the black color of the Negro, and together with the remaining formation and the distinct natural disposition appears to be just as much the effect of a *dry heat*, as the latter appears to be that of a *humid heat*. According to Herr Ives,⁷ the common maladies of the Indians are constipated gall-bladders and swollen livers; moreover their native color is almost jaundiced and appears to point toⁱ a continuous secretion of the bile which has

2: 439

* To adduce only one example: one makes use of the red slaves (Americans) in Surinam only for labors in the house because they are too weak for field labor, for which one uses Negroes. Yet there is no dearth of forcible means in this case; however, the natives of this part of the world are lacking in general in faculty and endurance.

^a *Ableitung*.

^b *Luftsaure*.

^c *Laugenhaft-Galligten*.

^d *dicke Stülpnase und Wurstlippen*.

^e *Ausdünnung*.

^a *gefällt*.

^b *netzförmigen Substanz*.

^c *stinken*.

^d *Abschlaffung*.

^e *Nahrungs schleim*.

^f *des menschlichen Geschlechts*.

^g *Zigeunerfarbe*.

^h *Nachartung*.

ⁱ *beweisen*.

2: 440

entered into the blood, whose soapy nature perhaps dissolves and makes evaporate the thickened fluids and thereby cools the blood at least in the outer parts. A self-help of Nature by means of a certain organization (whose effect shows itself in the skin) resulting in this or a similar procedure for continuously removing what irritates the circulation of the blood, may well be the cause of the cold hands of Indians* and perhaps (although this has not yet been observed) of an altogether diminished warmth of the blood, which makes them capable of tolerating the heat of the climate without detriment.

These then are conjectures which have at least sufficient ground to counterbalance other conjectures which find the differences in the human species so incompatible that they rather assume on that account many local creations. To say with *Voltaire* that God, who created the reindeer in Lapland to consume the moss of these cold parts, also created the Laplander there to eat this reindeer is not a bad idea for a poet but a poor resort for the philosopher who may not leave the chain of natural causes except where he sees it manifestly attached to immediate ordinance.^a

Nowadays one attributes with good reason the various colors of the plants to the iron that is precipitated by different fluids. Since all animal blood contains iron, nothing prevents us from ascribing the different color of these human races to the same cause. This way, for example, the saline acidic or the phosphoric acidic or the volatile alkaline in the evacuating vessels of the skin would precipitate the iron particles in the reticulum as red or black or yellow. In the whites,^b however, this iron that is dissolved in the fluids would not be precipitated at all and thereby would indicate at once the perfect mixture of the fluids and the strength of this human sort^c ahead of the others. Yet this is only a sketchy enticement to investigation in a field which is too foreign to me for venturing even conjectures with any confidence.

* I had indeed read somewhere that these Indians have the peculiarity of cold hands in very great heat and that this was supposed to be a fruit of their sobriety and moderation. Yet when I had the pleasure of speaking to the attentive and insightful traveler, Herr *Eaton*, who had been stationed as Dutch Consul and head of the Dutch office in Bassein, etc., on his travel through Königsberg, he told me the following: when he had danced with the wife of a European consul in Surat, he had been surprised to feel sweaty and cold hands on her (the habit of gloves has not yet taken hold there), and since he expressed his astonishment to others, he received the answer that she had an Indian mother and that this peculiarity was hereditary in them. The same gentleman also attested that when seeing the children of the *Parsis* together with those of the Indians there, the difference of the races in the white color of the former and the yellow-brown of the latter immediately caught one's eye and that the Indians still had in their build the distinctive feature that their thighs were proportionally longer than among us.

^a das unmittelbare Verhängnis.

^b Geschlecht der Weißen.

^c Menschenschlag.

2: 441

We have enumerated four human races, under which all the manifoldnesses of this species are supposed to be comprehended. Yet all variations still need a *phylectic species*,^d which either we must claim to be already extinct or else we have to select that one among the present variations to which we can compare the phyletic species to the largest extent. To be sure, one cannot hope to find the original human shape unchanged anywhere in the world now. Just because of the tendency of nature to adapt everywhere to the soil over many generations,^e the human shape must now be affected everywhere with local modifications. Yet the region of the earth from the 31st to the 52nd degree of latitude in the ancient world (which also with respect to its population appears to deserve the name of the ancient world) is rightly taken for that region of the earth in which the most fortunate mixture of the influences of the colder and hotter regions are found and also the greatest riches in creatures of the earth are found; and where also the human being must have diverged the least from his original formation,^f given that he is equally well prepared for all transplantings from there. Now here we do indeed find inhabitants that are white, however they are *brunette*, which shape we thus want to assume to be the one closest to that of the phyletic species. Of this shape, the *high blonde* with tender white skin, reddish hair, pale blue eyes seems to be the nearest northern subspecies,^g which in Roman times inhabited the northern areas of Germany and (according to other sources of evidence) further toward the east up to the Altai mountains, always inhabiting enormous forests in a rather cold region of the earth. Now the influence of a *cold* and *humid* air, which gives the fluids a tendency to scurvy, finally produced a certain sort of human beings that would have grown into a persistent race, if foreign mixings^h had not so frequently interrupted the progress of the variation in this region of the earth. Thus we can count the latter at least as an approximation among the actual races, and then they can be brought into the following outline connecting them with the natural causes of their origin:

Phyletic Species.

Whites of *brunette* color.

First race High blondes (Northern Europeans) from humid cold.

Second race Copper-reds (Americans) from dry cold.

Third race Blacks (Senegambia) from humid heat.

Fourth race Olive-yellows (Indians) from dry heat.

^a *Stammgattung.*

^b *Zeugungen.*

^c *Urbildung.*

^d *Abartung.*

^e *fremde Vermischungen.*

4. OF THE OCCASIONING CAUSES^a OF THE FOUNDING^b OF DIFFERENT RACES

2: 442

The greatest difficulty concerning the manifoldness of the races on the surface of the earth, no matter which ground of explanation one may assume, is the following: similar countries and regions still do not contain the same race; America in its hottest climate exhibits no east Indian shape, much less a Negro shape native to the country; in Arabia or Persia there is no indigenous Indian olive-yellow color, despite the fact that these countries very much agree with India in terms of climate and property of the air, and so on. As regards the first of these difficulties, it may be answered in a fairly conceivable way from the manner in which this region was populated. Once a race like the current one had established itself through the long residence of its original people^c in northeast Asia or in neighboring America, this race could not be transformed into another one through any further influences of the climate. For only the phyletic formation can degenerate into a race; however, once a race has taken root and has suffocated the other germs, it resists all transformation just because the character of the race has then become prevailing in the generative power.

With respect to the locality^d of the Negro race, however, which is proper only to Africa* (in the greatest perfection in Senegambia), as well as that of the Indian race, which is closed up in its country (except eastward where it appears to have turned half-breed^e), I believe that the cause for that lay in an *inland sea* of ancient times, which kept Hindustan as well as Africa separate from other countries lying otherwise nearby. For the region of the earth that stretches in an only slightly interrupted continuity from the border of Dauria over Mongolia, Little Bukhara, Persia, Arabia, Nubia, the Sahara to Cape White resembles for the most part the bottom of an ancient ocean. The countries in this region are what *Buache*^g calls a tableland, namely high and for the most part horizontally positioned plains in which the mountains found there nowhere have an extended slope, their base being buried under horizontally lying sand. For this reason, the rivers, of which there are only few there, have only a

* In the hot southern part of the world there is also a small tribe (*Stamm*) of Negroes who have spread to the neighboring islands. On account of their intermingling with Indian half-breeds, one is almost led to believe of those Negroes that they were not native to these regions but were gradually brought over in olden times due to a connection between the Malay Archipelago and Africa.

^a Gelegenheitsursachen.
^b Gründung.
^c Stammvolks.
^d Lokalität.
^e halbschlächtig angeartet.

short course and dry up in the sand. These parts resemble the basins of ancient oceans in that they are surrounded by mountains, and, considered in their entirety, retain their waters in their interior, and for this reason neither take in nor let out a stream. Moreover they are for the most part covered with sand, the sediment of an ancient calm ocean. From this, it now becomes conceivable how the Indian character could not have taken root in Persia and Arabia, which, at a time when Hindustan presumably had been populated for a long time, still served as the basin of an ocean; likewise it becomes conceivable how the Negro race as well as the Indian one could preserve themselves unmixed^a with northern blood for a long time, since they were cut off from the latter through this very ocean. The description of nature (condition of nature in the present time) is far from sufficient to indicate the ground for the manifold variations. No matter how much one opposes, and rightly so, the boldness of opinions, one must venture a *history* of nature, which is a separate science and which could gradually advance from opinions to insights.

2: 443

The physical geography which I am announcing hereby belongs to an idea which I make myself of a useful academic instruction^b and which I may call the preliminary exercise in the *knowledge of the world*.^c This knowledge of the world serves to procure the *pragmatic* element for all otherwise acquired sciences and skills, by means of which they become useful not merely for the *school* but rather for *life* and through which the accomplished apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny,^d namely, the *world*. Here a two-fold field lies before him, of which he requires a preliminary outline so that he can order in it all future experiences according to rules, namely, *nature* and the *human being*. However, both of these must be considered *cosmologically*, namely, not with respect to the noteworthy details that their objects contain (physics and empirical psychology^e) but with respect to what we can note of the relation as a whole in which they stand and in which everyone takes his place. I call the first instruction *physical geography* and have chosen it for the summer lecture course, the second one I call *anthropology*, which I reserve for the winter lecture course. The remaining lecture courses of this semester have already been announced publicly in the proper location.^f

^a unvermengt.

^b Unterricht.

^c Kenntnis der Welt.

^d Bestimmung.

^e empirische Seelenlehre.

^f The final paragraph, which was included in the first edition, is missing in the second edition. See the editor's introduction to this text.

Essays regarding the Philanthropinum

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Each of the following short pieces appeared originally in the *Königsbergische gelehrte und politische Zeitung*, and each also strongly reflects Kant's intense admiration for the Philanthropinum institutes of education that were first established by Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724–90). At the end of the *Friedländer* lectures on anthropology, Kant summarizes his hopes for these institutes as follows:

The present Basedowian institutes are the first that have come about according to the perfect plan of education. This is the greatest phenomenon which has appeared in this century for the improvement of the perfection of humanity, through it all schools in the world will receive another form, and the human race will thereby be freed from the constraints of the prevailing schools.

(25: 722–3; see also *Moralphilosophie Collins*, 27: 471)

Building on Rousseau's appeal for educational methods that would work with rather than against nature, the Philanthropinum institutes introduced a variety of pedagogical techniques and priorities that have since earned a place in the educational mainstream – e.g., conversation-based approaches to foreign language teaching (including Latin), gymnastics and physical education, and less stress on memorization. But above all, it was the non-sectarian and cosmopolitan emphases of Basedow's curriculum that appealed to Kant.

The first of the two essays was originally published anonymously on March 28, 1776. It was first explicitly attributed to Kant by Rudolph Reicke, who reprinted it in his *Kantiana: Beiträge zu Immanuel Kants Leben und Schriften* [(Königsberg: Th. Thiele's Buchhandlung, 1860), pp. 70–2], declaring it to be "without doubt" a genuine contribution of Kant's (p. 70). Paul Menzer, editor of the later Academy version of the text, states in his Introduction that "Kant's authorship was secured through a draft [of the essay] in his own hand, which R. Reicke kindly allowed the editor to use" (2: 522). Also, in a postscript in his letter of March 28, 1776 to Christian Heinrich Wolke (1741–1825, one of

Basedow's assistants when the Dessau Institute first opened in 1774 and later its director), Kant writes: "The enclosed paper should serve as a bit of evidence to demonstrate the renown your school is coming to have in these parts" (10: 194). It is believed that Kant's enclosure was in fact a copy of his own essay, which was published on the same day that he dated the letter.

To my knowledge, Kant's first essay regarding the Philanthropinum has not been previously translated into English. The following translation is based on Menzer's Academy text. In preparing the translation, I have also made use of Reicke's earlier version of the text, as well as a more recent edition contained in Kant, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Pädagogik und ihrer Begründung*, edited by Hans-Hermann Groothoff, 2nd edn. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982), pp. 61–2.

The second essay first appeared a year later in the March 27, 1777 issue of same journal, this time undersigned with the letter "K." For those who still had doubts, Kant's authorship was soon secured by the introductory words which accompanied the essay's reprinting in the *Pädagogische Unterhandlungen*, edited by J. B. Basedow and J. H. Campe (Dessau, 1777). [Campe (1746–1818) served briefly as director of the Institute from 1776–7, after Basedow stepped down and before Wolke took over.] In a Preface to the essay, the editors refer to "the recommendation of the famous Herr Professor Kant, based on impartiality and knowledge of our goals, which is contained in the twenty-fifth issue of the *Königsbergische gelehrte und politische Zeitung*." Here the complete name "Kant" appears at the end of the reprinted article.

The second essay was later reprinted by Karl von Raumer in his *Geschichte der Pädagogik* (Stuttgart, 1843), vol. III, pp. 269–72, and then again by Reicke in *Kantiana*, pp. 72–6. The present translation is based on Menzer's text in the Academy edition, though I have also made use of Raumer, Reicke, as well as a later reprinting in Groothoff's anthology of Kant's writings on pedagogy (pp. 62–5). An earlier English translation of the second essay was made by Edward Franklin Buchner in *The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1904; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1971), pp. 242–5.

2:445

Essays regarding the Philanthropinum

2:447

I. DESSAU 1776

First issue^a of the *Philanthropin Archives*,¹ communicated by fraternal friends of youth to guardians of humanity, particularly those who wish to begin an improvement of schools, and to fathers and mothers who wish to send their children to the *Dessau Philanthropinum*.²

Perhaps never before has a more just demand been made on the human species,^b and never before has such a great and more self-extending benefit been unselfishly offered, than is now the case with Herr Basedow, a man who, together with his praiseworthy assistants, has solemnly devoted himself to the welfare and betterment of human beings. That which good and bad heads have brooded over for centuries, but which without the fiery and constant enthusiasm of a single astute and sprightly man would have remained for centuries to come in dim and distant wishes – namely the genuine educational institute that is fitting to nature as well as civil purposes – stands now with its unexpectedly prompt results actually there and demands external assistance merely in order to extend itself in its current form, to spread its seeds over other countries and to perpetuate its species.^c For that which is merely the development of the natural predispositions lying in humanity shares this feature with universal mother nature: that she does not allow her seeds to run out, but rather multiplies herself and preserves her species. To each commonwealth,^d to each single citizen, it is infinitely important to get to know an institute in which an entirely new order of human affairs commences (one can learn about the same in these *Archives* and in Basedow's publication, *Something for Cosmopolitans to Read*, etc.).³, and which, if it is spread quickly, must bring about such a great and such a far-sighted reform in private life^e as

2:448

^a Stück.
^b Geschlecht.
^c Gattung.
^d gemeinses Wesen.
^e Privatleben.

well as in civil affairs,^f as one by a casual glance could not easily imagine. For this reason it is also the essential calling^g of every philanthropist^h to cultivate with care this still tender germⁱ as much as he can, to protect it or at least to recommend it incessantly to the protection of those who combine a good will with the capacity^j to do good. For once it will have reached complete growth, as the happy beginning allows one to hope, then its fruits will soon spread to all countries and to the most remote descendants. In this respect the 13th of May is an important day.^k For on that day the man who is sure of his cause invites the most learned and most astute men from neighboring cities and universities to observe that which mere reports could hardly persuade them to believe. The good has an irresistible power^l when it is before one's eyes. The voice of deserving and accredited deputies of humanity (a good number of which we wish for this congress) would have to necessarily arouse the attention of Europe to that which so intimately concerns her, and move her to an active participation in an institution of such general utility.^m For now it must already provide every philanthropist with great enjoyment and no less pleasant hope of imitating such a noble example to learn that (as reported recently in the newspaper)ⁿ the continuation of the Philanthropinum has been secured by means of considerable financial assistance on the part of a noble hand.^o Under such circumstances it is also not to be doubted that boarding-school pupils^p from many regions will hurry there in order to assure themselves of places in this institute, which may soon be short of spaces. But what is dearest to the hearts of those who eagerly wish for a rapid expansion of the good, namely the dispatching of skilled apprentice-teachers^q to Dessau, in order for them to learn and to practice the philanthropic manner of education,^r this unique means of having good schools everywhere soon seems especially to demand immediate attention and generous assistance from wealthy benefactors. In the expectation that this wish will soon be fulfilled, it is to be recommended strongly to all teachers in private as well as in public-school instruction^s to use Basedow's writings and the schoolbooks edited by him for their own instruction, and the latter as well as for the exercise of the youths in their trust, and thereby do as much as can be done

2:449

^a burgerliches Leben.^b Beruf.^c Menschenfreund, also "humanitarian" or "friend of humanity."^d Keim.^e Vermögen.^f Gewalt, also "force" or "authority."^g gemeinnützig.^h Pensionisten.ⁱ Kandidaten.^j philanthropische Erziehungsart.^k Schulunterweisung.

for the time being to make their instruction already now philanthropic.
Available at Kanter's bookstore for 15 Groschen.

[*Königsberg Learned and Political Journal*,^a March 28, 1776]

2. TO THE COMMONWEALTH^b

In the civilized countries of Europe there is no lack of educational institutes and of well-intentioned diligence of teachers to be of service for everyone in this matter. And yet it has now been clearly proven that they were all spoiled at the outset; that, because everything in them works against nature, the good to which nature has given the predisposition^c is far from being drawn out of the human being, and that, because we animal creatures are made into human beings only by education,^d in a short time we would see very different human beings around us if that educational method were to come into common use which is wisely derived from nature itself and not slavishly copied from old habit and unexperienced ages.

But it is futile to expect this salvation^e of the human species^f from a gradual improvement of the schools. They must be transformed^g if something good is to come out of them because they are defective in their original organization, and even the teachers must acquire a new formation.^h Not a slow *reform*, but a swift *revolution* can bring this about. And for this nothing more is necessary than just one school which is established in a radically new way according to the genuine method, directed by enlightened men prompted not by greedy but by noble zeal, observed and judged during its progress toward perfection by the attentive eyes of experts in all countries, but also supported and aided by the united contribution of all philanthropistsⁱ until it reaches completion.

Such a school is not only for those whom it educates, but, which is infinitely more important, for those, gradually increasing by number, to whom it gives the opportunity to form themselves into teachers^j according to the true educational method^k – a seed which, by means of careful cultivation, can give rise in short time to a multitude of

2: 450

^a *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitung*.

^b *Das gemene Wesen* – here, perhaps also “community” or “general public.”

^c *Anlage*.

^d *Ausbildung*. Also “formation,” “schooling,” “instruction,” “training.”

^e *Heil*. Also (in a secular sense), “well-being.”

^f *Geschlecht*.

^g *umgeschaffen*.

^h *Bildung*. Also “education,” “culture.”

ⁱ *Menschenfreunde*.

^j *zu Lehrern zu bilden*.

^k *Erziehungsmethode*.

well-instructed teachers who will soon cover an entire country with good schools.

Now the efforts of the general public of all countries should first be directed towards assisting in every way such a model school,^a helping it to attain soon the complete perfection for which it already contains the sources within itself. For to want to copy immediately its organization and design^b in other countries, while regarding the very one which is to become the first complete example and nursery^c of good education in its progress toward perfection through lack of funds and hindrances, amounts to the same as sowing seeds before they are mature and reaping weeds afterwards.

Such an educational institute is now no longer simply a beautiful idea, but appears with visible proofs of the feasibility of that which has long been wished for, with active and visible proofs.^d Surely it is a phenomenon of our age, which, although overlooked by ordinary eyes, must be much more important in the eyes of every intelligent spectator sympathetic to the welfare of humanity than that shiny nothing on the ever-changing stage of the great world, which, if it does not set it back, at least does not advance the good of the human species a hair’s breadth further.

Public reputation and above all the united voices of diligent and astute experts from different countries will already have made known to readers of this journal the *Dessau Educational Institute* (Philanthropinum) as the only one which bears these marks of excellence, not the least important of which is that as a result of its organization it will by itself discard in a natural way all defects which in the beginning might still cling to it. The attacks against it, which crop up here and there, and the occasional libels (of which one, namely *Mangelsdorf*’s,^e was answered recently by Herr Basedow with the dignity characteristic of uprightness)^f are such ordinary tricks of faultfinding^g and of ancient tradition defending itself on its dunghill, that a calm indifference from this sort of people, who always cast malicious glances upon everything which announces itself to be good and noble, could hardly arouse any suspicion as to the mediocrity of this good thing which is arising.

The opportunity is now offered to render aid (which individually may only be small, but through numbers can become important) to this Institute, which is dedicated to humanity and therefore to the participation of every cosmopolitan. Were one to exert one’s power of imagination in

2: 451

^a *Musterschule*.

^b *Einrichtung und Anlage*.

^c *Pflanzenschule*.

^d The text at the end of this sentence is corrupt. Rather than guess at the intended meaning, I have translated it literally.

^e *Rechtschaffenheit*.

^f *Tadelnsucht*, also “censoriousness.”

order to conceive an opportunity in which by means of a modest contribution one could promote the greatest possible, most permanent and universal good, it would have to be the one where the seed of the good itself can be cultivated and sustained, in order that in the course of time it may disseminate and perpetuate itself.

In line with these concepts and with the good opinion which we have of the number of well-meaning persons in our commonwealth, we refer to the twenty-first issue of this learned and political journal,⁸ together with the supplement, and look forward to numerous subscriptions, from all gentlemen of the clerical and teaching professions, from parents in general, to whom nothing which serves the improved formation of their children can be indifferent, yes even from those who, although they do not have children, still formerly as children received an education and because of this will recognize the obligation to contribute their share, if not to the propagation,⁹ still at least to the formation of human beings.

Subscriptions to the monthly publication of the Dessau Educational Institute, under the title of *Educational Treatises*,⁹ are now being accepted for 2 Reichsthaler 10 Groschen of our currency. But since some additional payments might be demanded at the end of the year due to the as of yet undeterminable number of sheets, it would perhaps be best (but this is left to each person's discretion), to dedicate a Ducat, in the way of a subscription, to the furtherance of this work, whereupon the surplus is to be paid back correctly to each person who should demand it. For the previously mentioned Institute has hopes that many noble-minded persons in all countries will eagerly take up such an opportunity in order to add on this occasion a voluntary small gift to the amount of the subscription, as a contribution to the support of the Institute, which is nearing perfection, but which will not be helped along in time by the expected assistance. For since, as Herr O. C. R. Büsching¹⁰ says (*Weekly Reports* 1776, No. 16), the governments of our time seem to have no money for the improvement of the schools, it will in the end depend on private persons of means to promote by generous contribution such an important, universal concern, if such improvements are not to remain completely undone.

2:45²

Local subscriptions, against receipt, are given out at Prof. Kant's in the morning hours from 10 until the afternoon around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and at Kanter's bookstore at all times.

[*Königsberg Learned and Political Journal*, March 27, 1777]

^a Vermehrung.

A note to physicians

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

On 18 April 1782, the supplement to issue No. 31 of the *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* (Königsberg Learned and Political Newspaper) contained a piece that was occasioned by the influenza epidemic of the spring of that year. The piece consisted of a short introduction written by Kant and the "Nachricht" (Note) proper by the London physician, John Fothergill, in a German translation made by Kant's friend and colleague, Christian Jacob Kraus. Fothergill's text had originally appeared in *Gentleman's Magazine*, vol. XLIV from February 1776, p. 65 column b.

In his introductory remarks Kant approaches the influenza epidemic of 1782 from the perspective of physical geography, noting the spread of the disease from East to West and drawing parallels to other epidemics of the recent and distant past. Moreover, he endorses the view, still not uncontested at the time, that influenza does not arise due to a corruption of the properties of the air but by contagion from already afflicted persons. Kant intends the publication of Fothergill's account of an earlier influenza epidemic as an incentive and a basis for the comparative study of the two epidemics, which he takes to be the occurrences of the same disease.

The translation of *Nachricht an Ärzte* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 5–8 and was undertaken by Günter Zöller. The German title (*Nachricht an Ärzte*) is not original, but based on the description of Fothergill's piece in Kant's introductory remarks ("a note by the famous [and now deceased] Dr. Fothergill"). Hence the term, "note," refers, at least in the first instance, to Fothergill's description of the influenza epidemic of 1775 and not, as the Academy Edition has it,¹ to Kant's introductory remarks. For traditional reasons, the title of the piece, brought into usage by the Academy edition, has been preserved in the present edition. Krause's translation of Fothergill's short text has been summarized in an editorial note added at the end of Kant's text.

A note to physicians

To be sure, with regard to its symptoms and the remedies against them, the noteworthy and strange epidemic that has only recently abated here, is properly an object^a only for physicians. But its spread and migration through large countries also entices the puzzlement and investigation of someone who regards this odd appearance merely from the viewpoint of a physical geographer. In this respect, one will not take it for an intervention in foreign affairs, if I intimate to physicians with enlarged concepts^b to investigate as far as possible the course of this malady, which does not seem to spread through the constitution of the air but by mere contagion. The community in which Europe has placed itself with all parts of the world through ships as well as caravans spreads many maladies over the whole world, just as one believes with great probability that the Russian land trade to China has brought over several kinds^c of harmful insects from the far East into that country, which over time might well spread still further. According to public news reports, our epidemic began in St. Petersburg from where it continued step by step along the coast of the Baltic sea, without leaping over intervening places, until it came to us and continued westward to and beyond West Prussia and Danzig, like the plague of Aleppo, according to Russel's description,¹ although there is no comparison between the latter and this horrible pestilence in terms of harmfulness. Letters from St. Petersburg made it known to us under the name *influenza*, and it seems that it is the same disease that reigned in London in 1775 and which the letters from there at the time also called *influenza*. In order to enable experts to compare both epidemics, I attach here the translation of a note by the famous (and now deceased) Dr. Fothergill² as it has been communicated to me by a friend.³

I. Kant

^a *Gegenstand.*

^b *von erweiterten Begriffen.*

^c *Arten.*

Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

This essay appears to have been occasioned by a passing remark made by Kant's colleague and follower Johann Schultz in a 1784 article in the *Gotba Learned Papers* (see Note 1 below). In order to make good on Schultz's remark, Kant wrote this article, which appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* late in the same year.

This is the first, and despite its brevity the most fully worked out, statement of his philosophy of history. The "idea" referred to in the title is a *theoretical* idea, that is, an *a priori* conception of a theoretical program to maximize the comprehensibility of human history. It anticipates much of the theory of the use of natural teleology in the theoretical understanding of nature that Kant was to develop over five years later in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. But this theoretical idea also stands in a close and complex relationship to Kant's moral and political philosophy, and to his conception of practical faith in divine providence. Especially prominent in it is the first statement of Kant's famous conception of a federation of states united to secure perpetual peace between nations.

The *Idea for a Universal History* also contained several propositions that were soon to be disputed by J. G. Herder in his *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*, leading to Kant's reply in his reviews of that work (1785) and in the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786).

Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht was first published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* IV (November 11, 1784). The translation is based on the presentation of the work in AA 2: 15–31 and was undertaken by Allen W. Wood.

8: 15

Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*

8: 17 Whatever concept one may form of the *freedom of the will* with a metaphysical aim, its *appearances*, the human actions, are determined just as much as every other natural occurrence in accordance with universal laws of nature. History, which concerns itself with the narration of these appearances, however deeply concealed their causes may be, nevertheless allows us to hope from it that if it considers the play of the freedom of the human will *in the large*, it can discover within it a regular course; and that in this way what meets the eye in individual subjects as confused and irregular yet in the whole species can be recognized as a steadily progressing though slow development of its original predispositions. Thus marriages, the births that come from them and deaths, since the free will of human beings has so great an influence on them, seem to be subject to no rule in accordance with which their number could be determined in advance through calculation; and yet the annual tables of them in large countries prove that they happen just as much in accordance with constant laws of nature, as weather conditions which are so inconstant, whose individual occurrence one cannot previously determine, but which on the whole do not fail to sustain the growth of plants, the course of streams, and other natural arrangements in a uniform uninterrupted course. Individual human beings and even whole nations^a think little about the fact, since while each pursues its own aim in its own way^b and one often contrary to another, they are proceeding unnoticed, as by a guiding thread, according to an aim of nature, which is unknown to them, and are laboring at its promotion, although even if it were to become known to them it would matter little to them.

Since human beings in their endeavors do not behave merely instinctively, like animals, and yet also not on the whole like rational citizens of

* A passage among the short notices in the twelfth issue of the *Gotha Learned Papers* this year, no doubt taken from my conversation with a passing scholar, elicits from me this elucidation, without which that passage would have no comprehensible meaning.¹

^a Völker.

^b nach seinem Sinne.

the world in accordance with an agreed upon plan, no history of them in conformity to a plan (as e.g. of bees or of beavers) appears to be possible. One cannot resist feeling a certain indignation when one sees their doings and refrainings on the great stage of the world and finds that despite the wisdom appearing now and then in individual cases, everything in the large is woven together out of folly, childish vanity, often also out of childish malice and the rage to destruction; so that in the end one does not know what concept to make of our species, with its smug imaginings about its excellences. Here there is no other way out for the philosopher – who, regarding human beings and their play in the large, cannot at all presuppose any rational *aim of theirs* – than to try whether he can discover an *aim of nature* in this nonsensical course of things human; from which aim a history in accordance with a determinate plan of nature might nevertheless be possible even of creatures who do not behave in accordance with their own plan. – We want to see if we will succeed in finding a guideline for such a history, and want then to leave it to nature to produce the man who is in a position to compose that history accordingly. Thus it did produce a *Kepler*, who subjected the eccentric paths of the planets in an unexpected way to determinate laws, and a *Newton*, who explained these laws from a universal natural cause.

8: 18

FIRST PROPOSITION

All natural predispositions of a creature are determined sometime to develop themselves completely and purposively.^a With all animals, external as well as internal or analytical observation confirms this. An organ that is not to be used, an arrangement that does not attain to its end, is a contradiction in the teleological doctrine of nature. For if we depart from that principle, then we no longer have a lawful nature but a purposelessly playing nature; and desolate chance^b takes the place of the guideline of reason.

SECOND PROPOSITION

In the human being (as the only rational creature on earth), those predispositions whose goal is the use of his reason were to develop completely only in the species, but not in the individual. Reason in a creature is a faculty of extending the rules and aims of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct, and it knows no boundaries to its projects. But reason itself does not operate instinctively, but rather needs attempts, practice and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage of insight to another. Hence every human being would have to live exceedingly long

8: 19

^a zweckmäßig, which could also be translated "suitably."

^b das trostlose Ungefähr.

in order to learn how he is to make a complete use of all his natural predispositions; or if nature has only set the term of his life as short (as has actually happened), then nature perhaps needs an immense series of generations, each of which transmits its enlightenment to the next, in order finally to propel its germs in our species to that stage of development which is completely suited to its aim. And this point in time must be, at least in the idea of the human being, the goal of his endeavors, because otherwise the natural predispositions would have to be regarded for the most part as in vain and purposeless; which would remove all practical principles and thereby bring nature, whose wisdom in the judgment of all remaining arrangements must otherwise serve as a principle, under the suspicion that in the case of the human being alone it is a childish play.

THIRD PROPOSITION

8: 20

Nature has willed that the human being should produce everything that goes beyond the mechanical arrangement of his animal existence entirely out of himself, and participate in no other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself free from instinct through his own reason. For nature does nothing superfluous and is not wasteful in the use of means to its ends. Since it gave the human being reason, and the freedom of the will grounded on it, that was already a clear indication of its aim in regard to that endowment. For he should now not be guided by instinct or cared for and instructed by innate knowledge; rather he should produce everything out of himself. The invention of his means of nourishment, his clothing, his external safety and defense (for which nature gave him neither the horns of the steer, nor the claws of the lion, nor the teeth of the dog, but merely his hands), all gratification that can make life agreeable, all his insight and prudence and even the generosity of his will, should be entirely his own work. In this it seems to have pleased nature to exercise its greatest frugality, and to have measured out its animal endowment so tightly, so precisely to the highest need of an initial existence, as though it willed that the human being, if he were someday to have labored himself from the greatest crudity to the height of the greatest skillfulness, the inner perfection of his mode of thought, and (as far as is possible on earth) thereby to happiness, may have only his own merit alone to thank for it; just as if it had been more concerned about his rational *self-esteem* than about his well-being. For in this course of human affairs there is a whole host of hardships that await the human being. But it appears to have been no aim at all to nature that he should live well; but only that he should labor and work himself up so far that he might make himself worthy of well-being through his conduct of life. Yet here it remains strange that the older generations appear to carry on

their toilsome concerns only for the sake of the later ones, namely so as to prepare the steps on which the latter may bring up higher the edifice which was nature's aim, and that only the latest should have the good fortune to dwell in the building on which a long series of their ancestors (to be sure, without this being their aim) had labored, without being able to partake of the good fortune which they prepared. But as puzzling as this may be, it is yet necessary once one assumes that a species of animals should have reason, and, as a class of rational beings who all die, while the species is immortal, should nevertheless attain to completeness in the development of their predispositions.

FOURTH PROPOSITION

The means nature employs in order to bring about the development of all its predispositions is their antagonism in society, insofar as the latter is in the end the cause of their lawful order. Here I understand by 'antagonism' the unsociable sociability of human beings,² i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society. The predisposition for this obviously lies in human nature. The human being has an inclination to become *socialized*, since in such a condition he feels himself as more a human being, i.e. feels the development of his natural predispositions. But he also has a great propensity to *individualize* (isolate) himself, because he simultaneously encounters in himself the unsociable property of willing to direct everything so as to get his own way,^a and hence expects resistance everywhere because he knows of himself that he is inclined on his side toward resistance against others. Now it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human being, brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence, and, driven by ambition, tyranny, and greed, to obtain for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he cannot *stand*, but also cannot *leave alone*. Thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture, which really consists in the social worth of the human being; thus all talents come bit by bit to be developed, taste is formed,^b and even, through progress in enlightenment, a beginning is made toward the foundation of a mode of thought which can with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make moral distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transform a *pathologically* compelled agreement to form a society finally into a *moral* whole. Without these qualities of unsociability from which the resistance arises, which are not at all amiable in themselves, qualities that each of us must necessarily encounter in his selfish pretensions, all talents would, in an arcadian

8: 21

^a nach seinem Sinne.^b gebildet.

8: 22

pastoral life of perfect concord, contentment and mutual love, remain eternally hidden in their germs; human beings, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would give their existence hardly any greater worth than that of their domesticated beasts; they would not fill the void in creation in regard to their end as rational nature. Thanks be to nature, therefore, for the incompatibility, for the spiteful competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or even to dominate! For without them all the excellent natural predispositions in humanity would eternally slumber undeveloped. The human being wills concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species: it wills discord. He wills to live comfortably and contentedly; but nature wills that out of sloth and inactive contentment he should throw himself into labor and toils, so as, on the contrary, prudently to find out the means to pull himself again out of the latter. The natural incentives to this, the sources of unsociability and thoroughgoing resistance, from which so many ills arise, which, however, impel human beings to new exertion of their powers and hence to further development of their natural predispositions, thus betray the ordering of a wise creator; and not the hand of an evil spirit who might have bungled his splendid undertaking or ruined it in an envious manner.

FIFTH PROPOSITION

The greatest problem for the human species, to which nature compels him, is the achievement of a civil society universally administering right. Since only in society, and indeed in that society which has the greatest freedom, hence one in which there is a thoroughgoing antagonism of its members and yet the most precise determination and security of the boundaries of this freedom so that the latter can coexist with the freedom of others—since only in it can the highest aim of nature be attained, namely, the development of all the predispositions in humanity, and since nature also wills that humanity by itself should procure this along with all the ends of its vocation: therefore a society in which *freedom under external laws* can be encountered combined in the greatest possible degree with irresistible power,^a i.e. a perfectly *just civil constitution*, must be the supreme problem of nature for the human species, because only by means of its solution and execution can nature achieve its remaining aims for our species. Human beings, who are otherwise so taken with unconstrained freedom, are compelled by need to enter into this condition of coercion; and indeed by the greatest necessity of all, namely that which human beings who inflict on one another, given that their own inclinations make it so that they can not long subsist next to one another in wild freedom. Yet in such a precinct as civil union is, these same inclinations have afterward

^a *Gewalt.*

their best effect; just as trees in a forest, precisely because each of them seeks to take air and sun from the other, are constrained to look for them above themselves, and thereby achieve a beautiful straight growth; whereas those in freedom and separated from one another, that put forth their branches as they like, grow stunted, crooked and awry. All culture and art that adorn humanity, and the most beautiful social order, are the fruits of unsociability, through which it is necessitated by itself to discipline itself, and so by an art extorted from it, to develop completely the germs of nature.

8: 23

SIXTH PROPOSITION

This problem is at the same time the most difficult and the latest to be solved by the human species. The difficulty which the mere idea of this problem lays before our eyes is this: the human being is an *animal which*, when it lives among others of its species, *has need of a master*. For he certainly misuses his freedom in regard to others of his kind; and although as a rational creature he wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, his selfish animal inclination still misleads him into excepting himself from it where he may. Thus he needs a *master*, who breaks his stubborn will^a and necessitates him to obey a universally valid will with which everyone can be free. But where will he get this master? Nowhere else but from the human species. But then this master is exactly as much an animal who has need of a master. Try as he may, therefore, there is no seeing how he can procure a supreme power^b for public right that is itself just, whether he seeks it in a single person or in a society of many who are selected for it. For every one of them will always misuse his freedom when he has no one over him to exercise authority over him in accordance with the laws. The highest supreme authority, however, ought to be just *in itself*^c and yet a *human being*. This problem is therefore the most difficult of all; indeed, its perfect solution is even impossible; out of such crooked wood as the human being is made, nothing entirely straight can be fabricated. Only the approximation to this idea is laid upon us by nature.* That it is also the latest to be worked out, follows besides from this: that it requires correct concepts of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience

* The role of the human being is thus very artificial. How it is with the inhabitants of other planets and their nature, we do not know; if, however, we discharge well this commission of nature, then we can well flatter ourselves that among our neighbors in the cosmic edifice we may assert no mean rank. Perhaps among them every individual might fully attain his vocation in his lifetime. With us it is otherwise; only the species can hope for this.

^a *eigenen Willen.*

^b *Gewalt.*

^c *für sich selbst.*

practiced through many courses of life and beyond this a good will that is prepared to accept it; three such items are very difficult ever to find all together, and if it happens, it will be only very late, after many fruitless attempts.

8: 24

SEVENTH PROPOSITION

The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is dependent on the problem of a lawful external relation between states and cannot be solved without the latter. What use is it to labor at a lawful civil constitution among individual human beings, i.e. at the ordering of a commonwealth? The same unsociability that necessitated human beings to this is once again the cause of every commonwealth, in its external relation, i.e. as a state in reference to other states, standing in unbound freedom, and consequently of each having to expect from the other precisely the ills that pressured individual human beings and compelled them to enter into a lawful civil condition. Nature has therefore once again used the incompatibility of human beings, even of great societies and state bodies of this kind of creature as a means to seek out in their unavoidable *antagonism* a condition of tranquility and safety; i.e. through wars, through the overstrained and never ceasing process of armament for them, through the condition of need that due to this finally every state even in the midst of peace must feel internally, toward at first imperfect attempts, but finally after many devastations, reversals and even thoroughgoing exhaustion of their powers, nature drives them to what reason could have told them even without much sad experience: namely, to go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter into a federation of nations,^a where every state, even the smallest, could expect its security and rights not from its own might, or its own juridical judgment, but only from this great federation of nations (*Fœdus Amphictyonum*),³ from a united might and from the decision in accordance with laws of its united will. As enthusiastic as this idea appears to be, and it has been ridiculed as such in *Abbé de St. Pierre* or *Rousseau* (perhaps only because they believed its execution was too near), it is nevertheless the unavoidable outcome of the condition of need into which human beings put one another that states must be compelled to the decision (as difficult as it is for them) to which the savage human being was just as reluctantly compelled, namely, of giving up his brute freedom and seeking tranquility and security in a lawful constitution. – All wars are therefore only so many attempts (not, to be sure, in the aims of human beings, but yet in the aim of nature) to bring about new relationships between states, and through destruction or at least dismemberment of all of them to form new bodies, which, however,

8: 25

^a *Völkerbund.*

once again cannot preserve themselves either in themselves or next to one another and hence must suffer new, similar revolutions until finally, partly through the best possible arrangement of their civil constitution internally, partly through a common agreement and legislation externally, a condition is set up, which, resembling a civil commonwealth, can preserve itself like an *automaton*.

Now whether one should expect it from an *Epicurean* concurrence of efficient causes that states, like little particles of matter, should seek all sorts of formations through their chance collisions, which again are destroyed through new impacts, until finally *by chance* there succeeds a formation that can preserve itself in its form (a fortunate coincidence that could hardly ever take place!); or whether one should rather assume that nature here follows a regular course, leading our species from the lowest step of animality gradually up to the highest step of humanity, and indeed through the human being's own art, albeit one extorted from him; or whether one would prefer that from all these effects and counter-effects of human beings nothing at all will result in the large, or at least nothing prudent, that it will remain as it always has been, and that therefore one cannot say ahead of time whether the discord that is so natural to our species will in the end prepare a hell of ills for us in however civilized^a a condition, in that nature will perhaps annihilate again, through barbaric devastations, this condition and all the previous steps of culture (which cannot be excluded under the government of blind chance, which is in fact the same as lawless freedom, if one does not ascribe secretly to a guiding thread of nature attached to wisdom!): all this leads roughly to the question whether it is indeed rational to assume *purposiveness* in the arrangement of nature in the parts and yet *purposelessness* in the whole. Therefore what the purposeless condition of savages did, namely hold back all natural predispositions in our species, but finally through ills into which this condition transported the species, necessitated them to go beyond this condition and enter into a civil constitution, in which all those germs could be developed; this the barbaric freedom of already established states also does, namely, that through the application of all powers of the commonwealth to armaments against one another, through the devastations perpetrated by war, even more, however, through the necessity of preserving themselves constantly in readiness for it, the full development of the natural predispositions are restrained in their progress; yet on the contrary, the ills that arise out of this necessitate our species to devise to the in itself salutary resistance of many states to one another arising from their freedom a law of equilibrium and to introduce a united power^b giving emphasis to that law, hence

8: 26

^a *gesitteten.*

^b *Gewalt.*

to introduce a cosmopolitan condition of public state security, which is not wholly without *dangers* so that the powers of humanity may not fall asleep, but it is at least not without a principle of *equality* between its reciprocal *effect* and *counter-effect*, so that they may not destroy each other. Before this last step (namely, to the combination of states) is done, thus almost halfway through its formation,^a human nature endures the hardest ills under the deceptive appearance of external welfare; and *Rousseau* was not so wrong when he preferred to it the condition of savages, as long, namely, as one leaves out this last stage to which our species has yet to ascend. We are *cultivated* in a high degree by art and science. We are *civilized*, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already *moralized*. For the idea of morality still belongs to culture; but the use of this idea which comes down only to a resemblance of morals in love of honor and in external propriety constitutes only being civilized. As long, however, as states apply all their powers to their vain and violent aims of expansion and thus ceaselessly constrain the slow endeavor of the inner formation^b of their citizens' mode of thought, also withdrawing with this aim all support from it, nothing of this kind is to be expected, because it would require a long inner labor of every commonwealth for the education of its citizens. But everything good that is not grafted onto a morally good disposition, is nothing but mere semblance and glittering misery. In this condition humankind will remain until, in the way I have said, it will labor its way out of the chaotic condition of the present relations between states.

8: 27

EIGHTH PROPOSITION

One can regard the history of the human species in the large as the completion of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an inwardly and, to this end, also an externally perfect state constitution, as the only condition in which it can fully develop all its predispositions in humanity. This proposition is a consequence of the previous one. One sees that philosophy can also have its *chiliasm*,^c but one the bringing about of which is promoted by the very idea of it, though only from afar, so that it is anything but enthusiastic. It all depends on whether experience reveals something of such a course as nature's aim. I say: it reveals *a little*; for this cycle appears to require so long a time to be completed that the little part of it which humanity has traversed with respect to this aim allows one to determine the shape of its path and the relation of the parts to the whole only

^a *Ausbildung*.^b *Bildung*.^c That is, its belief in the millennium (or apocalypse), from the Greek *chilos* = thousand.

as uncertainly as the course taken by our sun together with the entire host of its satellites in the great system of fixed stars can be determined from all the observations of the heavens made hitherto; yet from the general ground of the systematic constitution of the cosmic order and from the little one has observed, one is able to determine reliably enough. Nevertheless, in regard to the most distant epochs that our species is to encounter, it belongs to human nature not to be indifferent about them, if only they can be expected with certainty. This can happen all the less especially in our case, where it seems that we could, through our own rational contrivance, bring about faster such a joyful point in time for our posterity. For the sake of that, even the faint traces of its approach will be very important for us. Now states are already in such an artificial relation to one another that none of them can retard its internal culture without losing out in might and influence in relation to the others; thus the preservation of this end of nature itself, if not progress in it, is fairly well secured through their aims of ambition. Further, civil freedom cannot very well be infringed without feeling the disadvantage of it in all trades, especially in commerce, and thereby also the diminution of the powers of the state in its external relationships. But this freedom is gradually advancing. If one hinders the citizen who is seeking his welfare in any way he pleases, as long as it can subsist along with the freedom of others, then one restrains the vitality of all enterprise^d and with it, in turn, the powers of the whole. Hence the personal restrictions on the citizen's doing and refraining^b are removed more and more, and the general freedom of religion is ceded; and thus gradually arises, accompanied by delusions and whims, *enlightenment*, as a great good that must raise humankind even out of the selfish aims of aggrandizement on the part of its rulers, if only the latter understand their own advantage. This enlightenment, however, and with it also a certain participation in the good by the heart of the enlightened human being who understands the good perfectly, must ascend bit by bit up to the thrones and have its influence even on their principles of government. Although, for example, the governors of our world now have no money left over for public educational institutions or in general for anything that has to do with what is best for the world, because everything is always miscalculated^c ahead of time toward the next future war, they would actually find their own advantage at least in not hindering their own nation's own^d weak and slow endeavors in this regard. Finally war itself will gradually become not only an enterprise

^a *die Lebhaftigkeit des durchgängigen Betriebes*.^b *Tun und Lassen*.^c *verrechnet*; *verrechnen* can mean "to reckon or charge (to an account)," but it can also mean to "miscalculate" or make a mistake in one's reckonings; Kant appears to be punning on these two meanings here.^d *ihres Volks*.

8: 28

so artificial, and its outcome on both sides so uncertain, but also the aftereffects which the state suffers through an ever-increasing burden of debt (a new invention), whose repayment becomes unending, will become so dubious an undertaking, and the influence of every shake-up in a state in our part of the world on all other states, all of whose trades are so very much chained together, will be so noticeable, that these states will be urged merely through danger to themselves to offer themselves, even without legal standing, as arbiters, and thus remotely prepare the way for a future large state body, of which the past world has no example to show. Although this state body for now stands before us only in the form of a very rough project, nevertheless already a feeling begins to stir in all members, each of which has an interest in the preservation of the whole; and this gives hope that after many transforming revolutions, in the end that which nature has as its aim will finally come about – a universal *cosmopolitan condition*, as the womb in which all original predispositions of the human species will be developed.

8: 29

NINTH PROPOSITION

A philosophical attempt to work out universal world history according to a plan of nature that aims at the perfect civil union of the human species, must be regarded as possible and even as furthering this aim of nature. It is, to be sure, a strange and apparently an absurd stroke, to want to write a *history* in accordance with an idea of how the course of the world would have to go if it were to conform to certain rational ends; it appears that with such an aim only a *novel* could be brought about. If, nevertheless, one may assume that nature does not proceed without a plan or final aim even in the play of human freedom, then this idea could become useful; and although we are too shortsighted to see through to the secret mechanism of its arrangement, this idea should still serve us as a guiding thread for exhibiting an otherwise planless *aggregate* of human actions, at least in the large, as a *system*. For if one starts from *Greek history* – as that through which every other older or contemporaneous history has been kept or at least accredited*⁴ – if one follows their influence on the formation or malformation^a down to the present time its influence on the education

* Only a *learned public* that has endured uninterruptedly from its beginning up to our time can accredit ancient history. Back beyond it everything is *terra incognita*; and the history of nations (*Völker*) that lived outside it can be begun only from the time when they entered into it. This happened with the *Jewish nation* (*völk*) at the time of the Ptolemies through the Greek translation of the Bible, without which one would ascribe little credibility to their *isolated* records. From that point forward (if this beginning has first been properly ascertained) one can pursue its narratives. And thus with all the other nations (*Völkern*). The first page in *Thucydides* (says Hume) is the sole beginning of all true history.

^a *Bildung oder Mißbildung.*

or miseducation of the state body of the *Roman nation*^a which swallowed up the Greek state, and the latter's influence on the *barbarians* who in turn destroyed the former, down to the present time, and also adds to this *episodically* the political history of other nations,^b or the knowledge about them that has gradually reached us through these same enlightened nations^c – then one will discover a regular course of improvement of state constitutions in our part of the world (which will probably someday give laws to all the others). When one attends further everywhere only to the civil constitution and its laws and to the relations of states, insofar as, through the good they contained, they served for a while to elevate and exalt nations^d (and with them also arts and sciences), but through that again which was faulty attaching to them they brought them down, yet in such a way that there was always left over a germ of enlightenment that developed further through each revolution and this prepared for a following stage of improvement – then a guiding thread, as I believe, is revealed that can serve not merely for the explanation of such a confused play of things human, or for an art of political soothsaying about future changes in states (a utility which has already been drawn from the history of human beings, even if one regarded the latter as the disconnected effect of a freedom without rules!), but rather there will be opened a consoling prospect into the future (which without a plan of nature one cannot hope for with any ground), in which the human species is represented in the remote distance as finally working itself upward toward the condition in which all germs nature has placed in it can be fully developed and its vocation here on earth can be fulfilled. Such a *justification* of nature – or better, of *providence* – is no unimportant motive for choosing a particular viewpoint for considering the world. For what does it help to praise the splendor and wisdom of creation in the nonrational realm of nature, and to recommend it to our consideration, if that part of the great showplace of the highest wisdom that contains the end of all this – the history of humankind – is to remain a ceaseless objection against it, the prospect of which necessitates our turning our eyes away from it in disgust and, in despair of ever encountering a completed rational aim in it, to hope for the latter only in another world?

That with this idea of a world history, which in a certain way has a guiding thread *a priori*, I would want to displace the treatment of history^e proper, that is written merely *empirically* – this would be a misinterpretation of my aim; it is only a thought of that which a philosophical mind (which besides this would have to be very well versed in history) could

^a *des römischen Volks.*

^b *anderer Völker.*

^c *Nationen.*

^d *Völker.*

^e *Historie.*

8: 30

attempt from another standpoint. Moreover, the laudable circumspectness with which one now writes the history of one's time, naturally brings everyone to the scruple as to how our later posterity will begin to grasp the burden of history that we might leave behind for them after a few centuries. Without doubt they will prize the history of the oldest age, the documents of which might long since have been extinguished, only from the viewpoint of what interests them, namely, what nations^a and governments have accomplished or harmed regarding a cosmopolitan aim. But to pay regard to this, and likewise to the desire for honor of the heads of state as well as their servants, in order to direct it at the sole means by which they can bring their glorious remembrance down to the latest age – that can still be additionally a *small* motive for the attempt to furnish such a philosophical history.

^a *Völker*.

Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity*

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) was Kant's student in Königsberg between 1762 and 1765, but he had also come under the influence of Kant's eccentric friend Johann Georg Hamann (1730–88), whose views on reason, religion and society were deeply opposed to Kant's Enlightenment principles. During the 1770s, Herder rose to prominence as a critic of the Enlightenment, and in 1784 he produced the first volume of his greatest work, *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*. Kant was invited to review the work by Christian Gottfried Schütz, editor of the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* (published in Jena and Leipzig).

The first of Kant's reviews, presented here under the heading 'I.', appeared in January, 1785. It quotes extensively from Herder (though the quotations are often mere paraphrases, and do not even always accurately reflect what Herder said). Kant's chief criticisms of Herder in this first review are directed at Herder's attempt to derive all human characteristics from the upright posture of the human body and at Herder's attempt to argue for the spirituality and consequent immortality of the human soul using analogies of nature. Kant plainly admired Herder's wide learning and fertile imagination, but the tone of his reviews is condescending, since he plainly regarded the ideas of his former student as lacking in philosophical rigor, and as permitting poetic imaginings to substitute for clearheaded thinking at crucial points.

Herder reacted very negatively to this first review. He clearly perceived the condescending tone, resented being lectured at by his former teacher toward the end as if he were still a schoolboy, and thought Kant had utterly misunderstood the aims and meaning of his discussion, which were not – in Herder's view – metaphysical in the way that Kant interpreted them as being. This review would seem to have destroyed whatever was left of the friendship between the two men. This reaction explains Herder's late polemics against Kant in his *Metacritique of the Critique of Pure Reason* (1799) and *Kalligone* (1800) – which was an extended polemic against Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. But it

leaves quite unexplained the glowing and eloquent tribute Herder paid his former teacher in *Letters on the Advancement of Humanity* (1793–7) – a passage that Lewis White Beck quoted at the end of the “Sketch of Kant’s Life and Works” in all his Library of Liberal Arts translations of Kant’s writings. Clearly the relationship between Kant and Herder – both men having strong personalities and independent intellects of the first order – was more complex than can be captured by the simple choice between “friendly” and “unfriendly”.

This review, like all of the Herder reviews, was published anonymously, though from the start no one was in any doubt about the identity of the reviewer. Only a month after its appearance, there was a reply to it in the *Teutscher Merkur* by Karl Leonhard Reinhold, who, ironically, was within two years to become Kant’s most influential defender through his *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, which appeared in the *Teutscher Merkur* beginning in 1786. Kant’s brief rejoinder to Reinhold was published in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* in March, 1785, and is presented here under the heading ‘II.’.

The second volume of Herder’s *Ideas* appeared in the middle of 1785 and Kant once again reviewed it in the November issue of the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* (here under the heading ‘III.’). After a more sketchy summary than before, Kant’s review goes into matters of more philosophical substance, chiefly with the intent of replying to Herder’s criticisms of two important theses from Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (1784, contained in the present volume). This review, unlike the first one, does deal with issues that both philosophers regarded as central to the disagreements between them. In the second volume of the *Ideas*, Herder objected first to Kant’s assertion that “the human being is an animal who needs a master”, regarding it as excessively pessimistic, misanthropic, and politically dangerous. Kant defends the thesis as only realistic and, when properly understood, as politically harmless or even salutary. Second, Herder objected to Kant’s proposition that nature’s purposes in human history lie not in the happiness of individual human beings but in the development of the capacities of the human species, to which the happiness of individuals is to a great extent sacrificed. Herder sees in this proposition an example of the Enlightenment’s privileging of modern European states over past ages and less developed cultures, and also an implicit accusation against divine providence, which in Kant’s philosophy is allegedly seen as putting the abstraction of the species ahead of real human beings and of using human individuals as mere means to its ends. Kant replies to these charges by defending his thesis that nature’s purpose lies in developing the capacities of the species. His idea is that it is not human happiness but the worth of human nature, as found in the development of its capacities through reason, that is the purpose of nature (and of providence). So this and not

human happiness must be the true ground of whatever meaning we may find in history.

In 1787 Kant was invited by Schütz to review the third volume of Herder’s *Ideas*, but this time he declined, saying that he was too busy working on his “critique of taste” (his working title for what was published in 1790 as the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*). He asked his colleague C. F. Kraus (the leading German exponent of Adam Smith’s theory of political economy) to review this third volume, with the plain intent that the tone of the review should be as critical of Herder and as defensive of Kant as the review of the second volume. When Kraus refused, his friendship with Kant also came to an end.

Kant’s concern with Herder’s challenge to his views clearly did not end with these reviews. The *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786, contained in the present volume), though it never mentions Herder by name, was obviously intended as a satire on Book 10 of the *Ideas*, as well as a continuing reply to him on the points mentioned above. And the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* itself, with its focus on such themes, central to Herder’s thought, as the role of beauty, feeling and art in human life and the proper use of teleological reasoning in biology and in a moral-religious conception of the human condition, should be seen as Kant’s attempt to determine for himself how these themes were to be handled and where he had to reject Herder’s approach as excessively enthusiastic and uncritical.

Kant’s review of the first volume of Herder’s *Ideas* appeared in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in issue No. 4 (January 6), pp. 17a–20b and Supplement to No. 4, vol. 1, pp. 21a–22b. Kant’s reply to Reinhold appeared in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in the Supplement for March, vol. 1, last page. Kant’s review of the second volume of Herder’s *Ideas* was published in the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* of 1785 in issue No. 271 (15 November), vol. iv, pp. 153a–156b. The translation of *Recensionen von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 43–66 and was undertaken by Allen W. Wood. The counting of the two reviews of Herder and the rejoinder to Reinhold as three numbered parts is not original with Kant but follows the Academy edition.

8:43

Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas
for the philosophy of the
history of humanity*
Parts 1 and 2

8:45

I.

Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity.^a By Johann Gottfried Herder. *Quem te Deus esse iussit et humana qua parte locatus es in re dise.*^b First Part. 318 pp. Riga and Leipzig: Hartknoch, 1784.^c

The spirit of our ingenious^c and eloquent author shows in this writing his already recognized peculiarity.^d Thus it could be judged by the common standard just as little as many others that have flowed from his pen. It is as if his genius did not merely assemble the ideas from the broad field of the sciences and arts so as to increase them with other ideas that can be communicated, but also as if he transformed them in accordance with (to borrow an expression from him) a certain law of *assimilation* in his own manner and into his specific mode of thought, through which they become noticeably different from those by which other souls are nourished and grow (p. 292)^e and less capable of communication. Hence what to him is called "philosophy of the history of humanity"^e might well be something quite other than that which one usually understands by this name: not perhaps a logical precision in the determination of concepts or a careful distinction and proof of principles, but a glance not dwelling long but much more comprehensive, a sagacity adept in the discovery of analogies and a power of imagination bold in the use of them, combined with the skill in captivating its object, always held at an obscure distance, through feelings and sensations, which allow more to be surmised about them as the effects of a great content of thoughts, or as hints pregnant with meaning, than cold judgment would ever encounter in

^a *Menschheit*; this is the word that would most often be translated "humanity" in Kant's writings, and for which no footnote would normally be needed. But Herder's frequent use of the term *Humanität* requires us, in translating the following reviews, to use "humanity" for it, without footnote, and to footnote instead occurrences of *Menschheit*.

^b "Learn what God has commanded you to be and where you are to be located among things," Persius *Satires* 3.11.12. This is the motto of Herder's book.

^c *sinnreichen*.

^d *Eigentümlichkeit*.

^e *Menschheit*.

them outright. Since nevertheless freedom in thinking (which is encountered here in great measure), exercised by a fruitful mind, always affords matter for thinking, we will seek, as far as we may succeed in extracting from his ideas the most important and characteristic of them, and presenting them in his own expressions, but finally adding a few remarks about the whole.

Our author starts with broadening his prospect, in order to indicate to the human being his place among the other inhabitants of planets in our solar system, and, from the middle, not disadvantageous situation of the cosmic body he inhabits, infers a merely "mediocre earthly understanding and a yet even more ambiguous human virtue with which we have to reckon here, which, however – since our thoughts and powers have obviously germinated only from the organization of our earth and strive to alter and transform until they reach as much purity and refinement as our creation can offer, and since, if analogy may be our guide, it would not be otherwise on other stars – it may be conjectured that the human being may have one goal in common with the inhabitants of the latter, not only to enter upon an itinerary of more than one star, but perhaps finally even to attain to having dealings with all the creatures of the many and varied sister-worlds that have come to maturity."³ From there he goes on to consider the revolutions which preceded the generation of human beings. "Before our air, our water, our earth could be produced, there were necessarily many sorts of stamens,^a dissolving and precipitating one another; and the manifold species of the earth, of minerals, crystallization, even the organic formation in mussels, plants, animals, and lastly in human beings – how many dissolutions and revolutions of the one into the other did they not presuppose? He, the son of all elements and all beings, their most selected sum total and as it were the blossom of earthly creation, could be nothing else than the last and favorite child of nature, whose formation^b and reception must have been preceded by many developments and revolutions."⁴

In the spherical shape of the earth he finds an object of astonishment at the unity it occasions along with all thinkable manifoldness. "Who, having taken this figure to heart, would have gone on to convert people to a literal faith in philosophy and religion, or, with gloomy but holy zeal, to murder for it?"⁵ Likewise, the angle of the ecliptic occasions consideration of the human vocation: "Under our sun's oblique path, all the doing of human beings is an annual period."⁶ The nearer acquaintance with the atmosphere, and even the influence of the heavenly bodies on it, once it is better known, appears to him to promise a great influence on the history of humanity.^c In the section on the division of land and

^a *Stamina*.

^b *Bildung*.

^c *Menschheit*.

8: 47 sea, the structure of the earth is adduced as the ground of explanation for the difference in the histories of nations.^a "Asia is as connected in its mores and customs as a ground is in one extended land-mass: the small Red Sea already separates the mores, the small Persian Gulf even more so; but it is not without ground that the many lakes, mountains and rivers of America and the firm land have such a great extent in the temperate zone, and the structure of the old continent, as the first abode of human beings, is by nature's intention set up differently from that of the new world."⁷ The second book concerns the organizations on the earth and begins with the granite on which worked light, warmth and an unrefined air and water, and perhaps transforming silica into lime, in which the first living things of the sea, the crustacea, were formed.^b Next vegetation took its beginning. – Comparison of the formation^c of the human being with that of the plants and of the sexual love of the former with the flowering of the latter. Utility of the plant realm in regard to the human being. The animal realm. Alteration of the animals and of the human being in accordance with the climates. Those of the old world are imperfect. "The classes of creatures expand the more they distance themselves from human beings, and the nearer they are to him, the fewer they become. – In all there is a chief form, a similar bone structure. – These transitions make it not improbable that in sea-creatures, plants, and perhaps even in beings called 'dead' there may rule one and the same predisposition to organization, only in an infinitely more crude and confused manner. In the glance of the eternal being who sees all in one connection, perhaps the shape of the ice crystal, as it generates itself, and the snowflake into which it forms^d itself, still has an analogous relation with the formation^e of the embryo in the mother's womb. – The human being is a middle creature among the animals, that is, the most expanded form in which *all the traits of all the species* around him are collected into their most refined sum total. – From air and water I see as it were the animals coming from heights and depths to human beings and step by step they approach his shape."⁸ This book concludes: "Rejoice in your estate, o human being, and study yourself, noble middle creature, in everything that lives around you!"⁹

8: 48 The third book compares the structure of the plants and animals with the organization of human beings. We cannot follow him here, where he utilizes the observations^f of the naturalists for his own aim; only a few results: "Through such and such organs the creature generates a living stimulus from the dead life of the plants, and from the sum of this,

filtered through fine channels, the medium of sensation. The result of the stimuli becomes *drive*, the result of the sensation, *thought*; an eternal progression of organic creation, *which is placed in every living creature.*"¹⁰ The author does not reckon with germs here but rather with an organic force, in plants as much as animals. He says: "Just as the plant itself is organic life, so the polyp is also organic life. There are therefore many organic forces, those of vegetation, of the muscular stimuli, of sensation. The more and finer the nerves, the larger the brain, the more the species has understanding. The *animal soul* is the sum of all the effective forces in one organization," and the instinct is not a particular force of nature, but the direction that nature gave all those forces through their temperature.^a The more that the one organic principle^b of nature that we call now *formative*^c (in the rock), now *growing*^d (in the plant), now *sensitive*, now *artificially constructive*, and which is fundamentally only one and the same organic force, is distributed into more instruments and different members, the more it has in them a world of its own – the more instinct disappears, and there begins a free use of its own senses and members (as, e.g., with the human being). Finally the author gets to the essential natural difference of the human being. "The erect gait of the human being is *alone* natural to him, indeed, it is the organization for the entire calling of his species, and his distinguishing character."¹¹

It was not the case that because he was destined for reason, the erect posture was given to him for the use of his limbs in accordance with reason; rather he obtained reason through the erect posture, as the natural effect of the very same arrangement which was needed merely for letting him walk upright. "Let us with thankful glance pause to admire this holy work of art, the beneficence through which our kind became humankind, because we see what new organization of forces begins in the erect shape of humanity,^e and how through it alone the human being became a human being!"¹²

In the fourth book, the author carries out this point even further: "What is lacking to that humanlike creature (the ape) that it did not become a human being"¹³ and through what did the latter become it? Through the forming of the head for an *erect shape*, through inner and outer organization toward a perpendicular center of gravity; – the ape had all the parts of the brain that the human being has; but he has them, in accordance with the shape of his skull, in only a pressed back position, and he had the latter because his head was formed under a different angle and was not made for an erect gait. Right away all organic forces worked

^a *Völkergeschichte.*

^b *bildeten.*

^c *Ausbildung.*

^d *bildet.*

^e *Bildung.*

^f *Betrachtungen.*

^a *Temperatur.*

^b *Principium.*

^c *bildend.*

^d *treibend.*

^e *Menschheit.*

differently: "Look, therefore, to the heavens, O human being, and rejoice with shudders at your immeasurable privilege which the creator of the world attached to such a simple principle,^a your erect shape. – Elevated above the earth and plants, it is no longer smell that dominates, but rather the eye. – With the upright gait the human being became a creature of art, he obtained free and artificial hands, – only in the erect gait is true human language to be found. – Theoretically and practically, reason is nothing but what is *perceived*,^b a learned proportion and direction of ideas and forces, to which the human being has been formed^c in accordance with his organization and way of life."¹⁴ And now freedom: "The human being is the first of creation to be set free, he stands erect."¹⁵ Shame: "It must soon develop with an erect shape."¹⁶ His nature is subject to no particular variety. "Why is this? Through his erect shape, through nothing else. – He is formed for humanity;^d peaceableness, sexual love, sympathy, maternal love, a rung of the humanity of his upright formation – the rule of justice and truth is grounded on the erect form itself of the human being; the latter forms him also for propriety;^e religion is the highest humanity. The stooped animal senses obscurely; God raised the human being up, so that he, even without knowing and willing it, would scrutinize the causes of things and find thee, thou great connection of all things! Religion, however, produces hope and faith in immortality."¹⁷ The fifth book discourses on this latter. "From rock to crystals, from these to metals, from these to the creation of plants, from there to the animal, finally to the human being, we saw the form of organization ascend, with it also the forces and drives of the creature become more manifold and finally unite themselves all into the shape of the human being, insofar as this shape could encompass them –."¹⁸

8: 50

"Through this series of beings we noted a similarity in the chief form, which approached ever nearer the human shape – just as we also saw the forces and drives approach him. – With each creature, the duration of its life was fixed according to the end of nature that it had to further. – The more organized a creature is, the more its structure is composed from the lower realms. The human being is a compendium of the world: lime, earth, salts, acids, oil and water, forces of vegetation, of stimuli, of sensation are in him organically united. – Through this we come to assume also an *invisible realm of forces*, standing in precisely the same connection and transition, and an ascending series of invisible forces, just as in the visible realm of creation. – This invisible realm does *everything*

for the immortality of the soul, and not it alone, but for the continued duration of all effective and living forces of cosmic creation. Force cannot perish, though the instrument can well be disintegrated. What the everliving called into life, that lives; what works, works eternally in its eternal connection."¹⁹ These principles are not unfolded, "because this is not the place for it."²⁰ Nevertheless, "we see in matter so many forces like spirit that a complete opposition and contradiction of these beings – which are, to be sure, very different – of spirit and of matter, appears, if not self-contradictory then at least entirely unconfirmed."²¹ – "Preformed germs no eye has seen. If one speaks of an epigenesis,²² then one speaks improperly, as though the members accrued *from outside*. It is formation (*genesis*), an effect of *inner forces* for which nature had prepared a mass which they *give their form*,^a in which they are to make themselves visible. It is not our rational soul that forms the body, but the finger of divinity, organic force."²³ Now we are told this: 1. Force and organ are to be sure most inwardly combined, but are not precisely one and the same. 2. Every force works harmonically with its organ, for it has only formed it and assimilated itself to it for the revelation of its essence. 3. If the hull falls away, then the force remains, which already existed ahead of time before this hull, although in a low condition and just as organically."²⁴ At which point the author says to the materialists: "Let it be that our soul is originally one with all forces of matter, of stimulus, of movement, of life, and only works at a higher stage, in a more fully formed,^b more refined organization; has anyone ever seen even one force of movement or of stimulation perish, and are these lower forces one and the same with their organs?"²⁵ Of their connection we are told that it could be only progress. One can regard humankind as the great flowing together of lower organic forces, which are to germinate in him into the formation of humanity."²⁶

That the organization of the human being occurs in a realm of spiritual forces, is shown thus: "[1.]^c Thought is a thing wholly other than that which sense conveys to the organization of the human being; all experiences concerning its origin are evidences of the effect of an acting being that is to be sure organic, but nevertheless operating by its own power, in accordance with laws of spiritual combination. 2. As the body grows through nourishment, so the spirit does through ideas; indeed, we note with it the same laws of assimilation, growth and production. In short, in us there is formed an inner spiritual human being, who has his own nature and his body only as an instrument. – The clearer consciousness, this great advantage of the human soul, first has been formed only in a spiritual way, through humanity, etc."²⁷ – in a word, if we rightly understand

8: 51

^a *Principium.*^b *Vernommenes*, a play on the word *Vernunft* = reason.^c *gebildet.*^d *zur Humanität gebildet.*^e *Wohlanständigkeit.*^a *die sie sich zubilden.*^b *ausgebildetern.*^c This number seems required by the occurrence of "2." later in the passage.

it, the soul first came to be through spiritual forces gradually added on to one another. – “Our humanity is only a preparatory exercise,” the bud of a future flower. Nature step by step discards the ignoble, and on the contrary cultivates the spiritual, refining even further what is refined, and thus we can hope from its artist’s hand that also our bud of humanity will in that existence appear in its proper, true, divine human shape.”²⁸

The close is made with this proposition: “The present condition of the human being is probably the connecting^b middle member of two worlds. – If the human being closes the chain of earthly organizations as its highest and ultimate member, then precisely thereby he also begins the chain of a higher species of creatures as its lowest member, and thus he is probably the middle ring between two interlocking systems of creation. – He exhibits to us two worlds at once, and that makes the apparent duplicity of his essence. – Life is a struggle and the flower of pure immortal humanity is a crown difficult to acquire. – Our brothers of the higher stage therefore certainly love us more than we can seek and love them; for they see our condition more clearly, – and they perhaps educate^c us to be the participants in their good fortune. – It cannot well be imagined that the future condition should be so entirely incomunicable as the animal in the human being would like to believe, – thus without higher direction, language and the first science seems inexplicable. – Even in later times, the greatest effects on earth arise through inexplicable circumstances, – even sicknesses were often the instruments for them, if the organ became unusable for the common circuit of earthly life; so that it appears natural that the inner restless force perhaps receives impressions of which an undisturbed organization was not capable. – Yet the human being should not spy into his future condition, but should believe himself into it.” (But once he believes that he can spy into it, how can one prevent him from seeking now and then to make use of this faculty?) – “This much is certain, that in every one of his forces there lies an infinity; even the forces of the world whole appear hidden in the soul, and it needs only an organization, or a series of organizations, to be able to set these into activity and exercise, – As the flower stood there and in its *upright shape* closed the realm of the subterranean, still inanimate creation, – so the human being again stands there *upright* over everything that is stooped to the earth (animals). With his sublime gaze and upraised hands he stands there, as the son of the house, awaiting the call of his father.”²⁹

8: 52

Supplement

The idea and final aim of this first part (one, as it would appear, of a work planned for many volumes) consists in the following. While avoiding all

^a *Vorübung*.

^b *verbindende*.

^c *erziehen*.

metaphysical investigations, the spiritual nature of the human soul, its persistence and progressions in perfection are to be proven from the analogy to natural formations of matter, mainly in its organization. On behalf of this, spiritual forces, to which matter constitutes only the building material, and a certain invisible realm of creation, are assumed, which is to contain the animating force that organizes everything, and indeed in such a way that the schema of the perfection of this organization is supposed to be the human being, to which all earthly creatures, from the lowest stage on, approach until finally, through nothing but this completed organization, whose condition is mainly the upright gait of the animal, the human being came to be, whose death could never end the progress and advancement of the organizations that was previously shown in detail in all kinds of creatures, but rather makes us expect a passage of nature to still more refined operations, so as thereby to promote and elevate him to yet higher stages of life in the future, and so on into infinity. The reviewer must admit that he does not understand this inference from the analogy of nature, even if he were to concede that continuous gradation of its creatures, together with the rule governing it, namely the approximation to the human being. For they are *different* beings that occupy the many stages of the ever more perfect organizations. Thus in accordance with such an analogy only this can be inferred: that *somewhere else*, perhaps on another planet, there might again be creatures who would assert the next higher stage of organization above human beings, but not that *the same individual* will attain to it. With the little flying animals developing out of grubs or caterpillars there is an entirely unique procedure of nature, different from the common arrangement, and yet even there palingenesis³⁰ does not follow upon *death* but only on the *pupal stage*. What would have to be proven here, on the contrary, is that nature makes animals, even after their decomposition or combustion, ascend from their ashes into a specific more perfect organization, so that by analogy one could infer this also about the human being who is transformed here into ashes. Thus between the elevation of stages of the very same human being to a more perfect organization in another life, and the ladder of stages which one might think among entirely different kinds and individuals of a realm of nature, there is not the least similarity. Here nature lets us see nothing other than that she abandons individuals to complete destruction and preserves only the kind; but there one demands to know whether also the individual in the human being will survive his destruction here on earth, which might be inferred from moral or, if one will, metaphysical grounds, but never from any analogy with that visible generation. But now as pertains to that invisible realm of effective and self-sufficient forces, it is difficult to see why the author, after he has believed he is able safely to infer from the organic generations to its existence, did not

prefer to make the thinking principle in the human being pass immediately to it, as a merely spiritual nature, without raising it up out of chaos through the structure of organization; unless he were to take these spiritual forces to be something wholly other than the human soul and regarded the latter not as a particular substance, but merely as the effect^a on matter of an invisible universal nature that works within it and animates it – which opinion, however, we have reservations about ascribing to him. Yet what is one to think in general about the hypothesis of invisible forces, effecting organization, hence about the endeavor to want to explain *what one does not comprehend* from *what one comprehends even less?* At least with respect to the former we can become acquainted with its laws through experience, although their causes will remain unknown; but with respect to the latter we are deprived of all experience, and now what can the philosopher adduce here in justification of his allegation, except the mere despair about ever finding the disclosure in any cognition of nature and the decision he is forced into of seeking for it in the fruitful field of his poetic power?^b Also this is metaphysics, indeed even a very dogmatic one, however much our writer denies it because that is what the fashion wills.

Nevertheless, as to the ladder of the organizations, one may not reprobate him too much if it is not sufficient to his aim, that stretches far above this world; for its use in regard to the realms of nature here on earth likewise leads to nothing. The smallness of the distinctions, if one places the species one after another in accordance with their *similarities*, is, given so huge a manifoldness, a necessary consequence of this very manifoldness. Only an *affinity* among them, where either one species would have arisen from the other and all from a single original species or perhaps from a single procreative maternal womb, would lead to *ideas* which, however, are so monstrous that reason recoils before them; but one may not ascribe such things to our author without doing him an injustice. As to his contribution to comparative anatomy through all species of animals down to the plant, those who labor at the description of nature may judge for themselves how far the direction to new observations that he gives here could be of utility to them, and whether that direction has any ground at all. But the unity of the organic force (p. 141),³¹ which, as self-forming in regard to the manifoldness of all organic creatures, and later in accordance with the difference of these organs working through them in different ways, is supposed to constitute the entire distinctiveness of its many genera and species – this is an idea that lies entirely outside the field of the observational doctrine of nature and belongs merely to speculative philosophy; but even there, if

^a *Effekt.*

^b *Dichtungskraft.*

it were to find reception, it would wreak great devastation among the accepted concepts. Yet to try to determine what organization of the head externally in its figure and inwardly in regard to its brain is necessarily combined with the predisposition to an erect gait, yet even more how an organization directed merely to his end contains the ground of the faculty of reason, in which the animal thereby participates – that obviously surpasses all human reason, whether it wants to grope about on the guiding thread of physiology or fly in the air with those of metaphysics.

Nevertheless, these considerations^a should not take all merit from such a thoughtful work as this. One of its excellent merits is (not even thinking about the many reflections that are as beautifully said as they are nobly and truly thought) the courage with which its author has managed to overcome the scruples of his estate, which so often narrow all philosophy in regard to mere attempts of reason as to how far it can get by itself; in this we wish him many followers. Besides this, the mysterious obscurity in which nature itself conceals its business of the organization and the division of its creatures into classes bears a part of the responsibility for the obscurity and uncertainty that attaches to this first part of a philosophical history of humanity,^b which intended to couple on to one another, if possible, the extreme ends of it, the point from which it started and that where it loses itself in the infinite, out beyond earthly history; which attempt is bold, to be sure, but natural to the drive for inquiry of our reason, and not discreditable^c even if its execution does not fully succeed. But it is all the more to be wished that in the continuation of the work, in which he will have firm ground under his feet, our spirited author should put his lively genius under some constraint, and that philosophy, whose concern is more with pruning abundant saplings than with making them sprout,^d should guide him to the completion of his enterprise not through hints but through determinate concepts, not through conjectured^e but observed laws, not by means of a force of imagination given wings whether through metaphysics or through feelings, but through a reason which is expansive in its design but cautious in the execution.

II.

Reminder^f by the reviewer of Herder's Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (No. 4 and Supplement of the *General Literary Paper*) on an article directed against this review in the February issue of the *German Mercury*.

^a *Erinnerungen.*

^b *Menschengeschichte.*

^c *unrühmlich.*

^d *Treiben.*

^e *gemutmaßte.*

^f *Erinnerungen.*

8: 57

In the February number of the *German Mercury*, p. 148, there steps forth, under the name of a pastor, a defender of the book of Mr. Herder against the alleged attack on it in our *General Literary Paper*. It would be unfair to involve the name of a respected author in the dispute between reviewer and counter-reviewer; hence here we want to defend only our way of proceeding in publicizing and judging the said work as conforming to the maxims of diligence, impartiality, and moderation which this paper has adopted as its standard. In his article, the pastor quarrels much with a metaphysician whom he has in mind, and who, as he imagines him, is wholly spoiled for all instruction through the paths of experience, or where they do not complete the matter, for inferences in accordance with the analogy of nature, and who wants everything to fit his last of fruitless scholastic abstractions. The reviewer can well tolerate this quarrel, since in this he is fully of one opinion with the pastor, and the review itself is the best proof of that. But since he believes himself rather well acquainted with the materials for an anthropology, and likewise somewhat with the method of their use in attempting a history of humanity^a in the whole of its vocation, he is convinced that these materials may be sought neither in metaphysics nor in the cabinet of natural history specimens by comparing the skeleton of the human being with that of other species of animals; least of all, however, does the latter lead to his vocation for another world; but that vocation can be found solely in his *actions*, which reveal his character; he is also persuaded that Mr. Herder did not even have the aim in the first part of his work (which contains only the presentation of the human being as an animal in the universal system of nature, and thus a prodromus of future ideas) of providing the actual materials for the history of the human being, but only thoughts to which he wanted to make physiologists more attentive; their researches are commonly directed only to the mechanical aim of animal structure, but he wants to extend them further if possible, and as far as the organization appropriate^b for the use of reason in this creature; nevertheless, he has put more weight on these thoughts in this regard than they could ever bear. It is also not necessary for him who is of the latter opinion, as the pastor demands on p. 161, to prove that human reason might ever be *possible* with *another form* of organization, for into this there can be no more insight than into how it might be possible in the present form *alone*. The rational use of experience also has its boundaries. It can teach us, to be sure, that something is so-and-so, but never that it *could* not at all *be otherwise*; neither can any analogy fill this immeasurable gap between the contingent and the necessary. In the review it was said: "The smallness of the distinctions, if one places the species one after another

8: 58

in accordance with their *similarities*, is, given so huge a manifoldness, a necessary consequence of this very manifoldness. Only an *affinity* among them, where either one species would have arisen from the other and all from a single original species or perhaps from a single procreative maternal womb, would lead to *ideas* which, however, are so monstrous that reason recoils before them; but one may not ascribe such things to our author without doing him an injustice."³² These words seduced the pastor into believing that in the review of the work he had encountered *metaphysical orthodoxy*, hence *intolerance*; and he adds: "*Healthy reason left to its own freedom recoils from no idea.*"³³ But there is nothing to fear of all that he fathoms. It is merely the *horror vacui*^a of universal human reason, namely, to *recoil* where one runs up against an idea in which *nothing at all can be thought*, and in this regard the ontological codex might well serve as a canon for the theological, and indeed precisely for the sake of tolerance. The pastor finds besides the merit of *freedom in thinking* ascribed to the book much too common for so famous an author. Without doubt he is of the opinion that *external freedom* is being talked about, which, because it depends on place and time, is in fact no merit at all. Yet the review had before its eyes that *inner freedom*, namely the freedom from the chains of concepts and ways of thinking that are habitual and confirmed by general opinion; – a freedom that is *not at all* common, so that even those who confess loyalty only to philosophy have only rarely been able to work themselves all the way up to it. What he complains about in the review: "*that the passages it picks out are those expressing the results, but not at the same time those that prepare for them,*"³⁴ this may well be an unavoidable ill for authorship as a whole, which after all is easier to bear than picking out only one or another passage in order to pronounce general praise^b or condemnation on it. So let's stick with the judgment on the work in question, given with all due respect and even with sympathy for the author's *fame*, still more his *future fame*, which judgment therefore sounds quite different from that which the pastor (not very conscientiously) imputes to it on p. 161, "*that the book did not accomplish what its title promised.*" For the title did not at all promise, already in the first volume, which contains only general physiological preliminaries, to accomplish what is expected of the following ones (which, as far as one can judge, will contain the anthropology proper); and the reminder was not superfluous in that it limits the freedom in the latter, while it might have deserved indulgence in the former. Besides, it now depends only on the author himself to accomplish what the title promised, which one has cause to hope from his talents and his learning.

^a Menschheit.^b zweckmäßigen.

III.

Riga and Leipzig: Hartknoch. *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity*^a by Johann Gottfried Herder. Second Part, 344 pp. Octavo, 1785.

This part, which continues up to the tenth book, describes first, in six sections of the sixth book, the organization of peoples in the region of the north pole and around the Asiatic ridge of the earth, the zone of the finely formed nations^b and of the African nations,^c the human beings on the islands of the torrid zone and the Americans.^d The author closes his description with the wish for a collection of new portrayals of nations,^e for which Niebuhr, Parkinson, Cook, Höst, Georgi, and others have already provided the beginnings.³⁵ "It would be a fine gift if someone capable would collect the faithful paintings, scattered here and there, of the differences of our kind,^f and with them *laid* the ground for *an explicit natural doctrine and physiognomy of humanity*.^g Art could hardly be applied more philosophically, and an anthropological chart, like the zoological one that *Zimmermann*³⁶ has attempted, on which nothing must be indicated except what is diverse in humanity,^b but this also in all appearances and respects, such a thing would crown the philanthropic work."³⁷

The seventh book considers first the propositions that despite such different forms, humankind is nevertheless everywhere only one species and that this one kind has acclimatized itself everywhere on the earth. Next, light is shed on the effects of climate on the formation of the human being in body and soul. The author acutely remarks that many preliminaries are still lacking before we can come to a physiological-pathological climatology, much less a climatology of all the human powers of thinking and sensing, and that it is impossible from the chaos of causes and consequences which here comprise the height and depths of a given zone of the earth, its constitution and its products, foods and drinks, ways of life, labors, clothing, even the customary pastimes, pleasures and arts, together with other circumstances, to order a world in which every thing, ever single region is given its due, and receives neither too much nor too little. With commendable modesty he therefore mentions the general remarks following p. 99 only as problems (p. 92).³⁸ They are contained under the following chief propositions: 1. Through all kinds

^a Menschheit.

^b schön gebildeter Völker, which apparently refers to the Europeans and to North Americans of European descent.

^c Nationen.

^d That is, the native Americans.

^e Nationen.

^f Verschiedenheit unsers Geschlechts.

^g Menschheit.

^b Menschheit.

of causes a climatic community is furthered, which belongs to the life of living things. 2. The habitable land of our earth is concentrated into regions where most living beings operate in the form most satisfactory to them; this situation of the parts of the world has an influence on all their climates. 3. Through the structuring of the earth by mountain ranges, not only was the climate altered incalculably for the great variety of living things, but also the dispersal of humankind was prevented, as much as it can be prevented. In the fourth section of this book the author asserts that the genetic force is the mother of all formations on the earth to which the climate only contributes favorably or unfavorably, and closes with a few remarks about *the strife between genesis and climate*, where he among other things also *expresses the wish for a physical-geographic history of the descent and variation^a of our kind in accordance with climates and ages*.

In the eighth book, Mr. H. pursues the use of human senses, the power of the imagination of the human being, his practical understanding, his drives and happiness, and elucidates the influence of the traditions, of opinions, of usage and habit, through examples from different nations.^b

The ninth concerns itself with the dependency of the human being on others in the development of his capacities, with language as means for the formation of human beings, with the invention of the arts and sciences through imitation, reason and language, with the governments as established orders among human beings, mostly from inherited traditions; and closes with remarks about religion and the oldest tradition.

The tenth contains for the most part the result of thoughts the author has already expounded elsewhere; since aside from the observations about the first habitat of the human being and the Asiatic traditions about the creation of the earth and humankind, it repeats the most essential thing of the hypothesis about the Mosaic creation story from his work *The Oldest Document of Humankind*.

This dry catalogue of this part too is supposed to be only an announcement of the content, not an exhibition of the spirit of this work; it is supposed to invite you to read it, not replace the reading of it or make that unnecessary.

The sixth and seventh books contain almost entirely only extracts from ethnographic descriptions; of course sought out with skilled choice, arranged masterfully and everywhere accompanied by the author's own astute judgments; but, a detailed extract from them is all the less possible for that reason. It is also not our intention here to pick out or analyze many a fine passage, full of poetic eloquence, which will offer itself with advantage to every sensitive reader. But just as little do we want

^a Verartung

^b Nationen.

to investigate here whether the poetical spirit that animates his expression has not sometimes also invaded the author's philosophy; whether here and there synonyms have not been allowed to count as explanations and allegories for truths; whether instead of there being neighboring passages from the domain of philosophical language into the precinct of poetical language, the boundaries and proper dominions of both have not been completely displaced; and whether in many places the fabric of bold metaphors, poetic images, mythological allusions, have not served rather to conceal the body of the thoughts as under a *farthingale* than to let it shine forth agreeably as through a transparent vestment. We will leave it to critics of the fine art of philosophical writing, or to the final hand of the author himself, e.g. to investigate whether it would not be better to say: "not only day and night and change of seasons alter the climate" than, as on p. 99: "*Not only day and night and the rondelay of modulating seasons alter the climate*",³⁹ whether the following image, doubtless beautiful in a dithyrambic ode, is well fitted to a natural history description of these alterations on p. 100: "Around the throne of Jupiter its (the earth's) *horae*⁴⁰ dance a rondelay, and although what is formed under their feet is to be sure only an imperfect perfection, because everything is built on the unification of things of different kinds, but through an inner love and conjugal union with each other, still the child of nature is born, sensible regularity and beauty";⁴¹ or whether the transition turning from the traveller's remarks about the organization of different nations^a and about the climate to a collection of commonplaces based on them, with which the eighth book starts, is not too *epic*: "As one who from a voyage on the waves of the sea is supposed to take a voyage into the air, so with me, after the formations and natural forces of humanity,^b I now venture to get to its spirit and dare to investigate its alterable qualities on our broad earthly sphere on the basis of the defective and in part uncertain records of others."⁴² We shall also not investigate whether the stream of his eloquence does not here and there involve him in contradictions, whether, e.g., when it is cited on p. 248 that discoverers often had to leave the utility of their discoveries more to posterity than discovering it for themselves, this does not provide a new example to confirm the proposition that the natural predispositions of the human being, which relate to the use of his reason, were meant to be completely developed only in the species and not in the individual – which proposition, however, along with certain propositions flowing from it (which, however, he does not grasp entirely correctly), he is inclined to censure on p. 206 as close to an *insult against the majesty of nature* (which others, in prose,

call blasphemy against God);⁴³ all this, thinking of the limits that are set on us, we must here leave untouched.

But there is one thing that the reviewer would have wished, as much as to our author and to everyone else who undertakes as a philosopher a universal natural history of the human being: namely that a historical-critical mind had done all the preliminaries for them, picking out from the immeasurable multiplicity of ethnographic descriptions or travel narratives and all their conjectural records belonging to human nature, especially those in which they contradict one another, placing them next to one another (yet also with added reminders on the credibility of each narrator); for then no one would so rashly base himself on one-sided accounts, without first having weighed them precisely against the records of others. But now from a multiplicity of descriptions of countries one can prove, if one wants to, that Americans, Tibetans, and other genuine Mongolian peoples have no beard, but also, if it suits you better, that all of them are by nature bearded and only pluck them out; that Americans and Negroes are each a race,^a sunk beneath the remaining members of the human species in their mental predispositions,^b but on the other side by just as apparent records that as regards their natural predispositions, they are to be estimated equal to every other inhabitant of the world; so it remains to the choice of the philosopher whether he wants to assume differences of nature or wants to judge everything in accordance with the principle *tout comme chez nous*,^c so that all his systems he erected on so shaky a foundation must take on the look of rickety hypotheses. The division of the human species into *races*,^d is not favored by our author, primarily not that grounded on inherited colors, presumably because the concept of a race^e is for him not distinctly enough determined. In the seventh book, third number, he calls the cause of the climatic difference of human beings a *genetic* force. The reviewer has the following concept of the meaning of this expression, in the author's mind. He wants to dismiss on the one side the system of evolution⁴⁴ and yet also on the other side the mere mechanical influences of external causes as providing unworkable grounds of elucidation, and he assumes as its cause a principle of life, which appropriately modifies *itself* internally in accordance with differences of the external circumstances; with this the reviewer fully concurs, only with this reservation, that if the cause organizing itself *from within* were limited by its nature only perhaps to a certain number and degree of differences in the formation of a creature (so that after the institution of which it were not further free to form yet another type

^a Race.

^b Geistesanlagen.

^c Everything is as it is with us.

^d Rassen.

^e Race.

8: 63

under altered circumstances), then one could call this natural vocation^a of the forming nature also “germs” or “original predispositions,” without thereby regarding the former as primordially implanted machines and buds that unfold themselves only when occasioned (as in the system of evolution), but merely as limitations, not further explicable, of a self-forming faculty, which latter we can just as little explain or make comprehensible.

With the *eighth book* a new course of thought begins, which proceeds until the conclusion of this part and contains the origin of the formation^b of the human being as a rational and moral creature, hence the beginning of all culture; according to the author’s mind, this is not to be sought in the human species’ own faculty, but rather entirely outside it, in a teaching and instruction by other natures; starting from there, all progress in culture is supposed to be nothing but a further communication and contingent proliferation^c of an original tradition; it is to the latter and not to himself that the human being has to ascribe all his approximation to wisdom. The reviewer, when he sets foot outside nature and reason’s path of cognition, does not know how to proceed any longer, since he is not versed in the learned study of languages and the knowledge and judgment of ancient documents, and hence does not understand at all how to make use philosophically of the facts narrated and thereby also preserved in them; hence he admits that he can have no judgment here. Nevertheless, from the author’s extensive learning and his special gift of grasping disparate data under one viewpoint, it may be conjectured in advance that we will get many beautiful things to read at least about the course of things human, insofar as it can serve to acquaint us further with the character of the species and where possible even with certain classificatory differences within it, which can also be instructive for those who might be of a different opinion about the first beginning of all human culture. The author expresses briefly the foundation of his opinions (pp. 338–9, with the note) thus: “This (Mosaic) didactic story^d narrates that the first created human beings had dealings with the instructing Elohim, that under their guidance, through acquaintance with the animals, they acquired language and dominating reason, and that since the human being wanted to be like them in a forbidden way, in the knowledge^e of evil, he attained to this to his detriment and from now on took up another place, beginning a new, artificial way of life. If, therefore, the Deity willed that the human being should practice reason and foresight,

8: 64

it itself had to look after him^a with reason and foresight. – But now how did the Elohim look after the human beings, i.e. teach, warn and instruct them? If it is not just as bold to ask about this as to answer, then the tradition itself will provide the disclosure to us in another place.”⁴⁵

In an untrdden desert, a thinker, like a traveller, must remain free to choose his own path as he thinks best; one must wait to find out how successful he is and whether, after he has reached his goal, he will in due time find his way safely home again, i.e. to the seat of reason, and hence can count on having followers. For this reason the reviewer has nothing to say about the pathway of thought on which the author has entered, however, he believes himself to be justified in taking under his protection some of the propositions contested by the author along this pathway, because this freedom to choose his own road for himself must be admitted to him. Namely, he says this on p. 260: “It would be an *easy*, but *evil principle*^b for human history to say ‘The human being is an animal who has need of a master⁴⁶ and expects from this master, or from their connection, the good fortune of his final vocation.’”⁴⁷ “Easy” it may well be, just because it is confirmed by the experience of all times and in all peoples, but why “evil”? On p. 205 it is said: “Providence thought beneficially when it gave preference to the easier happiness of individual human beings over the artificial final ends of large societies and as far as possible saved those precious state machines for later time.”⁴⁸ Quite right, but first the happiness of an animal, then of a child, then of a youth, and finally that of a man. In all epochs of humanity,^d just as in all estates at any one time, a kind of happiness is found which is suited precisely to the concepts and the habits of the creature as to the circumstances into which it is born and grows up; indeed, as regards this point, it is not even possible to indicate a comparison in terms of the degree of happiness and a preference between one class of human beings or of one generation over the others. But what if the genuine end of providence were not this shadowy image of happiness, which each makes for himself, but rather the always proceeding and growing activity and culture that is put in play by it, whose greatest possible degree is only the product of a state constitution ordered in accordance with concepts of human right, and consequently something that can be a work of human beings themselves? Thus, in accordance with p. 206: “Every individual human being would have in himself the measure of his own happiness,”⁴⁹ without coming second to any following members in its enjoyment; but as to the worth not of their condition, once they exist, but to their existence itself, i.e. why they are really there, it is here

8: 65

^a *Naturbestimmung*.

^b formative education = *Bildung*.

^c *Wuchern*.

^d (*mosaische*) *lebrende Geschichte*.

^e *Erkenntnis*.

8: 66

alone that a wise intention on the whole is revealed. Does the author really mean that if the happy inhabitants of Tahiti, never visited by more cultured nations,^a had been destined to live for thousands of centuries in their tranquil indolence, one could give a satisfying answer to the question why they exist at all, and whether it would not have been just as good to have this island populated with happy sheep and cattle as with human beings who are happy merely enjoying themselves? That principle is therefore not as *evil* as the author thinks. – Even though it might have been an *evil man* who said it. – A second proposition to be taken under protection is this. On p. 212 it says: “If someone said that not the individual human being but humankind is to be educated,^b then he speaks unintelligibly for me, since kind and species are only general concepts, except only insofar as they exist in individual beings. – It is as if I spoke of animality, minerality and metality in general and adorned them with the most splendid attributes, which, however, contradict one another in single individuals! – On this path of Averroistic philosophy our philosophy of history shall not wander.”^c Obviously whoever says “No individual horse has horns but the species of horses is horned” would utter a flat absurdity. For “species” then signifies nothing but the mark in which all individuals must agree with one another. But if “the human species” signifies the *whole* of a series of generations going (indeterminably) into the infinite (as this meaning is entirely customary), and it is assumed that this series ceaselessly approximates the line of its destiny^c running alongside it, then it is not to utter a contradiction to say that in all its parts it is asymptotic to this line and yet on the whole that it will coincide with it, in other words, that no member of all the generations of humankind, but only the species will fully reach its destiny. The mathematician can give elucidation here; the philosopher would say: “The destiny of humankind is on the whole a *ceaseless progress*, and its completion is a mere idea, but very useful in all respects – the idea of a goal to which we have to direct our endeavors in accordance with the aim of providence.” Yet this error in the cited polemical passage is only a trifle. More important is its conclusion: “On this pathway of Averroistic philosophy (so he says) let our philosophy of history not wander.” Let it be concluded from this that our author, to whom everything that has been given out previously as philosophy has often been so displeasing, will now provide to the world, not in an unfruitful nominal definition, but through deed and example in this extensive work, a model of the genuine way of philosophizing.

^a gesitteten Nationen.^b erzogen.^c Bestimmung; this word will be translated as “destiny” several times more in the rest of this paragraph.

Determination of the concept of a human race

EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

Occasioned by the reception of his earlier essay, *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775, 2nd edn. 1777), which is also contained in the present volume, Kant’s second essay on the natural history of the human species, entitled *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace* (Determination of the Concept of a Human Race), appeared in November 1785 in issue no. 11 of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (Berlin Monthly), pp. 390–417. While Kant’s earlier essay had addressed the unity of the human species and its differentiation into subspecies (“races”) in a fairly detailed geographical context, his second essay on the same topics focuses on conceptual issues and stresses that the elucidation of a concept such as that of a human race cannot be based on observation alone but needs to be guided by a preliminary determination of what to look for.

Kant’s methodological clarification and the corresponding alternative presentation of his earlier account of the natural history of the human species in the second essay seek to redress the one-sided reception of the first essay, which had concentrated exclusively on Kant’s hypothetical account of the actual differentiation of the human species over time and space and neglected to pay attention to his chief philosophical concern with developing the very concept of a subspecies – as possessing physical characteristics that are passed on unfailingly both within one and the same subspecies and across different subspecies. Accordingly, Kant restates in his second essay the main traits of his theory of the possibility of the differentiation of a species into subspecies in the form of six key propositions, each elucidated by conceptual clarifications and geographical as well as anthropological illustrations and culminating in the definitional determination of a subspecies. In addition, Kant stresses the methodological difference between the description of nature and an account of the development of nature (“natural history”). He also rejects explicitly the recourse to different species in explaining the hereditary differences among different populations of human beings, maintaining instead the unity of the human species and its basis in a common stock of potentialities for specific differentiation (“germs”).

The continued controversial reception of his natural history of the human species soon led Kant to publishing a third and final essay on the topic, *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (1788), which is also contained in the present volume.¹

The translation of *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 89–106 and was undertaken by Holly Wilson and Günter Zöller. However, the six numbered sections are provided with arabic numbers, as in the original, and not with Roman numbers, as in the Academy edition. Special care has been taken in rendering Kant's highly differentiated terminology for the differentiation of biological species. Each such term is accompanied by a linguistic footnote placed at its first occurrence in Kant's text and is also listed in the glossary.

Determination of the concept of a human race

8: 89

The knowledge^a which the new travels have disseminated about the manifoldnesses in the human species so far have contributed more to exciting the understanding to investigation on this point than to satisfying it. It is of great consequence to have previously determined the concept that one wants to elucidate^b through observation before questioning experience about it; for one finds in experience what one needs only if one knows in advance what to look for. There is much talk about the different *human races*. Some mean by this entirely different *kinds* of human beings; others limit themselves to a narrower meaning but appear to find this difference to amount to not much more than the one which human beings make among themselves by painting and clothing themselves. My intention at present is merely precisely to determine this concept of a *race*, provided there are any in the human species;^c the explanation of the origin of the actually existing races that are considered susceptible to this designation is only a subsidiary work, which one can treat as one wishes. And yet I see that otherwise astute men, in their evaluation of what a few years ago was said in that regard,* directed their attention only to this subsidiary matter, namely the hypothetical application of the principle, but touched only lightly upon the principle itself, on which everything yet depends. This is a fate that befalls several investigations that revert back to principles, and which therefore might dissuade from all disputing and arguing in speculative matters, while recommending only the closer determination and elucidation of what has been misunderstood as advisable.

8: 91

* See Engel's *Philosopher for the World*, Part II, pp. 125f.

^a *Kenntnisse*.

^b *aufklären*.

^c *Menschengattung*.

8:92

I.
ONLY WHAT IS HEREDITARY^a IN AN ANIMAL
SPECIES CAN JUSTIFY A CLASSIFICATORY
DIFFERENCE IN THE ANIMAL SPECIES

The *Moor* (Mauritanian), who is burned brown by air and sun in his native country and who is so much distinguished from the German or Swede by the skin color, and the French or English *Creole* in the West Indies, who looks pallid and exhausted, as though scarcely recovered from an illness, can be as little counted among different classes of the human species because of this, as can the Spanish peasant from *La Mancha*, who goes around dressed in black like a schoolmaster because the sheep in his province all have black wool. For if the Moor has grown up in rooms and the Creole in Europe, they are both indistinguishable from the inhabitants of our part of the world.

The missionary *Demanet*¹ gives himself airs, as though he alone could judge correctly the blackness of the Negroes, because he spent some time in *Senegambia*, and denies his fellow citizens, the French, any judgment about the matter. I maintain, however, that in France one can judge far more correctly regarding the color of the Negroes who have long resided there, and even better regarding the color of those who have been born there, if one wants to determine their classificatory difference from other human beings, than could be done even in the blacks' home country. For that which the sun impressed into the skin of the Negro in Africa, and which is hence only accidental to him, must fall away in France, and only that blackness remains which was allotted to him by birth and which he passes on to his progeny, and which alone for that reason can be used for a classificatory difference. From all hitherto existing descriptions one cannot yet form a sure concept of the actual color of the South Sea Islanders. For while the color of mahogany wood is attributed to some of them, I still do not know how much of this brown is to be ascribed to a mere coloring from sun and air and how much to birth. Only a child conceived by such a couple in Europe would reveal without ambiguity the skin color that belongs to them *by nature*.^b From a passage in *Carteret's* travel account² (who, to be sure, had gone little ashore on his sea voyage but nevertheless had seen various islanders in their canoes), I conclude that the inhabitants of most of the islands must be whites. For he first saw, as he says, the *true yellow* of the Indian skin color on the *Free Will Island* (near the islands counted among the Indian waters). Whether the formation of the heads on *Malakula* is to be attributed to nature or artifice,^c or how much the natural skin color of the Kaffirs

differs from that of the Negroes, and whether other such characteristic properties are hereditary and impressed by nature itself at birth or only accidentally impressed, therefore will not be settled decisively for a long time.

8:93

2.
ONE CAN ASSUME FOUR CLASSIFICATORY
DIFFERENCES OF HUMAN BEINGS
WITH RESPECT TO SKIN COLOR

We know with certainty of no other hereditary differences of skin color than those of the *whites*, the *yellow* Indians, the *Negroes*, and the *copper-red* Americans. It is noteworthy that these characters appear to be especially suited for the division of the human species into classes, *first* because each of these classes is so considerably isolated with respect to its residence (i.e., separated from the others but unified in itself): the class of the whites from Cape Finisterra through the North Cape, the Ob river, Little Bukhara, Persia, Arabia Felix,^a Abyssinia, the northern border of the Sahara desert up to the White Cape in Africa or to the mouth of the Senegal; that of the *blacks* from there to Cape Negro and, with the exclusion of the Kaffirs, back to Abyssinia; that of the *yellows* in Hindustan proper up to Cape Comorin (a half-breed race descended from them is on the other side of the Indian peninsula and on a few islands lying nearby); that of the *copper-reds* in a completely separate part of the world, namely America. The *second* reason why this character is especially suited for the division into classes, even though a difference in color might appear very insignificant to some, is that the secretion through perspiration must be the most important part of Nature's foresight, considering that the creature – transplanted in all possible regions, where it is affected very differently by air and sun – is supposed to persist in a way that is least needy of art, and that the skin, as the organ of that secretion, carries in itself the trace of this diversity of the natural character which justifies the division of the human species into visibly different classes. – Moreover, I ask that one concede the sometimes disputed *hereditary* difference in skin color until the occasion for its confirmation is found in what follows; likewise to permit that I assume that there are no more hereditary ethnic characters with respect to this natural livery than the above four – for the simple reason that that number can be proven, while no other number besides it can be established with certainty.

8:94

^a was . . . anerbt.

^b von Natur.

^c Künstelei.

^a "Happy, or Flourishing Arabia." Ancient name for the comparatively fertile regions in southwestern and southern Arabia (in present-day Yemen).

3.

NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY IS NECESSARILY HEREDITARY IN THE CLASS OF THE WHITES THAN WHAT BELONGS TO THE HUMAN SPECIES IN GENERAL; AND SO WITH THE OTHER CLASSES AS WELL

8: 95

Among us whites there are many hereditary qualities that do not belong to the character of the species, and through which families, even peoples^a are distinguished from one another. But not a single one of these is inherited *unfailingly*,^b rather, those that have these qualities also produce children with others from the class of the whites which lack this differentiating quality. Thus the differential mark^c of the blond color is dominant in Denmark, whereas in Spain (but even more in Asia in the peoples that are counted among the whites) the brunette skin color (with its consequence, the eye and hair color) is dominant. The latter color can even acquire hereditary status^d without exception in an isolated people (as with the Chinese, to whom blue eyes appear ridiculous) because there is no fair-skinned person to be encountered among them who could engender^e his color. Yet if one of these dark-complexioned people has a fair-complexioned wife, then he begets either dark-complexioned or fair-complexioned children, depending on whether they turn to one side or the other,^f and the same vice versa. In certain families there is hereditary consumption, uneven growth, dementia, etc.; but none of these countless hereditary ills is *unfailingly* hereditary. While it would be better carefully to avoid such unions by paying attention to the family sort in marriages, I myself have several times noticed that a healthy man produced a child with a consumptive wife which resembled him in all facial traits and was healthy and another one which resembled the mother and, like her, was consumptive. Likewise, I find only one insane child among various intelligent ones in the marriage of a man in possession of reason with a woman who was herself in possession of reason, but who came from a family in which insanity was hereditary. There is *heredity*^g involved here; but it does not occur unfailingly with respect to that in which both parents differ. – One can apply this same rule also confidently to the remaining classes. Negroes, Indians, or Americans have their personal or family or provincial differences as well; but none of

these will engender^a and propagate its respective peculiarity *unfailingly* in mixing with *those of the same class*.

4.

IN THE MIXING OF THOSE FOUR NAMED CLASSES WITH ONE ANOTHER THE CHARACTER OF EACH ONE IS UNFAILINGLY HEREDITARY^b

The white man with the Negro woman and vice versa produce the *mullatto*, with the Indian woman the *yellow mestizo* and with the American the *red mestizo*; the American with the Negro produce the *black Caribbean*, and vice versa. (The mixing of the Indian with the Negro has not yet been attempted.) In heterogeneous mixing the character of the classes is *unfailingly* hereditary, and there are no exceptions to this. Where one finds them cited, there is a misunderstanding at bottom in that one took an *albino* or *kakerlak* (both deformities) for a white. This heredity^c always occurs on both sides and never unilaterally in one and the same child. The white father impresses on it the character of his class and the black mother that of hers. Thus an intermediary sort or bastard must arise each time, which hybrid kind^d gradually will become extinct within more or fewer generations^e occurring within one and the same class. However, if the hybrid kind confines itself to itself, then it will further propagate and perpetuate itself without exception.

5.

REFLECTION ON THE LAW OF NECESSARY HALF-BREED GENERATION^f

8: 96

It is always a very remarkable phenomenon that while there are so many characters in the human species, some of which are important and even hereditary within families, not a single one can be found within a class of human beings characterized merely by skin color that is necessarily hereditary – but that this latter character, insignificant as it may appear, is universally and *unfailingly* hereditary within its class as well as in the mixing with one of the three remaining classes. Perhaps we can surmise from this extraordinary phenomenon something about the causes of the heredity of such properties that do not belong essentially to the species, based solely on the circumstance that they occur unfailingly.

^a Völker.^b artet unausbleiblich an.^c Unterschied.^d kann . . . anerben.^e in die Zeugung bringen.^f auf die eine oder andere Seite ausschlagen.^g Nachartung.^a in die Zeugung bringen.^b artet . . . unausbleiblich an.^c Anarten.^d Blendlingsart.^e Gliedern der Zeugung.^f Gesetz der notwendig halbschlächtigen Zeugung.

First, it is an awkward undertaking to make out *a priori* what brings it about that something which does not belong to the essence of the species can be hereditary; and in this obscurity regarding the sources of cognition the freedom to form hypotheses is so unrestricted that it is a great pity for all the effort and labor spent on refutations in this matter, since every one follows his own head in such cases. In such cases, I, for my part, look only at the particular *maxim of reason*^a from which each person departs and according to which he generally manages to find facts which favor it; and afterward I seek out my maxim, making me incredulous of all those explanations even before I manage to make clear to myself the counterarguments. Now if I find my maxim proved, exactly in keeping with the use of reason in natural science and the only one fit for a consistent mode of thought, then I follow it without heed-ing those alleged facts, which borrow their credibility and sufficiency for the assumed hypothesis almost exclusively from that already chosen maxim and to which facts one can moreover oppose a hundred other facts without effort. Heredity^b through the effect of the power of the imagination in pregnant women, or even in the mares in the royal stables; the plucking of the beard in entire peoples,^c as well as the cropping of the tails on English horses, through which nature is supposedly compelled to drop outright from its generations^d a product for which it was originally organized; likewise the flattened noses, which are at first artificially given by parents to new-born children and then supposedly taken up by nature into her generative power – these and other grounds of explana-tion would hardly receive credence through the facts adduced to their support, to which one can oppose far better proved ones, if they did not receive their recommendation from an otherwise wholly correct maxim of reason, namely this one: rather to venture everything in surmising from given appearances than to assume special first powers of nature or created predispositions (according to the principle: *principia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda*^e). But I am confronted with another maxim which limits the one about doing without dispensable principles, namely, that throughout all of organic nature in all changes of individual creatures their species is preserved unchanged (according to the school formula: *quaelibet natura est conservatrix sui*^f). Now it is clear that if the magic power of the imagination^g or the human artifice with respect

to animal bodies were granted a faculty to alter the generative power it-self, to reshape the originary model of nature, or disfigure it by means of additions which afterward would yet be permanently preserved in subsequent generations,^a one would no longer know at all from which original nature had started, or how far its alteration^b could go, and into which distorted shape the species and kinds might finally degenerate given that the human imagination knows no boundaries. In accordance with this consideration, I take as my principle not to admit any botching influence of the power of the imagination on nature's business of generation, and not to admit any human faculty to effect alterations in the ancient original of the species or kinds through external artifice, to bring those alterations into the generative power and to make them hereditary. For if I admit even one case of this type, then it is as if I conceded even one ghost story or case of magic. The limits of reason are then broken through once, and delusion forces itself through this breach in thousands. There is also no danger that I intentionally make myself blind to actual experiences with this decision or, which is the same, make myself stubbornly incredulous. For without exception all such fantastic incidences are marked by the fact that they permit *no experiment*, but rather want to be proved only by snatching up contingent perceptions. Yet what is such that, while being susceptible to experiment, cannot withstand a single one, or avoids it with all kinds of excuse, is nothing but delusion and fiction. These are my reasons for not being able to concur with a mode of explanation that ultimately promotes the raving penchant to the art of magic, for which any cloak, even the smallest one, is desirable: namely, that heredity,^c even only the contingent one, which does not always succeed, could ever be the effect of another cause than that of the germs and predispositions lying in the species itself.

But even if I were to concede characters that spring from contingent impressions and nevertheless become hereditary, it would be im-possible to explain through this how those four differences in color are the *only ones* among all hereditary characters that are *unfailingly* hereditary. What else could be the cause of this than that they must have lain in the germs of the to us unknown original phylum of the human species, and that as such natural predispositions which were necessary for the preservation of the species^d at least in the first period of its prop-agation and for that reason had to occur unfailingly in the successive generations^e.

^a Vernunftmaxime.

^b Anerben.

^c Völkerschaften.

^d Zeugungen.

^e Latin for "principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity."

^f Latin for "nature always preserves itself."

^g Zauberkraft der Einbildung.

^a Zeugungen.

^b Abänderung.

^c Anarten.

^d Erhaltung der Gattung.

^e Zeugungen.

Therefore we are pressed to assume that there were once *different phyla* of human beings, approximately in the habitats in which we encounter them now, which were precisely suited by nature to their different regions, thus also differently organized so that the species might preserve itself – of which the four kinds of skin color are the outer mark. Now not only will this skin color be necessarily hereditary in each phylum in its habitat but it also will preserve itself undiminished in every other region of the earth in all generations^a within the same class if the human species has become sufficiently strong (be it that the complete development came about only little by little or that art was able to assist nature through the gradual use of reason). For this character is necessarily attached to the generative power, because it was required for the preservation of the kind. – However if these phyla were *original*, it would not be possible to explain and grasp why then in their reciprocal mixing with each other the differential character^b is inherited *unfailingly*, as actually happens. For nature has originally given each phylum its character in relation to its climate and in order to be suitable for the latter. Thus the organization of one phylum has an entirely different end from that of the other; and the fact that, in spite of this, the generative powers of both should be so well matched, even in this point of their characteristic difference, that an intermediary sort not only *could* originate but *had to* result unfailingly – that cannot be comprehended at all in the case of different original phyla. Only if one assumes that the predispositions to all this classificatory difference^c must have lain necessarily in the germs of *a single first phylum*, so that the latter would be suitable for the gradual population of the different regions of the world, can it be comprehended why, once these predispositions developed on occasion and accordingly also in different ways, different classes of human beings had to arise, which subsequently also had to contribute their determinate character necessarily to the generation^d with each other class, because this specific character belonged to the possibility of its own existence, thus also to the possibility of propagating its kind, and was derived from the necessary first predisposition in the phyletic species. From such inevitably hereditary properties, which are hereditary even in the mixing with other classes by producing half-breeds, one is forced to conclude their derivation from one single phylum, because without the latter the *necessity* of the heredity^e would not be comprehensible.

^a *Zeugungen*.

^b *Charakter ihrer Verschiedenheit*.

^c *klassischen Verschiedenheit*.

^d *Zeugung*.

^e *Notwendigkeit des Anartens*.

6. ONLY THAT WHICH IS UNFAILINGLY HEREDITARY IN THE CLASSIFICATORY DIFFERENCES OF THE HUMAN SPECIES CAN JUSTIFY THE DESIGNATION OF A PARTICULAR HUMAN RACE

Properties that belong essentially to the species itself, and thus are common to all human beings as such, are indeed unfailingly hereditary.^a But since no difference of human beings lies therein, no heed is paid to them in the division of the *races*. What comes into question for establishing a division of the species into classes are physical characters through which human beings (regardless of their sex) *differ* from one another, more precisely, only those physical characters which are hereditary (see §3). Now these classes are to be called *races* only if those characters are *unfailingly* hereditary (in the same class as well as in the mixing with every other). Thus the concept of a race contains first the concept of a common phylum, second *necessarily hereditary* characters of the classificatory difference among the latter's descendants.^b Through the latter, reliable grounds of distinction are established according to which we can divide the species into classes, which then, because of the first point, namely the unity of the phylum, may only be called *races* and by no means *kinds*. The class of the whites is not distinguished from that of the blacks as a special kind within the human species, and there are no *different kinds of human beings*. Otherwise the unity of the phylum from which they could have originated would be denied, for which denial one has no reason, but rather has a very important reason to the contrary, as was proven from the unfailing heredity of their classificatory characters.*

* Initially, when looking only for characters of comparison (in terms of similarity or dissimilarity), one obtains *classes* of creatures under a species. If one looks further to their phyletic origin, then it must become apparent whether those classes are so many different *kinds* or only *races*. The wolf, the fox, the jackal, the hyena and the house dog are so many classes of four-footed animals. If one assumes that each of them required a special phyletic origin, then they are so many kinds. However, if one concedes that they also could have originated from one phylum, then they are only races of the latter. In *natural history* (which is concerned only with generation and phyletic origination *kind* and *species* are not distinguished as such. This distinction occurs solely in the description of *nature*, in which only the comparison of marks matters. What is here called *kind*, is often only called *race* there.

^a *unausbleiblich erblich*

^b *notwendig erbliche Charaktere des klassischen Unterschiedes der Abkömmlinge desselben voneinander*.

The concept of a race is therefore: *the classificatory difference of the animals of one and the same phylum in so far as this difference is unfailingly hereditary.*

This is the determination^a that was my proper intention in this essay; the rest can be seen as belonging to the subsidiary intention or mere addition, and can be accepted or rejected. I consider only the first matter to be proven and moreover useful as a principle for investigation in natural history, because it is susceptible to an *experiment* that can safely guide the application of that concept, which would be shaky and uncertain without it. – If differently shaped human beings are placed in the circumstances of intermixing and if the generation^b is half-breed, then there is already a strong conjecture that they might belong to different races; however, if this product of their mixing is *always* half-breed, then that conjecture becomes certainty. On the contrary, if only a single generation^c exhibits no intermediary sort,^d then one can be certain that both parents from the same species still belong to one and the same race, no matter how different they might look.

8: 101 I have assumed only four races of the human species; not as if I were completely certain that there is nowhere a trace of still more, but because what I require for the character of a race, namely the generation of half-breeds, has been made out only in those and has been sufficiently established in no other class of human beings. Thus Mr. Pallas³ says in his description of the Mongolian peoples that the first generation^e of a Russian with a woman of those peoples (a *Buryat*) would immediately produce beautiful children; but he does not indicate whether no trace of the Kalmuckian origin is to be encountered in them. It would be a remarkable circumstance if the mingling of a Mongol with a European should extinguish completely the characteristic traits of the former, given that they are still to be encountered more or less discernibly in the mingling with more southern peoples (presumably with Indians) in the *Chinese*, *Avars*, *Malayans*, etc. But the Mongolian particularity actually concerns the shape and not the color; and only with respect to the latter has hitherto existing experience taught us the unfailing heredity^f as the character of a race. Also one cannot make out with certainty whether the Kaffir shape of the Papuans and of the various island dwellers of the Pacific Ocean who are similar to them indicates a special race because the product of their mixing with whites is not yet known; yet they are

sufficiently distinct from the Negroes through their bushy but curly beard.

REMARK

The present theory, which assumes certain original *germs* in the first and common human phylum which are quite properly *predisposed* to the now present racial differences, is based entirely on the **unfailing nature** of their heredity, which is confirmed in the four races named through all experience. If someone takes this ground of explanation to be unnecessary multiplication of principles in natural history and believes one could just as well dispense with those special natural predispositions and, while assuming the first parental phylum to be white, explain the remaining so-called races from the subsequent impressions that happened to the later descendants through air and sun, then he has not proven anything yet, when he alleges that many a peculiarity finally became hereditary merely from the long habitation of a people in the same region and constituted a physical ethnic character. He must adduce an example of the *unfailing nature* of the heredity of such peculiarities, and this not in the same people but in the mixing with every other (which differs from the former in those peculiarities), so that the generation^a turns half-breed without exception. But he is not able to do this. For there is no example of it to be found with respect to any other character than the one we have mentioned and the beginning of which exceeds all history. If he would rather assume different *first human phyla* with such hereditary characters, then first this would be poor advice for philosophy, which would have to resort to different creatures,^b and even with that still forfeit the unity of the species. For animals that are so different from each other that just as many different *creations*^c would be necessary for their existence might indeed belong to a *nominal species*^d (in order to classify them according to certain similarities) but never to a *real species*,^e which absolutely requires at least the possibility of phyletic origin^f from a single pair. To find the latter kind of species, however, is actually a task of natural history; someone engaged in the description of nature can content himself with the first kind of species. Second, even then one would still be assuming that peculiar correspondence between the generative forces of two different species, which, while being totally foreign to each other with respect to

^a Bestimmung.

^b Zeugung.

^c Zeugung.

^d Mittelschlag.

^e Zeugung.

^f unausbleibliche Anartung.

^a Zeugung.

^b verschiedenen Geschöpfen.

^c verschiedene Erschaffungen.

^d Nominalgattung.

^e Realgattung.

^f Abstammung.

their origin, still could produce fertile off-spring with each other – and this entirely gratuitously and without any other reason than that it so pleased nature. If, in order to prove the latter point, one cites animals in which this is supposed to occur regardless of the difference of their first phylum, then everyone will deny the latter presupposition in such cases, and will rather infer from such fertile mixing the unity of the phylum, as in the case of the mixing of dogs and foxes, etc. Thus the *unfailing heredity* of peculiarities from both parents^a is the only true and at the same time sufficient touchstone for the difference of the races to which the parents belong and a proof of the unity of the phylum from which they originated – namely, of the original germs placed in this phylum and developing over the course of the generations,^b germs without which that hereditary manifold would not have come about and above all would not have been able to become *necessarily hereditary*.

8: 103 The *purposive character* in an organization is surely the general reason for inferring a preparation that is originally placed in the nature of a creature with this intent, and for inferring created germs,^c if this end could only be obtained later on. Now with respect to the peculiarity of a race, this purposive character can be demonstrated nowhere so clearly as in the *Negro race*; yet the example taken from the latter alone also entitles us at least to conjecture the same of the remaining ones, according to the analogy. For one knows now that the human blood becomes black (as can be seen at the underside of a blood cake) merely by being overloaded with phlogiston.⁴ Now already the strong odor of the Negroes, which cannot be helped through any cleanliness, gives cause for conjecturing that their skin removes much *phlogiston* from the blood and that nature must have organized this skin so that the blood could *dephlogistize itself* in them through the skin in a far greater measure than happens in us, where that is for the most part the task of the lungs. Yet the true Negroes live in regions in which the air is so phlogistized through thick forests and swamp-covered regions, that it is, according to *Lind's*⁵ report, deadly peril for the English sailors to navigate up the *Gambia River* even for one day in order to buy meat there. Thus it was an arrangement very wisely made by Nature to organize their skin such that the blood, since it does not by far sufficiently remove enough phlogiston through the lungs, could dephlogistize itself much more strongly through the skin than is the case with us. It thus had to transport a lot of phlogiston into the ends of the arteries, thereby becoming overloaded with it in this location, that is, under the skin itself, and so shine through black, although it is still

8: 104

red in the interior of the body. Moreover, the different organization of Negro skin from ours is already noticeable through touch. – As far as the purposiveness of the organization of the other races is concerned, to the extent that it can be inferred from their color, it is indeed not possible to demonstrate it with equal probability. Yet the explanatory grounds for the skin color that could support the surmise of purposiveness are not entirely lacking. If Abbot *Fontana*⁶ is right about what he maintains against the cavalier *Landriani*,⁷ namely that the fixed air^a which is discharged from the lungs in every exhaling did not precipitate from the atmosphere but rather comes out of the blood itself, then a human race could well have blood that is overloaded with this aerial acid,^b which the lungs alone could not remove and to which removal the vessels of the skin would still have to contribute their share (to be sure, not in the shape of air but combined with some other perspired material). In this case the *aerial acid* mentioned would give the iron particles in the blood the red rust color which distinguishes the skin of the Americans; and the heredity^c of this constitution of the skin may have received its necessity from the fact that the current inhabitants of this part of the world could have arrived in their present habitats from northeast Asia, hence only along the coasts and perhaps even across the ice of the polar sea. But the water in these oceans must continuously expel an enormous amount of fixed air in its continuous freezing, with which the atmosphere there is presumably more overloaded than anywhere else; for the removal of which (since, once inhaled, the fixed air is not sufficiently removed from the lungs) Nature may thus have provided beforehand in the organization of the skin. In point of fact there is reportedly also much less sensitivity to be perceived in the skin of the original Americans, something that could be a consequence of that organization, which, once developed into a racial difference, is preserved even in warmer climates. Even in the latter climates there is no lack of material for the exercise of its business; for all foods contain an amount of fixed air in them, which can be taken in through the blood and be removed through the way mentioned. – The *volatile alkali*^d is another material that nature must remove from the blood, for the secretion of which nature may likewise have placed certain germs for the special organization of the skin in those descendants of the first phylum, who would find their residence in the first period of the unfolding of humanity^e in a dry and hot region that made their blood especially liable to produce that material excessively. The cold hands of the Indians, even when they are covered with sweat, appear to confirm an

^a fixe Luft.^b Luftsäure.^c Anartung.^d flüchtige Alkali.^e Auswickelung der Menschheit.^a unausbleibliche Anartung beiderseitiger Eigentümlichkeiten der Eltern.^b der in diesem Stamm gelegten, sich in der Folge der Zeugungen entwickelnden ursprünglichen Keime.^c anerschaffene Keime.

8: 105

organization which is different from ours. – Still there is little comfort for philosophy in artificially constructing hypotheses. But they are at least good for addressing an opponent who has no sound objection against the main proposition but triumphs over the fact that the assumed principle cannot even render the phenomena comprehensible – and for repaying his play with hypotheses with one that is at least equally plausible.

One may assume whatever system one wants, this much is still certain: that the currently existing races could no longer go extinct if all their mixing with each other were prevented. The *gypsies* found among us, of whom it is established that they are *Indians* in terms of their phyletic origination,^a give us the clearest proof of this. One can trace their presence in Europe far beyond three hundred years; and they still have not degenerated in the least from the shape of their forebears. The *Portuguese* at the *Gambia River*, supposedly degenerated into Negroes, are descendants of whites who have bastardized^b with blacks. For where is it reported, and how is it even probable, that the first Portuguese that came there had brought just as many white women with them, that those all stayed alive long enough, or were replaced with other white women, in order to found a pure subsidiary phylum of whites in a foreign part of the world?^c By contrast, there are better reports that, when all the colonists he had sent to *St. Thomas* died on him, King John II, who ruled from 1481 to 1495, populated this island entirely with baptized Jewish children (of Portuguese Christian confession^d), from whom, as far as we know, the present whites are descended. The Negro Creoles in North America and the Dutch on Java remain true to their race. One must not confuse the varnish which the sun adds to their skin, but which a cooler air removes again, with the color peculiar to the race; because the former is never hereditary. Thus the germs which were originally placed in the phylum of the human species for the generation^e of the races must have developed already in most ancient times according to the needs of the climate, if the residence there lasted a long time; and after one of these predispositions was developed in a people, it extinguished all the others entirely. For that reason one also cannot assume that a mixing of different races according to a certain proportion could restore still the shape of the human phylum. If that were the case, the hybrids^f that are produced from this heterogeneous pairing^g would still now (as the first

^a ihrem Abstamme nach.

^b verbastert.

^c einen reinen Abstamm von Weißen in einem fremden Weltteile zu gründen.

^d Gewissen.

^e Erzeugung.

^f Blendlinge.

^g ungleichartigen Begattung.

phylum once did) spontaneously decompose in their generations^a back into their original colors when transplanted into different climates. Yet so far no experience justifies one to surmise this; because all of these bastard generations preserve themselves in their own further propagation just as persistently as the races from whose mixing they originated. It is therefore impossible to guess the shape of the first human phylum (as far as the constitution of the skin is concerned); even the character of the whites is only the development of one of the original predispositions that together with the others were to be found in that phylum.

^a Zeugungen.

8: 106

Conjectural beginning of human history

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) had been Kant's student in Königsberg between 1762 and 1765, but was well known during the 1770s as a critic of the Enlightenment. In 1784 he produced the first volume of his greatest work, *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity*. Kant reviewed the first two volumes, containing books 1 through 10, for the *Allgemeine Litteraturzeitung* in the January and November issues of 1785.

Book 10 of Herder's *Ideas* contained an account of the earliest ages of human history. It was based on a creative interpretation of the biblical book of *Genesis*, and was designed to drive home some central points in Herder's critique of the Enlightenment. Herder sees human beings as destined by God for a life of innocent contentment, and originally as standing in natural harmony with the divine, whose spirit is expressed through all folk cultures, poetry and religion. He views the Fall as the self-assertion of human reason, which corrupts human life and brings misery on human beings when it claims an authority over human life that is detached from our larger humanity and made independent of these supernatural resources of revealed knowledge.

Herder's first expression of these ideas had come in his *Oldest Document of Humankind* (1774), to which Kant had reacted quite negatively, and expressed in letters to J. G. Hamann (who had also been Herder's mentor). Kant was especially contemptuous of Herder's thesis that God himself taught the first human beings both spoken and written language, as well as his apparent belief that although the Mosaic creation stories were mainly allegorical, the accounts of the Garden of Eden and the fall can be regarded, on the basis of comparison with other ancient histories, as a reliable historical account of the beginnings of the human species. Herder's belief that the human species truly began with a single couple that was taught language by God was again emphasized in the opening sentences of his decisive manifesto on the philosophy of history, *This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity* (also 1774).

In Kant's review of the second volume of the *Ideas*, that contained Herder's new presentation of his views about *Genesis*, he refrained from directly criticizing Herder's account of human origins. But in his review he did remark:

In an untrodden desert, a thinker, like a traveler, must remain free to choose his own path as he thinks best; one must wait to find out how successful he is and whether, after he has reached his goal, he will in due time find his way safely home again, i.e. to the seat of reason, and hence can count on having followers. For this reason the reviewer has nothing to say about the pathway of thought on which the author has entered, however, he believes himself to be justified in taking under his protection some of the propositions contested by the author along this pathway, because this freedom to choose his own road for himself must be admitted to him.

(AA 8: 64)

The *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* is best viewed as Kant's attempt to mark out his own path through the “untrodden desert” of the unrecorded past of the human species. It was published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* VII (January 1786), pp. 1–27, less than three months after Kant's last review of Herder's *Ideas*.

The *Conjectural Beginning* satirizes Herder's attempt by adopting the same format, but carefully criticizing at the outset any attempt to write a literal history based on the imaginative interpretation of holy documents and precisely delineating the nature and value he attributes to this kind of conjectural and imaginative history – which clearly lies in the tradition of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men* (1754). The satire seems at times even to extend to the scriptures themselves, since Kant obviously relishes such thoughts as that the voice of God in the garden of Eden was not a moral voice, so that eating the apple was not a crime but an act of reason's liberation from nature (AA 8: 110–11); that Adam and Eve first put on figleaves not out of shame but to excite one another's sexual desires (AA 8: 111–12); and that Cain's murder of Abel was not so much the beginning of fratricide or blood-guilt as a wholly justified act, necessary for the establishment of the newer agricultural economy over against the older pastoral way of life, and for the assertion of the right of property which led to the founding of civil society and to the development of all humanity's higher capacities (AA 8: 119).

The *Conjectural Beginning* also continues Kant's reply to Herder's criticism of his own philosophy of history and its ethical foundations. He presents a historical defense of reason, even of the inevitable moral corruption it brings upon us. He attempts to justify his more pessimistic conception of human nature, and he concludes the essay with a pointed argument that his account of human history satisfies the demands of philosophical theodicy, by showing that the ills we suffer are our own

fault, and that nature (or providence) nevertheless uses human misdeeds to further the development of human nature's rational powers. Such a view of providence, he concludes, is the one best suited to encourage us to contribute what we can to the further development of these human capacities as well as to human culture and to our own moral improvement.

Conjectural beginning of human history

8: 107

In the *progression* of a history it is indeed allowed to *insert* conjectures in order to fill up gaps in the records, because what precedes as a remote cause and what follows as an effect can provide a quite secure guidance for the discovery of the intermediate causes, so as to make the transition comprehensible. Yet to let a history *arise* simply and solely from conjectures does not seem much better than to make the draft for a novel. Indeed, it would not be able to support the name of a "conjectural history," but rather that of a mere *fiction*.^a – Nevertheless, what must not be ventured in the progression of the history of human actions, may yet be attempted through conjecture about its *first beginning* insofar as *nature* makes it. For that beginning must not be invented by fiction^b but can be taken from experience, if one presupposes that the latter in its first beginning was not better or worse than what we encounter now: a presupposition that conforms to the analogy of nature and does not bring anything venturesome with it. A history of the first development of freedom from its original predisposition in the nature of the human being is therefore something wholly other than the history of freedom in its progression, which can be grounded only on records.

Nevertheless, since conjectures must not make too high claims on assent, but must always announce themselves as at most only a movement of the power of imagination, accompanying reason and indulged in for the recreation and health of the mind, but not for a serious business, they also cannot compare themselves with that kind of history which is proposed and believed as an actual record about the same occurrence, whose test rests on grounds entirely different from mere philosophy of nature. Just for this reason, and since here I am venturing on a mere pleasure trip, I hope I may ask the favor to be allowed me to make use of a holy document as my map, and at the same time to imagine that my flight, which I make on the wings of the power of imagination, though not without a guiding thread attached by reason onto experience,

^a *Erdichtung*.

^b *erdichtet*.

might follow the same trajectory which that document contains in a historically^a prescribed manner. The reader will open the pages of that document (*Genesis*, chapter 2 through chapter 6) and will check step by step whether the path that philosophy takes in accordance with concepts will accord with that which the story^b provides.

Unless one is to enthuse^c in conjectures, the beginning must be made from that which is capable of no derivation by human reason from previous natural causes: thus with the *existence of the human being*, and indeed in his *fully formed state* because he must do without maternal assistance; in a *couple*, so that he can propagate his kind; and as only in *one single couple*, so that war will not arise right away, when human beings would be so near and yet so alien to one another, and also so that nature should not be blamed for depriving them, by the difference of ancestry, of the most suitable arrangement for sociability as the greatest end of the human vocation; for the unity of that family from which all human beings were to descend was without doubt the best contrivance for this. I set this couple in a place secured against the attack of predators and richly provisioned by nature with all means of nourishment, thus in a *garden*, as it were, in a zone that is always temperate.¹ And what is still more, I consider this couple only after it has already taken a mighty step in the skill of making use of its powers; thus I do not begin with the completely crude state of its nature;^d for if I undertook to fill up that gap, which presumably comprises a long duration, the conjectures would become too many for the reader, but their probabilities too few. The first human being could, therefore, *stand and walk*; he could *speak* (*Genesis* 2: 20²),* even *discourse*, i.e. speak according to connected words and concepts,^e hence *think*. These are all skills which he had to acquire for himself (for if they were innate, then they would also be inherited, which, however, experience contradicts); but I assume him now already provisioned with

8: 111

* The *drive to communicate* must have been what first moved him, even when he was still alone, to make his existence known toward living beings outside him, especially to those that utter a sound, which he could imitate and afterward use as a name. One sees a similar effect of this drive also in children and thoughtless people who disturb the thinking part of the commonwealth with humming, shouting, whistling, singing, and other noisy entertainments (often also by the like religious devotions). For I see no other motive for this than that they want to make their existence known far and wide.

8: 111

^a *historisch*; this word and its cognates will be footnoted to mark the distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte*.

^b *Geschichte*, which can be translated either as “history” or as “story,” will be translated both ways below, as seems best. But it should be kept in mind that it is sometimes doubtful (perhaps intentionally so) which meaning Kant has in mind.

^c *schwärmern*.

^d *von der gänzlichen Robigkeit seiner Natur*.

^e words and concepts: *Begriffen*.

them, merely in order to consider the development of what is moral in his doing and refraining, which necessarily presupposes that skill.

Instinct, that *voice of God* which all animals obey, must alone have guided the novice.³ It allowed him a few things for nourishment, but forbade him others (*Genesis* 3: 2–3).⁴ – But for this it is not necessary to assume a special, now lost instinct; it could have been merely the sense of smell and its affinity with the organ of taste, but also the latter’s familiar sympathy with the instruments of digestion, and also the faculty of pre-sensation, as it were, of the suitability or unsuitability of a food for gratification, such as one still perceives even now. One must not even assume this sense to have been more acute in the first couple than it is now; for it is familiar enough what a great difference is to be encountered between the power of perception in those human beings occupied only with their senses and those occupied at the same time with their thoughts, whereby they are turned away from their sensations.

As long as the inexperienced human being obeyed this call of nature, he did well for himself.⁵ Yet *reason* soon began to stir and sought through comparison of that which gratified with that which was represented to him by another sense than the one to which instinct was bound, such as the sense of sight, as similar to what previously was gratifying, to extend his knowledge of the means of nourishment beyond the limits of instinct (*Genesis* 3: 6).⁶ This attempt^a might have happened to turn out well enough, although instinct did not recommend it, if only it did not contradict it. Yet it is a property of reason that with the assistance of the power of the imagination it can concoct^b desires not only *without* a natural drive directed to them but even *contrary to* it, which desires in the beginning receive the name of *concupiscence*; but through them are hatched bit by bit, under the term *voluptuousness*, a whole swarm of dispensable inclinations, which are even contrary to nature. The occasion for deserting the natural drive might have been only something trivial; yet the success of the first attempt, namely of becoming conscious of one’s reason as a faculty that can extend itself beyond the limits within which all animals are held, was very important and decisive for his way of living. Thus if it had been only a fruit whose outward look, by its similarity with other pleasant fruits that one had otherwise tasted, invited him to the attempt; if to this perhaps was added the example of an animal whose nature was suited to such a gratification as was, on the contrary, disadvantageous to the human being; hence if there was a natural instinct consequently opposing it, then this could already give reason the first occasion to cavil with the voice of nature (*Genesis* 3: 1)⁷ and, despite its opposition,

8: 112

^a *Versuch*, which could also be translated “experiment”; the related term *Versuchung* means “temptation.”

^b *erkünsteln*.

to make the first attempt at a free choice, which, as the first one, probably did not turn out in conformity to expectation. Now the harm might have been as insignificant as you like, yet about this it opened the human being's eyes (*Genesis 3: 7*).⁸ He discovered in himself a faculty of choosing for himself a way of living and not being bound to a single one, as other animals are. Yet upon the momentary delight that this marked superiority might have awakened in him, anxiety and fright must have followed right away, concerning how he, who still did not know the hidden properties and remote effects of any thing, should deal with this newly discovered faculty. He stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss; for instead of the single objects of his desire to which instinct had up to now directed him, there opened up an infinity of them, and he did not know how to relate to the choice between them; and from this estate of freedom, once he had tasted it, it was nevertheless wholly impossible for him to turn back again to that of servitude (under the dominion of instinct).

Next to the instinct of nourishment, through which nature preserves every individual, the most preeminent is the *sexual instinct*, through which it cares for the preservation of the kind. Once reason had been stirred, it did not omit to demonstrate its influence on the latter too. The human being soon found that the stimulus to sex, which with animals rests merely on a transient, for the most part periodic impulse, was capable for him of being prolonged and even increased through the power of the imagination, whose concern, to be sure, is more with moderation, yet at the same time works more enduringly and uniformly the more its object is *withdrawn from the senses*, and he found that it prevents the boredom that comes along with the satisfaction of a merely animal desire. The figleaf (*Genesis 3: 7*)⁹ was thus the product of a far greater manifestation of reason than that which it had demonstrated in the first stage of its development. For to make an inclination more inward and enduring by withdrawing its object from the senses, shows already the consciousness of some dominion of reason over impulse and not merely, as in the first step, a faculty for doing service to those impulses within a lesser or greater extension. *Refusal* was the first artifice for leading from the merely sensed stimulus over to ideal ones, from merely animal desire gradually over to love, and with the latter from the feeling of the merely agreeable over to the taste for beauty, in the beginning only in human beings but then, however, also in nature. Moreover, *propriety*,^a an inclination by good conduct^b to influence others to respect for us (through the concealment of that which could incite low esteem), as the genuine foundation of all true sociability, gave the first hint toward the formation^c of the human

8: 113

being as a moral^a creature. – A small beginning, which, however, is epoch-making, in that it gives an entirely new direction to the mode of thought – and is more important than the entire immeasurable series of extensions of culture that followed upon it.

The third step of reason, after it had mixed itself into the first immediately sensed needs, was the deliberate *expectation of the future*. This faculty of not enjoying merely the present moment of life but of making present to oneself the coming, often very distant time, is the most decisive mark of the human advantage of preparing himself to pursue distant ends in accordance with his vocation,^b – but also simultaneously it is the most inexhaustible source of cares and worries which the uncertain future incites and from which all animals are exempt (*Genesis 3: 13–19*).¹⁰ The man, who had to nourish himself and his spouse, together with their future children, foresaw the ever-growing troubles of his labor; the woman foresaw the hardships to which nature had subjected her sex, and additionally still those which the more powerful man would lay upon her. Both foresaw with fear that which, after a troubled life, lying in the background of the painting, befalls unavoidably all animals, to be sure, yet without worrying them – namely, death, and they seemed to reproach themselves and make into a crime the use of reason that causes them all these ills. To live on in their posterity, who might perhaps have it better, or also might alleviate their hardships as members of a family, this was perhaps the single consoling prospect that sustained them (*Genesis 3: 16–20*).¹¹

8: 114

The fourth and last step that reason took in elevating the human being entirely above the society with animals was that he comprehended (however obscurely) that he was the genuine *end of nature*, and that in this nothing that lives on earth can supply a competitor to him. The first time he said to the sheep: *Nature has given you the skin you wear not for you but for me*, then took it off the sheep and put it on himself (*Genesis 3: 21*),¹² he became aware of a prerogative that he had by his nature over all animals, which he now no longer regarded as his fellow creatures, but rather as means and instruments given over to his will for the attainment of his discretionary aims. This representation includes (however obscurely) the thought of the opposite: that he must not say something like this to any *human being*, but has to regard him as an equal participant in the gifts of nature – a preparation from afar for the restrictions that reason was to lay on the will in the future in regard to his fellow human beings, and which far more than inclination and love is necessary to the establishment of society.

^a *Sittsamkeit*.^b *guten Anstand*.^c *Ausbildung*.^a *sittlichen*.^b *Bestimmung*.

And thus the human being had entered into an *equality with all rational beings*, of whatever rank they might be (*Genesis 3: 22*);¹³ namely, in regard to the claim of *being himself an end*, of also being esteemed as such by everyone else, and of being used by no one merely as a means to other ends. In this, and not in reason considered merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of various inclinations, there lies the ground of that so unlimited equality of the human being even with higher beings, however superior beyond all comparison they might be to him in natural gifts, none of whom has therefore a right to deal and dispose with him merely at their discretion. This step is combined, therefore, at the same time with the *release* of the human being from the mother's womb of nature, an alteration that does him honor, to be sure, but at the same time is very perilous, since it drives him out of the harmless and safe condition of infant care, out of a garden, as it were, which cared for him without any effort on his part (*Genesis 3: 23*),¹⁴ and thrust him into the wide world, where so much worry, toil, and unknown ills are waiting for him. In the future the troubles of his life will often elicit from him the wish for a paradise, the creature of his power of imagination, where he could dream or fritter away his existence in tranquil inactivity and constant peace. But between him and that imagined seat of bliss is interposed restless reason, which drives him irresistibly toward the development of the capacities placed in him and does not allow him to return to the condition of crudity and simplicity out of which it had pulled him (*Genesis 3: 24*).¹⁵ It drives him on nevertheless to take upon himself patiently the toil that he hates, and run after the bauble that he despises, and even to forget death itself which he dreads, on account of all those trivialities he is even more afraid to lose.

8: 115

REMARK

The result of this presentation of the first history of human beings is that the departure of the human being from the paradise which reason represents to him as the first abode of his species was nothing other than the transition from the crudity of a merely animal creature into humanity, from the go-cart^a of instinct to the guidance of reason – in a word, from the guardianship^b of nature into the condition of freedom. Whether the human being has gained or lost through this alteration can

^a *Gängelwagen*: a two-wheeled cart that was used in the eighteenth century to teach a child to walk by giving it support, the way training wheels are used on a bicycle.

^b *Unmündigkeit*, which Kant defines as “the incapacity to make use of one’s understanding without the guidance of another”; he defines “enlightenment” (*Aufklärung*) as “emergence from self-incurred guardianship,” and considers guardianship “self-incurred” when it is due not to a lack of understanding but to a lack of courage and resoluteness in thinking for oneself (AA 4: 35).

no longer be the question, if one looks to the vocation of his species, which consists in nothing but a *progressing* toward perfection, however faulty the first attempts to penetrate toward this goal – the earliest in a long series of members following one after another – might turn out to be. – Nevertheless, this course, which for the species is a *progress* from worse toward better, is not the same for the individual. Before reason awoke, there was neither command nor prohibition and hence no transgression; but when reason began its business and, weak as it is, got into a scuffle with animality in its whole strength, then there had to arise ills and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were entirely alien to the condition of ignorance and hence of innocence. The first step out of this condition, therefore was on the moral side a *fall*; on the physical side, a multitude of ills of life hitherto unknown were the consequence of this fall, hence punishment. The history of *nature* thus begins from good, for that is the *work of God*; the history of *freedom* from evil, for it is the *work of the human being*.¹⁶ For the individual, who in the use of his freedom looks merely at himself, there was a loss in such an alteration; for nature, which directs its ends with the human being to the species, it was a gain. The individual therefore has cause to ascribe all ills he suffers, and all the evil he perpetrates, to his own guilt, yet at the same time as a member of the whole (of a species), also to admire and to praise the wisdom and purposiveness of the arrangement. – In this manner one can also bring into agreement with themselves and with reason the assertions of the famous *J.-J. Rousseau*, which are often misinterpreted and to all appearance conflict with one another. In his writing *on the influence of the sciences and on the inequality of human beings*,¹⁷ he shows quite correctly the unavoidable conflict of culture with the nature of the human species as a *physical* species in which each individual was entirely to reach his vocation; but in his *Emile*, his *Social Contract*¹⁸ and other writings, he seeks again to solve the harder problem of how culture must proceed in order properly to develop the predispositions of humanity as a *moral* species to their vocation, so that the latter no longer conflict with humanity as a natural species. From this conflict (since culture, according to true principles of *education*^a of human being and citizen, has perhaps not yet rightly begun, much less having been completed) arise all true ills that oppress human life, and all vices that dishonor it;* nevertheless, the incitements to the latter, which one blames for

8: 116

8: 117

* In order to provide only a few examples of this conflict between the striving of humanity toward its moral vocation, on the one side, and the unalterable following of the laws placed in its nature for the crude and animal condition, on the other side, I offer the following: The epoch of majority, i.e. of the drive as well as the (continued on page 170)

^a *Erziehung*.

8: 117

(continued from page 169) faculty of generating one's kind, nature has fixed at the age of about sixteen or seventeen years – an age in which the youth in the crude natural condition literally becomes a man; for he then has the faculty of preserving himself, generating his kind and of preserving it along with his woman. The simplicity of their needs makes this easy for him. In the cultivated condition, on the contrary, there belong to the latter many means of acquisition, including skill and favorable external circumstances, so that at least in civil terms this epoch is postponed further at least on the average about ten years. Nature has nevertheless not altered the age of maturity at the same time as the progress of social refinement, but stubbornly follows the law it has set for the preservation of the human species as an animal species. Now from this arises an unavoidable injury to nature's end through morals, and to the latter through the former. For the natural human being is in a certain age already a man, when the civil human being (who, after all, has not ceased to be a natural human being) is only a youth, indeed, is probably only a child; for so one can call him who on account of his years (in the civil state) cannot even preserve himself, much less his kind, even though for his own part he may have the drive and the faculty of generating it, hence has the call of nature as his will. For nature has certainly not placed instincts and faculties in living creatures so that they might struggle with and suppress them. Thus its predisposition was not at all cut out for the moral condition, but merely for the preservation of the human species as an animal species; and the civilized condition therefore comes into an unavoidable conflict with the latter, which conflict only a perfect civil constitution (the uttermost goal of culture) could remove, while the space in between is usually taken up with vices and their consequence, the manifold of human misery.

Another example to prove the truth of the proposition that nature has grounded two predispositions in us for two different ends, namely humanity as an animal species and humanity as moral species is the saying of Hippocrates *ars longa, vita brevis* [art is long, life is short]. Sciences and arts could be brought much farther through one mind which is made for it, once this mind has attained the right maturity of judgment through long practice and acquired cognition, than entire generations of scholars could achieve this successively, if only this mind with its youthful power lived for the time allotted to these generations all together. Now nature obviously has taken its decision about the life span of the human being from a viewpoint other than that of the furthering of the sciences. For if the most fortunate mind stands at the brink of the great discoveries he might hope for from his skill and experience, his age steps in; he becomes dull and must leave it to a second generation (which begins again from ABC and has to traverse again the whole stretch that had already been gone through) to add the next span to the progress of culture. The course of the human species for the attainment of its complete vocation therefore seems to be ceaselessly interrupted and in continual danger of falling back into its old crudity; and so the Greek philosopher complains, not entirely without reason, that *it is a pity that one must die just when one has begun to have insight into how one really ought to have lived.*

8: 118

A third example might be the *inequality* among human beings, and indeed not that of natural gifts or goods of fortune but of their universal *human right* – an inequality about which Rousseau complains with much truth, but which is not to be separated from culture so long as it proceeds, as it were, planlessly (which is likewise unavoidable for a long time), and to which nature had certainly not destined the human being, since it gave him freedom and reason to restrict this freedom through nothing but reason's own universal, more precisely external lawfulness, which is called *civil right*. The human being was to labor himself out of the crudity of his natural predispositions by himself, and yet was to take care not to offend against them even as he elevates himself above them – a skill that he can expect to acquire only late and after many misbegotten attempts, while in between humanity sighs under the ills that it inflicts on itself from its lack of experience.

them, are in themselves good and purposive as natural predispositions, but these predispositions, since they were aimed at the merely natural condition, suffer injury from progressing culture and injure culture in turn, until perfect art again becomes nature, which is the ultimate goal of the moral vocation of the human species.

8: 118

CLOSE OF THE STORY

The beginning of the following period was that the human being passed over from the period of comfort and peace into that of *labor* and *discord*, as the prelude to the unification in society. Here we must once again make a great leap and transfer him at once into the possession of domesticated animals and crops, which he himself was able to multiply for his nourishment through sowing or planting (*Genesis 4: 2*),¹⁹ although the transition from the savage life of hunters to the first, and from the unsettled digging of roots or gathering of fruit to the second, might have taken place slowly enough. Here there had to begin already the strife between human beings who up to then had been living peacefully near one another, whose consequence was the separation of those of different ways of living and their dispersion across the earth. The *pastoral life* is not only comfortable but also, since there can be no lack of fodder in land that is uninhabited far and wide, it provides the most secure support. *Agriculture*, or planting, on the contrary, is very troublesome, dependent on the inconstancy of the weather, and hence insecure, requires also abiding dwelling, property in land and sufficient force^a to defend it; the shepherd, however, hates this property, since it limits the freedom of his pastures. As to the former, the farmer could seem to envy the herdsman as more favored by heaven (*Genesis 4: 4*);²⁰ in fact, however, the latter became very burdensome to him as long as he remained in the neighborhood; for the grazing stock did not spare his plantings. Now since after he has done harm to them it is an easy matter to get far away with his herd and evade all compensation for that harm, leaving nothing behind that he could not find just as well anywhere else, it was probably the farmer who used violence against such incursions²¹ which the other did not take to be impermissible, and (since the occasion for it could never entirely cease), if he did not want to forfeit the fruits of his long industry, he finally had to *distance* himself as far as it was possible for him from those who carry on the pastoral life (*Genesis 4: 16*).²² This separation makes the third epoch.

8: 119

When sustenance depends on the cultivation and planting of a soil (chiefly with trees), it requires abiding dwellings; and their defense against all violations requires a number of human beings assisting one

^a *Gewalt.*

another. Hence with this way of living human beings could no longer live as scattered families, but had to hold together and erect villages (improperly called *towns*), in order to protect their property against savage hunters or hordes of roaming herdsmen. The first needs of life, whose acquisition required a *different way of living* (*Genesis 4: 20*),²³ could now be *exchanged* for one another. From this culture had to arise and the beginning of art, both as a pastime and as industry (*Genesis 4: 21–2*);²⁴ but most importantly there had to arise also some arrangement for a civil constitution and public justice, first surely only in regard to great violent acts, the avenging of which was now left no longer to individuals, as in the savage condition, but to a lawful might that held the whole together, i.e. to a kind of government, which was not itself subject to the exercise of power (*Genesis 4: 23–4*).²⁵ – Bit by bit, from this first and crude inception, all human art, among which that of *sociability and civil security* is the most beneficial, could gradually develop, humankind multiply, and extend itself everywhere from a central point, like a beehive sending out already formed colonists. With this epoch began also the *inequality* among human beings, this rich source of so much evil, but also of all good, and it increased ever further.

Now as long as the nomadic pastoral peoples, who recognize God alone as their lord, continued to swarm around the town dwellers and farmers who have a human being (supreme ruler) as their lord (*Genesis 6: 4*)*²⁶ and as long as these sworn enemies of all landed property showed hostility toward the latter and were in turn hated by them, there was to be sure continual war between the two, at least unceasing danger of war, and on both sides peoples could therefore at least rejoice internally in the priceless good of freedom – (for the danger of war is also still today the sole thing that moderates despotism, because wealth is required for a state to be a might, but without *freedom*, no enterprise that could produce wealth will take place. In place of this, in a poor people there must be great participation in the preservation of the commonwealth, which in turn is possible only when it feels itself to be free in the latter). – But with time the increasing luxury^a of the town dwellers, but chiefly the art of pleasing, in which the town women eclipsed the dingy maids of the deserts, must have been a mighty lure for those shepherds (*Genesis 6: 2*),²⁷ so that they entered into combination with them and let

* The *bedouins* of Arabia still call themselves children of a former *sheikh*, the founder of their tribe (such as *Beni Haled* and the like). He is in no way the lord over them and cannot exercise power over them whenever it comes into his head. For in a pastoral people, where no one has landed property which he would have to leave behind, every family which does not like it can very easily sever itself from the tribe in order to strengthen another one.

^a *Luxus*.

themselves be drawn into the glittering misery of the towns. Then, through the melting together of two otherwise hostile populations, with the end of all danger of war, came at the same time the end of all freedom, hence the despotism of mighty tyrants, on the one side, yet with culture hardly begun, soulless luxury in most abject slavery mixed with all the vices of the crude condition, on the other side, which irresistibly deflected humankind from the progress of the formation^a of its predisposition to good predelineated by nature;²⁸ and it thereby made itself unworthy of its own existence as a species destined to dominate the earth, not to enjoy like cattle and to serve like slaves (*Genesis 6: 17*).²⁹

CONCLUDING REMARK

The thinking human being feels a sorrow, one which can even become a moral corruption, of which the thoughtless knows nothing: namely, discontent with the providence that governs the course of the world on the whole, when he estimates the ills that so much oppress humankind, and (as it appears) leaves it with no hope for anything better. But it is of the greatest importance to be *content with providence* (even though on this earthly world of ours it has marked out such a troublesome road for us), partly in order to grasp courage even among our toils, and partly so that by placing responsibility for it on fate, we might not lose sight of our own responsibility, which perhaps might be the sole cause of all these ills, and avoid the remedy against them, which consists in self-improvement.

One must admit that the greatest ills that oppress civilized peoples stem from war, yet to be sure less from one that actually is or has been than from the never relenting and even ceaselessly increasing *armament* for future war. To this are applied all forces of the state, all fruits of its culture that could be used for a still greater culture; in so many places freedom is mightily injured and the maternal provision of the state for individual members is transformed into an unrelenting hardness of these demands, a hardness justified to be sure also by the worry over external danger. Yet would there be this culture, would there be the close connection of the estates of the commonwealth for the reciprocal promotion of its welfare, would there be the population, or even the degree of freedom that is left over, although under very restrictive laws, if that war itself which is always feared did not extort this *respect for humanity* from the states' chief leaders? One needs only to look at *China*, which on account of its situation has to fear perhaps only an unforeseen attack, but not a mighty enemy, and in which therefore all trace of freedom has been eradicated. – Thus at the stage of culture where humankind still stands, war is an indispensable means of bringing culture still further; and only

^a *Ausbildung*.

8: 122

after a (God knows when) completed culture, would an everlasting peace be salutary, and thereby alone be possible for us. Thus, as regards this point, we are ourselves responsible for the ills against which we raise such bitter complaints; and the holy document is quite right to represent the melting together of the nations^a into one society and its complete liberation from external danger, when its culture had hardly begun, as a restraint on all further culture and as a sinking into incurable corruption.

The *second discontent* of human beings concerns the order of nature with regard to the *shortness of life*. To be sure, one must understand only partly how to assess the worth of this life if one can still wish it to last longer than it actually does; for that would only be to prolong a play which is a constant grappling with nothing but troubles. But one cannot really blame a childish power of judgment for fearing death without loving life, and its being hard for it to suffer through every day with even minimal contentment, yet for never having enough of these days not to want to repeat this calamity again. But if one considers only how much care torments us even as regards the means for spending such a short life, and how much injustice is done in the hope of a future, but short-lasting enjoyment, then one has to believe on rational grounds that if human beings could look forward to a lifespan of 800 years or more, the father would have to fear for his life from his son, one brother from his brother, or one friend from another; the vices of such a long-living humankind would rise to such a height that they would be worthy of no better fate than that of being eradicated from the earth in a universal flood (*Genesis 6: 12–13*).³⁰

The *third* wish, or rather the empty longing (for one is conscious that one can never get what one wishes) is the shadowy image of the *golden age* so much praised by the poets, where we are supposed to be relieved of all the imagined needs with which luxury burdens us, we are satisfied with the mere needs of nature, a complete equality of human beings, an everlasting peace among them – in a word, the pure enjoyment of a carefree life, dreamt away in laziness or frittered away in childish play: – a longing that makes the Robinsonades and voyages to the south sea islands so charming, but in general prove how much boredom the thinking human being feels with his civilized life, if he seeks its worth solely in *enjoyment* and brings in laziness as a counterweight to reason's reminder that he should give his life its worth through *actions*. The nullity of this wish to return to that time of simplicity and innocence is shown sufficiently when one is taught by the above representation of an original condition that the human being cannot preserve himself in it, because it is not enough for him, and still less is he inclined ever to return to it; so

8: 123

that he must after all ascribe the present condition of troubles to himself and to his own choice.

Thus such a presentation of his history is beneficial and serviceable to the human being for his instruction and improvement by showing him that he must not blame providence for the ills that oppress him; that he is also not justified in ascribing his own misdeeds to an original crime of his ancestral parents, through which a propensity to similar transgressions has supposedly become hereditary in their posterity (for voluntary actions cannot bring with them anything hereditary); but rather that he must recognize with full right what they did as having been done by himself and attribute the responsibility for all ills arising from the misuse of his reason entirely to himself, since he can very well become conscious of the fact that he would have behaved in precisely the same way under the same circumstances and would have begun the first use of reason that way (even against nature's hint). When this point about moral ills is set right, then the physical ills proper can hardly amount to a surplus in our favor in the balance of merit and guilt.

And thus the result of an oldest history of humanity attempted by philosophy is contentment with providence and with the course of things human on the whole – which does not start from good and progress toward evil, but develops gradually from the worse toward the better; and each of us, for his part, is called upon by nature itself to contribute as much as lies in his power to this progress.

^a *Völker.*

Some remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's *Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning hours*

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In 1785 the German-Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86) published his last work to appear during his lifetime, *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Daseyn Gottes* (Morning Hours or Lectures on the Existence of God). As Mendelssohn himself conceded in the Preface, the work was written in virtual ignorance of the recent writings in metaphysics, including the critique of traditional metaphysics by the “all-crushing Kant” (*des alles zermalmendenen Kant*).¹ Mendelssohn's apparently anachronistic attempt at a demonstration of the existence of a personal God by rational means belongs into the specific context of an intellectual dispute that shook the German lands in the 1780s.

In 1783 the writer and philosopher, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819), had stated in a communication to Mendelssohn, which he made public in 1785, that the writer and philosopher, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81), had confessed to Jacobi toward the end of his life to not being able to believe in a personal God any longer and to have become a pantheist or Spinozist.² Jacobi considered Lessing's confession as evidence of the impossibility to safeguard the belief in a personal God by rational means and sought support for his own theistic religious convictions in a leap of faith that defied reason. Confronted with the dilemma of Lessing's alleged pantheistic atheism and Jacobi's professed irrationalist fideism, Mendelssohn retreated in *Morning Hours* to the very position of a rationalist theism that had been rendered obsolete by Kant's principal limitation of valid theoretical cognition to objects of sense and specifically by his systematic refutation of the traditional rationalist arguments for the existence of a personal God.³

In 1786 Ludwig Heinrich Jakob (1759–1827), who taught philosophy at the University of Halle, approached Kant with his plan to publish a critique of Mendelssohn's *Morning Hours* that was to be based on Kant's critical work on metaphysics.⁴ Jakob wanted to make sure that his project did not infringe upon any plan Kant himself might have for responding to Mendelssohn's work. Kant confirmed Jakob in his project and

indicated his willingness to contribute a brief statement to Jakob's work in response to a specific passage in *Morning Hours* that had been pointed out to him by Jakob.⁵ In this passage Mendelssohn had referred to a “linguistic confusion” (*Verwirrung der Sprache*) and to a “boundary” (*Grenze*) not only of “human cognition” but of “all cognition in general” (*aller Erkenntnis überhaupt*).

Kant used the publication of Jakob's book, which appeared in October 1786, as the occasion to address briefly two main methodological and substantial defects of Mendelssohn's resuscitation of rationalist theistic metaphysics. In his statement, which was placed after Jakob's own preface (pp. XLIX–LX) and is dated 4 August 1786, he took issue with Mendelssohn's cavalier reduction of metaphysical controversies to linguistic confusions and with Mendelssohn's collapsing of the distinction between the things as they are in themselves and their appearances under conditions of human sensibility. Kant's statement is remarkable for his strategy of charging Mendelssohn's rationalist theism with providing the very foundations of the pantheistic or atheistic arguments he seeks to refute. Once Mendelssohn has admitted theoretical insight into the supersensory in establishing the existence of a personal God by means of rational argument, he is deprived of all defense against competing claims by the likes of Spinoza, who use rational arguments to deny the very possibility of such a being.

Together with two exactly contemporaneous works, the essay, *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?*,⁶ and the academic oration, *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body*, that is part of the present volume, *Some Remarks on Ludwig Henrich Jakob's Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning Hours* constitutes a trilogy of Kant's timely contributions to the pantheism dispute.

The translation of *Einige Bemerkungen zu Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's Prüfung der Mendelssohn'schen Morgenstunden* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 149–55 and was undertaken by Günter Zöller. The original title of Kant's statement as part of Jakob's book was *Einige Bemerkungen von Herrn Professor Kant* (Some Remarks by Herr Professor Kant). Given the nature of Kant's piece, which contains remarks on Mendelssohn's work and not on Jakob's, the German title chosen by the Academy edition should not be taken to mean that Kant's remarks are “on” Jacob's work but that they are a contribution “to” it.

8: 149

Some remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob's *Examination of Mendelssohn's Morning hours*

8: 151

When one reads the last writing published by Mendelssohn himself and perceives in it the confidence of this experienced^a philosopher in the *demonstrative* method of proof for the most important of all propositions of pure reason, a confidence that is not in the least weakened, then one is tempted to take for unfounded doubtfulness the narrow boundaries which scrupulous critique set for this faculty of cognition and consider refuted by *deed* all objections against the *possibility* of such an undertaking. Now it may indeed seem at least not disadvantageous to a good cause which is also indispensable to human reason that it is, if need be, based on conjectures, which one or the other may take for formal proofs; for in the end one has to arrive at the same proposition, no matter by what way, since reason can never satisfy itself completely without the latter. However, here an important scruple^b regarding the way which one takes comes to the fore. For once one concedes to pure reason in its speculative use the faculty to enlarge itself to insights beyond the boundaries of the sensible, then it is no longer possible to restrict it to this object;^c and not enough that it will then find a wide field opened for all kinds of enthusiasm,^d it will also believe itself capable of deciding through ratiocinations^e even about the possibility of a supreme being (according to the concept which religion employs) – we have examples of this in Spinoza and even in our time – and thus, through pretended dogmatism, to *overthrow* the proposition in question with the same audacity with which one boasted of having been able to *erect* it. By contrast, if, with respect to the supersensible, dogmatism has its wings clipped through strict critique, then the belief in question can be secured by a practically well-founded and theoretically irrefutable presupposition. Therefore a refutation of those pretensions, as well meaning as they might be, is, far

8: 152

from being disadvantageous, rather very serviceable to the matter^a itself, even indispensable.

This refutation has been taken over by the author of the present work, and after he has communicated to me a small sample of it, which testified to his talent of insight as well as popularity, I take pleasure in accompanying this writing with some considerations that pertain to this subject matter.^b

In the Morning Hours the astute *Mendelssohn*, in order to dispense with the laborious business of *deciding* the conflict of pure reason with itself through a complete critique of its faculty, avails himself of two feats^c which indolent judges customarily avail themselves of otherwise, namely, to *settle* the dispute amicably, or to *dismiss* it as not pertaining to any court of law.

The first maxim is to be found on p. 214 of the first edition: *You know how much I am inclined to declare all quarrels of the philosophical schools for mere quarrels over words, or at least to derive them originally from quarrels over words*; and he avails himself of this maxim almost through all polemical articles of this work. I am, however, of a completely opposite opinion and assert that in matters^d over which one has quarreled over a long period of time, especially in philosophy, there has never been at the basis a quarrel of words but always a true quarrel over things.^e For while in every language some words are used in several and different meanings, it cannot take long before those who have initially disunited themselves in their use note the misunderstanding and avail themselves of other words in their place; such that in the end there are just as few homonyms as there are synonyms. Thus Mendelssohn sought to reduce the old dispute over *freedom* and *natural necessity* in determinations of the will (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*, July 1783)^f to a mere dispute over words, since the word “must” is used in two different meanings (partly merely objectively, partly subjectively). But (to speak with *Hume*) this is like wanting to fill the breach of the ocean with a whisk of straw. For a long time already philosophers have abandoned this easily misunderstood expression and brought the disputed question under the formula which the former formula expresses in a more general manner: whether the occurrences in the world (among which also belong our voluntary^f actions) are determined by the series of antecedent efficient causes or not. And this is obviously no longer a dispute over words but an important dispute that is never to be decided by dogmatic metaphysics. Now the subtle

8: 153

^a versuchten.^b Bedenklichkeit.^c Gegenstand.^d Schwärmerei.^e Vernünftelien.^a Sache.^b diese Materie.^c Kunststücke.^d Dingen.^e Sachen.^f willkürliche.

man avails himself of this feat almost everywhere in his Morning Hours where he cannot quite manage the solution of difficulties. But it is to be feared that in artificially fathoming *logomachia*^a everywhere, he himself falls prey to logodelalia,^b beyond which nothing more disadvantageous can happen to philosophy.

The *second maxim* aims at hampering, with the semblance of lawfulness, the investigation of pure reason at a certain stage (which is by far not the highest one), in short, to silence the *questioner*. In the Morning Hours on page 116 it reads: "If I tell you what a thing does or suffers, then do not ask further what it is! If I tell you what concept to make yourself of a thing, then the further question what this thing is in itself has no more intelligibility."^c And so on. Now (as has been shown in the Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science), I do indeed comprehend that we cannot cognize anything else of corporeal nature than space (which is not yet anything existing but merely the condition for places outside each other, hence for mere external relations) and that the thing in space, apart from there being space in it (i.e., that it itself is extended), shows no further effect than movement (alteration of place, hence of mere relations), consequently no other force or passive property^d than moving force^e and movability (alteration of external relations). So let Mendelssohn, or anyone in his place, tell me whether I can believe to have cognized a thing according to what it is, if I know nothing further of it than that it is something that stands in external relations, in which itself there are external relations, that the former can be altered in it and through it altered in others, such that the ground thereof (moving force^f) lies in the relations themselves, in a word, whether, since I know^g nothing but relations^h of something to something else, of which I also can only know external relations, without there being anything internal given or being able to be given – whether there I could say: I have a concept of the thing in itself, and whether the question is not completely justified: what the thing that is the subject in all these relations is in itself. Exactly this can be well shown of the empirical concept of our soul, that it contains mere appearances of the inner sense and not yet the determinate concept of the subject itself; yet this would lead us here too far afield.

8: 154

To be sure, if we were to knowⁱ effects of a thing that could indeed be properties of the thing in itself, then we would not be allowed to ask

^a Greek for "fighting over words."

^b Greek for "trickery with words."

^c hat . . . weiter keinen Verstand.

^d Kraft oder leidende Eigenschaft.

^e bewegende Kraft.

^f bewegende Kraft.

^g kenne.

^h Beziehungen.

ⁱ kennten.

anymore what the thing is outside of these properties; for then it is exactly that which is given through those properties. But now one will demand that I indicate such properties and effective forces,^a so that one could distinguish them and through them the things in themselves from mere appearances. My answer is: this has already been done and been done by yourself.

Consider only how you bring about the concept of God as highest intelligence. You think in it nothing but *true reality*, i.e., something that is not only opposed to negations (as one ordinarily believes) but also and primarily to realities^b in the *appearance* (*realitas Phaenomenon*^c), such as all realities that have to be given to us through senses and are therefore called *realitas apparenſis*^d (although not with an entirely suitable expression). Now diminish all these realities (understanding, will, blessedness, might, etc.) in terms of degree, they will still remain the same in terms of kind^e (quality), and you will have properties of the things in themselves that you can apply to other things outside of God. You cannot think any others, and everything else is only reality in the appearance (property of a thing as object^f of the senses), by which you never think a thing as it is in itself. To be sure, it seems strange that we are only able properly to determine our concepts of things in themselves by first reducing all reality to the concept of God and only afterward are to apply the concept as it holds in that case also to other things as things in themselves. Yet that is merely the means of separating everything sensible and of what pertains to the appearance from what can be considered through the understanding as belonging to things in themselves.^g – Hence even with all cognitions that we might ever have of things^h through experience, the question: what their objects might be as things in themselves? cannot at all be considered meaningless.

Things are now such with the mattersⁱ of metaphysics that the records for the decision of its quarrels are almost ready for a ruling,^j so that only a little patience and impartiality in judgment is needed in order to perhaps witness that finally they can be cleared up.

Königsberg, 4 August 1786

I. Kant

^a wirkende Kräfte.

^b Realitäten.

^c Latin for "reality as phenomenon."

^d Latin for "reality as it appears."

^e Art.

^f Gegenstand.

^g Sachen an sich selbst.

^h Sachen.

ⁱ Sachen.

^j zum Spruche fertig.

On the philosophers' medicine of the body

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The Latin original of *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* was in all likelihood delivered by Kant as a public oration on the occasion of the end of his first term as Rector of the University of Königsberg on 1 October 1786.¹ Kant's learned speech places the relation between mind and body in the disciplinary and institutional context of the relation between medicine and philosophy. For Kant, mind and body influence each other both in health and in sickness. Accordingly, Kant assigns a philosophical function to the physician and a medical function to the philosopher: in treating the body, medicine is also able to relieve mental ills; and in teaching and practising the mastery of the body through the mind, philosophy may also achieve the healing of a sick body.

Kant's speech is remarkable for its concern with the bodily causes of mental illnesses. In passing, Kant addresses the much-discussed demise of the philosopher, Moses Mendelssohn, who had died earlier the same year. Mendelssohn had been involved in an acrimonious literary dispute with the writer and philosopher, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, over the latter's public charge that their common friend, the writer and philosopher, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, had confessed to not believing in a personal God. Rather than siding with those contemporaries who made Jacobi's conduct responsible for Mendelssohn's death, Kant attributes it to malnutrition caused by Mendelssohn's excessive asceticism.

Together with Kant's works, *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* and *From Soemmerring's On the Organ of the Soul*, both of which are contained in the present volume, Kant's rectoral address on the reciprocal interaction of mind and body constitutes a trilogy of smaller works in psychosomatics that supplements the detailed treatment of the parallelism between physical traits and mental as well as moral traits of human beings in Kant's early work, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, and in the corresponding portions of his late work, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, both of which are contained in the present volume.

The translation of *De Medicina Corporis, quae Philosophorum est* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 15: 939–53 and was undertaken by Mary Gregor.² Kant's manuscript, as transcribed in the Academy edition, contains a number of additions that are either inserted between the lines of the text or entered into the margins of the four pages into which the folio-size piece of paper had been folded. The additions are included in the present translation; they are marked as such, and their position in the original manuscript is indicated in each case. The Latin title of the work, *De Medicina Corporis, quae Philosophorum est*, was chosen by Kant in reference to the title that Hieronymus David Gaubius (1705–80), a professor of medicine at the University of Leiden, had used for two academic orations given and published in 1747 and 1763, respectively, both entitled *De Regimine MENTIS quod Medicorum est* (On the Physicians' Treatment of the Mind).³ In adapting Gaubius's title, Kant replaced the physicians' caring for the mind with the philosophers' caring for the body, while extending the claim to be able to cure from the physicians to the philosophers. In formulating the title of his address, Kant had first written "On the . . . Treatment of the Body" (*De Regimine corporis . . .*), then changed it to "On the . . . Cure and Discipline of the Body" (*De Cura et Disciplina corporis . . .*), before settling on "On the . . . Medicine of the Body" (*De Medicina Corporis . . .*).⁴

15: 939 *On the philosophers' medicine of the body*¹

[PAGE I]

We must see to it that we have a sound mind in a sound body.²

In this, the doctors' business is to help the ailing mind by caring for the body; the philosophers', to assist the afflicted body by a mental regimen. In the first place, everyone knows³ how much the mind's energy contributes to promoting or impeding all vital motions, especially in its affects: the Hippocratic *impetum faciens*⁴ belongs to this force of the mind. In fact, the phenomena we are considering here go on continuously and are absolutely essential to life: they are not extraordinary conditions that disturb nature, so to speak. First, the power of imagination is active in sleep, to stimulate the members of the body: when we are awake, going over and over some problem by ourselves, it weakens the body. And everyone knows how we can promote digestion by the emotions stirred in friendly but lively conversation, or by turning away from our meditations during dinner.

Apathy (the serene mind smiles,⁵ scorning black clouds and hoarse thunder) is highly commendable, insofar as it consists in freedom from those mental propensities that are properly called passions, which gnaw and consume the heart or, so to speak, bind the vital force with shackles. But we should distinguish passions from those inward motions of the mind that are called affects, and appraise the affects differently. Although they, too, agitate the body by a certain assault on it, they can be healthful, provided they do not reach the point of enervating it. The affects of joy and indignation, which sometimes pour out in heated words, are healthful. So too is astonishment. A certain alternation of fear and hope, such as people experience in games of chance. Although these games masquerade as friendly leisure activities, designed to while away the time, they still have an obvious air of desire for money about them. They produce a good deal of stimulation that can help the ailing body, primarily because the mind is not fixed on any object but wanders, moving quickly over a great many things which, indeed, are to be reckoned of no account.⁶

A philosopher is one who turns his mind to things for the sake of cultivating reason; and as for the things tasted in that sort of amusement – the lotus, so to speak – he despises all the attractions and desires of the senses. But since we are bound down by the arduous duties of public life, we have to cultivate reason's gardens as people occupied in leisure activity, not as overwhelmed with business. But the body that is burdened with yesterday's vices weighs down the mind along with it, and presses a bit of the divine breath to the earth.⁷ The discipline of the body must, therefore, be considered properly the philosopher's, not because he knows the body's machinery, but because he knows about the body from experience. Eulogizers of that great man Mendelssohn put the blame for his death on one or another of the learned men who got him involved in a dispute with them.⁸ In my judgment, however, no one should be accused of such an atrocious crime. What was at fault was, rather, the very way of life that much-lamented man adopted. For, although coddling ourselves and avoiding annoyances is not very conducive to prolonging our years, an overly severe discipline of the body, prescribed as it were by a harsh and coarse master, as distinguished from the temperance prescribed by a companion friendly to the mind, gradually exhausts its very powers. So it is particularly relevant that someone can become, as it were, intemperate in fasting, because of certain discomforts that generally go along with a full stomach: so much so that the glutton for pondering difficult investigations, being continuously hungry and struggling against his nature's instinct, eventually – with his lamp out of oil, as it were – is constrained to pay his debt to the needs of his frustrated nature. My opinion is that one should eat to satiety at least once a day, and put up with the resulting discomfort until the body's strength has increased.

[Marginal notations on page I of the manuscript from top to bottom:]

(In many diseases of the mind, when imagination turns savage and the patient's head resounds with great, unheard of things, or he is cast into the depths of depression and tormented by empty terrors, the mind has been dethroned, and bleeding the patient is likely to produce better results than reasoning with him. In treating a deranged person, it is better to use large doses of hellebore than to rely on the healing power of sound reason.)

(Since we want to act advisedly toward our end, and since the doctor and the philosopher obviously take different views of the nature of things and act accordingly, I think it is most important that neither of them crosses over the limits of his competence: seized with a certain meddlesomeness, the philosopher would seem to wish to play the doctor, and the doctor the philosopher. There is no doubt as to what constitutes their respective limits: the doctor is qualified to treat the disordered mind by measures applied to the body; the philosopher, to treat the body through the influence of the mind.)

15: 941

15: 942

15: 943

[PAGE II]

The question is whether the art of medicine should be practised on the human being in the same way as the art we call veterinary medicine is practiced on domestic cattle or whether it should take into account the force of the human mind.⁹ Those who pursue purely mechanical medicine, such as doctors trained in the school of Hoffmann,¹⁰ maintain that it should be practised in the same way, in so far, to be sure, as the similar constitution of the body in either kind of living being allows. The followers of Stahl,¹¹ who decide in favor of treating the human being differently, proclaim the remarkable force of the mind in curing diseases or bringing them to a head. It is for the philosopher to turn his mind to the latter.

15: 944

For there is in cattle, as well as in the human being, that remarkable faculty we call imagination, the principle of perception and motion by which things that are absent can really exist in the mind as though they were present, as can things that never have been and perhaps never can be. But in cattle, this force is not directed by any choice or deliberate intention of the animal, but is put into play by stimuli and impulsions implanted by nature itself, apart from any influence of the will. So, although a certain illness oppresses the mind of the animal when it is brought into captivity, still the black anxiety that afflicts miserable humankind escapes the animal, which knows nothing of worry. Hence, in human beings, the idle sport of imagination gives those ineffectual motions of the mind that we call affects, if not greater vehemence, at least longer duration, and they assault the heart profoundly. This is why the hideous movements that we call convulsions, and epilepsy, can spread to other people: imagination gives them a certain contagiousness. This gives rise to a strategy, which does not belong to the doctor as such, of practicing medicine merely through the force of imagination, whether by dispersing it into a variety of impulsions or by diverting it from one subject to another. Hence the confidence invalids put in the doctor adds strength to his remedies for even the most enfeebled.

15: 945

As for the deranged, I think they should be committed to the care of doctors rather than philosophers, since the mind, displaced from its throne, is not sufficiently aware of the rules of a sound mind – for this, the mind has to be in control of itself. Moreover, we find that this disease is often innate and hereditary or, if some other cause happens to bring it on, this cause must be supposed to inhere in the vital organs rather than the inner recesses of the mind.

Are we to think, with the Stahlists, that all remedies work only through the mind's force of perceiving and moving, which pervades the whole body and looks after it? Or are we to think that the efficacy of most remedies is merely mechanical? Let the experts in the art decide. But as

to whether the distinctively human cognitive power is to be valued as a kind of force in which the human being surpasses brute animals, this is a question for the philosopher.

[*Notations in the left margin of page II of the manuscript:*]

[on 15: 944, next to "this force is not . . . influence of the will":] (The affects break through the ganglia (as if they were barred). [The Academy Edition inserts this in the text, after "influence of the will."])

[on 15: 944, next to the second paragraph:] (Perhaps sleep does not depend on weariness of the body, but rather weariness depends on the lack of vital motions (in the sensory organ) in someone who is drowsy. One who frees his mind from all self-consciousness is easily overcome by sleep.)

Games, especially when undertaken for the sake of profit, excite the mind in a number of ways.

Bodily motions prescribed by a doctor who is not a philosopher weaken the invalid's body, unless they are seasoned with some social amusement and affect the body favorably.)

[on 15: 945, next to the beginning of the page:] (There was a dialectician who so brooded over a sophism, in his eagerness to resolve it, that he visibly wasted away and needed lead shoes.)

[on 15: 945, next to the second paragraph:] (It is healthful for the body when, at dinner, the mind is not only free from cares but disposed to merriment and turned away from concentrating on any one subject. What best serves the body is conversation, amiable discussion, especially mirth breaking into hearty laughter. Here the mind exerts most strongly its force in moving the body.)

[in the bottom margin:] (Hutten's letter to Erasmus.)¹²

15: 946

[PAGE III]

The doctor's way of controlling the mind consists only of certain remedies which might relieve the mind by attending to the body; by driving diseases from the mind or warding them off, these remedies could keep its health guarded and in good repair. Sometimes the doctor undertakes to produce an effective, healthful medication that will help the body by working directly on the mind, cheering it up or alleviating worries by suppressing, or even by stimulating, affects. As often as he does this, the doctor plays the philosopher; and this is so far from being censurable that it rather deserves to be extolled with greater praise.

In fact, a regimen of the mind is not the business of doctors but of philosophers or, if you prefer, of doctors not as doctors but insofar as they are to be called philosophers. Nonetheless, the doctor's way of controlling the mind covers a pretty wide field. Dreadful ills encircle humankind. Some dethrone the mind (as happens in the deranged) or drive it into the headlong affects, as in the irascible and the lustful; others take

15: 947

away the use of reason, as in the foolish; still others produce captivating semblances that fly about through the void, which lead those we call fanatics to rave with a certain show of reason, or torment cruelly the mind of those we call melancholics or hypochondriacs. These and many other diseases are, by right, subjected to the doctor's way of controlling the mind. For the source of these ills is to be sought in the body rather than in the mind, and it is bleeding the patient or administering cathartics that helps his mind, not instructing him or reasoning with him.

First in rank is what nourishing and saving nature contributes to bodily health through the mind when a healthy human being is in his normal state, as distinguished from that extraordinary influx when affects break through the barriers by which nature strives to keep the mind from interfering with vital motions.

Looking after the body is not what we call coddling ourselves (always pampering our disposition), avoiding anything hard and troublesome, as the soft and spoiled human being does. It is, rather, like the pledge that nature requires of us that we keep it in good repair and sound to its end, i.e., that we keep ourselves equal to whatever we have to do in life, whether by bearing up under difficulties or by enduring labors.

The philosophers' regimen of the body – that is to say, the regimen whose laws philosophers prescribe for everyone, even the most ordinary people – is the same regimen whose laws any philosopher, as an educated director of his own life, has to obey insofar as he is a philosopher, i.e., one who spends his life intent on searching into things. So the law can be given by which the doctor is to govern his life insofar as he practises medicine, that is, insofar as, by compassion, he keeps the mind free from disturbances.

[Notations in the right margin of page III of the manuscript, from top to bottom:]

(First, the mind free from cares is not so fixed to the ground that it feeds on the same fodder as suits animals that are bent down and obedient to their stomachs. It needs diverse and changing thoughts, and want of them gnaws the heart and consumes the vital forces of the body itself. If the mind should suffer from this defect, which would have been corrected by beneficial nature, left undisturbed in its business, the mind inclines more heavily to this sickness and augments its ills. Hence the mind needs to be gladdened by delightful things or distracted from its toils.

As to what sleep is, I am no better informed than the most ignorant; and if anyone thinks he understands this device that nature designs for restoring the vital forces, I sing to him boldly with the poet: what I do not know, others only put on a show of knowing.¹³ The mind empty of thoughts plunges us into sleep, and into dreams that serve as guards to sustain us.

15: 948

The doctor's service concerns the body directly and never the mind, unless the mind is affected through taking care of the body. If the doctor tries to cure the body through the mind's energy, he plays the philosopher. Against these things, help is furnished to the body through the mind [*the note breaks off.*])

[PAGE IV]

15: 949

It is not only when the mind is free from care and serene that it aids the vital functions of the body, but also when it is stirred up, at dinner, by the sport and jests of conversation – when, to enliven the gathering, the guests enter into a contest, and the enthusiasm and exertion of the conversationalists rises to the limits of an affect. To what extent this happens is experienced every day by those who feast together: they can eat liberally and consume with impunity twice the amount of food they could safely eat if they were alone. In such a situation, the remarkable force of the impulsions of the human mind manifests itself in increasing the strength of the body, as long as it remains within the limits of the mind that is in control of itself. But as soon as the force goes beyond these limits and, to that extent, crosses the barriers set by sound reason, it is incredible how violent the impulse is that assaults and shakes the vital principle. Perhaps, as a certain English doctor holds, it breaks through in an affective disturbance, those barriers, called the ganglia of the nerves, that restrain motions of the will from having effects on the vital organs.¹⁴ The philosopher should therefore consider whether it is possible for him to write the laws of dining socially for those whose way of life commits them to concern for the mind rather than the body in whatever they undertake. He should consider not only what sort of pastime refreshes the mind, but also how conversation can put into play healthful impulses that move us repeatedly and agreeably, especially on an occasion for nourishing the body.¹⁵ It is true that the sort of intemperance that indulges the body alone is most to be avoided, and, as Horace in particular says: the body burdened with yesterday's vices . . .¹⁶ But wisdom does not require us to cheat ourselves, in step-motherly fashion, and waste away by frugality. So the eminent philosopher Mendelssohn was forced to observe strict temperance because of the many bodily infirmities from which he suffered. But, as we have heard, in trying to keep his mind in good shape for his studies, he went beyond temperance to such abstemiousness that he kept himself always hungry, so as to avoid the slight and usually transitory discomforts of the stomach that follow a proper meal. By this, however, he so weakened the forces of his body that the sort of every-day injury that would hardly affect someone properly nourished shattered and killed that much-lamented man, exhausted by excessive temperance.

15: 950

15: 951

The vicissitude of human affairs overturns whatever the daring race of Iapetus¹⁷ undertakes and spins it about in a restless whirlwind, allowing nothing human beings accomplish to stand on a firm basis. So it is that neither in empires nor in peoples, nor in customs and the arts, whether the liberal or useful arts, is there any fixed place or character. Rather, everything revolves in an eternal vortex and is driven around in a circle (so that it will not settle down into an inert heap).

[Marginal notations on page IV of the manuscript; G indicates German, L Latin:]

[in the top margin; L:] (Everything whatsoever drags and is dragged around by the same things in turn. The only stayer and conserver is the author of a system, not a part.)

[in the left margin:]

15: 952 [on 15: 950 next to "It is true . . ." to the end of 15: 950; L:] (Motions impressed on the body by the mind affect it profoundly, for better or worse, in the vital principle. Those who dine alone do not profit from this digression.)

[on 15: 950 next to top of the page; G:] (Motions without mental delight are harmful. Scorning the allurements of life is the way to preserve life. This is not the apathy of indifference but the apathy of composure, of the mind that is earnest where duty is concerned, but unmoved by pleasure.)

[on 15: 951 next to the second paragraph; G:] (The question arises: whether it is not the case that the somewhat disturbing or frightful dreams that come when we sleep after a surfeit are useful.)

[on 15: 949 next to the top of the page; L:] (First question: whether the influence of the mind is also required for vital motions.

Whether it is not only as sensitive that the soul influences the body, but also as rational, through choice.)

[on 15: 949 next to from "To what extent . . ." to 15: 950 ". . . whatever they undertake."; G:] (First, attention directed to oneself, especially to one's body, is harmful to the body, supports illnesses, especially cramps. Attention directed to the mind weakens the body. The diary of one given to self-observation.¹⁸ Hence the utility of not fixing one's attention, eventually sleep, which is a dispersion through dreams, hence motion without formed self-consciousness. Conversation is internal motion with continual distractions. Reproaching oneself inwardly is very prejudicial to the body. Affects that pass away without any aftermath are helpful, longings are harmful.)

15: 953 [next to end of 15: 950 to the end of 15: 951; G:] (What the state of the arts and sciences was in Egypt, Persia, and India does not concern us. We have them from the Greeks. The Greeks had religion without theology, legislation without jurisprudence, and doctors without medical science. It was all a matter of practice, stemming from tradition and improved by experience. The sciences were limited to philosophy and mathematics,

which had not yet been connected. They were regarded as only exercises for the mind, and had no influence on those civil arrangements. The Christian religion has the merit of being compatible with the philosophy and all the wisdom of the ancients. Now theology arose, and with it philosophy, applied to law and medicine. But these three were the main sciences because they were essential to the well-being of the state.)

(The sciences, like men, are subject to a specific course of development. After a long period during which, like savages, they establish themselves apart from one another, they come together into a society, first a small and then a larger one, until they finally form a system, within which each supports the other, while the boundaries of each are precisely determined and no part mixes with another. In this respect they are like states, which will finally be united, not in a universal kingdom, but in a great federation. Within this federation, each succeeds in becoming productive and well-ordered within, and each is a center which the others are concerned to preserve, and no state can grow at the expense of another. Now dialectic, now theology, now morals, now legislation swallowed everything.)

On the use of teleological principles in philosophy

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

After *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (1775; 2nd edn 1777) and *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785), both of which are contained in the present volume, Kant published his third and final essay on the natural history of the human species, entitled *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie*, in January and February of 1788 in the *Teutscher Merkur* (German Mercury), issues nos. 1 and 2 (1st quartal, pp. 36–52 and pp. 107–36).¹ The immediate occasion was the publication of an essay in the same journal in two installments in the fall of the previous year (October 1786, pp. 57–86 and November 1786, pp. 150–66), entitled *Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen. An Herrn Dr. Biester* (Something Further on the Human Races. To Dr. Biester²). The author of the critical essay was Georg Forster (1754–94), who had accompanied his father, Johann Reinhold Forster, on Captain James Cook's second voyage around the world in 1772–5, later assumed a professorship in natural history in Vilnius, Lithuania (at the time part of the Russian Empire) and who had moved to Mainz, Germany, in late 1788, where he was to turn into a fervent supporter of the French revolution.³ Forster's essay contained objections to Kant's concept of a human race, along with a mention of and two passing references to Kant's slightly earlier essay, *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), which had also appeared in the *Teutscher Merkur* and which is also contained in the present volume.

In addition to providing his response to Forster, the essay *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* also served Kant to express publicly his appreciation of the work of another critic of his, Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758–1823), who had approached Kant in October 1787 to identify himself as the author of the anonymously published *Briefe über die kantische Philosophie* (Letters on the Kantian Philosophy) that had been appearing in the *Teutscher Merkur* beginning in August 1786.⁴ Reinhold, who had assumed a professorship in philosophy at the University of Jena in the summer of 1787 that had been offered to him in part on the basis of his pioneering work in expositing and explaining Kant's critical

philosophy, had asked Kant for a public statement endorsing his reading of Kant and for a brief clarification about an apparent contradiction that he and others had discovered between two passages in works by Kant.⁵ Kant agreed to Reinhold's request and sent him his essay for publication in the very journal that had launched the wider recognition of the critical philosophy.

Virtually the entire essay, *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*, is devoted to Kant's reply to Forster. Forster had objected to the precedence of theory over observation in Kant and to the exclusive focus on skin color as the criterion of racial differentiation among the human species. Against Kant, he had maintained the exclusive influence of climate on skin coloration, leaving out entirely the role of predisposition ("germs") in defining the possible range of skin coloration. Accordingly, Forster had disputed the applicability of Kant's definition of a race to actually existing human populations. Most importantly, unlike Kant, who had insisted on the unity of the species in terms of its natural history (a position now referred to as "monogeneticism"), Forster maintained that human beings, while belonging to one and the same species, did not have the same origin ("polygeneticism") and insisted in particular on the special status of the Negro.

Kant's reply, which is conciliatory in tone, addresses each of the methodological and substantial points of Forster's attack, clearing up linguistic and conceptual misunderstandings on Forster's part and restating his definition of a human race and his theory about the interaction of generic predispositions (to call them "genetic" would be an anachronism) and specific climatic conditions in the gradual differentiation of the human species. The conceptual innovation in Kant's third essay on the natural history of the human species is the explicit recourse to considerations of purposiveness in natural science. While stressing the inscrutability of the basic powers underlying nature, Kant defends the need as well as the justification for introducing and applying a heuristic principle of purposiveness in the investigation of nature in general and in that of living beings in particular.

The use of the plural, "teleological principles," in the title of Kant's essay refers to different areas in which recourse to the principle of purposiveness is indicated. More specifically, Kant distinguishes between natural teleology (natural science), teleology of freedom ("morals") and the teleology of nature in light of the final purpose of freedom ("transcendental philosophy"). The latter perspective foreshadows Kant's exhaustive exploration of the forms of purposiveness in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), in particular in its second part, the "Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment."⁶ A different direction was given to Kant's teleological account of the natural history of the human species in a work by the physician and writer, Christoph Girtanner (1760–1810),

entitled *Ueber das Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte* (On the Kantian Principle for Natural History), in which the author expanded Kant's developmental perspective to the animal and plant kingdom.

In addition to a brief indirect reference to the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* at the beginning of the essay,⁷ the discussion of Reinhold is limited to a short paragraph toward the end of the essay, in which Kant expresses his gratitude and admiration for Reinhold's lucid and perceptive presentation of the critical philosophy in a popular vein.

The translation of *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 157–84 and was undertaken by Günter Zöller. Special care has been taken in rendering Kant's highly differentiated terminology for the differentiation of biological species. Each such term is accompanied by a linguistic footnote placed at its first occurrence in Kant's text and is also listed in the glossary.

On the use of teleological principles in philosophy

8: 158

If one understands by *nature* the sum-total of all that exists as determined by laws, taking together the world (as nature properly so called) and its supreme cause, then the investigation of nature (which in the first case is called physics, in the second metaphysics) can pursue two paths: either the merely *theoretical* path or the *teleological* path, and with respect to the latter either as *physics*, using only such ends for its intention that can be known to us through experience, or as *metaphysics* using for its intention, in accordance with its calling,^a only an end that is fixed through pure reason. Elsewhere I have shown that in metaphysics reason on the theoretical path of nature^b (with respect to the cognition of God) is not able to achieve its *entire* intention as wished, and that therefore only the teleological path remains for it – yet in such a way that it is not the natural ends, which rest only on arguments from experience,^c but an end that is given and determined a priori through pure practical reason (in the idea of the highest good) that may supplement the shortcoming of the deficient theory. In a small essay on the human races^d I have attempted to prove a similar warrant, indeed a need to start from a teleological principle where theory abandons us. But both cases contain a demand to which the understanding submits only reluctantly, and which can give sufficient occasion for misunderstanding.

In all examination of nature reason rightly calls first for theory and only later for the determination of ends.^d No teleology or practical purposiveness can compensate for the lack of the former. We always remain ignorant with respect to the efficient causes, no matter how evident we can make the suitability of our presupposition with final causes, be they of nature or of our will. This complaint seems to be most founded where (as in the case of metaphysics) practical laws even have to precede in order to first indicate the end for the sake of which I venture to determine

^a Berufe.^b auf dem theoretischen Naturwege.^c Beweisgründen der Erfahrung.^d Zweckbestimmung.

8: 160

the concept of a cause – which concept thus seems not at all to concern the nature of the object but seems only to be an occupation with our own goals and needs.

It is always difficult to agree about principles in those cases where reason has a double, mutually limiting interest. But it is even difficult just to understand each other regarding the principles of this kind because they concern the very method of thinking, prior to the determination of the object and because conflicting claims of reason render ambiguous the viewpoint from which one has to consider one's object. In the present journal two of my essays about two subjects that are very different and of quite unequal importance have been subjected to an astute examination.² In one of them I have *not* been *understood*, although I expected to be understood, while in the other one I have been *understood well* beyond all expectation; both by men of excellent talent, youthful power, and blossoming fame. In the former I came under suspicion for wanting to answer a question of the *physical* investigation of nature through documents of religion; in the latter I was freed of the suspicion of wanting to encroach upon religion by proving the insufficiency of a *metaphysical* investigation of nature. In both cases the difficulty in being understood is grounded in the warrant, which has not yet been sufficiently elucidated, of being allowed to use the teleological principle where sources of theoretical cognition^a are not sufficient. Yet this use has to be restricted to the extent that the right of *precedence* of the theoretical-speculative investigation to first try out its entire faculty in the matter is secured, and furthermore that subsequently this freedom shall remain available to it at all times (where in the case of the metaphysical investigation it is rightfully demanded of pure reason that it antecedently justify this and its presumption in general to decide about anything, in order to be able to count on confidence, and in the process reveal completely the *state of its faculty*^b). A large part of the dissension here stems from the concern about the encroachment that supposedly threatens the freedom of the use of reason. Once this concern is alleviated, I believe I can easily clear away the obstacles to unanimity.

8: 161

In the *Teutscher Merkur*, October and November 1786, Privy Councillor Georg Forster advances objections against an explanation of my previously expressed opinion about the concept and the origin of the *human races* in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, November 1785 – objections which, I believe, derive only from the misunderstanding of the principle from which I start. To be sure, the famous man right away finds it awkward to establish a *principle* in advance which is supposed to guide the investigator of nature even *in searching* and observing, and especially

^a theoretische Erkenntnisquellen.

^b Vermögenszustand.

a principle that would orient observation toward a *natural history* to be furthered by this procedure, in contrast to a mere *description of nature*; moreover, he finds this distinction itself illicit. Yet this dissension is easily removed.

With regard to the first scruple, it is undoubtedly certain that nothing of a purposive nature could ever be found through mere empirical groping without a guiding principle of what to search for; for only *methodically* conducted experience can be called *observing*. I do not care for the mere empirical traveler and his narrative, especially if what is at issue is a coherent cognition which reason is supposed to turn into something for the purpose of a theory. Such a traveler will usually answer when asked about something: I would have been able to notice that if I had known that I was going to be asked about it. After all, Herr F. himself follows the lead of Linné's principle of the persistence of the character of the pollinating parts of plants,³ without which the systematic *description of nature* of the vegetable kingdom would not have been ordered and enlarged in so praiseworthy a manner. To be sure, it is unfortunately all too true that some are so careless as to import their ideas into the observation itself (and to take the similarity of those characters, in accordance with certain examples, for an indication of the similarity of the powers of the plants, as apparently even happened to the great authority on nature⁴). And the lesson for *rash reasoners*^b (which presumably concerns neither of the two of us) is equally well founded. Yet this misuse cannot suspend the validity of the rule.

Now as far as the doubted, even outright rejected difference between *description of nature* and *natural history* is concerned: if one were to understand by the latter a *narrative* of events in nature^c not to be reached by any human reason, e.g., the first origin of the plants and animals, then indeed that would be, as Hr. F. puts it, a science for gods, who were present then or were even the authors, and not one for human beings. Yet *natural history* would only consist in tracing back, as far as the analogy permits, the connection between certain present-day conditions of the things in nature and their causes in earlier times according to laws of efficient causality, which we do not make up but derive from the powers of nature as it presents itself to us now. Such would be a natural history that is not only possible but that also has been attempted often enough, e.g., in the theories of the earth (among which that of the famous Linné also finds its place⁴). Moreover, even Hr. F.'s surmise about the first origin of the *Negro* certainly belongs not to the description of nature but to natural history. This difference is grounded in the

8: 162

^a Naturkenner.

^b rasche Vernünftiger.

^c Naturgegebenheiten.

8: 163

constitution of things, and I demand nothing new thereby but merely the careful separation of one business from the other, since they are entirely *heterogeneous*, and, while one (the description of nature) appears as a science with all the splendor of a great system, the other (natural history) can only point to fragments or shaky hypotheses. Through this separation and through the presentation of natural history as a science of its own, although one that for now (and maybe forever) is realizable more in silhouette than in deed (and in which for most questions a *vacat*^a is likely to be found), I hope to bring it about that one does not with putative insight give credit to one discipline for something that actually only belongs to the other one, and that one gets to know more closely the extent of actual cognitions in natural history (for one possesses some) as well as the latter's limits, which lie in reason itself, together with the principles according to which natural history could be enlarged in the best possible manner. One must pardon me for this scrupulousness, considering that in other cases I have encountered a fair amount of harm from the carelessness of letting the boundaries of the sciences run into each other and have pointed that out not exactly to everyone's liking. Moreover, I have become totally convinced that through the mere separation of what is heterogeneous^b and what previously had been left in a mixed state,^c often a completely new light is cast upon the sciences – which may reveal quite a great deal of paltriness that previously was able to hide behind heterogeneous cognitions,^d but which also opens up many authentic sources of cognition where one would not at all have expected them. The biggest difficulty in this putative innovation lies merely in the name. The word *history*,^e taken to mean the same as the Greek *historia* (narrative, description), has been in use too much and too long for us easily to tolerate that it be granted another meaning which can designate the investigation of origin in nature,^f especially given the fact that finding another suitable technical expression for the latter meaning is not without difficulty.* But the linguistic difficulty in the distinction cannot suspend the difference in the things.^g Presumably such a dissension over a quite unavoidable deviation from *classical* expressions has also been the cause for the disunion over the matter itself in the

* I would propose the word *physiography* (*Physiographie*) for the description of nature and the word *physiogony* (*Physiogenie*) for natural history.

^a Latin for “remains empty,” designating a lack of answer.

^b *Scheidung des Ungleichtartigen*.

^c *Gemenge*.

^d *fremdartige Kenntnisse*.

^e *Geschichte*.

^f *Naturforschung des Ursprungs*.

^g *Sachen*.

case of the concept of a *race*. What happened to us here is what *Sterne* says on the occasion of a physiognomic dispute, which, according to his whimsical ideas, caused a tumult among all the faculties of the University of Strasburg: The logicians would have decided the matter, *had they not come across a definition*.⁵ What is a *race*? The word does not figure in a system of the description of nature, therefore presumably the thing itself is nowhere in nature either. Yet the *concept* designated by this expression is well grounded in the reason of each observer of nature who infers from a hereditary particularity^a of different interbreeding animals^b that does not at all lie in the concept of their species^c a common cause,^d namely a cause that lies originally in the phylum of the species. The fact that this word does not occur in the description of nature (but instead of it that of variety), cannot prevent the observer of nature from finding it necessary with respect to natural history. To be sure, he will have to determine the word clearly for this purpose; and this we would like to attempt here.

The name *race*, as *radical* peculiarity indicating a common phyletic origination^e and at the same time permitting several such persistently hereditary characters^f not only of the same animal species but also of the same phylum, is quite suitably conceived. I would translate it through *subspecies*^g (*progenies classifica*^b), in order to distinguish a race from the *degeneration*ⁱ (*degeneratio s. progenies specifca*)^j, which one cannot admit because it is contrary to the law of nature (in the preservation of its kind in unchangeable form^k). The word *progenies* indicates that races are not characters that are originally distributed through so many phyla

8: 164

8: 164

* The appellations of the *classes* and *orders* express quite unambiguously a merely logical separation which *reason* makes among its concepts for the purpose of comparison only. However, *genera* and *species* can also refer to the *physical* separation which *nature* itself makes among its creatures with respect to their *generation* (*Erzeugung*). Thus the character of the race can be sufficient for classifying creatures in accordance with it, but not for making a special *kind* (*Species*) out of them, since the latter could also refer to a separate phyletic origination, which we do not want to be understood by the name of a race. It needs no explaining that we here take the word *class* not in the extended meaning in which it is taken in *Linné*'s system; but we also use it for division with an entirely different intention.

^a *sich vererbende Eigentümlichkeit*.

^b *vermischt zeugenden Tieren*.

^c *Gattung*.

^d *Gemeinschaft der Ursache*.

^e *Abstamm.*

^f *beharrlich forterbende Charaktere*.

^g *Abartung*.

^h Latin for “progeny that establishes a class.”

ⁱ *Ausartung*.

^j Latin for “degeneration or progeny that establishes a species.”

^k *Erbaltung ihrer Spezies in unveränderlicher Form*.

as kinds of the same species^a but rather characters that develop only over the course of generations,^b hence not different *kinds* but *subspecies*, yet so determinate and persistent that they justify a distinction in terms of classes.

Following these preliminary concepts, the *human species* (understood in accordance with its universal marks in the description of nature) could be divided in a system of natural history into *phylum* (or *phyla*), *races* or *subspecies* (*progenies classifica*) and different *human sorts* (*varietates nativae*^c), the last of which do not contain unfailing marks that are hereditary according to a law to be specified and thus are not sufficient for a division into classes either. Yet all of that is so far merely an idea of the way in which the greatest degree of manifoldness in the generation^d can be united by reason with the greatest unity of phyletic origin.^e Whether there really is such an affinity in the human species must be decided through the observations that make known the unity of the phyletic origin. And here one sees clearly that one must be guided by a determinate principle merely in order to *observe*, i.e., to pay attention to that which could indicate the phyletic origin, not just the resemblance of characters, since in that case we are dealing with a problem^f of natural history, not of the description of nature and of mere methodical nomenclature.^g Someone who has not made his investigation according to that principle will have to search again; for what he needs in order to decide whether there is a real or merely a nominal affinity among the creatures will not present itself to him on its own.

There can be no more certain marks of the diversity^b of the original *phylum* than the impossibility of gaining fertile progeny through the mixing of two divisions of human beings that are different in hereditary terms. However, if such a mixing succeeds, then even the greatest difference of shape is no obstacle to finding that their common phyletic origin for them is at least possible. For just as they can still *unite* through generationⁱ into a product that contains characters of both, despite their diversity, so they were able to *divide* through generation^j out of one *phylum*, which had the predispositions for the development of both characters originally hidden in it, into that many races. And reason will not

8: 165

^a als Spezies derselben Gattung.

^b in der Folge der Zeugungen.

^c Latin for “innate varieties.”

^d Zeugung.

^e Abstammung.

^f Aufgabe.

^g methodischen Benennung.

^h Verschiedenheit.

ⁱ Zeugung.

^j Zeugung.

without need start from two principles if it can make do with one. But the certain sign of hereditary peculiarities, as the marks of just so many races, has already been named. Now we still need to note something about the hereditary *varieties* that give rise to the denomination of one or the other sort of human beings (family or ethnic sort).^a

A variety is the hereditary peculiarity that is not classificatory,^b since it is not propagated unfailingly; for such a persistence of the hereditary character is required to justify the division into classes even in the description of nature. A shape that in propagation reproduces the character of the closest parents only *sometimes*, and for the most part only unilaterally at that (by taking after the father or the mother), is no mark for recognizing the phyletic origination of both parents – e.g., the difference between blondes and brunettes. Likewise, the race or subspecies is an unfailing *hereditary* peculiarity which justifies the division into classes but yet does not warrant the division into kinds,^c since the unfailing half-breed regeneration^d (hence the *melting together* of the differential characters) does not yet preclude to view their inherited difference as originally *unified* in their *phylum* in mere predispositions and as developed and *separated* only gradually in procreation. For one cannot turn a family of animals^e into a special kind^f if it belongs with another one to one and the same system of generation of nature.^g Thus in natural history species and kind^b would mean one and the same thing, namely the hereditary peculiarity that is not consistent with a common phyletic origination. By contrast, the hereditary peculiarity that is so compatible is either necessarily hereditary or not. In the first case it constitutes the character of the *race*, in the second that of the *variety*.

With respect to what can be called *variety* in the human species, I only note here that also in this case nature has to be viewed not as forming in complete freedom but as only developing and as predetermined with respect to those varieties through original dispositions, just as is the case with the racial characters. For in the variety, too, there is to be found purposiveness and corresponding suitability, which cannot be the work of chance. Every portrait painter who reflects about his art can confirm what Lord Shaftesbury already noted,^h namely, that there is a certain originality in every human face (its design, as it were), which marks the individual

8: 166

^a Menschenschlags . . . Familien- und Volksschlags.

^b klassisch.

^c ist nicht spezifisch.

^d unausbleiblich halbschlächtige Nachartung.

^e Tiergeslecht.

^f besonderen Spezies.

^g Zeugungssystem der Natur.

^h Gattung und Spezies.

as destined^a for particular ends which it does not have in common with others, although deciphering these signs exceeds our faculty. One can tell that an image painted from life and well rendered is true, i.e., that it is not derived from the imagination. But in what does this truth consist? Without doubt in a determinate proportion of one of the many parts of the face to all the others, in order to express an individual character, which contains an obscurely represented end. No part of the face, even if the latter might seem disproportionate to us, can be altered in the depiction, while preserving the others, without it being immediately noticeable to the eye of the expert, even though he has not seen the original, when comparing it with the portrait copied from nature, which of the two contains nature unaltered and which fiction. The variety among human beings of the same race is in all likelihood just as purposively supplied in the original phylum in order to ground and subsequently develop the greatest degree of manifoldness for the sake of infinitely different ends, as is the difference of the races, in order to ground and subsequently develop the fitness to fewer but more essential ends – yet with the difference that the latter predispositions, once developed (which must have occurred already in most ancient times), do not let new forms of this kind^b come about anymore and do not let the old ones become extinct either, whereas the former, at least to our knowledge, seem to indicate a nature that is inexhaustible in new characters (outer as well as inner ones).

8: 167

With respect to the varieties, nature seems to prevent the *melting together*^c because it is contrary to its end, namely the manifoldness of the characters; by contrast, as regards the differences of the races, nature seems at least to permit the melting together, although not to favor it, since thereby the creature becomes fit for several climates but not suited to any one of them to the degree achieved by the first adaptation^d to it. For after paying careful attention to the family sort, I cannot concur with the common opinion according to which children (of our class of whites) are supposed to inherit those marks that belong to the variety (namely stature, facial formation, skin color, even some inner as well as outer ailments) from their parents half each^e (as one says: this the child has from the father, that from the mother). They take after, if not the father or mother, then at least the family of one or the other in an unmixed manner. And while the abhorrence against the mixings of people that are too closely related for the most part may have moral reasons,^f and while their infertility may not be sufficiently proven, still the wide spread of

this abhorrence even to primitive peoples^g gives rise to the conjecture that its reason^h may lie remotely in nature itself, which does not want the old forms to always be reproduced all over, but rather that all the manifoldness be brought out which she had placed into the original germs of the human phylum. Also, a certain degree of uniformity that can be found in a family sort or even in an ethnic sort may not be ascribed to half-breed adaptationⁱ of its characters (which, in my view, does not take place at all with respect to varieties). For the preponderance of the generative power of one or the other half of married people, where at times almost all children take after the father's line or all take after the mother's,^j can reduce the initially large difference of the characters and produce a certain uniformity (visible only to foreign eyes) through effect and counter-effect, which brings it about that the regenerations^k become ever more rare on one of the sides. But this is only a casual opinion, which I present to the reader to judge as he pleases. It is more important that in other animals almost everything which one would want to call variety in them (such as the size, the constitution of the skin, etc.) is subject to half-breed adaptation; and this would seem to contain an objection against my distinction between races and varieties if one considers the human being, according to the analogy with animals (with respect to procreation), as is only fair. In order to judge this matter, one already needs to assume a higher standpoint for the explanation of this arrangement of nature, namely the standpoint that non-rational animals, whose existence can have a value only as a means, already had to be equipped in the predisposition in different ways for different uses (as the different races of dogs, which, according to *Buffon*,^l are to be derived from the common phylum of the German shepherd). By contrast, the greater uniformity^m of the end in the human species did not demand such great difference of adapting natural forms,ⁿ and thus the necessarily adapting natural form needed only to be predisposed toward the preservation of the kind^b in a few climates that are markedly different from each other. But since I only intended to defend the concept of *races*, I do not need to vouch for the explanatory ground of the varieties.

8: 168

After removing this verbal disagreement, which is often more responsible for a dissension than the one over principles, I now hope to encounter less of an obstacle to maintaining my mode of explanation.

^a roben Völkern.^b Grund.^c halbschlüchtigen Anartung.^d väterlichen oder . . . mütterlichen Stamm.^e Nachartungen.^f Einhelligkeit.^g anartender Naturformen.^h Erhaltung der Spezies.^a bestimmt.^b Art.^c Zusammenschmelzung.^d erste Anartung.^e auf die Halbscheid.^f Ursachen.

8: 169

Herr F. agrees with me in that he finds at least one hereditary peculiarity among the different shapes of human beings, namely that of the Negro as opposed to the other human beings, large enough for not holding it to be a mere play of nature and the effect of contingent impressions but rather demanding for it predispositions that were originally incorporated into the phylum and a specific arrangement of nature.^a This unanimity among our concepts is already important and also makes it possible to bring the explanatory principles on each side closer together. By contrast, the common, shallow mode of representation, which places all differences in our species on the same footing, namely that of chance, and as such differences still now come about and vanish, just as external circumstances make it happen, declares all investigations of this kind superfluous and thereby declares invalid even the persistence of the kind^b in the same purposive form. Only two differences in our concepts remain, which, however, are not so far apart as to render necessary a dissension that could never be settled. The first one is that the previously mentioned hereditary peculiarities, namely those of the *Negro* as opposed to all other human beings, are the only ones which are supposed to deserve to be taken for originally implanted; while I judge still others (those of the *Indians* and *Americans*, in addition to that of the *whites*) to be equally entitled to figure in the complete classificatory division. The second deviation, which, however, concerns not so much the observation (description of nature) as the theory to be assumed (natural history), is this: that Hr. F. finds it necessary to assume two original phyla in order to explain these characters; while on my view, it is possible and indeed more appropriate to the philosophical mode of explanation to view them (which I consider, like Hr. F., to be original characters) as a development of purposive first predispositions implanted in one phylum. Now this is not actually such a great dissension that reason could not come to an agreement on this point, considering that the physical first origin of organic beings remains unfathomable to both of us and to human reason in general, and the same with the half-breed adaptation in propagation. Now the system according to which the germs are already originally divided and isolated in two different phyla but nevertheless afterward in the mixing of what was previously separated melt together again harmoniously – this system does not procure the slightest further ease for the possibility of rational comprehension than the system according to which the germs are originally implanted in one and the same phylum and subsequently develop *purposively for the first general population*. In addition, the latter hypothesis carries with it the advantage of sparing us different local creations.^c

^a ursprünglich dem Stämme einverleibte Anlagen und spezifische Natureinrichtung.^b Beharrlichkeit der Spezies.^c Lokalschöpfungen.

Moreover, there can be no thought of sparing us *teleological* grounds of explanation, in order to replace them with physical ones, in the case of organized beings as regards the preservation of their kind.^a Therefore the teleological mode of explanation does not place a new burden on the investigation of nature beyond the one which it can never shake off in any case, namely to follow only the *principle of ends*^b in those matters. Furthermore it was only through the discoveries of his friend, the famous philosophical anatomist Hr. Soemmerring,^c that Hr. F. was moved to find the difference of the Negro from other human beings more important than it might please those who would like to blur all hereditary characters into each other and regard them as merely accidental shadings. Now this excellent man defends the perfect purposiveness of the Negro formation with respect to his native country.*^c Yet one can hardly detect in the bone structure of the head of the Negro a suitability to his soil that is more comprehensible than the one to be found in the organization of the skin, that great instrument for the secretion^d of all that is supposed to be removed from the blood. Consequently Hr. Soemmerring appears to be referring to the *latter* arrangement of nature, which is so distinct^e from the rest of it (and of which the constitution of the skin is an important piece) and to be presenting the *former* only as its clearest hallmark for the anatomist. Therefore, if it is proven that there are other equally persistently hereditary peculiarities which do not at all flow into each other following the gradations of the climate but are sharply delineated and small in number, Hr. F. will hopefully not be disinclined to grant those an equal claim to special original germs that are purposively implanted in the phylum – even if those further peculiarities do not fall into the domain of anatomy. But hopefully we might still achieve agreement in the end concerning the question whether because of this several phyla or only one common one need to be assumed.

8: 170

* Soemmerring, On the Corporeal Difference of the Negro from the European, p. 79. "One finds properties in the build of the Negro that make him the most perfect creature for his climate, perhaps more perfect than the European for his." The excellent man doubts (in the same work, §44) Dr. Schott's opinion of the skin of the Negroes being more suitably organized for the better evacuation of noxious materials.^f Yet that opinion receives a lot of probability if one connects it with Lind's (Of the Diseases of the Europeans . . .) reports^g about the noxious character of the air around the river Gambia, which is phlogistonized through swampy forests, and which becomes deadly so fast to the English sailors, while the Negroes live in it as in their element.

8: 170

^a Art.^b Prinzip der Zwecke.^c die vollkommene Zweckmaßigkeit der Negerbildung in Betreff seines Mutterlandes.^d Absonderungswerkzeuge.^e ausgezeichnet.

8: 171

Thus only those difficulties would have to be removed which prevent Hr. F. from joining my position, not so much with respect to the principle but rather with respect to the difficulty of adapting it appropriately in all cases of its application. In the first section of his treatise, October 1786, p. 70, Hr. F. establishes a color scale of the skin that goes from the inhabitants of northern Europe across Spain, Egypt, Arabia, Abyssinia to the equator, and from there in reverse direction proceeding into the temperate southern zone across the countries of the Kaffir and Hottentots, and this with a gradation, from brown to black and back again, so proportionate to the climate of the countries (in his view) that he is astonished at how one could have overlooked this. (He assumes in this, although without proof, that the colonies originating from black Africa and stretching toward the tip of Africa, were gradually transformed merely through the effect of the climate into Kaffir and Hottentots.) But one must be more astonished yet at how he could have overlooked the mark of unfailing half-breed generation, upon which everything depends here – a mark that is sufficiently determinate and justifiably to be taken for the only decisive one. For neither the northernmost European in the mixing with those of Spanish blood nor the Mauritanian or Arab (presumably also the Abyssinian, who is closely related to the latter) in the mixing with Circassian women are the least subject to this law. Once one sets aside what the sun in a country impresses upon each individual in it, there is also no ground^a for judging that their color is any other than the brunette one among the white human sort. However, as far as the similarity to the Negro in the Kaffir and to a lesser degree in the Hottentots in the same part of the world is concerned, which presumably would pass the test of half-breed generation,^b it is probable to the highest degree that these might be nothing but bastard generations^c of a Negro people with the Arabs, who have been visiting these coasts since the most ancient times. For why is it that the same presumed color scale is not also found at the West coast of Africa, where indeed nature makes a sudden leap from the brunette Arabs or Mauritians to the blackest Negroes on the Senegal river, without previously having taken the middle road of the Kaffir? This also cancels the experiment^d proposed on page 74 and decided in advance, which was supposed to demonstrate the objectionable character of my principle, namely that the black brown Abyssinian, in mixing with a Kaffir woman, would yield no intermediary sort in terms of color, since the color of both of them is the same, namely black brown. For if Hr. F. assumes that the brown color of the Abyssinian in the intensity found in the Kaffir is inborn, and this in a such a way that it would

^a Ursache.^b Versuch der halbschlächtigen Zeugung.^c Bastarderzeugungen.^d Probeversuch.

have to yield an intermediary color in mixed generation^e with a white woman, then the experiment^f indeed might turn out as Hr. F. wishes. But it would also not prove anything against me since the difference of the races is not judged according to what is the same in them but what is different in them. All one could say would be that there are also deep brown races that differ from the Negro or his phyletic origination *in other marks* (e.g., the bone structure). For it would only be with respect to the latter that the generation would result in a blend,^g and my list of colors would merely be increased by one. If however the deep color worn by the Abyssinian who grew up in his country is not inborn but only like that of a Spaniard, e.g., raised from small age in that very country, then his skin color would undoubtedly yield, when crossed with that of the Kaffir, an intermediary sort of generation,^d but which would be hidden, though, and would seem to be a uniform sort (in terms of skin color) since the contingent coloring through the sun comes in. Therefore the projected experiment proves nothing against the fitness of the necessarily hereditary skin color for a differentiation of the races. It only proves the difficulty of being able to determine correctly the skin color, insofar as it is inborn, in places where the sun covers it over with contingent varnish, and it confirms the legitimacy of my demand to give preference to *generations^e* from the same parents *in a foreign country* for this purpose.

Now we possess a decisive example of the latter in the Indian skin color of a small people that has been propagating itself for some centuries in our Northern countries, namely the *gypsies*.^f That they are an *Indian* people is established by their language, independent of their skin color. Yet nature has been so obstinate in preserving their skin color that, while their presence in Europe can be traced back as far as twelve generations,^g it still appears so perfectly that, were they to grow up in India, in all likelihood no difference would be found between them and the natives there. Now to say that one would have to wait another twelve times twelve generations until the northern air would have bleached out their inheritable skin color entirely, would mean to put off the investigator of nature with dilatory answers and to look for excuses. Yet to pass off their color for mere variety, like that of the brunette Spaniard by contrast to the Dane, would mean to doubt nature's imprint. For they beget unfailingly half-breed children with our old natives, to which law the

^a vermischter Zeugung.^b Versuch.^c Blending.^d Mittelschlag der Zeugung.^e Zeugungen.^f Zigeunern.^g Generationen.

8: 172

race of the whites is not subject with regard to any of its characteristic varieties.

Yet the most important counterargument occurs on pages 155–6, by which, in case it were founded, would be proven that, even if I were conceded my *original predispositions*, the latter would not be consistent with the suitability of human beings to their mother-countries *in their spreading over the surface of the earth*. At most, says Hr. F., it could be argued that *exactly those* human beings whose *predisposition* are suited *for this* or that *climate* would be born here or there through a wise arrangement of Providence. But, he continues, how is it then that this same Providence became so shortsighted not to think ahead to a *second transplanting*,^a in which that germ, which was fit only for one climate, had become entirely purposeless.

8: 173

As far as the first point is concerned, one should remember that I took those first predispositions not to be *divided among different* human beings – for then they would have become as many different *phyla* – but to have been *united* in the first human couple. Hence those of their descendants in which the *entire* original predisposition for all future subspecies was still unseparated were fit for all climates (*in potentia*^b), such that the germ that would make them suitable to the region of the earth in which they or their early descendants were to find themselves could develop in that place. Thus there was no need for a special wise arrangement^c to bring them into those places where their predispositions fit. Rather wherever they went by chance and continued their generation^d over long periods of time, there developed the germ for this region of the earth to be found in their organization, which made them fit for such a climate. The development of the predispositions depended on^e the places, and the places did not have to be selected according to the already developed predispositions, as Hr. F. misunderstands the matter. Yet all of this only holds of the earliest times, which may have lasted long enough (for the gradual population of the earth) in order to first provide a people which had a permanent place with the influences of climate and soil that are required for the development of those of its predispositions suited for this location. But now he continues: How come the same understanding that calculated so correctly which countries and which germs should match, suddenly became so short-sighted not to have foreseen the case of a *second transplanting*? (According to what was previously said, countries and germs *always had to* match in that situation, even if one would rather that it was not an understanding but the very same nature that

^a *Verpflanzung*.

^b Latin for “potentially.”

^c *weisen Fügung*.

^d *Generation*.

^e *richtete sich nach*.

had arranged the organization of the animals with such consistent inner purposiveness that also provided for their preservation with equal care.) That way, the inborn peculiarity that is fit for one climate becomes entirely purposeless, etc.

As far as this second objection is concerned, I concede that the understanding, or, if one prefers, the spontaneously purposively active nature,^a indeed paid no heed to a transplanting after germs have already developed, yet without thereby justifying the accusation of lacking wisdom and being short-sighted. Rather through the arranged suitability to the climate nature has hindered its exchange,^b especially that of the warm climate against the cold one. For it is exactly this poor match of the new region to the already adapted natural character of the inhabitants of the old region that all by itself keeps them away from the former. And where have Indians and Negroes attempted to expand into northern regions? – But those who were driven there have never been able to bring about in their progeny (such as the Creole Negroes, or the *Indians* under the name of the gypsies) a sort that would be fit for farmers or manual laborers.*

8: 174

* The last remark is not put forward here in order to prove something but is nevertheless not insignificant. In Hr. Sprengel's Contributions, 5th Part, pp. 287–92,¹¹ a knowledgeable man, adduces the following against Ramsay's wish to use all Negro slaves as *free* laborers: that among the many thousand freed Negroes which one encounters in America and England he knew no example of someone engaged in a business which one could properly call *labor*; rather that, when they are set free, they soon abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been forced to carry out, and instead become hawkers, wretched innkeepers, lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting, in a word, tramps. The same is to be found in the gypsies among us. The same author notes on this matter that it is not the northern climate that makes the Negroes disinclined for labor. For they would rather endure waiting behind the coaches of their masters or, during the worst winter nights, in the cold entrances of the theaters (in England) than to be threshing, digging, carrying loads, etc. Should one not conclude from this that, in addition to the *faculty* to work, there is also an immediate drive to activity (especially to the sustained activity that one calls *industry*), which is independent of all enticement and which is especially interwoven with certain natural predispositions; and that Indians as well as Negroes do not bring any more of this impetus into other climates and pass it on to their offspring than was needed for their preservation in their old motherland and had been received from nature; and that this inner predisposition extinguishes just as little as the externally visible one. The far lesser needs in those countries and the little effort it takes to procure only them demand no greater predispositions to activity. – Here I would like to cite something from Marsden's thorough description of Sumatra (see Sprengel's Contributions, 6th Part, pp. 198–9).¹² “The color of their (the Redjangs) skin is ordinarily *yellow* without the admixture of red which produces the color of copper. They are almost consistently somewhat lighter in color than the mestizos in other regions of India. – The white color of the (*continued on page 210*)

^a *von selbst zweckmäßig wirkende Natur*.

^b *Verwechslung*.

8: 175

Yet precisely that which Hr. F. takes to be an insurmountable difficulty for my principle throws the most advantageous light on it, when applied in a certain way, and solves difficulties that no other theory is able to do anything about. I assume that so many generations^a were required from the time of the beginning of the human species through the gradual development of the predispositions which are found in it for the purpose of complete adaptation to a climate that during this time span the expansion of the human species over the most considerable part of the earth could have taken place, under meager multiplication of the species^b – an expansion that for the most part was brought about forcefully through violent revolutions of nature. If through these causes a small people of the old world had been driven from southern regions to the northern ones, then the adaptation, which may not yet have been completed with respect to the previous region, must have gradually come to a standstill, while making room for an opposite development of the predispositions, namely for the northern climate. Now let us suppose that this sort of human beings had moved in a north-eastern direction all the way to America – a view^c which currently has the greatest probability –, then its natural predispositions would have developed as far as is possible even before it could have expanded again to any considerable degree to the south in this new part of the world, and this development, which was now completed, would have made impossible all further adaptation to a new climate. Thus a race would have been founded which remains always the same for all climates in its advance toward the south, and which therefore is not suited to any climate, since the southern adaptation prior to its departure was interrupted halfway through and exchanged against an adaptation to the northern climate, thereby establishing the persistent state of this cohort of human beings.^d And indeed *Don Ulloa*¹³ (an extremely important witness, who knew the inhabitants of America in both hemispheres) asserts having found the characteristic shape of the

(continued from page 209) inhabitants of Sumatra in comparison with other peoples of the same region is, on my view, a strong proof that the color of the skin does not at all depend immediately on the climate. (He says the same about the color of the skin of children of Europeans born there and of Negroes in the second generation, and conjectures that the darker skin of the Europeans who have stayed there a long time is a consequence of the many bilious illnesses to which everyone there is exposed.) – Here I must also note that the hands of the natives and the mestizos are usually cold in spite of the hot climate^e (an important circumstance, which indicates that the peculiar constitution of the skin cannot stem from superficial external causes).

^a Generationen.

^b Vermehrung der Art.

^c Meinung.

^d Menschenhaufens.

8: 176

inhabitants of this part of the world to be of a consistent similarity (one of the more recent seafarers, whose name I cannot give with certainty right now, describes their color as *iron rust mixed with oil*). That their natural disposition did not achieve a *perfect* suitability for any climate, can be seen from the circumstance that hardly another reason can be given for why this race, which is too weak for hard labor, too indifferent for industry and incapable of any culture – although there is enough of it as example and encouragement nearby – ranks still far below even the Negro, who stands on the lowest of all the other steps that we have named as differences of the races.

Now let us consider all other possible hypotheses with respect to this phenomenon. If one does not wish to extend the special creation of the Negro, already suggested by Hr. F., with a second one, namely that of the American, then no other answer is left than that America is *too cold or too new* for ever producing the subspecies of the Negro or the yellow Indian, or for having produced it in the short time since it has been populated. The first assertion is by now sufficiently refuted, given the hot climate of this part of the world. Now to the *second* assertion, namely that if only one had the patience to wait still for several thousands of years, finally the Negro (at least in terms of hereditary skin color) would emerge here, too, thanks to the gradual influence of the sun. Here one would first have to be certain that sun and air can accomplish such engraftings,^a merely in order to defend oneself against *objections* with respect to such a merely surmised result,^b which can always be postponed further arbitrarily and is merely conjectured. Given that the engrafting influence of the climate is itself still very much contested, how much less can a merely arbitrary surmise be placed against *facts*!

An important confirmation of the derivation of the unfailingly hereditary differences through the development of predispositions that are to be found together in a human phylum originally and purposively for the preservation of the kind^c is the following: the races that have developed from it are not spread *sporadically*^d (in all parts of the world, in one and the same climate, in the same way), but *zykladisch*^e in unified heaps which are to be found distributed within the confines of a country in which each of them was able to form itself. Thus the *pure* phyletic origin of the *yellow-colored* race is confined in the boundaries of *Hindustan*, while *Arabia*, not far from there, which for the most part occupies the same part of the earth, contains nothing thereof. But neither of them contains any *Negroes*, who are only to be found in *Africa* between the

^a Einfropfungen.

^b Erfolg.

^c Art.

^d sporadisch.

^e zykladisch.

8: 177

Senegal river and *Cape Negro* (and so on in the interior of this part of the world). By contrast, the whole of *America* contains neither one nor the other, indeed contains no racial character of the old world (except for the *Eskimos*, who, judging from the characters of their shape and even talent, seem to be later arrivals from one of the old parts of the world). Each of these races is, as it were, isolated and, while being in the same climate, they are distinguished from each through a character that adheres inseparably to the generative faculty of each of them. Thus they render very improbable the opinion of the origin of these characters as effects of the climate, while confirming the conjecture of an entirely consistent generative affinity^a through the unity of phyletic origin, while simultaneously confirming the conjecture of a *cause* of their classificatory difference residing in the human beings themselves, not merely in the climate – a difference which must have required a long time before becoming effective in a way suited to the place of the propagation, and which, once established, permits no further subspecies through any transferrals.^b For this reason the cause of the classificatory difference can be taken for nothing other than a gradually developing *original pre-disposition* placed into the phylum and restricted to a certain number according to the main differences of the influences exercised by the air. This argument^c seems to be weakened by the race of the *Papuas*, which is scattered among the islands belonging to south Asia and further east to the Pacific Ocean, and which I have called Kaffir, following Capt. *Forrester*¹⁴ (presumably because he found grounds for not calling them Negroes, partly in their skin color, partly in their head and beard hair, which they are able to comb out to considerable extent, something that is contrary to the property of the Negroes). But this damage is made good through the equally observable wondrous dispersion of yet other races, namely the Haraforas, and of certain human beings that are more similar to the pure Indian stock,^d since it also weakens the proof for the effect of the climate on their hereditary property, given that the latter comes out so differently in one and the same region of the earth. For that reason one also deems it probable that they are not aborigines but foreigners^e (in the case of the Papuas perhaps from Madagascar), who were driven from their residences through whatever cause (perhaps a powerful revolution of the earth, which must have been effective from west to east). Regarding the inhabitants of Freewill Island, concerning which I cited *Carteret's* account from memory (perhaps incorrectly), things may be as

they may;¹⁵ one will have to look for evidence concerning the development of the differences of the races in the conjectured habitats of their stock^a on the *continent* and not on the *islands*, which, for all appearances, were populated only after nature's effect had been completed for a long time.

8: 178

This much in defense of my concept of the derivation of the hereditary manifoldness of organic creatures of one and the same *natural species*^b (*species naturalis*, insofar as they stand in connection through their generative faculty and can have sprung from one phylum*), in contrast to the school species^c (*species artificialis*, insofar as they stand under a common mark of mere comparison), the first of which belongs to natural history, the second to the description of nature. Now I would like to add something about Hr. F.'s own system regarding its origin. We both agree that in a natural science everything must be explained *naturally*, because otherwise it would not belong to this science. I have followed this principle so carefully that an astute man (Hr. O. C. R. Büsching¹⁶ in the review of my essay mentioned above), because of my talk of nature's intention, wisdom and foresight, even turns me into a *naturalist*, but with the qualification of *his own kind*, since I do not find it advisable to use a *theological* language in matters that concern the mere cognitions of nature and their reach (where it is quite appropriate to express oneself in *teleological* terms) – in order to indicate quite diligently to each mode of cognition its boundaries.

Yet the same principle^d – that everything in natural science must be explained naturally – also indicates the boundaries of natural science. For one has reached its extreme boundary if one uses the last of all explanatory grounds that can still be confirmed by *experience*. Where these come to an end, and one must bring in self-concocted powers^e of matter following unheard-of and unverifiable laws, one has already gone beyond

8: 179

* To belong to one and the same phylum does not immediately mean to have been generated from a single original *pair*; it only means this much: the manifoldness which are now to be found in a certain animal species must not thereby be regarded as so many original differences. Now if the first human phylum consisted of however many persons (of both sexes) who were yet all homogeneous, then I might as well derive the present human beings from a single pair as from many of them. Hr. F. suspects me of wanting to assert the latter as a fact, and on the strength of an authority at that. Yet it is only the idea that follows quite naturally from the theory. But as regards the difficulty that, due to rapacious animals, humankind would have been poorly protected had it begun from a single pair, this does not cause him any particular trouble. For his all-producing earth would only have had to bring forth those animals later than the human beings.

^a *Stamm*.

^b *Naturgattung*.

^c *Schulgattung*.

^d *Grundsatz*.

^e *selbst erdachten Kräften*.

natural science. And while one may still cite natural things as causes, one attributes powers to them the existence of which cannot be proven through anything, or even the very possibility of which can hardly be reconciled with reason. Since the concept of an organized being already includes that it is some matter in which everything is mutually related to each other as end and means, which can only be thought as a *system of final causes*, and since therefore their possibility only leaves the teleological but not the physical-mechanical mode of explanation, at least as far as *human* reason is concerned, there can be no investigation in physics about the origin of all organization itself. The answer to this question, provided it is at all accessible to us, obviously would lie *outside* of natural science *in metaphysics*. I myself derive all organization from *organic beings* (through generation^a) and all later forms (of this kind of natural things) from laws of the gradual development of *original predispositions*, which were to be found in the organization of its phylum. Such development can often be seen in the transplantings of plants. How this phylum itself *came about*, this problem^b lies entirely beyond the limits of all physics possible to human beings, within which I believed that I had to hold myself.

Therefore I fear nothing from a court of inquisition^c for Hr. F.'s system (for it, too, would presume a jurisdiction outside of its domain). Moreover, if necessary, I vote for a philosophical *jury* (p. 166), composed of mere investigators of nature, and yet do not believe that their ruling would be in his favor. "The earth in labor (p. 80), which let originate animals and plants, without being generated by beings of their own kind, from the soft mother's womb fructified by sea mud, the local generations based thereupon, when *Africa* produced its human beings (the Negroes), *Asia* its human beings (all others) (p. 158), the affinity of all derived from there, in an unnoticeable gradation from the human being to the whale (p. 77) and so on farther down the chain of nature^d of organic beings (presumably to the mosses and lichen), and this not only in the system of comparison but in the system of generation^e from the common phylum" – those statements may not make the investigator of nature recoil as though before a monster (p. 75) (for it is a play with which many may have entertained themselves at one time or another, but which they

8: 180

* Concerning this idea, which became very popular especially through Bonnet.¹⁷ Hr. Prof. Blumenbach's reminder (Handbook of Natural History 1779, Preface, §7)¹⁸ deserves to be read. Also this insightful man attributes the *formative drive*, through which he brought so much light into the doctrine of generations, not to inorganic matter but only to the members of organized beings.

^a *Zeugung*.

^b *Aufgabe*.

^c *Ketzgericht*.

^d *Naturkette*.

^e *Vergleichungssystem . . . Erzeugungssystem*.

soon gave up since nothing is gained by it). Still he would be scared away from it by the consideration that he had thereby, without noticing it, gone astray from the fertile soil of the investigation of nature to the desert of metaphysics. Moreover, I know of yet another fear which is not exactly (p. 75) *unmanly*, namely to recoil from everything which unhitches reason from its first principles^a and permits it to wander about in unbounded imaginings. But perhaps Hr. F. merely wanted to do a favor to some *hypermetaphysician*^b (for there are such as well, namely those who do not know the elementary concepts, even pretend to scorn them and yet go out heroically on conquests) and provide material for his fantasy, only to make fun of it later.

True metaphysics knows the boundaries of human reason and, among other things, its hereditary defect,^c which it can never deny: that it cannot and may not at all concoct a priori *basic powers* (for then it would devise nothing but empty concepts), but can do nothing else than reduce the powers which experience teaches it (to the extent that the latter differ only in appearance^d but are basically identical) to the smallest possible number, and to look for the pertinent *basic power* in the *world*, if it is a matter of physics, or *outside the world*, if it is a matter of metaphysics (viz., to indicate that basic power which is no longer dependent on anything else). Given that we can only know a basic power through the relation of a cause to an effect, we cannot provide any other concept of a basic power and come up with another appellation for it than the one taken from the effect and expressing only this relationship.* Now the concept

8: 181

8: 181

* E.g., the *imagination* in the human being is an effect that we cognize to be not the same with other effects of the mind. Therefore the power related to this effect can only be called power of the imagination (as basic power). Likewise, under the title moving forces, repulsive force and attractive force are *basic powers*. Several have thought that they had to assume a single basic power for the sake of the unity of the substance and even have thought to gain cognition of it simply by coining the *common title* of various basic powers, e.g. that the basic power of the soul is the power of representing the world. This would be the same as if I were to say: the sole basic power of matter is moving force, since repulsion and attraction both stand under the common concept of movement. Yet one desires to know whether the former could also be *derived* from the latter, which is impossible. For with respect to their specific difference, the *lower* concepts can never be derived from the *higher* ones. And as far as the unity of the substance is concerned, which appears to include the unity of the basic power already in its concept, this illusion rests on an incorrect definition of *power*. For the latter is not that *which* contains the ground of the actuality of the accidents (i.e., the substance) but only the *relation* of the substance to the accidents *inssofar* as the former contains the ground of the actuality of the latter. But different relations may well be attributed to the substance (its unity notwithstanding).

^a *ersten Grundsätzen*.

^b *Hypermetaphysiker*.

^c *Erbfehler*.

^d *dem Anscheine nach*.

8: 182

of an organic being is this: that it is a material being which is possible only through the relation of everything contained in it to each other as end and means (and indeed every anatomist as well as every physiologist actually starts from this concept). Therefore a basic power that is effectuated through an organization has to be thought as a cause effective according to *ends*,^a and this in such a manner that these ends have to be presupposed for the possibility of the effect. But we know such powers, *in terms of their ground of determination only in ourselves*, namely in our understanding and will, as a cause of the possibility of certain products that are arranged entirely according to ends, namely that of *works of art*. In us understanding and will are basic powers, of which the latter, insofar as it is determined by the former, is a faculty to produce something *according to an idea* which is called end. Now we may not conceive a new basic power independent of all experience. Yet such would be the case with the basic power that were effective in a being in a purposive manner^b without having its determining ground in an *idea*. Hence the concept of a being's faculty to be effective^c from itself *purposively* but *without an end* and intention^d that would lie in it or its cause – as a special basic power not exemplified by experience – is entirely fictitious and empty, i.e., without the slightest guarantee that any object could correspond to it at all. Thus regardless of whether the cause of organic beings is to be met with *in* the world or *outside* the world, we must either give up all determination of their cause, or think an *intelligent being* along with them – not as though we understood that such an effect is *impossible* from another cause (as the late Mendelssohn,¹⁹ together with others, thought); but because, in order to presuppose another cause with the exclusion of final causes, we would have to *make up* a basic power – something to which reason is not at all entitled, because otherwise it would take no effort for reason to explain *whatever* and *however* it wants.

And now to add up the total from all this. *Ends* have a direct relationship to *reason*, be it foreign reason or our own. Yet, even in order to place them in foreign reason, we must presuppose our own reason at least as an analogue to the latter, since those ends cannot be represented at all without such an analogy. Now ends are either ends of *nature* or ends of *freedom*. No human being can know^e a priori that there must be ends in nature; however, he can very well know^f a priori that there must be a connection of causes and effects in nature. Hence the use of the teleological

^a eine nach Zwecken wirkende Ursache.

^b zweckmäßig wirkte.

^c wirken.

^d zweckmäßig, aber ohne Zweck und Absicht.

^e einsehen.

^f einsehen.

principle with respect to nature is always empirically conditioned. Things would be the same with the ends of freedom, if the objects of volition had to be given to the latter antecedently by nature (in needs and inclinations) as determining grounds of freedom, in order to determine through reason, merely by comparing those grounds among each other and with their sum, what to take for our end. Yet the Critique of Practical Reason shows that there are pure practical principles, through which reason is determined a priori and which thus indicate a priori the latter's end. Now the use of the teleological principle in explanations of nature, given that it is restricted to empirical conditions, can never indicate the ultimate ground^a of the purposive connection completely and with sufficient determination for all ends. But the latter has to be expected from a *doctrine of pure ends*^b (which can be no other doctrine than that of *freedom*), the principle of which contains a priori the relation of reason in general to the whole of all ends and can only be practical. However, since a pure practical teleology, i.e., a morals,^c is destined to realize its ends in the world, it may not neglect their *possibility* in the world, both as regards the *final* causes given in it and the suitability of the *supreme cause of the world* to a whole of all ends as effect – hence natural *teleology* as well as the possibility of a nature in general, i.e., transcendental philosophy. This serves to secure objective reality to the doctrine of practically pure ends^d with respect to the possibility of the object in the exercise,^e namely the objective reality of the end that this doctrine prescribes as to be effectuated in the world.

Now in both these regards, the author of the *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* has demonstrated in an exemplary manner his talent, insight and laudable mode of thought in usefully applying that philosophy to universally necessary ends. And while it may be an imposition on the excellent editor of the present journal which might seem to encroach upon his modesty, I have not been able to fail to ask his permission to insert in his journal my recognition of the merit of the unnamed and until quite recently to me unknown author of those letters concerning the common cause of a speculative as well as practical reason that is guided by fixed principles,^f to the extent that I endeavored to make a contribution to this. The talent of a lucid, even graceful presentation of dry abstract^g doctrines, without loss of their thoroughness, is so rare (it is the least granted to old age) and yet so useful, I will not

^a Urgrund.

^b reine Zweckslehre.

^c Moral.

^d praktischen reinen Zweckslehre.

^e in der Ausübung.

^f Grundsätzen.

^g abgezogener.

8: 183

say only for the recommendation, but even for the clarity of insight, the intelligibility and the conviction associated with it – that I consider myself obliged to pay thanks publicly to the man who supplemented^a my works, to which I was not able to provide this facilitation, in such a manner.

Finally, I would like to use this occasion to touch briefly on the accusation of contradictions, allegedly discovered in a work of considerable extent, presumably before having been grasped in its entirety. Those alleged contradictions all vanish by themselves if one considers them in connection with the rest of the work. In the Leipz. gel. Zeitung 1787 No. 94²⁰ a contradiction is pointed out between that which stands in the Critique etc. edition 1787 in the introduction, p. 3, 1. 7 with what follows soon thereafter on p. 5, 1. 1 and 2.²¹ For in the first passage I had said:

8: 184 among the cognitions a priori, however, those are called *pure* in which nothing empirical is *intermixed*; and I had given as an example of the opposite the proposition: everything *alterable* has a cause. By contrast, I cite on p. 5 this same proposition as an example of a pure cognition a priori, i.e., one that is not *dependent* on anything empirical. Here we have two meanings of the word *pure*, of which I am only concerned with the latter in the whole work, though. To be sure, I could have avoided the misunderstanding by an example of the first kind of propositions such as: Everything *contingent* has a cause. For here nothing empirical is *intermixed*. But who can think of all occasions for misunderstanding? – The same thing happened to me with a note to the preface of the *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science*, pp. xvif.,²² where I declare the deduction of the categories to be important yet not *extremely necessary*, while studiously asserting the latter in the Critique. One can easily see that in the former work the deduction was considered only with a *negative* intention, namely in order to prove that with the categories *alone* (without sensible intuition) *no cognition* of things could come about – which becomes clear already if one turns only to the **exposition** of the categories (as logical functions applied merely to objects in general). Yet since we also engage in a use of the categories in which they actually pertain to the *cognition* of objects (of experience), the possibility of an objective validity of such concepts a priori in relation to the empirical had to be proven separately,^b so that they would not be judged to be without meaning or to have *originated* empirically. And that was the *positive* intention with respect to which the *deduction* is indeed indispensably necessary.

I have just learned that the author of the Letters mentioned above, Hr. Councillor Reinhold, is now professor of philosophy in Jena – an addition that can only be advantageous to this famous university.

I. Kant

^a ergänzte.
^b besonders.

From Soemmering's *On the organ of the soul*

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In 1796 the physician and anatomist, Samuel Thomas Soemmering¹ (1755–1830) published an eighty-page treatise entitled *Über das Organ der Seele* (*On the Organ of the Soul*),² in the first part of which he described the anatomy of the human brain by detailing the path of the nerves from the various regions of the body to their endings in the brain's ventricles and the liquid they contain. He discussed the role of the ventricular liquid in terms of the traditional psycho-physiological concept of the *sensorium commune* (common sensory organ), in which the different sensory data converge and combine. In the second part of the work Soemmering went on to speculate about the vital properties of the ventricular liquid and its function as the "seat" (*Sitz*) or "organ" (*Organ*) of the soul, thereby pursuing the specific localization of psychic entities in the anatomy of the human brain.

Prior to publication Soemmering had sent the completed manuscript of his work to Kant, indicating his intention to dedicate the work to Kant. Kant responded with a letter to Soemmering dated 10 August 1795³ that contained his thanks for the planned dedication and included as an insert a detailed statement on Soemmering's work,⁴ to be used as Soemmering saw fit. Soemmering thanked Kant for the statement and the permission in a letter dated 22 August 1795, in which he also stressed his caution in using the terms "seat of the soul" and "common sensory organ" and greeted with enthusiasm Kant's speculations on the organizational properties of liquids, specifically of the "brain water" (*Hirnwasser*).⁵ In a second letter to Soemmering, dated 17 September 1795,⁶ Kant added the following reflection to his earlier statement:

The main problem concerning the common organ of the senses is this: to bring unity of aggregation into the infinite manifold of all sensory representations of the mind, or rather, render that unity comprehensible by reference to the structure of the brain. This problem can be solved only if there is some means of associating even *heterogeneous* but temporally contiguous impressions: e.g., associating the visual representation of a garden with the auditory representation

of a piece of music played in that garden, the taste of a meal enjoyed there, etc. These representations would become confused if the nerve bundles were to affect each other through reciprocal contact. But now the *water* of the brain cavities can serve to mediate the influence of one nerve on the other and, by the latter's reaction, can serve to connect in one consciousness the corresponding representation, without these impressions becoming mixed – as little as the tones of a polyphonic concerto are propagated in a mixed state through the *air*.⁷

When Soemmering's work appeared in print in Königsberg in 1796, it bore the dedication “*Unserem Kant*” (To Our Kant) and included Kant's statement, placed at the end of the work (pp. 81–6) and preceded by the following announcement: “The pride of our age, *Kant*, had the kindness not only to grant his approbation to the idea governing the preceding treatise, but even to expand and refine it, and so to render it more perfect. His kind permission allows me to crown my work with his own words” (p. 81). In the main body of his work, Soemmering quoted in full Kant's further reflections on the psycho-physiological function of the brain water from Kant's second letter to him (pp. 45f.).

At a methodological level, the statement on Soemmering's work is a contribution to Kant's long-standing interest in the demarcation between different disciplines in general and between philosophy and natural science in particular. A special focus of Kant's concern with the differences in method and reach among the scientific disciplines were border disputes that involved competing claims to insight into a subject matter that is addressed by more than discipline.

The case in point in Kant's engagement with Soemmering's work is the relation between a natural-scientific approach to the phenomenon of consciousness that reduces the latter to functions of the brain, and a philosophical account of consciousness that insists on the heterogeneity of the physical and the mental. Kant's principal objection against the localization of mental phenomena and their sum total, that is, the soul, in physiological phenomena (brain) is that states and processes of consciousness are objects of inner perception (inner sense) occurring in time, while the brain and its states and processes are objects of outer perception (outer sense) taking place in space.

At a substantial level, Kant's statement takes up Soemmering's scientific hypothesis that the physiological basis for the combination of sensory data in one consciousness is to be located in the “brain water.” Based on his indirect acquaintance with the new chemistry of Lavoisier, who had demonstrated the composition of water out of two gases (oxygen and hydrogen), Kant conjectures that the chemical decomposition and recombination of the brain water can serve as a material basis for the mental combination of diverse sensations into the collective unity of consciousness.

Kant's substantial speculations on the organizational properties of water in the statement on Soemmering's work build on his own earlier work on the organization of matter in living beings in the second part of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), entitled “Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment”.⁸ Two years after the appearance of his statement on Soemmering's work, Kant published *The Conflict of the Faculties*,⁹ in which he addressed the methodological issue of interdisciplinary border disputes in three case studies involving the competing claims of the four faculties that made up the traditional European university (philosophy, theology, law, and medicine).

In terms of its focus on the interaction between body and mind (“soul”), Kant's piece on Soemmering also goes together with a number of his works on issues of psycho-somatics, namely *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764), *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), *On the Philosophers' Medicine of the Body* (1786) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), all of which are contained in the present volume. The translation of *Aus Soemmering Über das Organ der Seele* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 12: 31–5 and was undertaken by Arnulf Zweig. The title of Kant's small work is not original with Kant but describes the original publication situation.

From Soemmerring's *On the organ of the soul*¹

12: 31

You ask, worthy man, for my opinion of your completed work concerning a certain principle of the vital force^a in animal bodies, a principle which, considered from the side of the faculty of mere perception, is called the *immediate sensory organ*^b (*proton Aistheterion πρῶτον Αἰσθητήριον*) but which, if considered from the side of the unification of all perceptions in a certain part of the brain, is called the *common place of sensation*^d (*sensorium commune*).² As one not wholly unfamiliar with *natural studies*,^e I acknowledge the honor you do me with many thanks. – But there remains bound up with it a question presented to *metaphysics* (whose oracle, as they say, has long since fallen silent); and that question perplexes me, making me wonder whether I should accept this honor or not. For there is also in it the question concerning the *seat of the soul* (*sedes animae*), both with regard to its *sensory receptivity*^f (*facultas sensitiva percipiendi*)^g and its faculty of motion^b (*facultas locomotiva*). Hence a response is sought over which two faculties could get into quarrel because of their jurisdiction (the *forum competens*), the *medical* faculty, in its anatomical-physiological division, with the *philosophical* faculty, in its psychological-metaphysical division. As happens with all *coalition attempts* unpleasantries arise between those who want to base everything on *empirical* principles and those who demand *a priori* grounds (a case which still occurs in the attempts of unifying the *pure* doctrine of law with politics as *empirically conditioned* doctrine of law, as well as between the *pure* doctrine of religion and the revealed one as equally *empirically conditioned*) – unpleasantries which rest solely on the conflict of the

^a *Lebenskraft.*^b *Sinnenwerkzeug.*^c Greek for “first sensory organ.”^d *der gemeinsame Empfindungsplatz.*^e *Naturkunde.*^f *Sinnenempfänglichkeit.*^g Latin for “capacity of perceiving through the senses.”^b *Bewegungsvermögen.*ⁱ Latin for “competent forum.”

faculties regarding to which of them the question belongs, if an answer is sought from a university (as the institution encompassing all wisdom). – Whoever, in the present case, sides with the *physician*^a as a physiologist spoils things with the *philosopher* as a metaphysician; and vice versa, whoever pleases the latter offends the physiologist.

Actually, however, it is the concept of a *seat of the soul* that occasions the disagreement of the faculties concerning the common sensory organ and this concept therefore had better be left entirely out of the picture, which is all the more justified since the concept of a seat of the soul requires *local presence*,^b which would ascribe to the thing that is only an object of the inner sense, and insofar only determinable according to temporal conditions, a spatial relation, thereby generating a contradiction. By contrast, a *virtual presence*,^c which belongs only for the understanding, and which just for that reason is not spatial, provides a concept that makes it impossible to treat the question posed (regarding the *sensorium commune*) as a merely physiological task.^d For even though most people believe that they can feel the thinking in their head, this is merely an error of subreption, namely taking the judgment about the cause of the sensation in a certain place (the brain) for the sensation of the cause in this place; and then afterward having the traces in the brain of the impressions made on it, under the name *material ideas* (Descartes),³ accompany the thoughts according to *laws of association*, which, even though they are very arbitrary hypotheses, at least do not require any seat of the soul and do not confuse the physiological task with metaphysics. – Hence we are only concerned with the matter that makes possible the unifying of all sensory representations in the mind.*^e – But the only matter that qualifies for this (as *sensorium commune*), according to the discovery you have made by

12: 32

* By *mind* one means only the *faculty* of combining the given representations and effectuating the unity of empirical apperception (*animus*), not yet the substance (*anima*) according to its nature, which is entirely distinct from that matter and from which is abstracted here; by this we gain that, with regard to the thinking subject, we must not cross over into metaphysics, which is concerned with the pure consciousness and with the latter's *a priori* unity in the synthesis (*Zusammensetzung*) of given representations (i.e., concerned with the understanding); rather we are concerned with the power of the imagination, to whose intuitions, as empirical representations (even in the absence of their objects), there can be assumed to correspond impressions in the brain (actually habits [*babitus*] of reproduction), which belong to a whole of inner self-intuition.

^a *Mediziner.*^b *lokale Gegenwart.*^c *virtuelle Gegenwart.*

^d *Aufgabe*; here as well as later on in the text Kant uses this Germanic word rather than the more technical, Greek-based term *Problem* in the sense of a formally posed task or problem to be solved.

^e *Gemüt.*

12: 33

your deep anatomical research,^a is the matter contained in the cavity of the brain, and is mere water as the immediate organ of the soul which, on the one hand, *separates* the nerve bundles that terminate there so that the sensations coming from different nerves are not mixed up, and which, on the other hand, effectuates a thoroughgoing *community* among them so as to prevent any of these sensations, received by the same mind, from being outside the mind (which would be a contradiction).

Now however a great scruple comes in: that, since *water*, as a fluid, cannot be thought of as organized, yet no matter which lacks organization, i.e., which is without the purposive disposition of its parts in an enduring form, could serve as the immediate organ of the soul, that neat discovery may not reach its goal.

A continuous matter is *fluid* whose every part within the space it occupies can be moved from its location by the smallest force. This property appears however to contradict the concept of an organized matter, which one thinks of as a machine, consequently as *rigid** matter resisting the displacement of its parts (and hence also the alteration of its inner configuration) with a certain force. But to think of that water as partly fluid, partly rigid (like, perhaps, the crystalline moisture in the eye) would also to some extent destroy the aim in assuming that property of the immediate organ of the soul, which was to explain its function.

How would it be if, instead of the *mechanical* organization, based on the juxtaposition of the parts for the formation of a certain shape, I proposed a *dynamical* organization, based on chemical principles^b (just as the former organization is based on mathematical ones) and which is thus compatible with the fluidity of that matter? – Just as the *mathematical* division of a space and of the matter occupying it (e.g., of the cavity of the brain and of the water filling it) can go to infinity, so the *chemical* division, as a dynamical one (separation of different kinds of matter dissolved by each other in a given matter), might be such that it, too, goes to infinity (*in indefinitum*), as far as we know. – Pure ordinary water, which until recently was still held to be a chemical element, is now, through pneumatic experiments, being separated into two different kinds of air.^c Each of these kinds of air contains in itself, besides its base, also the caloric matter,^d which nature perhaps can decompose into light matter^e and

12: 34

* To the *fluid* (*fluidum*) must actually be opposed the *rigid* (*rigidum*), as the contrast with the former is also put by Euler.⁴ The opposite of the *solid* is the *empty*.

^a tiefe Zergliederungskunde.

^b Prinzipien

^c Luftparten

^d Wärmestoff

^e Lichtstoff

other matter,^a as light can be further decomposed into different colors, etc. If one also considers what an immeasurable manifoldness of partly volatile matters^b the realm of plants produces from that ordinary water, presumably through decomposition and other kinds of connection, then one can imagine what manifoldness of tools the nerves encounter at their ends in the water of the brain (which might be nothing more than ordinary water) where they terminate, in order to be receptive to the world of sense and in turn also to be able to act back on it.

If now one takes as a hypothesis that a faculty of the nerves underlies the mind in its empirical thinking, i.e., in separating and combining given sensory representations, a faculty that decomposes the water in the brain cavity into those primary matters^c according to the differences of the sensory representations, thus a faculty allowing a play of different sensations by setting free one or another of the elements (e.g., those of light, by means of the stimulated optic nerve, or those of sound, by the auditory nerve, etc.), yet in such a way that these matters^d immediately recombine when the stimulus ceases; then one could say that this water *were being* continuously organized without ever being organized. Which would yet achieve the same result aimed at with the permanent organization, namely to make comprehensible the collective unity of all sensory representations in a common sense organ (*sensorium commune*), but rather in terms of its chemical dissection.^e

The actual task, as formulated by Haller,⁵ is still not solved by this. It is not merely a physiological task but is supposed also to serve as a means of figuring out^f the unity of the consciousness of oneself (which belongs to the understanding) in the spatial relationship of the *soul* to the organs of the brain (which belongs to the outer sense), hence the *seat* of the soul, as its *local* presence – which is a task for metaphysics, yet one that is not only unsolvable for the latter but also in itself contradictory. – For if I am to render intuitive^g the location of my soul, i.e., of my absolute self, anywhere in space, I must perceive myself through the very same sense by which I also perceive the matter immediately surrounding me, just as it happens when I want to determine my place in the world *as a human being*, namely I must consider my body in relation to other bodies outside me. – But the soul can perceive itself only through the inner sense, while it perceives the body (whether internally or externally) only through outer senses, and consequently it can determine absolutely no location

12: 35

^a Materie

^b flüchtige Stoffe

^c Urstoffe

^d Stoffe

^e Zergliederung

^f vorstellig . . . machen

^g anschaulich

for itself, because for that it would have to make itself into an object of its own outer intuition and would have to place itself outside itself, which is self-contradictory. Thus the required resolution of the task regarding the seat of the soul, with which metaphysics is supposed to come up, leads to an impossible magnitude ($\sqrt{-2}$); and one can say to the person who undertakes to provide it, with the words of Terence: *nihil plus agas, quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias.*⁴ Still the physiologist, who is content to pursue the merely dynamic presence, where possible, up to the immediate one, can also not be reproached for having summoned the metaphysician to supply what is still lacking.

⁴ Terence, *Eunuch* 1, i. 17f.: “You would not accomplish anything more than if you set out with your reason to become mad.”

Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

In a letter written toward the end of 1773 to his former student Marcus Herz, Kant notes:

This winter, for the second time, I am giving a lecture course on anthropology, which I now intend to make into a proper academic discipline. . . . The intention that I have is to disclose through it the sources of all the sciences, the science of morals, of skill, of social intercourse, of the method of educating and governing human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical. . . . I include so many observations of ordinary life that my listeners have constant occasion to compare their ordinary experience with my remarks and thus, from beginning to end, find the lectures entertaining and never dry. In my spare time, I am working on a preparatory exercise for students out of this (in my opinion) very pleasant empirical study of skill, prudence, and even wisdom that, along with physical geography and distinct from all other instruction, can be called knowledge of the world. (10: 145–6).

Kant taught his anthropology course twenty-four times – every winter semester from 1772 until his retirement in 1796. A companion course in physical geography (which he had first offered in 1756, and out of which the anthropology course to some extent grew) was offered in the summer semesters. Physical geography, the study of nature, and anthropology, the study of the human being, were viewed as together constituting the two main aspects of knowledge of the world, a distinctly pragmatic knowledge designed to be “useful not merely for *school*, but rather for *life*, and through which the accomplished apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny, namely, the *world*” (*On the Different Races of Human Beings* 2: 443).

Kant's book, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, essentially reflects the last lectures that he gave for his annual anthropology course. In a footnote at the end of the Preface, he describes the work simply as “the present manual for my anthropology course” (7: 122 n.). By “present” he is alluding to the fact that his own lectures for the course changed considerably over the years. Many earlier versions of the

lectures – in the form of notes made by students and auditors of the course – also exist. Seven different versions of these latter lectures, dating from 1772 to 1789, along with brief selections from still other versions, are collected in volume twenty-five of the Academy Edition [*Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, edited by Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1997)]. An English translation of some of this material is forthcoming in a future volume of The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (*Lectures on Anthropology*, edited by Robert B. Louden and Allen W. Wood). By comparing Kant's own final set of notes with earlier transcriptions made by students and auditors, one gains a sense of how his conception of anthropology developed and changed over the years.

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View had the largest first printing (2000) of all of Kant's books, and by nearly all accounts the course for which the lectures were first prepared was also his most popular and successful. Intended for a broad audience, they reveal not only Kant's unique contribution to the newly emerging field of anthropology, but also his desire to offer students a practical view of the world and of humanity's place in it. At the same time, Kantian anthropology does not form an entirely uniform narrative, but is rather an eclectic venture revealing multiple origins, competing concerns and goals, as well as multiple application possibilities. (For instance, in addition to the physical geography lectures, the empirical psychology portions of Kant's metaphysics lectures also form part of the background of his anthropology.)

Two editions of the *Anthropology* were published during Kant's life: the first edition was published in 1798; the second in 1800. The Academy Edition of the text [vii: 117–333, edited by Oswald Külpe (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1907; reprint 1917)] is based on the second edition, and the present translation is based on Külpe's text. In preparing my translation I have also made use of Reinhard Brandt's more recent edition of the text [*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000)].

The *Anthropology* is unique among Kant's published books in that it is the only one for which a virtually complete hand-written manuscript (prepared by Kant) still exists. This *Handschrift*, which was given to the University of Rostock Library in 1840 by the son of a former student of Kant's who himself had bought the manuscript at an auction in 1808, occasionally differs substantially from both the first and second editions of the *Anthropology*, and in the judgment of many scholars gives us a closer indication of Kant's original intentions. The changes between the first and second editions (abbreviated as "A1" and "A2" in my notes), though numerous, are mostly stylistic, and were probably made not by Kant himself but by Christian Gottfried Schütz. For instance, in a letter to Kant of May 22, 1800, Schütz refers to "the pleasant business, which I had taken on, of attending to the final proofreading of the second

edition of your *Anthropology*" (12: 307). While not all of the myriad variant readings between A1 and A2 are listed in the footnotes to this translation, an attempt has been made to list all that substantially affect the meaning of the passage in question.

The differences between the *Handschrift* (abbreviated as "H" in the footnotes) and the first edition of 1798 are more substantial, but even here it is not clear how big a role Kant played in preparing the manuscript for publication. (He was by now seventy-four years old, retired, and not in good health, and seems even in earlier years often to have allowed others to handle proofreading details for him.) How many of the changes between the *Handschrift* and the first edition were approved by Kant himself? We do not know. At any rate, I have included all of the longer supplementary texts (*Ergänzungen*) from the *Handschrift* in the present translation. These additional texts are of two types: (1) remarks written in the margins of the *Handschrift*, and (2) passages that are crossed out (but by whom?) in the *Handschrift*. Both are printed as footnotes in the present text, and are always prefaced either by "*Marginal note in H:*" or "*Crossed out in H:*".

This supplementary material from the *Handschrift* presents multiple challenges to the translator. Kant's remarks here sometimes have a rough "notes to oneself" feel, and do not always follow grammatical conventions. I have tried to render the *Ergänzungen* literally, and so my translations of them also occasionally have these same characteristics. Again, the main rationale for printing them is the hypothesis that at least in some cases they take us closer to Kant's own considered views. Words and phrases within the *Ergänzungen* footnotes enclosed by "<>" have been crossed out in the *Handschrift*; "[?]" indicates that the preceding word in the *Handschrift* is illegible. In translating this supplementary material from the *Handschrift*, I have relied primarily on Külpe's printed version, which is located in the back of Academy volume 7. However, I would also like to thank Heike Tröger of the Special Collections division of the University of Rostock Library for providing me with a photocopy of the *Handschrift* as well as for help and advice in deciphering the *Handschrift* during an exciting visit to Rostock in June 2003.

In preparing my own endnotes dealing with the content of the text, I have often followed Külpe's own extensive notes in the Academy Edition, though in some places (where indicated) I have also borrowed from other German as well as English-language editions of the text. Readers who find themselves pursuing issues and questions not addressed in the endnotes are encouraged to consult Reinhard Brandt's extensive and detailed commentary on the text [*Kritische Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1999)].

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View has been translated into English twice before – by Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,

1974); and by Victor Lyle Dowdell [revised and edited by Hans H. Rudnick, with an Introduction by Frederick P. Van De Pitte (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978)]. Both translations are good, and the present translation owes a debt to each. In preparing this new translation, I have tried to adhere strictly to the translation principles summarized in the General Editors' Preface reprinted at the beginning of each volume in *The Cambridge Edition*, with one notable exception: Kant's own division of sentences has not always been followed. I have shortened some of them.

Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view

7: 117

P R E F A C E^a

7: 119

All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education,^b has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world's use. But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. – Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called *knowledge of the world*, even though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth.

A doctrine of the knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. – Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what *nature* makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what *he* as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself. – He who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Descartes)¹ over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere observer and must let nature run its course, for he does not know the cranial nerves and fibers, nor does he understand how to put them to use for his purposes. Therefore all theoretical speculation about this is a pure waste of time. – – But if he uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human being for this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a *pragmatic* purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here.

Such an anthropology, considered as *knowledge of the world*, which must come after our *schooling*,^c is actually not yet called *pragmatic* when it contains an extensive knowledge of *things* in the world, for example, animals, plants, and minerals from various lands and climates, but only

7: 120

^a The Preface and Contents are missing in the *Handschrift (H)*.

^b *seine Schule macht.*

^c *die Schule.*

when it contains knowledge of the human being as a *citizen of the world*. – Therefore, even knowledge of the races of human beings as products belonging to the play of nature is not yet counted as pragmatic knowledge of the world, but only as theoretical knowledge of the world.

In addition, the expressions “to *know* the world” and “to *have* the world”^a are rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only *understands* the play that one has watched, while the other has *participated* in it. – But the anthropologist is in a very unfavorable position for judging so-called *high society*, the estate of the nobles,^b because they are too close to one another, but too far from others.

Travel belongs to the means of broadening the range of anthropology, even if it is only the reading of travel books. But if one wants to know what to look for abroad, in order to broaden the range of anthropology, first one must have acquired knowledge of human beings at home, through social intercourse with one's townsmen or countrymen.* Without such a plan (which already presupposes knowledge of human beings) the citizen of the world remains very limited with regard to his anthropology. *General* knowledge always precedes *local* knowledge here, if the latter is to be ordered and directed through philosophy: in the absence of which all acquired knowledge can yield nothing more than fragmentary groping around and no science.

However, all such attempts to arrive at such a science with thoroughness encounter considerable difficulties that are inherent in human nature itself.

7: 121

1. If a human being notices that someone is observing him and trying to study him, he will either appear embarrassed (self-conscious) and *cannot* show himself as he really is; or he dissembles, and does not *want* to be known as he is.

2. Even if he only wants to study himself, he will reach a critical point, particularly as concerns his condition in affect,^c which normally

does not allow *dissimulation*: that is to say, when the incentives are active, he does not observe himself, and when he does not observe himself, the incentives are at rest.

3. Circumstances of place and time, when they are constant, produce *habits* which, as is said, are second nature, and make it difficult for the human being to judge how to consider himself, but even more difficult to judge how he should form an idea of others with whom he is in contact; for the variation of conditions in which the human being is placed by his fate or, if he is an adventurer, places himself, make it very difficult for anthropology to rise to the rank of a formal science.

Finally, while not exactly sources for anthropology, these are nevertheless aids: world history, biographies, even plays and novels. For although the latter two are not actually based on experience and truth, but only on invention, and while here the exaggeration of characters and situations in which human beings are placed is allowed, as if in a dream, thus appearing to show us nothing concerning knowledge of human beings – yet even so, in such characters as are sketched by a Richardson or a Molière,² the *main features* must have been taken from the observation of the real actions of human beings: for while they are exaggerated in degree, they must nevertheless correspond to human nature in kind.

An anthropology written from a pragmatic point of view that is systematically designed and yet popular (through reference to examples which can be found by every reader), yields an advantage for the reading public: the completeness of the headings under which this or that observed human quality of practical relevance can be subsumed offers readers many occasions and invitations to make each particular into a theme of its own, so as to place it in the appropriate category. Through this means the details of the work are naturally divided among the connoisseurs of this study, and they are gradually united into a whole through the unity of the plan. As a result, the growth of science for the common good is promoted and accelerated.*

7: 122

* A large city such as Königsberg on the river Pregel, which, is the center of a kingdom, in which the provincial councils of the government are located, which has a university (for cultivation of the sciences) and which has also the right location for maritime commerce – a city which, by way of rivers, has the advantages of commerce both with the interior of the country and with neighboring and distant lands of different languages and customs, [7: 121] can well be taken as an appropriate place for broadening one's knowledge of human beings as well as of the world, where this knowledge can be acquired without even traveling.

^a die Welt *kennen* und Welt *haben*.

^b die sogenannte große Welt aber, den Stand der Vornehmen.
^c seinen Zustand im Affekt (or, “his emotional condition”).

* In my work with *pure philosophy*, at first freely undertaken, later included as part of my teaching duties, I have for some thirty years given lectures twice a year aimed at *knowledge of the world* – namely (in the winter semester) *anthropology* and (in summer) *physical geography*, which, because they were popular lectures, were also attended by people of different estates. This is the present manual for my anthropology course. As for physical geography, it is scarcely possible at my age to produce a manuscript from my text, which is hardly legible to anyone but myself. [Kant first offered his geography course in 1756. The anthropology course, which to a certain extent grew out of the geography course, was first offered in the winter semester of 1772–3. A poorly edited version of Kant's physical geography lectures was eventually published by Friedrich Theodor Rink in 1802 (9: 151–436) – Ed.]

CONTENTS

Part I. Anthropological Didactic. On the art of cognizing the interior as well as the exterior of the human being	<i>page</i>	238
Book I. On the cognitive faculty		
On consciousness of oneself		239
On egoism		240
Remark. On the formality of egoistic language		242
On the voluntary consciousness of one's representations		242
On self-observation		243
On the representations that we have without being conscious of them		246
On distinctness and indistinctness in consciousness of one's representations		248
On sensibility in contrast to understanding		251
Apology for sensibility		256
Defense of sensibility against the first accusation		257
Defense of sensibility against the second accusation		257
Defense of sensibility against the third accusation		258
On ability with regard to the cognitive faculty in general		259
On artificial play with sensory illusion		261
On permissible moral illusion		263
On the five senses		265
On the sense of touch		266
On hearing		266
On the sense of sight		267
On the sense of taste and smell		268
General remark about the outer senses		269
Questions		270
On inner sense		272
On the causes that increase or decrease sense impressions according to degree		273
a. Contrast		273
b. Novelty		274
c. Change		274

d. Intensification extending to perfection	275
On the inhibition, weakening, and total loss of the sense faculties	276
On the power of imagination	278
On the productive faculty belonging to sensibility according to its different forms	284
A. On sensibility's productive faculty of constructing forms	284
B. On sensibility's productive faculty of association	285
C. On sensibility's productive faculty of affinity	286
On the faculty of visualizing the past and the future by means of the power of imagination	291
A. On memory	291
B. On the faculty of foresight (<i>praevisio</i>)	294
C. On the gift of divination (<i>facultas divinatrix</i>)	296
On involuntary invention in a healthy state, i.e., on dreams	297
On the faculty of using signs (<i>facultas signatrix</i>)	298
Appendix	302
On the cognitive faculty, in so far as it is based on understanding	303
Division	303
Anthropological comparison of the three higher cognitive faculties with one another	304
On the weaknesses and illnesses of the soul with respect to its cognitive faculty	309
A. General division	309
B. On mental deficiencies in the cognitive faculty	311
C. On mental illnesses	317
Random remarks	322
On talents in the cognitive faculty	325
On the specific difference between comparative and argumentative wit	326
A. On productive wit	326
B. On sagacity, or the gift of inquiry	328
C. On the originality of the cognitive faculty, or genius	328
Book II. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure	333
Division	333
On sensuous pleasure	333
A. On the feeling for the agreeable, or sensuous pleasure in the sensation of an object	333
Elucidation through examples	334
On boredom and amusement	336

Contents

B. On the feeling for the beautiful, that is, on the partly sensuous, partly intellectual pleasure in reflective intuition, or taste	342
Taste contains a tendency toward external advancement of morality	347
Anthropological observations concerning taste	348
A. On taste in fashion	348
B. On taste in art	349
On luxury	352
Book III On the faculty of desire	353
On affects in comparison with passion	354
Of the affects in particular	355
A. On the government of the mind with regard to the affects	355
B. On the various affects themselves	356
On timidity and bravery	358
On affects that weaken themselves with respect to their end (<i>impotentes animi motus</i>)	362
On the affects by which nature promotes health mechanically	363
General remark	365
On the passions	367
Division of the passions	368
A. On the inclination to freedom as a passion	369
B. On the desire for vengeance as a passion	371
C. On the inclination toward the capacity of having influence in general over other human beings	372
a. The mania for honor	373
b. The mania for domination	373
c. The mania for possession	374
On the inclination of delusion as a passion	375
On the highest physical good	376
On the highest moral-physical good	377
Part II Anthropological Characteristic. On the way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior	383
Division	384
A. The character of the person	384
I. On natural aptitude	384
II. On temperament	385
I. Temperaments of feeling	386
A. The sanguine temperament of the light-blooded person	386
B. The melancholy temperament of the heavy-blooded person	386
II. Temperaments of activity	387

Contents

C. The choleric temperament of the hot-blooded person	387
D. The phlegmatic temperament of the cold-blooded person	387
III. On character as the way of thinking	389
On the qualities that follow merely from the human being's having or not having character	390
On physiognomy	393
On the guidance of nature to physiognomy	394
Division of physiognomy	394
A. On the structure of the face	394
B. On what is characteristic in the features of the face	396
C. On what is characteristic in facial expressions	397
Random remarks	398
B. On the character of the sexes	399
Random remarks	402
Pragmatic consequences	404
C. The character of the peoples	407
D. On the character of the races	415
E. On the character of the species	416
Main features of the description of the human species' character	425

ANTHROPOLOGY
PART I
ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC

ON THE ART OF COGNIZING THE INTERIOR
AS WELL AS THE EXTERIOR OF
THE HUMAN BEING

Book I
On the cognitive faculty

On consciousness of oneself

§ 1. The fact that the human being can have the "I" in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a *person*, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person – i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from *things*, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes.³ This holds even when he cannot yet say "I," because he still has it in thoughts, just as all languages must think^a it when they speak in the first person, even if they do not have a special word to express this concept of "I." For this faculty (namely to think) is *understanding*.

But it is noteworthy that the child who can already speak fairly fluently nevertheless first begins to talk by means of "I" fairly late (perhaps a year later); in the meantime speaking of himself in the third person (Karl wants to eat, to walk, etc.). When he starts to speak by means of "I" a light seems to dawn on him, as it were, and from that day on he never again returns to his former way of speaking. – Before he merely *felt* himself, now he *thinks* himself. – The explanation of this phenomenon might be rather difficult for the anthropologist.

The observation that a child neither expresses tears nor laughs until three months after his birth appears to be based on the development of certain ideas of offense and injustice,^b which point to reason. – In this period of time he begins to follow with his eyes shining objects held before him, and this is the crude beginning of the progress^c of perception (apprehension of the ideas of sense), which enlarges to *knowledge* of objects of sense, that is, of *experience*.

Furthermore,^d when the child tries to speak the mangling of words is so charming for the mother and nurse, and this inclines them^e to constantly hug and kiss him, and they thoroughly spoil the tiny dictator by fulfilling his every wish and desire. On the one hand, this creature's charm in the time period of his development toward humanity must be credited to the innocence and openness of all of his still faulty utterances, during which no dissimulation and no malice are present. But on the other hand, the child's charm must also be credited to the natural tendency of the nurses^f to comfort a creature that ingratiatingly entrusts

^a "think" is italicized (*gesperrt*) in *H*.

^b A1 and A2: injustice; *H*: kindness.

^c of the progress not in *H*.

^d Furthermore not in *H*.

^e and this inclines them added in A2.

^f of the nurses not in *H*.

himself entirely to the will of another.^a This permits him a playtime, the happiest time of all, during which the teacher^b once more enjoys the charm of childhood, and practically makes himself a child.

However, the memory of the teacher's childhood does not reach back to that time; for it was not the time of experiences, but merely of scattered perceptions not yet united under the concept of an object.

On egoism

§ 2. From the day that the human being begins to speak by means of "I," he brings his beloved self to light wherever he is permitted to, and egoism progresses unchecked. If he does not do so openly (for then the egoism of others opposes him), nevertheless he does so covertly and with seeming self-abnegation and pretended modesty, in order all the more reliably to give himself a superior worth in the judgment of others.

Egoism can contain three kinds of presumption: the presumption of understanding, of taste, and of practical interest; that is, it can be logical, aesthetic, or practical.

The *logical egoist* considers it unnecessary also to test his judgment by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*).^c But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgment that this may be the most important reason why learned people cry out so urgently for *freedom of the press*. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgments, and we are exposed to error. One must not even say that *mathematics* is at least privileged to judge from its complete authority, for if the perceived general agreement of the surveyor's judgment did not follow from the judgment of all others who with talent and industry dedicated themselves to this discipline, then even mathematics itself would not be free from fear of somewhere falling into error. — There are also many cases where we do not even trust the judgment of our own senses alone, for example, whether a ringing is merely in our ears or whether it is the hearing of bells actually being rung, but find it necessary to ask others whether it seemed the same to them. And while in philosophizing we may not^d call up the judgments of others to confirm our own, as jurists do in calling up the judgments of those versed

7: 129

^a Marginal note in H: Cognition consists of two parts, intuition and thought. To be aware of both in one's consciousness is not to perceive oneself, but the representation of the I in thought. In order to know oneself, one must perceive oneself. *perceptio*, and also added to this *apperceptio*.

^b *Erzieher*.

^c Trans.: an external criterion of truth.

^d H: may not, indeed should not.

in the law, nevertheless each writer^a who finds no followers with his publicly avowed opinion^b on an important topic is suspected of being in error.

For this very reason it is a *hazardous enterprise*, even for intelligent people, to entertain an assertion that contradicts generally accepted opinion. This semblance of egoism is called *paradox*. It is not boldness to run the risk that one says might be untrue, but rather that only a few people might accept it. — The predilection for paradox is in fact *logical obstinacy*, in which someone does not want to be an imitator of others, but to appear as a rare human being. Instead, a person like this often appears only *strange*. But because every person must have and assert his own thoughts (*Si omnes patres sic, at ego non sic. Abelard*),^c the reproach of paradox, when it is not based on vanity, or simply wanting to be different, carries no bad^d connotations. — The opposite of paradox is *banality*, which has common opinion on its side. But with this there is just as little guarantee, if not less, because it lulls one to sleep; whereas paradox arouses the mind to attention and investigation, which often leads to discoveries.

The *aesthetic egoist* is satisfied with his own taste, even if others find his verses, paintings, music, and similar things ever so bad, and criticize or even laugh at them. He deprives himself of progress toward that which is better when he isolates himself with his own judgment; he applauds himself and seeks the touchstone of artistic beauty only in himself.

7: 130

Finally, the *moral egoist* limits all ends to himself, sees no use in anything except that which is useful to himself, and as a eudaemonist^e puts the supreme determining ground of his will simply in utility and his own happiness, not in the thought of duty. For, since every other human being also forms his own different concept of what he counts as happiness, it is precisely egoism which drives him to have no touchstone at all of the genuine concept of duty, which absolutely must be a universally valid principle.^f — That is why all eudaemonists are practical egoists.

The opposite of egoism can only be *pluralism*, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the

^a Crossed out in H: writer [When the writer deprived of general public acclamation by others who freely admit not to understand such investigations nevertheless remains in suspicion, this must be because what he has taught is in error; for one cannot so casually overlook the judgment of others as a touchstone of truth].

^b H: stands isolated and just because of that is suspected by the public of being in error. 'bad not in H.'

^c H: eudaemonist <instructed quite correctly in his principle>.

^d A1 and A2: which . . . principle. H: which <can only be found with respect to the end, in the determining grounds of the free will which must be valid for everyone.>.

world. – This much belongs to anthropology. As for what concerns this distinction according to metaphysical concepts, it lies entirely beyond the field of the science treated here. That is to say, if the question were merely whether I as a thinking being have reason to assume, in addition to my own existence, the existence of a whole of other beings existing in community with me (called the world), then the question is not anthropological but merely metaphysical.

Remark. On the formality of egoistic language

In our time, the language of the head of state is normally in the plural when addressing the people (We . . . , by the grace of God, etc.). The question arises, whether the meaning of this is not rather egoistic; that is, indicative of the speaker's own complete power, and means exactly the same as what the King of Spain says with his *Io, el Rey* ("I, the King")? However, it appears that this formality of the highest authority was originally supposed to indicate condescension (We, the King and his council, or estates). – But how did it happen that the reciprocal form of address, which in the ancient classical languages was expressed through *thou*, hence in the singular, came to be indicated by different people (particularly Germanic peoples) in the plural through *you*? In order to indicate more precisely the person being addressed, the Germans have even invented two expressions; namely, *he* and *they* (as if it were not a form of address at all, but rather an account of someone absent, and indeed, either one or more than one person). Finally, to complete all the absurdity of professed abasement before the person being addressed and exalting him, expressions have come into use by means of which we address not the person but the abstract quality of his estate^a (Your grace, Right Honorable, Right Noble, High and noble, and so on). – All of this is probably a result of the feudal system, which took care that the degree of respect due to the nobility was not missing,^b from the royal dignity on through all gradations up to the point where even human dignity stops and only the human being remains – that is, to the estate of the serf, who alone is addressed by his superiors by means of *thou*, or of a child, who is not yet permitted to have his own way.

7: 131

On the voluntary consciousness of one's representations

§ 3. The endeavor to become conscious of one's representations is either the *paying attention to* (*attentio*) or the *turning away from* an idea of which I am conscious (*abstractio*). – The latter is not the mere failure and omission of the former (for that would be distraction, *distractio*), but rather a real act of the cognitive faculty of stopping a representation of which

^a *Stand*.

^b "degree of respect . . . missing" not in *H*.

I am conscious from being in connection with other representations in one consciousness. That is why one does not say "to abstract (isolate) *something*," but rather "to abstract (isolate) *from something*"; that is, to abstract a determination^a from the object of my representation, whereby this definition obtains the universality of a concept, and is thus taken into the understanding.

To be able to abstract from a representation, even when the senses force it on a person, is a far greater faculty than that of paying attention to a representation, because it demonstrates a freedom of the faculty of thought and the authority of the mind, *in having the object of one's representations under one's control* (*animus sui compos*). – In this respect, the faculty of *abstraction* is much more difficult than that of attention, but also more important, when it concerns sense representations.

Many human beings are unhappy because they cannot abstract. The suitor could make a good marriage if only he could overlook a wart on his beloved's face, or a gap between her teeth. But it is an especially bad habit of our faculty of attention to fix itself directly, even involuntarily, on what is faulty in others: to fix one's eyes on a button missing from the coat of someone who is directly in front of us, or on gaps between his teeth, or to direct attention to a habitual speech defect, thereby confusing the other person and ruining the game not only for him but also for conversation. If the essentials are good, then it is not only fair, but also prudent, to *look away from* the misfortune^b of others, yes, even from our own good fortune. But this faculty of abstraction is a strength of mind^c that can only be acquired through practice.

7: 132

On self-observation

§ 4. Noticing oneself (*animadvertere*) is not yet *observing* oneself (*observare*). The latter is a methodical compilation of the perceptions formed in us, which deliver material for a diary of an *observer of oneself*, and easily lead to enthusiasm and madness.^d

Paying attention (*attentio*) to oneself is necessary, to be sure, when one is dealing with others. But in social intercourse it must not become visible; for then it makes conversation either *embarrassed* (self-conscious)

^a *eine Bestimmung*.

^b *das Üble*.

^c *H*: strength of soul.

^d *Schwärmerei und Wahnsinn*. "Enthusiasm" is the traditional rendering for *Schwärmerei*. However, throughout the Enlightenment, "enthusiasm" often was meant in a sense closer to our "fanaticism." As Locke wrote: "This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or over-weening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either of those two, or both together" (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* [1689], iv.xix.7).

or *affected* (stilted). The opposite of both is *ease*^a (an *air dégagé*): a self-confidence that one's behavior will not be judged unfavorably by others. He who pretends as if he would like to judge^b himself in front of the mirror to see how the pose suits him, or who speaks as if he were listening to himself speak (not merely as if someone else were listening to him), is a kind of actor. He wants to represent^c and to feign an illusion of his own person whereby, when others observe this effort of his, he suffers in their judgment, because it arouses the suspicion of an intention to deceive them. – Candor in the manners by which one shows oneself externally (which gives rise to no such suspicion) is called *natural* behavior (which nevertheless does not exclude all fine art and formation of taste), and it pleases as a result of simple *veracity* in expression. But where at the same time open-heartedness peeks through speech from *simple-mindedness*,^d that is, from the lack of an art of dissimulation that has already become the rule, then it is called *naïveté*.

7: 133

The plain manner of expressing oneself, as a result of innocence and simple-mindedness (ignorance in the art of pretence), as evidenced in an adolescent girl who is approached or a peasant unfamiliar with urban manners, arouses a cheerful laugh among those who are already practised and wise in this art. Their laughter is not a jeering with contempt, for in their hearts they still honor purity and sincerity; but rather a good-humored, affectionate smiling at inexperience in the *art of pretence*, which is evil, even though it is grounded in our already corrupted human nature. But one should sigh for this naïve manner rather than laugh at it, when one compares it to the idea of a still uncorrupted human nature.* It is a momentary cheerfulness, as if from a cloudy sky that opens up just once in a single spot to let a sunbeam through, but then immediately closes up again in order to spare the weak mole's eyes of selfishness.

But the real purpose of this section concerns the *warning* mentioned above, namely, not to concern oneself in the least with spying and, as it were, the affected composition of an inner history of the *involuntary* course of one's thoughts and feelings. The warning is given because this is the most direct path to illuminism or even terrorism, by way of a confusion in the mind^e of supposed higher inspirations and powers flowing into us, without our help, who knows from where. For without

* In regard to this one could parody the famous verse of Persius as follows: *Naturam videant ingemiscantique relicta* [Trans.: that they may look on nature, and sigh because they have lost her – Ed.].

^a *Ungezwungenheit*.

^b H: <admire>.

^c *repräsentieren*. H: represent <that is, draw preferable attention to himself and he appears foolish (vain in a silly way)>.

^d *Einfalt*.

^e *Kopfverwirrung*.

noticing it, we make supposed discoveries of what we ourselves have carried into ourselves, like a *Bourignon* with his flattering ideas, or a *Pascal* with his terrifying and fearful ones.⁵ Even an otherwise splendid mind, *Albrecht Haller*, fell into a situation of this kind. While occupied with the long-worked-on but also often-interrupted diary of his spiritual condition, he finally reached the point of asking a famous theologian, his former academic colleague Dr. *Less*, whether in his vast treasury of theology he could not find consolation for his anguished soul.⁶

To observe the various acts of representative power^a in myself, *when I summon them*, is indeed worth reflection; it is necessary and useful for logic and metaphysics. – But to wish to eavesdrop on oneself when they come into the mind *unbidden* and on their own (this happens through the play of the power of imagination when it is unintentionally meditating)^b constitutes a reversal of the natural order in the faculty of knowledge, because then the principles of thought do not lead the way (as they should), but rather follow behind. This eavesdropping on oneself is either already a disease of the mind (melancholy), or leads to one and to the madhouse. He who knows how to describe a great deal about his *inner experiences* (of grace, of temptations) may, with his voyage of discovery in the exploration of himself, land only in Anticyra.⁷ For the situation with these inner experiences is not as it is with *external* experiences of objects in space, where the objects appear^c next to each other and^d permanently fixed.^e Inner sense sees the relations of its determinations^f only in time,

7: 134

^a *Vorstellungskraft*.

^b “unintentionally meditating” not in H.

^c H: are.

^d Crossed out in H: and [can be presented persistently to the sense, but where, namely in time, the phenomena (of the mind) are in permanent flux, and in different moments always give different views of exactly the same objects, which here the soul is (of the subject himself) is <always new to the faculty of cognition> and can be justified, in order to ground an *experience*, rather the inner perceptions, which are coordinated with each other according to their relation *in time*, <place their object as it were> are themselves conceived in *flux* <with and in continuous change> by the passing by of some and the coming into being of others, whereby it easily happens that imaginings instead of perceptions are inserted and, what we <even unexpectedly> *invent* in addition, is taken falsely for inner experience, and ascribed by us to ourselves].

^e Marginal note in H: Concerning intuiting and *reflecting* consciousness. The former can be empirical or *a priori*. The other is never empirical, but always intellectual.

The latter is either *attending* or *abstracting*. Importance in pragmatic use.

Reflection is the comparison of representation with consciousness, by which a concept (of the object) becomes possible. Reflection therefore precedes the concept, but presupposes representation in general.

Consciousness of oneself (*appercept*) is not empirical. But consciousness of the *apprehension* of a given (*a posteriori*) representation is empirical.

Double I.

^f *Bestimmungen*.

hence in flux, where the stability of observation necessary for experience does not occur.*

7: 135

On the representations that we have without being conscious of them

§ 5. A contradiction appears to lie in the claim to have representations and still not be conscious of them; for how could we know that we have them if we are not conscious of them? *Locke* already raised this objection, and this is why he also rejected the existence of representations of this nature.⁸ – However, we can still be *indirectly* conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious of it. – Such representations are then called *obscure*; the others are *clear*, and when their clarity also extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection,^a they are then called *distinct representations*, whether of thought or intuition.

When I am conscious of seeing a human being far from me in a meadow, even though I am not conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, etc., I properly *conclude* only that this thing is a human being. For if I wanted to maintain that I do not at all have the representation of him in my intuition because I am not conscious of perceiving these parts of his head (and so also the remaining parts of this human being), then I would also not be able to say that I see a human being, since the representation of the whole (of the head or of the human being)^b is composed of these partial ideas.

* If we consciously represent two acts: inner activity (spontaneity), by means of which a concept (a thought) becomes possible, or *reflection*; and receptiveness (receptivity), by means of which a perception (*perceptio*), i.e., empirical *intuition*, becomes possible, or *apprehension*; then consciousness of oneself (*apperceptio*) can be divided into that of reflection and that of apprehension. The first is a consciousness of understanding, *pure* apperception; the second a consciousness of inner sense, *empirical* apperception. In this case, the former is falsely named *inner* sense. – In psychology we investigate ourselves according to our ideas of inner sense; in logic, according to what intellectual consciousness suggests. Now here the “I” appears to us to be double (which would be contradictory): 1) the “I” as *subject* of thinking (in logic), which means pure apperception (the merely reflecting “I”), and of which there is nothing more to say except that it is a very simple idea; 2) the “I” as *object* of perception, therefore of inner sense, which contains a manifold of determination that make an inner *experience* possible.

To ask, given the various inner changes within a man’s mind (of his memory or of principles adopted by him), when a person is conscious of these changes, whether he can still say that he remains the *very same* (according to his soul), is an absurd question. For it is only because he represents himself as one and the same *subject* in the different states that he can be conscious of these changes. The human “I” is indeed twofold according to form (manner of representation), but not according to matter (content). [Marginal note in H:] Concerning voluntary *ignoring* and not taking notice.

^a “together . . . connection” not in H.

^b “or . . . human being” not in H.

The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, *obscure* representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast *map* of our mind are *illuminated*. This can inspire us with wonder over our own being, for a higher being need only call “Let there be light!” and then, without the slightest co-operation on our part (for instance, if we take an author with all that he has in his memory), as it were set half a world before his eyes. Everything the assisted eye discovers by means of the telescope (perhaps directed toward the moon) or microscope (directed toward infusoria) is seen by means of our naked eyes. For these optical aids do not bring more rays of light and thereby more created images into the eye than would have been reflected in the retina without such artificial tools, rather they only spread the images out more, so that we become conscious of them. – Exactly the same holds for sensations of hearing, when a musician plays a fantasy on the organ with ten fingers and both feet and also speaks with someone standing next to him. In a few moments a host of ideas is awakened in his soul, each of which for its selection stands in need of a special judgment as to its appropriateness, since a single stroke of the finger not in accordance with the harmony would immediately be heard as discordant sound. And yet the whole turns out so well that the freely improvising musician often wishes that he would have preserved in written notation many parts of his happily performed piece, which he perhaps otherwise with all diligence and care could never hope to bring off so well.

Thus the field of *obscure* representations is the largest in the human being. – But because this field can only be perceived in his passive side as a play of sensations, the theory of obscure representations belongs only to physiological anthropology, not to pragmatic anthropology, and so it is properly disregarded here.

We often play with obscure representations, and have an interest in throwing them in the shade before the power of the imagination, when they are liked or disliked. However, more often we ourselves are a play of obscure representations, and our understanding is unable to save itself from the absurdities into which they have placed it, even though it recognizes them as illusions.

Such is the case with sexual love, in so far as its actual aim is not benevolence^a but rather enjoyment of its object. How much wit has been wasted in throwing a delicate veil over that which, while indeed liked, nevertheless still shows such a close relationship with the

7: 136

^a *Wöblwollen*.

common species of animals that it calls for modesty? And in polite society the expressions are not blunt, even though they are transparent enough to bring out a smile. – Here the power of imagination enjoys walking in the dark, and it takes uncommon skill if, in order to avoid *cynicism*, one does not want to run the risk of falling into ridiculous *purism*.

On the other hand, we are often enough the play of obscure representations that are reluctant to vanish even when understanding illuminates them. To arrange for a grave in his garden or under a shady tree, in the field or in dry ground, is often an important matter for a dying man; although in the first case he has no reason to hope for a beautiful view, and in the latter no reason to fear catching a cold from the dampness.

The saying “clothes make the man” holds to a certain extent even for intelligent people. To be sure, the Russian proverb says: “One receives the guest according to his clothes, and sees him to the door according to his understanding.” But understanding still cannot prevent the impression that a well-dressed person makes of obscure representations of a certain importance. Rather, at best it can only have the resolution afterwards to correct the pleasing, preliminary judgment.

Even studied obscurity is often used with desired success in order to feign profundity and thoroughness, perhaps in the way that objects seen at dusk or through a fog always appear larger than they are.* [The Greek motto] “skotison” (make it dark) is the decree of all mystics, in order to lure^a treasure hunters of wisdom by means of an affected obscurity. – But in general a certain degree of mystery in a book is not unwelcome to the reader, because by means of it his own acumen to resolve the obscure into clear concepts becomes palpable.

On distinctness and indistinctness in consciousness of one's representations

§ 6. Consciousness of one's representations that suffices for the *distinction* of one object from another is *clarity*. But that consciousness by means of which the *composition* of representations also becomes clear is called *distinctness*. Distinctness alone makes it possible that an

* Viewed by *daylight*, however, that which is brighter than the surrounding objects also appears to be larger, for example, white stockings present fuller calves than do black ones, a fire started in the night on a high mountain appears to be larger than one finds it to be upon measurement. – Perhaps this also explains the apparent size of the moon as well as the apparently greater distance of stars from each other near the horizon; for in both cases shining objects appear to us which are seen near the horizon through a rather darkened air layer; and what is dark is also judged to be smaller, because of the surrounding light. Thus in target practice a black target with a white circle in the middle would be easier to hit than a white target with the opposing arrangement. [Marginal note in H:] Clarity of concepts (clarity of understanding) and of the presentation of concepts. This is brightness of mind.

^a “in . . . lure” not in H.

aggregate of representations becomes *knowledge*, in which *order* is thought in this manifold, because every conscious combination *presupposes* unity of consciousness, and consequently a rule for the *combination*. – One cannot contrast the distinct representation with the fused representation (*perceptio confusa*); rather it must simply be contrasted with the *indistinct* representation (*mere clara*). What is confused must be composite, for in what is simple there is neither order nor confusion. Confusion is thus the *cause* of indistinctness, not the *definition* of it. In every complex representation (*perceptio complexa*), and thus in every cognition (since intuition and concept are always required for it), distinctness rests on the *order* according to which the partial representations are combined, and this prompts either a *merely logical* division (concerning the mere form) into higher and subordinate representations (*perceptio primaria et secundaria*), or a *real* division into principal and accessory representations (*perceptio principialis et adhaerens*). It is through this *order* that cognition becomes distinct. – One readily sees that if^a the faculty of *cognition* in general is to be called *understanding* (in the most general meaning of the word), then this must contain the *faculty of apprehension* (*attentio*) given representations in order to produce *intuition*, the *faculty of abstracting* what is common to several of these intuitions (*abstraction*) in order to produce the *concept*, and the *faculty of reflecting* (*reflexio*) in order to produce *cognition* of the object.

He who possesses these faculties to a preeminent degree is called *genius*, he to whom they are distributed in a very small measure a *blockhead* (because he always needs to be led by others), but he who conducts himself with *originality* in the use of these faculties (in virtue of his bringing forth from himself what must normally be learned under the guidance of others) is called a *genius*.

He who has learned nothing of what one must nevertheless be *taught* in order to know something is called an *ignoramus*, provided that he claims to be a scholar and so *should* have known it; without this claim he can be a great genius. He who cannot *think for himself*, even though he can learn a great deal, is called a *narrow mind* (limited). – A man may be a *great scholar* (a machine for instructing others, as he himself was instructed) and still be very *limited* with respect to the rational use of historical knowledge.^b – He whose way of acting with that which he has learned reveals, in public communication, the constraint of the *status quo* (thus a want of freedom in thinking for oneself) is a *pedant*, whether

^a Crossed out in H: if [this recognition is to be experience (1) *Apprehension* of the given (apprehensio) representation. (2) *Consciousness* of the manifold of its contents (apprehension). (3) *Reflection* on the manner of combining the latter in a consciousness (*reflexio*) belonging to such a cognition].

^b blockhead: *Pinsel*; brain: *Kopf*.

^c “with . . . knowledge” not in H.

is a scholar, a soldier or even a courtier. The scholarly pedant is actually the most tolerable of all of these, because one can still learn from him. On the other hand, with the latter two scrupulousness in formalities (pedantry) is not merely useless but also, on account of the pride to which the pedant unavoidably clings, ridiculous as well, since it is the pride of an *ignoramus*.

However the art, or rather the facility, of speaking in a sociable *tone* and in general of appearing fashionable, is falsely named *popularity* – particularly when it concerns science. It should rather be called polished superficiality, because it frequently cloaks the paltriness of a limited mind. But only children can be misled by it. As the Quaker by Addison said to the chattering officer sitting next to him in the carriage, “Your drum is a symbol of yourself: it resounds because it is empty.”⁹

In order to judge human beings according to their cognitive faculty (understanding in general), we divide them into those who must be granted *common sense* (*sensus communis*), which certainly is not *common* (*sensus vulgaris*), and people of *science*. The former are knowledgeable in the application of rules to cases (*in concreto*); the latter, in the rules themselves before their application (*in abstracto*). – The understanding that belongs to the first cognitive faculty is called *sound* human understanding (*bon sens*); that belonging to the second, a *clear head* (*ingenium perspicax*). – It is strange that sound human understanding, which is usually regarded only as a practical cognitive faculty, is not only presented as something that can manage without culture, but also something for which culture is even disadvantageous, if it is not pursued enough. Some praise it highly to the point of enthusiasm and represent it as a rich source of treasure lying hidden in the mind, and sometimes its pronouncement as an oracle (Socrates’s genius) is said to be more reliable than anything academic science offers for sale. – This much is certain, that if the solution to a problem is based on general and innate rules of understanding (possession of which is called mother wit), it is more dangerous to look around for academic and artificially drawn-up principles (school wit) and thereafter to come to their conclusion, than to take a chance on the outburst from the determining grounds of masses of judgment that lie in the obscurity of the mind. One could call this logical *tact*, where reflection on the object is presented from many different sides and comes out with a correct result, without being conscious of the acts that are going on inside the mind during this process.

But sound understanding can demonstrate its superiority only in regard to an object of experience, which consists not only in increasing knowledge *through* experience but also in enlarging experience itself; not, however, in a speculative, but merely in an empirical-practical^a respect.

^a H: practical.

7: 140

For in the speculative employment of the understanding scientific principles *a priori* are required; however in the empirical-practical employment of understanding there can also be experiences, that is, judgments which are continually confirmed by trial and outcome.

On sensibility in contrast to understanding

§ 7. In regard to the state of its representations, my mind is either *active* and exhibits a faculty (*facultas*), or it is *passive* and consists in *receptivity* (*receptivitas*). A *cognition* contains both joined together, and the possibility of having such a cognition bears the name of *cognitive faculty* – from the most distinguished part of this faculty, namely, the activity of mind in combining or separating representations from one another.

Representations in regard to which the mind behaves passively, and by means of which the subject is therefore *affected* (whether it *affects* itself or is *affected* by an object), belong to the *sensuous*^a cognitive faculty. But ideas that comprise a sheer *activity* (thinking) belong to the *intellectual* cognitive faculty. The former is also called the *lower*; the latter, the *higher* cognitive faculty.* The lower cognitive faculty has the character of *passivity* of the inner sense of sensations; the higher, of spontaneity of apperception, that is, of pure consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking. It belongs to logic (a system of rules of the understanding), as the former belongs to psychology (a sum of all inner perceptions under laws of nature) and establishes^b inner experience.

7: 141

* To posit *sensibility* merely in the indistinctness of representations, and *intellectuality* by comparison in the distinctness of representations, and thereby in a merely *formal* (logical) distinction of consciousness instead of a *real* (psychological) one, which concerns not merely the form but also the content of thought, was a great error of the Leibniz-Wolffian school. Their error was, namely, to posit sensibility in a lack (of clarity in our partial ideas), and consequently in indistinctness, and to posit the character of ideas of understanding in distinctness; [7: 141] whereas in fact sensibility is something very positive and an indispensable addition to ideas of the understanding, in order to bring forth a cognition. – But Leibniz was actually to blame. For he, adhering to the Platonic school, assumed innate, pure intellectual intuitions called ideas, which are encountered in the human mind, though now only obscurely; and to whose analysis and illumination by means of attention alone we owe the cognition of objects, as they are in themselves. [Marginal note in H:] Sensibility is a subject’s faculty of representation, in so far as it is affected.

As lack and as supplementary state for cognition.
A representation recollected or made abstract.

^a *sinnliche*.

^b Crossed out in H: establishes [Now, since with the former, cognition of objects depends merely on the subjective property of being affected by impressions which come from the object (representing it in a certain way), which cannot be exactly the same with all subjects, thus <one can> say: this presents objects of the *senses* to us only as they appear to us, not according to what they are in themselves. (But (continued on page 252)

Remark.^a The object of a representation, which comprises only the way I am affected by it, can only be cognized by me as it appears to

(continued from page 251) since these appearances are closely connected with the law of understanding, cognition (of the objects of the senses), which is called experience, is therefore not less certain, as if it concerned objects in themselves. And because for us there can be no knowledge other than of things which can be presented to our senses, therefore there may always be concepts in the idea of reason which go beyond their limits, but only have objective reality in a practical respect (of the idea of freedom); we are here concerned only with those things that can be given to our senses.

^a Crossed out in H: Remark [Second Section.]

On Sensibility

That this proposition applies even to the inner self and the human being, who observes his inner self according to certain impressions from whatever source they may arise, and through this can only recognize himself as he appears to himself, not as he absolutely is: this is a bold *metaphysical proposition (paradoxon)*, which cannot be dealt with in anthropology. – But if <he> obtains inner experience <from> himself, and if he pursues this investigation as far as he can, he will have to confess that self-knowledge would lead to an unfathomable depth, to an abyss in the exploration of his nature. [Human being, you are such a difficult problem in your own eyes/No I am not able to grasp you. Pope according to Brock's translation. – Külpe notes that the quotation is from B. H. Brockes, *Versuch vom Menschen des Herrn Alexander Pope* (Hamburg, 1740), but more precisely from a French poem contained in this book: *Les contradictions de l'homme*. – Ed.] And this belongs to anthropology.

All cognition presupposes understanding. The irrational animal <perhaps> has something similar to what we call representations (because it has effects that are <very> similar to the representations in the human being), but which may perhaps be entirely different – but no cognition of things; for this requires *understanding*, a faculty of representation with consciousness of action whereby the representations relate to a given object and this relation may be thought. – However, we do not understand anything correctly <according to form> except that which we can make at the same time when the material for it would be given to us. Consequently, understanding is a faculty of spontaneity in our cognition, a higher faculty of cognition, because it submits representations to certain *a priori* rules and itself makes experience possible.

In the self-cognition of the human being through inner experience he does not *make* what he has perceived in himself, for this depends on impressions (the subject matter of representations) that he *receives*. Therefore he is so far enduring, that is, he has a representation of himself as he is affected by himself, which according to its form depends merely on the subjective property of his nature, which should not be interpreted as belonging to the object, even though he still also has the right to attribute it to the object (here his own person), but with the qualification that he can only recognize himself as an object through his representation in experience as he *appears* to himself, not as he, the observed, is in himself. – If he wished to cognize in the latter way, he would have to rely on a consciousness of pure spontaneity (the concept of freedom), (which is also possible), but it would still not be perception of inner sense and the empirical cognition of his inner self (inner experience) which is based on it. Rather, it can only be consciousness of the rule of his actions and omissions, without thereby acquiring a theoretical (physiological) cognition of his nature, which is what psychology actually aims at. – Empirical self-cognition therefore presents to inner sense the human being as he appears to it, not as he is in himself, because every cognition explains merely the *affectability* of the subject, not the inner characteristic of the subject as

(continued on page 253)

(continued from page 252)

How then is the great difficulty to be removed, in which consciousness of oneself still presents only the appearance of oneself, and not the human being in himself? And why does it not present a double I, but nevertheless a doubled consciousness of this I, first that of mere *thinking* but then also that of inner *perception* (rational and empirical); that is, discursive and intuitive apperception, of which the first belongs to logic and other to anthropology (as physiology)? The former is without content (matter of cognition), while the latter is provided with a content by inner sense.

An object of the (external or internal) sense, in so far as it is perceived, is called *appearance (phænomenon)*. Cognition of an object in appearance (that is, as phenomenon) is *experience*. Therefore appearance is that representation through which an object of the senses is given (an object of perception, that is, of empirical intuition), but experience or empirical *cognition* is that representation through which the object as such at the same time is *thought*. – Therefore experience is the activity (of the power of imagination) through which appearances are brought under the concept of one object of experience, and experiences are made by employing observations (intentional perceptions) and through reflecting about how to unify them under one concept. – We acquire and broaden our cognition through experience by supplying the understanding with appearances of external or even inner sense as material. And no one doubts that we could not equally make inner observations of ourselves and make experiences in this way, but if we dare now to speak of objects of inner sense (which as sense always provides appearances only) it is because we are able to reach only cognition of ourselves, not as we are, but as we appear (internally) to ourselves. There is something shocking in this proposition, which we must consider more carefully. – We allow a judgment of this kind regarding objects outside us, but it looks quite absurd to apply it to what we perceive within ourselves. – That some word-twisters take appearance and *semblance (Erscheinung und Schein)* for one and the same thing and say that their statements mean as much as: "it seems (scheint) to me that I exist and have this or that representation" is a falsification unworthy of any refutation.

This difficulty rests entirely on a confusing of *inner sense* (and of empirical self-consciousness) with *apperception* (intellectual self-consciousness), which are usually taken to be one and the same. The I in every judgment is neither an intuition nor a concept, and not at all a determination of an object, but an act of understanding by the determining subject as such, and the consciousness of oneself; pure apperception itself therefore belongs merely to logic (without any matter and content). On the other hand, the I of inner sense, that is, of the perception and observation of oneself, is not the subject of judgment, but an object. Consciousness of the one who *observes* himself is an entirely simple representation of the subject in judgment as such, of which one knows everything if one merely thinks it. But the I which has been observed by itself is a sum total of so many objects of inner perception that psychology has plenty to do in tracing everything that lies hidden in it. And psychology may not ever hope to complete this task and answer satisfactorily the question: "What is the human being?"

One must therefore distinguish pure apperception (of the understanding) from empirical apperception (of sensibility). The latter, when the subject attends to himself, is also at the same time affected and so calls out sensations in him, that is, brings representations to consciousness. These representations are in conformity with each other according to the form of their relation, the subjective and formal condition of sensibility; namely, intuition in time (simultaneously or in succession), and not merely according to rules of the understanding. Now since this form cannot be assumed to be valid for every being as such that is conscious of itself, therefore the cognition which has the inner sense of the human being as its ground cannot represent by inner experience how he himself is (because the condition is not valid for all thinking beings, for (continued on page 254)

me; and all experience (empirical cognition), inner no less than outer, is only the cognition of objects as they *appear* to us, not as they *are* (considered in themselves alone). For what kind of sensible intuition there will be depends not merely on the constitution of the object of the representation, but also on the constitution of the subject and its receptivity, after which thinking (the concept of the object) follows. – Now the formal constitution of this receptivity cannot in turn be borrowed from the senses, but rather must (as intuition) be given *a priori*; that is, it must be a sensible intuition which remains even after everything empirical (comprising sense experience) is omitted, and in inner experiences this formal element of intuition is *time*.

Experience is empirical cognition, but cognition (since it rests on judgments) requires reflection (*reflexio*), and consequently consciousness of activity in combining the manifold of ideas according to a rule of the unity of the manifold; that is, it requires concepts and thought in general (as distinct from intuition). Thus consciousness is divided into *discursive* consciousness (which as logical consciousness must lead the way, since it gives the rule), and *intuitive* consciousness. Discursive consciousness (pure apperception of one's mental activity) is simple. The "I" of reflection contains no manifold in itself and is always one and the same in every judgment, because it is merely the formal element of consciousness. On the other hand, *inner experience* contains the material of consciousness and a manifold of empirical inner intuition, the "I" of *apprehension* (consequently an empirical apperception).

It is true that I as a thinking being am one and the same subject with myself as a sensing being. However, as the object of inner empirical intuition; that is, in so far as I am affected inwardly by experiences in

7: 142

(continued from page 253) then it would be a representation of the understanding). Rather, it is merely a consciousness of the way that the human being appears to himself in his inner observation. Cognition of oneself according to the constitution of what one is in oneself cannot be acquired through inner *experience* and does not spring from knowledge of the nature of the human being, but is simply and solely the consciousness of one's freedom, which is known to him through the categorical imperative of duty, therefore only through the highest practical reason.

B

Of the field of sensibility in relation to the field of understanding

§ 8

Division

The mind (*animus*) of the human being, as the sum total of all representations that have a place within it, has a domain (*sphaera*) which concerns three parts: the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. Each of these has two divisions, the field of *sensibility* and the field of *intellectuality*. (the field of sensible or intellectual cognition, pleasure or displeasure, and desire or abhorrence.)

Sensibility can be considered as a weakness or also a strength.]

time, simultaneous as well as successive, I nevertheless cognize myself only as I appear to myself, not as a thing in itself. For this cognition still depends on the temporal condition, which is not a concept of the understanding (consequently not mere spontaneity); as a result it depends on a condition with regard to which my faculty of ideas is passive (and belongs to receptivity). – Therefore I always cognize myself only through inner experience, as I *appear* to myself; which proposition is then often so maliciously twisted as if it said: it only *seems* to me (*michi videri*) that I have certain ideas and sensations, indeed it only seems that I exist at all. – The semblance is the ground for an erroneous judgment from subjective causes, which are falsely regarded as objective; however appearance^a is not a judgment at all, but merely an empirical intuition which, through reflection and the concept of understanding arising from it, becomes inner experience and consequently truth.

The cause of these errors is that the terms *inner sense* and *apperception* are normally taken by psychologists to be synonymous, despite the fact that the first alone should indicate a psychological (applied) consciousness, and the second merely a logical (pure) consciousness. However, that we only cognize ourselves through inner sense as we *appear* to ourselves is clear from this: apprehension (*apprehensio*) of the impressions of inner sense presupposes a formal condition of inner intuition of the subject, namely time, which is not a concept of understanding and is therefore valid^b merely as a subjective condition according to which inner sensations are given to us by virtue of the constitution of the human soul. Therefore, apprehension does not give us cognition of how the object is in itself.

This note does not really belong to anthropology. In anthropology, experiences are appearances united according to laws of understanding, and in taking into consideration our way of representing things, the question of how they are apart from their relation to the *senses* (consequently as they are in themselves) is not pursued at all; for this belongs to metaphysics, which has to do with the possibility of *a priori* cognition. But it was nevertheless necessary to go back so far simply in order to stop the offenses of the speculative mind in regard to this question. As for the rest, knowledge of the human being through inner experience, because to a large extent one also judges others according to it, is more important than correct judgment of others, but nevertheless at the same time perhaps more difficult. For he who investigates his interior easily carries many things into self-consciousness instead of

7: 143

^a appearance: *Erscheinung*; semblance: *Der Schein*.

^b valid added in A2.

merely observing. So it is advisable and even necessary to begin with observed *appearances* in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to *inner experience*.

Apology for sensibility

§ 8. Everyone shows the greatest respect for understanding, as is already indicated by the very name *higher cognitive faculty*. Anyone who wanted to praise it would be dismissed with the same scorn earned by an orator exalting virtue (*stulte! quis unquam vituperavit?*).^a Sensibility, on the other hand, is in bad repute. Many evil things are said about it: e.g., 1) that it *confuses* the power of representation, 2) that it monopolizes conversation and is like an *autocrat*, stubborn and hard to restrain, when it should be merely the *servant* of the understanding, 3) that it even *deceives* us, and that we cannot be sufficiently on guard where it is concerned. – On the other hand sensibility is not at a loss for eulogists, especially among poets and people of taste, who not only extol the merits of *sensualizing* the concepts of the understanding, but who also assign the *fertility* (wealth of ideas) and *emphasis* (vigor) of language and the *evidence* of ideas (their lucidity in consciousness) directly to this sensualizing of concepts and to the view that concepts must not be analyzed into their constituent parts with meticulous care. The bareness^b of the understanding, however, they declare to be sheer poverty.* We do not need any panegyrists here, but only an advocate against the accuser.

7: 144 The *passive element* in sensibility, which we after all cannot get rid of, is actually the cause of all the evil said about it. The inner perfection of the human being consists in having in his power the use of all of his faculties, in order to subject them to his *free choice*. For this, it is required that *understanding* should rule without weakening sensibility (which in itself is like a mob, because it does not think), for without sensibility there would

* Since we are speaking here only of the cognitive faculty and therefore of representation (not of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, *sensation* will mean nothing more than [7: 144] sense representation (empirical intuition) in distinction from concepts (thoughts) as well as from pure intuition (representations of space and time). [Marginal note in H:] Consciousness of oneself is either discursive in concept or intuitive in the inner intuition of time. – The I of apperception is simple and binding; however, the I of apprehension is a matter of a manifold with representations joined to one another in the I as object of intuition. This manifold in one's intuition is given . . . [smudged] an *a priori* form in which it can be ordered . . .

^a Trans.: Fool! Who has ever criticized virtue?

^b *Nacktheit*.

be no material that could be processed for the use of legislative understanding.

Defense of sensibility against the first accusation

§ 9. *The senses do not confuse*. He who has *grasped* a given manifold, but *not yet ordered* it, cannot be said to have *confused* it. Sense perceptions (empirical representations accompanied by consciousness) can only be called inner *appearances*. The understanding, which comes in and connects appearances under a rule of thought (brings *order* into the manifold), first makes empirical cognition out of them; that is, *experience*. The *understanding* is therefore neglecting its obligation, if it judges rashly without first having ordered the sense representations according to concepts, and then later complains about their confusion, which it blames on the particular sensual nature of the human being. This reproach applies both to the ungrounded complaint over the confusion of outer as well as inner representations through sensibility.^a

Certainly, sense representations come before those of the understanding and present themselves *en masse*. But the fruits are all the more plentiful when understanding comes in with its order and intellectual form and brings into consciousness, e.g., *concise* expressions for the concept, *emphatic* expressions for the feeling, and *interesting* ideas for determining the will. – When the *riches* that the mind produces in rhetoric and poetry are placed before the understanding all at once (*en masse*), the understanding is often embarrassed on account of its rational employment.^b It often falls into confusion, when it ought to make clear and set forth all the acts of reflection that it actually employs, although obscurely. But sensibility is not at fault here, rather it is much more to its credit that it has presented abundant material to understanding, whereas the abstract concepts of understanding are often only glittering poverty.

Defense of sensibility against the second accusation

§ 10. *The senses do not have command* over understanding. Rather, they offer themselves to understanding merely in order to be at its disposal.

^a Marginal note in H: Perception (empirical intuition with consciousness) could be called merely appearance of inner sense. However, in order for it to become inner experience the law must be known which determines the form of this connection is a consciousness of the object.

The human being cannot observe himself internally if he is not led by means of a rule, under which perceptions alone must be united, if they are to furnish him with an experience. Therefore they are together only appearances of himself. To cognize himself from them he must take a principle of appearance (in space and time) as a basis, in order to know what the human being is.

Sensibility as strength or weakness.

^b the . . . employment only in H.

That the senses do not wish to have their importance misjudged, an importance that is due to them especially in what is called common sense (*sensus communis*), cannot be credited to them because of the presumption of wanting to rule over understanding. It is true that there are judgments which one does not bring *formally* before the tribunal of understanding in order to pronounce sentence on them, and which therefore seem to be directly dictated by sense. They are embodied in so-called aphorisms or oracular outbursts (such as those to whose utterance Socrates attributed his genius). That is to say, it is thereby assumed^a that the *first* judgment about the right and wise thing to do in a given case is normally also the *correct* one, and that pondering over it will only spoil it. But in fact these judgments do not come from the senses; they come from real,^b though obscure, reflections of understanding. – The senses make no claim in this matter; they are like the common people who, if they are not a mob (*ignobile vulgus*), gladly submit to their superior, understanding, but still want to be heard. But if certain judgments and insights are assumed to spring directly from inner sense (without the help of understanding), and if they are further assumed to command themselves, so that sensations count as judgments, then this is sheer *enthusiasm*, which stands in close relation to derangement of the senses.

7: 146

Defense of sensibility against the third accusation

§ 11. *The senses do not deceive.* This proposition is the rejection of the most important but also, on careful consideration, the emptiest reproach made against the senses; not because they always judge correctly, but rather because they do not judge at all. Error is thus a burden only to the understanding. – Still, *sensory appearances* (*species, apparentia*) serve to excuse, if not exactly to justify, understanding. Thus the human being often mistakes what is subjective in his way of representation for objective (the distant tower, on which he sees no corners, seems to be round; the sea, whose distant part strikes his eyes through higher light rays, seems to be higher than the shore (*altum mare*); the full moon, which he sees ascending near the horizon through a hazy air, seems to be further away, and also larger, than when it is high in the heavens, although he catches sight of it from the same visual angle). And so one takes *appearance* for *experience*; thereby falling into error, but it is an error of the understanding, not of the senses.

A reproach which logic throws against sensibility is that in so far as cognition is promoted by sensibility, one reproaches it with

^a it . . . assumed added in A2.

^b real added in A2.

superficiality (individuality, limitation to the particular), whereas understanding, which goes up to the universal and for that reason has to trouble itself with abstractions, encounters the reproach of *dryness*. However aesthetic treatment, whose first requirement is popularity, adopts a method by which both errors can be avoided.

On ability with regard to the cognitive faculty in general

§ 12. The preceding paragraph, which dealt with the faculty of appearance,^a which no human being can control, leads us to a discussion of the concepts of the *easy* and the *difficult*^b (*leve et grave*), which literally in German signify only physical conditions and powers. But in Latin, according to a certain analogy, they should signify the *practicable* (*facile*) and the *comparatively-impracticable* (*difficile*); for the barely practicable is regarded as *subjectively-impracticable* by a subject who is doubtful of the degree of his requisite capacity^c in certain situations and conditions.

7: 147

Facility in doing something (*promptitudo*) must not be confused with *skill*^d in such actions (*habitus*). The former signifies a certain degree of mechanical capacity: “I can if I want to,” and designates subjective *possibility*. The latter signifies subjective-practical *necessity*, that is, *habit*, and so designates a certain degree of will,^e acquired through the frequently repeated use of one’s faculty: “I choose^f this, because duty commands it.” Therefore one cannot explain *virtue* as *skill* in free lawful actions, for then it would be a mere mechanism of applying power. Rather, virtue is *moral strength* in adherence to one’s duty, which never should become habit but should always emerge entirely new and original from one’s way of thinking.^g

The easy is contrasted to the *difficult*, but often it is contrasted to the *onerous* as well. A subject regards something as *easy* whenever he encounters a large surplus in his capacity for applying the requisite power to an action. What is easier than observing the formalities of visits, congratulations, and condolences? But what is also more arduous for a busy man? They are friendship’s *vexations* (drudgeries), from which everyone heartily wishes to be free, and yet still carries scruples about offending against custom.

What vexations there are in external customs that are attributed to religion but which actually collect around ecclesiastical form! The merit of piety is set up exactly in such a way that it serves no purpose other

^a *Scheinvermögen*.

^b *die Begriffe vom Leichten und Schweren*.

^c *Vermögen*.

^d skill: *Fertigkeit*; facility: *Leichtigkeit*.

^e *Wille*.

^f *ich will*.

^g *Denkungsart*.

7: 148

than the mere submission of believers to patiently let themselves be tormented by ceremonies and observances, atonements and mortifications of the flesh (the more the better). To be sure, this compulsory service is *mechanically easy* (because no vicious inclination need be sacrificed as a result), but to the reasonable person it must come as *morally very arduous* and onerous. – So when the great moral teacher of the people said, “My commands are not difficult,”¹⁰ he did not mean by this that they require only a limited expenditure of power in order to be fulfilled; for in fact as commands that require pure dispositions of the heart they are the most difficult ones of all that can be commanded. But for a reasonable person they are still infinitely easier than commands of busy inactivity (*gratis anhelare, multa agendo, nihil agere*),¹¹ such as those which Judaism established. For to a reasonable man the mechanically easy feels like a heavy burden, when he sees that all the effort connected to it still serves no purpose.

To make something difficult easy is *meritorious*; to depict it to someone as easy, even though one is not able to accomplish it oneself, is *deception*. To do that which is easy is *meritless*. Methods and machines, and among these the division of labor among different craftsmen (manufactured goods), make many things easy which would be difficult to do with one's own hands without other tools.

To point out difficulties before one gives instruction for an undertaking (as, e.g., in metaphysical investigations) may admittedly discourage others, but this is still better than concealing difficulties from them. He who regards everything that he undertakes as easy is *thoughtless*. He who performs everything that he does with ease is *adept*; just as he whose actions reveal effort is *awkward*. – Social entertainment (conversation) is merely a game in which everything must be easy and must allow easiness. Thus a ceremony (stiffness) in conversation, e.g., the solemn good-bye after a banquet, has been gotten rid of as something outmoded.

People's state of mind in a business undertaking varies according to the difference of temperaments. Some begin with difficulties and concerns (the melancholic temperament), with others (the sanguine) hope and the presumed easiness of carrying out the undertaking are the first thoughts that come into their minds.

But how to regard the vainglorious claim of powerful men, which is not based on mere temperament: “What the human being *wills*, he *can do*”? It is nothing more than a high-sounding tautology: namely, what he *wills at the order of his morally-commanding reason*, he *ought to do* and consequently *can also do* (for the impossible is not commanded to him by reason). However, some years ago there were fools like this who also prided themselves on taking the dictum in a physical sense, announcing themselves as world-assailants; but their breed has long since vanished.

7: 149

Finally, *becoming accustomed (consuetudo)* in fact makes the endurance of misfortune^a easy (which is then falsely honored with the name of a virtue, namely patience), for when sensations of exactly the same kind persist for a long time without change and draw one's attention away from the senses, one is barely conscious of them anymore. But this also makes consciousness and memory of the good that one has received *more difficult*, which then usually leads to ingratitude (a real vice).

Habit^b (*assuetudo*), however, is a physical inner necessitation to proceed in the same manner that one has proceeded until now. It deprives even good actions of their moral worth because it impairs the freedom of the mind and, moreover, leads to thoughtless repetition of the very same act (*monotony*), and so becomes ridiculous. – Habitual fillers^c (*phrases used for the mere filling up of the emptiness of thoughts*) make the listener constantly worried that he will have to hear the little sayings yet again, and they turn the speaker into a talking machine. The reason why the habits of another stimulate the arousal of disgust in us is because here the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and because here one is led *instinctively* by the rule of habituation, exactly like another (non-human) nature, and so runs the risk of falling into one and the same class with the beast. – Nevertheless, certain habits can be started intentionally and put in order when nature refuses free choice her help; for example, accustoming oneself in old age to eating and drinking times, to the quality and quantity of food and drink, or also with sleep, and so gradually becoming mechanical. But this holds only as an exception and in cases of necessity. As a rule all habits are reprehensible.

On artificial play with sensory illusion^d

§ 13. *Delusion*,^e which is produced in the understanding by means of sense representations (*praestigiae*), can be either natural or artificial, and is either *illusion* (*illusio*) or *deception* (*fraus*). – The delusion by which one is compelled to regard something as real on the testimony of his eyes,^f though the very same subject declares it to be impossible on the basis of his understanding, is called *optical delusion*^g (*fascinatio*).

Illusion^b is that delusion which persists even though one knows that the supposed object is not real. – This mental game with sensory illusion is very pleasant and entertaining, as in, for example, the perspective

7: 150

^a misfortune: *Übel*; becoming accustomed: *das Gewohntwerden*.

^b *Angewohnheit*.

^c *Flickwörter*.

^d *Das Blendwerk*.

^e deception: *Betrug*; illusion: *Täuschung*.

^f H: the senses; A1: his senses.

^g *Augenverblendnis*.

^b *Illusion*.

drawing of the interior of a temple, or the painting of the school of Peripatetics (by *Corregio*, I think), of which Raphael Meng¹³ says: "if one looks at them for long, they seem to walk"; or the painted steps with a half-opened door in the town hall of Amsterdam, where one is induced to climb up them, and so forth.

However, *deception* of the senses exists when, as soon as one knows how the object is constituted, the illusion^a also immediately ceases. All types of sleights of hand are things like that. Clothing whose color sets off the face to advantage is illusion;^b but makeup is deception. One is seduced by the first, but mocked by the second. – This is why *statues* of human beings or animals painted with natural colors are not liked: each time they unexpectedly come into sight, one is momentarily deceived into regarding them as living.

Bewitchment^c (*fascinatio*) in an otherwise sound state of mind is a delusion of the senses, of which it is said that the senses are not dealing with natural things; for the judgment that an object (or a characteristic of it) *exists* is irresistibly changed after closer attention to the judgment that it does *not exist* (or has a different shape). – So the senses seem to contradict each other; like a bird that flutters against a mirror in which he sees himself and at one moment takes the reflection for a real bird, at another, not. With human beings this game, in which they *do not trust their own senses*, occurs especially in those who are seized by strong passion. When the lover (according to *Helvétius*)¹⁴ saw his beloved in the arms of another, she could simply deny it to him, saying: "Faithless one! You do not love me any more. You believe what you see more than what I say to you." – Cruder, or at least more harmful, was the deception practised by ventriloquists, Gassnerists, mesmerists,¹⁵ and other alleged necromancers. In former times poor ignorant women who imagined that they could do something supernatural were called *witches*, and even in this century belief in witches has not been rooted out completely.* It seems that the feeling of wonder over something outrageous has in itself much that is alluring for the weak man: not merely because new opened to him, but also because he is thereby

7: 151

* Even in this century a Protestant clergyman in Scotland serving as a witness at a trial about such a case said to the judge: "You Honor, I assure you on my honor as a minister that this woman is a *witch* (*Hexe*)"; to which the judge replied: "And I assure you on my honor as a judge that you are no sorcerer (*Hexenmeister*)."¹⁶ The word *Hexe*, which has now become a German word, comes from the first words of the formula of the mass used at the Consecration of the Host, which the faithful see with *bodily* eyes as a small disc of bread but which, after the formula has been pronounced, they are obliged to see with *spiritual* eyes as the body of a human being. For the words *hoc est* (continued on page 263)

^a *Schein*.

^b *Illusion*.

^c *Bezauberung*.

prospects are suddenly absolved from the burdensome use of reason, while others are induced to make themselves equal to him in ignorance.

On permissible moral illusion^d

§ 14. On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty, and of unselfishness without deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant sincerely by this. And it is also very good that this happens in the world. For when human beings play these roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused and merge into the disposition. – But to deceive the deceiver in ourselves, the inclinations, is a return again to obedience under the law of virtue and is not a deception, but rather an innocent^e illusion of ourselves.

An example of this is the *disgust* with one's own existence, which arises when the mind is empty of the sensations toward which it incessantly strives. This is *boredom*, in which one nevertheless at the same time feels a weight of inertia, that is, of weariness with regard to all occupation that could be called work and could drive away disgust because it is associated with hardships, and it is a highly contrary feeling^d whose cause is none other than the natural inclination toward *ease* (toward rest, before weariness even precedes). – But this inclination is deceptive, even with regard to the ends that reason makes into a law for the human being,¹⁶ [it makes] him content with himself *when he is doing nothing at all* (vegetating aimlessly), because he *at least is not doing anything bad*.^e To deceive it in return (which can be done by playing with the fine arts, but most of all through social conversation), is called *passing time* (*tempus fallere*), where the expression already indicates the intention, namely to deceive even the inclination toward idle rest. We are passing time when we keep the mind at play by the fine arts, and even in a game that is aimless in itself within a peaceful rivalry at least the culture of the mind is brought

7: 152

(continued from page 262) were initially added to the word *corpus*, and in speaking *hoc est corpus* was changed to *hocuspocus*, presumably from pious timidity at saying and profaning the correct phrase. This is what superstitious people are in the habit of doing with unnatural objects, in order not to profane them. [Kant's etymology is incorrect. At present it is believed that *Hexe* derives from *Hag* (hedge, grove, little forest); a *Hexe* being a demonic woman inhabiting such an area. Kant's interpretation is based on Christoph Adelung's *Versuch eines vollständigen grammatisch-kritischen Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen Mundart*, 2nd edn. (Leipzig, 1793) – Ed.]

^a *erlaubten moralischen Schein*.

^b *H*: a laudable illusion. illusion: *Täuschung*.

^c *H*: has an end and.

^d *H*: a feeling of one's own unworthiness, whose.

^e *Böse*.

about – otherwise it would be called *killing time*. – Nothing is accomplished by using force against sensibility in the inclinations; one must outwit them and, as *Swift* says,¹⁷ surrender a barrel for the whale to play with, in order to save the ship.

In order to save virtue, or at least lead the human being to it, nature has wisely implanted in him the tendency to willingly allow himself to be deceived. Good, honorable *decorum* is an external illusion^a that instills respect in others (so that they do not behave over familiarly with others). It is true that woman^b would not be content if the male sex did not appear to pay homage to her charms. But *modesty* (*pudicitia*), a self-constraint that conceals passion, is nevertheless very beneficial as an illusion that brings about distance between one sex and the other, which is necessary in order that one is not degraded into a mere tool for the other's enjoyment. – In general, everything that is called *propriety* (*decorum*), is of this same sort – namely, nothing but *beautiful illusion*.^c

Politeness (*politesse*) is an illusion of affability that inspires love. *Bowing* (compliments) and all *courtly gallantry* together with the warmest verbal assurances of friendship are to be sure not exactly always truthful ("My dear friends: there is no such thing as a friend." *Aristotle*);¹⁸ but this is precisely why they do not *deceive*, because everyone knows how they should be taken, and especially because these signs of benevolence and respect, though empty at first, gradually lead to real dispositions of this sort.

All human virtue in circulation is small change – it is a child who takes it for real gold. – But it is still better to have small change in circulation than no funds at all,^d and eventually they can be converted into genuine gold, though at considerable loss. It is committing high treason against humanity to pass them off as *mere tokens* that have no worth at all, to say with the sarcastic *Swift*:¹⁹ "Honor is a pair of shoes that have been worn out in the manure," etc., or with the preacher *Hofstede*²⁰ in his attack on *Marmontel's Belisar* to slander even a Socrates, in order to prevent anyone from believing in virtue. Even the illusion of good in others must have worth for us, for out of this play with pretences, which acquires respect without perhaps earning it,^e something quite serious can finally develop. – It is only the illusion of good *in ourselves* that must be wiped out without exemption, and the veil by which self-love conceals

7: 153

^a external illusion: *äußerer Schein*; *decorum*: *Anstand*.

^b Marginal note in H: Of a pair who received guests who had not previously announced themselves.

Qualification of the claim of sensibility and the faculty of cognition. –

NB. it must ultimately come before the title of the understanding.

^c *schöner Schein*.

^d H (crossed out): or with mere stamped paper, which has no inner value.

^e without . . . it not in H.

our moral defects must be torn away. For illusion does *deceive*, if one deludes oneself that one's debt is cancelled or even thrown away by that which is without any moral content, or persuades oneself that one is not guilty – e.g., when repentance for misdeeds at the end of one's life is depicted as real improvement, or intentional transgressions as human weakness.^a

On the five senses

§ 15. *Sensibility* in the cognitive faculty (the faculty of intuitive representations) contains two parts: *sense* and the *power of imagination*. – The first is the faculty of intuition in the presence of an object, the second is intuition even *without* the presence of an object. – But the senses, on the other hand, are divided into *outer* and *inner sense* (*sensus internus*). Outer sense is where the human body is affected by physical things; inner sense, where it is affected by the mind. It should be noted that the latter, as a mere faculty of perception (of empirical intuition), is to be thought of differently than the feeling of pleasure and pain; that is, from the receptivity of the subject to be determined by certain ideas for the preservation or rejection of the condition of these ideas, which one could call *interior sense* (*sensus interior*). – A representation through sense of which one is conscious of as such is called *sensation*,^b especially when the sensation at the same time arouses the subject's attention to his own state.

§ 16. To begin with, one can divide the senses of physical sensation into those of *vital sensation* (*sensus vagus*) and those of *organic sensation* (*sensus fixus*); and, since they are met with on the whole only where there are nerves, into those which affect the whole system of nerves, and those that affect only those nerves that belong to a certain part of the body. – Sensations of warm and cold, even those that are aroused by the mind (e.g., by quickly rising hope or fear), belong to *vital sensation*. The *shudder* that seizes the human being himself at the representation of the sublime, and the *horror*, with which nurses' tales drive children to bed late at night, belong to vital sensation; they penetrate the body as far as there is life in it.

The organic senses, however, in so far as they refer to external sensation, can rightly be enumerated as not more or less than five.

Three of them are more objective than subjective, that is, as empirical intuitions they contribute more to the cognition of the external object than they stir up the consciousness of the affected organ. Two, however,

^a Marginal note in H: To exist without the senses is to proceed thoughtlessly.

On the *easiness* of doing something (*promitudo*). On the subjective *necessity* of doing something with *facility* (*habitus*). Distinguish mechanical easiness, which is dependent on practice; from dynamic easiness, which is objective. Virtue is not facility but strength.

^b *Sensation*. *Empfindung*, also translated as "sensation," is used four words later.

7: 154

are more subjective than objective, that is,^a the idea obtained from them is more a representation of *enjoyment* than of cognition of the external object. Therefore one can easily come to an agreement with others regarding the objective senses; but with respect to the subjective sense, with one and the same external empirical intuition and name of the object, the way that the subject feels affected by it can be entirely different.^b

The senses of the first class are 1) *touch* (*tactus*), 2) *sight* (*visus*), 3) *hearing* (*auditus*). – Of the latter class are a) *taste* (*gustus*), b) *smell* (*olfactus*); taken together they are nothing but senses of organic sensation, as it were like so many external entrances prepared by nature so that the animal can distinguish objects.

On the sense of touch

7: 155

§ 17. The sense of touch lies in the fingertips and their nerve papillae, so that through touching the surface of a solid body one can inquire after its shape. – Nature appears to have allotted this organ only to the human being, so that he could form a concept from the shape of a body by touching it on all sides; for the antennae of insects seem merely to have the intention of inquiring after the presence of a body, not its shape. – This sense is also the only one of *immediate* external perception; and for this very reason it is also the most important and most reliably instructive, but nevertheless it is the coarsest, because the matter whose surface is to inform us about the shape^c of the object through touching must be solid. (As concerns vital sensation, whether the surface is soft or rough, much less whether it feels warm or cold, this is not in question here.) – Without this sense organ we would be unable to form any concept at all of a bodily shape, and so the two other senses of the first class^d must originally be referred to its perception in order to provide cognition of experience.

On hearing

§ 18. The sense of hearing is one of the senses of merely *mediate* perception. – Through and by means of the air that surrounds us a distant object to a large extent is cognized. And it is by means of just this

^a Crossed out in H: that is [they prompt more the subject's feeling of life (an organ affected to know) than they contribute something to the cognition of the affecting object and its constitution. With regard to the first human beings they could therefore very well reach agreement <and as>, but they are usually very far apart from each other regarding the sensation of the latter].

^b Marginal note in H: On the sense of sight without color and of the sense of hearing without music.

^c about the shape not in H.

^d of . . . class added in A2.

medium, which is set in motion by the vocal organ, the mouth, that human beings are able most easily and completely to share thoughts and feelings with others, especially when the sounds which each allows the other to hear are articulated and, in their lawful combination by means of the understanding, form a language. – The shape of the object is not given through hearing, and the sounds of language do not lead immediately to the idea of it, but just because of this, and because they are nothing in themselves or at least not objects, but at most signify only inner feelings, they are the best means of designating concepts. And people born deaf, who for this very reason must remain mute (without speech), can never arrive at anything more than an *analogue* of reason.

But with regard to vital sense, *music*, which is a regular play of aural sensations, not only moves sense in a way that is indescribably vivacious and varied, but also strengthens it; for music is as it were a language of sheer sensations (without any concepts). Sounds here are *tones*, and they are for hearing what colors are for seeing; a communication of feelings at a distance to all present within the surrounding space, and a social pleasure that is not diminished by the fact that many participate in it.^e

On the sense of sight

7: 156

§ 19. Sight is also a sense of *mediate* sensation, appearing only to a certain organ (the eyes) that is sensitive to moving matter; and it takes place by means of *light*, which is not, like sound, merely a wave-like motion of a fluid element^f that spreads itself through space in all directions, but rather a radiation that determines a point for the object in space. By means of sight the cosmos becomes known to us to an extent so immeasurable that, especially with the self-luminous celestial bodies, when we check their distance with our measures here on earth, we become fatigued over the long number sequence.^g And this almost gives us more reason to be astonished at the delicate sensitivity of this organ in respect to its perception of such weakened impressions than at the magnitude of the object (the cosmos), especially when we take in the world in detail, as presented to our eyes through the mediation of the microscope, e.g., infusoria. – The sense of sight, even if it is not more indispensable than that of hearing, is still the noblest, because among all the senses, it is furthest removed from the sense of touch,^h the most limited

^a Marginal note in H: On the feeling of the muscles of the mouth at the voice.

^b Seben. *Gesicht*, also translated as "sight," is the next word.

^c A1: motion of the infinitely cruder fluid (air).

^d *zahlenreiche*.

^e H: and <thereby offers infinitely more material for thought>.

condition of perception: it not only has the widest sphere of perception in space, but also its organ feels least affected (because otherwise it would not be merely sight). Thus sight comes nearer to being a *pure intuition* (the immediate representation of the given object, without admixture of noticeable sensation).

These three outer senses lead the subject through reflection to cognition of the object as a thing outside ourselves. – But if the sensation becomes so strong that the consciousness of the movement of the organ becomes stronger than the consciousness of the relation to an external object, then external representations are changed into internal ones. – To notice smoothness or roughness in what can be touched is something entirely different from inquiring about the figure of the external body through touching. So too, when the speech of another is so loud that, as we say, the ears hurt from it, or when someone who steps from a dark room into bright sunshine blinks his eyes. The latter will be blind for a few moments due to the too strong or too sudden light, the former will be deaf for a few moments due to the shrieking voice. That is, both persons are unable to find a concept of the object because of the intensity of the sensations; their attention is fixed merely on the subjective representation, namely, the change of the organ.^a

7: 157

On the senses of taste and smell

§ 20. The senses of taste and hearing are both more subjective than objective. In the former, the organs of the *tongue*, the *throat*, and the *palate* come into contact with the external object; in the latter, we inhale air that is mixed with foreign vapors, and the body itself from which they stream forth can be far away from the organ.^b Both senses are closely related to each other, and he who lacks a sense of smell always has only a dull sense of taste.^c – One can say that both senses are affected by *salts* (stable and volatile), one of which must be dissolved by fluid in the mouth, the other by air, which has to penetrate the organ in order to have its specific sensation sent to it.

^a Marginal note in H: Thoughtless, he who establishes something without investigating.

Gullible, he who trusts on the basis of another witness without investigation.

Skeptical, he who places faith in no witness.

A believer (*creditor*), he who places trust in the promise of another. The faithful are those who trust an actual or putative promise of a being that cannot deceive.

Superstitious (*superstition*) he who keeps that which he mistakes for the gift [?] of another.

^b and . . . organ added in A2.

^c Crossed out after “taste” in H: [Neither of the two ways of sensing leads by itself alone to cognition of the object, if one does not call another sense for help, for example].

General remark about the outer senses

§ 21. One can divide the outer senses into those of *mechanical* and *chemical* influence. The three highest senses belong to the mechanical, the two lower to the chemical. The three highest senses are senses of *perception* (of the surface), the latter two are senses of *pleasure* (of the most intimate taking into ourselves). – Thus it happens that *nausea*, an impulse to free oneself of food through the shortest way out of the esophagus (to vomit), has been allotted to the human being as such a strong vital sensation, for this intimate taking in can be dangerous to the animal.

However, there is also a *mental pleasure*, which consists in the communication of thoughts. But if it is forced on us and still as mental nutrition is not beneficial to us, the mind finds it repulsive^d (as in, e.g., the constant repetition of would-be flashes of wit or humor, whose sameness can be unwholesome to us), and thus the natural instinct to be free of it is also called nausea by analogy, although it belongs to inner sense.

7: 158

Smell is taste at a distance, so to speak, and others are forced to share the pleasure of it, whether they want to or not. And thus smell is contrary to freedom and less sociable than taste, where among many dishes or bottles a guest can choose one according to his liking, without others being forced to share the pleasure of it. – Filth seems to arouse nausea not so much through what is repugnant to the eyes and tongue as through the stench that we presume it has. For taking something in through smell (in the lungs) is even more intimate than taking something in through the absorptive vessels of the mouth or throat.

Given the same degree of influence taking place on them, the senses *teach* less the more strongly they feel themselves being *affected*. Inversely, if they are expected to teach a great deal, they must be affected moderately. In the strongest light we *see* (distinguish) nothing, and a stentorian, strained voice *stuns* us (stifles thought).

The more susceptible to impressions the vital sense is (the more tender and sensitive), the more unfortunate the human being is; on the other hand, the more susceptible he is toward the organic sense (sensitive) and the more inured to the vital sense, the more fortunate he is^b – I say more fortunate, not exactly morally better – for he has the feeling of his own well-being more under his control. One can call the capacity for sensation that comes from *strength* delicate *sensitivity* (*sensibilitas sthenica*); that coming from the subject's *weakness* – his inability to withstand satisfactorily the penetration of influences on the senses into consciousness, that is, attending to them against his will, can be called tender *sensitivity*^c (*sensibilitas asthenica*).

^a finds it repulsive added in A2.

^b On the other hand . . . he is added in A2.

^c tender sensitivity: *zärtliche Empfindlichkeit*; delicate sensitivity: *zarte Empfindsamkeit*.

Questions

§ 22. Which organic sense is the most ungrateful and also seems to be the most dispensable? The sense of *smell*. It does not pay to cultivate it or refine it at all in order to enjoy;^a for there are more disgusting objects than pleasant ones (especially in crowded places), and even when we come across something fragrant, the pleasure coming from the sense of smell is always fleeting and transient. – But as a negative condition of well-being, this sense is not unimportant, in order not to breathe in bad air (oven fumes, the stench of swamps and animal carcasses), or also not to need rotten things for nourishment.^b – The second sense of pleasure, namely the sense of *taste*, has exactly the same importance, though it also has the specific advantage of promoting sociability in eating and drinking, something the sense of smell does not do. Moreover, taste is superior because it judges the wholesomeness of food beforehand, at the gate of entrance to the intestinal canal; for as long as luxury and indulgence have not over-refined the sense, the agreeableness of the sense of taste is connected to the wholesomeness of food, as a fairly certain prediction of it. – In the case of people who are ill the appetite, which usually takes care of them and is of benefit to them like a medicine, fails. – The smell of food is so to speak a foretaste, and by means of the smell of his favorite food the hungry person is invited to pleasure, just as the satiated person is repelled by the same smell.^c

Can the senses be used vicariously, that is, can one sense be used as a substitute for another? Through gestures one can coax the usual speech from a deaf person, granted that he has once been able to hear, thus by means of his eyes. Observing the movement of one's lips also belongs here; indeed, exactly the same thing can take place by means of the feeling of touching moving lips in the dark. However, if the person is born deaf, the sense of *seeing* the movement of the speech organs must convert the sounds, which have been coaxed from him by instruction,

^a in order to enjoy not in *H*.

^b Marginal note in *H*: Smell does not allow itself to be described, but only compared through similarity with another sense (like music with the play of colors), for example, of taste, to compare, e.g., that which smells sour, sweet, rotten – faint odor of slate.

^c Marginal note in *H*: Division – Anthropological doctrine of elements. Exposition and doctrine of method. Characteristic. Element. Doctrine. On the faculty of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, and the faculty of desire. – All of this is sensible or intellectual. On the sensible faculty of cognition. 1. On the senses. 2. On the power of imagination. Agreeableness which it presses on a. – music, b. odor. *Curiosus* is he who desires to experience rare things or also to possess them for curiosity.

Overly strong light or shouting makes one blind and deaf; that is, one cannot receive concepts of objects.

Whether there is not really a 6th sense to acquire (*papagey*), namely with regard to sex, the kiss is an enjoyment between both sexes. The embrace of those of the same sex or of small and still stammering children is a mere outburst of love. Analogy.

into a feeling of the movement of his own speech muscles. But he never arrives at real concepts in this way, because the signs that he needs are not capable of universality. – The lack of a musical ear, although the mere physical organ is uninjured, since it can hear sounds but not tones, and such a human being can speak but not sing, is a deformity difficult to explain. So too there are people who *see* well but cannot distinguish any colors, and to whom all objects seem as though they are in a copper engraving.

Which lack or loss of a sense is more serious, that of hearing or sight? – When it is inborn, the first is the least replaceable of all the senses; however if it occurs later after the use of the eyes has been cultivated, whether by observation of gestures or more indirectly by means of reading of a text, then such a loss can be compensated by sight, especially in one who is well-to-do,^d though not satisfactorily. But a person who becomes deaf in old age misses this means of social intercourse very much, and while one sees many blind people who are talkative, sociable, and cheerful at the dinner table, it is difficult to find someone who has lost his hearing and who is not annoyed, distrustful, and dissatisfied in a social gathering. In the faces of his table companions he sees all kinds of expressions of affect, or at least of interest, but he wears himself out in vain guessing at their meaning, and thus in the midst of a social gathering he is condemned to solitude.

§ 23. In addition, a receptivity for certain objects of external sensation of a special kind belongs to both of the last two senses (which are more subjective than objective). This receptivity is merely subjective, and acts upon the organs of smell and taste by means of a stimulus that is neither odor nor flavor but is felt like the effect of certain stable salts that incite the organs to specific *evacuations*. That is why these objects are not really enjoyed and taken *intimately* into the organs, but merely come into contact with them in order to be promptly eliminated. But just because of this they can be used throughout the day without satiation (except during mealtime and sleep). – The most common substance for this sensation is *tobacco*, be it in *snuffing*, or in placing it in the mouth between the cheek and the gums to stimulate the flow of saliva, or in *smoking* it through pipes, just as the Spanish women of Lima smoke a lighted cigar.²¹ Instead of tobacco the Malayans, as a last resort, make use of the areca nut rolled up in a betel leaf (betel nut), which has exactly the same effect. – This *craving* (*Pica*), apart from the medical benefit

^d Crossed out in *H*: well-to-do [very much replaceable. A person who is born blind or who in the course of time has at last become blind does not particularly regret his loss.]

7: 161

or harm that may result from the secretion of fluids in both organs, is, as a mere excitation of sensuous feeling^a in general, so to speak a frequently repeated impulse recollecting attention to the state of one's own thoughts, which would otherwise be soporific or boring owing to uniformity and monotony. Instead, these means of stimulation always jerk our attention awake again. This kind of conversation of the human being with himself takes the place of a social gathering, because in place of conversation it fills the emptiness of time with continuous newly excited sensations and with stimuli that are quickly passing, but always renewed.

On inner sense^b

§ 24. Inner sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being *does*, since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is a consciousness of what he *undergoes*, in so far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts. It rests on inner intuition, and consequently on the relations of ideas in time (whether they are simultaneous or successive). Its perceptions and the inner experience (true or illusory) composed by means of their connections are not merely *anthropological*, where we abstract from the question of whether the human being has a soul or not (as a special incorporeal substance); but *psychological*, where we believe we perceive such a thing within ourselves, and the mind, which is represented as a mere faculty of feeling and thinking, is regarded as a special substance dwelling in the human being. – There is then only *one* inner sense, because the human being does not have different organs for sensing himself inwardly, and one could say that the soul is the organ of inner sense. It is said that inner sense is subject to *illusions*,^c which consist either in taking the appearances of inner sense for external appearances, that is, taking imaginings for sensations, or in regarding them as inspirations^d caused by another being that is not an object of external sense. So the illusion here is either *enthusiasm* or *spiritualism*, and both are *deceptions* of inner sense. In both cases it is *mental illness*: the tendency to accept the play of ideas of inner sense as experiential cognition, although it is only a fiction,^e and also the tendency to keep oneself in an artificial frame of mind, perhaps because one considers it beneficial and superior to the vulgarity of ideas of sense, and accordingly to trick oneself with the intuitions thus formed (dreaming when awake). – For gradually the human being comes to regard that which he has intentionally put in his mind as something that previously already

7: 162

^a *Sinnengefühl*.

^b H, A1: Appendix: on inner sense.

^c *Täuschungen*.

^d either in . . . inspirations added in A2; in this H, A1.

^e H: an intentional fiction.

must have been there, and he believes that he has merely discovered in the depths of his soul what in reality he has forced on himself.

This is how it was with the fanatically exciting inner sensations of a *Bourignon*, or the fanatically frightening ones of a *Pascal*. This mental depression cannot be conveniently cleared away by rational ideas (for what are they able to do against supposed intuitions?). The tendency to retire into oneself, together with the resulting illusions of inner sense, can only be set right when the human being is led back into the external world and by means of this to the order of things present to the outer senses.^a

On the causes that increase or decrease sense impressions according to degree

§ 25. Sense impressions are increased according to degree by means of 1) contrast, 2) novelty, 3) change, 4) intensification.

a. Contrast

Dissimilarity^b (contrast) is the juxtaposition, arousing our attention, of mutually contrary *sense representations* under one and the same concept. It is different from *contradiction*, which consists in the linking of mutually antagonistic *concepts*. A well-cultivated piece of land in a sandy desert, like the alleged paradisaical region in the area of Damascus in Syria, *elevates* the idea of the cultivation by means of mere contrast. – The bustle and glitter of an estate or even of a great city near the quiet, simple, and yet contented life of the farmer; or a house with a thatched roof in which one finds tasteful and comfortable rooms inside, enlivens our representations, and one gladly lingers nearby because the senses are thereby strengthened. – – On the other hand, poverty and ostentatiousness, the luxurious finery of a lady who glitters with diamonds and whose clothes are dirty; – or, as once with a Polish magnate, extravagantly laden tables and numerous waiters at hand, but in crude footwear – these things do not stand in contrast but in contradiction, and one sense representation destroys or weakens the other because it wants to unite what is opposite under one and the same concept, which is impossible. – – But one can also make a *comical* contrast and express an apparent contradiction in the *tone* of truth, or express something obviously contemptible in the language of praise, in order to make the absurdity still more palpable – like *Fielding* in his *Jonathan Wild the Great*, or *Blumauer* in his travesty

7: 163

^a Marginal note in H: NB. Above the *animus sui compos* who has all mental changes in his control.

On dull, weak, delicate senses – feeling of exhaustion and strength *sagacitatem*, of dogs on the lookout. – The old one believes he will be fine, while the *vital* feeling becomes weak. – The blind distinguish the colors of feeling. Strong senses for perceiving, delicate ones for distinguishing.

^b *Abschaltung*.

of Virgil; and, for example, one can parody a heart-rending romance, like *Clarissa*,²² merrily and with profit, and thus strengthen the senses by freeing them from the conflict that false and harmful^a concepts have mixed into them.

b. Novelty

Through the *new*, to which the rare and that which has been kept hidden also belong, attention is enlivened. For it is an acquisition; the sense representation thereby wins more power. *Everyday life* or the *familiar* extinguishes it. But by this are not to be understood^b the discovery, contact with, or public exhibition of a work of *antiquity*, whereby a thing is brought to mind that one would have supposed was destroyed long ago by the force of time according to the natural course of events. To sit on a piece of the wall of an ancient Roman theater (in Verona or Nîmes); to have in one's hands a household utensil of that ancient people, discovered after many centuries under the lava in Herculaneum; to be able to show a coin of the Macedonian kings or a gem of ancient sculpture, and so on, rouses the keenest attention of the expert's senses.^c The tendency to acquire knowledge merely for the sake of its novelty, rarity, and hiddenness is called *curiosity*. Although this inclination only plays with ideas and is otherwise without interest in their objects, it is not to be criticized, except when it is a matter of spying on that which really is of interest to others alone. – But as concerns sheer sense impressions, each morning, through the mere *novelty* of its sensations, makes all sense representations clearer and more livelier (as long as they are not diseased) than they generally are toward evening.

7: 164 c. Change

Monotony (complete uniformity in one's sensations) ultimately causes *atony* (lack of attention to one's condition), and the sense impressions grow weak. Change refreshes them, just as a sermon read in the same tone, whether it be shouted out or delivered with a measured yet uniform voice, puts the whole congregation to sleep. – Work and rest, city and country life, social conversation and play, entertainment in solitude, now with stories, then with poems, sometimes with philosophy, and then with

^a and harmful not in *H*.

^b *Crossed out in H*: understood [for it can be new enough, and because of the rarity and likewise seclusion that lies within it. The attention].

^c *Marginal note in H*: Monotony, disharmony, and atony of the faculty of sensation.

They increase with the dosage.

Habit makes them necessary. *Crossed out in H*: [One calls the inclination to see such rarities *curiosity*; although that which is concealed merely because it is regarded as secret and will be found out is also designated by this name, but then it serves to name an inattentive person.].

mathematics, strengthen the mind. – It is one and the same vital energy that stirs up the consciousness of sensations; but its various organs relieve one another in their activity. Thus it is easier to enjoy oneself in *walking* for a considerable length of time, since one muscle (of the leg) *alternates* at rest with the other, than it is to remain standing rigid in one and the same spot, where one muscle must work for a while without relaxing. – This is why travel is so attractive; the only pity is that with idle people it leaves behind a *void* (atony), as the consequence of the monotony of domestic life.

Nature itself has arranged things so that pain creeps in, uninvited, between pleasant sensations that entertain the senses, and so makes life interesting. But it is absurd to mix in pain intentionally and to hurt oneself for the sake of variety, to allow oneself to be awakened in order to properly feel oneself falling asleep again; or, as with *Fielding*'s novel (*The Foundling*),²³ where an editor of this book added a final part after the author's death, in order to introduce jealousy that could provide variety in the marriage (with which the story ends). For the deterioration of a state does not increase the interest our senses take in it; not even in a tragedy. And the conclusion is not a variation.^d

d. Intensification extending to perfection

A continuous series of successive sense representations, which *differ* according to degree, has, if each of the following representations is always stronger than the one preceding it, an *outer limit of tension (intensio)*; to approach this limit is *arousing*, on the other hand to exceed it is *relaxing (remissio)*. But in the point that separates both states lies the *perfection (maximum)* of the sensation, which brings about insensitivity and, consequently, lifelessness.

If one wants to keep the faculty of sensing lively, then one must not begin with strong sensations (because they make us insensitive toward those that follow); rather it is better to deny them to oneself at the beginning and apportion them sparingly to oneself,^b so that one can always climb higher. In the introduction the preacher begins with a cold instruction of the understanding that points to reflection on a concept of duty, then he introduces a moral interest into his analysis of the text, and then he concludes in the application with an appeal to all incentives of the human soul through sensations that can give energy to the moral interest.

Young man! Deny yourself gratifications^c (of amusement, indulgence, love, and so forth), if not with the Stoic intention of wanting to do

^a not even . . . variation not in *H*.

^b and . . . to oneself not in *H*.

^c *H*: gratification of the senses.

7: 165

without them completely, then with the refined Epicurean intention of having in view an ever-increasing enjoyment. This stinginess with the assets of your enjoyment of life^a actually makes you richer through the *postponement* of enjoyment, even if, at the end of life, you have had to give up most of the profit from it. Like everything ideal, the consciousness of having enjoyment in your control is more fruitful and comprehensive than anything that gratifies through sense, because by this means it is simultaneously consumed and thus deducted from the total quantity.

On the inhibition, weakening, and total loss of the sense faculties

§ 26. The sense faculties can be weakened, inhibited, or lost completely. Thus there exist the conditions of drunkenness, sleep, unconsciousness, apparent death (asphyxia), and actual death.^b

Drunkenness is the unnatural condition of inability to order one's sense representations according to laws of experience, provided that the condition is the effect of an excessive consumption of drink.^c

7: 166

According to its verbal definition, sleep is a condition in which a healthy human being is unable to become conscious of representations through the external senses. To find the real definition of this is entirely up to the physiologists, who, if they are able, may explain this relaxation, which is nevertheless at the same time a gathering of power for renewed external sensations (through which the human being sees himself as a newborn in the world, and by which probably a third of our lifetime passes away unconscious and unregretted).^d

^a *Lebensgefühl*.

^b The sense faculties . . . death added in A2. H, A1: The condition of the human being is here that of *sleep* or *drunkenness* or *unconsciousness* or actual or apparent death.

^c Drunkenness . . . of drink added in A2. A similar definition appears in A1 at the beginning of §29, below.

^d *Crossed out in H:* [If one feels tired when one goes to bed, but for some unknown reason nevertheless cannot fall asleep, by calm attentiveness to one's physical sensations one may perceive something spastic in the muscles of the foot as well as in the brain, and at the moment of falling asleep feel a fatigue which is a very agreeable sensation. – That waking is a condition of strain and contraction of all fibers is also observable in the phenomenon that recruits, who, after they have just been woken from sleep and are measured standing up, are found to be about half an inch longer than the still shorter height which they would have been found in if they had been lying awake in their bed for awhile.]

Sleep is not merely a *need* for relaxation of exhausted powers but also an enjoyment of comfort at the beginning (at the moment of falling asleep) as well as at the end (at the moment of waking up). However, with this, as with all enjoyments, it is necessary to be thrifty, because it exhausts the capacity for sensation and along with also <weakens> the vital force. – It is the same with this as with the Mohammedan's manner of representing food proportion, where it is said that having weighed every single human being at birth shows how much he should eat. If he eats a lot, then he will have consumed his portion soon and will die early; if he eats moderately, then he has a long time to eat, and therefore also to live. – One could also say just the same about sleep: he (*continued on page 277*)

The unnatural condition of dazed sense organs, which results in a lesser degree of attention to oneself than would normally be the case, is an analogue of drunkenness; that is why he who is suddenly awakened from a firm sleep is called drunk with sleep. – He does not yet have his full consciousness. – But even when awake one can suddenly be seized by confusion while deliberating about what to do in an unforeseen case, an inhibition of the orderly and ordinary use of one's faculty of reflection, which brings the play of sense representations to a standstill. In such a case we say that he is disconcerted, beside himself (with joy or fear), *perplexed, bewildered, astonished*, he has lost his *Tramontano**^a and so on, and this condition is to be regarded as like a momentary sleep that seizes one and that requires a *collecting* of one's sensations. In a violent, suddenly aroused affect (of fear, anger, or even joy), the human being is, as we say, *beside himself* (in an *ecstasy*, if he believes that he is gripped by an intuition which is not of the senses); he has no control over himself, and is temporarily paralyzed, so to speak, in using his outer senses.

§ 27. *Unconsciousness*,^b which usually follows dizziness (a fast-spinning circle of many different sensations that is beyond comprehension), is a foretaste of death.^c The complete inhibition of all sensation is asphyxia or *apparent death*, which, as far as one can perceive externally, is to be distinguished from actual death only through the result (as in persons drowned, hanged, or suffocated by fumes).

No human being can experience his own *death* (for to constitute an experience requires life), he can only observe it in others. Whether it is painful cannot be judged from the death rattle or convulsions of the

7: 167

* The North Star is called *Tramontano* or *Tramontana*, and *perdere la tramontana*, to lose the North Star (as the sailor's guiding star), means to lose one's composure, not to know how to find one's way about.

(continued from page 276) who sleeps a lot in the younger but still manly years will have little sleep in old age, which is a sad fate. – The Kalmyks regard sleeping during the day as shameful, and the Spaniards' *siesta* does not shed a favorable light on their vigor.]

^a A1 contains the following explanation, probably taken from a Note in the *Allgemeine Litterarische Anzeige* 1798, pp. 2087f.: “*Tramontano* is an arduous north wind in Italian, similar to the *Sirocco*, which is an even worse southeast wind. Now when a young, inexperienced man enters a social gathering (principally of ladies), which is more brilliant than he expected, he is easily embarrassed as to how he ought to start speaking. Now it would be unseemly to begin with a newspaper report, for one does not see what brought him to speak of it. However, since he has just come from the street, the bad weather would be the best means of introduction, and if he does not think of this, then the Italian says: ‘He has lost the north wind.’” – In H the entire remark is absent. NB. The expression *perdre la tramontana* is also found in French classics, e.g., in Jean de La Fontaine's (1621–95) tale *Le Tableau*.

^b H: and death, of which the former.

^c H: of the latter, that is, the ceasing of all sensation, even though it is not the cause of the latter.

dying person; it seems much more to be a purely mechanical reaction of the vital force,^a and perhaps a gentle sensation of the gradual release from all pain. – The fear of death that is natural to all human beings, even the unhappiest or the wisest, is therefore not a horror of *dying* but, as Montaigne²⁴ rightly says, horror at the thought of *having died* (that is, of being dead), which the candidate for death thinks he will still have after his death, since he thinks of his corpse, which is no longer himself, as still being himself in a dark grave or somewhere else. – This illusion cannot be pushed aside, for it lies in the nature of thought as a way of speaking to and of oneself. The thought *I am not* simply cannot exist; because if I am not then I cannot be conscious that I am not. I can indeed say: “I am not healthy,” and think such *predicates* of myself negatively (as is the case with all *verba*); but to *negate* the subject itself when *speaking* in the first person, so that the subject destroys itself, is a contradiction.

On the power of imagination^b

§ 28. The power of imagination (*facultas imaginandi*), as a faculty of intuition without the presence of the object, is either *productive*, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), which thus precedes experience; or *reproductive*, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object (*exhibitio derivativa*), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously. – Pure intuitions of space and time belong to the productive faculty; all others presuppose empirical intuition, which, when it is connected with the concept of the object and thus becomes empirical cognition, is called *experience*. – The power of imagination, in so far as it also produces images involuntarily, is called *fantasy*. He who is accustomed to regarding these images as (inner or outer) experiences is a *visionary*.^c – An involuntary play of one's images in sleep (a state of health) is called *dreaming*.^d

The power of imagination (in other words), is either *inventive* (productive) or merely *recollective* (reproductive). But the productive power of imagination is nevertheless not exactly *creative*, for it is not capable of producing a sense representation that was *never* given to our faculty of sense; one can always furnish evidence of the material of its ideas. To one who has never seen *red* among the seven colors, we can never make this sensation comprehensible, but to the person who is born blind we cannot make any colors comprehensible, not even the secondary colors,

7: 168

7: 169

^a *Lebenskraft*.

^b In H and A1: “On sensibility in the faculty of cognition Second Chapter.”

^c *Phantast*.

^d Crossed out in H: *dreaming* [that is, with the insensibility of all external sense organs there is an analogue with the laws of experience enduring an involuntary play of imagination, although also he who in waking has submitted to the propensity to mix fantasy among experiences and thereby to merge them into each other is called a dreamer.]

for example, green, which is produced from the mixture of two colors. Yellow and blue mixed together give green; but the power of imagination would not produce the slightest idea of this color, unless it had *seen* them mixed together.

This is exactly how it is with each one of the five senses, that is, the sensations produced by the five senses in their synthesis cannot be made by means of the power of imagination, but must be drawn originally from the faculty of sense. There have been people for whom the representation of light by their faculty of sight consisted of no greater selection than white or black, and for whom, although they could see well, the visible world seemed like a copperplate engraving. Likewise, there are more people than one would believe who have a good and even extremely sensitive sense of hearing, but who have absolutely no musical ear; whose sense for tone is entirely indifferent not merely to imitating tones (singing) but also to distinguishing them from noise. – The same may be true with the ideas of taste and smell; namely, that the *sense* lacks the material of enjoyment for many specific sensations, and one person believes that he understands another in this connection, while the sensations of the one may differ from those of the other not only in degree but specifically and completely. – There are people who lack the sense of smell entirely, they regard the sensation of inhaling pure air through the nose as the sensation of smelling, and consequently they cannot make head or tail of any description which tries to describe the sensation of smell to them. But where the sense of smell is lacking, the sense of taste is also badly missing, and if someone has no sense of taste, it is wasted effort to instruct and teach him about it. But hunger and its satisfaction (satiation)^e is something quite different from taste.

So, no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the *material* for its images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories formed of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding. However, sometimes we also name (though only in a figurative sense) the power of imagination's sensitivity for representations through communication as a sense, saying “This human being has no *sense* for it.” Though in not grasping communicated representations and uniting them in thought, there exists an inability not of sense, but partly of understanding. He himself does not think about what he says, and therefore others also do not understand him; he speaks *nonsense* (*non sense*) – a mistake that is still to be distinguished from what is *devoid of sense*, where thoughts are paired together in such a way that another person does not know what he should make of them. The fact that the word “sense” (but only in the singular) is used so often for

^e “satiation” added in A2.

"thought" should signify that it is of a still higher level than that of thinking. The fact that one says of an expression that within it lies a deep or profound sense (hence the word "aphorism"), and that sound human understanding is also called "common sense"^a and is still placed at the top, even though this expression actually signifies only the lowest level of the cognitive faculty – all of this is based on the fact that the power of imagination, which puts material under the understanding in order to provide content for its concepts (for cognition), seems to provide a reality to its (invented) intuitions due to the analogy between them and real perceptions.^b

7: 170 § 29. Partaking in intoxicating food and drink is a physical means to excite or soothe the power of imagination.* Some of these, as poisons, weaken the power of life (certain mushrooms, wild rosemary, wild hogweed, the Chicha of the Peruvians, the Ava of the South Sea Indians, opium); others strengthen it or at least elevate its feeling (like fermented beverages, wine and beer, or the spirits extracted from them, such as brandy); but all of them are contrary to nature and artificial. He who takes them in such excess that he is for a time incapable of ordering his sense representations according to laws of experience^c is said to be drunk or intoxicated,^d and putting oneself in this condition voluntarily or intentionally is called getting drunk. However, all of these methods are supposed to serve the purpose of making the human being forget the burden that seems to lie, originally, in life generally. – This very widespread inclination and its influence on the use of the understanding deserve special consideration in a pragmatic anthropology.

* I pass over here what is not a means to a purpose but a natural consequence of a situation in which someone is placed, and where his imagination alone disconcerts him. Examples of this are *dizziness*, caused by looking down from the edge of a steep height (perhaps also by looking down from a narrow bridge without railings) and *seasickness*. – The board on which a human being who feels faint steps would strike no fear in him if it were lying on the ground, but when it is placed over a deep precipice as a footbridge the thought of the mere possibility of taking a false step is so powerful that the person attempting to cross over really is in danger. – Seasickness (which I myself experienced on a voyage from Pillau to Königsberg, if indeed one wants to call this a sea voyage), with its attack of vomiting, came, as I believe I observed, merely by means of my eyes; because the rocking of the ship, as seen from the cabin, made me see now the bay, now the summit of Balga, and the recurrent falling after the rising of the ship provoked, by means of the power of the imagination, an antiperistaltic movement of the intestines by the stomach muscles.

^a Sense: *Sinn*, thought: *Gedanken*, aphorism: *Sinnspruch*, common sense: *Gemeinsinn*.

^b In H and A1 the following heading occurs: "On Certain Physical Means of Exciting or Soothing the Power of Imagination."

^c in such excess . . . experience added in A2.

^d or intoxicated added in A2.

All silent intoxication has something shameful in it; that is, intoxication that does not enliven sociability and the reciprocal communication of thoughts – of which opium and brandy are examples. Wine, which merely stimulates, and beer, which is more nourishing and satisfying like a food, serve as social intoxication; but with the difference that drinking-bouts with beer make guests more dreamy and withdrawn, whereas at a wine-party the guests are cheerful, boisterous, talkative, and witty.

Intemperance in social drinking that leads to befuddlement of the senses is certainly rude behavior in a man, not merely in respect to the company with whom he enjoys himself, but also in respect to self-esteem, if he leaves staggering or at least with unsure steps, or merely slurring his words. But there is much to be said for qualifying the judgment of such a mistake, since the borderline of self-control can be so easily overlooked and overstepped, for the host desires that the guest leave fully satisfied (*ut conviva satur*) by this act of sociability.

The freedom from care that drunkenness produces, and along with it also no doubt the carelessness, is an illusory feeling of increased power of life: the drunken man no longer feels life's obstacles, with whose overcoming nature is incessantly connected (and in which health also consists); and he is happy in his weakness, since nature is actually striving in him to restore his life step by step, through the gradual increase of his powers. – Women, clergymen, and Jews normally do not get drunk, or at least they carefully avoid all appearance of it, because their civil status is weak^a and they need to be reserved (for which sobriety is required). For their external worth rests simply on others' belief in their chastity, piety, and a separatist lawfulness.^b For, as concerns the last point, all separatists, that is, those who submit not only to a public law of the land but also to a special one (of their own sect) are, as oddities and allegedly chosen people, particularly exposed to the attention of the community and the sting of criticism; thus they cannot slacken their attention to themselves, since drunkenness, which removes caution, is a scandal for them.^c

A Stoic admirer of *Cato* said: "his virtue was strengthened by wine (*virtus eius incaluit mero*)²⁵"; and a modern German said of the ancient Germans: "they formed their counsels (to make a resolution of war) while they were drunk, so that they would not be lacking in vigor, and reflected on them while sober, so that they would not be without understanding."²⁶

^a *bürgerlich schwach*.

^b *separatistische Gesetzlichkeit*.

^c Marginal note in H: The power of imagination is either creative (*productiv*) or reproductive (*reproductiv*). The latter needs the law of *association* of representations. The characteristic is arbitrary for the aim of *reproduction associ rende*. – In respect to time it is the looking backward, the apprehending, and the foreseeing power of imagination.

Drink loosens the tongue (*in vino disertus*).^a – But it also opens the heart and is an instrumental vehicle of a moral quality, namely frankness. – Holding back one's thoughts is an oppressive state for a sincere heart; and merry drinkers do not readily tolerate a very temperate guest at their revel, because he represents an observer who looks out for the faults of others while he hides his own.²⁷ Hume also says: "The drinking companion who never forgets is annoying; the follies of one day must be forgotten in order to make room for those of the next."²⁸ Good-naturedness is presupposed by this permission that man has, for the sake of social pleasure, to go a bit beyond the borderline of sobriety for a short while. The fashionable politics of half a century ago, when the Nordic courts sent envoys who could drink a great deal without getting drunk, but who made others drunk in order to question or persuade them, was deceitful; but it has disappeared along with the coarseness of the customs of those times, and a long lecture of warning against this vice may well be superfluous with respect to the civilized classes.^b

7: 172

Can one also explore the temperament of the human being who is getting drunk, or his character, while he is drinking? I think not. Alcohol is a new fluid mixed with those flowing in his veins and a further neural stimulus, one that does not reveal the *natural* temperature more clearly but rather introduces another one. – That is why one person who gets drunk becomes amorous, another boastful, a third cantankerous, a fourth (especially when drinking beer) soft-hearted or pious or altogether silent. But all of them, once they have slept it off and one reminds them of what they said the previous evening, will laugh at this strange humor or ill-humor of their senses.

§ 30. Originality of the power of imagination (not imitative production), when it harmonizes with concepts, is called *genius*; when it does not harmonize with them, it is called *enthusiasm*. It is noteworthy that we can think of no other suitable form for a *rational* being than that of a human being. Every other form would represent, at most, a symbol of a certain quality of the human being – as the serpent, for example, is an image of evil cunning – but not the rational being himself. Therefore we populate all other planets in our imagination with nothing but human forms, although it is probable that they may be formed very differently, given the diversity of soil that supports and nourishes them, and the different elements of which they are composed. All other forms which we might give them are *caricatures*.*

* Therefore the *Holy Trinity*, an old man, a young man, and a bird (the dove), must not be presented as real forms that are similar to their objects, but merely as symbols. Pictorial expressions of the descent from heaven and the ascension to heaven (continued on page 283)

^a Trans.: wine makes eloquent.

^b civilized classes: *gesittete Stände*, coarseness of the customs: *Rohigkeit der Sitten*.

When the lack of a sense (for example, sight) is inborn, then the crippled person cultivates, as far as possible, another sense to use as a substitute for it, and exercises the productive power of the imagination to a high degree. He tries to make the shapes of external bodies conceivable by means of *touch*, and where this sense does not suffice on account of magnitude (for example, with a house), he tries to make the *spaciousness* conceivable by still another sense, possibly *bearing*, that is, through the echo of voices in a room. Finally, however, if a successful operation rescues the organ for sensation, he must first of all *learn* to see and hear, that is, try to bring his perceptions under concepts of this kind of object.

7: 173

Concepts of objects often prompt a spontaneously produced^a image (through the productive power of imagination), which we attach to them involuntarily. When we read or have someone tell us about the life and deeds of a great man according to talent, merit, or rank, we are usually led to give him a considerable stature in our imagination; on the other hand when someone is described as delicate and soft in character we usually form an image of him as smallish and pliable. Not only the peasant but also one fairly acquainted with the ways of the world finds it very strange when the hero, whom he had imagined according to the deeds narrated of him, is presented to him as a tiny little fellow, and, conversely, when the delicate and soft Hume is presented to him as a husky man. – Therefore one must not pitch the expectation of something too high, because the power of imagination is naturally inclined to heighten to extremes; since reality is always more limited than the idea that serves as a pattern for its execution. –

It is not advisable to praise a person too highly before one wishes to introduce him into a social gathering for the first time; on the contrary, it can often be a malicious trick on the part of a rogue to make him seem ridiculous. For the power of imagination raises the representation of what is expected so high that the person in question can only suffer in comparison with our preconceived idea of him. This is exactly what happens when a book, a play, or anything else belonging to gracious manners is announced with exaggerated praise; for when it comes to the presentation, it is bound to fail. Merely having read a play, even a good one, already weakens the impression when one sees it performed. – But if what was praised in advance turns out to be the exact opposite of our

(continued from page 282) have exactly the same significance. In order to attach an intuition to our concepts of rational beings, we can proceed in no other way other than to anthropomorphize them; however it is unfortunate or childish if, in doing so, the symbolic representation is raised to a concept of the thing in itself.

^a *selbstgeschaffen*.

strained anticipation of it, then the subject presented, no matter how innocuous, provokes the greatest laughter.^a

7: 174

Changing forms set in motion, which in themselves really have no significance that could arouse our attention – things like flickering flames in a fireplace, or the many twists and bubble movements of a brook rippling over stones – entertain the power of imagination with a host of representations of an entirely different sort (than that of sight, in this case): they play in the mind and it becomes absorbed in thought. Even music, for one who does not listen as a connoisseur, can put a poet or philosopher into a mood in which he can snatch and even master thoughts agreeable to his vocation or avocation, which he would not have caught so luckily had he been sitting alone in his room. The cause of this phenomenon seems to lie in the following: when sense, through a manifold that of itself can arouse no attention at all, is distracted by some other object that strikes it more forcibly, thought is not only facilitated but also enlivened, in so far as it requires a more strenuous and enduring power of imagination to provide material for its intellectual ideas. – The English *Spectator*²⁹ tells of a lawyer who, while pleading a case, was in the habit of taking a thread from his pocket which he incessantly wound and unwound on his finger. When his opponent, the rogue, secretly slipped the thread out of his pocket, the lawyer was completely disconcerted and talked sheer nonsense; and thus it was said that he lost the thread of his discourse. – The sense that is riveted on one sensation pays no attention to other unfamiliar sensations (because of habituation), and therefore it is not distracted by them; but because of this the power of imagination can all the better keep itself on a regular course.

On the productive faculty belonging to sensibility according to its different forms
§ 31. There are three different kinds of productive faculty belonging to sensibility. These are the *forming* of intuitions in space (*imaginatio plastica*), the *associating* of intuitions in time (*imaginatio associans*), and that of *affinity*, based on the common origin of ideas from each other (*affinitas*).

7: 175

A. On sensibility's productive faculty of constructing forms^b
Before the artist can present a physical form (palpably, so to speak), he must have produced it in his power of imagination; and this form is then an invention which, if it is involuntary (as perhaps in a dream), is called *fantasy* and does not belong to the artist; but if it is governed by choice, is called *composition*, *fabrication*.^c If the artist works from images that are

^a In A1 this entire paragraph occurs later – viz., as the third paragraph of §32, below.

^b *Bildung*.

^c fabrication: *Erfindung*, invention: *Dichtung*.

similar to works of nature, his productions are called *natural*;^d but if he produces forms according to images that cannot be found in experience, then the objects so formed (such as Prince Palagonia's villa in Sicily)³⁰ are called fantastic, unnatural, distorted forms, and such fancies are like^e dream images of one who is awake (*velut aegri somnia vanae finguntur species*).^c – We play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but imagination (as fantasy) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently.

The play of fantasy with the human being in sleep is called dreaming, and it also takes place in a healthy condition; on the other hand if it happens while the human being is awake, it reveals a diseased condition. – Sleep, as release from every faculty of external perception and especially from voluntary movements, seems to be necessary for all animals and indeed even plants^d (by analogy of the latter with the former) for the recovery of powers expended while awake. But the same thing also seems to be the case with dreaming: if the power of life were not always kept active in sleep by dreams, it would be extinguished and the deepest sleep would have to bring death along with it. – When we say that we have had a sound sleep, without dreams, this is indeed saying nothing more than that we do not remember anything upon waking up, which, if the products of the imagination change rapidly, can also occur while awake, namely when we are in a state of distraction. If one who fixes his glassy stare on the same point for a while is asked what he is thinking about, the answer obtained is: "I haven't been thinking of anything." If there were not upon awakening many gaps in our memory (from inattention to neglected interconnecting ideas), and if the following night we would begin to dream again just where we had left off the night before, then I do not know whether we would not believe that we were living in two different worlds. – Dreaming is a wise arrangement of nature for exciting the power of life through affects related to involuntary invented events, while bodily movements based on choice, namely muscular movements, are in the meantime suspended. – But one must not take the stories we dream to be revelations from an invisible world.^e

7: 176

B. On sensibility's productive faculty of association

The law of *association* is this: empirical ideas that have frequently followed one another produce a habit in the mind such that when one idea

^a If the artist . . . *natural* added in A2.

^b fantastic . . . like added in A2.

^c Trans.: chimeras are created like the dreams of a sick person. *Crossed out in H:* [Therefore we cannot properly think of a rational being under any other form except that of a human being.]

^d *Marginal note in H:* Jumping off from the subject matter of the discourse.

^e Dreaming is . . . an invisible world not in H.

is produced, the other also comes into being.^a – It is futile to demand a physiological explanation of this; one may make use of whatever serves as^b an hypothesis (which is itself, again, an invention), such as Descartes's hypothesis of his so-called material ideas in the brain. At least no explanation of this kind is *pragmatic*; that is, we cannot use it for any technical application, because we have no knowledge of the brain and of the places in it where the traces of the impressions made by ideas might enter into sympathetic harmony with one another, in so far as they touch each other (at least indirectly), so to speak.

This association^c often extends very far, and the power of imagination often goes so fast from the hundredth to the thousandth that it seems we have completely skipped over certain intermediate links in the chain of ideas, though we have merely not been aware of them. So we must often ask ourselves: "Where was I? Where did I start out in my conversation, and how did I reach this last point?"*

C. On sensibility's productive faculty of affinity

By *affinity* I understand the union of the manifold in virtue of its derivation from one ground. – What interrupts and destroys social conversation is the jumping off from one subject to another entirely different one, for which the ground of the empirical association of representations is merely subjective (that is, with one person the representations are associated differently than they are with another) – this association, I say, is misleading, a kind of nonsense in terms of form. – Only when a subject has been exhausted and a short pause sets in can one introduce another subject of interest. The irregular, roaming power of imagination so confuses the mind, through the succession of ideas that are not tied to anything objective, that he who leaves a gathering of this kind feels

* Therefore he who starts a social conversation must begin with what is near and present to him, and then gradually direct people's attention to what is remote, so long as it can be of interest. Thus a good and common expedient for a person who steps from the street into a social gathering assembled for mutual conversation is the bad weather. For if when stepping into the room he begins with something of the news from Turkey that is just now in the papers, he does violence to others' power of imagination, since they cannot see what has brought him to talk about it [7: 177]. The mind demands a certain order for all communication of thoughts, and much depends on the introductory ideas and the beginning, in conversation as much as in a sermon. [Marginal note in H: *facultas signatrix* belongs to the associative power of imagination.]

However, if we perceive real sense representations (not imaginary ones), whose connection is named after a rule of experience, and we perceive our representations by themselves as being connected to each other, then this happens in time and is associative.

On the necessity of two sexes for reproduction]

^a H contains an additional sentence here: It is a connection of association.

^b whatever serves as added in A2.

^c *Nachbarschaft*.

as though he has been dreaming. – In silent thinking as well as in the sharing of thoughts, there must always be a theme on which the manifold is strung, so that the understanding can also be effective. However, the play of the power of imagination here still follows the rules of sensibility, which provide the material whose association is achieved without consciousness of the rule, and this association is *in conformity with* the understanding although not derived *from* it.

The word *affinity* (*affinitas*) here recalls a process found in chemistry: intellectual combination is analogous to an interaction of two specifically different physical substances intimately acting upon each other and striving for unity, where this *union* brings about a third entity that has properties which can only be produced by the union of two heterogeneous elements. Despite their dissimilarity, understanding and sensibility by themselves form a close union for bringing about our cognition, as if one had its origin in the other, or both originated from a common origin; but this cannot be, or at least we cannot conceive how dissimilar things could sprout forth from one and the same root.*

§ 32.^a The power of imagination, however, is not as creative as one would like to pretend. We cannot think of any other form that would be suitable for a rational being than that of a human being. Thus the sculptor or painter always depicts a human being when he makes an angel or a god. Every other figure seems to him include parts (such as wings, claws, or hooves) which, according to his idea, do not combine together with the structure of a rational being. On the other hand, he can make things as large as he wishes.

* The first two ways of composing ideas could be called *mathematical* (of enlargement), but the third would be *dynamic* (of production); whereby an entirely new thing emerges (somewhat like a neutral salt in chemistry). The play of forces in inanimate as well as in animate nature, in the soul as well as in the body, is based on the dissolution and union [7: 178] of the dissimilar. It is true that we arrive at cognition of the play of forces through experience of its effects; but we cannot reach the ultimate cause and the simple components into which its material can be analyzed. – – What is the reason for the fact that all organic beings that we know reproduce their species only through the union of two sexes (which we then call male and female)? We cannot very well assume that the Creator, simply for the sake of curiosity and to establish an arrangement on our planet that pleased him, was so to speak just playing. Rather, it seems that it must be impossible for organic creatures to come into being from the matter of our world through reproduction in any other way than through the two sexes established for this purpose. – – In what darkness does human reason lose itself when it tries to fathom the origin, or even merely undertakes to make a guess at it! [Marginal note in H: 1. Formation by means of cold or warm crystallization, in which a solvent (heat or water) escapes, e.g., in calcite. a) mechanical formation of shape: where the sea [?]]

b) joining together.

Synthesis of aggregation (mathematical) and of coalition (dynamic).
Understanding. Judgment. Reason.]

^a In H and A1 the following title occurs here: *Elucidation through examples*.

Deception due to the *strength* of the human power of imagination often goes so far that a person believes he sees and feels outside himself that which he has only in his mind. Thus the dizziness that seizes the person who looks into an abyss, even though he has a wide enough surface around him so as not to fall, or even stands by a firm handrail. – Some mentally ill people have a strange fear that, seized by an inner impulse, they will spontaneously hurl themselves down. – The sight of others enjoying loathsome things (e.g., when the Tunguse rhythmically suck out and swallow the mucus from their children's noses) induces the spectator to vomit, just as if such a pleasure were forced on him.

7: 179

The *homesickness* of the Swiss (and, as I have it from the mouth of an experienced general, also the Westphalians and Pomeranians from certain regions) that seizes them when they are transferred to other lands, is the result of a longing for the places where they enjoyed the very simple pleasures of life – aroused by the recollection of images of the carefree life and neighborly company in their early years. For later, after they visit these same places, they are greatly disappointed in their expectations and thus also find their homesickness cured. To be sure, they think this is because everything there has changed a great deal, but in fact it is because they cannot bring back their youth there. It is also noteworthy that this homesickness seizes more the peasants from a province that is poor but bound together by strong family ties, than those who are busy earning money and take as their motto: *Patria ubi bene*.^a

If one has heard before that this or that human being is evil, then one believes one can read malice in his face, and especially when emotion and passion appear on the scene, invention mixes here with experience to form a single sensation. According to Helvétius,³¹ a lady looked through a telescope and saw the shadows of two lovers in the moon; the clergyman, observing it later, said: "Not at all, Madame; they are the two bell towers of a cathedral."

Furthermore, to all this one can add the effects produced by sympathetic power of imagination. The sight of a human being in a convulsive or epileptic seizure stimulates similar spasmodic movements in the spectator; just as the yawning of another leads one to yawn with him; and the physician Dr. Michaelis³² states that when a soldier in the army in North America fell into a violent frenzy, two or three bystanders were suddenly thrown into the same state upon seeing him, although this condition was merely temporary. This is why it is not advisable for weak-nerved people^b (hypochondriacs) to visit lunatic asylums out of curiosity. For the most part, they avoid them of their own accord, because they

^a Trans.. Home is where we are doing well.

^b *Nervenschwachen*.

fear for their sanity. – One also finds that when someone explains something emotional to vivacious people, especially something that may have caused anger to them,^a their attention is so aroused that they make faces and are involuntarily moved to a play of expression corresponding to this affect. – One may also have noticed that compatibly married people gradually acquire a similarity in facial features, and the cause is interpreted to be that they were married on account of this similarity (*similis simili gaudet*).^b But this is false; for nature instead strives, in the sexual instinct, for diversity of subjects so that they fall in love with each other and so that all the variety which nature has implanted in their germs^c will develop. Rather, it is the intimacy and inclination with which they look into each other's eyes so often and at such length when they are close to each other in solitary conversations that produces sympathetic and similar expressions, which, when they become fixed, eventually turn into permanent facial features.

7: 180

Finally, one can also attribute to this unintentional play of productive power of imagination, which can then be called *fantasy*, the tendency to harmless *lying* that is *always* met with in children and *now and then* in adults who, though otherwise good-natured, sometimes have this tendency almost as a hereditary disease. The events and supposed adventures they narrate issue from the power of imagination like a growing avalanche as it rolls down, and they do not have any kind of advantage in view except simply to make their stories interesting. This is like Shakespeare's Sir John Falstaff, who made five people out of two buckram-clad men before he finished his story.^d ³³ –

§ 33.^e Because the power of imagination is richer and more fruitful in representations than sense, when a passion appears on the scene the power of imagination is more enlivened through the absence of the object than by its presence. This is evident when something happens that recalls the representation of an object to the mind again, which for a while seemed to be erased through distractions. – Thus a German prince, a rugged warrior but a noble man, took a trip to Italy to drive from his mind his love for a commoner in his residence.³⁴ But upon his return the first glimpse of her dwelling stirred his imagination so much more strongly than continuous association would have done that he yielded to his resolution without further hesitation, which fortunately was also what was expected. – This sickness, the effect of an inventive power of

^a to him] H, A2; to them A1. "something emotional": *etwas im Affekt*.

^b Trans.: Like takes pleasure in like.

^c Keine.

^d Marginal note in H: Lies of children.

^e In H and A1 the following title occurs here: *On the means of animating and controlling the play of the power of imagination*.

imagination, is incurable: except through *marriage*. For marriage is truth (*eripitur persona, manet res. Lucretius*).^a

The inventive power of imagination produces a kind of intercourse with ourselves, which, though it may consist merely of appearances of inner sense, is nevertheless analogous to those of outer sense. The night enlivens and raises it above its real content; just as the moon in evening makes a great figure in the heavens, though on a bright day it is seen as an insignificant little cloud. The power of imagination swarms in one who studies by candle-light in the still of the night, or who quarrels with his imaginary opponent, or wanders about in his room building castles in the air. But everything that seems important to him then loses its entire importance the following morning after a night's sleep. With time, however, he feels a weakening of his mental powers from this bad habit.

7: 181

Therefore the taming of the power of imagination, by going to sleep early so that one can get up early, is a very useful rule for a psychological diet. But women and hypochondriacs (who commonly have their ailment for just this reason) enjoy the opposite behavior more. – Why are ghost stories, which are welcomed late at night, found to be distasteful to everyone and entirely inappropriate for conversation as soon as we get up the following morning? Instead we ask if anything new has happened in the household or in the community, or resume our work of the preceding day. The reason is that what is in itself mere *play* is appropriate for the relaxation of powers drained during the day, but what is *business* is appropriate for the human being strengthened and, so to speak, reborn by a night's sleep.

The offences (*vitia*) of the power of imagination are that its inventions are either merely *unbridled* or entirely *ruleless* (*effrenis aut perversa*). The latter fault is the worst kind. The former inventions could still find their place in a possible world (the world of fable); but ruleless inventions have no place in any world at all, because they are self-contradictory. – Images of the first type, that is, of unbridled imagination, account for the horror with which the Arabs regard human and animal figures hewn in stone that are often encountered in the Libyan desert Ras-Sem; they consider them to be human beings petrified by a curse.³⁵ – But these same Arabs' opinion that on the day of universal resurrection these statues of animals will snarl at the artist and admonish him for having made them without being able to give them souls, is a contradiction. – Unbridled fantasy can always be humbled (like that of the poet who was asked by Cardinal Este on the occasion of a book dedicated to him: "Master Ariosto,³⁶ where the devil did you get all this drivel?"). It is luxuriant because of its riches; but ruleless fantasy approaches madness, where fantasy plays completely

^a Trans.: When the mask is snatched away, the thing itself remains (Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura* 3: 58).

with the human being and the unfortunate victim has no control at all over the course of his representations.

Moreover, a political artist, just as well as an aesthetic one, can guide and rule the world (*mundus vult decipi*)^a by deluding it through images in place of reality; for example, the *freedom* of the people (as in the English Parliament), or their rank and *equality* (as in the French Assembly), which consist of mere formalities. However, it is still better to have only the illusion of possessing this good that ennobles humanity than to feel manifestly deprived of it.^b

7: 182

*On the faculty of visualizing the past and the future by means
of the power of imagination*

§ 34. The faculty of deliberately visualizing the past is the *faculty of memory*, and the faculty of visualizing something as taking place in the future is the *faculty of foresight*. Provided that they belong to sensibility, both of them are based on the *association* of representations of the past and future consciousness of the subject with the present; and although they are not themselves perceptions, as a connecting of perceptions *in time*, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what *no longer exists* with what *does not yet exist* through what *presently exists*. They are called the faculties of *memory* and *divination*, of respicience and prospicience (if we may use these expressions), where one is conscious of one's ideas as those which would be encountered in one's past or future state.

A. On memory

Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the former representations *voluntarily*, so that the mind is not a mere plaything of the imagination. Fantasy, that is, creative power of imagination, must not mix in with it, because then memory would be *unfaithful*. – To quickly *grasp* something in memory, to *recall* it to mind easily, and to *retain* it for a long time are the formal perfections of memory. But these qualities are rarely found together. When we believe we have something in our memory but cannot bring it to consciousness, we say that we cannot *remember* it (not remember it to *oneself*; for this means much the same as to make oneself senseless).^c The effort to remember the idea, if one is anxious about it, is mentally exhausting, and the best thing to do is to distract oneself for a while with other thoughts and from time to time look back at the object

7: 183

^a Trans.: The world wants to be deceived.

^b Marginal note in H: Do not visit lunatic asylums.

^c remember: entsinnen, remember to oneself: *sich entsinnen*, make oneself senseless: *sich sinnlos machen*. Kant is protesting here against the standard German use of the reflexive verb *sich entsinnen*.

quickly. Then one usually catches one of the associated representations, which calls it back to mind.

To grasp something *methodically* (*memoriae mandare*) is called *memorizing* (not *studying*, as the common man says of the preacher who merely learns by heart the sermon he intends to give). – Memorizing can be *mechanical*, *ingenious*, or *judicious*. The first is based merely on frequent word-for-word repetition; for example, in learning the multiplication tables, where the pupil must go through the whole series of words following each other in the usual order, in order to reach what is sought after. For instance, when the apprentice is asked how much 3×7 is, he will begin with 3×3 and probably arrive at 21; however if one asks him how much 7×3 is, he will not be able to remember it so quickly, but must reverse the numbers in order to place them in the usual order. When what is to be learned is a ceremonial formula where no expression can be altered, but which must, as they say, be reeled off, even people with the best of memories are afraid to rely on them (in fact this very fear could make them err). And therefore they regard it as necessary to *read it off*, as the most experienced preachers do, because the least alteration of words in this case would be ridiculous.

Ingenious memorizing is a method of impressing certain ideas on the memory by association with correlative ideas that in themselves (as far as understanding is concerned) have no relationship at all with each other; for example, associating sounds of a language with quite dissimilar images supposed to correspond with them. In this case, in order to grasp something in the memory more easily, we inconvenience it with still more correlative ideas; consequently it is *absurd*, a ruleless procedure of the power of imagination^a in pairing together things that cannot belong together under one and the same concept. And at the same time it is a contradiction between means and intention, since it tries to make memory's work easier but in fact makes it more difficult by burdening it unnecessarily with an association of quite disparate representations.* The observation that witty people seldom have a trustworthy memory (*ingeniosis non admodum fida est memoria*)^b is explained by this phenomenon.

7: 184

Judicious memorizing is nothing other than memorizing, in thought, a *table of the divisions* of a system (for example, that of Linnaeus)³⁷ where, if

* Thus the illustrated primer, like the picture Bible or even one of the *law digests* presented in pictures, is an optical box that a childish teacher uses to make his pupils even more childish than they were before. As an example for such a manner of teaching, we can use a heading of the *Pandects, de hereditibus suis et [7: 184] legitimis* [trans.: we have learned from our heritage, and only the legitimate heritage], to be committed to memory as follows: the first word would be made sensible by a chest with padlocks, the second by a sow, and the third by the two tables of Moses.

^a H and A: a ruleless power of the imagination.

^b Trans.: Wags just do not have a trustworthy memory.

one should forget something, one can find it again through the enumeration of the parts that one has retained; or else through memorizing the *sections* of a whole made visible (for example, the provinces of a country on a map, which lie to the north, to the west, etc.); for here one also needs understanding, and this is reciprocally helpful to the imagination. Most of all, the judicious use of *topics*, that is, a framework for general concepts, called *commonplaces*,^a facilitates remembering through class division, as when one distributes books in a library on shelves with different labels.

There is no *mnemonic art* (*ars mnemonica*) in the sense of a general doctrine. Among the special tricks belonging to it are maxims in verse (*versus memoriales*), since the rhythm has a regular syllabic stress that is a great advantage to the mechanism of memory. – Concerning the prodigies of memory, such as Pico Mirandola, Scaliger, Angelus Politianus, Magliabecchi,³⁸ and so on, polyhistorians who carry around in their heads, as material for the sciences, a load of books for one hundred camels – one must not speak disdainfully of them, since they perhaps did not possess the faculty of *the power of judgment* suitable for choosing among all this knowledge in order to make appropriate use of it. For it is already merit enough to have produced the raw material abundantly, even though later on other heads must come along to process it with *judgment* (*tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus*).^b One of the ancients said: “The art of writing has ruined memory (to some extent made it dispensable).”³⁹ There is some truth in this proposition, for the common man is more likely to have the various things entrusted to him lined up, so that he can remember them and carry them out in succession, just because memory here is mechanical and no subtle reasoning^c interferes with it. On the other hand, the scholar, who has many strange ideas running through his head, lets many of his tasks or domestic affairs escape through distraction, because he has not grasped them with sufficient attention. But to be safe with a notebook in the pocket is after all a great convenience, in order to recover precisely and without effort everything that has been stored in the head. And the art of writing always remains a magnificent one, because, even when it is not used for the communication of one's knowledge to others, it still takes the place of the most extensive and reliable memory, and can compensate for its lack.

However, *forgetfulness* (*obliviositas*), where the head, no matter how often it is filled, still remains empty like a barrel full of holes, is all the greater a misfortune. This is sometimes undeserved, as with old people who can easily remember the events of their younger years, but who

^a H. *commonplaces* (*loci topici*).

^b Trans.: As much as we have in our memory, so much do we know.

^c *Vernunfteln*.

7: 185

always lose their thoughts over more recent ones. But it is also often the effect of a habitual distraction, which especially seizes women who are accustomed to reading novels. For since with this type of reading the intention is only to entertain ourselves for the moment, and since we know that it is mere fiction, women readers here thus have complete freedom, while reading, to create things in accordance with the drift of their power of imagination. This is naturally distracting and makes for habitual *absent-mindedness* (lack of attention to the present); as a result the memory is inevitably weakened. – This practice in the art of killing time and making oneself useless to the world, while later complaining about the brevity of life, is one of the most hostile attacks on memory, to say nothing of the mental disposition to fantasy that it produces.

B. On the faculty of foresight^a (*Praevisio*)

7: 186

§ 35. To possess this faculty interests us more than any other, because it is the condition of all possible practice and of the ends to which the human being relates the use of his powers. Every desire contains a (doubtful or certain) foresight^b of what is possible through it. Recalling the past (remembering) occurs only with the intention of making foresight of the future possible by means of it: generally speaking, we look about us from the standpoint of the present in order to decide something or to be prepared for something.

Empirical foresight is the *anticipation of similar cases* (*exspectatio casuum similiū*) and requires no rational knowledge of causes and effects, but only the remembering of observed events as they commonly follow one another, and repeated experiences produce an aptitude for it. What the wind and weather will be is of great interest to the mariner and the farmer. But we do not reach much further here than the so-called Farmer's Almanac, whose forecasts^c are praised when they happen to come true and forgotten when they are not fulfilled; thus they always rest on some trust. – One might almost believe that Providence intentionally made the play of atmospheric conditions such an inscrutable tangle that human beings could not easily make the necessary preparations for every occasion, but rather would need to use their understanding in order to be prepared for all events.^d

To live for the day (without caution and care) does not bring much honor to human understanding; it is like the Caribbean who sells his hammock in the morning and in the evening is embarrassed about it because he does not know how he will sleep that night. But as long

as no offence against morality occurs in this connection, one who is hardened to all eventualities can be regarded as happier than one who always diminishes the joy of life with gloomy outlooks. But of all the outlooks that the human being can have, the most comforting, if his present moral condition warrants it, is the prospect of continuing in this state and progressing even further toward the good. On the other hand, if he courageously makes the resolution from now on to choose a new and better life, he must tell himself: "Nothing will come of it anyway. You have often (due to procrastination) made this promise to yourself, but you have always broken it under the pretext of making an exception just this once." Thus the expectation of similar cases is a bleak state of affairs.

But where what hovers over us depends on fate rather than on the use of our free choice, looking into the future is either presentiment, that is, *premonition*^a (*præsensio*), or^b prescience (*præsagitio*). The first suggests as it were a hidden sense for what is not yet present; the second a consciousness of the future produced by reflecting on the law of succession of events (the law of causality).

One can easily see that premonition is a chimera; for how can one sense what does not yet exist? If there are judgments arising from obscure concepts of such a causal relation, then they are not presentiments; rather we can develop the concepts that lead to them and explain how matters stand with the causal relation and the judgment so conceived. – For the most part, premonitions are of the fearful sort; anxiety, which has its physical causes, precedes any definite notion of what the object of fear is. But there are also the joyous and bold premonitions of enthusiasts^b who scent the imminent revelation of a mystery for which the human being has no such receptivity of sense, and believe they see the unveiling of the presentiment of what, like the Eopotes,^d they await in mystical intuition. – The second sight of the Scottish Highlanders also belongs to this class of enchantments.^c Several of them believed they saw a man strung up on a mast, the news of whose death they pretended to have received when they actually entered a distant port.

7: 187

* Recently an attempt has been made to distinguish between *ahnen* and *abnden*; but the first is not a German word, and there remains only the latter. – *Abnden* means to bear in mind. *Es abndet mir* means: I have a vague recollection of it; *etwas abnden* means to remember someone's action in bad terms (that is, to punish). It is always the same concept, but used in different ways. [*Abndung* – punishment, vengeance, retribution, was formerly used for *Abnung* – premonition, presentiment. Both are recognized German words – Ed.]

^a *Abndung*.

^b *Schwärmer*. Again, in the the German Enlightenment, this term had a sense closer to our "fanatics."

^c *Bezauberungen*.

^a *Vorhersehungsvermögen*.

^b *Voraussehen*.

^c *Voraussagungen*.

^d all events: *alle Fälle*, every occasion: *jede Zeit*.

7: 188

C. On the gift of divination (*Facultas divinatrix*)

§ 36. Predicting, fortune-telling, and prophesying^a are distinguished as follows: the *first* is foresight according to laws of experience (therefore natural); the *second* is contrary to the familiar laws of experience (contrary to nature); but the *third* is, or is considered to be, inspiration from a cause that is distinct from nature (supernatural). Because this third capacity seems to result from the influence of a god, it is also properly called the *faculty of divination* (since every shrewd guess about the future is also improperly called divination).

To say of someone that he is able to *foretell*^b this or that fate can indicate a perfectly natural skill. But if he pretends that he has a supernatural insight into it, we must say that he is a *specious soothsayer*,^c like the gypsies of Hindu origin, who call fortune-telling from the lines of the hand *reading the planets*; or astrologers and treasure-hunters, and also their associates the alchemists; but the Pythia in Greek antiquity, and in our own time the ragged Siberian Shaman, tower over them all. The fortune-tellings of the auspices and haruspices of the Romans did not purport to discover what is hidden in the course of the world's events so much as to discover the will of the gods, to which in accordance with their religion they had submitted. – But how the poets also came to consider themselves as inspired (or possessed), and as fortune-tellers (*vates*), and how they could boast of having inspirations in their poetical impulses (*furor poeticus*), can only be explained by the fact that the poet, unlike the prose-orator who composes his commissioned work with leisure, must rather snatch the propitious moment of the mood of his inner sense as it comes over him, in which lively and powerful images and feelings pour into him, while he behaves merely passively, so to speak. For as an old observation goes, genius is mixed with a certain dose of madness. The belief that blindly chosen passages from the works of famous poets (driven by inspiration, so to speak) are oracular utterances (*sortes Virgilianae*)^d is also based on this supposition. Modern devotees use a jewel-case as a similar means to discover heaven's will. This also applies to the interpretation of the Sibylline books,^e which were supposed to foretell the fate of the Roman state, though the Romans unfortunately lost parts of^f them due to injudicious stinginess.^e

All prophesies that foretell an inevitable fate of a people, for which they are themselves still responsible and which therefore is to be brought

about by *their own free choice*, contain an absurdity – in addition to the fact that the foreknowledge is *useless* to them, since they cannot escape from it. For in this unconditional fate (*decreatum absolutum*) there is thought to be a *mechanism of freedom*, by which the concept contradicts itself.

7: 189

The extreme limit of absurdity, or of deception, in specious fortune-telling may be that a madman has been considered a *seer* (of invisible things); as if^a a spirit were speaking from him which had taken the place of the soul that had long since departed from its bodily dwelling. And so the poor mental (or merely epileptic) patient was looked upon as an *Energumen* (one possessed), and he was called a *Mantis* by the Greeks if the demon possessing him was considered to be a good spirit. The interpreter of the *Mantis*, however, was called a *prophet*. – Every form of folly must be exhausted in order for us to gain possession of the future, the foreseeing of which interests us a great deal, by leaping over all the steps that might have led us there by means of the understanding working through experience. *O, curas hominum!*^b

Moreover, there is no science of soothsaying so certain and yet so far-reaching as astronomy, which foretells the revolutions of the heavenly bodies *ad infinitum*. But even this could not prevent a mysticism from promptly joining it which, instead of reckoning the epochs of the world on the basis of events, as reason requires, wanted, on the contrary, to make the events dependent on certain sacred^c numbers, thus transforming chronology itself, which is such a necessary condition of all history, into a fable.

On involuntary invention in a healthy state, i.e., on dreams

§ 37. To investigate the natural constitution of *sleep*, of *dreaming*, and of *somnambulism* (to which talking aloud during sleep also belongs) lies outside the field of a *pragmatic anthropology*; for we cannot draw any rules^d of *conduct* from these phenomena in the state of dreaming, since these rules are valid only for the person who is awake and does not want to dream, or^e wants to sleep without thinking. And the judgment of the Greek emperor who condemned a human being to death when he explained to his friends that in his dream he had killed the emperor, under the pretext that "he would not have dreamed it, unless he were thinking about doing it while awake," is both contrary to experience and cruel. "When we are awake we have a world in common, but when we are asleep each has his own world." – Dreaming seems to belong so necessarily to sleeping that sleeping and dying would be one and the same thing, if

7: 190

^a prophesying: *Weissagen*, fortune-telling: *Wahrsagen*, predicting: *Vorhersagen*.

^b *wahrsagt*.

^c *er wahrsagert*.

^d parts of added in A2.

^e Marginal note in H: Astronomy
Uselessness of prophecy

^a *H* and *A1*: that a spirit is speaking.

^b Trans.: Oh, the troubles of humanity!

^c sacred not in *A1* or *A2*.

^d *H* and *A1*: rule.

^e *A1*: but. Also, wants is not in *H*.

the dream were not added as a natural, although involuntary, agitation of the inner vital organs by means of the power of imagination. Thus I remember well how, as a boy tired because of playing, I went to sleep and, at the moment of falling asleep, quickly awoke due to a dream that I had fallen into water and was being turned around in circles, coming close to drowning, only soon to fall asleep again more peacefully. Presumably this was because the activity of the chest muscles in breathing, which depends completely on choice, had slackened, and with the failure of breathing the movement of the heart was impeded, and thus the power of imagination had to be set into action again by means of the dream. – Here belongs also the beneficial effect of dreaming during a so-called *nightmare* (*incubus*). For without this frightful image of a ghost oppressing us and the straining of every muscle to get into another position, the cessation of blood flow would quickly bring an end to life. This is why nature seems to have arranged for most dreams to contain difficulties and dangerous situations, because such ideas excite the powers of the soul more than when everything goes smoothly. One often dreams that one cannot rise to one's feet, or that one is lost, bogged down in a sermon, or that at a large gathering out of forgetfulness one has put on a nightcap instead of a wig, or that one can hover back and forth through the air at will, or awakens laughing merrily, without knowing why. – How it happens that we are often placed in the long distant past in dreams, speaking with those long dead, or why we are tempted to regard this as a dream and yet feel compelled to regard this image as reality, will always remain unexplained. But one can take it as certain that there could be no sleep without dreaming, and whoever imagines that he has not dreamed has merely forgotten his dream.^a

7: 191

On the faculty of using signs (Facultas signatrix)

§ 38. The faculty of cognizing the present as the means for connecting the representation of the foreseen with that of the past is the *faculty of using signs*. – The mental activity of bringing about this connection is *signifying (signatio)*, which is also called signaling, of which the higher degree is called *marking*.^b

^a Crossed out in H: According to Sonnerat [Pierre Sonnerat, *Reise nach Ostindien und China* (Zürich, 1783), I: 60, 69 – Ed.] the Indians on the coast of Malabar have been bound to a large extent to a very secret order, whose sign (in the shape of a round tin coin) hangs from a band around the neck directly on the skin. They call it their *tali*, which is accompanied in their initiation ceremony by a mystical word that one person whispers into another's ear only at death. However, the Tibetans have made use of certain sacred things, e.g., flags with certain holy words written on them or also sacred stones, which are planted on or laid over a hill and which they call *mani*. The word *talisman* has probably arisen from the putting together of both words, which appears to correspond in sense and meaning with the *manitou* of the American savages.

^b marking: *Auszeichnung*, signaling: *Signalieren*, signifying: *Bezeichnung*.

Forms of things (intuitions), so far as they serve only as means of representation through concepts, are *symbols*; and cognition through them is called symbolic or *figurative (speciosa)*. – *Characters* are not yet symbols; for they can also be mere mediate (indirect) signs which in themselves signify nothing, but only signify something through association with intuitions and then leading through them to concepts.^a Therefore, *symbolic* cognition must not be opposed to *intuitive* but to *discursive* cognition, in which the character accompanies the concept merely as guardian (*custos*), in order to reproduce the concept when the occasion arises. Symbolic cognition is therefore not opposed to intuitive cognition (through sensuous intuition), but rather to intellectual cognition (through concepts). Symbols are merely means that understanding uses to provide the concept with meaning through the presentation of an object for it. But they are only indirect means, owing to an *analogy* with certain intuitions to which the concept can be applied.

He who can only express himself symbolically still has only a few concepts of understanding, and the lively presentation^b so often admired in the speeches presented by savages (and sometimes also the alleged wise men among a still uncultivated people) is nothing but poverty in concepts and, therefore, also in the words to express them. For example, when the American savage says: "We want to bury the hatchet," this means: "We want to make peace," and in fact the ancient songs, from Homer to Ossian or from Orpheus to the prophets, owe their bright eloquence merely to the lack of means for expressing their concepts.

To claim (with Swedenborg)^c that the real appearances of the world present to the senses are merely a *symbol* of an intelligible world hidden in reserve is *enthusiasm*. But in exhibiting concepts (called ideas) that belong to morality and therefore to pure reason, concepts which constitute the essence of all religion, it is *enlightenment* to distinguish the symbolic from the intellectual (public worship from religion), the temporarily useful and necessary *shell* from the thing itself. Because otherwise an *ideal* (of pure practical reason) is mistaken for an *idol*, and the final end is missed. – It is not disputed that all peoples of the earth have begun with this exchange, and that, when it is a question of what their teachers themselves really thought in their holy writings, one must not interpret them symbolically but rather *literally*; for to twist their words would be dishonest. But when it is a question not merely of the *truthfulness* of the teacher but also, and indeed essentially, of the *truth* of the teaching,^c then one can and should

^a Added in H: like the words of a language, which are meaningless sounds for the ear of a stranger, but just because of this also lead to more definite concepts.

^b H: presentation, A1 and A2: representation.

^c teaching: *Lebre*, teacher: *Lebrer*. Marginal note in H: On superstition

Nominal and real signs
Indirect – direct.

7: 192

interpret this teaching as a merely symbolic kind of representation, in which established formalities and customs accompany those practical ideas. Because otherwise the intellectual sense, which constitutes the final end, would be lost.^a

§ 39. One can divide signs into *arbitrary* (artificial), *natural*, and *miraculous* signs.

A. To the first group belong: (1) signs of *gesticulation* (mimetic signs, which are also partly natural); (2) *characters* (letters, which are signs for sounds); (3) *tone signs* (notes); (4) purely visual signs that have been agreed upon between individuals (*ciphers*); (5) *class signs* for free men honored with hereditary rank^b (coats of arms); (6) *signs of service*, in prescribed clothing (uniforms and liveries); (7) *signs of honor*, for service (ribbons awarded by orders); (8) *signs of disgrace* (brandings and so on). – In writing, signs of pause, question or emotion, and astonishment^c (punctuation marks) also belong to arbitrary signs.

All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others. Thinking is *speaking* with oneself (the Indians of Tahiti call thinking “speech in the belly”); consequently it is also *listening* to oneself inwardly (by means of the reproductive power of imagination). To the man born deaf, his speaking is a feeling of the play of his lips, tongue, and jaw; and it is hardly possible to imagine that he does anything more by his speaking than carry on a play with physical^d feelings, without having and thinking real concepts. – But even those who can speak and hear do not always understand themselves or others, and it is due to the lack of the faculty of signification,^e or its faulty use (when signs are taken for things, and vice versa), that, especially in matters of reason, human beings who are united in language are as distant as heaven from earth in concepts. This becomes obvious only by chance, when each acts according to his own concepts.

7: 193

B. Secondly, as concerns natural signs, the relation of sign to thing signified, depending on the time, is either *demonstrative* or *rememorative* or *prognostic*.

Pulsation signifies to the physician the presence of a feverish condition in the patient, as smoke signifies fire. Reagents reveal to the chemist what hidden substances are present in water, just as the weathervane reveals the

^a Crossed out in H: would. [For the designation of thoughts, not of mere sensations, the human being at first makes use of *mimical* signs, then *sound* signs of language, and finally *allegorical* signs of <visible images of> pictures, which should contain an analogy with <things that are not visible> merely thinkable objects.]

^b honored . . . rank not in H. class signs: *Standzeichen*.

^c “question” and “and astonishment” not in H.

^d physical not in H.

^e Bezeichnungsvermögen.

wind, etc. But whether *blushing* reveals consciousness of guilt, or rather a delicate sense of honor, or just an imposition of something about which one would have to suffer shame, is uncertain in cases that come before us.^a

Burial mounds and mausoleums are signs of remembrance of the dead, just as pyramids are also everlasting reminders of the former great power of a king. – Layers of shells in regions far from the sea, the holes of Pholades^b in the high Alps, or volcanic residue where no fire now bursts forth from the earth, signify to us the ancient condition of the world and establish an *archaeology* of nature. However, they are not as plainly visible as the scarred-over wounds of a warrior. – The ruins of Palmyra, Baalbek, and Persepolis are telling monuments of the state of art in *ancient states*,^b and sad indications of the change of *all* things.

Generally, *prognostic* signs are the most interesting of all; because in the series of changes the present is only an instant, and the determining ground of the faculty of desire takes to heart the present only for the sake of future consequences (*ob futura consequentia*), and pays careful attention to them. – In regard to future events in the world, the surest prognosis is to be found in astronomy;^c but it is childish and fantastic when constellations of stars and conjunctions and changes in the positions of the planets are represented (in the *Astrologia iudiciaria*) as allegorical signs written in heaven of impending human^d fate.

Natural prognostic signs of an impending illness or recovery, or (like the *facies Hippocratica*) of imminent death, are appearances which, based on long and frequent experience, serve the physician as a guide in his course of medical treatment, even after^e insight into their connection as cause and effect. Such are critical days. But^f the auguries and haruspices

7: 194

^a Marginal note in H: A. Voluntary signs 1. Of gesture (mimetic) 2. Written signs (letters) 3. Tone signs (notes) 4. Secret guild signs (codes) 5. Signs of social standing (coats of arms) 6. Service signs (uniform or livery) 7. Signs of honor (ribbons of an order) 8. Signs of disgrace (branding with a hot iron) 9. Ear-marking signs (*nota*) 10. Differentiating signs (punctuation) 11. Signs of remembrance (*signum rememorativum*)

B. Natural signs Signs to regard as things in themselves.

C. Signs of wonder Zodiac.

Effects are signs of their causes.

Sign of the zodiac – constellation.

Art of astrology (*astrol. Ind.*), signs in the heavens, comets, eclipses, northern lights.

Whether the sacred number (*heil. Zahl*) indicates the way of the world [?]. The dragon chasing the sun and moon *apocalipt.* Signs of divination, mystical signs, holy 7 – x.x. Planets, metals. Weekdays and world epochs. Superstitions of fishermen.

^b states added in A2.

^c in regard . . . astronomy: A2; The *interpretation of heavenly signs* with respect to future events in the world is the surest: H, A1.

^d Human added in A2.

^e H: before.

^f After “But” in A1: the position of the stars at birth (the horoscope) or.

contrived by the Romans for politically shrewd purposes were a superstition sanctified by the state in order to guide the people in dangerous times.

C. As concerns *miraculous signs* (events in which the nature of things reverses itself), apart from those which do not now matter to us (monstrosities among human beings and animals), there are signs and miracles in the sky – comets, balls of light shooting across the sky, northern lights, even solar and lunar eclipses. It is especially when several such signs come together and are accompanied by war, pestilence, and the like, that they are things which seem, to the terrified great masses, to herald the not far distant Judgment Day and the end of the world.

Appendix

In addition, it is worth mentioning here an odd game of the power of imagination with the human being, in which signs are confused with things so that an inner reality is posited for signs, as if things had to conform to them. – Since the course of the moon in its four phases (new moon, first quarter, full moon, and last quarter) cannot be divided in whole numbers any more exactly than into twenty-eight days (and the Zodiac of the Arabians is divided into twenty-eight houses of the moon), of which a quarter makes seven days, the number seven has thereby acquired a mystical importance. Thus, even the creation of the world had to comply with it, especially since (according to the Ptolemaic system) there were supposed to be seven planets, as well as^a seven tones in the scale, seven primary colors in the rainbow, and seven metals. – From this also the climacteric years⁴⁵ emerged (7×7 and, since 9 is also a mystical number for the Indians, 7×9 as well as 9×9), at the end of which human life is supposed to be in great danger. In the Judeo-Christian chronology seventy weeks of years (490 years)⁴⁶ also constitute not only the divisions of the most important changes (between God's call to Abraham and the birth of Christ), but even determine quite exactly their borders, so to speak *a priori*, as if chronology did not have to conform to history, but the reverse, that history had to conform to chronology.

7: 195

But also in other cases it becomes a habit to make things depend on numbers. When a physician, to whom the patient sends a gratuity through his servant, unwraps the paper and finds therein eleven ducats, he will become suspicious that the servant may have embezzled one; for why not a full dozen? He who buys a complete set of porcelain dishes at an auction will bid less when it is not a full dozen; and if there should be thirteen plates, he will place a value on the thirteenth only in so far as it ensures that if one were to be broken, he would still have the full dozen. Since one does not invite one's guests by the dozen, what interest can

^a as well as added in A2.

there be in giving a preference to this precise number? In his will a man bequeathed eleven silver spoons to his cousin and added: "He himself will know best, why I do not bequeath the twelfth to him" (at his table he noticed that the dissolute young man had secretly stuck a spoon in his pocket, but he didn't want to embarrass him then). With the opening of the will one could easily guess what the meaning of the testator was, but only because of the accepted prejudice that only the dozen would be a full number. – The twelve signs of the zodiac (a number to which the twelve judges in England seem analogous) have also acquired a similar mystical significance. In Italy, Germany, and perhaps elsewhere too,^a a dinner party of exactly thirteen guests is considered ominous, because it is imagined that one of them, whoever it may be, will die that year; just as at a table of twelve judges, the thirteenth, who finds himself among them, can be no other than the defendant who will be judged. (I once found myself at such a table, where the lady of the house upon sitting down noticed this supposedly evil state of affairs and secretly ordered her son, who was one of the company, to get up and eat in another room, so that the merriment would not be disturbed.) – But even the sheer magnitude of numbers arouses astonishment, when one has enough of the things that they signify, by the fact that the magnitude does not, in counting, complete a round number according to the decadic system (and is consequently arbitrary). Thus the emperor of China is supposed to have a fleet of 9,999 ships, and on hearing this number we secretly ask ourselves, why not one more? Although the answer could be: "Because this number of ships is sufficient for his needs"; in reality the intent of the question is not focussed on the needs, but rather merely on a kind of number mysticism. – Worse,^b although not uncommon, is when someone who through miserliness and fraud has brought his fortune to 90,000 thalers in cash now cannot rest until he has a full 100,000, without needing it. And in achieving this goal he perhaps at least deserves the gallows, even if he does not get it.

7: 196

To what childishness the human being sinks in his ripe old age, when he allows himself to be led by the leash of sensibility! Let us now see how much better or worse he fares when he pursues his course under the illumination of understanding.^c

On the cognitive faculty, in so far as it is based on understanding

Division

§ 40. *Understanding*, as the faculty of *thinking* (representing something by means of *concepts*), is also called the *higher cognitive faculty* (as

^a Germany, and perhaps elsewhere too added in A2.

^b H: Worse still.

^c Marginal note in H: The 13th dinner guest.

Many a person stints, deceives in order to leave 100,000 full.

distinguished from sensibility, which is the *lower*), because the faculty of intuition (pure or empirical) contains only the singularity^a in objects, whereas the faculty of concepts contains the universality of representations, the *rule* to which the manifold of sensuous intuitions must be subordinated in order to bring unity to the cognition of the object. – Therefore understanding certainly is of *higher rank* than sensibility,^b with which irrational animals can manage provisionally, following implanted instincts, like a people without a sovereign. But a sovereign without a people (like understanding without sensibility) is not able to do anything at all. Therefore between the two there is no dispute about rank, though the one is addressed as higher and the other as lower.

7: 197

The word *understanding* is, however, also taken in a particular sense, namely when it is subordinated to understanding in a general sense as one member of a division with two other members; and then the higher cognitive faculty (materially, that is, considered not by itself, but rather in relation to the *cognition* of objects) consists of *understanding*, the power of *judgment*, and *reason*. – Let us now make some observations about human beings, how one differs from another in these mental endowments or in their habitual use or misuse, first in a healthy soul, and then also in mental illness.

Anthropological comparison of the three higher cognitive faculties with one another

§ 41. A correct understanding is that which is not only lustrous owing to its great number of concepts but also owing to the *appropriateness* of its concepts for cognition of the object; thus it contains the ability and skill to comprehend *truth*. Many a human being has a great many concepts in his head which together amount to a *similarity* with what one wants to learn from him, but which still do not turn out to be true of the object and its determination. He can have concepts of vast scope, and even handle them with *dexterity*. Correct understanding, which is sufficient for concepts of general cognition, is called *sound* understanding (sufficient for everyday needs). It says, with Juvenal's centurion: "Quod sapio, satis est mihi, non ergo curo – esse quod Arcesilas aerummosique Solones."⁴⁷ It goes without saying that nature's gift of a merely straightforward and correct understanding will limit itself in regard to the range of knowledge expected of it, and that the person endowed with it will proceed *modestly*.^c

§ 42. If by the word "understanding" is meant the faculty of cognition of rules (and thus cognition through concepts) in general, so that the understanding composes the entire *higher* faculty of cognition in itself,

^a das Einzelne.

^b H adds: but sensibility is more necessary, and yet *more indispensable*.

^c Marginal note in H: 1. What do I want? 2. What does it depend on? 3. What do I gain? (what comes of it?)

Correct understanding, practiced power of judgment and thorough reason.

then the rules are not to be understood as those according to which nature guides the human being in his conduct, as occurs with animals which are driven by natural instinct, but only those that he himself *makes*. What he merely learns, and thus entrusts to his memory, he performs only mechanically (according to laws of reproductive imagination) and without understanding. A servant who has merely to pay a compliment according to a definite formula needs no understanding, that is, he does not need to think for himself. But when in the absence of his master whose household affairs he has to manage, where many rules of behavior will be necessary that cannot be literally prescribed, then he will need understanding.

7: 198

Correct understanding, *practiced* judgment, and *thorough* reason constitute the entire range of the intellectual cognitive faculty; especially if this faculty is also judged as competence in promoting the practical, that is, competence in promoting ends.

Correct understanding is healthy understanding, provided that it contains an *appropriateness* of concepts for the purpose of its use. By joining together sufficiency (*sufficientia*) and precision (*praecisio*) we arrive at *appropriateness*, which constitutes the quality of the concept. Appropriateness contains neither more nor less than the concept demands (*conceptus rem adaequans*).^a Thus a correct understanding is the first and foremost of all intellectual faculties, because it fulfills its purpose with the *fewest* means.

Craftiness, a head for intrigue, is often regarded as great though misused understanding; but it is only the way of thinking of very limited human beings and is very different from prudence, whose appearance it has. One can deceive the naïve person only once, which in the course of time is very disadvantageous to the personal intention of the crafty person.

The domestic or civil servant under express orders needs only to have understanding. The officer, to whom only the general rule is prescribed for his entrusted tasks, and who is then left alone to decide for himself what to do in cases that come up, needs judgment. The general, who has to judge all possible cases and has to think out the rules for himself, must possess reason. – The talents necessary for these different dispositions^b are very distinct. "Many a man shines on the second rank who would be invisible on the first." (*Tel brille au second rang, qui s'eclipse au premier*).⁴⁸

Quibbling is not the same as having understanding, and to draw up maxims for show and yet contradict them by one's actions, like Christina of Sweden,⁴⁹ is called being unreasonable. – This is how it was with the Earl of Rochester's answer to King Charles II of England, when the King

^a Trans.: the concept has to be adequate to the object.

^b *Vorkebrungen*.

^c *Klügeln*.

7: 199

came upon him in deep reflection and asked: "What are you meditating on so deeply?" – Answer: "I am composing your Majesty's epitaph." – Question: "How does it run?" Answer: "Here lies King Charles II, who said many prudent things^a in his life, but never did anything prudent."⁵⁰

One who is silent in company and only now and then drops a quite ordinary judgment looks reasonable,^b just as a certain degree of *coarseness* is passed off as (old German) *honesty*.

Natural understanding can be enriched through instruction with many concepts and furnished with rules. But the second intellectual faculty, namely that of discerning^c whether something is an instance of the rule or not – *the power of judgment (iudicium)* – cannot be *instructed*, but only exercised. That is why its growth is called *maturity*, and its understanding that which comes only with years. It is also easy to see that this could not be otherwise; because instruction takes place by means of communication of rules. Therefore, if there were to be doctrines for the power of judgment, then there would have to be general rules according to which one could decide whether something was an instance of the rule or not; which would generate a further inquiry on into infinity. Thus the power of judgment is, as we say, the understanding that comes only with years; it is based on one's long experience, and it is the understanding whose judgment a^d French Republic searches for in the assembly of the so-called Elders.

This faculty, which is aimed only at that which is feasible, what is fitting, and what is proper (for technical,^e aesthetic, and practical power of judgment), is not as lustrous as the faculty that extends knowledge. For it merely makes room for sound understanding and forms the association between it and reason.

§ 43. Now if understanding is the faculty of rules, and the power of judgment the faculty of discovering the particular in so far as it is an instance of these rules, then *reason* is the faculty of deriving the particular from the universal and thus of representing it according to principles and as necessary. – We can therefore also explain reason by means of the faculty of *judging* and (in a practical regard) *acting* according to principles. The human being needs reason for every moral (consequently also religious) judgment, and cannot rest on statutes and established customs.^f – *Ideas* are concepts of reason, to which no object given in experience

^a *viel Kluges.*

^b *verständig.*

^c *Unterscheidung.*

^d *H:* even a.

^e *H, A1:* theoretical.

^f *H:* bond.

^g *Gebräuche.*

7: 200

can be adequate. They are neither intuitions (like those of space and time), nor feelings (like the doctrine of happiness looks for), both of which belong to sensibility. Ideas are, rather, concepts of a perfection that we can always approach but never completely attain.

Rationalizing^a (without sound reason) is a use of reason that misses its final end, partly from inability, partly from an inappropriate viewpoint. *To rave with reason* means to proceed according to principles in the form of one's thoughts,^b but in the matter or^c end to use means that are directly contrary to it.

Subordinates must not rationalize (wrangle),^d because the principle that should be employed must often be concealed from them, or at least remain unknown to them. But the commanding officer (general) must have reason, because instructions cannot be given to him^e for every case that comes up. Yet to require that a so-called layman (*Laicus*) should not use his own reason in matters of religion, particularly since these must be appreciated as moral, but instead should follow the appointed *clergyman (Clericus)*, thus someone else's reason,^f is an unjust demand. For in moral matters every man must himself be responsible for what he does and does not do, and the clergyman will not, and indeed cannot, assume the responsibility for it at his own risk.

However, in these cases human beings are inclined to place more security in their own person, so that they renounce completely all use of their own reason and submit passively and obediently to formulas laid down by holy men. But they do this not so much because they feel incapable of insight (for the essence of all religion is surely moral, which soon becomes evident to every human being by himself); rather they do it out of *craftiness*, partly in order to be able to push the blame on to someone else when they have acted wrongly; partly, and above all, to evade gracefully^g that which is essential (change of heart), and which is much more difficult than cult worship.^h

Wisdom, as the idea of a practical use of reason that conforms perfectly with the law, is no doubt too much to demand of human beings. But also, not even the slightest degree of wisdom can be poured into a man by others; rather he must bring it forth from himself. The precept for

^a *Vernünftelei.*

^b *H, A1:* direction of thought.

^c or added in A2.

^d *räsonieren.*

^e *Marginal note in H:* Provisional judgments.

^f *fremder Vernunft.*

^g *mit guter Art.*

^h *Kultus.*

7: 201

reaching it contains three leading maxims: 1) Think for oneself, 2) Think into the place of the other (in communication with human beings), 3) Always think consistently^a with oneself.⁵¹

The age at which the human being reaches the full use of his reason can be fixed, in respect to his *skill* (the capacity to achieve any purpose one chooses), around the twentieth year; in respect to *prudence* (using other human beings for one's purposes), around the fortieth year; and finally, in respect to *wisdom*, around the sixtieth year. However, in this last period wisdom is more *negative*; it sees the follies of the first two periods. At this point we can say: "It is too bad that we have to die now, just when we have learned for the very first time how we should^b have lived quite well." But even this judgment is rare in the last period, since the attachment to life becomes stronger the more its value, in terms of action as well as enjoyment, decreases.

§ 44. Just as the faculty of discovering the particular for the universal (the rule) is the *power of judgment*, so the faculty of thinking up^c the universal for the particular is *wit (ingenium)*. The power of judgment is a matter of noting the differences in a manifold that is identical in part; wit is a matter of noting the identity of a manifold that is different in part. – The outstanding talent in both is noticing even the smallest similarity or dissimilarity. The faculty to do this is *acumen^d (acumen)*, and observations of this kind are called *subtleties*; which, if they do not advance cognition, are called^e empty *hairsplitting* or idle *rationalizing (vanae argutationes)*, and the person who indulges in them is guilty of an admittedly useless, although not exactly untrue, employment of understanding in general^f – Therefore acumen is bound not merely to the power of judgment but also befits wit; except that in the first case it is considered valuable more on account of *exactitude (cognitio exacta)*, while in the second case it is because of the *riches* of the good mind. Thus wit is also said to be *blooming*; and just as nature seems to be carrying on more of a game with its flowers but a business with fruits, so the talent encountered in wit is ranked lower (according to the ends of reason) than talent in the power of judgment. – Common and *sound* understanding makes a claim neither to wit nor to

^a *einstimmig*.

^b should: *sollen*. H: could.

^c *auszudenken*.

^d *Scharfsinnigkeit*.

^e "called" added in A2.

^f Marginal note in H: On natural and civil immaturity.

How much there is that reason does not clear up in respect to what its own history should be. It is not mere fable but a big lie.

Subtlety and micrological suppositions, preliminary concepts to invention, the capacity of *acumen*. Probability for the power of judgment. Insight for reason. Comprehension of that which one can make oneself, *mathematics*. One wonders nevertheless that it takes place like this.

acumen, for it limits itself to true needs; whereas wit and acumen deliver a kind of intellectual luxury.

On the weaknesses and illnesses of the soul with respect to its cognitive faculty

A. General division^a

§ 45. The defects of the cognitive faculty are either *mental deficiencies* or *mental illnesses*. Illnesses of the soul with respect to the cognitive faculty can be brought under two main types. One is *melancholia* (hypochondria) and the other is *mental derangement* (mania).⁵² ^b With the *former*, the patient is well aware that something is not going right with the course of his thoughts, in so far as his reason has insufficient control over itself to direct, stop, or impel the course of his thoughts. Untimely joys and untimely griefs, hence moods, alternate in him like the weather, which one must take as it comes. – Mental derangement indicates an arbitrary^d course in the patient's thoughts which has its own (subjective) rule, but which runs contrary to the (objective) rule that is in agreement with laws of experience.

With regard to sense representations, mental derangement is either *amentia* or *dementia*. As a perversity of judgment and reason, it is called *insania* or *vesania*.^e Whoever habitually neglects to compare his imaginings with laws of experience (who dreams while awake) is a *visionary* (a melancholic);^f if he does so with affect, he is called an *enthusiast*. Unexpected fits of the visionary are called *attacks of fantasy (raptus)*.

The simpleton, the imprudent person, the stupid person, the coxcomb, the fool, and the buffoon differ from the mentally deranged not merely in degree but in the distinctive quality of their mental discord, and because of their ailments they do not yet belong in the madhouse; that is, a place where human beings, despite the maturity and strength of their age, must still, with regard to the smallest matters of life, be kept orderly^g through someone else's reason. – Dementia accompanied by affect is *madness*,^b whose fits, though involuntary, can often be original and which then, like poetic raptureⁱ (*furor poeticus*), border on *genius*. But an attack like this of a gentle but unregulated flow of ideas, if it strikes reason, is called *enthusiasm*. Brooding over one and the same idea

^a General division added in A2.

^b The defects . . . (mania) added in A2. A1 (and H, with slightly different wording): The highest division is that in which *melancholia* (hypochondria) and *mental derangement (delirium)* are named.

^c *unzeitig*.

^d H, A1: involuntary.

^e amentia: *Unsinnigkeit*; dementia: *Wahn*; insania: *Wahnwitz*; vesania: *Aberwitz*.

^f melancholic: *Grillenfänger*; visionary: *Phantast*.

^g *in Ordnung gehalten*.

^b *Tollheit*.

ⁱ H, A1: a poetic attack.

7: 202

7: 203

when there is no possible point to it, e.g., over the loss of a spouse who cannot be called back to life, in order to seek peace in the pain itself, is dumb *madness*.^a – *Superstition* is more comparable with dementia, *fanaticism* with insania. The latter type of mental patient is also often called (in milder terms) *over-excited* or even eccentric.

Ravings in fever, or an attack of frenzy related to epilepsy, which may occasionally be caused sympathetically through strong power of imagination at the mere frightening sight of a madman (for which reason it is also not advisable for people with unsteady nerves to extend their curiosity over to the cells of these unfortunates), are temporary and not to be regarded as madness. – However, what is called a *crotchety person*^b (who is not mentally ill; for by this we usually mean a melancholic perversion of inner sense), is mostly a human *arrogance* that borders on dementia. His unreasonable demand that others should despise themselves in comparison with him is directly counter to his own purpose (like that of a madman), since through this demand he provokes others to undermine his self-conceit in every possible way, to torment him, and to expose him to ridicule because of his offensive foolishness. – The expression of a *whim*^c (*marotte*) that someone nurtures is milder. It is a principle that should be popular, but which nevertheless never meets with approval among prudent people. For example, he is gifted with presentiment, with certain inspirations similar to those of Socrates's genius and certain qualities that should be grounded in experience, but which as a matter of fact are based on unclear influences such as sympathy, antipathy, and idiosyncracy (*qualitates occultae*), which as it were are all chirping inside his head like a house cricket⁵³ and yet which no one else can hear. – The mildest of all deviations across the borderline of sound understanding is the *hobbyhorse*; a fondness for occupying oneself assiduously, as with a business, with objects of the power of imagination that the understanding merely plays with for amusement – a busy idleness, so to speak. For old people, those retired from business, and those in comfortable circumstances, this frame of mind, which is so to speak like withdrawing again into carefree childhood, is not only conducive to health, as an agitation that keeps the life force constantly moving; it is also charming. At the same time, it is also laughable; but in such a way that the one laughed at can still laugh good-naturedly along with us. – However, with younger people and busy people this hobbyhorse-riding also serves as relaxation, and prigs who denounce these harmless little follies with pedantic seriousness deserve Sterne's reprimand: "Let everyone ride his

7: 204

^a *stumme Verrücktheit*.^b *ein Wurm*.^c *Grille*.

own hobbyhorse up and down the streets of the city, as long as he does not force you to sit behind him."⁵⁴

B. On mental deficiencies in the cognitive faculty

§ 46. He who lacks wit has an *obtuse* head (*obtusum caput*). As for the rest, where it depends on understanding and reason, he can have a very good head; only we must not demand of him that he play the poet. This happened with Clavius,⁵⁵ whose schoolmaster wanted to apprentice him to a blacksmith because he could not make verses, but who became a great mathematician when he was given a mathematics book. – A mind that is *slow* in comprehending is for this reason not yet a weak mind; just as he who is *nimble* with concepts is not always profound but is often very shallow.

Lack of the power of judgment without wit is *stupidity* (*stupiditas*). But the same lack with wit is *silliness*. – He who shows judgment in business is *shrewd*. If at the same time he has wit, then he is called *clever*.^a He who merely affects one of the qualities, the *joker* as well as the *prig*, is a disgusting subject. – Through adversity one is *made wise*; but he who has progressed so far in this school that he can make others clever through their own adversities is *cunning*.^b – *Ignorance* is not stupidity. As a certain lady replied to the question of an academic, "Do the horses eat at night too?" "How can such a learned man be so stupid!" Otherwise, ignorance is a proof of good understanding, as long as the human being merely knows how to ask good questions (in order to be instructed, either by nature or by another human being).

The *simpleton* is he who cannot grasp *much* through his understanding; but he is not therefore stupid, unless he grasps it incorrectly. "Honest but stupid" (as some improperly describe Pomeranian servants) is a false and highly reprehensible saying. It is false because honesty (observing one's duty from principles) is practical reason.^c It is highly reprehensible because it presupposes that anyone would deceive if only he felt skillful enough to do so, and that he who does not deceive merely displays his own incapacity. – Hence the sayings: "He didn't invent gunpowder," "He won't betray the country," "He is no wizard," betray misanthropic principles, namely that with the presupposition of a good will in human beings whom we know, we still cannot be sure; rather we can only be sure with the incapacity. – Thus, *Hume*⁵⁶ says, the Grand Sultan does not entrust his harem to the virtue of those who are obliged to guard it, but rather to their incapacity (as black eunuchs). – To be very limited (*narrow*) with respect to the *range* of one's concepts does not yet

7: 205

^a clever: *klug*; shrewd: *gescheit*.^b cunning: *abgewitzt*; made wise: *gewitzigt*.^c Marginal note in H: Treasure seekers, alchemists, and lottery players – superstitions that all have who count on luck. Fishermen, hunters.

constitute stupidity, rather it depends on the *quality* of one's concepts (principles). – That people allow themselves to be taken in by treasure seekers, alchemists, and lottery agents is not to be attributed to their stupidity but to their evil will:^a the desire to get rich at others' expense without a proportionate effort of their own. *Craftiness*, cunning, slyness (*versutia, astutia*) is skill in cheating others. The question now is: whether the cheater must be *more clever* than the one who is easily cheated, and whether it is the latter who is the stupid one? The *true-hearted person* who readily *trusts* (believes, gives credit) is sometimes, but very improperly, called a *fool* because he is an easy catch for rogues, as in the saying "When fools come to market, the merchants rejoice." It is true and prudent that I never again trust someone who has once cheated me, for he is corrupt in his principles. But to trust no *other* human being because *one* has cheated me is misanthropy. The cheater is really the fool. – But what if he once through a great deception knew how to place himself in the position of no longer needing another and his trust? In that case the character under which he *appears* may very well change, but only to the point that, instead of being *laughed at* as a deceived cheater, the lucky person is *sput upon*, and there is really no permanent advantage in that.*

7: 206

* The Palestinians living among us since their exile, or at least the great majority of them, have earned the not unfounded reputation of being cheaters, due to their spirit of usury. Admittedly it seems strange to think of a *nation* of cheaters; but it is just as strange to think of a nation of nothing but merchants, the far greater majority of whom are bound by an ancient superstition recognized by the state they live in, seek no civil honor, but rather wish to replace their loss through the advantage of outwitting the people under whom they find protection, and even one another. It cannot be otherwise with an entire nation of nothing but merchants, as non-productive members of society (for example, the Jews in Poland). So their constitution, which is sanctioned by ancient statutes and even by us under whom they live (who have certain holy books in common with them) cannot be repealed without inconsistency, even though they have made the saying "Buyer beware" into the highest principle of their morality in dealing with us. – In place of the futile project of moralizing to this people in regard to the matter of cheating and honesty, I prefer rather to give my conjecture of the origin of this peculiar condition (that is, of a people consisting of nothing but merchants). – – In the most ancient times, wealth was brought by trade with India and from there over land to the western coast of the Mediterranean Sea and the ports of Phoenicia (to which Palestine belongs). – Indeed, it could have made its way over many other places, for instance, Palmyra, in more ancient times Tyre, Sidon, or also, with some sea crossings, by way of Eziongeber and Elat; as well as from the Arabian coast to Thebes and so across Egypt to the Syrian coast. But Palestine, of which Jerusalem was the capital, was also situated very advantageously for caravan trade. The phenomenon of the one-time wealth of Solomon was probably the result of this, and even the surrounding land up to the time of the Romans was full of merchants. After the destruction of Jerusalem, these merchants, having already acknowledged extensive dealings with other businessmen of their language and faith, could gradually spread into far distant lands (in Europe), taking language (continued on page 313)

^a böser Wille.

§ 47. *Distraction (distractio)* is the state of diverting attention (*abstractio*) away from certain ruling ideas by dispersing it among other, dissimilar ones. If the distraction is intentional, it is called *dissipation*; but if it is involuntary it is *absent-mindedness (absentia)*.
7: 206

Absentmindedness is one of the mental deficiencies attached, through the reproductive power of imagination, to a representation on which one has expended great or continuous attention and from which one is not able to get away; that is, one is not able to set the course of the power of imagination free again. If this malady^a becomes habitual and directed to one and the same object, it can turn into dementia. To be distracted in company is *impolite*, and often laughable as well. Women are not usually subject to this impulse, unless they occupy themselves with learning. A servant who is distracted while waiting on tables usually has something bad^b in mind: either he is up to something or he fears the consequences of what he has done.
7: 207

But one can also *distract oneself*,^c that is, create a diversion for one's involuntary reproductive power of imagination, as, for example, when the clergyman has delivered his memorized sermon and wants to prevent it from echoing^d in his head afterwards. This is a necessary and in part artificial precautionary procedure for our mental health. Continuous reflection on one and the same object leaves behind it a reverberation, so to speak (as when one and the very same piece of dance music that went on for a long time is still hummed by those returning from a festivity, or when children repeat incessantly one and the same of their kind of *bon mot*, especially when it has a rhythmic sound). Such a reverberation, I claim, molests the mind, and it can only be stopped by distraction and by applying attention to other objects, for example, reading newspapers. – *Recollecting oneself (collectio animi)* in order to be ready for every new occupation promotes mental health by restoring the balance between one's powers of soul. The healthiest way of doing this is social conversation

(continued from page 312) and faith with them and remaining together, finding protection from the states into which they had moved because of the advantage of their business. – So their dispersion throughout the world, with their unity of religion and language, must not be attributed to a *curse* inflicted upon this people, but rather to a *blessing*; especially since their wealth, estimated per capita, probably now exceeds that of any other people of the same number. [A1, A2: So their . . . the same number. H: Therefore the greatest undoing of their state was the greatest luck for the individuals. For it is to be assumed that the riches in *money* of this widely scattered people would exceed the riches of any other people of the same number, if all their riches were merged (about which Morris Cangallerie has made a suggestion). – Assuming that riches are happiness.]

^a Übel.^b etwas Arges.^c H and A1 add: (*dissipation*).^d das Nachbrumoren.

7: 208

filled with varied subjects, similar to a game. But the conversation must not jump from one topic to another, contrary to the natural relationship of ideas, for then the company breaks up in a state of mental distraction, since everything is mixed together and the unity of the conversation is entirely missing. Thus the mind finds itself confused and in need of a new distraction in order to be rid of that one.^a

One sees from this that there is a (not common) art for busy people belonging to mental diatribes: the art of distracting themselves in order to collect their powers. – But when one has collected one's thoughts, that is, prepared them to be used for any purpose desired, one nevertheless cannot be called distracted if, in an improper place or while discussing business affairs with others one gives way to one's thoughts and so pays no attention to these affairs. Rather, one can only be reproached for absentmindedness, which admittedly is improper in *company*. – Thus to distract oneself without being distracted is an art that is not common. If distraction is habitual, it gives the human being who is subject to this ill the appearance of a dreamer and makes him useless to society, since he blindly follows his power of imagination in its free play, which is not ordered by any reason. – *Reading novels*, in addition to causing many other mental discords, also has the result that it makes distraction habitual. For although through the depiction of characters who actually can be found among human beings (even if with some exaggeration) thoughts are given a coherence as in a true story, whose presentation must always be systematic in a certain way, the mind is nevertheless at the same time allowed to insert digressions (namely, to insert still other events as inventions) while reading. And the train of thought becomes fragmentary, so that one lets representations of one and the same object play in the mind in a scattered way (*sparsim*), not combined (*conjunctim*) in accordance with the unity of understanding. The teacher from the pulpit or in the academic lecture-hall, the prosecutor or defence attorney who has to demonstrate mental composure in free speaking (*impromptu*), also if need be in conversation, must pay attention to three things. First, he must look at what he is saying now, in order to present it clearly; second, he must look back to what he has said; and then third, he must look ahead to what he just now intends to say. If he fails to pay attention to any of these three items, that is to say, fails to arrange them in this order, then he lands himself and his listeners or readers in distraction, and an otherwise good mind cannot reject these rules without being called confused.

§ 48. An understanding that is in itself sound (without mental deficiency) can still be accompanied by deficiencies with regard to its exercise, deficiencies that necessitate either a postponement until the growth to

^a Marginal note in H: *absentia* – boredom.

Reading novels. Distraction to faith, reputation.

proper maturity, or even the *representation*^a of one's person through that of another in regard to matters of a civil nature. The (natural or legal) incapacity of an otherwise sound human being to use his own understanding in civil affairs is called *immaturity*.^b If this is based on immaturity of age, then it is called *nonage* (being a minor); but if it rests on legal arrangements with regard to civil affairs, it can then be called *legal* or *civil* immaturity.^c

7: 209

Children are naturally immature and their parents are their natural guardians. *Woman* regardless of age is declared to be immature in civil matters;^d her husband is her natural curator. However, if she lives with him and keeps her own property, then another person is the curator. – It is true that when it comes to talking woman by the nature of her sex has enough of a mouth to represent both herself and her husband, even in court (where it concerns mine and thine), and so could literally be declared to be *over-mature*.^e But just as it does not belong to women to go to war, so women cannot personally defend their rights and pursue civil affairs for themselves, but only by means of a representative. And this legal immaturity with respect to public transactions makes woman all the more powerful in respect to domestic welfare; because here the *right of the weaker* enters in, which the male sex by its nature already feels called on to respect and defend.^f

But to make oneself immature, degrading as it may be, is nevertheless very comfortable, and naturally it has not escaped leaders who know how to use this docility of the masses^g (because they hardly unite on their own); and to represent the danger of making use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another as very great, even lethal. Heads of state call themselves *fathers of the country*, because they understand better how to make their *subjects* happy than the subjects understand; but the people are condemned to permanent immaturity with regard to their own best interest. And when Adam Smith⁵⁷ improperly says of these heads of state: "they are themselves, without exception, the greatest spendthrifts of all," he is firmly refuted by the (wise!) sumptuary laws issued in many countries.

The *clergyman* holds the *layperson* strictly and constantly in his immaturity. The people have no voice and no judgment in regard to the path they have to take to the kingdom of heaven. The human being does not need his own eyes in order to reach it; he will soon be led, and even

^a *Stellvertretung*.

^b *Unmündigkeit*.

^c Marginal note in H: fragmentary, not backward and forward.

^d *bürgerlich-unmündig*.

^e over-mature: *übermündig*, enough of a mouth: *Mundwerk genug hat*.

^f because . . . defend not in H.

^g *große Haufe*.

7: 210

when Holy Scriptures are placed in his hands so that he may see them with his own eyes, he is at once warned by his leaders: "Find in them nothing other than what we assure you is to be found in them." In every field the mechanical handling of human beings under the reign of others is the surest means of maintaining a legal order.

Scholars usually are glad to allow themselves to be kept in immaturity by their wives with regard to domestic arrangements. A scholar, buried in his books, answered the screams of a servant that there was a fire in one of the rooms: "You know, things of that sort are my wife's affair." – Finally, a spendthrift who has already gained maturity can also bring on a relapse into civil immaturity by reasons of state if, after^a his legal entry into full age, he shows a weakness of understanding with respect to the administration of his estate, which portrays him as a child or an imbecile. However, judgment about this lies outside the field of anthropology.^b

§ 49. A man who can be taught nothing, who is incapable of *learning*, is *simple-minded* (*hebes*), like an untempered knife or axe. He who is only skilled at copying is called a *blockhead*; on the other hand, he who can himself be the author of a spiritual or artistic product is a *brain*. Quite different from this is *simplicity* (as opposed to *artificiality*), of which it is said: "Perfect art becomes nature again," and which one only achieves late in life. Simplicity is a faculty of achieving exactly the same end through an economy of means – that is, *straightaway*. He who possesses this gift (the wise man) is, by virtue of his simplicity, not at all simple-minded.

He who in particular cannot succeed in business is called *stupid*, because he possesses no power of judgment.

A *fool* is one who sacrifices things that have a value to ends that have no value; for example, sacrificing domestic happiness for splendor outside the house. When foolishness is offensive, it is called *buffoonery*. – We can call someone foolish without offending him: he can even admit it to himself. But to become the tool of rogues (according to Pope) and be called a *buffoon* cannot be heard calmly by anyone.* *Arrogance* is buffoonery, for in the first place it is *foolish* to expect others to attach little value to themselves in comparison with me; and so they will always play *tricks* with me, which defeat my purpose. The result, however, is

7: 211

* If one replies to someone's prank, "You're not being *prudent*," this is a somewhat flat expression for "You're *joking*" or "You're not being *shrewd*." – A shrewd human being is one who judges correctly and practically, but simply. It is true that experience can make a shrewd human being *prudent*, that is, skilled in the *artificial* use of understanding, but nature alone can make him shrewd.

^a A1: "at the time of" instead of "after." Full age: *Majorenität*.

^b "after his . . . of anthropology" not found in H. In H and A1 the following heading occurs here: "B. On differences in degree of mental weakness."

only that I am *laughed at*. But in this unreasonable demand there is also offense, and this produces well-deserved *hate*. The word *buffoon*, used against a woman, does not have the same harsh meaning: because a man does not believe he can be offended by the conceited presumption of a woman. And so buffoonery appears to be tied merely to the concept of a man's arrogance. – If we call someone who harms himself (temporarily or permanently) a buffoon, and so mix hate in with our contempt of him, although in fact he has not offended us, then we must think of his behavior as an offense to humanity in general and consequently as an offense committed against someone else. Whoever acts directly contrary to his own legitimate interests is also sometimes called a buffoon, although in fact he only harms himself. *Arouet*, Voltaire's father, said to someone who congratulated him on his well-known sons:⁵⁸ "I have two buffoons for sons, one is a buffoon in prose, the other in verse" (one had thrown himself into Jansenism and was persecuted; the other had to pay for his satirical verses in the Bastille). In general, the fool places a greater value on *things* than from a rational point of view he should do; the buffoon, on *himself*.

Calling a human being a *fop* or a *coxcomb* is also based on the concept of imprudence as buffoonery. The fop is a young buffoon; the coxcomb, an old one. Both are misled by rogues or scamps, but where the first incurs pity, the latter incurs bitter scorn. A witty German philosopher and poet⁵⁹ clarified the epithets *fat* and *sot* (which come under the generic name *fou*) by an example: "A *fat*," he said, "is a young German moving to Paris; a *sot* is the same man after he has returned from Paris."^a

Complete mental deficiency, which either does not suffice even for animal use of the vital force (as among the *Cretins* of Valais), or which is just sufficient for a mechanical imitation of external actions that are possible through animals (sawing, digging, and so on), is called *idiocy*. It cannot really be called sickness of soul; it is rather absence of soul.

7: 212

C. On mental illnesses

§ 50. The major division, as already mentioned above,⁶⁰ is the division into *melancholia* (hypochondria) and *mental derangement*. The name of the former is taken from the analogy to listening, in the middle of the night, to the chirping noise of a cricket in the house, which disturbs the peace of mind necessary for sleep.⁶¹ Now the illness of the hypochondriac consists in this: that certain internal physical sensations do not so much disclose a real disease present in the body but rather are mere

^a H: when he has returned home again. Marginal note in H: Mental illnesses are 1. Weakening 2. Disturbance and a mean between both (*Raptus* or hypochondria) and melancholy.

7: 213

causes of anxiety about it; and that human nature, by virtue of a peculiar characteristic (which animals do not have), can strengthen or sustain a feeling by paying attention to certain *local impressions*. On the other hand, either intentional *abstraction*, or abstraction caused by other distracting occupations, may weaken the feeling, and if the abstraction becomes habitual, make it stay away completely.* In this way hypochondria, considered as melancholia, becomes the cause of imagining physical disease: the patient is aware that it is imaginary, but every now and then he cannot refrain from regarding it as something real. Or, conversely, from a real physical ailment (such as unease from flatulent food after having a meal), hypochondria will produce imaginings of all sorts of grave external mishaps and worries about one's business, which disappear as soon as digestion has been completed and flatulence has ceased. -- The hypochondriac is a melancholic (visionary) of the most pitiful sort: obstinate, unable to be talked out of his imaginings, and always running headlong to the physician, who has no end of trouble with him, and who can calm him only by treating him like a child (with pills containing bread crumbs instead of medicine). And when this patient, who despite his perpetual sickness can never be sick, consults medical books, he becomes completely unbearable because he believes he feels all the ailments in his body that he reads about in books. -- Extraordinary gaiety, in the form of lively wit and joyous laughter, serves as the distinctive feature of this diseased imagination;^a which the patient sometimes feels himself give way to: thus the ever changing play of his moods. Anxious fear, childish in character, of the thought of *death* nourishes this illness. But whoever does not look away from these thoughts with manly courage will never really be happy in life.

Still on this side of the border of mental derangement is *sudden change of mood*^b (*raptus*), an unexpected leap from one theme to a totally different one, which no one is prepared for. Sometimes it precedes derangement, which it announces, but often the mind is already so disorganized that these assaults of irregularity become the rule with him. -- Suicide is often merely the effect of a *raptus*. For he who cuts his throat in the intensity of emotion will soon after patiently allow it to be sewn up again.

* I have remarked in another writing that averting attention from certain painful sensations and exerting it on any other object voluntarily grasped in thought can ward off the painful sensations so completely that they are unable to break out into illness. [See Kant's discussion in Part III of the *Conflict of the Faculties*, entitled "On the Power of the Mind to Master its Morbid Feelings by Sheer Resolution" (7: 97–116). Entire note is missing in H – Ed.]

^a *Einbildungskrankheit*.
^b *H*: mood with affect.

7: 214

Melancholy^a (*melancholia*) can also be a mere delusion of misery which the *gloomy* self-tormenter (inclined to worry) creates. It is itself not yet mental derangement, but it can very well lead to it.^b -- By the way, it is a mistaken but common expression to speak of a *melancholic* mathematician (for example, Professor Hausen),⁶² when one merely means a deep-thinking one.

§ 51. The *delirious raving* (*delirium*) of a person who is awake and in a *feverish* state is a physical illness and requires medical attention. Only the delirious person, in whom the physician perceives no such pathological occurrences, is called *mad*; for which the word *deranged* is only a euphemistic expression. Thus if someone has intentionally caused an accident, the question arises whether he is liable and to what extent; consequently, the first thing that must be determined is whether or not he was mad at the time. In this case the court cannot refer him to the medical faculty but must refer him to the philosophical faculty (on account of the incompetence of the court). For the question of whether the accused at the time of his act was in possession of his natural faculties of understanding and judgment is a wholly psychological question; and although a physical oddity of the soul's organs might indeed sometimes be the cause of an unnatural transgression of the law of duty (which is present in every human being), physicians and physiologists in general are still not advanced enough to see deeply into the mechanical element in the human being so that they could explain, in terms of it, the attack that led to the atrocity, or foresee it (without dissecting the body). And *forensic medicine* (*medicina forensis*) -- when it depends on the question of whether the mental condition of the agent was madness or a decision made with sound understanding -- is meddling with alien affairs, which the judge does not understand. He must at least refer it to another faculty, as something not belonging to his competence.*

* Thus, in the case of a woman who killed a child out of despair because she had been sentenced to the penitentiary, such a judge declared her insane and therefore exempt from the death penalty. -- For, he said, he who draws true conclusions from false premises is insane. Now this woman adopted the principle that confinement in the penitentiary is an indelible disgrace, worse than death (which is quite false), and came to the conclusion, by inference from it, that she deserved death. -- As a result she was insane and, as such, exempted from the death penalty. -- On the basis of this argument it might easily be possible to declare all criminals insane, people whom we should pity and cure, but not punish.

^a *Tiefsinnigkeit*.

^b *Marginal note in H*: What do I want? x x –

To think for oneself – In the place of the

The first thing is that it has no governance <?> over oneself in respect to the attention one's feelings, therefore it consists of loud moods.

§ 52.^a It is difficult to bring a systematic division into what is essential and incurable disorder. It is also of little use to occupy oneself with it, because all methods of cure in this respect must turn out to be fruitless, since the powers of the subject do not cooperate (as is the case with bodily diseases), and yet the goal can only be attained through his own use of understanding. Although anthropology here can only be indirectly pragmatic, namely, only command omissions, nevertheless it still requires at least an attempt at a general outline of this most profound degradation of humanity, which still is attributable to nature. One can divide derangement^b in general into the *tumultuous*, the *methodical*, and the *systematic*.

7: 215

1) *Amentia*^c is the inability to bring one's representations into even the coherence necessary for the possibility of experience. In lunatic asylums it is women who, owing to their talkativeness, are most subject to this disease: that is, their lively power of imagination inserts so much into what they are relating that no one grasps what they actually wanted to say. This first type of derangement is *tumultuous*.

2) *Dementia*^d is that disturbance of the mind in which everything that the insane person relates is to be sure in conformity with the formal laws of thought that make an experience possible; but, owing to the falsely inventive power of imagination, self-made representations are regarded as perceptions. Those who believe they are surrounded by enemies everywhere, who consider all glances, words, and otherwise indifferent actions of others as aimed against them personally and as traps set for them, belong in this category. – In their unhappy delusion they are often so astute in interpreting that which others do naturally as aimed against them that, if only the data were true, we would have to pay due honor to their understanding. – I have never seen anyone who has been cured of this disease (for to rave with reason is a special predisposition). However, they are not to be reckoned among the hospital buffoons; for, being concerned only with themselves, they direct their supposed craftiness only to their own preservation, without putting others in danger, and therefore do not need to be locked up for reasons of safety. This second type of derangement is *methodical*.

3) *Insania*^e is a deranged *power of judgment* in which the mind is held in suspense by means of analogies that are confused with concepts of similar things, and thus the power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding, conjures up the connection of disparate things as universal, under which the representations of the universal are contained.

^a In H and A1 this section is entitled *Classification of derangement*.

^b *Verrückung*.

^c *Unsinnigkeit*.

^d *Wahnsinn*.

^e *Wahnwitz*.

Mental patients of this kind are for the most part very cheerful; they write insipid poetry and take pleasure in the richness of what, in their opinion, is such an extensive alliance of concepts all agreeing with each other. – The lunatic of this sort is not curable because, like poetry in general, he is creative and entertaining by means of diversity. – This third kind of derangement is indeed methodical, but only *fragmentary*.

4) *Vesania*^a is the sickness of a deranged *reason*. – The mental patient flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that can be completely exempted from its touchstone, imagining that he conceives the inconceivable. – The invention of the squaring of the circle, of perpetual motion, the unveiling of the supersensible forces of nature, and the comprehension of the mystery of the Trinity are in his power. He is the calmest of all hospital patients and, because of his self-enclosed speculation, the furthest removed from raving; for, with complete self-sufficiency, he shuts his eyes to all the difficulties of inquiry. – This fourth kind of derangement could be called *systematic*.^b

7: 216

For in this last kind of mental derangement there is not merely disorder and deviation from the rule of the use of reason, but also *positive unreason*; that is, *another* rule, a totally different standpoint into which the soul is transferred, so to speak, and from which it sees all objects differently. And from the *Sensorio communis* that is required for the unity of *life* (of the animal), it finds itself transferred to a faraway place^d (hence the word "derangement")^e – just as a mountainous landscape sketched from a bird's eye view prompts a completely different judgment about the region than when it is viewed from level ground. It is true that the soul does not feel or see itself in another place (for it cannot perceive itself according to its position in space without committing a contradiction, since it would then intuit itself as an object of its outer sense, when it itself can only be the object of its inner sense); however, in this way we explain, as best we can, the so-called derangement. – It is astonishing, however, that the powers of the unhinged mind still arrange themselves in a system, and that nature even strives to bring a principle of unity into unreason, so that the faculty of thought does not remain idle. Although it is not working objectively toward true cognition of things, it is still at work subjectively, for the purpose of animal life.

^a *Aberwitz*.

^b Marginal note in H: There is a system in lunacy.

^c *Arout* had two buffoons for sons.

^d Not raving mad.

Disturbed. *Mente captus*.

^e Trans.: common sense.

^f place added in A2.

^g *Verrückung* – which can also mean "displacement."

7: 217

On the other hand, the attempt to observe oneself by physical means, in a condition approaching derangement into which one has voluntarily placed oneself in order to observe better even what is involuntary, shows enough reason for the investigation of the causes of the phenomena. But it is dangerous to conduct experiments with the mind and to make it ill to a certain degree in order to observe it and investigate its nature by the appearances that may be found there. – Thus *Helmont*, after taking a specific dose of wolfsbane (a poisonous root),⁶³ claims to have perceived a sensation as if he were *thinking in his stomach*. Another physician gradually increased his doses of camphor until it seemed to him that everything on the streets was in great tumult. Many have experimented on themselves with opium for so long that they fell into mental deficiency when they gave up further use of this aid to stimulating thought. – An artificially induced dementia could easily become a genuine one.

Random remarks

§ 53.^a The germ^b of madness develops at the same time with the germ of reproduction, so that this too is hereditary. It is dangerous to marry into families where even a single such individual has been met with. For no matter how many children of a married couple there are who remain protected from this evil legacy because, for example, they all take after the father or his parents and ancestors, if there has been only one insane child in the mother's family (although she herself is free from this misfortune), one day there nevertheless will appear in this marriage a child who takes after the maternal side (as can also be observed from the resemblance of features) and has a *hereditary* mental derangement.

People often claim to know how to indicate the accidental causes of this illness, so that it may be represented not as hereditary but rather as acquired, as if the unfortunate one himself were to blame for it. “He became crazy from *love*,” they say of one; of another, “He went mad from *pride*”; of yet a third, “He *studied too hard*.” – Falling in love with a person from a class^d of whom to expect marriage is the greatest folly was not the cause but rather the effect of madness; and as far as pride is concerned, the expectation of an insignificant human being that others bow down before him and the decorum that they *hold up* their heads against him presupposes a madness, without which he would not have fallen into such behavior.

^a H and A1 begin with the following sentence: “There is no deranged child.”

^b *Keim*.

^c H: so that; A1: and that.

^d *Stand*.

7: 218

However, as concerns *studying too hard*,^{*} there is no need at all to warn young people against it. Here youth more likely needs spurs rather than reins. Even the most intense and sustained exertion on this score, though it can indeed *tire* the mind, so that the human being takes a dislike to science, cannot *upset* the mind unless it was already eccentric and consequently discovered a taste for mystical books and revelations that go beyond sound human understanding. To this also belongs the tendency to devote oneself entirely to the reading of books that have received a certain holy unction, reading them merely for the sake of the letter, without having the moral element in view – for which a certain author has found the expression: “He is scripture-crazy.”^a

I doubt whether there is a difference between general madness (*delirium generale*) and that which is fixed upon a definite object (*delirium circa obiectum*). *Unreason* (which is something positive, not mere lack of reason) is, just like reason, a mere form into which objects can be fitted, and both reason and unreason are therefore dependent on the universal.^b However, what first comes into the mind at the *outbreak* of a crazy disposition (which usually happens suddenly) henceforth becomes the chief object of the crazy person's ravings (the accidentally encountered *matter* over which he later babbles), because the novelty of the impression fixes it more firmly in his mind than other impressions following later.

One also says of someone whose mind has jumped over something: “He has crossed the line,” just as if a human being who crosses the equator for the first time were in danger of losing his understanding.^c But this is only a misunderstanding. It is only to say that the coxcomb who hopes to fish up gold by means of a trip to India, without long effort, draws up his plan here like a buffoon. However, while he is carrying it out the budding folly grows and, upon his return, even if fortune has smiled upon him, it shows itself fully developed.

7: 218

* That businessmen *overextend* themselves and lose their powers in far-flung schemes is a common phenomenon. However, anxious parents have nothing to fear about an excess of diligence in young people (as long as their minds are otherwise sound). Nature itself already prevents such overloads of knowledge by the fact that the student gets disgusted with things over which he has broken his head and brooded in vain.

^a *schrifttoll*.

^b *auf Allgemeine gestellt*.

^c *Crossed out in H:* understanding [But this is only a <superstitious> saying of the rabble completely unfamiliar with geography, <of which he> who is devoted to seafaring as a businessman knows nothing. Even the fact that some have set out by ship to India because they were possessed by the crazy idea that they would not fail to amass riches there, just because someone once succeeded in doing so, is <the cause of much of this>. But the germ of foolishness, which consists in depending on the good luck of adventure to become wealthy without work, grew in time and matured on the return.]

7: 219

The person who *talks aloud* to himself or is caught *gesticulating* to himself in his room falls under the suspicion that something is not right with his head. – The suspicion grows even more if he believes he is blessed with inspirations or visited by higher beings in conversations and dealings. However, it does not apply if he grants that other holy men are perhaps capable of these supersensible intuitions, does not imagine that he has been chosen for them; indeed, does not even once confess to wishing to be chosen for them, and therefore excludes himself.^a

The only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of *common sense* (*sensus communis*) and its replacement with *logical private sense* (*sensus privatus*); for example, a human being in broad daylight sees a light burning on his table which, however, another person standing nearby does not see, or hears a voice that no one else hears. For it is a subjectively-necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the *understanding of others*, instead of *isolating* ourselves with our own understanding and judging *publicly* with our private representations, so to speak. Thus the prohibition of books that advance only theoretical opinions (especially when they have no influence at all on legal commissions and omissions) offends humanity. For we are thereby robbed, not of the only, but still of the greatest and most useful means of correcting our own thoughts, which happens due to the fact that we advance them in public in order to see whether they also agree with the understanding of others; for otherwise something merely subjective (for instance, habit or inclination) would easily be taken for something objective. This is precisely what the illusion consists in that is said to deceive us, or rather by means of which we are misled to deceive ourselves in the application of a rule. – He who pays no attention at all to this touchstone, but gets it into his head to recognize private sense as already valid apart from or even in opposition to common sense, is abandoned to a play of thoughts in which he sees, acts, and judges, not in a common world, but rather in his own world (as in dreaming). – Sometimes, however, it is merely a matter of terminology, through which an otherwise clear-thinking mind wishes to communicate his external perceptions to others that do not agree with the principle of common sense, and he sticks to his own sense. Thus *Harrington*,⁹⁴ the gifted author of *Oceana*, fancied that his perspiration (*effluvia*) leapt from his skin in the form of flies. However, this could well have been electrical effects on a body overcharged with this substance, an experience which others

7: 220

^a Marginal note in H: Nature and art in products of the faculty of cognition Wit, clever head, sagacity and originality

1. to make the material (of the same kind) ready
2. to know how one should search for it and invent it
3. How one without imitation should connect it – *From stock (von der Brühe)*

claim to have had; and perhaps he meant only that there was a similarity between his feeling and flies jumping off, not that he saw these flies.

Madness accompanied by *fury (rabies)*, an affect of anger (toward a real or imaginary object) that makes the subject insensitive to all external impressions, is only a variety of derangement, which often looks more frightening than it is in its consequences. Like a paroxysm during an acute illness, it is not so much rooted in the mind as stimulated by material causes, and can often be removed by the physician with one dose.^a

On the talents in the cognitive faculty

§ 54. By *talent* (natural gift) we understand that excellence of the cognitive faculty which depends not on instruction but on the subject's natural predisposition. These talents are *productive wit* (*ingenium strictius s. materialiter dictum*), *sagacity*, and *originality* of thought (genius).

Wit is either *comparative* (*ingenium comparans*) or *argumentative* (*ingenium argutans*). Wit *pairs* (assimilates) heterogeneous representations that often, according to the law of the power of imagination (of association), lie far apart from each other. It is a peculiar faculty of assimilating, which belongs to the understanding (as the faculty of cognizing the universal), in so far as it brings objects under genera.^b Afterwards, it requires the power of judgment in order to determine the particular under the universal and in order to apply the faculty of thought toward *cognition*. – To be *witty* (in speech or writing) cannot be learned through the mechanism of the school and its constraint, rather it belongs, as a special talent, to the *liberality* of temperament in the mutual communication of thoughts (*veniam damus petimusque vicissim*).^c It is a quality of

^a with one dose not in H. Crossed out in H: physician [On the Talents of the Faculty of Cognition which are at the Command of the Understanding

§ 39

They are wit, <sagacity>, the gift of inquiry, <and originality> of talent (a witty, reflective, and singular mind <or> a *genius*). They are natural gifts whose *exercise* serves to promote that which lies in the concepts of the understanding. The fitness for this (*abilitas*) cannot be acquired: nature must have furnished the human being with this. However, one can cultivate it, and one understands by this not merely the faculty but also a propensity (instinct) toward making use of it <so that if the understanding as it were involuntarily strives toward it, there is enough material to supply it for thinking>. If the word *Ingenium* is understood in its literal sense, as the innate talent in general, then the first talent would signify *facility* (*promptitudo*), the second *sagacity*, and the third *originality* of mind in the arrangement of its thoughts. – The power of imagination provides the material <to the understanding>, and this may be one and the same in different minds; but the talent to work on it for the use of the understanding in this connection can nevertheless differ greatly.

The faculty of <association> reconciling strange conceptual representations by means of the understanding is creative wit (*perspicacia*).

^b *Gattungen*.

^c Trans.: we give pardon and we seek it in return.

understanding in general that is hard to explain: it is as though its *agreement* – which contrasts with the *strictness* of judgment (*iudicium discretivum*) in the application of the universal to the particular (the generic concepts to those of the species), *limits* both the faculty of assimilation and also the inclination to use this faculty.^a

7: 221

On the specific difference between comparative and argumentative wit

A. On productive wit

§ 55. It is pleasant, popular, and stimulating to discover similarities among dissimilar things, and so wit provides material to the understanding to make its concepts more general. Judgment, on the other hand, which limits concepts and contributes more to correcting than enlarging them, is indeed praised and recommended; but it is serious, rigorous, and limiting with regard to freedom of thought, and just for this reason it is unpopular. The activity of comparative wit is more like play; but that of judgment is more like business. – Wit is more like a flower of youth; the power of judgment, more a ripe fruit of old age. – He who unites both to a high degree in a product of the mind is *perspicacious* (*perspicax*).

Wit snatches at *sudden inspiration*; the power of judgment strives for *insight*. Circumspection is a *mayor's virtue*⁶⁵ (to protect and administer the town by given laws, under the supreme command of the castle). On the other hand, *Buffon*,⁶⁶ the great author of the system of nature, was considered *bold* (*hardi*) by his countrymen for setting aside the scruples of the power of judgment, even though his daring venture appears rather lacking in modesty (frivolity). – Wit goes more for the *sauce*; the power of judgment, for the *sustenance*. To hunt for *witty sayings* (*bons mots*), such as the Abbot Trublet⁶⁷ richly displayed, and in doing so to put wit on the rack, makes shallow minds, or eventually disgusts well-grounded ones. Wit is inventive in *fashions*, that is, assumed rules of behavior, which are pleasing only because of their novelty and which, before they become *custom*, must be exchanged for other forms that are just as transitory.

Wit in wordplay is *insipid*; while needless subtlety (micrology) of judgment is *pedantic*. *Humorous wit*^b means one that comes from a mind disposed to *paradox*, where the (cunning) joker peers from behind the naïve sound of simplicity in order to expose someone (or his opinion) to ridicule

^a Crossed out in H: faculty. [Sagacity or the gift of inquiry is also a gift of nature: <to know it one> to understand how one should search effectively (with luck) (to question nature or other human beings). It is a talent to judge provisionally where the truth might be found and to track it. Bacon of Verulam in his *Organon* has given us a brilliant example of this art of judging provisionally (*iudicii praevit*) with regard to himself, through which the method of natural science has been put on its <true> proper track.]

Genius, however, is originality in the generation of products of the faculty of cognition; the faculty of thinking and acting in an exemplary manner independently of any other exemplar.]

^b Launichter Witz.

7: 222

by exalting, with apparent eulogy (persiflage), the opposite of what is worthy of approval – for example, “Swift’s art of sinking in poetry,”⁶⁸ or *Butler’s Hudibras*.⁶⁹ Such a wit, which uses contrast to make what is contemptible even more contemptible, is very stimulating through the surprise of the unexpected. However, it is an easy wit (like that of Voltaire’s), and always only a *game*.^a On the other hand, the person who presents true and important principles in clothing (like Young⁷⁰ in his satires) can be called a very difficult wit, because it is a *serious business* and arouses more admiration than amusement.

A *proverb* (*proverbiū*) is not a *witty saying* (*bon mot*), for it is a formula that has become common which expresses a thought that is transmitted by imitation, even though it could well have been a witty saying in the mouth of the first speaker. Speaking through proverbs is therefore the language of the rabble, and shows a complete lack of wit in social intercourse with the refined world.

It is true that profundity is not a matter of wit; but in so far as wit, through the graphic element that it adds to thought, can be a vehicle or garb for reason and its management of morally practical ideas, it can be thought of as profound wit (as distinguished from superficial wit). As one of the so-called admirable sayings of *Samuel Johnson* about women goes, which is quoted in *The Life of Waller*: “Doubtless he praised many women whom he would have hesitated to marry, and perhaps he married one he would have been ashamed to praise.”⁷¹ Here the play of antitheses constitutes the only admirable thing; reason gains nothing by it. – But when it was a matter of disputed questions for reason, then his friend *Boswell* could not coax out from Johnson any of those oracular utterances, which he sought so incessantly, that revealed the slightest wit. Rather, everything that Johnson uttered about skeptics in religion, or of the right of government, or even about human freedom in general, fell out with a blunt coarseness because of his natural despotism which the pampering of his flatterers rooted deeply in him. His admirers liked to call this *roughness*,^a but it showed his great^b inability to unite wit

7: 223

^a Boswell relates that when a certain lord in his presence expressed his regret that Johnson had not had a finer education, *Baretti* said: “No, no my lord. You could have done with him whatever you wanted, he would always have remained a bear.” “No doubt, but at least a *dancing bear*?” asked the lord. A third, his friend, thought to soften this by saying: “*He has nothing of the bear but the coat.*” [See *Boswell, Life of Johnson*, ed. Crocker (New York, 1867), I. 252 – Ed.]

7: 223

^a Marginal note in H: *inane argutianes*. Crass concepts of sophistical wit, which nevertheless are fine in respect to that which they are being compared to.

All of these talents have their opponents. –

Also here it is necessary here to have an inclination for it.

On taste in dealings with writings, not with sermons.

^b H: complete.

with profundity in the same thought. — Also, it appears that men of influence, who refused to listen when Johnson's friends suggested that he would be an exceptionally qualified member of parliament, appreciated his talent very well. For the wit that suffices for the composition of the dictionary of a language⁷² is not enough for awakening and enlivening the ideas of reason that are required for insight into important affairs. — *Modesty* automatically enters into the mind of one who sees himself called to this office, together with a mistrust in one's own talents that leads one not to decide for oneself but rather to take others' judgments into account (unnoticed, if necessary). This was a quality that Johnson never possessed.

B. On sagacity, or the gift of inquiry

§ 56. To *discover* something (that lies hidden either in ourselves or elsewhere) in many cases often requires a special talent of knowing how to search well: a natural gift for *judging in advance* (*iudicii praevi*) where the truth may indeed be found; for tracking things and using the slightest grounds of relationship to discover or invent that which is sought.^a The logic of the schools teaches us nothing about this. But Bacon of Verulam⁷³ in his *Organon* gave a brilliant example of the method of how the hidden constitution of natural things could be uncovered through experiments. However, even this example is insufficient to give instruction according to definite rules as to how one should search successfully, for we must always first presuppose something here (begin with a hypothesis) from which to begin our course of investigation, and this must come about as a result of principles, certain modes of procedure. And it all comes down to how we should scent these out. For to venture forth blindly, trusting good luck until one stumbles over a stone and finds a piece of ore and subsequently a lode as well, is indeed bad advice for inquiry. Still, there are people of talent who, so to speak, with the divining rod in hand track down the treasures of knowledge without having learned to do so; which they then also cannot teach to others but can only demonstrate to them, because it is a natural gift.

7: 224

C. On the originality of the cognitive faculty, or genius

§ 57. *Inventing* something is entirely different from *discovering* something. For the thing that one *discovers* is accepted as already existing beforehand, it is only that it was not yet known; for example, America before Columbus. But what one *invents*, for example, *gunpowder*, was not yet

^a Marginal note in H: On the necessary modesty in our handling of ideas and through the same.

Insight (*perspicacia*) is a faculty of reason which does not depend on wit but whose influence it is better to restrain.

On Invention, Discovery.

known at all before the artist* who made it. Both discovery and invention can be meritorious. However, one can *find* something that one doesn't look for at all (like the alchemist who found phosphorus),⁷⁴ and there is no merit whatsoever in it. — Now the talent for inventing is called *genius*. But we confer this name only on an *artist*, therefore on one who knows how to *make* something, not on one who is merely acquainted with and *knows* many things. However, it is also not conferred on an artist who merely imitates, but rather on one who is disposed to produce his works *originally*; finally, it is conferred on this artist only when his product is *exemplary*, that is, when it serves as an example (*exemplar*) to be imitated. — So a human being's genius is "the exemplary originality of his talent" (in respect to this or that kind of artistic product). But we also call a mind that has the predisposition to this a genius; then this word is to denote not merely a person's natural gift, but also the person himself. — To be a genius in many departments is to be a *vast* genius (like Leonardo da Vinci).

The proper field for genius is that of the power of imagination, because this is creative and, being less under the constraint of rules than other faculties, it is thus all the more capable of originality. — It is true that the mechanism of instruction is indeed disadvantageous to the budding of a genius as far as his originality is concerned, because instruction always requires the student to imitate. But every art still requires certain mechanical basic rules, namely rules concerning the appropriateness of the product to the underlying idea; that is, *truth* in the presentation of the object that one is thinking of. Now this must be learned by means of school rigor,^a and is indeed always an effect of imitation. However, to free the power of imagination even from this constraint and allow the talent proper to it to proceed without rules and *swoon*,^b even against nature, might deliver original folly; but it would certainly not be exemplary and thus also would not be counted as genius.^d

Spirit is the *animating* principle in the human being. In the French language, *spirit* and *wit* bear one and the same name, *Esprit*. In German it is different. One says that a speech, a text, a woman in society, etc., are

* Gunpowder was already used in the siege of Algeciras, long before the time of the monk Schwarz, and its invention seems to belong to the Chinese. But it could still be that that German, who obtained this powder, experimented in analyzing it (for example, by leaching out the saltpeter in it, washing away the carbon, and burning the sulphur), thus *discovered* it, though he did not *invent* it. [Külpe surmises that Kant probably obtained this information from an essay by Gramm, "On Gunpowder," which appeared in the *Allgemeine Magazin der Natur, Kunst und Wissenschaften* V (1755), pp. 230, 232 – Ed.]

^a mit Schulstreng.

^b schwärmen.

^c "but" added in A2.

^d Marginal note in H: The essence of genius and the power of imagination.

7: 225

beautiful but without spirit. The supply of wit makes no difference here; for we can also be put off by it, since its effect leaves nothing permanent. If all these above-mentioned things and persons are to be called *spirited*, then they must arouse an *interest* by means of *ideas*. For this sets the power of imagination in motion, which sees a great playroom for concepts of this kind before it. Therefore how would it be if we were to use the German term *singular spirit^a* to express the French word *génie*? For our nation permits itself to be persuaded that the French have a word for this in their own language that we do not have in ours but rather must borrow from them. Nevertheless, they *themselves* have borrowed it from the Latin (*genius*), where it means nothing other than a singular spirit.

However, the reason why exemplary originality of talent is designated by this *mystical* name is because the man who has genius cannot explain to himself its outbursts or even make himself understand how he arrived at an art which he could not have learned. For *invisibility* (of the cause of an effect) is an accessory concept of *spirit* (a *genius* which is already assigned to the gifted man at his birth), whose inspiration he only follows, so to speak. The mental powers, however, must move harmoniously with the help of the imagination, because otherwise they would not animate but would disturb one another, and since this must occur owing to the *nature* of the subject^b, we can also call genius the talent "by which nature gives the rule to art."⁷⁵

7: 226

§ 58. Whether the world on the whole is particularly served by great geniuses, because they often take new paths and open new prospects; or whether mechanical minds, with their commonplace understanding that advances slowly on the rod and staff of experience, even if they are not epoch-making (for if none of them excites admiration, it is true that they also cause no disorder), have contributed most to the growth of the arts and sciences, may remain undiscussed here. – But one type of them, called *men of genius* (they are better called apes of genius), have forced their way in under this sign-board which bears the words "minds extraordinarily favored by nature," declaring that difficult study and research are dilettantish and that they have snatched the spirit of all science in one grasp, though they pretend to administer it in small doses that are concentrated and powerful. This type, like that of the quack and the charlatan, is very disadvantageous to progress in scientific and moral education^c when he knows how to conceal his poverty of spirit by dogmatizing from the seat of wisdom in decisive tones over religion, politics, and morals, like one of the initiated or a ruler. What

else is there to do against this other than to continue patiently on one's way with diligence, order, and clarity, paying no attention to this trickster?

§ 59. Genius also seems to have different original seeds within itself and to develop them differently, according to the difference of national type and the soil where it was born. With the Germans it strikes more in the *roots*; with the Italians, in the *foliage*; with the French, in the *blossoms*; and with the English, in the *fruit*.

Still, genius, as the inventive mind, is distinguished from the *universal* mind (which grasps all the various sciences). The latter can be universal about what can be learned; that is, he is a person who possesses historical knowledge of what, with regard to all the sciences, has been done up to now (a *polyhistorian*), like Jul. Cäs. Scaliger. The genius is the man, not so much of wide *range* of mind as of intense greatness, who is epoch-making in everything he undertakes (like Newton or Leibniz). The *architectonic* mind, which methodically examines the connection of all the sciences and how they support one another, is only a subordinate type of genius, but still not a common one. – However, there is also *gigantic* erudition which is still often *cyclopean*, that is to say, missing one eye: namely, the eye of true philosophy, by means of which reason suitably uses this mass of historical knowledge, the load of a hundred camels.

7: 227

Purely natural minds (*élèves de la nature, Autodidacti*) can in many cases also count as geniuses, because, although indeed much of what they know could have been learned from others, they have thought it out for themselves, and in what is not itself a matter of genius, they are nevertheless geniuses – just as, concerning the mechanical arts, there are many in Switzerland who are inventors in these arts. But a prematurely clever prodigy (*ingenium praecox*), like Heinecke in Lübeck, or the short-lived Baratier in Halle,⁷⁶ are deviations from nature's rule, rarities for a natural history collection. And while their premature ripening arouses admiration, at bottom it is also often cause for repentance on the part of those who promoted it.

In the end, since the entire use of the cognitive faculty^a for its own advancement, even in theoretical cognition, surely requires reason, which gives the rule in accordance with which it alone can be advanced, we can summarize the demand that reason makes on the cognitive faculty in three questions, which are directed to the three cognitive faculties:^b

^a *eigentümlicher Geist.*

^b of the subject not in *H.*

^c *wissenschaftliche und sittliche Bildung.*

^a *Erkenntnisvermögen.*
^b *Fakultäten.*

What do I want? (asks understanding)*

What does it matter? (asks the power of judgment)

What comes of it? (asks reason).

Minds differ greatly in their ability to answer all three of these questions. – The first requires only a clear mind to understand itself; and after some culture this natural gift is fairly common, especially when one draws attention to it. – To answer the second question appropriately is a greater rarity; for all sorts of ways of determining the concept at hand and the apparent solution to the problem present themselves: what is the one solution that is exactly appropriate to this problem (for example, in lawsuits, or at the outset of certain plans of action having the same end)? For this there is a talent for selecting what is exactly appropriate in a given case (*iudicium discretivum*), which is much desired but also very rare. The lawyer who arrives with many principles that are supposed to prove his assertion makes the judge's sentence very difficult, because he himself is only fumbling around. But if the lawyer, after clarifying what he wants to say, knows how to find the point about the matter (for there is only one), then the issue is quickly settled, and the verdict of reason follows by itself.

Understanding is positive and drives out the darkness of ignorance – the power of judgment is more negative, for the prevention of errors from the dim light in which objects appear. – Reason blocks the sources of errors (prejudices), and thereby safeguards understanding through the universality of principles. – It is true that book-learning increases knowledge, but it does not extend concepts and insight when reason is not added. However, reason is still different from *rationalizing*,^a playing with mere experiments in the use of reason without a law of reason. If the question is whether I should believe in ghosts, I can *rationalize* about their possibility in all sorts of ways; but *reason* prohibits the *superstitious* assumption of their possibility, that is, without a principle of explanation of the phenomenon according to laws of experience.

By means of the great difference of minds, in the way they look at exactly the same objects and at each other, and by means of the friction between them and the connection between them as well as their separation, nature produces a remarkable drama of infinite variety on the stage of observers and thinkers. For the class of thinkers the following maxims (which have already been mentioned above, as leading to wisdom)^b can be made unalterable commands:

* "Wanting" is understood here in a purely theoretical sense: What do I want to assert as true?

^a *Vernünfteln*.

^b "(which have . . . to wisdom)" added in A2.

1. To think for oneself.

2. To think oneself (in communication with human beings) into the place of every other person.

3. Always to think consistently with oneself.

The first principle is negative (*nullius addictus iunare in verba Magistrorum*),^a the principle of freedom from constraint; the second is positive,^b the principle of liberals who adapt to the principles of others; the third is the principle of the consistent (consequent) (logical) way of thinking. Anthropology can furnish examples of each of these principles, but it can furnish even more examples of their opposite.

The most important revolution from within the human being is "his exit from his self-incurred immaturity".^c Before this revolution he let others think for him and merely imitated others or allowed them to guide him by leading-strings. Now he ventures to advance, though still shakily, with his own feet on the ground of experience.^c

7: 229

Book II^d
The feeling of pleasure and displeasure
Division.

7: 230

1) *Sensuous pleasure*, 2) *intellectual pleasure*. The former is either introduced A) through *sense* (enjoyment), or B) through the *power of imagination* (taste); the second (that is, intellectual pleasure) is either introduced a) through representable *concepts* or b) through *ideas*, – – and thus the opposite, *displeasure*, is also introduced in the same way.

On sensuous pleasure

A.^e On the feeling for the agreeable, or sensuous pleasure in the sensation of an object.

§ 60. *Enjoyment* is a pleasure through sense, and what amuses sense is called *agreeable*. *Pain* is displeasure through sense, and whatever produces it is *disagreeable*. – They are opposed to each other not as profit and lack of profit (+ and o), but as profit and loss (+ and -), that is, one is opposed to the other not merely as *opposite* (*contradictorie s. logice oppositum*), but also as *counterpart* (*contrarie s. realiter oppositum*).^f – – The expressions for what *pleases* or *displeases*, and for what is in between, the *indifferent*, are too broad; for they can also refer to intellectual pleasure and displeasure, where they would then not coincide with enjoyment and pain.

^a Trans.: Nobody is forced to follow the words of the master. See Horace, *Epistles* I.1.14.

^b "negative" and "positive" not in H.

^c H: experience alone.

^d H and A1: Second chapter.

^e H and A1: First section.

^f Translations: contradictory or logically opposed; contrasted or truly opposed. (Neither Latin phrase is in H.)

7: 231

One can also explain these feelings by means of the effect that the sensation produces on our state of mind. What directly (through sense) urges me to *leave* my state (to go out of it) is *disagreeable* to me – it causes me pain; just as what drives me to *Maintain* my state (to remain in it) is *agreeable* to me, I enjoy it. But we are led along irresistibly in the stream of time and in the change of sensations connected with it. Now even if leaving one point of time and entering another is one and the same act (of change), there is still a temporal sequence in our thought and in the consciousness of this change; in conformity with the relation of cause and effect. – So the question arises, whether it is the consciousness of *leaving* the present state, or the prospect of *entering* a future state, that awakens in us the sensation of enjoyment? In the first case the enjoyment is nothing other than the ending of a pain and something negative; in the second it would be presentiment of something agreeable, therefore an increase of the state of pleasure, consequently something positive. But we can already guess beforehand that only the first will happen; for time drags us from the present to the future (not the reverse), and the cause of our agreeable feeling can only be that we are first compelled to leave the present, without any certainty into which other state we shall enter, knowing only that it is definitely another one.

Enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life. But (animal) life, as physicians also have already noted, is a continuous play of the antagonism of both.

Therefore pain must always precede every enjoyment; pain is always first. For what else but a quick death from joy would follow from a continuous promotion of the vital force, which cannot be raised above a certain degree anyway?

Also, no enjoyment can immediately follow another; rather, between one and another pain must appear. Small inhibitions of the vital force mixed in with advancements of it constitute the state of health that we erroneously consider to be a continuously felt well-being; when in fact it consists only of intermittent pleasant feelings that follow one another (with pain always intervening between them). Pain is the incentive^a of activity, and in this, above all, we feel our life; without pain lifelessness would set in.

7: 232

Pains that subside slowly (like the gradual recovery from an illness or the slow reacquisition of lost capital) *do not result in lively enjoyment*, because the transition is imperceptible. – I subscribe with full conviction to these tenets of Count Veri.⁷⁸

Elucidation through examples

Why is a game (especially for money) so attractive and, if it is not too selfish,^b the best distraction and relaxation after a long intellectual

exertion, since through idleness one recuperates only slowly? Because a game is a state of incessant movement between fearing and hoping. After a game the evening meal tastes better and also is digested better. – By what means are *plays* (whether tragedies or comedies) so alluring? Because in all of them certain difficulties enter in – anxiety and confusion between hope and joy – and so the play of opposing affects by the conclusion of the piece advances the life of the spectator, since it has stirred up motion within him. – Why does a love story end with the wedding, and why is a supplementary volume added by the hand of a bungler who continues the story into the marriage (as in Fielding's novel)⁷⁹ repugnant and in bad taste? Because jealousy, as the pain that comes to lovers between their joys and hopes, is spice to the reader *before* the marriage, but poison *in* marriage; for, to use the language of novels, "the end of love's pain is simultaneously the end of love" (understood as love with affect). – Why is work the best way of enjoying one's life? Because it is an arduous occupation (disagreeable in itself and pleasing only through success), and rest becomes a tangible pleasure, joy, through the mere disappearance of a long hardship; otherwise rest would not be anything enjoyable. – Tobacco (whether smoked or snuffed) is at first linked with a disagreeable sensation. But just because nature immediately removes this pain (by secreting a mucous from the palate or nose), tobacco (especially when smoked) becomes a kind of company, by entertaining and constantly reawakening sensations and even thoughts; even if in this case they are only fleeting. – Finally, even if no positive pain stimulates us to activity, if necessary a negative one, *boredom*, will often affect us in such a manner that we feel driven to do something harmful to ourselves rather than nothing at all. For boredom is perceived as a *void* of sensation by the human being who is used to an alternation of sensations in himself, and who is striving to fill up his instinct for life with something or other.⁸⁰

7: 233

^a Marginal note in H: On passing the time as a pure, continuous removal of a pain. – On the boredom which no Carib feels.

How for us each period of time is long and life is short, or the opposite.

How one passes the time (not ordered work).

Crossed out in H: [On boredom

§ 46

That the incentive of activity, which results in disgust at a sensationless existence (*borror vacui*), accompanies the human being the more his vital power is roused, from the age of childhood until the end of life, and this always impels him to come out of the present condition, <in fact> is a wise arrangement of nature and its end, and is not to be disputed. But where then does *contentment* (joy in the persistence of his condition) remain, and under these circumstances how highly can he value the worth of his mere life in general? – The phenomenon is strange but nevertheless normal, that for the one who is not burdened every day with compulsory affairs, <the life> the life which has been saved appears too short. – The cause of this appearance is <exactly the same> one and the same with the fact that German miles, which, however, are not measured (continued on page 336)

^a Stachel.

^b eigennützig.

On boredom and amusement

§ 61. To feel one's life, to enjoy oneself, is thus nothing more than to feel oneself continuously driven to leave the present state (which must therefore be a pain that recurs just as often as the present). This also explains the oppressive, even frightening arduousness of boredom for everyone who is attentive to his life and to time (cultivated human beings).^a This pressure or impulse^a to leave every point of time we are in and pass over

* Because of his inborn lifelessness, the Carib is free from this arduousness. He can sit for hours with his fishing rod, without catching anything; thoughtlessness is a lack of incentive to activity, which brings pain with it, from which this one is spared. [Külp refers readers here to *Archenholz, Literatur und Völkerkunde* vi (1785), 479 – Ed.] – Our reading public of refined taste is always sustained by the appetite and even the ravenous hunger for reading ephemeral writings (a way of doing nothing), not for the sake of self-cultivation, but rather for enjoyment. So the readers' heads always remain empty and there is no fear of over-saturation. For they give the appearance of work to their busy idleness and delude themselves that it is a worthy expenditure of time, but it is no better than what the *Journal des Luxus und der Moden* offers to the public. [Founded in 1786, the *Journal of Luxury and Fashion* was edited by F. J. Bertuch and J. M. Krause – Ed.]

(continued from page 335) ones, are longer the further they are from the capital (e.g., in Pomerania), than when they are nearer to one (e.g., Berlin). Where village upon village, or one farm after another, follows quickly, the traveler believes that he has covered a great stretch of land, <which he naturally also> because he necessarily thinks a long time about it, which contain a great many perceptions following one after another, <which is necessary for it because they> and now after the presumed long time he values the route covered which to him seems <big> long. On the other hand, in a desolate land, because the number of <objects> perceptions following one another in the former case require a long time <for it requires it>, consequently also according to the route of the accomplished trip, the lack of these requires only a short time <afterwards>, so that this is also judged at the end as shorter. Consequently the value of the length of one's life at the end depends on being able <in looking back> to look back on it with contentment, that is, being satisfied with it, and this is based on the number <and man> of occupations which have filled out time (*vilam extendere factis*). The more you have thought, and the more you have done, the longer you yourself have lived according to your <plain> own imagination <estimate of time>.

But what <proves> confirms the above proposition most of all is that all enjoyment consists in the <overcoming of> canceling of a pain, and so is acquired only by continually leaving the present condition, and this is indicated by the ease with which, after looking at one's watch at a party after an entertaining game or a lively conversation, one says "Where has the time gone!"

^a Marginal note in H: On Affects

Taste is the faculty for the play of the power of imagination to choose what is universally valid – therefore the effect of a joy in everyone whose power of imagination . . . is capable of feelings.

Whether horrible representations also belong to it. Yes – but not the object rather the representation is beautiful

Why does one rejoice over time that has become short?

Taste is either the taste that distinguishes or the taste that savors. – The first belongs merely to sense intuition as a faculty of representation, the second belongs to the same

into the following one is accelerating and can grow until a man makes the resolution to end his life; for the luxurious person has tried every form of enjoyment, and no enjoyment is new to him any longer. As someone in Paris said of Lord Mordaunt: "The English hang themselves in order to pass the time."^b – The void of sensations we perceive in ourselves arouses a horror (*horror vacui*) and, as it were, the presentiment of a slow death which is regarded as more painful than when fate suddenly cuts the thread of life.

This also explains why things that shorten time are taken to be the same thing as enjoyments; because the quicker we make time pass, the more we feel refreshed – as when one member of a party that has conversed for three hours long while taking a pleasure trip in a carriage cheerfully comments upon exiting when a member looks at his watch: "Where has the time gone?" or "How short the time has been for us!" If, on the contrary, we paid attention to time when it was filled with enjoyment and not merely when it brought pain we were endeavoring to leave behind us, how rightly we would regret every loss of time. – Conversations that contain little exchange of ideas^a are called *boring*, and just because of this also arduous, and an *entertaining* man is still regarded as an agreeable man, even if not exactly an important one. As soon as he merely enters the room, the face of every guest immediately lights up, as with joy at being relieved of a burden.

But how are we to explain the phenomenon that a human being who has tortured himself with boredom for the greatest part of his life, so that every day seemed long to him, nevertheless complains at the end of his life about the *brevity* of life? – The cause of this is to be sought in the analogy with a similar observation: why do German miles (which are not measured or indicated with milestones, like the Russian versts) always become shorter the nearer we are to a capital (e.g., Berlin), and longer the farther we are from one (in Pomerania)? The reason is that the *abundance* of objects seen (villages and farmhouses) produces in our memory the deceptive conclusion that a vast amount of space has been covered and, consequently, that a longer period of time necessary for this purpose has also passed. However, the *emptiness* in the latter case produces little recollection of what has been seen and therefore leads to the conclusion that the route was shorter, and hence the time less, than would be shown by the clock. – In the same way, the multitude of stages that mark the last part of life with various and different tasks will arouse in an old person the illusion^b of a longer-travelled lifetime than

7: 234

as feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Whether and how it tastes good or bad. – *Sapere – Gustare.*

^a *Vorstellungen.*

^b *Einbildung.*

7: 235

he would have believed according to the number of years, and filling our time by means of methodical, progressive occupations that lead to an important and intended end (*vitam extendere factis*)^a is the only sure means of becoming happy with one's life and, at the same time, weary of life. "The more you have thought, and the more you have done, the longer you have lived (even in your own imagination)." — Hence the conclusion of such a life occurs with *contentment*.

But what about *contentment* (*acquiescentia*) during life? — For the human being it is unattainable: neither from the moral point of view (being content with his good conduct) nor from the pragmatic point of view (being content with the well-being that he intends to secure through skill and prudence). As an incentive to activity, nature has put pain in the human being that he cannot escape from, in order always to progress toward what is better, and even in the last moments of life, contentment with the last stage of it can only be called comparative (partly because we compare ourselves with the lot of others, and partly because we compare ourselves with ourselves); but the contentment is never pure and^b complete. — To be (absolutely) contented in life would be *idle rest* and the standstill of all incentives, or the dulling^c of sensations and the activity connected with them. However, such a state is no more compatible with the intellectual life of the human being than the stopping of the heart in an animal's body, where death follows inevitably unless a new stimulus (through pain) is sent.

Remark: In this section we should also deal with *affects* as feelings of pleasure and displeasure that transgress the bounds of the human being's inner freedom. But since these are often confused with the *passions* and, indeed, also stand in close relationship to passions, which will be discussed in another section, namely, the one on the faculty of desire, I shall undertake a discussion of them when the occasion arises in the third section.⁸¹

§ 62. To be habitually disposed to cheerfulness is, to be sure, usually a quality of temperament; but often it can also be an effect of principles, such as Epicurus's *pleasure principle*,^d so-called by others and for that reason denounced, which actually was intended to designate the *always-cheerful heart* of the sage. — Even-tempered is he who is neither delighted nor distressed, and who is quite different from one who is *indifferent* to the coincidences of life and therefore has dull feelings. — Equanimity differs from the *mood* disposition (presumably it was called a *lunatic*^e disposition at first), which is a subject's disposition to attacks of joy or

7: 236

grief for which the subject himself can give no reason, and which is particularly common with hypochondriacs. It is entirely different from the *witty*^a talent (of a Butler or Sterne); here the wit intentionally places objects in the wrong position (stands them on their head, so to speak), and, with roguish simplicity, gives his audience or readers the pleasure of rearranging them on their own. — *Sensitivity* is not opposed to this equanimity. For it is a *faculty* and a *power* which either permits or prevents both the state of pleasure as well as displeasure from entering the mind, and thus it possesses choice. On the other hand, *sentimentality* is a *weakness* by which we can be affected, even against our will, by sympathy for others' condition who, so to speak, can play at will on the organ of the sentimental. Sensitivity is manly; for the man who wants to spare his wife or children difficulties or pain must possess such delicate feeling as is necessary in order to judge their sensation not by *his* own strength but rather by their *weakness*, and *delicacy* of his sensation is necessary for generosity. On the other hand, the ineffectual sharing of one's feelings in order to appear sympathetically in tune with the feelings of others, thus allowing oneself to be affected in a merely passive way, is silly and childish. — So piety can and should be good humored; we can and should perform difficult but necessary work in good humor, indeed even die in good humor: for all these things lose their value if they are done or endured in bad humor and in a morose frame of mind.^b

Concerning grief that one broods over intentionally, as something will end only with his life, it is said that he *grieves* over it (a misfortune). — But one must not grieve over anything; what cannot be changed must be driven from the mind: because it would be nonsense to want to make what happened into what has not happened. To better oneself^f is good and is also a duty; but to want to improve on what is already beyond my power is absurd. On the other hand, *taking something to heart*, which means to make a firm resolution to adopt any good advice or teaching, is the deliberate determination to connect our will with a sufficiently strong feeling for carrying it out. — The penitence of the self-tormentor is completely wasted effort; he should instead quickly apply his disposition to a better way of life. And it has, in addition, the bad consequence that he regards his record of guilt as thereby simply wiped out (through repentance), so that he is spared the effort toward improvement, which under reasonable circumstances should now have been doubled.^d

§ 63. One way of enjoying ourselves is also a way of *cultivating* ourselves; that is, increasing the capacity for having more enjoyment of this

^a Trans.: extend life through activity.

^b H: or.

^c or the dulling not in H.

^d *Wollustprinzip*.

^e lunatic: *lunatisch*; mood: *launisch*.

^a *launicht*.

^b H: if they are done morosely.

^c oneself added in A2.

^d Marginal note in H: We always place our contentment in comparison with others.

Absolute contentment does not occur except at the end of life.

7: 237

kind, and this applies to the sciences and the fine arts. However, *another way* is *overindulgence*,^a which makes us increasingly less capable of further enjoyment. But whichever way we may seek enjoyment, it is a principal maxim, as already stated above,^b that we indulge only so far that we can climb still further; for being satiated produces that disgusting state that makes life itself a burden for the spoiled human being, and which consumes women^c in the name of vapors.⁸² — Young man! (I repeat)⁸³ get fond of work; deny yourself enjoyments, not to *renounce* them, but rather to keep them always in perspective as far as possible! Do not dull your receptivity to enjoyments by savoring them prematurely! The maturity of age, which never lets us regret having done without a single physical enjoyment, will guarantee, even in this sacrifice, a capital of contentment which is independent of either chance or the laws of nature.

§ 64. However, we also judge enjoyment and pain by a *higher satisfaction* or dissatisfaction within ourselves (namely, moral): whether we ought to refuse them or give ourselves over to them.

- 1) The object can be pleasant, but the enjoyment of it *displeasing*. Therefore we have the expression a *bitter joy*. — He who is in bad circumstances and then inherits the estate of his parents or other appreciative and generous relatives cannot avoid rejoicing over their death; but he also cannot avoid reproaching himself for this joy. The same thing takes place in the mind of an assistant^d who, with unfeigned sadness, attends the funeral of his esteemed predecessor.
- 2) The object can be *unpleasant*; but the *pain* concerning it *pleasing*. Therefore we have the expression *sweet sorrow*:^e for example, the sweet sorrow of a widow who has been left well off but does not want to allow herself to be comforted, which is often interpreted improperly as affection.

On the other hand, enjoyment can also be pleasing, viz., when we find enjoyment in such objects that it does us credit to be occupied with. If, for example, someone entertains himself with fine arts instead of mere sensual pleasures, he has the added satisfaction that he (as a refined man) is capable of such pleasures. — Likewise, the pain of a human being can also be displeasing to him. The hatred of an insulted person is pain; but even after satisfaction the well-disposed man^f can still not refrain from reproaching himself for continuing to retain a grudge against the offender.

^a *Abnutzung*.

^b as already stated above added in A2.

^c women not in *H*.

^d *Adjunkt*.

^e pain: *Schmerz*; sweet sorrow: *süßer Schmerz*.

^f *der Wohldenkende*.

7: 238

§ 65. Enjoyment which someone (legally) acquires himself^a is doubly felt; once as *gain* and then also as *merit* (the attribution, inwardly, of being the author himself). — Money acquired by working is enjoyable, at least for a *longer time*, than money won in games of chance; and even if we overlook the general harmfulness of the lottery, there remains, nevertheless, something which a well-disposed human being must be ashamed of if he should win by this means. — A misfortune for which an external cause is to blame *pains* us; but one for which we ourselves are to blame *saddens* and depresses us.

But how do we explain or reconcile that a misfortune which one person has suffered from another leads to two different kinds of explanation?^b Thus, for example, one sufferer says: “I would accept it, if I were in the least to blame for it”; but the second says: “It is my consolation that I am entirely innocent in the matter.” — To suffer innocently is *irritating*, because it is an insult inflicted by another person. — To suffer when one is guilty is *depressing*, because it is a reproach from inside. — It is easy to see that of these two the second is the better human being.^c

§ 66. It is not exactly the nicest observation about human beings that their enjoyment increases through comparison with others' pain, while their own pain is diminished through comparison with similar or even greater sufferings of others. However, this effect is purely psychological (according to the principle of contrast: *opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescent*)^d and has no bearing on the moral matter of perhaps wishing suffering on others so that we can feel the comfort of our own condition all the more deeply. One sympathizes with others by means of the power of imagination (for instance, when one sees someone who has lost his balance and is about to fall, one spontaneously and vainly leans toward the opposite side, in order to as it were place him back into balance again),^e and one is only happy not to be entwined in the same fate.*

* *Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis,
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem;
Non quia vexari quenquam est iucunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.*
Lucretius.

[Trans.: What joy it is, when out at sea the stormwinds are lashing the waters, to gaze from the shore at the heavy stress some other man is enduring! Not that anyone's afflictions are in themselves a source of delight; but to realize from what troubles you yourself are free is joy indeed. *De Rerum Natura* 2. 1–4, trans. Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1951) – Ed.]

^a *H*: for himself.

^b *zweierlei Sprache*.

^c It is . . . human being not in *H*.

^d Trans.: opposites become clearer when they are juxtaposed.

^e *H*: in.

^f (for instance . . . balance again) not in *H*.

7: 239

This is why people run with great desire, as to a theater play, to watch a criminal being taken to the gallows and executed. For the emotions^a and feelings which are expressed in his face and in his bearings have a sympathetic effect on the spectators and, after the anxiety the spectators suffer through the power of the imagination (whose strength is increased even further by means of the ceremony), the emotions and feelings leave the spectators with a mild but nevertheless genuine feeling of relaxation, which makes their subsequent enjoyment of life all the more tangible.

Also, if one compares one's pain with other possible pains of one's own, it thereby becomes more bearable. The misfortune of someone who has broken his leg can be made more bearable if he is shown that he could easily have broken his neck.

The most thorough and easiest means of soothing all pains is the thought, which can well be expected of a reasonable human being, that life as such, with regard to our enjoyment of it, which depends on fortunate circumstances, has no intrinsic value of its own at all, and that life has value only as regards the use it is put to, and the ends to which it is directed. So it is not luck but only *wisdom* that can secure the value of life for the human being; and its value is therefore in his power. He who is anxiously worried about losing his life will never enjoy life.^b

B.^c On the feeling for the beautiful, that is,^d On the partly sensuous, partly intellectual pleasure in reflective intuition,^e or taste

§ 67. *Taste*, in the proper sense of the term, is, as has already been stated above,⁸⁴ the property of an organ (the tongue, palate, and throat) to be specifically affected by certain dissolved matter in food or drink. In its use it is to be understood either as taste that merely *differentiates* or, at the same time, as taste that also *savors* [for example, whether something is sweet or bitter, or whether what is tasted (sweet or bitter) is *pleasant*]. The former can offer universal agreement as to how certain substances are to be *designated*, but the latter can never offer a universally valid judgment: namely, that something (for example, something bitter) which is pleasant to me will also be pleasant to everyone. The reason for this is clear: neither pleasure nor displeasure belongs to the cognitive faculty as regards objects; rather they are determinations of the subject, and so cannot be ascribed to external objects. – The taste that savors therefore contains at the same time the concept of a differentiation between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, which I connect with the representation of the object in perception or imagination.

^a *Gemütsbewegungen*.

^b "will . . . life" not in H. *Marginal note in H*: Why die for joy. Affect.

^c H and A1: Second Part.

^d H and A1: or.

^e *in der reflektierten Anschauung*.

But the word *taste* is also taken for a sensible faculty of judgment, by which I choose not merely for myself, according to sensation, but also according to a certain rule which is represented as valid for everyone.^a This rule can be *empirical*, in which case, however, it can make no claim to true universality or, consequently, to necessity either (the judgment of everyone else about taste that savors *must* agree with mine). – So, with regard to meals, the rule of taste that holds for the Germans is to begin with a soup, but the English begin with solid food; because a habit, gradually extended by imitation, has been made into a rule for arranging a meal.

But there is also a taste that savors, whose rule must be grounded *a priori*, because it proclaims *necessity* and consequently also validity for everyone as to how the representation of an object is to be judged in relation to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (where reason is accordingly involved in it, although one cannot derive its judgment from principles of reason, and so cannot prove it). And one could call this taste *rationalizing^b* taste, in distinction to the *empirical* taste that is the taste of the senses (the former is *gustus reflectens*, the latter *reflexus*).^c

All *presentation* of one's own person or one's art^d with *taste* presupposes a *social condition* (talking with others) which is not always sociable (sharing in the pleasure of others), but at the beginning is usually *barbaric*, unsociable,^e and purely competitive. – No one in complete solitude will decorate or clean his house; he will not even do it for his own people (wife and children), but only for strangers, to show himself to

^a *Crossed out in H*: everyone. [Since otherwise pleasure would be appetite in accordance with an object, which one cannot demand of everyone <and>, instead each person must <for oneself through experience> try it out for himself; and this would not be taste, which one represents <describes> as *a priori* as <a pleasure> necessary and as a pleasure which one can <must have it> require from everyone. <However> Now this pleasure therefore cannot be sensual pleasure, but also not intellectual pleasure, therefore it must in fact be sensible. However, the faculty of representations is sensible, without nevertheless being representations of sense. Therefore the taste that savors, which serves as a rule for each, is for the power of imagination. From this follows the explanation:

Taste is the faculty for the play of the power of imagination to choose what is universally valid.]

^b *vernünftelnde*.

^c *Marginal note in H*: Not the means, but the object of intuition itself immediately!

Naturally this play must then be free and yet in accordance with law, if it is to produce a pleasure in the object.

Taste refers to society and to communication with others, without this it would be a mere choice for the appetite. –

For oneself alone no one would limit one's choice because of the form.

The sociable, festive meal calls for diversity, but because of freedom of choice also order and unity.

^d *Kunst*.

^e "unsociable" not in H.

7: 241

advantage. But in *taste* (taste concerning choice), that is, in aesthetic power of judgment, it is not the *sensation* directly (the material of the representation of the object), but rather how the free (productive) power of imagination joins it together through invention,^a that is, the *form*, which produces satisfaction in the object. For only form is capable of laying claim to a universal rule for the feeling of pleasure. One must not expect such a universal rule from sensations, which can differ greatly, according to the different sense-capacities of subjects. – One can therefore explain taste as follows:^b “taste is the faculty of the aesthetic power of judgment to choose with universal validity”.

Taste is, accordingly, a faculty of making *social* judgments of external objects within the power of imagination. – Here the mind feels its freedom in the play of images (therefore of sensibility); for *sociability*^c with other human beings presupposes freedom – and this feeling is pleasure. – But the *universal validity* of this feeling for everyone, which distinguishes tasteful choice (of the beautiful) from choice through mere sensation (of what is merely subjectively pleasing) carries with it the concept of a law; for only in accordance with this law can the validity of satisfaction for the person who judges be universal. The faculty of representing the universal, however, is the *understanding*. Therefore the judgment of taste is not only an aesthetic judgment but also a judgment of understanding, but both are thought in combination (consequently the judgment of understanding is not considered as pure). – The judging of an object through taste is a judgment about the harmony or discord of freedom, in the play of the power of imagination and the lawfulness of understanding, and therefore it is a matter only of judging the form aesthetically (the compatibility of the sense representations), not the generation of products, in which the form is perceived. For that would be *genius*, whose passionate vitality often needs to be moderated and limited by the propriety of taste.^d

^a *Dichtung*.

^b *Crossed out in H:* follows [Taste is <the power of judgment> the faculty which <connects> unites the free play of the power of imagination with the lawfulness of the understanding. It is therefore the faculty of the aesthetic power of judgment to choose that which is universally valid.]

^c *Sozialität*.

^d *Marginal note in H:* What one chooses for the pleasure of others can nevertheless be choice without interest.

From whence – *Sapor*?

To choose means to distinguish something in an object through the feeling of pleasure. To choose is not yet to desire, for it is still problematic. Still not interest xx.

Beauty – Sublimity.

In a sermon not spirit and taste

7: 242

Beauty alone belongs to taste; it is true that the *sublime* belongs to aesthetic judgment, but not to taste. However, the *representation* of the sublime can and should nevertheless be beautiful in itself; otherwise it is coarse, barbaric, and contrary to good taste. Even the *presentation* of the evil or ugly (for example, the figure of personified death in Milton) can and must be beautiful whenever an object is to be represented^a aesthetically, and this is true even if the object is a *Thersites*.^b Otherwise the presentation produces either distaste or disgust, both of which include the endeavor to push away a representation that is offered for enjoyment; whereas *beauty* on the other hand carries with it the concept of an invitation to the most intimate union with the object, that is, to immediate enjoyment. – With the expression “a *beautiful soul*” one says everything that can be said to make one aim at the innermost union with such a soul; for *greatness* and *strength* of soul concern the matter (the instruments for certain ends). *Goodness of soul*,^b however, concerns the pure form, under which it must be possible to unite all ends, and so wherever it is encountered it is *primordially creative* but also *supernatural*, like the Eros of the world of fable. – Nevertheless, this goodness of soul is the central point around which the judgment of taste gathers all of its judgments of sensuous pleasure that are compatible with the freedom of understanding.

Remark. How could it have happened that modern languages in particular have designated the aesthetic faculty of judging with an expression (*gustus, sapor*) that merely refers to a certain sense organ (the inside of the mouth) and to its discrimination as well as choice of enjoyable things? – There is no situation in which sensibility and understanding unite in one enjoyment that can be continued as long and repeated with satisfaction as often as a good meal in good company. – But here the meal is regarded merely as the vehicle for supporting the company. The aesthetic taste of the host shows itself in his skill in choosing with universal validity,

1) the cold and bright theory of the text for the understanding

2) Real life in relation to the text, whether it agrees with this or not.

3) The stimulating application of the same to real life.

Taste results in communication of pleasure in the representation of an object and therefore it is social. No one dresses tastefully or dresses up for himself. But whence *Sapor* and *Sapientia*. – The taste that differentiates, which is fine. *Sancho* small iron key xx. Taste is the faculty of aesthetic judgment, to choose what is universally valid.

Thereby 1) empirical interest is restrained, for this gives no universality. 2) Intellectual interest is restrained, but then also 3) the relation of an object to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, which also concerns merely the form of the object, is indicated, 4) the freedom of the power of imagination, which is the intuitive representation of its own product, is indicated [?].

^a *H:* presented.

^b *Seelengüte.* *H:* beauty of soul.

7: 243

something which he cannot bring about through his own sense of taste, because his guests might choose other foods or drinks, each according to his own private sense. Therefore he sets up his meeting with *variety*, so that everyone will find something that suits his sense, which yields a comparative universal validity. In the present discussion we cannot deal with his skill in choosing guests who themselves engage in reciprocal and common conversation (which is indeed also called taste, but which is actually reason applied to taste, and yet is distinct from it). And so the feeling of an organ^a through a particular sense has been able to furnish the name for an ideal feeling; the feeling, namely, of a sensible, universally valid choice in general. – It is even more strange that the skill of testing by sense whether something is an object of enjoyment for one and the same subject (not whether the choice of it is universally valid) (*sapor*) has even been exaggerated to designate wisdom (*sapientia*); presumably because an unconditionally necessary end requires neither reflection nor experiment, but comes into the soul immediately by, so to speak, tasting what is wholesome.

§ 68.^b The *sublime* is awe-inspiring greatness (*magnitudo reverenda*) in extent or degree which invites approach (in order to measure our powers against it); but the fear that in comparison with it we will disappear in our own estimation is at the same time a deterrent (for example, thunder over our heads, or a high, rugged mountain).⁸⁶ And if we ourselves are in a safe place, the collecting of our powers to grasp the appearance, along with our anxiety that we are unable to measure up to its greatness, arouses *surprise* (a pleasant feeling owing to its continual overcoming of pain).

The *sublime* is the counterweight but not the opposite of the beautiful; because the effort and attempt to raise ourselves to a grasp (*apprehensio*) of the object awakens in us a feeling of our own greatness and power; but the representation in thought of the sublime by *description* or presentation can and must always be beautiful. For otherwise the astonishment becomes a *deterrent*, which is very different from *admiration*, a judgment in which we do not grow weary of being astonished.

The *monstrous* is greatness that is contrapurposive^c (*magnitudo monstrosa*).⁸⁷ Writers, therefore, who wanted to extol the vast extent of the Russian empire have missed badly in calling it monstrous; for herein lies a reproach, as if it were *too great* for a single ruler. – A human being is *adventurous* who has the propensity to become entangled with events whose true account resembles a novel.

^a *Organgefühl*.

^b In H the following heading occurs here: *On taste in regard to the sublime*.

^c *zweckwidrig*.

The sublime is therefore not an object for taste, but rather an object for the feeling of emotion;^a however, the artistic presentation of the sublime in description and embellishment (in secondary works,^b *parerga*) can and should be beautiful, since otherwise it is wild, coarse, and repulsive, and, consequently, contrary to taste.

Taste contains a tendency toward external advancement of morality

7: 244

§ 69. Taste (as a formal sense, so to speak)^c concerns the *communication* of our feeling of pleasure or displeasure to others, and includes a susceptibility, which this very communication affects pleasurable, to feel a satisfaction (*complacentia*) about it in common with others (sociably). Now satisfaction that can be considered valid not merely for the subject who feels it but also for everybody else, that is, universally valid, must contain necessity (of this satisfaction). So, in order to be considered universally valid, this satisfaction must contain an *a priori* principle. Consequently, it is a satisfaction in the agreement of the subject's pleasure with the feeling of everyone else according to a universal law, which must spring from the subject's giving of universal law and so from reason. That is to say, the choice in accordance with this satisfaction, according to its form, comes under the principle of duty. Therefore ideal taste has a tendency toward the external advancement of morality.⁸⁸ – Making the human being *well-mannered*^d for his social situation to be sure does not mean as much as forming him into a *morally good* person, but nevertheless it prepares him for the latter by the effort he makes in his social situation to please others (to become liked or admired). – In this way one could call taste morality in external appearance; even though this expression, taken literally, contains a contradiction; since being well-mannered after all includes the *appearance*^e or demeanor of moral goodness, and even a degree of it; namely, the inclination^f to place a value even on the semblance^g of moral goodness.

§ 70. To be well-mannered, respectable, well-behaved, polished (with the coarseness planed down) is still only the negative condition of taste. The representation of these qualities in the power of the imagination can be a tasteful, externally *intuitive* way of representing an object, or one's own person, but only for two senses, hearing and sight. Music and the plastic arts (painting, sculpture, architecture, and horticulture) lay claim

^a *das Gefühl der Rührung*.

^b *Nebenwerken*.

^c so to speak not in H.

^d *gesittet*.

^e *Anschein*.

^f the inclination added in A2.

^g *Schein*.

7: 245

to taste as a susceptibility of a feeling of pleasure for the mere forms of external intuition, the former in respect to hearing, the latter in respect to sight. On the other hand, the *discursive* way of representing things through speech or writing includes two arts in which taste can manifest itself: *rhetoric* and *poetry*.^a

Anthropological observations concerning taste^b

A. On taste in fashion

§ 71. The human being has a natural tendency to compare his behavior to that of a more important person (the child with adults, the lower ranking person with those of higher rank) in order to imitate the other person's ways. A law of this imitation, which aims at not appearing lower than others, especially in cases where no regard to utility is paid, is called *fashion*. Fashion therefore belongs under the title of *vanity*, because there is no inner worth in its intention; and also of *foolishness*, because in fashion there is still a compulsion to let ourselves be led slavishly by the mere example that many in society give us. To be *in fashion* is a matter of taste; he who clings to a past custom that is *out of fashion* is called *old-fashioned*; and he who even places a worth on being *out of fashion* is an *eccentric*. But it is always better, nevertheless, to be a fool in fashion than a fool *out of fashion*, if we want to impose such a harsh name on this vanity at all; a title that, indeed, the mania for fashion really deserves if it sacrifices true utility or even duties to this vanity. – All fashions, by their very concept, are mutable ways of living.^c For when the game of imitation is fixed, it becomes *custom*, and then taste is no longer considered at all. Accordingly, it is novelty that makes fashion popular, and to be inventive in all sorts of external forms, even if they often degenerate into something fantastic and somewhat hideous, belongs to

^a Marginal note in H: § 51

On poetry and rhetoric, spirit and taste

Excess of good living with taste is luxury.

The taste of sense is a matter of only two senses, hearing and sight. The taste of reflection is also a matter of manners (*mores*). The latter, which is called beauty, is as it were morality in appearance (virtue, if it appears visibly (*venus ornata*), – therefore polished, *poli* – it is the middle step between sensual stimulus and morality. The individuality of the former is left out and delight remains, universality and necessity lead to the good.

On taste in fashion

Only two senses belong to ideal spirit and taste.

On splendor and pomp – adventures. Many of them are sugary, like romance novels.

To be ostentatious is not tasteful but *tasteless* – To be fashionable is not tasteful, but vain.

^b Crossed out in H: Taste [Popular taste (in contrast to *select* taste) is **fashion**. The question: What then is fashion? <means> refers not merely to <what is now> elegant usage which through habit has, as it were, become law, but]

^c *veränderliche Lebensweisen*.

the style of courtiers, especially ladies. Others then anxiously imitate these forms, and those in low social positions^a burden themselves with them long after the courtiers have put them away. – So fashion is not, strictly speaking, a matter of taste (for it can be quite contrary to taste), but of mere vanity in giving oneself airs,^b and of rivalry in outdoing one another by it. (The *élégants de la cour*, otherwise called *petits maîtres*, are windbags.)

Splendor can be joined with true, ideal taste, which is therefore something sublime that is at the same time beautiful (such as a splendid starry heaven, or, if it does not sound too vulgar, a St. Peter's church in Rome). Even *pomp*, an ostentatious display for show, can also be joined with taste, but not without firm objection by taste; because pomp is calculated for the masses, which include a great deal of rabble, whose taste, being dull, calls more for sensation than the capacity for judging.

7: 246

B. On taste in art

Here I shall take into consideration only the speaking arts:^c *rhetoric* and *poetry*, because they are aimed at a frame of mind whereby the mind is directly aroused to activity, and thus they have their place in a *pragmatic* anthropology, where one tries to know the human being according to what can be made of him.

The principle of the mind that animates by means of *ideas* is called *spirit*. – *Taste* is a merely regulative faculty of judging form in the combination of the manifold in the power of imagination; *spirit*, however, is the productive faculty of reason which provides a *model* for that *a priori* form of the power of imagination. Spirit and taste: *spirit* to provide ideas, *taste* to limit them to the form that is appropriate to the laws of the productive power of imagination and so to *form* them (*fingendi*) in an original way (not imitatively). A product composed with spirit and taste can be called *poetry* in general and is a work of *beautiful art*; it may be presented directly to the senses by means of the eyes or ears and can also be called *poetic art*^d (*poetica in sensu lato*); it may include the arts of painting, horticulture, and architecture, as well as the arts of composing music and verse (*poetica in sensu stricto*).^e But *poetic art* as contrasted with *rhetoric* differs from it only by the way understanding and sensibility are mutually subordinated: poetic art is a *play* of sensibility *ordered* through understanding; rhetoric is a *business* of understanding *animated* through sensibility. However, both the orator as well as the poet (in the broad

^a *niedrige Ständen*.

^b giving oneself airs not in H.

^c *redende Künste*.

^d poetic art: *Dichtkunst*; beautiful art: *schöne Kunst*; poetry: *Poesie*.

^e Translations: poetry in the broad sense; poetry in the strict sense.

7: 247

sense) are *inventors* and bring forth out of themselves new forms (combinations of the sensible) in their power of imagination.*

Because the gift of poetry is an artistic skill and, when it is combined with taste, a talent for beautiful art that aims, in part, at illusion (although one that is sweet and often also indirectly beneficial), it is obvious that no great use (often even detrimental use) of the gift has been made in life. – Accordingly, it is well worth our while to ask some questions and make some observations about the character of the poet, and also about the influence that his occupation has on himself and others and its worthiness.^a

Among the beautiful (speaking) arts, why does poetry win the prize over rhetoric, when both have exactly the same ends? – Because poetry is at the same time music (singable) and tone; a sound that is pleasant in itself, which mere speech is not. Even rhetoric borrows from poetry a sound that approximates tone: *accent*, without which the oration lacks the necessary intervening moments of rest and animation. But poetry wins the prize not merely over rhetoric but also over every other beautiful art: over painting (to which sculpture belongs) and even over music. For

* *Novelty* in the *presentation* of a concept is a principal demand of beautiful art placed on the inventor, even if the concept itself is not supposed to be new. – But for understanding (apart from taste) we have the following expressions for increasing our knowledge through new perception. To *discover* something is to perceive something for the first time that was already there, for example, America, the magnetic force directed toward the poles, atmospheric electricity. – To *invent* something (to bring into reality that which was not yet there), for example, the compass, the aerostat. – To *locate* something, to recover that which was lost through searching. – To *devise* and *think out* (for example, with tools for artists, or machines). – To *fabricate*, consciously to represent the untrue as true, as in novels, where it happens only for entertainment. – Fabrication given out as truth, however, is a *lie*.

(*Turpiter atrum desinit in piscem mulier formosa superne.*)

Horace

[Trans.: The woman, well-shaped on top, ends below ugly in a black fish. *Ars poetica* v. 3 f. – Ed.]

^a *Würdigung. Marginal note in H:* The principle in the human being that animates by means of ideas with reason is called – spirit

The painter of *Originalen* the orator the poet – each original author must be a poet and in his product lies spirit.

Scansion

prose that has become crazy

A witty (also sharp) thought produced in rhyme is therefore not *poesie* – it lacks spirit. The ancient poems had more spirit than wit.

Uneven length and *naïveté*.

Poets are seldom good businessmen, musicians likewise not, except as lovers, not artists

Poetry and versemongery

The singability of verse is not a natural language.

7: 248

music is a *beautiful* (not merely pleasant) *art* only because it serves poetry as a vehicle. Also, among poets there are not so many shallow minds (minds unfit for business) as there are among musicians, because poets also speak to the understanding, but musicians speak only to the senses. – A good poem is the most penetrating means of enlivening the mind. – – But it is true not merely of poets, but of everyone who possesses the gift of beautiful art, that one must be born to it and cannot achieve it by diligence and imitation; also, in order to succeed in his work a lucky mood needs to come over the artist, just like a moment of inspiration (this is why he is also called *vates*). For a work that is made according to precepts and rules turns out to be spiritless (slavish), however a product of beautiful art requires not merely taste, which can be grounded on imitation, but also originality of thought, which, as self-inspired,^a is called *spirit*. – The *painter of nature* with paintbrush or pen (in the latter case it is prose or verse) is not the beautiful spirit, because he only imitates; the *painter of ideas* alone is the master of beautiful art.

Why does one usually understand by “poet” a writer who composes in *verse*; that is, in a discourse^b that is scanned (spoken rhythmically, like music)? Because in announcing a work of beautiful art he enters with a solemnity that must satisfy the finest *taste* (in respect to form); otherwise the work would not be beautiful. – However, since this solemnity is mostly required for the beautiful representation of the sublime, a similarly affected solemnity without verse is called (by Hugh Blair) “*prose run mad*.⁸⁹ – On the other hand, versification is also not poetry, if it is without spirit.

Why is rhyme in the verses of poets of modern times, when the rhyme happily brings the thought to conclusion, an important requirement of taste in our part of the world? On the other hand, why is rhyme a repulsive offence against verse in poems of ancient times, so that now, for example, verse free of rhyme in German is not very pleasing, but a Latin Virgil put into rhyme is even less pleasing? Presumably because with the old classical poets prosody was fixed, but in modern languages prosody is to a large extent lacking, and the ear is compensated for this lack through rhyme, which concludes the verse with a sound similar to the ending of the previous verse. In prosaic, solemn language a rhyme occurring accidentally between other sentences becomes ridiculous.

Where does the *poetic license* to now and then violate the laws of language, to which the orator is not entitled, come from? Presumably from the fact that the orator is not hindered by the law of form too much to express a great thought.

^a als aus sich selbst belebend.

^b Rede.

7: 249

Why is a mediocre poem intolerable, but a mediocre speech still quite bearable? The cause appears to lie in the fact that the solemnity of tone in every poetic product arouses great expectations and, precisely because these expectations are not satisfied, the poem usually sinks even lower than its prose value would perhaps merit. – The conclusion of a poem with a verse, which can be preserved as an aphorism, produces a pleasant aftertaste and thereby makes amends for much of this staleness;^a thus it too belongs to the art of the poet.

In old age the *poetic vein* dries up, at a time when the sciences still promise good health and activity in work to a good mind. This is probably so because beauty is a *blossom*, whereas science is the *fruit*; that is, poetry must be a free art which, on account of its variety, requires facility; but in old age this facile sense^b dwindles away (and rightly so). Furthermore, *habit*, merely advancing along the same track in the sciences, at the same time brings facility along with it; thus poetry, which requires originality and *novelty* in each of its products (and in addition to this agility), does not agree well with old age; except perhaps in matters of *caustic wit*, in epigrams and *xenia*,^c where poetry is at the same time more serious than playful.

That poets make no such fortune as lawyers and others in the learned professions lies in the predisposition of temperament which is, on the whole, required of the born poet: namely, to drive cares away by means of convivial play with thoughts. – However, a peculiarity, which concerns *character*, namely, of *having no character*, but being capricious, moody, and (without malice) unreliable, of wilfully making enemies for oneself, without even hating anyone, and of mocking one's friend bitingly, without wanting to hurt him, lies in a partly innate predisposition of eccentric *wit* ruling over the practical power of judgment.

On luxury

7: 250

§ 72. *Luxury (luxus)* is the excess, in a community, of social high living *with taste* (which is thus contrary to the welfare of the community). Excess *without taste*, however, is public *debauchery (luxuries)*. – If we take the effects of both on the community's welfare into consideration, then luxury is a dispensable expenditure which makes the community *poor*, while debauchery is one that makes it *ill*. Nevertheless, luxury is still compatible with the advancing culture of the people^d (in art and science); debauchery, however, gorges with pleasure and eventually causes disgust. Both are more ostentatious (glittering on the outside) than self-pleasing;

^a *Schale.*

^b *dieser leichte Sinn.*

^c *öffentliche Schwelgerei.*

^d *das Volk.*

luxury, through elegance (as in balls and spectacles) for the ideal taste; debauchery, through abundance and diversity for the sense of *taste* (for physical taste, as, for example, at the feast of a Lord Mayor). – Whether the government is entitled to limit both of these by sumptuary laws is a question whose answer does not belong here. But since the beautiful as well as the pleasant arts weaken the people to some extent, so that they can be more easily governed, the introduction of a Spartan roughness would work directly against the government's aim.

The art of good living is the due proportion^a of living well to sociability (thus, to living with taste). One sees from this that luxury is detrimental to the art of good living, and the expression “he knows how to live,” when used of a wealthy or distinguished man, signifies the skillfulness of his choice in social enjoyment, which includes moderation (sobriety) in making pleasure mutually beneficial, and is calculated to last.

Since luxury can properly be reproached not in domestic life but only in public life, one sees from this that the relation of the citizen to the commonwealth, as concerns the freedom to engage in rivalry, to forestall utility, if necessary, for the sake of the embellishment of one's own person or possessions (in festivals, weddings, funerals, and so on down to good tone in common dealings), can hardly be burdened with sumptuary edicts. For luxury still provides the advantage of enlivening the arts, and so reimburses the commonwealth for the expenses that such a display might have entailed for it.

Book III^b On the faculty of desire

7: 251

§ 73. *Desire (appetitio)* is the self-determination of a subject's power through the representation of something in the future as an effect of this representation.^c Habitual sensible desire is called *inclination*. Desiring without exercising power to produce the object is *wish*. Wish can be directed toward objects that the subject himself feels incapable of producing, and then it is an *empty (idle) wish*. The empty wish to be able to annihilate the time between the desire and the acquisition of the desired object is *longing*. The undetermined desire, in respect to the object (*appetitio vaga*), which only impels the subject to leave his present state without knowing what state he then wants to enter, can be called the *peevish wish* (one that nothing satisfies).

Inclination that can be conquered only with difficulty or not at all by the subject's reason is *passion*. On the other hand, the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure in the subject's present state that does not let him to rise to

^a *Angemessenheit.*

^b H and A1: Third Chapter.

reflection (the representation by means of reason as to whether he should give himself up to it or refuse it) is *affect*.

To be subject to affects and passions is probably always an *illness of the mind*, because both affect and passion shut out the sovereignty of reason. Both are also equally vehement^a in degree; but as concerns their quality they are essentially different from each other, both with regard to the method of prevention and to that of the cure that the physician of souls would have to apply.⁹²

7: 252

On affects in comparison with passion

§ 74. Affect is^b surprise through sensation, by means of which the mind's composure (*animus sui compos*) is suspended. Affect is therefore rash,^c that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling that makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless). – Lack of affect that does not reduce the strength of incentives to action is *phlegm* in the good sense, a property of the valiant man (*animi strenui*), who does not let the strength of affects bring him out of calm reflection. What the affect of anger does not accomplish quickly, it does not do at all; and it forgets easily. But the passion of hatred takes its time, in order to root itself deeply and think about its opponent. – If a father or schoolmaster has only had the patience to listen to the apology (not the justification), he cannot punish. – If a person comes into your room in anger in order to say harsh words to you in fierce indignation, politely ask him to sit down; if you succeed in this, his scolding will already be milder, since the comfort of sitting is a relaxation that is not really compatible with the threatening gestures and screaming that can be used when standing. On the other hand, passion (as a state of mind belonging to the faculty of desire) takes its time and reflects, no matter how fierce it may be, in order to reach its end. – Affect works like water that breaks through a dam; passion, like a river that digs itself deeper and deeper into its bed. Affect works on our health like an apoplectic fit; passion, like consumption or emaciation. Affect is like drunkenness that one sleeps off, although a headache follows afterward; but passion is regarded as a sickness that comes from swallowing poison, or a deformity^d which requires an inner or an outer^e physician of the soul, one who nevertheless knows how to prescribe remedies that are for the most part not radical, but almost always merely palliative.^f

^a *heftig.*

^b *Crossed out in H:* is [as it were <the eruption> overflow through the bursting of <the> a dam <of a river>; passion on the other hand is a river, induced by the steepness of the ground, that digs itself deeper and deeper and makes itself constant.]

^c *übereilt.*

^d comes . . . deformity not in *H*.

^e an inner or an outer not in *H*.

^f *Marginal note in H:* Affect is rash, but does not bear a grudge. If one gives it room, it is even amused at and loves that which has offended it.

Where a great deal of affect is present, there is generally little passion; as with the French, who as a result of their vivacity are fickle in comparison with the Italians and Spaniards (as well as Indians and Chinese), who brood over revenge in their rage or are persistent in their love to the point of dementia. – Affects are honest and open, passions on the other hand are deceitful and hidden. The Chinese reproach the English with being impetuous and hotheaded, “like the Tartars”; but the English reproach the Chinese with being out-and-out (though calm) deceivers, who do not allow this reproach to dissuade them at all in their passion.⁹³ – Affect is like *drunkenness* that one sleeps off; passion is to be regarded as a *dementia* that broods over a representation which nestles itself deeper and deeper. – The person who *loves* to be sure can still remain quite clear-sighted; but the person who is *falls in love* is inevitably blind to the faults of the beloved object,^a though the latter person will usually regain his sight eight days after the wedding. – Whoever^b is usually seized by affect like a fit of madness, no matter how benign these emotions may be, nevertheless resembles a deranged person; but since he quickly regrets the episode afterward, it is only a paroxysm that we call *thoughtlessness*. Some people even wish that they could get angry, and Socrates was doubtful as to whether it would not be good to get angry at times; but to have affect so much under one's control that one can cold-bloodedly reflect whether one should get angry or not appears to be somewhat contradictory. – On the other hand, no human being wishes to have passion. For who wants to have himself put in chains when he can be free?

Of the affects in particular

A. On the government of the mind with regard to the affects

§ 75. The principle of *apathy* – namely, that the wise man must never be in a state of affect, not even in that of compassion^c with the misfortune of his best friend, is an entirely correct and sublime moral principle of the Stoic school; for affect makes us (more or less) blind. – Nevertheless, the wisdom of nature has planted in us the predisposition to compassion in order to handle the reins *provisionally*, until reason has achieved the necessary strength; that is to say, for the purpose of enlivening us,^d nature has added the incentive of pathological (sensible) impulse to the moral incentives for the good, as a temporary surrogate of reason. By the way,

It is not hatred (passion).

Love can be brought about by means of a momentary impression of a friendly smile, but quickly disappears. But to be in love is a passion that one is never rid of.

^a beloved object: *geliebte Gegenstand*; falls in love: *verliebt*; loves: *liebt*.

^b In *H* the following sentence occurs before “Whoever:” Affect is honest and does not allow itself to dissemble. Passion usually hides.

^c *Mitleid.*

^d *zur Belebung.*

7: 254

affect, considered by itself alone, is always imprudent; it makes itself incapable of pursuing its own end, and it is therefore unwise to allow it to come into being intentionally. – Nevertheless, reason, in representing the morally good by connecting its ideas with intuitions (examples) that have been imputed to them, can produce an enlivening of the will (in spiritual or political speeches to the people, or even in solitary speeches to oneself). Reason is thus enlivening the soul not as effect but rather as cause of an affect in respect to the good, and reason still always handles the reins, causing an *enthusiasm* of good resolution^a – an enthusiasm which, however, must be attributed to the *faculty of desire* and not to emotion, as to a stronger sensible *feeling*.

The *natural gift of apathy*, with sufficient strength of soul, is, as I have said,⁹⁴ fortunate **phlegm** (in the moral sense). He who is gifted with it is, to be sure, on that account not yet a wise man, but he nevertheless has the support of nature, so that it will be easier for him to become one more easily than others.

Generally speaking, it is not the intensity of a certain feeling that constitutes the affected state, but the lack of reflection in comparing this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of pleasure or displeasure). The rich person, whose servant clumsily breaks a beautiful and rare crystal goblet while carrying it around, would think nothing of this accident if, at the same moment, he were to compare this loss of *one pleasure*^b with the multitude of *all* the pleasures that his fortunate position as a rich man offers him. However, if he now gives himself over completely to this one feeling of pain (without quickly making that calculation in thought), then it is no wonder that, as a result, he feels as if his entire happiness were lost.

B. On the various affects themselves

§ 76. The feeling that urges the subject to **remain** in the state he is in is *agreeable*; but the one that urges him to **leave** it is *disagreeable*. Combined with consciousness, the former is called *enjoyment (voluptas)*, the latter the *lack of enjoyment (taedium)*. As affect the first feeling is called *joy*, the other *sadness*. – *Exuberant joy* (which is tempered by no concern about pain) and overwhelming sadness (which is alleviated by no unmitigated by any hope), *grief*, are affects that threaten life. Nevertheless, we can see from the register of deaths that more human beings have lost their lives suddenly due to exuberant joy than due to grief. For the mind gives itself over completely to *hope* as an affect, owing to the unexpected offering of the prospect of immeasurable good fortune, and so the affect rises to

the point of suffocation; on the other hand, continually fearful grief is naturally and always opposed by the mind, so that grief only kills slowly.

Fright is suddenly aroused fear that disconcerts the mind. Similar to fright is the *startling*,^a something that *puzzles* (though not yet *alarms*) us and arouses the mind to collect itself for reflection; it is the stimulus to *astonishment* (which already contains reflection in itself). This does not happen so easily to the experienced person; but it is proper for art to represent the usual from a point of view that will make it startling. *Anger* is fright that at the same time quickly stirs up powers to resist ill.^b Fear concerning an object that threatens an undetermined ill is *anxiety*. Anxiety can fasten on to someone without his knowing a particular object for it: an uneasiness arising from merely subjective causes (from a diseased state). *Shame* is anguish that comes from the worried contempt of a person who is *present* and, as such, it is an affect. Moreover, a person can also feel ashamed without the presence of the person before whom he is ashamed; however, then it is not an *affect* but, like grief, a *passion* for tormenting oneself persistently with contempt, but in vain; shame, on the other hand, as an affect, must occur suddenly.

Affects are^c generally diseased occurrences (symptoms) and can be divided (by an analogy with Brown's system)⁹⁵ into *sthenic* affects, which come from strength, and *asthenic* affects, which come from weakness. Sthenic affects are of such a nature as to *excite* the vital force, but in doing so they also often exhaust it as well; asthenic affects are of such a nature as to relax the vital force, but in doing so they often prepare for its recovery as well. – *Laughing* with affect is a *convulsive* cheerfulness. *Weeping* accompanies^d the *melting* sensation of a powerless wrath against fate or other human beings, like the sensation of an insult suffered from them; and this^e sensation is *wistfulness*. But both laughing and weeping^f cheer us up; for they are liberations from a hindrance to the vital force through their effusions (that is, we can laugh till we cry if we laugh till exhaustion). Laughing is *masculine*, weeping on the other hand is *female* (with men it is *effeminate*).^g And when tears glisten in a man's eyes, it is only his *being moved* to tears that can be forgiven, and this only if it comes from magnanimous but powerless sympathy with others' suffering, without letting the tears fall in drops, and still less if he accompanies them with sobs, thereby making a disgusting music.^h

7: 256

^a das *Auffallende*.

^b *Übel*.

^c H and A1: are; A2: can be.

^d A2: accompanies; H and A1: is.

^e A2: this; H and A1: the latter.

^f laughing and weeping not in H.

^g (with men . . . *effeminate*) not in H.

^h "when tears . . . a man's eyes" and "without letting . . . disgusting music" not in H.

^a ein *Enthusiasm* des guten Vorsatzes.

^b of *one* pleasure not in H.

On timidity and bravery^a

§ 77. Anxiety, anguish, horror, and terror are degrees of fear, that is, degrees of aversion to danger. The composure of the mind to take on fear with reflection is *courage*; the strength of inner sense (*Ataraxia*) through which we do not easily allow ourselves to be put in fear is *intrepidity*. Lack of courage is *cowardice*;^{*} lack of intrepidity is *shyness*.^b

Stout-hearted is he who does not become frightened; *courage* has he who in reflecting on danger does not yield; *brave* is he whose courage is *constant* in danger. *Foolhardy* is the reckless person who ventures into dangers because he does not recognize them. *Bold* is he who ventures into dangers although he is aware of them; *reckless*, he who places himself in the greatest danger at the obvious impossibility of achieving his end (like Charles XII at Bender).⁹⁶ The Turks call their brave men^c (who are perhaps brave through opium) *madmen*. – *Cowardice* is thus *dishonorable despair*.

Fright is not a *habitual* characteristic to easily be seized with fear, for this is called timidity; it is merely a *state* and accidental^d disposition, dependent for the most part merely on bodily causes, of feeling not prepared enough against a suddenly arising danger. When the unexpected approach of the enemy is announced to a commander who is in his dressing gown, this can easily stop the blood in the ventricles of the heart for an instant, and a certain general's physician noted that he was fainthearted and timid when he had acid indigestion. *Stout-heartedness*, however, is merely^e a quality of temperament. *Courage*, on the other hand, rests on principles and is a virtue. Reason then gives the resolute man strength that nature sometimes denies him. Being frightened in battle even produces salutary evacuations that have proverbially given rise to mockery (not having one's heart in the right place); but it has been noticed that

7: 257

* The word *poltroon* (derived from *pollex truncatus*) was rendered with *murcus* in later Latin and signified a human being who chops off his thumb in order not to be allowed to go to war. [Claudius Salmasius (1588–1653), French humanist and philologist, first created this etymology. However, the derivation is no longer accepted. On *murcus*, see also Ammianus Marcellinus 15.12.3. This note is not in H – Ed.]

^a *Tapferkeit.*

^b Marginal note in H: On vigorous and softening affects (tears, which provoke laughter) – On shame and audacity.

The feeling through which nature strives to maintain itself in exactly the same condition is agreeable; however, that through which it is driven to go beyond it is unpleasant. That which is neither of the two is indifferent.

Anger belongs to the faculty of desire.

Anger near *Hallucinatio*.

Affects stimulate the circulation of the blood.

^c *Braven.*

^d accidental not in H.

^e merely not in H.

those very sailors who at the call of combat hurry to their place of performance are afterwards the most courageous in battle. The same thing has also been noted in the heron when the falcon hovers over him and he prepares himself for battle against it.

Accordingly, *patience* is not courage. Patience is a feminine virtue; for it does not muster the force for resistance, but hopes to make suffering (enduring) imperceptible through habit. He who *cries out* under the surgeon's knife or under the pain of gout or stone is therefore not cowardly or weak in this condition; his cry is like cursing when one is out walking and bumps against a loose cobblestone (with one's big toe, from which the word *hallucinari* is derived)⁹⁷ – it is rather an outburst of anger in which nature endeavors to break up the constriction of blood in the heart through cries. – However, the Indians of America display a particular kind of patience: when they are encircled they throw away their weapons and, without begging for mercy, calmly let themselves be massacred. Now in doing this, do they show more courage than the Europeans, who in this situation defend themselves to the last man? To me it seems to be merely a barbaric conceit by means of which to preserve the honor of their tribe, so that their enemy could not force them to lament and groan as evidence of their submission.

However, courage as affect (consequently belonging in one respect to sensibility) can also be aroused by reason and thus be genuine bravery (strength of virtue).⁹⁸ If, in doing something worthy of honor, we do not allow ourselves to be intimidated by taunts and derisive ridicule of it, which is all the more dangerous when sharpened by wit, but instead pursue our own course steadfastly, we display a moral courage which many who show themselves as brave figures on the battlefield or in a duel do not possess. That is to say, to venture something that duty commands, even at the risk of being ridiculed by others, requires resoluteness, and even a high degree of courage; because *love of honor* is the constant companion of virtue, and he who is otherwise sufficiently prepared against *violence* seldom feels equal to ridicule if someone scornfully refuses this claim to honor.^a

The propriety which presents an external semblance of courage, so that one does not compromise one's respect in comparing oneself to others, is called *audacity*;^b it is the opposite of *timidity*, a kind of shyness and concern not to appear favorably in the eyes of others. – As reasonable^c

7: 258

^a “That is . . . to honor:” A2. In H and A1, this same sentence occurs after the next paragraph, but with the following opening phrase: “Finally, it also belongs to courage, which is purely moral, to venture something. . . .”

^b *Dreistigkeit.*

^c *billig.*

confidence in oneself, audacity cannot be reproached.^a But the kind of *audacity** in propriety that gives someone the semblance of not caring about the judgment of others concerning himself is *impudence*,^b impertinence, or, in milder terms, immodesty; it thus does not belong to courage in the moral sense of the term.

Whether suicide also presupposes courage, or always despondency only, is not a moral question but merely a psychological one.⁹⁹ If it is committed merely in order not to outlive one's honor, therefore out of *anger*, then it appears to be courage; however, if it is due to exhaustion of patience in suffering as a result of *sadness*, which slowly exhausts all patience, then it is an act of *despair*. It seems to be a kind of heroism to the human being to look death straight in the eye and not fear it, when he can no longer love life. But if, although he fears death, he still cannot stop loving life in all circumstances, so that in order to proceed to suicide a mental disorder stemming from anguish must precede, then he dies of cowardice, because he can no longer bear the agonies of life. – To a certain extent the manner of execution of the suicide allows this distinction of mental state to be recognized. If the chosen means are sudden and fatal without possible rescue, as in, for example, a pistol shot or a strong dose of mercury chloride (as a great king carried with him in war, in case he should be taken prisoner),¹⁰⁰ or deep water with one's pockets full of stones, then we cannot contest the courage of the person who has committed suicide. However, if the chosen means are a rope that can still be cut by others, or an ordinary poison that can be removed from his body by the physician, or a slit in the throat that can be sewn up again and healed – attempts in which the subject, when he is saved, is himself normally happy and never attempts it again – then it is cowardly despair from weakness, not vigorous despair, which still requires a strong frame of mind^c for such an act.

7: 259

* This word should really be written *Dräufigkeit* (from *dräuen* or *droben*), not *Dreistigkeit*; because the tone or expression of such a human being makes others fear that he could also be crude. In the same way we write *liederlich* for *lüderlich*, although the former signifies a careless, mischievous, but otherwise not useless, good-natured human being, whereas *lüderlich* signifies a depraved human being who disgusts everyone else (from the word *Luder*). [Neither of Kant's etymologies is accepted at present – Ed.]

^a Marginal note in H: The grotesque, the *gout baroc*, the *a la Grec*, and the *arabesque* are all a false taste.

In all affects the mind is moved by means of *futura consequentia*. Fear is also in all of them. However, not the affects of anger or shame.

Courage, which belongs to virtue (of bravery), occurs not merely in physical dangers or in those who died for external honors, but also in those who instead risked a little of the ridicule of others, and this is pure moral courage.

Knight Bayard Murcus.

^b *Dummdreistigkeit*.

^c *Stärke des Gemütsfassung*.

It is not always just depraved, worthless souls who decide to rid themselves of the burden of life in this manner; on the contrary, we need not fear that such people, who have no feeling for true honor, will easily perform an act of this kind. – Although suicide will always remain horrible, and though by committing it the human being makes himself into a monster, still it is noteworthy that in times of public and legally declared injustice during a revolutionary state of affairs (for example, the Public Welfare Committee of the French Republic), honor-loving men (for example, Roland)¹⁰¹ have sought to forestall execution by law through suicide, which in a constitutional state of affairs they themselves would have declared to be reprehensible. The reason for it is this: in every execution under a *law* there is something disgraceful, because it is *punishment*, and when the punishment is unjust, the man who falls victim to the law cannot acknowledge the punishment as one that is *deserved*. He proves it, however, owing to the fact that, having been doomed to death, he now prefers to choose death as a free human being and he inflicts it on *himself*. That is why tyrants (such as Nero) viewed it as a mark of favor to allow the condemned person to kill himself, because then it happened with more honor.^a – However, I do not desire to defend the morality of this.

The courage of the warrior is still quite different from that of the duellist, even if the government takes an indulgent view of *duelling*, though without making it publicly permissible by law, and the army makes it a matter of honor as, so to speak, self-defense against insult, in which the commander in chief does not interfere. – In adopting the terrible principle of winking at the duel, the head of state has not reflected on it properly; for there are also worthless people who risk their lives in order to count for something, and those who put their own life on the line for the preservation of the state are not at all meant here.

Bravery is courage *in conformity with law*; the courage, in doing what duty commands, not to shrink even from the loss of life. Fearlessness alone is of no consequence; rather, it must be joined with moral irreproachability (*mens conscientia recti*), as in Sir Bayard¹⁰² (*chevalier sans peur et sans reproche*).^b

^a Marginal note in H: Thirst for revenge (faculty of desire) is a weakness
Whether he who pales or blushes from anger is more dangerous?

One can also have a moral love of enjoyment as well as one of benevolence. However, the former can become enthusiastic. (Love of benevolence.) Affect of morality.

On the quantity of enthusiasm in religion, which, the higher it rises, the more it is purified of the sensible . . . in what is moral.

^b Translation of French: the knight without fear or blame. Translation of Latin: a mind that knows what is right.

On affects that weaken themselves with respect to their end (Impotentes animi motus)^a

§ 78. The affects of anger and shame have the peculiarity that they weaken themselves with respect to their end. They are suddenly^b aroused feelings of an evil^c in the form of an insult; however, because of their intensity they are at the same time unable to avert the evil.

Who is more to be feared, he who *turns pale* in intense anger, or he who *turns red* in this situation? The first is to be feared immediately; the second is all the more to be feared later (on account of his vindictiveness). In the first case, the disconcerted person is frightened of himself; frightened that he will be carried away by the intensity of his use of violence, which he might later regret. In the second case fright suddenly changes into fear that his consciousness of his inability to defend himself might become *visible*. – Neither affect is detrimental to health, if people are able to give vent to anger through the quick composure of the mind; but where this is not possible, then in part they are dangerous to life itself or, when their outbreak is restrained, in part they bequeath a rancor; that is, a mortification at not having responded in the proper way to an insult. Such rancor, however, is avoided if people can only have a chance to express the affects in words. But both affects are of the kind that make people speechless, and for this reason they present themselves in an unfavorable light.

It is true that *hot temper* can be diminished through inner discipline of the mind; but the weakness of an extremely delicate feeling of honor that manifests itself in shame does not allow itself to be removed so easily. For as *Hume* says¹⁰³ (who himself was affected by this weakness – shyness about speaking in public), if the first attempt at audacity fails, it only makes us more timid; and there is no other remedy but to start our intercourse with people whose judgment concerning propriety matters little to us, and gradually^d get away from the supposed importance of the judgment of others concerning us, and in this way inwardly to consider ourselves on an equal footing with them. The habit here produces *candor*, which is equally far removed from *shyness* and insulting *audacity*.

We sympathize with another person's *shame* insofar as it is painful to him, but we do not sympathize with his *anger* if he *tells* us with the affect of anger what provoked his anger; for while he is in such a state, the one who listens to his story (of an insult suffered) is himself not safe.^e

^a Trans.: the disabled movements of the mind.

^b A2: "The affects . . . suddenly." H and A1: "They are *anger* and *shame*. Suddenly . . ."

^c *ein Übel*.

^d Crossed out in H: gradually [to progress in dealings with him whose judgment is more significant, and thus further up to that of the most important person's more candid display of himself, which belongs to complete education. toward]

^e Marginal note in H: *ob futura consequential* [trans.: on account of what the consequences will be].

Surprise (confusion at finding oneself in an unexpected situation) at first impedes the natural play of thought and is therefore unpleasant; but later it promotes the influx of thought to the unexpected representation all the more and thus becomes an agreeable excitement of feeling. However, this affect is properly called *astonishment* only if we are thereby quite uncertain whether the perception takes place when we are awake or dreaming. A newcomer in the world is surprised at everything; but he who has become acquainted with the course of things through varied experience makes it a principle to be surprised at nothing (*nihil admirari*). On the other hand, he who thoughtfully and with a scrutinizing eye pursues the order of nature in its great variety falls into *astonishment* at a wisdom he did not expect: an admiration from which he cannot tear himself away (he cannot be surprised enough). However, such an affect is stimulated only by reason, and is a kind of sacred awe at seeing the abyss^f of the supersensible opening before one's feet.

On the affects by which nature promotes health mechanically

§ 79. Health is promoted mechanically by nature through several affects. *Laughing* and *crying* in particular belong here.^b Anger is also a fairly reliable aid to digestion, if one can scold freely (without fear of resistance), and many a housewife has no other emotional exercise^c than the scolding of her children and servants.^d Now if the children and servants only submit patiently to it, an agreeable tiredness of the vital force spreads itself uniformly through her body;^e however, this remedy is also not without its dangers, since she fears resistance by these members of the household.

Good-natured *laughing* (not malicious laughing combined with bitterness) is on the other hand more popular and more fruitful: namely,^f the kind of laughter that someone should have recommended to the Persian king who offered a prize to anyone "who would invent a new pleasure." – The jerky (nearly convulsive) exhaling of air attached to laughter (of which sneezing is only a small but enlivening effect, if its sound is allowed to go unrestrained) strengthens the feeling of vital force through the wholesome exercise of the diaphragm. It may be a hired jester (harlequin) who makes us laugh,^g or a sly wit belonging to our circle of friends, a wag who seems to have no mischief in mind and does not join in the laughter, but with seeming simplicity suddenly releases a tense anticipation (like a taut string). The resulting laughter is always

^a *Abgrund des Übersinnlichen*.

^b A2: Health . . . here. H and A1: They are *laughing* and *crying*.

^c *keine andere innigliche Motion*.

^d than . . . servants not in H.

^e *durch die Maschine*.

^f is . . . namely not in H.

^g who . . . laugh added in A2.

a shaking of the muscles involved in digestion, which promotes it far better than the physician's wisdom would do. Even a great absurdity of mistaken judgment can produce exactly the same effect, though at the expense of the allegedly cleverer man.*

7: 263

Weeping, an inhaling that occurs with (convulsive) sobs, when it is combined with an outburst of tears, is, as a soothing remedy, likewise a provision of nature for health; and a widow who, as one says, refuses to allow herself to be comforted – that is, who does not want the flow of tears to be stopped – is taking care of her health without knowing it or really wanting to. Anger, which might arise in this situation, would quickly check the flood of tears, but to her detriment; although not only sadness but also anger can bring women and children to tears. – For *their feeling of powerlessness* against an evil, together with a strong affect (be it anger or sadness), calls upon the assistance of external natural signs which then (according to the right of the weaker) at least disarm a masculine soul. However, this expression of tenderness, as a weakness of the sex, must not move the sympathetic *man* to shedding tears, though it may well bring tears to his eyes; for in the first case he would violate^a his own sex and thus with his femininity not be able to serve as protector for the weaker sex, and in the second case he would not show the sympathy toward the other sex that his masculinity makes his duty – the duty, namely, of taking the other sex under his protection as befits the character that books of chivalry attribute to the brave man, which consists precisely in this protection.

* Many examples of this latter point could be given. But I shall cite only one, which I heard from the lips of the late Countess of K – g, a lady who was a credit to her sex. [Countess Charlotte Amalie von Keyserling (1729–91). Kant was a frequent dinner guest at her estate – Ed.] Count *Sagamoso*, who had been commissioned to establish the Order of the Knights of Malta in Poland (of Ostrogothic appointment), visited her, and by chance a schoolmaster appeared on the scene who was a native of Königsberg and was visiting his relatives in Prussia, but who had been brought to Hamburg as organizer and curator of the natural history collection that some rich merchants kept as their hobby. In order to talk to him about something, the Count spoke in broken German: "Ick abe in Amburg eine Ant geabt (ich habe in Hamburg eine Tante gehabt); aber die ist mir gestorben" [I have an aunt in Hamburg, but she is dead – Ed.] The schoolmaster immediately seized the word *Ant* and asked: "Why didn't you have her skinned and stuffed?" He took the English word *aunt*, which means *Tante*, for *Ente* [duck – Ed.] and, because it occurred to him that it must have been a very rare specimen, deplored the great loss. One can imagine what laughter this misunderstanding must have caused.

Marginal note in H: I refrain here from the examples, but xx.

Deep sigh.

Sagamoso

3. the hieroglyphic, mysterious, intimating (*a la Grecque*)

4. that which is seen in a dream (*arabesque*), both of them at the edges.

^a *sich an seinem eigenen Geschlecht vergreifen*.

But why do young people prefer *tragic drama* and also prefer to perform it when they want to give their parents a treat; whereas old people prefer *comedy*, even burlesque? The reason for the former is in part exactly the same as the one that moves children to risk danger: presumably, by an instinct of nature to test their powers. But it is also partly because, given the frivolity of youth, no melancholy is left over from the distressing and terrifying impressions the moment the play has ended, but rather there is only a pleasant tiredness after vigorous internal exercise, which puts them once again in a cheerful mood.^a On the other hand, with old people these impressions are not so easily blotted out, and they cannot bring back the cheerful mood in themselves so easily. By his antics a nimble-witted harlequin produces a beneficial shaking of their diaphragm and intestines, by which their appetite for the ensuing social supper is whetted, and thrives as a result of the lively conversation.^b

General remark

Certain internal physical feelings are *related* to the affects, but they are not themselves affects because they are only momentary, transitory, and leave no trace of themselves behind: the *shuddering* that comes over children when they listen at night to their nurses' ghost stories is like this. – *Shivering*, as if one were being doused with cold water (as in a rain-storm), also belongs here. Not the perception of danger, but the mere thought of danger – though one knows that none is present – produces this sensation, which, when it is merely a moment of fright and not an outbreak of it, seems not to be disagreeable.

7: 264

Dizziness and even *seasickness*¹⁰⁴ seem to belong, according to their cause, to the class of such imaginary dangers.^c One can advance without tottering on a board that is lying on the ground; but if it lies over an abyss or, for someone with weak nerves, merely over a ditch, then the empty apprehension of danger often becomes really dangerous. The rolling of a ship even in a mild wind is an alternate sinking and being lifted up. With the sinking there occurs the effort of nature to raise itself (because all sinking generally carries the representation of danger with it); consequently the up and down movement of the stomach and intestines is connected mechanically with an impulse to vomit, which is then intensified when the patient looks out of the cabin window, catching alternate glimpses of the sky and the sea, whereby the illusion that the seat is giving way under him is even further heightened.

^a *zur Fröhlichkeit stimmt*.

^b *Marginal note in H*: Striking, the remarkable, what puzzles, what excites the attention as unexpected and in which one cannot immediately find oneself, is an inhibition with an outpouring following thereafter.

^c *ideale Gefahren*.

An actor who is himself unmoved, but otherwise possesses understanding and a strong faculty of the power of imagination, can often stir others more by an affected (artificial) affect than by the real one. In the presence of his beloved, a serious lover is embarrassed, awkward, and not very captivating. But a man who merely *pretends* to be in love and has talent can play his role so naturally that he gets the poor, deceived girl completely into his trap, just because his heart is unaffected and his head is clear; consequently he is in full possession of the free use of his skill and power to imitate the appearance^a of a lover very naturally.

7: 265

Good-natured (openhearted) laughter is *sociable* (insofar as it belongs to the emotion of cheerfulness); malicious (sneering) laughter is *hostile*. The distracted person (like Terrasson¹⁰⁵ entering solemnly with his night cap instead of his wig on his head and his hat under his arm, full of the quarrel concerning the superiority of the ancients and the moderns with respect to the sciences)^b often gives rise to the first type of laughter; he is *laughed at*, but still not *ridiculed*.^c We smile at the intelligent *eccentric*, but it doesn't cost him anything; he joins in the laughter. – A mechanical (spiritless) laughter is insipid and makes the social gathering tasteless. He who never laughs at all at a social gathering is either sullen or pedantic. Children, especially girls, must be accustomed early to frank and unrestrained smiling, because the cheerfulness of their facial features gradually leaves a mark within and establishes a *disposition* to cheerfulness, friendliness, and sociability, which is an early preparation for this approximation to the virtue of benevolence.

A good-natured and at the same time cultivated way of stimulating a social gathering is to have someone in it as the butt of our wit (to pull his leg) without being caustic (to mock him without being offensive), provided that he is prepared to reply in kind with his own wit, thus bringing a cheerful laughter into the group. But if this happens at the expense of a simpleton whom one tosses to another like a ball, then the laughter is unrefined, to put it mildly, because it is gloating over his misfortune; and if it happens to a parasite who for the sake of revelry abandons himself to the mischievous game or allows himself to be made a fool of, then it is a proof of bad taste as well as obtuse moral feeling on the part of those who can burst out laughing about this. However, the position of a court jester, whose function is to tease the king's distinguished servants and thus season the meal through laughter for the sake of the beneficial shaking of his diaphragm, is, depending on how one takes it, *above* or *below* all criticism.

On the passions^a

§ 80. The subjective possibility of the emergence of a certain desire, which precedes the representation of its object, is *propensity* (*propensio*); – the inner necessitation of the faculty of desire to take possession of this object before one even knows it, is *instinct* (like the sexual instinct, or the parental instinct of the animal to protect its young, and so forth). – A sensible desire that serves the subject as a rule (habit) is called *inclination* (*inclinatio*). – Inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the sum of all inclinations in respect to a certain choice is *passion* (*passio animi*).

Since passions can be paired with the calmest reflection, it is easy to see that they are not thoughtless,^b like affects, nor stormy and transitory; rather, they take root and can even co-exist with rationalizing. – It is also easy to see that they do the greatest damage to freedom, and if affect is *drunkenness*, then passion is an *illness* that abhors all medicine, and it is therefore far worse than all those transitory emotions^c that at least stir up the resolution to be better; instead, passion is an enchantment that also refuses recuperation.

7: 266

One uses the term *mania* to designate passion (mania for honor, revenge, dominance, and so on), except for the passion of love, when it is not a case of *being in love*. The reason is that once the latter desire has been satisfied (by enjoyment), the desire, at least with regard to the very person involved, also stops. So one can list being passionately in love [among the passions] (as long as the other party persists in refusal), but one cannot list any physical love as passion, because it does not contain a *constant principle* with respect to its object. Passion always presupposes a maxim on the part of the subject, to act according to an end prescribed to him by his inclination. Passion is therefore always connected with his reason, and one can no more attribute passion to mere animals than to pure rational beings. The manias for honor, revenge, and so forth, just because they are never completely satisfied, are therefore counted among the passions as illnesses for which there is only a palliative remedy.

§ 81. Passions are cancerous sores for pure practical reason, and for the most part they are incurable because the sick person does not want to be cured and flees from the dominion of principles, by which alone a cure could occur. In the sensibly practical too,^d reason goes from the general to the particular according to the principle: not to please one inclination by placing all the rest in the shade or in a dark corner, but rather to see to it that it can exist together with the totality of *all* inclinations. – The *ambition* of a human being may always be an inclination whose direction is approved by reason; but the ambitious person nevertheless also wants

^a H and A1: On the faculty of desire.^b unbesonnen.^c vorübergehende Gemütsbewegungen.^d auch im Sinnlich-Praktischen.^a Schein.^b full . . . sciences not in H.^c ridiculed: ausgelacht; laughed at: belacht.

7: 267

to be loved by others, he needs pleasant social intercourse with others, the maintenance of his financial position, and the like. However, if he is a *passionately* ambitious person, then he is blind to these ends, though his inclinations still summon him to them, and he overlooks completely the risk he is running that he will be hated by others, or avoided in social intercourse, or impoverished through his expenditures. It is folly (making *part* of one's end the *whole*), which directly contradicts the formal principle of reason itself.

That is why passions are not, like affects, merely *unfortunate^a* states of mind full of many ills, but are without exception *evil* as well. And the most good-natured desire, even when it aims at what (according to matter) belongs to virtue, for example, beneficence, is still (according to form) not merely *pragmatically* ruinous but also *morally* reprehensible, as soon as it turns into passion.

Affect does a momentary damage to freedom and dominion over oneself. Passion abandons them and finds its pleasure and satisfaction in a slavish mind. But because reason still does not ease off with its summons to inner freedom, the unhappy man groans in his chains, which he nevertheless cannot break away from because they have already grown together with his limbs, so to speak.

Nevertheless, the passions have also found their eulogists¹⁰⁶ (for where are they not found, once maliciousness has taken its seat among principles?), and it is said that "nothing great has ever been accomplished in the world without intense passions, and that Providence itself has wisely planted passions in human nature just like elastic springs."¹⁰⁷ – Concerning the many *inclinations*, it may readily be admitted that those of a natural and animal need are ones that living nature (even that of the human being) cannot do without. But Providence has not willed that inclinations might, indeed even should, become *passions*. And while we may excuse a poet for presenting them from this point of view (that is, for saying with Pope:¹⁰⁸ "If reason is a magnet, then the passions are the wind"), the philosopher must not accept this principle, not even in order to praise the passions as a provisional arrangement of Providence, which would have intentionally placed them in human nature until the human race had reached the proper degree of culture.

Division of the passions

The^b passions are divided into passions of *natural* (innate) inclination and passions of inclination that result from human *culture* (acquired).

^a *unglücklich*.

^b Crossed out in H: The [are according to the chief classification A.) those of external *freedom*, therefore a passion of negative enjoyment, B.) those of *capacity*, therefore passion of positive enjoyment either a.) of the <physically> real concerning the senses or b.) of the ideal in mere possession of the means to this or that enjoyment.]

7: 268

The passions of the first kind are the *inclinations of freedom and sex*, both of which are connected with affect. Those of the second kind are the *manias for honor, dominance, and possession*, which are not connected with the impetuosity of an affect but with the persistence of a maxim established for certain ends. The former can be called *inflamed passions (passiones ardentes)*; the latter, like avarice, *cold passions (frigidae)*. All passions, however, are always only desires directed by human beings to human beings, not to things; and while we can indeed have great inclination toward the utilization of a fertile field or a productive cow, we can have no *affection* for them (which consists in the inclination toward *community* with others), much less a passion.

A. On the inclination to freedom as a passion

§ 82. For the natural human being this is the most violent^a inclination of all, in a condition where he cannot avoid making reciprocal claims on others.

Whoever is able to be happy only according to *another* person's choice (no matter how benevolent this other person may be) rightly feels that he is unhappy. For what guarantee has he that his powerful fellow human being's judgment about his well-being will agree with his own? The savage (not yet habituated to submission) knows no greater misfortune than to have this befall him, and rightly so, as long as no public law protects him until the time when discipline has gradually made him patient in submission. Hence his state of continuous warfare, by which he intends to keep others as far away from him as possible and to live scattered in the wilderness. Even the child who has just wrenched itself from the mother's womb seems to enter the world with loud cries, unlike all other animals, simply because it regards the inability to make use of its limbs as *constraint*, and thus it immediately announces its claim to freedom (a representation^b that no other animal has).* – Nomadic

* *Lucretius*, as a poet, interprets this indeed remarkable phenomenon in the animal kingdom differently:

Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut aequumst

Cui tantum in vita restet transire malorum!

[Trans.: And fills the air with lamenting cries As it befits someone who still has to go through so much evil in his life.

De rerum natura v 227f. – Ed.]

Now the newborn child certainly cannot have this perspective; but the fact that his feeling of uncomfortableness is not due to bodily pain but to an obscure idea (or a representation analogous to it) of freedom and its hindrance, *injustice*, is disclosed a few months later after the birth by the *tears* which accompany his screaming; they indicate a kind of exasperation when he strives to approach certain objects or in general merely strives to change his position and feels himself hindered in it. – This (*continued on page 370*)

^a natural human being: *Naturmensch*; most violent: *beftigste*.

^b *Vorstellung* (here, perhaps "idea").

7: 269 peoples, for example, the Arabs, since they (like pastoral peoples) are not attached to any land, cling so strongly to their way of life, even though it is not entirely free of constraint, and moreover they are so high-spirited, that they look with contempt on *settled* peoples, and the hardship that is inseparable from their way of life has not been able to dissuade them from it in thousands of years. Mere hunting peoples (like the *Oleni-Tungusi*)¹⁰⁹ have really ennobled themselves by this feeling of freedom (which has separated them from other tribes related to them). – Thus it is not only the concept of freedom under moral laws that arouses an affect, which is called enthusiasm,^a but the mere sensible representation of outer freedom heightens the inclination to persist in it or to extend it into a violent passion,^b by analogy with the concept of right.^c

7: 270 With mere animals, even the most violent inclination (for example, the inclination to sexual union) is not called passion: because they have no reason, which alone establishes the concept of freedom and with which passion comes into collision. Accordingly, the outbreak of passion can be attributed to the human being. – It is said of human beings that they love certain things *passionately* (drinking, gambling, hunting) or hate them passionately (for example, musk or brandy). But one does not exactly call these various inclinations or disinclinations so many passions, because they are^d only so many different instincts; that is, only so many different states of *mere passivity* in the faculty of desire, and they deserve to be classified, not according to the objects of the faculty of desire as *things* (which are innumerable), but rather according to the principle of the use or abuse that human beings make of their person and of their freedom under each other, when one human being makes another a mere means

(continued from page 369) impulse to have his own way and to take any obstacle to it as an affront is marked particularly by his tone, and manifests a maliciousness that the mother finds necessary to punish, but he usually replies with still louder shrieking. The same thing happens when the child falls through his own fault. The young of other animals play, those of the human being quarrel early with each other, and it is as if a certain concept of justice (which relates to external freedom) develops along with their animality, and is not something to be learned gradually.

^a Enthusiasm.

^b Crossed out in H: passion B The inclination toward possession of the capacity in general without using it is also passion. [One can love or hate something passionately, but merely through instinct, where understanding adds nothing, as with love of the fair sex; but then the inclination is directed not to the species of the object but merely to the individual <instead>, and cannot be considered passion according to type and objective, but is merely called subjective inclination. – On the other hand if the inclination is directed merely to the means and possession of the same toward satisfaction of all inclinations in general, therefore toward mere capacity, it can only be called a passion.]

^c A2: by . . . right; H and A1: through habit.

^d Crossed out in H: are [and only concern the feeling of pleasure and displeasure directly, on the other hand under passion, where the things required].

to his ends. – Passions actually are directed only to human beings and can also only be satisfied by them.

These passions are the *manias for honor, for dominance, and for possession*.

Since passions are inclinations that aim merely at the possession of the means for satisfying all inclinations which are concerned directly with the end, they have, in this respect, the appearance of reason; that is, they aspire to the idea of a faculty connected with freedom, by which alone ends in general can be attained. Possessing the means to *whatever* aims one chooses certainly extends much further than the inclination directed to one single inclination and its satisfaction. – Therefore they can also be called inclinations of delusion, which delusion consists in valuing the mere opinion of others regarding the worth of things as equal to their real worth.^a

B. On the desire for vengeance^b as a passion

§ 83. Passions can only be inclinations directed by human beings to human beings, insofar as they are directed to ends that harmonize or conflict with one another, that is, insofar as they are love or hatred. But the concept of right, because it follows directly from the concept of outer freedom, is a much more important and strongly moving impulse to the will than benevolence. So hatred arising from an injustice we have suffered, that is, the *desire for vengeance*, is a passion that follows irresistibly from the nature of the human being, and, malicious as it may be, maxims of reason are nevertheless interwoven with the inclination by virtue of the permissible *desire for justice*, whose analogue it is. This is why the desire for vengeance is one of the most violent and deeply rooted passions; even when it seems to have disappeared, a secret hatred, called *rancor*,^c is always left over, like a fire smoldering under the ashes.^d

The *desire* to be in a state^e and relation with one's fellow human beings such that each can have the share that justice allots him is certainly no passion, but only a determining ground of free choice through pure practical reason. But the *excitability* of this desire through mere self-love,

7: 271

^a Marginal note in H: The capacity to need the power of others for one's purposes.

^b H and A1: Justice.

^c Groll.

^d Marginal note in H: Passion is the receptivity of the inner compulsion of a human being through his own inclination in adherence to his ends.

To be sure, passions therefore presuppose to be sure a sensible but nevertheless also a counteracting rational faculty of desire (they are therefore not applicable to mere animals), except that inclination in the former takes away pure practical reason, in the latter domination, taking possession of maxims either in respect to one's ends or the use of means toward them. To love or hate passionately. Unnaturalness and vindictiveness.

All passions are directed by human beings only to human beings, in order to use them for one's purposes or also in . . .

^e H: such a state.

that is, just for one's own advantage, not for the purpose of legislation for everyone, is the sensible impulse of hatred, hatred not of injustice, but rather against *he who is unjust* to us. Since this inclination (to pursue and destroy) is based on an idea, although admittedly the idea is applied selfishly, it transforms the desire for justice against the offender into the passion for retaliation, which is often violent to the point of madness, leading a man to expose himself to ruin if only his enemy does not escape it, and (in blood vengeance) making this hatred hereditary even between tribes, because, it is said, the blood of someone offended but not yet avenged *cries out* until the innocently spilled blood has once again been washed away with blood – even if this blood should be one of the offending man's innocent descendants.

C. On the inclination toward the capacity of having influence in general over other human beings^a

§ 84. This inclination comes closest to technically practical reason, that is, to the maxim of prudence. – For getting other human beings' inclinations into one's power, so that one can direct and determine them according to one's intentions, is almost the same as *possessing* others as mere tools of one's will. No wonder that the striving after such a *capacity* becomes a passion.

This capacity contains as it were a threefold power in itself: *honor*, *authority*, and *money*, through which, if one is in possession of them, one can get to every human being and use him according to his purposes, if not by means of one of these influences, then by means of another. – The inclinations for this, if they become passions, are the *manias for honor*, *for domination*, and *for possession*. It is true that here the human being becomes the dupe (the deceived) of his own inclinations, and in his use of such means he misses his final end; but here we are not speaking of *wisdom*, which admits of no passions at all, but only of *prudence*, by which one can manage fools.

However, the passions in general, as violent as they may be as sensible incentives, are still sheer *weaknesses* in view of what reason prescribes to the human being.^b Therefore the clever man's capacity to use the passions for his purposes may be proportionately smaller, the greater the passion is that dominates other human beings.

Mania for honor is the weakness of human beings which enables a person to have influence on them through their *opinion*; *mania for domination*, through their *fear*; and *mania for possession*, through their own *interest*. – Each is a slavish disposition by means of which another person, when he has taken possession of it, has the capacity to use a person's own

inclinations for his purposes. – But consciousness of having this capacity and of possessing the means to satisfy one's inclinations stimulates the passion even more than actually using it does.

a. THE MANIA FOR HONOR § 85. *Mania for honor* is not *love of honor*, an esteem that the human being is permitted to expect from others because of his inner (moral) worth; rather it is striving after the *reputation of honor*, where semblance^a suffices. Here arrogance is permitted (an unjustified demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us, a foolishness that acts contrary to its own end) – this arrogance, I say, needs only to be *flattered*, and one already has control over the fool by means of this passion. Flatterers,* the yes-men who gladly concede high-sounding talk to an important man, nourish this passion that makes him weak, and are the ruin of the great and powerful who abandon themselves to this spell.

Arrogance is an inappropriate desire for honor that acts contrary to its own end, and cannot be regarded as an intentional means of using other human beings (whom it repels) for one's ends; rather the arrogant man is an instrument of rogues, and is called a fool. Once a very intelligent and upright merchant asked me: "Why is the arrogant person always base as well?" (He had known from experience that the man who boasted with his wealth as a superior commercial power later, upon the decline of his fortune, did not hesitate to grovel.) My opinion was this: that, since arrogance is the unjustified demand on another person that he *despise* himself in comparison to others, such a thought cannot enter the head of anyone except one who feels ready to debase himself, and that arrogance itself already supplies a never-deceiving, foreboding sign of the baseness of such human beings.¹¹⁰

b. THE MANIA FOR DOMINATION This passion is intrinsically unjust, and its manifestation summons everything against it. It starts, however, from the fear of being dominated by others, and is then soon intent on placing the advantage of force over them; which is nevertheless a precarious and unjust means of using other human beings for one's own purposes: in part it is *imprudent* because it arouses opposition, and in part it is *unjust* because it is contrary to freedom under law, to which everyone can lay claim. – As concerns the *indirect* art of domination, for example,

* The word *Schmeichler* [flatterer – Ed.] was originally supposed to be *Schmiegler* (one who bows and scrapes before people), in order to lead at will a conceited powerful person through his arrogance; just as the word *Heuchler* [hypocrite – Ed.] (actually it should be written *Häuchler*) [breather – Ed.] should have designated a deceiver who feigns his *false humility* before a powerful clergyman by means of *deep sighs* mixed with his speech. [Marginal note in H: Arrogance is base bowing and scraping. Valiant passion.]

^a *Schein*.

^a *H:* as a passion.

^b Marginal note in H: The capacity in itself, possession of means increases more the passion than the use of it: it is agreeable for oneself.

that of the female sex by means of love which she inspires in the male sex, in order to use him for her purposes, it is not included under this title; for it does not employ force, but knows how to dominate and bind its subject through his own inclination. – Not that the female part of our species is free from the inclination to dominate the male part (exactly the opposite is true), but it does not use the same *means* for this purpose as the male part, that is, it does not use the advantage of *strength* (which is here what is meant by the word *dominate*); but rather the advantage of *charm*, which comprehends an inclination of the other part to be dominated.^a

7: 274

c. THE MANIA FOR POSSESSION Money is the solution, and all doors that are closed to the man of lesser wealth open to him whom Plutus favors. The invention of this means, which does not have (or at least should not have) any use other than that of serving merely as a means for the exchange of human beings' industry, and with it however everything that is also physically good among them, has, especially after it was represented by metal, brought forth a mania for possession which finally, even without enjoyment in the mere possession, and even with the renunciation (of the miser) to make any use of it, contains a power that people believe satisfactorily replaces the lack of every other power. This passion is, if not always morally reprehensible, completely banal,^b is cultivated merely mechanically, and is attached especially to old people (as a substitute for their natural incapacity). On account of the great influence of this universal means of exchange it has also secured the name of a *faculty* purely and simply, and it is a passion such that, once it has set in, no modification is possible. And if the first of the three passions makes one *hated*, the second makes one *feared*, and the third makes one *despised*.*

* Contempt is here to be understood in the moral sense; for in a civil sense, if it turns out to be true, as Pope says, that "the devil, in a golden rain of fifty to a hundred falls into the lap of the usurer and takes possession of his soul," the masses on the contrary *admire* the man who shows such great business acumen. [See Pope, *Moral Essays* (3), "Of the Uses of Riches," lines 369–74 in *The Poetical Works* (New York: Worthington, 1884), p. 252 – Ed.]

Crossed out in H: despised [Division On the <formal> natural inclinations (of propensity) that are incurred in comparison with the <material inclinations (of impulse)> (those of habituation and imitation)] Division On formal inclination in the <use> play of vital power in general.

They are 1. inclination to enjoyment in general, 2. to occupation in general, 3. to leisureliness.

(continued on page 375)

^a Not . . . dominated not in *H*.^b ganz geistlos.^c *Vermögen*. This word can also mean fortune, means, wealth, substance. Kant may be playing on these multiple meanings here.*On the inclination of delusion as a passion*

§ 86. By delusion, as an incentive of desires, I understand the inner practical illusion of taking what is subjective in the motivating cause for objective. – From time to time nature wants the stronger stimulations of passion in order to regenerate the activity of the human being, so that he does not lose the feeling of life completely in mere *enjoyment*. To this end it has very wisely and beneficently simulated objects for the naturally lazy human being, which according to his imagination are real ends (ways of acquiring honor, control, and money). These objects give the person who is reluctant to undertake any *work*^d enough to *keep him occupied* and *busy doing nothing*, so that the interest which he takes in them is an interest of mere delusion. And nature therefore really is playing with the human being and spurring him (the subject) to its ends; while he stands convinced (objectively) that he has set his own end. – These inclinations of delusion, just because fantasy is a self-creator in them, are apt to become *passionate* in the highest degree, especially when they are applied to *competition* among human beings.

The games of the boy in hitting a ball, wrestling, running, playing soldier; later on the games of the man in playing chess and cards (where in the first activity the mere advantage of the understanding is intended, in the second also plain profit); finally, the games of the citizen, who tries his luck in public gatherings with faro or dice – taken together, they are unknowingly the spurs of a wiser nature to daring deeds, to test human beings' powers in competition with others; actually so that their vital

(continued from page 374)

a. Because I abstract here from the object of desire (of matter), the aversion of nature to an *emptiness* in the feeling of its existence, that is, *boredom*, is by itself enough of an impulse for every cultivated human being to fill up this emptiness. – The desire for continuous enjoyment, be it physical or even aesthetic (where it is called luxury), is a luxurious living which is at the same time an erosion of life, where one becomes hungrier the more one enjoys it. (n. This is true also of the aimless mania for reading.)

b. *Occupation* during *leisure*, which is therefore not called business but *play*, and which aims at victory in conflict with others, contains an incentive to maximal stimulation of inclinations; even if this does not aim at acquisition (without interested intention). However, in *gambling* this is often intensified into the most violent passion; while [the refinement of qualities of intercourse is pretended calmness and even polite behavior in order to hide skillfully the inner raging fury. And the ruined person tries to put on a good face while he is taken advantage of.

It is not easy to explain why games of chance exert such a strong fascination among civilized and uncivilized peoples (Chinese and American savages). However, it is even more difficult to explain it as a way to maintain social intercourse, or indeed to explain how it is valued as promoting humanity. – People with unclear concepts: hunters, fisherman, perhaps also sailors, are first and foremost common lottery players and are on the whole superstitious.]

^d *Geschäft*.

7: 275

force in general is preserved from weakening and kept active. Two such contestants believe they are playing with each other; in fact, however, nature plays with both of them – which reason can clearly convince them about, if they consider how badly the means chosen by them suit their end. – But the well-being they feel while stimulated in this way, because it is closely related to ideas of illusion (though ill-construed), is for this very reason the cause of a propensity to the most violent and long-lasting passion.*

Inclinations of illusion make weak human beings superstitious and superstitious human beings weak; that is, inclined to expect interesting results from circumstances that cannot be *natural causes* (something to fear or hope for). Hunters, fishermen, gamblers too (especially in lotteries) are superstitious, and the illusion that leads to the *delusion* of taking the subjective for the objective, the voice of inner sense for knowledge of the thing itself, also makes the propensity to superstition comprehensible.

7: 276

On the highest physical good

§ 87. The greatest sensuous enjoyment, which is not accompanied by any admixture of loathing^a at all, is *resting after work*, when one is in a healthy state. – In this state, the propensity to rest without having first worked is *laziness*. – Nevertheless, a somewhat long refusal to go back again to one's *business*, and the sweet *far niente*^b for the purpose of collecting one's powers, is not yet laziness: for (even in play) one can be *occupied* agreeably and usefully at the same time, and even changing the type of work according to its specific nature is a varied recreation; on the other hand it takes considerable determination to return to a piece of hard work that has been left unfinished.

Among the three vices: *laziness*, *cowardice*, and *duplicity*, the first appears to be the most contemptible. But in this judging of laziness, one can often do much wrong to a human being. For nature has also wisely placed the aversion to continuous work in many a subject, an instinct that is beneficial both to the subject as well as to others, because, for example, man cannot stand any prolonged or frequently repeated expenditure of power without exhaustion, but needs certain pauses for recreation. Not without reason *Demetrius*^{III} therefore also could have allotted an altar to this demon (*laziness*); for, if *laziness* did not intervene, *indefatigable*

* A man in Hamburg, who had gambled away a considerable fortune there, now spent his time watching the players. Someone asked him how he felt when he remembered that he once had such a fortune. The man replied: "If I had it again, I would still not know how to use it in a more agreeable way."

^a *Ekel*.

^b Trans.: doing nothing. ("For . . . powers" not in H.)

malice would commit far more ill in the world than it does now; if *cowardice* did not take pity on human beings, militant blood-thirst would soon wipe them out; and if there were no *duplicity* then, because of the innate malice of human nature, entire states would soon be overthrown [for among the many scoundrels united in conspiracy in great number (for example, in a regiment), there will always be one who will betray it].

The strongest impulses of nature are *love of life* and *sexual love*, which represent the invisible reason (of the ruler of the world) that provides generally for the highest physical good^a of the human race by means of a power higher than human reason, without human reason having to work toward it. Love of life is to maintain the individual; sexual love, the species. For by means of the general mixing of the sexes, the life of our species endowed with reason is *progressively* maintained, despite the fact that this species intentionally works toward its own destruction (by war).^b Nevertheless, this does not prevent rational creatures, who grow constantly in culture even in the midst of war, from representing unequivocally the prospect of a state of happiness for the human race in future centuries, a state which will never again regress.^c

7: 277

On the highest moral-physical good

§ 88. The two kinds of good, the *physical* and the *moral*, cannot be *mixed* together; for then they would neutralize themselves and not work at all toward the end of true happiness. Rather, inclination to *good living* and *virtue* conflict with each other, and the limitation of the principle of the former through the latter constitute, in their collision, the entire end of the well-behaved^d human being, a being who is partly sensible but partly moral and intellectual. But since it is difficult to prevent mixing in practice, the end of happiness needs to be broken down by counteracting agents (*reagentia*) in order to know which elements in what proportion can provide, when they are combined, the enjoyment of a *moral happiness*.

^a *das physische Weltbeste*.

^b Marginal note in H: To be sure not a higher level of humanity, as with the Americans, also not to a specifically different one – rather, to a greater humanization *humanisatio*.

Is humanity comprehended in perpetual progress to perfection? Is the human species becoming increasingly better or worse, or does it remain with the same moral content?

From the time the child is in the arms of its nurse until old age, the proportion of cunning, deception, and evil is always the same.

The answer to the question, whether war shall be or not, is [?] continually determined by the highest persons in power.

The highest level of culture is when the state of war between peoples is in equilibrium, and the means to this is the question of who among them shall inquire whether war shall be or not.

^c *nicht mehr rückgängig sein wird*.

^d *wohlgeartet*.

The way of thinking characteristic of the union of good living with virtue in *social intercourse* is *humanity*. What matters here is not the degree of good living, since one person requires much, another little, depending on what seems to him to be necessary. Rather, what matters is only the kind of relationship whereby the inclination to good living is limited by the law of virtue.

Sociability is also a virtue, but the *social inclination* often becomes a passion. If, however, social enjoyment is boastfully heightened by extravagance, then this false sociability ceases to be virtue and is a good living^a that is detrimental to humanity.

7: 278

Music, dance, and games^b form a speechless social gathering (for the few words necessary for play establish no conversation, which requires a mutual exchange of thoughts). Games, which some pretend should merely serve to fill the void of conversation after the meal, are after all usually the main thing: a means of acquisition whereby affects are vigorously stirred, where a certain convention of self-interest is established so that the players can plunder each other with the greatest politeness, and where a complete egoism is laid down as a principle that no one denies as long as the game lasts. Despite all the culture these manners^c may bring about, such conversation hardly promises really to promote the union of social good living with virtue, and so it hardly promises to promote true humanity.

The good living that still seems to harmonize best with true humanity is *a good meal in good company* (and if possible, also alternating company). Chesterfield¹¹² says that the company must not number fewer than the *graces* or more than the *muses*.*

When I manage a dinner party composed of nothing but men of taste (asthetically united),^d insofar as they intend not merely to have a meal in

* Ten at a table; because the host, who serves the guests, does not count himself along with them.

[†] At a festive table, where the presence of ladies by itself restricts men's freedom within the bounds of good manners, sometimes a sudden silence sets in which is unpleasant because it threatens the company with boredom, and no one trusts himself to introduce something new and appropriate for the resumption of the conversation – he cannot pull it out of thin air, but rather should get it from the news of the day; however, it must be interesting. A single person, particularly the hostess, can often prevent this standstill all by herself and keep the conversation flowing so that, as at a concert, it ends with universal and complete gaiety and, because of this, is all the more beneficial. It is like Plato's symposium, of which the guest said: "Your meals are pleasing not only when one enjoys them, but also as often as one thinks of them." [The reference is not to Plato's *Symposium*, but probably to an anecdote from Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 10.14 – Ed.]

^a ein Wohlleben.

^b Spiel.

^c H and A1: fine manners.

7: 279

common but to enjoy one another's company (this is why their number cannot amount to many more than the number of graces), this little dinner party must have the purpose not only of physical satisfaction – which each guest can have by himself alone – but also social enjoyment, for which physical enjoyment must seem to be only the vehicle. That number is just enough to keep the conversation from slackening or the guests from dividing into separate small groups with those sitting next to them.^e The latter situation is not at all a conversation of taste, which must always bring culture with it, where each always talks with all (not merely with his neighbor). On the other hand, so-called festive entertainments (feasts and grand banquets) are altogether tasteless. It goes without saying that in all dinner parties, even one at an inn, whatever is said publicly by an indiscreet table companion to the detriment of someone absent may not be used *outside* this party and may not be gossiped about. For even without making a special agreement about it, any such symposium has a certain holiness and a duty of secrecy about it with respect to what could later cause inconvenience, outside the group, to its members; for without this trust, the healthy enjoyment of moral culture within a social gathering and the enjoyment of this social gathering itself would be denied. – Therefore, if something derogatory were said about my best friend in a *so-called* public party (for actually even the largest dinner party is always only a private party, and only the state party as such^f is public in its idea) – I would, I must say, defend him and, if necessary, take on his cause with severity and bitterness of expression; but I would not let myself be used as the instrument for spreading this evil report and carrying it to the man it concerns. – It is not merely a social *taste* that must guide the conversation; there are also principles that should serve as the limiting condition on the freedom with which human beings openly exchange their thoughts in social intercourse.

There is something analogous here to ancient customs in the trust between human beings who eat together at the same table; for example, those of the Arab, with whom a stranger can feel safe as soon as he has merely been able to coax a refreshment from him (a drink of water) in his tent; or when the deputies coming from Moscow to meet the Russian Tsarina offered her *salt* and *bread*, and by the enjoyment of them she could regard herself as safe from all snares by the right of hospitality. – Eating together at one table is regarded as the formality of such a covenant of safety.

^e Added in A1 and A2: it need not be feared that.

^f nur die staatsbürgerliche überhaupt.

Eating alone (*solipsismus convictorii*)^a is unhealthy for a scholar who philosophizes;* it is not restoration but exhaustion (especially if it becomes solitary feasting); fatiguing work rather than a stimulating play of thoughts. The *savoring* human being who weakens himself in thought during his solitary meal^b gradually loses his sprightliness which, on the other hand, he would have gained if a table companion with alternative ideas had offered stimulation through new material which he himself had not been able to track down.

At a full table, where the number of courses is intended only to keep the guests together for a long time (*coenam ducere*),^c the conversation usually goes through three stages: (1) narration, (2) arguing,^d and (3) jesting. – A. The first stage concerns the news of the day, first domestic, then foreign, that has flowed in from personal letters and newspapers. – B. When this first appetite has been satisfied, the party becomes even livelier, for in subtle reasoning^e it is difficult to avoid diversity of judgment over one and the same object that has been brought up, and since no one exactly has the lowest opinion of his own judgment, a dispute arises which stirs up the appetite for food and drink and also makes the appetite wholesome in proportion to the liveliness of this dispute and the participation in it. – C. But because arguing is always a kind of work and exertion of one's powers, it eventually becomes tiresome as a result of engaging in it while eating rather copiously: thus the conversation sinks naturally to the mere play of wit, partly also to please the women present, against whom the small, deliberate, but not shameful attacks

* For the man who philosophizes must constantly carry his thoughts with him, in order to find out through numerous trials what principles he should tie them to; and ideas, because they are not intuitions, float in the air before him, so to speak. The historical or mathematical scholar, on the other hand, can put them down before himself and so, with pen in hand, according to universal rules of reason, arrange them empirically, just like facts; and because his ideas are arranged in certain points, he can continue his work on the following day where he left off. – As concerns the philosopher, one cannot regard him as a *worker* on the buildings of the sciences, that is, not as scholars work; rather one must regard him as an *investigator of wisdom*. He is the mere idea of a person who takes the final end of all knowledge as his object, practically and (for the purpose of the practical) theoretically too, and one cannot use this name "philosopher" in the plural, but only in the singular (the philosopher judges like this or like that): for he signifies a mere idea, whereas to say *philosophers* would indicate a plurality of something that is surely absolute unity.

^a Trans.: the solitary person at the table. *Marginal note in H:* For eating alone by oneself refectory.

^b during . . . meal not in *H*.

^c Trans.: to keep people at the dinner table.

^d *Rasönnieren.*

^e *Vernünfteln.*

on their sex^a enable them to show their own wit to advantage. And so the meal ends with *laughter*, which, if it is loud and good-natured, has actually been determined by nature to help the stomach in the digestive process through the movement of the diaphragm and intestines, thus promoting physical well-being. Meanwhile the participants in the feast believe – one wonders how much! – that they have found culture of the spirit in one of nature's purposes. – Dinner music at a festive banquet of fine gentlemen is the most tasteless absurdity that revelry has ever contrived.

The rules for a tasteful feast that *animates* the company are: (a) to choose topics for conversation that interest everyone and always provide someone with the opportunity to add something appropriate, (b) not to allow deadly silences to set in, but only momentary pauses in the conversation, (c) not to change the topic unnecessarily or jump from one subject to another: for at the end of the feast, as at the end of a drama (and the entire life of a reasonable human being, when completed, is also a drama) the mind inevitably occupies itself with reminiscing various phases of the conversation; and if it cannot discover a connecting thread, it feels confused and realizes with indignation that it has not progressed in culture, but rather regressed. – A topic that is entertaining must almost be exhausted before proceeding to another one; and when the conversation comes to a standstill, one must know how to slip some related topic into the group, without their noticing it, as an experiment: in this way one individual in the group can take over the management of the conversation, unnoticed and unenvied. (d) Not to let *dogmatism*^b arise or persist, either in oneself or in one's companions in the group; rather, since this conversation should not be business but merely play, one should avert such seriousness by means of a skillful and suitable jest. (e) In a serious conflict that nevertheless cannot be avoided, carefully to maintain discipline over oneself and one's emotions, so that mutual respect and benevolence always shine forth – here what matters is more the *tone* (which must be neither noisy nor arrogant) of the conversation than the content, so that no guest returns home from the gathering estranged from the others.^c

No matter how insignificant these laws of refined humanity¹¹³ may seem, especially if one compares them to pure moral laws, nevertheless, anything that promotes sociability, even if it consists only in pleasing maxims or^d manners, is a garment that dresses virtue to advantage, a

^a on their sex not in *H*.

^b *Rechthaberei.*

^c *mit dem anderen entzweiet.*

^d maxims or not in *H*.

garment which is also to be recommended in a serious respect. – The *cynic's purism* and the *anchorite's mortification of the flesh*, without social good living,^a are distorted forms of virtue which do not make virtue inviting; rather, being forsaken by the graces, they can make no claim to humanity.

^a *gesellschaftliches Wohlleben*.

^a *Marginal note in H: Anthropology 1st Part Anthropological Didactic* What is the human being?

^b *2nd Part Anthropological Characteristic* How is the peculiarity of each human being to be cognized?

The former is as it were the doctrine of elements of anthropology, the latter is the doctrine of method.

^b *Charakteristik.* Anthropological not in *H*.

7: 285

Division

(1) The character of the person, (2) the character of the sexes, (3) the character of the peoples, (4) the character of the species.¹¹⁴

A. The character of the person

From a pragmatic consideration, the universal, *natural* (not civil) doctrine of signs (*semiotica universalis*) uses the word *character* in two senses: because on the one hand it is said that a certain human being has *this* or that (physical) character; on the other hand that he simply has *a* character (a moral character), which can only be one, or nothing at all. The first is the distinguishing mark of the human being as a sensible or natural being; the second is the distinguishing mark of the human being as a rational being endowed with freedom. The man of principles, from whom one knows what to expect, not from his instinct, for example, but from his will, has a character. – Therefore in the Characteristic one can, without tautology, divide what belongs to a human being's faculty of desire (what is practical) into what is *characteristic* in (a) his *natural aptitude* or natural predisposition, (b) his *temperament* or sensibility, and (c) his *character* purely and simply, or way of thinking.^a – The first two predispositions indicate what can be made of the human being; the last (moral) predisposition indicates what he is prepared to make of himself.

I. On natural aptitude

To say that the human being has a good *disposition*^b means that he is not stubborn but compliant; that he may get angry, but is easily appeased and bears no grudge (is negatively good). – On the other hand, to be able to say of him that “he has a good heart,” though this also still pertains to sensibility, is intended to say more. It is an impulse toward the practical good, even if it is not exercised according to principles, so that both the person of good disposition and the person of good heart are people whom a shrewd guest can use as he pleases. – Accordingly, natural aptitude has more (subjectively) to do with the *feeling* of pleasure or displeasure, as to how one human being is affected by another (and in this his natural aptitude can have something characteristic), than (objectively) with the *faculty of desire*, where life manifests itself not merely in feeling, internally, but also in activity, externally, though merely in accordance with incentives of sensibility. Now *temperament* exists in this relation, and must still be distinguished from a habitual disposition (incurred through habit), because a habitual disposition is not founded upon any natural predisposition, but on mere occasional causes.

^a natural aptitude: *Naturell*; natural predisposition: *Naturanlage*; way of thinking: *Denkungsart*.

^b ein gut *Gemüt*.

II. On temperament

From a *physiological* point of view, when one speaks of temperament one means *physical constitution* (strong or weak build) and *complexion* (fluid elements moving regularly through the body by means of the vital power, which also includes heat or cold in the treatment of these humors).

However, considered *psychologically*, that is, when one means temperament of soul (faculties of feeling and desire), those terms borrowed from the constitution of the blood will be introduced only in accordance with the analogy that the play of feelings and desires has with corporeal causes of movement (the most prominent of which is the blood).

Hence it follows that the temperaments which we attribute merely to the soul may well also have corporeal factors in the human being, as covertly contributing causes: – furthermore, since, *first*, they can be divided generally into temperaments of *feeling* and *activity*, and since, *second*, each of them can be connected with the excitability (*intensio*) or slackening (*remissio*) of the vital power, only **four** simple temperaments can be laid down (as in the four syllogistic figures, by means of the *medius terminus*):^a the *sanguine*, the *melancholy*, the *choleric*, and the *phlegmatic*. By this means, the old forms can then be retained,^b and they only receive a more comfortable interpretation suited to the spirit of this doctrine of temperaments.

This is why terms referring to the *constitution of the blood* do not serve to indicate the *cause* of the phenomena observed in a sensibly affected human being – whether according to the pathology of humors or of nerves:¹¹⁵ they serve only to classify these phenomena according to observed effects. For in order properly to give to a human being the title of a particular class, one does not need to know beforehand what chemical blood-mixture it is that authorizes the designation of a certain property of temperament; rather, one needs to know which feelings and inclinations one has observed combined in him.

So the general division of the doctrine of temperaments can be the division into temperaments of *feeling*^c and temperaments of *activity*; and this division can again be divided into two kinds by means of subdivision, which together give us the four temperaments.^d – I count the *sanguine*, A, and its opposite, the *melancholy*, B, as temperaments of *feeling*.^e – The

^a Trans.: middle term.

^b H and A1: gracefully retained.

^c H and A1: *sensation*.

^d Marginal note in H: If one temperament should be mixed with another, they resist each other, they neutralize each other – however, if one at times alternates with another, then it is mere mood and not a definite temperament. One does not know what one should make of the human being. Cheerfulness and thoughtlessness, melancholy and insanity, high-mindedness and stubbornness, coldness and persistence.

^e H and A1: *sensation*.

7: 287

former has the peculiarity that sensations are quickly and strongly affected, but not deeply penetrating (they do not last). On the other hand, in the latter temperament sensations are less striking, but they get themselves rooted deeply. One must locate this distinction of temperaments of feeling *in this*, and not in the tendency to cheerfulness or sadness. For the thoughtlessness of the sanguine temperament disposes it to gaiety, on the other hand the pensiveness that broods over a sensation deprives gaiety of its easy variability, without thereby exactly producing sadness. – But since every change that one has under one's control generally stimulates and strengthens the mind, he who makes light of whatever happens to him is certainly happier, if not wiser, than he who clings to sensations that benumb his vital power.

I. TEMPERAMENTS OF FEELING

A. *The sanguine temperament of the light-blooded person*

7: 288 The sanguine person indicates his sensibility and is recognizable in the following signs: he is carefree and of good cheer; he attributes a great importance to each thing for the moment, and the next moment may not give it another thought. He makes promises in all honesty, but does not keep his word because he has not reflected deeply enough beforehand whether he will be able to keep it. He is good-natured enough to render help to others, but he is a bad debtor and always asks for extensions. He is a good companion, jocular and high-spirited, does not like to attribute great importance to anything (*Vive la bagatelle!*),^a and all human beings are his friends. He is not usually an evil human being, but he is a sinner hard to convert; indeed, he regrets something very much but quickly forgets this regret (which never becomes *grief*). Business tires him, and yet he busies himself indefatigably with things that are mere play; for play involves change, and perseverance is not his strength.^b

B. *The melancholy temperament of the heavy-blooded person*

He who is disposed to melancholy (not the person afflicted with melancholy, for this signifies a condition, not the mere propensity to a condition) attributes a great importance to all things that concern himself, finds cause for concern everywhere and directs his attention first to difficulties, just as the sanguine person, on the other hand, begins with hope of success: therefore the melancholy person also thinks deeply, just as the sanguine person thinks only superficially. He makes promises with difficulty, for keeping his word is dear to him, but the capacity to do so is questionable. Not that all this happens from moral causes (for we are speaking

here of *sensible* incentives), but rather that the opposite inconveniences him, and just because of this makes him apprehensive, mistrustful, and suspicious, and thereby also insusceptible to cheerfulness. – Moreover, this state of mind, if it is habitual, is nevertheless contrary to that of the philanthropist, which is more an inherited quality of the sanguine person, at least in its impulse; for he who must *himself* do without joy will find it hard not to begrudge it to others.

II. TEMPERAMENTS OF ACTIVITY

7: 289

C. *The choleric temperament of the hot-blooded person*

One says of him: he is *hot-tempered*, flares up quickly like straw-fire, readily allows himself to be calmed if the other person gives in, is thereupon angry without hatred, and in fact loves the other person all the more for quickly having given in to him. – His activity is *rash*, but not persistent. – He is busy, but reluctant to undertake business himself just because he is not persistent in it; and therefore he likes to be the mere commander in chief who presides over it, but does not want to carry it out himself. Hence his ruling passion is ambition; he likes to take part in public affairs and wants to be loudly praised. Accordingly he loves the *show*^a and pomp of *formalities*; he gladly takes others under his wing and according to appearances is magnanimous, not from love, however, but from pride, for he loves himself more.^b – He has a high opinion of *order* and therefore appears to be cleverer than he is. He is avaricious in order not to be stingy; polite, but with ceremony; stiff and affected in social intercourse; likes any flatterer who is the butt of his wit; suffers more wounds due to the opposition of others against his *proud* arrogance than the *miser* ever suffers due to opposition against his *avaricious* arrogance; for a little caustic wit directed at him completely blows away the aura of his importance, whereas the miser is at least compensated for this by his profit. – In short, the choleric temperament is the least happy of all, because it calls up the most opposition to itself.

D. *The phlegmatic temperament of the cold-blooded person*

Phlegm signifies *lack of emotion*, not indolence (lifelessness); and therefore one should not immediately call a person who has much phlegm a phlegmatic or say that he is phlegmatic and place him under this title in the class of idlers.

Phlegm, as *weakness*, is the propensity to inactivity, not to let oneself be moved to business even by strong incentives. Insensitivity to such

7: 290

^a Trans.: three cheers for trifles!

^b seine Sache nicht.

^a *Schein*.


^b A1 and A2: more: *H*: only.

stimuli is voluntary uselessness,^a and the desires aim only at satiety and sleep.

Phlegm, as *strength*, on the other hand, is the quality of not being moved easily or *rashly* but, if slowly, then *persistent*. – He who has a good dose of phlegm in his composition warms up slowly, but retains the warmth longer. He does not easily fly into a rage, but reflects first whether he should become angry; when the choleric person, on the other hand, may fall into a rage at not being able to bring the steadfast man out of his cold-bloodedness.

The cold-blooded man has nothing to regret if he has been equipped by nature with a quite ordinary portion of reason, in addition to this phlegm; without being brilliant, he will still proceed from principles and not from instinct. His fortunate temperament takes the place of wisdom, and even in ordinary life one often calls him the philosopher. As a result of this he is superior to others, without offending their vanity. One often calls him *sly* as well; for all the bullets and projectiles fired at him bounce off him as from a sack of wool. He is a conciliatory husband, and knows how to establish dominion over his wife and relatives by seeming to comply with everyone's wishes; for by his unbending but considerate will he knows how to bring their wills round to his – just as bodies with small mass and great velocity penetrate an obstacle on impact, whereas bodies with less velocity and greater mass carry along with themselves the obstacle that stands in their path, without destroying it.

If one temperament should be an associate of another – as it is commonly believed – for example,



7: 291

then they either *oppose* each other or *neutralize* each other. The former occurs if one tries to think of the sanguine as united with the melancholy in one and the same subject; likewise the choleric with the phlegmatic: for they (A and B, likewise C and D) stand in contradiction to one another. – The latter, namely neutralization, would occur in the *mixing* (chemical, so to speak) of the sanguine with the choleric, and the melancholy with

^a *willkürliche Unnützlichkeit*.

the phlegmatic (A and C, likewise B and D). For good-natured cheerfulness cannot be conceived of as being fused with forbidding anger in one and the same act, any more than the pain of the self-tormentor can be conceived of as being fused with the contented repose of the self-sufficient mind. – If, however, one of these two states alternates with the other in the same subject, then the result is mere moodiness,^a not a specific temperament.

Therefore there is no *composite* temperament, for example, a sanguine-choleric temperament (which all windbags want to have, since then they can claim to be the gracious but also stern master). Rather, there are in all only four temperaments, and each of them is simple, and one does not know what should be made of the human being who attributes a mixed one to himself.

Cheerfulness and thoughtlessness, melancholy and insanity, high-mindedness and stubbornness, finally coldness and feeble-mindedness are only distinguished as effects of temperament in relation to their causes.*

III. ON CHARACTER AS THE WAY OF THINKING

To be able to simply say of a human being: "he has a *character*" is not only to have *said* a great deal about him, but is also to have *praised* him a great deal; for this is a rarity, which inspires profound respect and admiration toward him.

7: 292

If by this term "character" one generally understands that which can definitely be expected of a person, whether good or bad, then one usually adds that he has *this* or *that* character, and then the term signifies his *way of sensing*. – But simply to have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he

* What influence the variety of temperament has upon public affairs, or vice-versa (through the effect which the habitual exercise in public affairs has on temperament), is claimed to have been discovered partly by experience and partly also with the assistance of conjectures about occasional causes. Thus it is said, for example, that

in religion the choleric is *orthodox*
the sanguine is *latitudinarian*
the melancholy is *enthusiast*
the phlegmatic is *indifferentist*. – [Crossed out in H:
in public office the choleric – regard for order
the sanguine – careless
the melancholic – punctilious.]

But these are tossed-off judgments which are worth as much for Characteristic as scurrilous wit allows them (*valent, quantum possunt*). [Trans.: they are worth as much as is attributed to them – Ed.]

In H the following sentence is added: And one can parody lawyers in a similar manner.

^a *das bloße Launen*.

has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed be false and incorrect, nevertheless the formal element of the will in general, to act according to firm principles (not to fly off hither and yon, like a swarm of gnats), has something precious and admirable^a in it; for it is also something rare.

Here it does not depend on what nature makes of the human being, but of what the human being *makes of himself*; for the former belongs to temperament (where the subject is for the most part passive), and only the latter enables one to recognize that he has a character.

All other good and useful properties of the human being have a *price* that allows them to be exchanged with other things that have just as much use; talent has a **market price**, since the sovereign or lord of the manor can use a talented human being in all sorts of ways; – temperament has a **fancy price**,^b one can have an enjoyable time with such a person, he is a pleasant companion; – but character has an inner **worth**,^c and is beyond all price.

7: 293 On the qualities that follow merely from the human being's having or not having character

(1) The *imitator* (in moral matters) is without character; for character consists precisely in originality in the way of thinking. He who has character derives his conduct from a source that he has opened by himself.^c However, the rational human being must not be an *eccentric*; indeed, he never will be, since he relies on principles that are valid for

* A seafarer listened to the dispute in a society led by scholars over the rank of their respective faculties. He decided it in his own way, namely: how much would a human being he had captured bring in for him at the sale in the marketplace in Algiers? No human being there can use a theologian or a jurist, but the physician knows a trade and can be worth cash. – King James I of England was asked by the wet nurse who had breastfed him to make her son a *gentleman* (a man of refinement). James answered: “That I cannot do. I can make him an earl, but he must make himself a gentleman.” – Diogenes (the Cynic), as the story goes [see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 6.74 – Ed.], was captured on a sea voyage near the island of Crete and offered for sale at a public slave market. “What can you do? What do you know?” asked the broker who had put him on the stand. “I know how to rule,” answered the philosopher, “and you find me a buyer who needs a *master*.” The merchant, moved by this strange demand, concluded the sale by this strange transaction: he turned his son over to Diogenes for education, to make of him what he wanted; meanwhile he himself conducted business in Asia for several years, and then upon his return he received his previously uncouth son transformed into a skillful, well-mannered, virtuous human being. – Thus, approximately, can one estimate the gradation of human worth.

^a *H*: even admirable.

^b *Affektionspreis*.

^c aus einer von ihm selbst geöffneten Quelle.

everyone. The imitator is the *mimicker* of the man who has a character. Good-naturedness from temperament^a is a painting of watercolors and not a trait of character; but a trait of character drawn in caricature is an outrageous mockery pushed on the man of true character: because he does not take part in evil^b once it has become public custom (fashion), and, consequently, he is presented^c as an eccentric.

(2) Maliciousness^d from temperamental predisposition is nevertheless less bad than good-naturedness from temperamental predisposition without character; for by character one can get the upper hand over maliciousness from temperamental predisposition. – Even a human being of evil character (like Sulla), though he arouses disgust through the violence of his firm maxims, is nevertheless also an object of admiration: as we admire *strength of soul* generally, in comparison with *goodness of soul*. Both must be found united in the same subject in order to bring out what is more an ideal than something that exists in reality; namely, the right to the title of *greatness of soul*.

3) The rigid, inflexible disposition^e which accompanies a formed resolution (as, for example, in Charles XII) is indeed a natural predisposition very favorable to character, but it is not yet a determinate character as such. For character requires maxims that proceed from reason and morally-practical principles. Therefore one cannot rightly say that the malice^f of this human being is a quality of his character; for then it would be diabolic. The human being, however, never *sanctions* the evil in himself, and so there is actually no malice from principles; but only from the forsaking of them. – –

7: 294

Accordingly, it is best to present negatively the principles that relate to character. They are:

- a. Not intentionally to say what is false; consequently, also to speak with caution so that one does not bring upon oneself the disgrace of retraction.
- b. Not to dissemble; appearing well disposed in public, but being hostile behind people's backs.
- c. Not to break one's (legitimate) promise;^g which also includes honoring even the *memory* of a friendship now broken off, and not abusing later on the former confidence and candor of the other person.

^a die *Gutartigkeit aus Temperament*.

^b das *Böse*.

^c *H* and *Ar*: represented.

^d *Bösartigkeit*.

^e *Der steife, unbiegsame Sinn*.

^f *Bosheit*.

^g sein (erlaubtes) *Versprechen*.

- d. Not to enter into an association of taste^a with evil-minded human beings, and, bearing in mind the *noscitur ex socio* etc.,¹¹⁶ to limit the association only to business.
- e. Not to pay attention to gossip derived from the shallow and malicious judgment of others; for paying attention to it already indicates weakness. Also, to moderate^b our fear of offending against fashion, which is a fleeting, changeable thing; and, if it has already acquired some importance in its influence, then at least not to extend its command into morality.^c

The human being who is conscious of having character in his way of thinking does not have it by nature; he must always have *acquired* it. One may also assume that the grounding of character is like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to oneself; which makes the resolution and the moment when this transformation took place unforgettable to him,^d like the beginning of a new epoch. – Education, examples, and teaching generally cannot bring about this firmness and persistence in principles *gradually*, but only, as it were, by an explosion which happens one time as a result of weariness at the unstable condition of instinct. Perhaps there are only a few who have attempted this revolution before the age of thirty, and fewer still who have firmly established it before they are forty. – Wanting to become a better human being in a fragmentary way is a futile endeavor, since one impression dies out while one works on another; the grounding of character, however, is absolute unity of the inner principle of conduct as such. – It is also said that *poets* have no character, for example, they would rather insult their best friends than give up a witty inspiration; or that character is not to be sought at all among courtiers, who must put up with all fashions;^e and that with clergymen, who court the Lord of Heaven as well as the lords of the earth in one and the same pitch,^f firmness of character is in a troublesome condition; and, accordingly, it probably is and will remain only a pious wish that they have inner (moral)^g character. But perhaps the *philosophers* are to blame for this, because they have never yet isolated this concept and placed it in a sufficiently bright light, and have sought to present virtue only in fragments but have never tried to present it *whole*, in its beautiful form, and to make it interesting for all human beings.

7: 295

^a *Geschmacksumgang*.^b to moderate added in A2.^c *Ihr Gebot wenigstens nicht auf die Sittlichkeit auszudehnen.* A1 and A2: "then . . . morality." H reads: "then it is still better, as one says, to be a fool in fashion than a fool out of fashion."^d and . . . him not in H.^e *alle Formen*.^f in . . . pitch not in H.^g (moral) not in H.

In a word: the only proof within a human being's consciousness that he has character is that he has made truthfulness his supreme maxim, in the heart of his confessions to himself as well as in his behavior toward everyone else; and since to have this is the minimum that one can demand of a reasonable human being, but at the same time also the maximum of inner worth (of human dignity), then to be a man of principles (to have a determinate character) must be possible for the most common human reason and yet, according to its dignity, be superior to the greatest talent.^h

On physiognomy

Physiognomy is the artⁱ of judging a human being's way of sensing or way of thinking according to his visible form; consequently, it judges the interior by the exterior. – Here one does not judge him in his unhealthy, but in his healthy condition; not when his mind is agitated, but when it is at rest. – It goes without saying that if he who is being judged for this purpose perceives that someone is observing him and spying out his interior, his mind is not at rest but in a state of constraint and inner agitation, indeed even indignation, at seeing himself exposed to another's censure.

If a watch has a fine case, one cannot judge with certainty from this (says a famous watchmaker) that the interior is also good; but if the case is poorly made, one can with considerable certainty conclude that the interior is also no good; for the craftsman will hardly discredit a piece of work on which he has worked diligently and well by neglecting its exterior, which costs him the least labor. But it would be absurd to conclude here, by the analogy of a human craftsman with the inscrutable creator of nature, that the same holds for Him: that, for example, He would have added a good soul to a beautiful body in order to recommend the human being, whom he created, to other human beings and promote him, or, on the other hand, frighten one person away from another (by means of the *hic niger est, bunc tu Romane caveto*).^j For *taste*, which contains a merely subjective ground of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of one human being with another (according to their beauty or ugliness), cannot serve as a guide to *wisdom*, which has its existence objectively with certain natural qualities as its end (which we absolutely cannot understand), in order to assume that these two heterogeneous things¹¹⁷ are united in the human being for one and the same end.

7: 296

^a Marginal note in H: Cut stones

Camee and intaglio.

^b H and A1: doctrine.^c Trans.: This one is black-hearted; therefore, Romans, beware of him. See Horace, *Satires* 1.4.85.

On the Guidance of Nature to Physiognomy

If we are to put our trust in someone, no matter how highly he comes recommended to us, it is a natural impulse to first look him in the face, particularly in the eyes, in order to find out what we can expect from him. What is revolting or attractive in his gestures determines our choice or makes us suspicious even before we have inquired about his morals, and so it is incontestable that there is a physiognomic Characteristic, which however can never become a science, because the peculiarity of a human *form*, which indicates certain inclinations or faculties of the subject being looked at, cannot be understood by description according to concepts but only by illustration and presentation in intuition or by an imitation of it; whereby the human form in general is set out to judgment according to its *varieties*, each one of which is supposed to point to a special inner quality of the human being.

The caricatures of human heads by *Baptista Porta*,¹¹⁸ which present animal heads compared analogically with certain characteristic human faces, and from which conclusions were supposed to be drawn about a similarity of natural predispositions in both, have long been forgotten. *Lavater*¹¹⁹ spread this taste widely by silhouettes, which became popular and inexpensive wares for a while, but recently they have been completely abandoned. – Now almost nothing remains of this, except perhaps the ambiguous remark (of von Archenholz)¹²⁰ that the face of a human being which one imitates by means of a grimace to oneself alone also stirs up certain thoughts and sensations, which agree with the imitated person's character. Thus there is no longer any demand for physiognomy as the art of searching out the interior of the human being by means of certain external, involuntary signs; and nothing remains of it but the art of cultivating taste, and to be more precise not taste in things but in morals, manners, and customs, in order to promote human relations and knowledge of human beings generally by means of a critique, which would come to the aid of this knowledge.

Division of physiognomy

On Characteristic: 1. in the *structure of the face*, 2. in the *features of the face*, 3. in the *habitual gesture of the face* (*mien*).

A. ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE FACE It is noteworthy that the Greek artists – in statues,^a cameos, and intaglios – also had an ideal in mind of the structure of the face (for gods and heroes), which was meant to express eternal youth and at the same time a repose free from all affects, without putting in anything *charming*. – The *Greek perpendicular profile* makes the eyes deeper set than they should be according to our taste

^a statues added in A2.

(which leans toward what is charming), and even a *Venus de Medici* lacks charm. – The reason for this may be that since the ideal should be a firm,^a unalterable norm, a nose springing out of the face from the forehead at an angle (where the angle may be greater or smaller), would yield no *firm rule of form*, as is nevertheless required of that which belongs to the norm. The modern Greeks, despite their otherwise beautifully formed bodies, still do not have that severe perpendicularity of profile^b in their faces, which seems to prove that these ideal facial structures in works of art^c were *prototypes*. – According to these mythological models, the eyes happen to lie deeper and have been placed somewhat in the shade of the base of the nose; on the other hand nowadays one considers human faces more beautiful that have a nose with a slight deviation from the direction^d of the forehead (an indentation at the base of the nose).

When we pursue our observations of human beings as they actually are, it becomes apparent that an exactly measured *conformity to the rule* generally indicates a very ordinary human being who is without spirit. The *mean* seems to be the basic measurement and the basis of beauty; but it is far from being beauty itself, because^e for this something characteristic is required. – However, one can also come across this characteristic in a face without beauty, where the expression speaks very well for the face, though in some other respect (perhaps moral or aesthetic). That is, one may find fault with a face here, there a forehead, nose, chin, or color of hair, and so on, and yet admit that it is still more pleasing for the individuality of the person than if it were in perfect conformity to the rule, since this generally also carries lack of character with it.

But one should never reproach a face with *ugliness* if in its features it does not betray the expression of a mind corrupted by vice or by a natural but unfortunate propensity to vice; for example, a certain feature of sneering as soon as one begins to speak, or of looking another person in the face with impudence that is untempered by gentleness, and thereby showing that one thinks nothing of his judgment. – There are men whose faces are (as the French say) *rebarbaratif*,^f faces with which, as the saying goes, one can drive children to bed; or who have a face lacerated and made grotesque by smallpox; or who have, as the Dutch say, a *wanschapene*^g face (a face imagined as it were in delusion or in a dream). But at the same time people with such faces still show such

^a bestimmt.

^b of profile not in H.

^c H and A1: gems.

^d A1: direction (*Richtung*); A2: *Giebtung*. According . . . nose) not in H.

^e because . . . is required not in H. H reads: One can therefore find fault in a beautiful face, in a forehead that is slightly too small, in a broad chin, or in the color of the hair, etc.

^f Trans.: forbidding, repulsive. (The correct French word is *rébarbatif*.)

^g Trans.: misshapen, shapeless.

good-naturedness and cheerfulness that they can make fun of their own faces, which therefore by no means can be called ugly, although they would not be offended if a lady said of them (as was said of *Pelisson*¹²¹ at the Académie française): "Pelisson abuses the privilege men have of being ugly." It is even more wicked and^a stupid when a human being from whom one may expect manners^b behaves like rabble by reproaching a handicapped person with his physical defects, which often serve only to enhance his spiritual merits. If this happens to someone who has met with an accident in his early youth (for example, if he is called "you blind dog," or "you lame dog"), it makes that person really malicious and gradually embitters him toward people who, because they are well-formed,^c think they are better.

Generally, people who have never left their country make an object of ridicule of the unfamiliar faces of strangers. Thus little children in Japan run after the Dutch businessmen there, calling out "Oh what big eyes, what big eyes!" and the Chinese find the red hair of many Europeans who visit their country horrid, but their blue eyes ridiculous.

As concerns the bare skull and its structure which constitutes the basis of its shape, for example, that of the Negroes, the Kalmyks, the South Sea Indians, and so on, as they have been described by Camper and especially Blumenbach,¹²² observations about it belong more to physical geography than to pragmatic anthropology. A mean between the two can be the remark that even among us the forehead of the male sex is generally *flat*, while that of the female is more *rounded*.

Whether a hump on the nose indicates a satirist – whether the peculiarity of the shape of the Chinese face, of which it is said that the lower jaw projects slightly beyond the upper, is an indication of their stubbornness^d – or whether the forehead of the Americans, overgrown with hair on both sides, is a sign of innate feeble-mindedness, and so forth, these are conjectures that permit only an uncertain interpretation.^e

B. ON WHAT IS CHARACTERISTIC IN THE FEATURES OF THE FACE It does a man no harm, even in the judgment of the female sex, if his face has been disfigured and made unpleasing because of the coloring of his skin or pockmarks; for if good-naturedness shines forth from his eyes, and if at the same time from his glance the expression of a man valiant

^a H and A1: and at the same time.

^b Sitten.

^c Wöhlgebildete.

^d After "stubbornness" H adds: "also whether it has an influence on their temperament, and so forth, these questions belong to comparative animal physiology."

^e Marginal note in H: Hume in thought and Rousseau

On skulls according to Camper and Blumenbach. Spherical head, not flat forehead. Heydeger.

in the consciousness of his power and at peace shines forth, then he can always be liked and lovable, and this holds good universally. – One jokes with such people and their amiability (*per antiphrasin*); and a woman can be proud to have such a husband in her possession. Such a face is not a *caricature*,^a for a caricature is an intentionally exaggerated sketch (*a distortion*) of the face in affect,^b devised for derision and belonging to mimicry. It must rather^c be included among a variety that lies in nature, and must not be called a distorted face (which would be repulsive); for even if it is not lovely it can inspire love, and although it is without beauty it is still not ugly.*

C. ON WHAT IS CHARACTERISTIC IN FACIAL EXPRESSIONS^d Expressions are facial features put into play, and this results more or less from strong affect, the propensity to which is a characteristic trait of the human being.

It is difficult not to betray the imprint of an affect by any expression; it betrays itself by the painstaking restraint in gesture or in the tone itself, and he who is too weak to govern his affects will expose his interior through the play of expressions (against the wish of his reason), which he would like to hide and conceal from the eyes of others. But if one finds out about them, those who are masters in this art are not exactly regarded as the best human beings with whom one can deal in confidence, especially if they are practised in affecting expressions that contradict what they do.

The art of interpreting expressions that unintentionally reveal one's interior, while nevertheless thereby lying about it, can provide the occasion for many fine remarks, of which I wish to consider only one. – If someone who is otherwise not cross-eyed looks at the tip of his nose while relating something and consequently crosses his eyes, then what

* Heidegger, a German musician in London, was a grotesquely formed but bright and intelligent man, with whom refined people liked to associate for the sake of conversation. – Once it occurred to him at a drinking party to claim to a lord that he had the ugliest face in London. The lord reflected and wagered that he could present a face still uglier, and then sent out for a drunken woman, at whose appearance the whole party burst into laughter and called out: "Heidegger, you have lost the bet." "Not so fast," he replied, "let the woman wear my wig and I shall put on her headdress; then we shall see." As this happened, everyone fell into laughter, to the point of suffocation, for the woman looked like a very well-bred man, and the man like a witch. This proves that in order to call anyone beautiful, or at least tolerably pretty, one must not judge absolutely but always only relatively, and that someone must not call a man ugly just because he is perhaps not pretty. – Only repulsive physical defects of the face can justify this verdict.

^a A2: Such . . . not; A1 and H: These are not depictions in.

^b des Gesichts im Affekt.

^c A2: It must rather; H and A1: These depictions must.

^d Von dem Charakteristischen der Mienen. (This heading was added in A2.)

he is relating is always a lie. – However, one must not include here the defective eye condition of a cross-eyed person, who can be entirely free from this vice.

Moreover, there are gestures established by nature, by which human beings of all races^a and climates understand each other, even without prior agreement. To these gestures belong *nodding the head* (in affirmation), *shaking the head* (in disavowal), *raising the head* (in defiance), *shaking the head* (in astonishment), *turning up one's nose* (in derision), *laughing derisively* (sneering), *making a long face* (upon refusal of a request), *frowning* (in annoyance), *quickly opening and closing the mouth* (bah!), *beckoning toward and waving away from oneself with the hands*, *beating the hands together over the head* (in surprise), *making a fist* (in threatening), *bowing*, *putting the finger on the mouth* (*compescere labella*),^b in order to command silence, *hissing*, and so forth.

Random remarks

Frequently repeated expressions that accompany emotion,^c even involuntarily, gradually become permanent facial features, which, however, disappear in death. Consequently, as Lavater remarks, the terrifying face that betrays the scoundrel in life ennobles itself (negatively) in death, so to speak: for then, when all the muscles relax, there remains as it were the expression of repose, which is innocent. – Thus it can also happen that a man who has gone through his youth uncorrupted may still in later years, despite his good health, acquire another face because of debauchery. But from this nothing should be inferred about his natural predisposition.

One also speaks of a *common* face in contrast with one that is refined. The latter signifies nothing more than an assumed importance, combined with a courtly manner of ingratiating, which thrives only in big cities, where human beings rub against one another and grind away their roughness. Therefore, when civil servants, born and brought up in the country, are promoted with their families to notable municipal positions, or even when they only qualify for such service in accordance with their rank, they show something common, not merely in their manners, but also in their facial expression. For, having dealt almost exclusively with their subordinates, they felt free and easy in their sphere of activity, so that their facial muscles did not acquire the flexibility required for cultivating the play of expression appropriate to dealings with people in all relationships – toward superiors, inferiors, and equals – and to the affects connected with them. To have this play of expression without compromising oneself is required for a good reception in society. On the other

7: 302

hand, when human beings of equal rank accustomed to urbane manners become conscious of their superiority over others in this respect, this consciousness, if it becomes habitual by long practice, molds their faces with permanent features.

Devotees of a dominant^d religion or cult, when they have long been disciplined and, so to speak, hardened in the mechanical practices of devotion, introduce national features into a whole people, within the boundaries of that religion or cult, traits that even characterize them physiognomically. Thus Herr Fr. Nicolai¹²³ speaks of the embarrassing *sanctimonious* faces in Bavaria; whereas *John Bull* of old England carries even on his face the freedom to be impolite wherever he may go in foreign lands or toward foreigners in his own country. So there is also a national physiognomy, though it should not necessarily be thought of as innate. – There are characteristic marks in societies that the law has brought together for punishment. Regarding the prisoners in Amsterdam's *Rasphuis*, Paris's *Bicêtre*, and London's *Newgate*, a skillful and well-travelled German physician remarks that they were mostly bony fellows and conscious of their superiority, but that there were none about whom it would be permissible to say, with the actor *Quin*:¹²⁴ "If this fellow is not a scoundrel, then the Creator does not write a legible hand." For in order to pass sentence so strongly, more power of discrimination would be needed than any mortal may claim to possess, between the play that nature carries on with the forms it develops in order to produce mere diversity of temperaments, and what this does or does not do for morality.

B. The character of the sexes

7: 303

In all machines that are supposed to accomplish with little power just as much as those with great power, *art* must be put in. Consequently, one can already assume that the provision of nature put more art into the organization of the female part than of the male; for it furnished the man with greater power than the woman in order to bring both into the most intimate *physical* union, which, insofar as they are nevertheless also *rational* beings, it orders to the end most important to it, the preservation of the species. And moreover, in this quality of theirs (as rational animals), it provided them with social inclinations in order to make their sexual companionship^e persist in a domestic union.

Two persons convening at random is insufficient for the unity and indissolubility of a union; one partner must *yield* to the other, and, in turn, one must be superior to the other in some way, in order to be able to rule over or govern him. For in the *equality* of claims of two people who cannot do without each other, self-love produces nothing

^a *Gattungen*.

^b Trans.: to close the lips (with one's finger).

^c *Gemütsbewegung*.

^d *machhabende*.

^e *Geschlechtsgemeinschaft*.

but squabbling. In the *progress of culture*, each partner must be superior in a different way:^a the man must be superior to the woman through his physical power and courage,^b while the woman must be superior to the man through her natural talent for mastering his desire for her; on the other hand in still uncivilized conditions superiority is simply on the side of the man. – For this reason, in anthropology the characteristic features of the female sex, more than those of the male sex, are a topic of study for the philosopher. In the crude state of nature one can no more recognize these peculiarities than those of crab apples and wild pears, which reveal their diversity only through grafting or inoculation; for culture does not introduce these feminine qualities, it only allows them to develop and become recognizable under favorable conditions.

7: 304

Feminine ways are called weaknesses. One jokes about them; fools ridicule them, but reasonable people see very well that they are just the levers^c women use for governing men and using them for their own purposes. Man is easy to study, woman does not betray her secret, although she is poor at keeping another person's secret (because of her loquacity). He loves *domestic peace* and gladly submits to her regime, simply in order not to find himself hindered in his own concerns; she does not shy away from *domestic warfare*, which she conducts with her tongue, and for which nature bestowed her with loquacity and eloquence full of affect,^d which disarms the man. He relies on the right of the stronger to give orders at home because he is supposed to protect it against external enemies; she relies on the right of the weaker to be protected by the male partner against men, and disarms him by tears of exasperation while reproaching him with his lack of generosity.^e

In the crude state of nature it is certainly different. There the woman is a domestic animal. The man leads the way with weapons in his hand, and the woman follows him loaded down with his household belongings. But even where a barbaric civil constitution makes polygamy legal, the most favored woman in his kennel (called a harem) knows how to achieve dominion over the man, and he has no end of trouble creating a tolerable

^a auf heterogene Art.

^b "physical" and "and courage" not in H.

^c Hebezeuge.

^d affektvolle Beredtheit.

^e Marginal note in H: Why a woman (*Venus*) also marries the ugliest man (*Vulcan*) and is not laughed at about it

Among unrefined groups of people the woman is a beast of burden.

Hearne of Hudson Bay. [Samuel Hearne (1745–92), British fur trader. Hired by the Hudson's Bay Company, Hearne made three expeditions to northern Canada. See his *Journey from Prince of Wales Fort on Hudson's Bay to the Northern Ocean* (1795) – Ed.]

– On the last favor of the *Cicisbeo*.

The beatings of the Russians out of love and jealousy.

peace amid the quarrel of many women to be the one (who is to rule over him).

In civil society^a the woman does not give herself up to the man's desire without marriage, and indeed *monogamous* marriage. Where civilization has not yet ascended to feminine freedom in *gallantry* (where a woman openly has lovers other than her husband), the man punishes his wife if she threatens him with a rival.* But when gallantry has become the fashion and jealousy ridiculous (as never fails to happen in a time of luxury), the feminine character reveals itself: by extending favors toward men, woman lays claim to freedom and, at the same time, to the conquest of the entire male sex. – This inclination, though it indeed stands in ill repute under the name of coquetry, is nevertheless not without a real basis of justification. For a young wife is always in danger of becoming a widow, and this causes her to extend her charms over all men whose fortunate circumstances make them marriageable; so that, should this situation occur, she would not be lacking in suitors.

Pope¹²⁵ believes that one can characterize the female sex (the cultivated part of it, of course) by two points: the inclination to *dominate* and the inclination to *enjoyment*. – However, by the latter one must understand not domestic but public enjoyment, where woman can show herself to advantage and distinguish herself; and then the latter inclination also dissolves into the former, namely: not to yield to her rivals in pleasing others, but to triumph over them all, if possible, by her taste and charm. – However, even the first-mentioned inclination, like inclination generally, is not suitable for characterizing a class of human beings in general in their conduct toward others. For inclination toward what is advantageous

* The old saying of the Russians that women suspect their husbands of keeping other women if they do not get a beating now and then by them is usually regarded as fiction. [Külp refers readers here to "Von Weibern, die erst dann, wenn sie geschlagen werden, ihre Männer lieben," *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 13 (1789), pp. 551ff.; as well as to Carl Friedrich Flögel, *Geschichte des Groteske-Komischen* (1788), p. 181. Brandt has found a much earlier text where a similar saying occurs – Sigmund von Herberstein, *Moscoviter wunderbare Historien* (1567), p. LVIII – Ed.]. However, in Cook's Travels one finds that when an English sailor on Tahiti saw an Indian punishing his wife by beating her, the sailor, wanting to be gallant, attacked the husband with threats. The woman turned on the spot against the Englishman and asked how it concerned him: the husband must do this! [See James Cook, *Captain Cooks dritte und letzte Reise, oder Geschichte einer Entdeckungsreise nach dem stillen Ocean* (1789), esp. the reports on Tahiti (3: 45–6) and on Friendship Island (3: 394) – Ed.] – Accordingly, one will also find that when the married woman openly practises gallantry and her husband pays no attention to it, but compensates himself for it by drinking- and card-parties, or wooing other women, then not merely contempt but also *hatred* overcomes the female partner: because the woman recognizes by this that he now places no worth at all in her, and that he abandons his wife indifferently to others to gnaw on the same bone.

^a burgerlicher Zustand.

7: 305

to us is common to all human beings, and so too is the inclination to dominate, so far as this is possible for us; therefore it does not characterize a class. – However, the fact that this sex is constantly feuding with itself, whereas it remains on very good terms with the other sex, might rather be considered as its character, were this not merely the natural result of rivalry to win the advantage of one over others in the favor and devotion of men. In that case, inclination^a to dominate is woman's real aim, while enjoyment in public, by which the scope^b of her charm is widened, is only the means for providing the effect for that inclination.^c

One can only come to the characterization of this sex if one^d uses as one's principle not what we make our end, but what nature's end was in establishing womankind; and since this end itself, by means of the foolishness of human beings, must still be wisdom according to nature's purpose, these conjectural ends can also serve to indicate the principle for characterizing woman – a principle which does not depend on our choice but on a higher purpose for the human race. These ends are: (1) the preservation of the species, (2) the cultivation of society and its refinement by womankind.

1. When nature entrusted to woman's womb its dearest pledge, namely, the species, in the fetus by which the race^e is to propagate and perpetuate itself, nature was frightened so to speak about the preservation of the species and so implanted this fear – namely, fear of physical injury and timidity before similar dangers – in woman's nature; through which weakness this sex rightfully demands male protection for itself.

2. Since nature also wanted to instill the finer feelings that belong to culture – namely those of sociability and propriety – it made this sex man's ruler through her modesty and eloquence in speech and expression. It made her clever while still young in claiming gentle and courteous treatment by the male, so that^f he would find himself imperceptibly fettered by a child through his own magnanimity, and led by her, if not to morality itself, to that which is its cloak, moral decency,^g which is the preparation for morality and its recommendation.

Random remarks

Woman wants to dominate, man to be dominated (especially before marriage). – This was the reason for the gallantry of ancient

^a In . . . inclination not in H.

^b Spielraum.

^c Marginal note in H: Woman seeks to please all men because, if her man dies, she has hope for another, whom she has pleased.

^d A1: we.

^e species: Species; race: Gattung.

^f A2: "so that . . . and"; H and A1: "and through his own magnanimity he would be imperceptibly fettered by a child."

^g zu dem, was ihr Kleid ist, dem gesitteten Anstande.

knighthood. – She acquires confidence early in her ability to please. The young man is always afraid of displeasing and, consequently, is embarrassed (self-conscious) in the company of ladies. – She maintains, merely from the claim of her sex, this pride of the woman to restrain all man's importunities through the respect^a that she inspires, and the right to demand respect^b for herself without even deserving it. – The woman refuses, the man woos; her surrender is a favor. – Nature wants that the woman be sought after, therefore she herself does not need to be so particular in her choice (in matters of taste) as the man, whom nature has also built more coarsely, and who already pleases the woman if only his physique shows that he has the strength and ability to protect her. For if she were disgusted with regard to the beauty of his physique and refined in her choice, then she would have to do the wooing in order to be able to fall in love, while he would have to appear to refuse; which would entirely degrade the value of her sex, even in the eyes of the man. – She must appear to be cold in love, whereas the man must appear to be full of affect. Not to respond to an amorous advance seems to be shameful to the man, but to easily lend an ear seems shameful to the woman. – The desire of the latter to allow her charms to play on all refined men is coquetry, the affectation of appearing to be in love with all women is gallantry; both can be a mere affectation that has become the fashion, without any serious consequence^c – as with cisisbeism,¹²⁶ an affected freedom of the married woman, or, in the same way, the courtesan system that formerly existed in Italy. (In the Historia Concilii Tridentini¹²⁷ it is reported, among other things: erant ibi etiam 300 honestae meretrices, quas cortegianas vocant.)^d It is said of this courtesan system that its well-mannered public associations contained more refined culture than did mixed companies in private houses. – In marriage the man woos only his own wife, but the woman has an inclination for all men; out of jealousy, she dresses up only for the eyes of her own sex, in order to outdo other women in charm or fashionableness.^e The man, on the other hand, dresses up only for the feminine sex; if one can call this dressing up, when it goes only so far as not to disgrace his wife by his clothes. – The man judges feminine mistakes leniently, but the woman judges them very strictly (in public); and young women, if they were allowed to choose whether a male or female tribunal should pass judgment on their offences, would certainly choose the former for their judge. – When refined luxury has reached a

^a Respekt.

^b Achtung.

^c Marginal note in H: Of all female virtues none is required except that she firmly stand her ground against the attempt on her female honor (not to give herself away without honor).

^d Trans.: there were also 300 kept mistresses, who are called courtesans.

^e "or fashionableness" not in H; "if . . . clothes" in following sentence also not in H.

high level, the woman appears demure only by compulsion and makes no secret of wishing that she might rather be a man, so that she could give her inclinations larger and freer latitude; no man, however, would want to be a woman.

The woman does not ask about the man's continence^a before marriage; but for him this same question on the part of the woman is of infinite importance. – In marriage, women scoff at intolerance (the jealousy of men in general), but it is only a joke of theirs; on this subject the *unmarried* woman judges with great severity. – As concerns scholarly women: they use their *books* somewhat like their *watch*, that is, they carry one so that it will be seen that they have one; though it is usually not running or not set by the sun.¹²⁸

Feminine virtue or lack of virtue is very different from masculine virtue or lack of virtue, not only in kind but also as regards incentive. – She should be *patient*; he must be *tolerant*. She is *sensitive*; he is *sentimental*.^b – Man's economic activity consists in *acquiring*, woman's in *saving*. – The man is jealous *when he loves*; the woman is jealous even when she does not love, because every lover won by other women is one lost from her circle of admirers. – The man has his *own taste*,^c the woman makes herself the object of *everyone's taste*. – “What the world says is *true*, and what it does, *good*,” is a feminine principle that is hard to unite with a *character* in the narrow sense of the term. However, there have still been heroic women who, in connection with their own household, have upheld with glory a character suitable to their vocation. – Milton¹²⁹ was encouraged by his wife to accept the position of Latin Secretary, which was offered to him after Cromwell's death, though it was against his principles now to declare a government lawful which he had previously described as unlawful. “Ah, my dear,” he replied; “you and others of your sex^d want to travel in coaches, but I – must be an honorable man.” – Socrates's wife, perhaps also Job's, were similarly driven into the corner by their valiant husbands; but masculine virtue upheld itself in these men's characters, without, however, diminishing the merit of feminine virtue in theirs, given the relation in which they were placed.

7: 308

Pragmatic consequences

The feminine sex must train and discipline itself in practical matters; the masculine sex understands nothing of this.

^a *Enthaltsamkeit*.

^b patient: *geduldig*; tolerant: *duldend*; sensitive: *empfindlich*; sentimental: *empfindsam*. (In these two sentences Kant is playing on the sound and meaning of related German adjectives.)

^c *hat Geschmack für sich*.

^d *H*: the rest of your sex; *A1*: your sex.

The *young* husband rules over his *older* spouse. This is based on jealousy, according to which the party that is subordinate to the other in sexual power^a guards itself against encroachment on its rights by the other party and thus feels compelled to submit to being obliging and attentive in its treatment of the other party. – This is why every experienced wife will advise against marriage with a young man, even with one of just the *same age*; for with the passing of years the female party certainly ages earlier than the male, and even if one disregards this inequality, one cannot safely count on the harmony that is based on equality. A young, intelligent woman will have better luck in marriage with a healthy but, nevertheless, noticeably older man. – However, a man who perhaps has already lewdly squandered his *sexual power* before marriage will be the fool in his own house, for he can have this domestic domination only insofar as he does not fail to fulfill any reasonable demands.

Hume notes¹³⁰ that women (even old maids) are more annoyed by satires on *marriage* than by *gibes* against their *sex*. – For these gibes can never be serious, whereas the former could well become serious if the difficulties of the married state are correctly illuminated, which the unmarried person is spared. However, skepticism on this topic is bound to have bad consequences for the whole feminine sex, because this sex would be degraded to a mere means for satisfying the desire of the other sex, which however can easily result in boredom and unfaithfulness.^b – Woman becomes free by marriage; man loses his freedom by it.

It is never a woman's concern to spy out the moral properties in a man, especially a young man, *before* the wedding. She believes that she can improve him; an intelligent woman, she says, surely can set right a badly behaved man, in which judgment she generally finds herself deceived in the most lamentable manner. This also applies to the naïve woman who believes that the debaucheries^c of her husband before marriage can be overlooked, because, if only he has not exhausted himself, this instinct will now be sufficiently provided for by his wife. – These good children do not consider that dissoluteness^d in this area consists precisely in change of pleasure, and that the monotony^e of marriage will soon lead him back to his former way of life.*

* The consequence of this is, as in Voltaire's *Voyage de Scaramentado*: “Finally,” he says, “I returned to my fatherland, Candia, took a wife there, soon became a cuckold, and found that this is the most comfortable life of all.” [See the conclusion to Voltaire's *Histoire des voyages de Scaramentado* – Ed.]

^a *Geschlechtsvermögen*.

^b which . . . unfaithfulness not in *H*.

^c *Ausschweifungen*.

^d *Liederlichkeit*.

^e *Einerlei*.

7: 309

7: 310

Who, then, should have supreme command in the household? – for there certainly can be only one who coordinates all transactions^a in accordance with one end, which is his. – I would say, in the language of gallantry (though not without truth): the woman should *dominate* and the man should *govern*;^b for inclination dominates, and understanding governs. – The husband's behavior must show that to him the welfare of his wife is closest to his heart. But since the man must know best how he stands and how far he can go, he will be like a minister to his monarch who is mindful only of enjoyment. For example, if he undertakes a festival or the building of a palace, the minister will first declare his due compliancy with the order, even if at present there is no money in the treasury, and even if certain more urgent necessities must first be attended to, and so on – so that the most high and mighty master can do all that he wills, but under the condition that his minister suggests to him what his will is.^c

Since the woman is to be sought after (this is required for the refusal necessary to her sex), even in marriage she will be generally seeking to please; so that, if she by chance should become a widow while young, she will find suitors for herself. – With the matrimonial alliance, the man lays aside all such claims. Therefore jealousy caused by this coquetry^d of women is unjust.

Conjugal love, however, is by its nature *intolerant*. Women occasionally ridicule this intolerance, but,^e as has already been mentioned above, they do so in jest; for if a husband were patient and indulgent when a stranger encroached upon his rights, this would result in his wife's contempt and also hatred toward such a husband.

The fact that fathers generally *spoil* their daughters and mothers their sons; and that among the latter the wildest son, if only he is daring, is usually spoiled by the mother, appears to have its cause in the prospect of each parent's needs *in case the other should die*; for if the wife dies before the husband, he can still have a mainstay in his oldest daughter, and if the wife loses her husband, then the grown-up, well-behaved son has the duty incumbent on him, and also the natural inclination within him, to honor her, to support her, and to make her life as a widow pleasant.

I have dwelt longer on this section of Characteristic than may seem proportionate to the other divisions of anthropology; but nature has also put into her economy here such a rich treasure of arrangements for her end, which is nothing less than the maintenance of the species,

^a alle Geschäfte.

^b govern: *regieren*; dominate; *herrschen*.

^c diesen Willen ihm sein Minister an die Hand gibt.

^d H and A1: from this cause of gallantry.

^e but . . . above added in A2.

7: 311

that when the occasion arises for closer researches there will still be more than enough material, in its problems, to admire the wisdom of gradually developing natural predispositions and to use it for practical purposes.

C. The character of the peoples

By the word *people* (*populus*) is meant the *number* of human beings united in a region, insofar as they constitute a *whole*. This number, or even a part of it that recognizes itself as united into a civil whole through common ancestry, is called a *nation* (*gens*); the part that exempts itself from these laws (the unruly crowd within this people) is called a *rabble* (*vulgaris*);* whose illegal association is the *mob* (*agere per turbas*);^a this conduct that excludes them from the *quality*^b of a citizen.

Hume thinks that if each individual in a nation is intent on assuming his own particular character (as with the English), the nation itself has no character.^c¹³¹ It seems to me he is mistaken; for affectation of a character is precisely the general character of the people to which he himself belongs, and it is contempt for all foreigners, particularly because the English believe that they alone can boast of a respectable constitution that combines civil freedom internally with power against outsiders.^c – A character like this is *arrogant rudeness*, in contrast to the *politeness* that easily becomes familiar; it is obstinate behavior toward every other person from supposed self-sufficiency, where one believes one has no need of anybody else and so can be excused^d from kindness toward other people.

Thus the two *most civilized* peoples on earth,^f England and France, have contrasting characters, and perhaps chiefly because of this are in a constant feud with each other. Also because of their innate character, of which the acquired and artificial character is only the result, England and France are perhaps the only peoples to which one can assign a definite and – as long as they do not become^e mixed by the violence of war – unchangeable character. – That French has become the universal language

7: 312

* The abusive name *la canaille du peuple* probably has its origin in *canalicola*, an idler going to and fro along the canal in ancient Rome and teasing the crowd of working people (*cavillator et ridicularius*, *vid. Plautus, Curculio*). [The terms *cavillator* and *ridicularius* do not appear in Plautus's *Curiculio*, but rather in his *Miles Gloriosus* 3.1.47. See also his *Truculentus* 3.2.15–16, and Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 4.20.3. Kant's etymology is also false. *Canaille* actually means "dog-people," and is derived from the Latin *canis* (dog) – Ed.]

^f It is understood that in this classification the German people is disregarded; for otherwise the praise of the author, who is German, would be self-praise. [This note is not in H – Ed.]

^a Trans.: acting like rabble.

^b Qualität.

^c Macht gegen Außen.

^d A2: can . . . people; H and A1: and does not need to be kind to anybody.

^e Crossed out in H: war [which because of the difference in their natural predispositions is difficult to avoid]

of conversation, especially in the feminine world, and English the most widely used language *of commerce*,^{*} especially among business people, probably lies in the difference in their continental and insular situation. However, as concerns their natural aptitude, what they actually have at present, and its formation by means of language, this must be derived from the innate character of the original people of their ancestry; but the documents for this are lacking. – In an anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, however, the only thing that matters to us is to present the character of both, as they are now, in some examples, and, as far as possible, systematically; which makes it possible to judge what each can expect from the other and how each could use the other to its own advantage.

Hereditary maxims, or those which have become, as it were, second nature through long usage, as well as those maxims grafted upon them, which express the sensibility of a people, are only so many risky attempts to classify^a the *varieties* in the natural tendency of entire peoples, and more empirically for geographers than according to principles of reason for philosophers.[†]

7: 313 To claim that the kind of character a people will have depends entirely on its form of government is an ungrounded assertion that explains nothing; for from where does the government itself get its particular character? – Climate and soil also cannot furnish the key here; for migrations of entire peoples have proven that they do not change their character as a result of their new place of residence; instead they merely adapt it

* The commercial spirit also shows certain modifications of its pride in the difference of tone used in bragging. The Englishman says: "The man is *worth* a million"; the Dutchman: "He *commands* a million"; the Frenchman: "He *has* a million."

† If the *Turks*, who call Christian Europe *Frankestan*, traveled in order to get to know human beings and their national character (which no people other than the European does, and which proves the limitedness in spirit of all others), they would perhaps divide the European peoples in the following way, according to the defects shown in its character:

1) The *land of fashion* (France). – 2) The *land of moods* (England). – 3) The *land of ancestry* (Spain). – 4) The *land of splendor* (Italy). – 5) The *land of titles* (Germany, together with Sweden and Denmark, as German peoples). – 6) The *land of lords* (Poland), where every citizen wants to be a lord but none of these lords, except he who is not a citizen, wants to be a subject. – – Russia and European Turkey, both largely of Asiatic ancestry, would lie outside Frankestan: the first is of *Slavic*, the other of *Arabic* origin, both are descended from two ancestral peoples who once extended their domination over a larger part of Europe than any other people, and they have fallen into the condition of a constitution of law without freedom, where no one therefore is a citizen.

7: 313

^a Crossed out in H: classify [The Frenchman characterizes himself to his advantage through his excellent talent <skill> and the propensity to consistently agreeable and philanthropic relations. The *Etranger* is, under this title, already under his protection. His liveliness makes him inclined to surprise, which can often be healthy, but more often <nevertheless> also neck-breaking, and he participates in all national pleasures or interests.]

to the circumstances, while language, type of occupation, and even type of dress always reveal traces of their ancestry, and consequently also their character. – – I shall sketch their portrait somewhat more from the side of their faults and deviations from the rule than from the more beautiful side (but, nevertheless, not in caricature); for, in addition to the fact that flattery *corrupts* while criticism *improves*, the critic offends less against the self-love of human beings when he merely confronts them all, without exception, with their faults than when, by praising some more and others less, he only stirs up the envy of those judged against one another.

1. *The French nation* is characterized among all others by its taste for conversation, with regard to which it is the model for all the rest. It is *courteous*, especially toward foreigners who visit France, even if it is now out of fashion to be *courtly*. The Frenchman is courteous, not because of interest, but rather because of taste's immediate need to talk with others. Since this taste particularly concerns association with women of high society, the language of ladies has become the common language of high society, and it is indisputable that an inclination of this kind must also have an influence on willingness in rendering services, helpful benevolence, and, gradually, on universal philanthropy according to principles. And so it must make such a people as a whole *lovable*.

The other side of the coin is a *vivacity* that is not sufficiently kept in check by considered principles,¹³² and to clear-sighted reason it is thoughtlessness not to allow certain forms to endure for long, when they have proved satisfactory, just because they are old or have been praised excessively; and it is an infectious *spirit of freedom*, which probably also pulls reason itself into its play, and, in^a the relations of the people to the state, causes an enthusiasm that shakes everything and goes beyond all bounds. – The peculiarities of this people, sketched plainly^b but nevertheless according to life, easily permit without further description the delineation of a whole merely through disconnected fragments jotted down, as materials for Characteristic.

The words *esprit* (instead of *bon sens*), *frivolité*, *galanterie*, *petit maître*, *coquette*, *étouderie*, *point d'honneur*, *bon ton*, *bureau d'esprit*, *bon mot*, *lettre de cachet*, and so forth, cannot easily be translated into other languages, because they denote more the peculiarity of the sensibility of the nation that uses them than the object that the thinking person^c has in mind.

2. *The English people*. The ancient tribe of *Britons*^{*} (a Celtic people) seem to have been human beings of a capable kind, but the immigrations

* As Professor Büsch correctly writes it (after the word *britanni*, not *brittani*). [Johann Georg Büsch (1728–1800), professor of mathematics at the Hamburg Handelsakademie,

^a in . . . state not in H.

^b in *schwarzer Kunst*.

^c *der Denkende*.

7: 314

of tribes of German and French peoples (for^a the brief presence of the Romans could leave no noticeable trace) have obliterated the originality of this people, as their mixed language proves. And since the insular situation of their land, which protects them fairly well against attacks from without and rather invites them to become aggressors, made them a powerful people of maritime commerce, they have a character that they have acquired for themselves when they actually have none by nature. Accordingly the character of the Englishman cannot signify anything other than the principle learned from early teaching and example, that he must make a character for himself, that is, affect to have one. For an inflexible disposition to stick to a voluntarily adopted principle and not to deviate from a certain rule (no matter which) gives a man the significance that one knows for certain what one has to expect from him, and he from others.^b

7: 315

That this character is more directly opposed to that of the French people than to any other is evident from the fact that it renounces all amiability toward others, and indeed even among the English people, whereas amiability is the most prominent social quality of the French. The Englishman claims only respect, and by the way, each wants only to live as he pleases. – For his compatriots the Englishman establishes great, benevolent institutions, unheard of among all other peoples. – However, the foreigner who has been driven to England's soil by fate and has fallen on hard times can die on the dunghill because he is not an Englishman, that is, not a human being.

But even in his own country the Englishman isolates himself when he pays for his own dinner. He prefers to eat alone in a separate room than at the *table d'hôte*, for the same money: for at the *table d'hôte*, some politeness is required. And abroad, for example, in France, where Englishmen travel only to proclaim all the roads and inns as abominable (like D. Sharp),¹³³ they gather in inns only for the sake of companionship among themselves. – But it is curious that while the French generally love the English nation and praise it respectfully, nevertheless the Englishman (who has never left his own country) generally hates and scorns the French. This is probably not due to rivalry among neighbors (for in this respect England considers itself indisputably superior to France), but to the commercial spirit in general, which makes the English merchants very unsociable in their assumption of high

author of many popular works in applied and commercial science. Külpe notes that he was not able to locate Büsch's dictum concerning the spelling "Britons." This note is not in H. – Ed.]

^a (for . . . trace) not in H.
^b and . . . others not in H.

standing.* Since both peoples are close to each other with respect to their coasts and are separated only by a channel (which^a could very well be called a sea), their rivalry nevertheless causes in each of them a different kind of political character modified by their feud: *concern^b* on the one side and *hatred* on the other. These are the two forms of their incompatibility, of which one aims at *self-preservation*, the other at *domination*; however in the contrary case^c the aim is destruction of the other.

We can now formulate more briefly the characterization of the others, whose national peculiarity is derivable not so much from their different types of culture – as is for the most part so in the preceding two cases – as from the predispositions of their nature, which results from the mixture of their originally different tribes.

3. The *Spaniard*, who arose from the mixture of European with Arabian (Moorish) blood, displays in his public and private behavior a certain *solemnity*; and even towards superiors, to whom he is lawfully obedient, the peasant displays a consciousness of his own *dignity*. – The Spanish grandeur and the grandiloquence found even in their colloquial conversation point to a noble national pride. For this reason the familiar playfulness of the French is entirely repugnant to the Spaniard. He is moderate and wholeheartedly devoted to the laws, especially those of his ancient religion. – This gravity also does not hinder him from enjoying himself on days of amusement (for example, bringing in the harvest with song and dance), and when the *fandango* is fiddled on a summer evening, there is no lack of working people now at their leisure who dance to his music in the streets. – This is his good side.

The worse side is: he does not learn from foreigners; does not travel in order to get to know other peoples;^t remains centuries behind in the sciences; resists any reform; is proud of not having to work; is of a

* The commercial spirit itself is generally unsociable, like the aristocratic spirit. One *house* (as the merchant calls his establishment) is separated from another by its business, as one *castle* is separated from another by a drawbridge, and friendly relations without ceremony are hence proscribed, except with people under the *protection* of the house, who then, however, would not be regarded as members of it.

^t The limitation of spirit of all peoples who are not prompted by disinterested curiosity to get to know the outside world with their own eyes, still less to be transplanted there (as citizens of the world), is something characteristic of them, whereby the French, English, and Germans favorably differ from other peoples.

^a (which . . . sea) not in H.

^b H: friendship.

^c im entgegengesetzten Falle. Kant's meaning here is not clear.

Marginal note in H: Russians and Poles are not capable of any autonomy. The former, because they want to be without absolute masters; the latter, because they all want to be masters.

French wit is superficial
Gondoliers and *Lazzaroni*

7: 316

romantic temperament of spirit, as the bullfight shows; is cruel, as the former *Auto da Fé* proves; and shows in his taste an origin that is partly non-European.

4. The *Italian* unites French vivacity (gaiety) with Spanish seriousness (tenacity), and his aesthetic character is a taste that is linked with affect; just as the view from his Alps down into the charming valleys presents matter for courage on the one hand and quiet enjoyment on the other. Temperament here is neither mixed nor unsteady (for then it would yield no character), rather it is a tuning of sensibility toward the feeling of the sublime, insofar as it is also compatible with the feeling of the beautiful. – His countenance manifests the strong play of his sensations, and his face is full of expression. The pleading of an Italian advocate before the bar is so full of affect that it is like a declamation on the stage.

Just as the Frenchman is preeminent in the taste for conversation, so is the Italian in the *taste for art*. The former prefers *private* amusements; the latter, *public*: pompous pageantries, processions, great spectacles, carnivals, masquerades, the splendor of public buildings, pictures drawn with the brush or in mosaic, Roman antiquities in the grand style, in order to *see* and be seen in high society. However, along with these (let us not forget self-interest) the invention of *exchange*, *banks*, and the *lottery*. – – This is his good side; and it also extends to the liberty that the *gondolieri* and *lazzaroni*^a can take toward those of high rank.

The worse side is: they converse, as Rousseau says,¹³⁴ in halls of splendor and sleep in rats' nests. Their *conversazioni* are like a stock exchange, where the lady of the house offers something tasty to a large social gathering, so that in wandering about they can share with each other the news of the day without even the necessity of friendship, and has supper with a chosen few from the group. – However, the *evil side*^b is knifings, bandits, assassins taking refuge in hallowed sanctuaries, neglect of duty^c by the police, and so forth: all of which is not so much to be blamed on the Romans as on their two-headed form of government.¹³⁵ – However, these are accusations that I can by no means justify and which the English generally circulate, who approve of no constitution but their own.

5. The *Germans* are reputed to have a good character, that is to say, one of honesty and domesticity; qualities^d that are not suited to splendor. – Of all civilized peoples, the German submits most easily and permanently to the government under which he lives, and is most distant from the rage for innovation and opposition to the established order. His character is phlegm combined with understanding; he neither rationalizes about

the already established order nor thinks one up himself. At the same time, he is nevertheless the man of all countries and climates; he emigrates easily and is not passionately bound to his fatherland. But when he goes to a foreign country as a colonist, he soon contracts with his compatriots a kind of civil union that, by unity of language and, in part, also religion, settles him as part of a little clan,^e which under the higher authority distinguishes itself in a peaceful, moral condition, through industry, cleanliness, and thrift, from settlements of all other peoples. – So goes the praise that even the English give the Germans in North America.

7: 318

Since phlegm (taken in its good sense) is the temperament of cool reflection and perseverance in the pursuit of one's ends, together with endurance of the difficulties connected with the pursuit, one can expect as much from the talent of the German's correct understanding and profoundly reflective reason as from any other people capable^f of the highest culture; except in the department of wit and artistic taste, where he perhaps may not be equal to the French, English, and Italians. -- Now this is his good side, in what can be accomplished through continuous *industry*, and for which *genius** is just not^g required; the latter of which is also far less useful than German industriousness combined with the talent for sound understanding. – In his dealings with others, the German's character is modesty. More than any other people, he learns foreign languages, he is (as Robertson puts it)¹³⁶ a *wholesale dealer* in learning, and in the field of the sciences he is the first to get to the bottom of many things that are later utilized by others with much ado; he has no national pride, and is also too cosmopolitan to be deeply attached to his homeland. However, in his own country he is more hospitable to foreigners than any other nation (as Boswell admits);¹³⁷ he strictly

* *Genius* is the talent for *discovering* that which cannot be taught or learned. One can certainly be taught by others how one should make good verses, but not how to make a good poem; for this must spring by itself from the author's nature. Therefore one cannot expect that a poem be made to order and procured as a product for a good price; rather it must be expected just like an inspiration of which the poet himself cannot say how he came by it, that is, from an occasional disposition, whose source is unknown to him (*sicut genius, natale comes qui temperat astrum*). [Horace, *Epistles* 2. 2.187. Trans.: The genius knows that companion who rules our birth star – Ed.] – Genius, therefore, flashes as a momentary phenomenon, appearing at intervals and then disappearing again; it is not a light that can be kindled at will and kept burning for as long as one pleases, but an explosive flash that a happy impulse of the spirit lures from the productive power of imagination.

^a *ibn zu einem Völkchen ansiedelt.*

^b capable . . . culture not in *H*.

^c Crossed out in *H*: not [Genius is required as a talent for producing that which cannot be <demanded> acquired through learning from another, but which can only be acquired through one's own inventiveness, such things are the works of genuine poets xx].

^a Trans.: Neapolitan street loungers, lazybones.

^b *die Schlimme.*

^c *das vernachlässigte Amt.*

^d qualities . . . splendor not in *H*.

disciplines his children toward propriety,^a just as, in accordance with his propensity to order and rule, he would rather submit to despotism than get mixed up in innovations (especially unauthorized reforms in government). — This is his good side.

7: 319

His unflattering side is his tendency to imitation and his low opinion of his own ability to be original (which is exactly the opposite of the defiant Englishman's); however, in particular there is a certain mania for method that allows him to classify other citizens punctiliously not, for example, according to a principle of approximation to equality, but rather according to degrees of superiority and order of rank; and in this schema of rank he is inexhaustible in the invention of titles (*Edlen* and *Hochedlen*, *Wohl-* and *Hochwohl-* and *Hochgeboren*),^b and thus servile out of mere pedantry.^c To be sure, all of this may be attributable to the form of the German constitution, but one should not overlook the fact that the origin of this pedantic^d form itself comes from the spirit of the nation and the natural propensity of the German to lay out a ladder between the one who is to rule down to the one who is to be ruled, each rung of which is marked with the degree of reputation proper to it. For he who has no occupation, and hence also no *title*, is, as they say, nothing. The state, which confers these titles, certainly yields a profit, but also, without paying attention to side effects, it stirs up demands of a different^e significance among the subjects, which must appear ridiculous to other peoples. In fact, this mania for punctiliousness and this need for methodical division, in order for a whole to be grasped under one concept, reveals the limitation of the German's innate talent.

Since *Russia* has *not yet* developed what is necessary for a definite concept of natural predispositions which lie ready in it; since *Poland* is *no longer* at this stage; and since the nationals of European *Turkey* *never have* attained and *never will* attain what is necessary for the acquisition of a definite national character,^f the^g sketch of them may rightly be passed over here.

Anyway,^b since the question here is about innate, natural character which, so to speak, lies in the blood mixture of the human being, not characteristics of nations that are acquired and *artificial* (or spoiled by

^a *Sittsamkeit*.

^b The approximate English translations of these titles would be: Noble, Most Noble, The Honorable, The Most Honorable, The Right Honorable.

^c *Marginal note in H:* Germans no originality in matters of spirit, rather imitation.

^d *pedantic* not in *H*.

^e *H, A1:* some of a different.

^f *ein bestimmter Volkscharakter*.

^g *A2:* the . . . here; *A1:* one must be lenient with this incomplete and uncertain sketch of national character, which rests on *demonstrative*, *remembered*, and *prognostic* evidence. [*H* is quite similar to *A1* here — Ed.]

^b Anyway added in *A2*.

too much artifice), one must therefore be very cautious in sketching them. In the character of the *Greeks* under the harsh oppression of the *Turks* and the not much lighter oppression of their own *Caloyers*,¹³⁸ their temperament (vivacity and thoughtlessness) has no more disappeared than has the structure of their bodies, their shape, and facial features. This characteristic would, presumably,^a in fact reestablish itself if, by a happy turn of events, their form^b of religion and government would provide them the freedom to reestablish themselves. — Among another Christian people, the *Armenians*, a certain commercial spirit of a special kind prevails; they wander on foot from the borders of *China* all the way to *Cape Corso* on the coast of Guinea to carry on commerce. This indicates^c a separate origin of this reasonable and industrious people who, in a line from northeast to southwest, travel through almost the whole extent of the ancient continent and who know how to secure a peaceful reception by all the peoples they encounter. And it proves that their character is superior to the fickle and groveling character of the modern Greek, the first form of which we can no longer examine. — This much we can judge with probability: that the mixture of tribes (by extensive conquests), which gradually extinguishes their characters, is not beneficial to the human race — all so-called philanthropy notwithstanding.

7: 320

D. On the character of the races

With regard to this subject I can refer to what Herr Privy Councilor *Girtanner*¹³⁹ has presented so beautifully and thoroughly in explanation and further development in his work (in accordance with my principles); I want only to make a further remark about *family kind*^d and the varieties or modifications^e that can be observed in one and the same race.

Instead of *assimilation*, which nature intended in the melting together of different races, she has here made a law of exactly the opposite: namely, in a people of the same race (for example, the white race), instead of allowing the formation of their characters constantly and progressively to approach one another in likeness — where ultimately only one and the same portrait would result, as in prints taken from the same copperplate — rather to diversify to infinity the characters of the same tribe and even of the same family in physical and mental traits. — It is true that nurses, in order to flatter one of the parents, say: “The child has this from the father, and that from the mother”; but if this were true, all forms of human generation would have been exhausted long ago, and since *fertility*

7: 321

^a Presumably not in *H*.

^b *H* and *A1:* forms.

^c indicates added by Külpe.

^d *Familienschlag*.

^e *Spielarten*.

in matings is regenerated through the heterogeneity of individuals, reproduction would have been brought to a standstill. – So, for example, ash-colored hair (*cendrée*) does not come from the mixture of a brunette with a blond, but rather signifies a particular family kind. And nature has sufficient supply on hand so that she does not have to send, for want of forms in reserve, a human being into the world who has already been there. Also, proximity of kinship notoriously results in infertility.^a

E. On the character of the species

In order to indicate a character of a certain being's species, it is necessary that it be grasped under one concept with other species known to us. But also, the characteristic property (*proprietas*) by which they differ from each other has to be stated and used as a basis for distinguishing them. – But if we are comparing a kind of being that we know (A) with another kind of being that we do not know (non-A), how then can one expect or demand to indicate a character of the former when the middle term of the comparison (*tertium comparationis*) is missing to us? – The highest species concept may be that of a *terrestrial rational* being, however we will not be able to name its character because we have no knowledge of *non-terrestrial rational* beings that would enable us to indicate their characteristic property and so to characterize this terrestrial being among rational beings in general. – It seems, therefore, that the problem of indicating the character of the human species is absolutely insoluble, because the solution would have to be made through experience by means of the comparison of two *species* of rational being, but experience does not offer us this.^b

^a Marginal note in H:

1st Stage

The human being is an animal created not merely for nature and instinct but also for fine art.

2nd Stage

Judgment of the Spaniards in Mexico

^b Crossed out in H: this. [The human being is conscious of himself not merely as an animal that can reason (*animal rationabile*), but he is also conscious, irrespective of his animality, of being a rational being (*animal rationale*); and in this quality he does not cognize himself through experience, for it <would> can never teach him the <objective> unconditional necessity <of the determination of his will> of what he is supposed to be. Rather, experience can only teach him empirically what he is or should be under empirical conditions, but with respect to himself the human being cognizes from pure reason (*a priori*) <the humanity also as a>; namely, the ideal of humanity which, in comparison to him <with which he> as a human being through the frailties of his nature as limitations of this archetype, makes the character of his species recognizable and describable <and thus can show the pure character of his species>. However, in order to appreciate this character of his species, the comparison with a standard that can<not> be found anywhere else but in perfect humanity is necessary.]

Therefore, in order to assign the human being his class in the system of animate nature, nothing remains for us than to say that he has a character, which he himself creates, insofar as he is capable of perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the *capacity of reason* (*animal rationabile*), can make out of himself a *rational animal* (*animal rationale*) – whereby he first *preserves* himself and his species;^a secondly, trains, instructs, and *educates* his species for domestic society; thirdly, *governs* it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate^b for society. But in comparison with the idea of possible rational beings on earth in general, the characteristic of the human species is this: that nature has planted in it the seed of *discord*, and has willed that its own reason bring *concord* out of this, or at least the constant approximation to it. It is true that in the *idea* concord is the *end*, but in *actuality* the^c former (discord) is the *means*, in nature's plan, of a supreme and, to us, inscrutable wisdom: to bring about the perfection of the human being through progressive culture, although with some sacrifice of his pleasures of life.

Among the living *inhabitants of the earth* the human being is markedly distinguished from all other living beings by his *technical* predisposition for manipulating things (mechanically joined with consciousness), by his *pragmatic* predisposition (to use other human beings skillfully for his purposes), and by the *moral* predisposition in his being (to treat himself and others according to the principle of freedom under laws). And any one of these three levels can by itself alone already distinguish the human being characteristically as opposed to the other inhabitants of the earth.

I. *The technical predisposition.* The questions whether the human being was originally destined to walk on four feet (as Moscati¹⁴⁰ proposed, perhaps merely as a thesis for a dissertation), or on two feet; – whether the gibbon, the orangutan, the chimpanzee, and so on are destined [for this]¹⁴¹ (wherein Linné and Camper¹⁴² disagree with each other); – whether the human being is a herbivorous or (since he has a membranous stomach) a carnivorous animal; – whether, since he has neither claws nor fangs, consequently (without reason)^d no weapons, he is by nature a predator or a peaceable animal – – the answer to these questions is of no consequence. At any rate, this question could still be raised: whether the human being by nature is a *sociable* animal or a solitary one who shies away from his neighbors? The latter is the most probable.

^a Art.

^b appropriate for society not in H.

^c the former (discord) not in H.

^d ohne Vernunft.

7: 323

A first human couple, already fully developed, put there by nature in the midst^a of food supplies, if not at the same time given a natural instinct that is nevertheless not present in us in our present natural state, is difficult to reconcile with nature's provision for the preservation of the species. The first human being would drown in the first pond he saw before him, for swimming is already an art that one must learn; or he would eat poisonous roots and fruits and thus be in constant danger of dying. But if *nature* had *implanted* this instinct into the first human couple, how was it possible that they did not transmit it to their children; something that after all never happens now?

It is true that songbirds teach their young certain songs and pass them on by tradition, so that a bird taken from the nest while still blind and reared in isolation has no song after it is grown up. But where did the first song come from;^{*} for it was not learned, and if it had arisen instinctively, why did the young not inherit it?

The characterization of the human being as a rational animal is already present in the form and organization of his *hand*, his *fingers*, and *fingertips*; partly through their structure, partly through their sensitive feeling. By this means nature^b has made the human being not suited for one way of manipulating things but undetermined for every way, consequently suited for the use of reason; and thereby has indicated the technical predisposition, or the predisposition of skill, of his species as a *rational* animal.

7: 324

II. *The pragmatic predisposition* to become civilized through culture, particularly through the cultivation of social qualities, and the natural tendency of his species in social relations to come out of the crudity of mere personal force^c and to become a well-mannered (if not yet moral) being destined for concord, is now a higher step.^d – The human being is capable of, and in need of, an education in both instruction and training (discipline). Now the question here is (with or against Rousseau)¹⁴³

* One can assume with Sir Linné the hypothesis for the archaeology of nature that from the universal ocean that covered the entire earth there first emerged an island below the equator, like a mountain, on which gradually developed all climatic degrees of warmth, from the heat on its lower shores to the arctic cold on its summit, together with the plants and animals appropriate to them. Concerning birds of all kinds, it is assumed that songbirds imitated the innate organic sounds of all different sorts of voices, and that each, so far as its throat permitted, banded together with others, whereby each species made its own particular song, which one bird later imparted through instruction to another (like a tradition). And one also observes that finches and nightingales in different countries also introduce some variety in their songs.

^a H: midst; A1 and A2: therefore.

^b By . . . nature not in H.

^c Robigkeit der bloßen Selbstgewalt.

^d is . . . step not in H.

whether the character of the human species, with respect to its natural predisposition, fares better in the *crudity* of its nature than with the *arts of culture*, where there is no end in sight? – First of all, it must be noted that with all other animals left to themselves, each individual reaches its complete destiny; however with the human being only the *species*, at best,^a reaches it; so that the human race can work its way up to its destiny only through *progress* in a series of innumerable many generations. To be sure, the goal always remains in prospect for him, but while the *tendency* to this final end can often be hindered, it can never be completely reversed.^b

III. *The moral predisposition*. The question here is: whether the human being is *good* by nature, or *evil* by nature, or whether he is by nature equally susceptible to one or the other, depending on whether this or that formative hand falls on him (*cereus in vitium flecti etc.*).^c In the latter case the *species* itself would have no character. – But this case is self-contradictory; for a being endowed with the power of practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice (a person) sees himself in this consciousness, even in the midst of the darkest representations, subject to a law of duty and to the feeling (which is then called moral feeling) that justice or injustice is done to him or, by him, to others.^d Now this in itself is already the *intelligible* character of humanity as

^a aber allenfalls nur die *Gattung*.

^b Crossed out in H: reversed [Now because the transition from the crude to the civilized condition is <unstoppable but also at the same time> not a leap but an imperceptible, progressive achievement of civilization, it is <although one can certainly point out epochs which> <first of all> as futile to warn against it and stem the tide under the pretext that natural <evil and misfortune> as well as injustice will fall with violence directly out of Pandora's box with force on the unlucky world. <On the other hand> The quiet simplicity and contentedness (of the shepherd's life), which does not require much art <and> or applied skill, remains free. But this calculation of advantage with disadvantage is incorrect. For the growth of the number of human beings in the civilized condition constricts the scope of human intentions through war. And this gives the progressive culture of the human race such a rich surplus over the loss, that the sum of virtues as well as joys of life always outweigh their opposites on the whole, and over the course of centuries they must promise a constantly growing advantage, since prudence seasoned by means of experience naturally knows how to always lead progress onto a better track.]

^c Trans.: like was molded toward evil.

^d Crossed out in H: others. [Therefore one can also raise the question whether the human being by *nature* (that is, before he can think about the determining grounds of his free doing and forbearing, consequently before he can <represent> think of a law) could be called *good* or *evil*, which is to ask whether the human being is inclined to act according to principles, to give preference to the impulses of sensual stimulus, in contrast to the motives of the moral law, or whether there is therefore in him an innate propensity, for which he must then be declared *evil* by nature. However, the human being inclined primarily toward *evil* cannot immediately be <made> declared to be an *evil human being*, for this same freedom of choice also makes it possible for reason to outweigh this propensity habitually through its maxims, though admittedly only through (continued on page 420)

such, and in this respect the human being is *good* according to his innate predispositions (good by nature). But experience nevertheless also shows that in him there is a tendency to actively desire what is unlawful, even though he knows that it is unlawful; that is, a tendency to *evil*, which stirs as inevitably and as soon as he begins to make use of his freedom, and which can therefore be considered innate. Thus, according to his *sensible* character the human being must also be judged as evil (by nature). This is not self-contradictory if one is talking about the character of the *species*; for one can assume that its natural destiny consists in continual progress toward the better.

7: 325

The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the characteristic of his formation,^a is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to *cultivate* himself, to *civilize* himself, and to *moralize* himself by means of the arts and sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself over *passively* to the impulses of ease and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by *actively* struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature.

The human being must therefore be *educated* to the good; but he who is to educate him is on the other hand a human being who still lies in the crudity of nature and who is now supposed to bring about what he himself needs. Hence the continuous deviation from his destiny with the always repeated returns to it. – Let us state the difficulties in the solution of this problem and the obstacles to solving it.

A.

The first physical determination of this problem consists in the human being's impulse to preserve his species as an animal species. – But here already the natural phases of his development refuse to coincide with the

(continued from page 419) a <new> particular resolution for each act, <but not> without as it were making a persistent propensity toward the good take root.

In other words, whether he in the crudity of his condition has a greater propensity toward that which he realizes is evil than toward that which he realizes is good and therefore also, because it is good, recognizes; consequently <which also> here would be the character of the human species.

The stages of emerging from this crudity are: that the human being is cultivated, civilized, and eventually also moralized.]

Marginal note in H: The question whether human nature is good or evil depends on the concept of what one calls evil. It is the propensity to desire what is illicit, although one knows very well that it is wrong. The crying of a child whose wish is not fulfilled, although it would be fulfilled just as little by anyone else, is malicious, and the same holds true with every craving to dominate others. – Why does a child cry at birth without shedding tears.

^a Die Charakteristik seiner Ausbildung.

civil phases. According to the *first*, the human being in his natural state, at least by his fifteenth year, is *driven* by the *sexual instinct*, and he is also *capable* of procreating and preserving his kind. According to the *second*, he can (on average) hardly venture upon it before his twentieth year. For even if, as a citizen of the world, the young man has the capacity early enough to satisfy his own inclination and his wife's; nevertheless, as a citizen of the state, he will not have the capacity for a long time to support his wife and children. – He must learn a trade, to bring in customers, in order to set up a household with his wife; but in the more refined classes of people his twenty-fifth year may well have passed before he is mature for his vocation. – Now with what does he fill up this interval of a forced and unnatural abstinence? Scarcely with anything else but vices.

B.

The drive to acquire science, as a form of culture that ennobles humanity, has altogether no proportion to the life span of the species. The scholar, when he has advanced in culture to the point where he himself^a can broaden the field, is called away by death, and his place is taken by the mere beginner who, shortly before the end of his life, after he too has just taken one step forward, in turn relinquishes his place to another. – What a mass of knowledge, what discoveries of new methods would now be on hand if an Archimedes, a Newton, or a Lavoisier¹⁴⁴ with their diligence and talent would have been favored by nature with a hundred years of continuous life without decrease of vitality! But the progress of the species is always only fragmentary (according to time) and offers no guarantee against regression, with which it is always threatened by intervening revolutionary barbarism.^b

C.

The species seems to fare no better in achieving its destiny with respect to *happiness*, which man's nature constantly impels him to strive for; however, reason limits the condition of worthiness to be happy; that is, morality. – One certainly need not accept as his real opinion the hypochondriac (ill-humored) portrayal which Rousseau paints of the human species, when it ventures out of the state of nature, for a recommendation to re-enter that state and return to the woods. By means of this picture he expressed our species' difficulty in walking the path of continuous approximation to its destiny. The portrayal is not a fabrication: – the experience of ancient and modern times must disconcert every thinking person and make him doubt whether our species will ever fare better.^c

^a A1 and A2: himself; H: rightly.

^b staatsumwälzende Barbarei.

^c Marginal notes in H: [The prosecutor – lawyer and judge. The intermediary one is he who is instructed to defend any matter, be it illusion or truth to him.]

(continued on page 422)

7: 326

7: 327

Rousseau wrote three works on the damage done to our species by 1) leaving nature for *culture*, which weakened our strength,^a 2) *civilization*, which caused inequality and mutual oppression, 3) presumed *moralization*, which brought about unnatural education and the deformation of our way of thinking. – These three works,¹⁴⁵ I maintain, which present the state of nature as a state of *innocence* (a paradise guarded against our return by the gatekeeper with a fiery sword), should serve his *Social Contract*, *Émile*, and *Savoyard Vicar* only as a guiding thread for finding our way out of the labyrinth of evil with which our species has surrounded itself by its own fault. – Rousseau did not really want the human being to go back to the state of nature, but rather to look back at it from the stage where he now stands. He assumed that the human being is good *by nature* (as far as nature allows good to be transmitted), but good in a negative way; that is, he is not evil of his own accord and on purpose,^b but only in danger of being infected and ruined by evil or inept leaders and examples. Since, however, good human beings, who must themselves have been educated for this purpose, are necessary for moral education, and since there is probably not one among them who has no (innate or acquired) corruption in himself, the problem of moral education for our *species* remains unsolved even in the quality of the principle, not merely in degree, because an innate evil tendency in our species may be censured by common human reason, and perhaps also restrained, but it will thereby still not have been eradicated.

In a civil constitution, which is the highest degree of artificial improvement^c of the human species' good predisposition to the final end of its destiny, *animality* still manifests itself earlier and, at bottom, more powerfully than pure^d *humanity*. Domestic animals are more useful to the human being than wild animals only because of *weakening*. The human being's self-will^e is always ready to break out in aversion toward his neighbor, and he always presses his claim to unconditional freedom; freedom not merely to be independent of others, but even to be master over other beings who^f by nature are equal to him – which one even

(continued from page 421)

That there is a cosmopolitan predisposition in the human species, even with all the wars, which gradually in the course of political matters wins the upper hand over the selfish predispositions of peoples.

^a *H*: nature's strength.

^b and on purpose not in *H*.

^c *der höchste Grad der künstlichen Steigerung*.

^d pure not in *H*.

^e *der eigene Wille*.

^f who . . . him not in *H*.

notices already in the smallest child.* This is because nature within the human being strives to lead him from culture to morality, and not (as reason prescribes) beginning with morality and its law, to lead him to a culture designed to be appropriate to morality. This inevitably establishes a perverted, inappropriate tendency: for example,^a when religious instruction, which necessarily should be a *moral culture*, begins with *historical culture*, which is merely the culture of memory, and tries in vain to deduce morality from it.

The education of the human race, taking its species as a *whole*, that is, *collectively (universorum)*, not all of the individuals (*singulorum*), where the multitude does not yield a system but only an aggregate gathered together; and the tendency toward an envisaged civil constitution, which is to be based on the principle of freedom but at the same time on the principle of constraint in accordance with law: the human being expects these only from *Providence*; that is, from a wisdom that is not *his*, but which is still (through his own fault)^b an impotent *idea* of his own reason. – This education from^c above, I maintain, is salutary but harsh and stern in the cultivation^d of nature, which extends through great hardship and almost to the extinction of the entire race. It consists in bringing forth the *good* which the human being has not intended, but which continues to maintain itself once it is there, from *evil*, which is always internally at odds with itself. Providence signifies precisely the same wisdom that

* The cry of a newborn child is not the sound of distress but rather of indignation and furious anger; not because something hurts him, but because something annoys him: presumably because he wants to move and his inability to do so feels like a fetter through which his freedom is taken away from him. – What could nature's intention be here in letting the child come into the world with loud cries which, *in the crude state of nature*, are extremely dangerous for himself and his mother? For a wolf or even a pig would thereby be lured to eat the child, if the mother is absent or exhausted from childbirth. However, no animal except the human being (as he is now) will *loudly announce* his existence at the moment of birth; which seems to have been so arranged by the wisdom of nature in order to preserve the species. One must therefore assume that in the first epoch of nature with respect to this class of animals (namely, in the time of crudity), this crying of the child at birth did not yet exist; and then only later a second epoch set in, when both parents had already reached the level of culture necessary for *domestic* life; without our knowing how, or through what contributing causes, nature brought about such a development. This remark leads far; for example, to the thought that upon major upheavals in nature this second epoch might be followed by a third, when an orangutan or a chimpanzee formed the organs used for walking, for handling objects, and for speaking, into the structure of a human being, whose innermost part contained an organ for the use of the understanding and which developed gradually through social culture.

^a for example . . . it not in *H*.

^b "(through . . . fault)" not found in *H*.

^c from . . . maintain not in *H*.

^d *Bearbeitung*.

7: 328

7: 329

we observe with admiration in the preservation of a species of organized natural beings, constantly working toward its destruction and yet always being protected, without therefore assuming a higher principle in such provisions than we assume to be in use already in the preservation of plants and animals. – As for the rest, the human species should and *can* itself be the creator of its good fortune; however, that it *will* do so cannot be inferred *a priori* from what is known to us about its natural predispositions, but only from experience and history, with expectation as well grounded as is necessary for us not to despair of its progress toward the better, but to promote its approach to this goal with all prudence and moral illumination (each to the best of his ability).

One can therefore say that the first character^a of the human being is the capacity as a rational being to obtain a character as such for his own person as well as for the society in which nature has placed him. This capacity, however, presupposes an already favorable natural predisposition and a tendency to the good in him; for evil is really without character (since it carries within itself conflict with itself and permits no lasting principle in itself).^b

The character of a living being is that which allows its destiny to be cognized in advance. – However, for the ends of nature one can assume as a principle that nature wants every creature to reach its destiny through the appropriate development of all predispositions of its nature, so that at least the species, if not every *individual*, fulfills nature's purpose. – With irrational animals this actually happens and is the wisdom of nature; however with human beings only the species reaches it. We know of only one species of rational beings on earth; namely, the human species,^c in which we also know only one natural tendency^d to this end; namely, some day to bring about, by its own activity, the development of good out of evil. This is a prospect that can be expected with moral *certainty* (sufficient certainty for the duty of working toward this end), unless upheavals in nature suddenly cut it short. – For there are human beings; that is, to be sure malicious, but nevertheless ingenious rational beings who are also endowed with a moral predisposition. With the advance of culture they feel ever more strongly the ill which they selfishly inflict on one another; and since they see no other remedy for it than to subjugate the private interest (of the individual) to the public interest (of all united),

^a H: character trait.

^b Marginal note in H: Quite different is the answer to the question, what one should do in order to furnish *conviction* for the moral law rather than just *entry*.

^c H: and in fact in a long line of generations, until it also ends, although in an ideal prospect, each individual also promises to meet.

^d H: of rational beings.

they subjugate themselves, though reluctantly, to a discipline (of civil constraint). But in doing so they subjugate themselves only according to laws they themselves have given, and they feel themselves ennobled by this consciousness; namely, of belonging to a species that is suited to the destiny of the human being, as reason represents it to him in the ideal.^e

7: 330

Main features of the description of the human species' character

I. The human being was not meant to belong to a herd, like cattle, but to a hive,^f like the bee. – *Necessity* to be a member of some civil society or other.

The simplest, least artificial way to establish such a society is to have one leader in this hive^c (monarchy). – But many such hives next to each other will soon attack each other like robber bees (war); not, however, as human beings do, in order to strengthen their own group by uniting with others – for here the comparison ends – but only to use by cunning or force *others'* industry *for themselves*. Each people seeks to strengthen itself through the subjugation of neighboring peoples, either from the desire to expand or the fear of being swallowed up by the other unless one beats him to it. Therefore civil or foreign war in our species, as great an evil as it may be, is yet at the same time the incentive to pass from the crude state of nature to the *civil* state. War is like a mechanical device of Providence, where to be sure the struggling forces injure each other through collision, but are nevertheless still regularly kept going for a long time through the push and pull of other incentives.

II. *Freedom* and *law* (by which freedom is limited) are the two pivots around which civil legislation turns. – But in order for law to be

^a Marginal note in H: The character of the species can only be drawn from history.

That the human species taken *collectively* possesses in itself a striving toward artistic skill through which the selfishness of all individuals (*singulorum*) works toward the happiness of all (*universorum*) by means of the moral predisposition.

The character of the species is that the human race as a whole has a natural tendency to always become better.

The species can be considered collectively as a whole or distributively as the logical unity of the concept of the human being.

The character of the species cannot be constituted historically through history alone. This is to be understood only of the human species as animal species. – It can be inferred from reason, provided that reason subjectively knows and modifies itself, individually and in relation to others.

^b Stock.

^c Korb. H: Stock.

effective and not an empty recommendation, a middle term* must be added; namely, *force*,^a which, when connected with freedom, secures success for these principles. – Now one can conceive of four combinations of force with freedom and law:

- A. Law and freedom without force (anarchy).
- B. Law and force without freedom (despotism).
- C. Force without freedom and law (barbarism).
- D. Force with freedom and law (republic).

7: 33¹

One sees that only the last combination deserves to be called a true civil constitution; by which, however, one does not have in view one of the three forms of state (democracy), but understands by *republic* only a state as such. And the old Brocardian dictum: *Salus civitatis (not civium) suprema lex esto*^b does not mean that the physical well-being of the community (the *happiness* of the citizens) should serve as the supreme principle of the state constitution; for this well-being, which each individual depicts to himself according to his personal inclination in this way or that, is no good at all for an objective principle, which requires universality. The dictum says only that the *rational well-being*,^c the preservation of the *state constitution* once it exists, is the highest law of a civil society as such; for society endures only as a result of that constitution.^d

* By analogy with the *medius terminus* in a syllogism which, when connected with the subject and predicate of the judgment, yields the four syllogistic figures.

^a *Gewalt*.

^b Trans.: The well-being of the state (not of the citizens) shall be the highest law. Compare Cicero, *De Legibus* 3.3: “*Salus populi suprema lex esto*” (the well-being of the people shall be the highest law). The version of the dictum cited by Kant can be traced to the collection of church laws compiled by Bishop Burchard (“*Brocard*” in French and Italian) of Worms (d. 1025). Most of the laws were formulated as proverbs.

^c *Verstandeswohl*.

^d Crossed out in H: constitution. [Now regarding what belongs to a character of the human species, this is not gathered from history in the way that it shows other human beings in different times and in different lands. For with the mixture of good and evil, which they display according to different occasional causes, sometimes the result would turn out favorably for them and sometimes unfavorably. Therefore the most extensive and most careful interpretation <according to> of history can give no safe teaching here. But to attempt the inner examination of how one is held together, and how one will be judged by <other> one's fellow human beings, *reveals* his character, which consists precisely in not *revealing* oneself. And at least in the case of a negative semblance, he will deceive others to his advantage in their judgment concerning him. Therefore his character consists in the propensity to lying, which not only proves a lack of frankness, but also a lack of sincerity, which is the hereditary cancer of the human species. – And so the character of the species consists in the attempt not to allow character to be visible and to take each of these searching looks or investigations for affronts.]

The character of the species, as it is known^a from the experience of all ages and by all peoples, is this: that, taken collectively (the *human race* as one whole), it is a multitude of persons, existing successively and side by side, who cannot *do without* being together peacefully and yet cannot *avoid* constantly being objectionable to one another.^b Consequently, they feel destined by nature to [develop], through mutual compulsion under laws that come from themselves, into a *cosmopolitan society (cosmopolitismus)* that is constantly threatened by disunion but generally progresses toward a coalition. In itself it is an unattainable idea but not a constitutive principle (the principle of anticipating lasting peace amid the most vigorous actions and reactions of human beings). Rather, it is only a regulative principle: to pursue this diligently as the destiny of the human race, not without grounded supposition^c of a natural tendency toward it.

If one now asks whether the human species (which, when one thinks of it as a species of rational *beings on earth*^d in comparison with rational beings on other planets, as^e a multitude of creatures arising from one demiurge, can also be called a *race*) – whether, I say, it is to be regarded as a good or bad race, then I must confess that there is not much to boast about in it. Nevertheless, anyone^f who takes a look at human behavior not only in ancient history but also in recent history will often be tempted to take the part of *Timon* the misanthropist in his judgment; but far more often, and more to the point, that of *Momus*,¹⁴⁶ and find foolishness^g rather than malice the most striking characteristic mark of our species. But since foolishness combined with a lineament of malice (which is then called folly)^b is not to be underestimated in the moral physiognomy of our species, it is already clear enough from the concealment of a good part of one's thoughts, which every prudent human being finds necessary,ⁱ that in our race everyone finds it advisable to be on his guard and not to allow others to view *completely* how he is. This already betrays the propensity of our species to be evil-minded toward one another.

It could well be that on some other planet there might be rational beings who could not think in any other way but aloud; that is, they

^a *kundbar*.

^b *das friedliche Beisammen nicht entbehren und dabei dennoch einander beständig widerwärtig zu sein nicht vermeiden können*.

^c *nicht ohne gegründete Vermutung*.

^d H: *beings*.

^e as . . . demiurge not in H.

^f Külp: anyone; H, A1, and A2: no one.

^g *Torheit*.

^b *Narrheit*.

ⁱ Marginal note in H: There could be beings that would not be able to think without speaking at the same time, therefore they could only think aloud. These beings would have an entirely different character than the human species.

7: 33²

7: 333

could not have any thoughts that they did not at the same time *utter*, whether awake or dreaming, in the company of others or alone. What kind of behavior^a toward others would this produce, and how would it differ from that of our human species? Unless they were all *pure as angels*, it is inconceivable how they could live in peace together, how anyone could have any respect at all for anyone else, and how they could get on well together. – So it already belongs to the original composition of a human creature and to the concept of his species to explore the thoughts of others but to withhold one's own; a neat quality^b which then does not fail to progress gradually from *dissimulation* to intentional *deception* and finally to *lying*.^c This would then result in a caricature of our species that would warrant* not mere good-natured *laughter* at it but *contempt* for what constitutes its character, and the admission that this race of terrestrial rational beings deserves no honorable place among the (to us unknown) other rational beings – except that precisely this condemning judgment reveals a moral predisposition in us, an innate demand of reason, to also work against this propensity. So it presents the human species not as evil, but as a species of rational being that strives among obstacles to rise out of evil in constant progress toward the good.

7: 333

* Frederick II once asked the excellent *Sulzer*, whom he valued according to his merits and whom he had entrusted with the administration of the schools in Silesia, how things were going there. Sulzer replied, “They’re beginning to go better, now that we built on the principle (of Rousseau’s) that the human being is good by nature.” “Ah (said the king), *mon cher Sulzer, vous ne connaissez pas assez cette maudite race à laquelle nous appartenons.*” [Trans.: my dear Sulzer, you don’t really know this wretched race to which we belong – Ed.] – It also belongs to the character of our species that, in striving toward a civil constitution, it also needs a discipline by religion, so that what cannot be achieved by *external* constraint can be brought about by *internal* constraint (the constraint of conscience). For the moral predisposition of the human being is used politically by legislators, a tendency that belongs to the character of the species. However, if morals do not precede religion in this discipline of the people, then religion makes itself lord over morals, and statutory religion becomes an instrument of state authority (politics) under *religious despots*: an evil that inevitably upsets and misguides character by governing it with *deception* (called statecraft). While *publicly* professing to be merely the first servant of the state, that great monarch could not conceal the contrary in his agonizing private confession, but he excused himself by attributing this corruption to the evil *race* called the human species. [Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–79), aesthetician, member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, translator of Hume’s *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1756). See also Kant’s reply to “a letter from the late excellent Sulzer” in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* 4: 410n. However, according to Külpe, Sulzer was never appointed administrator of the schools in Silesia, and only spoke personally with the King on one occasion. Kant’s report of this alleged discussion perhaps comes from Christoph Friedrich Nicolai, *Anekdoten von König Friedrich II. Von Preussen*, 2nd edn. (1790) – Ed.]

^a *H*: behavior; *A1* and *A2*: an effect.

^b *saubere Eigenschaft*.

^c lying: *Lüge*; intentional deception: *vorsätzliche Täuschung*; dissimulation: *Verstellung*.

In this its volition is generally good, but achievement is difficult because one cannot expect to reach the goal by the free agreement of *individuals*, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system^a that is cosmopolitan united.^b

^a crossed out in *H*: in its mutual subordination.

^b *in und zu der Gattung als einem System, das kosmopolitisch verbunden ist.*

Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's *Lithuanian–German and* *German–Lithuanian dictionary*

Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's dictionary

his sympathies with the preservation and study of Lithuanian culture, as embodied in the Lithuanian language. The *Postscript* is the last work of Kant's that he himself published.

The translation of *Nachschrift zu Christian Gottlieb Mielckes Litauisch-deutschem und deutsch-litauischem Wörterbuch* is based on the presentation of the work in AA 8: 443–5 and was undertaken by Günter Zöller.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

In 1800 the Protestant Cantor, Christian Gottlieb Mielcke (1733–1807), published a bilingual Lithuanian–German dictionary that was based on a previous work dating from 1747 by the Protestant pastor, Philipp Ruhig (1675–1749), who had also published the first collection of Lithuanian folk songs. The work appeared in Königsberg with the publisher Hartung and included, as announced in the detailed subtitle, a preface by Mielcke, a second preface by the Berlin Protestant preacher and deacon, Daniel Jenisch (1762–1804), a third preface by the Königsberg church and school official, Christoph Friedrich Heilsberg (1726 or 1727–1804), and a “postscript of Herr Professor Kant”. Jenisch had been a student of Kant's and had gone on to publish on Kant's moral philosophy. Heilsberg and Kant had been fellow students. The Mielcke family (Milkus in Lithuanian) belonged to the Lithuanian minority that lived in Eastern Prussia (part of the Duchy and later Kingdom of Prussia), constituting Little Lithuania, which was predominantly Protestant. The majority of Lithuanians had lived in the dominantly catholic Grand Duchy of Lithuania that had been politically united with Poland since the sixteenth century. With the three Partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, 1793, and 1795 among Russia, Prussia and Austria, the Lithuanians' territories fell to Russia, and the Grand Duchy ceased to exist.

Against this background of a nation that had vanished from the political map of Europe, Kant is pleading for the preservation of Lithuanian culture and language in Prussia. Kant's postscript is remarkable for the close tie that it establishes, almost in passing, between the culture of a people and its language, for the idea that a language can preserve distant historical facts such as peoples' migrations, and for its anthropological focus on the social character of the Lithuanian people. Kant's brief text also contains an aside on the Poles recently incorporated into Prussia, arguing for the continued public use of the Polish language in their schools and churches. Kant's postscript, titled that “of a friend,” shows

Postscript to Christian Gottlieb
Mielcke's *Lithuanian-German and*
German-Lithuanian dictionary

P R E F A C E

POSTSCRIPT OF A FRIEND

From the preceding description¹ of the Prussian Lithuanian one can see that he very much deserves to be preserved in the peculiarity^a of his character and, since language is an excellent means of guiding the former's formation and preservation, also in the purity of his language in the instruction in schools as well as from the pulpit. I further add to this the following: that he is farther from slavishness than the neighboring peoples,^b that he is used to talking with his superiors in a tone of equality and trusting frankness, which the superiors also do not mind nor coldly refuse a handshake, because they also find him consenting to everything that is fair. This is a pride quite different from all haughtiness of a certain neighboring nation,^c to be encountered when someone among them is more noble, or rather it is a feeling of his worth, which indicates courage and at once guarantees his loyalty.

But even apart from the usefulness which the state can draw from the assistance of a people of such character, it is to be considered no small advantage which the sciences, especially the ancient history of the migrations of peoples, can draw from the still unmixed language of a very old tribe of people^d that is now restricted to a small area and, as it were, isolated. Hence to preserve its peculiarity is in itself already of great worth. *Büsching* deplored therefore the early death of the learned Professor Thunmann in Halle,² who had dedicated his powers to these investigations with somewhat too large an exertion. – In general, even if such great yield were not to be expected from every language, it is still of importance for the formation of every small people^e in a country, e.g., in Prussian Poland, to instruct it in the schools and from the pulpit

according to the model of the purest (in this case, Polish) language, even if the latter were spoken only outside the country, and to make this language more and more current, because thereby the language becomes more suited to the peculiarity of the people and the latter's comprehension^f becomes more enlightened.

I. Kant

^f *Begriff desselben.*

^a *Eigentümlichkeit.*

^b *Völker.*

^c *Nation.*

^d *Völkerstamm.*

^e *Völklein.*

Lectures on pedagogy

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

The *Lectures on Pedagogy* stem from a course on practical pedagogy that the philosophy faculty at the University of Königsberg was required to offer as well as to rotate among its professors. Kant taught the course four times: winter semester 1776–7, summer semester 1780, winter semester 1783–4, winter semester 1786–7. His text the first time he offered the course was Johann Bernhard Basedow's *Methodenbuch für Väter und Mütter der Familien und Völker* (Altoona and Bremen, 1770). In 1774 Basedow had founded the Philanthropinum Institute in Dessau, a Rousseau-inspired educational experiment that Kant greatly admired. (See also Kant's *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum*, pp. 100–4 in this volume.) From 1780 on Kant was required to use his former colleague Friedrich Samuel Bock's book, *Lehrbuch der Erziehungskunst zum Gebrauch für christliche Eltern und künftige Jugendlehrer* (Königsberg and Leipzig, 1780). However, in keeping with his general practice regarding the “required text rules” that were common at the time, Kant's own lecture notes follow neither Basedow nor Bock at all closely.

Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert, co-editor of the first collected edition of Kant's works, reports that towards the end of his life Kant offered his lecture notes on pedagogy – “which according to the habit of the philosopher consisted in individual scraps of paper (*einzelne Papierschnitzel*)” – to his younger colleague Friedrich Theodor Rink, “in order to select out from them the most useful ones for the public.”¹ Rink (1770–1811) studied theology in Königsberg from 1786–9 (during which time he attended some of Kant's lectures), and returned to the university in 1792 to lecture as a *Privatdozent*. During 1792–3 he was a frequent dinner guest at Kant's home. In 1794 (at the age of only twenty-four) he was appointed associate professor of oriental languages, promoted to full professor in 1797, and in 1800 he became full professor of theology. From 1801 until the end of his life he served as a pastor in Danzig. Kant also entrusted Rink with the editing of his *Lectures on Physical Geography* (9: 151–436). Other publications of Rink's concerning Kant include a biography, *Ansichten*

aus Immanuel Kant's Leben (Königsberg: Göbbels and Unzer, 1805); as well as an edited anthology, *Sammlung einer bisher unbekannt gebliebener kleiner Schriften von Immanuel Kant* (Königsberg, 1800).

Unfortunately, the original *Papierschnitzel* that Kant handed over to Rink have not survived. As a result, it is not possible to know for certain whether Rink published all or only some of Kant's notes on education, whether he rearranged the order of those that he did publish, whether words or phrases were deleted or added, etc. What is certain is that the resulting book published by Rink (*Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik*, ed. D. Friedrich Theodor Rink [Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1803]) is not well organized and is at times repetitive. As a result, over the years various attempts have been made by later editors to improve upon Rink's effort, chiefly by rearranging portions of his text. However, without Kant's original notes, all such interpretive speculations seem imprudent at best. As Paul Natorp, editor of the Academy edition of the text, writes: “as regards the arrangement of the material, in the absence of a secure basis of possible correction it seems necessary to reprint Rink's text without alterations” (9: 570).

The present translation is based on Natorp's text (9: 437–99), with one exception. I have chosen not to include Rink's short Preface and occasional footnotes. Here I side with Schubert: “the insignificant remarks of Rink have been left out, because they themselves do not add to the fragmentary papers offered by Kant himself, but only superficially add some literary notes.”² In preparing the translation, I have also compared Natorp's text to the following additional German editions: *Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik*, ed. D. Friedrich Theodor Rink (Königsberg: Friedrich Nicolovius, 1803) (here I would also like to extend my thanks to the staff at the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek in Göttingen, for securing a photocopy of this important text for my personal use); *Über Pädagogik. Mit Kant's Biographie*, ed. Theodor Vogt (Langensalza: Hermann Beyer and Sons, 1878); *Über Pädagogik*, ed. Hermann Holstein (Bochum: Ferdinand Kamp, 1961); *Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik* 2 – vol. 12 of Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968); Traugott Weisskopf, *Immanuel Kant und die Pädagogik: Beiträge zu einer Monographie* (Zürich: Editio Academia, 1970) (Weisskopf, in addition to reprinting Rink's original text, also explores in great detail the background of Kant's *Lectures*, Rink's editing work, previous scholarly opinions of it, etc.); and *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Pädagogik und ihrer Begründung*, ed. Hans-Hermann Groothoff, 2nd edn. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982).

Lectures on Pedagogy has been translated into English twice previously – *Kant on Education*, translated by Annette Churton, with an Introduction by C. A. Foley Rhys Davids (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner

& Co. Ltd, 1899; reprinted Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992); and *The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant*, translated and edited with an introduction by Edward Franklin Buchner (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott company, 1904; reprint New York: AMS Press, 1971). I owe a debt to each of these previous translators. However, both Churton and Buchner base their translations on Theodor Vogt's edition, *Über Pädagogik. Mit Kant's Biographie* (Langensalza: Hermann Beyer and Sons, 1878). Because Vogt's text is the most influential of the editorial rearrangement efforts referred to earlier, the order in which they present Kant's lecture note materials differs somewhat from what follows.

Lectures on pedagogy

9:437

The human being is the only creature that must be educated. By education we mean specifically care (maintenance, support), discipline (training) and instruction, together with formation.^a Accordingly, the human being is first infant, then pupil, and then apprentice.

Animals use their powers as soon as they have any in a regular manner; that is to say, in such a way that they do not harm themselves. It is indeed wonderful to note, for instance, that young swallows, when scarcely hatched out of their eggs and still blind, nevertheless know how to make their own excrement fall out of their nests. This is why animals need no care, but at most food, warmth, and guidance or a certain protection. Most animals indeed need nourishment, but not care. For by care is meant the precaution of the parents that children not make any harmful use of their powers. For example, were an animal to cry immediately when it comes into the world, as children do, it would inevitably become the prey of wolves and other wild animals, who would be attracted by its crying.

Discipline or training changes animal nature into human nature. An animal is already all that it can be because of its instinct; a foreign intelligence^b has already taken care of everything for it. But the human being needs his own intelligence. He has no instinct and must work out the plan of his conduct for himself. However, since the human being is not immediately in a position to do this, because he is in a raw state when he comes into the world, others must do it for him.

The human species is supposed to bring out, little by little, humanity's entire natural predisposition by means of its own effort.¹ One generation educates the next. One can see the first beginnings of education in either a crude or in a perfect, developed state. If the latter is assumed to have preceded and come first, then the human being must, however, afterwards have once more grown savage and fallen into a raw state.

9:441

^a *Bildung*. Kant often uses this term very broadly to refer to the entire process of spiritual or mental formation. Thus it can also encompass "education," "instruction," "discipline," and "culture."

^b *eine fremde Vernunft*.

9:442

Discipline prevents the human being from deviating by means of his animal impulses from his destiny: humanity.² Discipline, for example, must restrain him so that he does not wildly and thoughtlessly put himself in danger. Training is therefore merely negative, that is to say, it is the action by means of which man's tendency to savagery is taken away. Instruction, on the other hand, is the positive part of education.

Savagery^a is independence from laws. Through discipline the human being is submitted to the laws of humanity and is first made to feel their constraint. But this must happen early. Thus, for example, children are sent to school initially not already with the intention that they should learn something there, but rather that they may grow accustomed to sitting still and observing punctually what they are told, so that in the future they may not put into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them.

Now by nature the human being has such a powerful propensity towards freedom that when he has grown accustomed to it for a while, he will sacrifice everything for it.³ And it is precisely for this reason that discipline must, as already said, be applied very early; for if this does not happen, it is difficult to change the human being later on. He then follows every whim. It is also observable in savage nations that, though they may be in the service of Europeans for a long time, they can never grow accustomed to the European way of life. But with them this is not a noble propensity towards freedom, as Rousseau and others believe; rather it is a certain raw state in that the animal in this case has so to speak not yet developed the humanity inside itself. Therefore the human being must be accustomed early to subject himself to the precepts of reason. If he is allowed to have his own way and is in no way opposed in his youth, then he will retain a certain savagery throughout his life. And it is also of no help to those who in their youth have been spared by all too much motherly affection, for later on they will be opposed all the more from all sides, and receive blows everywhere, as soon as they get involved in the business of the world.

9: 443

It is a common error made in the education of princes that, because they are destined to become rulers, no one really opposes them in their youth. Because of the human being's propensity towards freedom, a polishing of his crudity is necessary; whereas with the animal, on account of its instincts, this is not necessary.

The human being needs care and formation. Formation includes training and instruction. These, as far as we know, no animal needs. For none of them learns anything from the parents, except birds, in their singing. This they are taught by the parents, and it is touching to see when, just like in a school, the mother bird sings to her young with

^a Wildheit.

all her might and they try to bring out the same tones with their small throats. In order to convince oneself that birds do not sing by instinct, but actually learn it, it is worth the trouble to do a test by taking away about half of the eggs from a canary, and put sparrows' eggs in their place; or by perhaps exchanging very young sparrows for young canaries. If one then brings the young sparrows into a room, where they cannot hear the sparrows outside, they learn the canaries' song, and one gets singing sparrows. It is indeed very admirable that each species of bird, through all the generations, retains a certain main song; and the tradition of the song may well be the most faithful in the world.

The human being can only become human through education. He is nothing except what education makes out of him. It must be noted that the human being is educated only by human beings, human beings who likewise have been educated. That is also why the lack of discipline and instruction in some people makes them in turn bad educators of their pupils. If some day a being of a higher kind were to look after our education, then one would see what the human being could become. But since education partly teaches the human being something and partly merely develops something within him, one can never know how far his natural predispositions reach. If at least an experiment were conducted here through support of the rulers and through the united powers of many people, then we might even by this means gain disclosure as to how far the human being might rise. But it is as important for the speculative mind as it is sad for the philanthropist to observe how the rulers for the most part care only for themselves and take no part in the important experiments of education in such a manner that nature may take a step closer to perfection.

There is no one who, having been neglected in his youth, would not recognize in mature age in what regard he had been neglected, whether as regards discipline or as regards culture^a (the latter being another term for instruction). He who is uncultured is raw; he who is undisciplined is savage.^b Omission of discipline is a greater evil than omission of culture, for the latter can be made up for later in life; but savagery cannot be taken away, and negligence in discipline can never be made good. Perhaps education will get better and better and each generation will move one step closer to the perfection of humanity; for behind education lies the great secret of the perfection of human nature. Henceforth this may happen. Because now for the first time we are beginning to judge rightly and understand clearly what actually belongs to a good education. It is delightful to imagine that human nature will be developed better and better by means of education, and that the latter can be brought into a

^a Kultur.

^b wild.

9: 444

form appropriate for humanity. This opens to us the prospect of a future happier human species.⁴ –

An outline of a theory of education is a noble ideal, and it does no harm if we are not immediately in a position to realize it. One must be careful not to consider the idea to be chimerical and disparage it as a beautiful dream, simply because in its execution hindrances occur.

9: 445

An idea is nothing other than the concept of a perfection which is not yet to be found in experience – as is the case of a perfect republic governed by rules of justice. Is the latter therefore impossible? If our idea is only correct, then it is by no means impossible, despite all of the obstacles which stand in the way of its execution. If, for example, everyone were to lie, would truth-telling therefore become a mere whim?⁵ Now the idea of education which develops all the human being's natural predispositions is indeed truthful.

With the present education the human being does not fully reach the purpose of his existence. For how differently do people live! There can only be uniformity among them if they act according to the same principles, and these principles would have to become their second nature. What we can do is work out the plan of an education more suited to the human being's purpose and hand down instructions to that effect to posterity, which can realize the plan little by little. It is observable, for instance, that the auricula only bears flowers of one and the same color when cultivated from a root. On the other hand, if it is grown from seed one gets flowers of totally different and most varied colors. Thus nature has after all placed the germs^b in these plants, and it is merely a matter of proper sowing and planting that these germs develop in the plants. The same holds true with human beings.

Many germs lie within humanity, and now it is our business to develop the natural dispositions proportionally and to unfold humanity from its germs and to make it happen that the human being reaches his vocation.^c Animals fulfill their vocation automatically and unknowingly. The human being must first seek to reach his, but this cannot happen if he does not even have a concept of his vocation. It is also completely impossible for the individual to reach the vocation. Let us assume a fully formed first human couple, and let us see how they educate their pupils. The first parents already give the children an example which the latter imitate, and that way some natural predispositions are developed. But not all predispositions can be developed in this manner, for the children only see these examples in occasional circumstances. Formerly, human beings did not even have a conception of the perfection which human

^a eine bloße Grille.

^b Keime.

^c Bestimmung – also “destiny.”

nature can reach. We ourselves are not even yet clear about this concept. But this much is certain, that individual human beings, no matter what degree of formation they are able to bring to their pupils, cannot make it happen that they reach their vocation. Not individual human beings, but rather the human species, shall get there.

Education is an art, the practice of which must be perfected over 9: 446

the course of many generations. Each generation, provided with the knowledge of the preceding ones, is ever more able to bring about an education which develops all of the human being's natural predispositions proportionally and purposively, thus leading the whole human species towards its vocation. – Providence has willed that the human being shall bring forth by himself that which is good, and he speaks, as it were, to him: “Go forth into the world,” so might the creator address humanity, “I have equipped you with all predispositions toward the good. It is up to you to develop them, and thus your own happiness and unhappiness depend on you yourself.” –

It is the human being himself who is supposed to first develop his predispositions toward the good. Providence has not placed them already finished in him; they are mere predispositions and without the distinction of morality. The human being shall make himself better, cultivate himself, and, if he is evil, bring forth morality in himself. If one thinks this over carefully, one finds that it is very difficult. That is why education is the greatest and most difficult problem that can be given to the human being. For insight depends on education and education in turn depends on insight. For that reason education can only move forward slowly and step by step, and a correct concept of the manner of education can only arise if each generation transmits its experience and knowledge to the next, each in turn adding something before handing it over to the next. What great culture and experience does this concept therefore not presuppose? It could accordingly originate only late, and we ourselves have not yet got completely clear about it. Now should the education of the individual imitate the course followed by the development of humanity in general through its different generations?⁵

Two human inventions can probably be regarded as the most difficult, namely the arts of government and education; and yet there is still controversy about their very idea.

But from where do we start to develop the human predispositions? Shall we start from the crude^a state or from an already developed state? It is difficult to imagine a development out of a crude state (hence also the concept of the first human being is so difficult), and we see that in a development from such a state he has again and again fallen back into a crude state from which he has then once more raised himself. In the

9: 447

^a rob – also “raw,” “unrefined.”

earliest written accounts of even very cultured peoples who have left us excellent records we find something bordering closely on a crude state. – And yet how much culture is not already required for writing? As regards civilization, the beginning of the art of writing could thus be called the beginning of the world.

Since the development of the natural predispositions in the human being does not take place by itself, all education is – an art. – Nature has placed no instinct in him for this. – The origin as well as the continuation of this art is either *mechanical*, without plan and ordered by given circumstances, or *judicious*. The art of education arises mechanically only on those chance occasions when we learn by experience whether something is harmful or useful to people. All educational art which arises merely mechanically must carry with it many mistakes and defects, because it has no plan for its foundation. The art of education or pedagogy must therefore become judicious if it is to develop human nature so that the latter can reach its vocation. Parents who are already educated are examples for imitation by means of which children form themselves. But if children are to become better, pedagogy must become a course of study. Otherwise, there is nothing to hope from it. Otherwise one whose education is corrupted will educate the other one. The mechanism in the art of education must be transformed into science,^a otherwise it will never become a coherent endeavor, and one generation might tear down what another has already built up.

One principle of the art of education, which particularly those men who are educational planners should have before their eyes, is this: children should be educated not only with regard to the present but rather for a better condition of the human species that might be possible in the future; that is, in a manner appropriate to the idea of humanity and its complete vocation. This principle is of great importance. Parents usually educate their children merely so that they fit in with the present world, however corrupt it may be. However, they ought to educate them better, so that a future, better condition may thereby be brought forth. But here we encounter two obstacles:

9: 448 1) Parents usually care only that their children get on well in the world, and 2) princes regard their subjects merely as instruments for their own designs.

Parents care for the home, princes for the state. Neither have as their final end the best for the world^b and the perfection to which humanity is destined, and for which it also has the predisposition. However, the design for a plan of education must be made in a cosmopolitan manner.

^a *Wissenschaft*.

^b *das Weltbeste* – in the sense of “the highest good in the world.”

And is, then, the best for the world an idea which can be harmful to us in our best private condition?^a Never! For even though it appears that something must be sacrificed for it, through it one nevertheless always promotes the best of one's present condition. And then, what glorious consequences accompany it! Good education is exactly that from which all the good in the world arises. The germs which lie in the human being must only be developed further and further. For one does not find grounds of evil in the natural predispositions of the human being. The only cause of evil is this, that nature is not brought under rules. In the human being lie only germs for the good.

But from where is the better condition of the world supposed to come? From the princes, or from the subjects? Should the latter first better themselves on their own and meet a good government halfway?^b If it is to be brought about by the princes, then the education of the princes must first become better – an education which for some time has always had the large defect, that in their youth no one resisted them. But a tree which stands alone in the field grows crooked and spreads its branches wide. By contrast, a tree which stands in the middle of the forest grows straight towards the sun and air above it, because the trees next to it offer opposition. It is the same with the princes. Still, it is better yet that they be educated by someone from among their subjects rather than by one from their own rank. We can therefore expect the good to come from above only if the education there is the superior one. That is why this matter depends mainly on private efforts and not so much on the assistance of the princes, as *Basedow*^c and others thought. For experience teaches that the princes first of all have not so much the best for the world in mind but rather the well-being of their state, so that they may reach their own goals. If, however, they provide the money, then the design of the plan must after all be left to their discretion. This is the case in everything which concerns the education of the human spirit, the enlargement of human knowledge. Power and money do not do accomplish it, but at most facilitate it. But they could accomplish it, if only in political economy one were not to charge the interest for the imperial treasury in advance. Academies have not done it thus far either, and the appearance that they will do so has never been smaller than at present.

Accordingly, the set-up of the schools should depend entirely on the judgment of the most enlightened experts. All culture begins with private individuals and extends outward from there. It is only through the efforts of people of more extended inclinations, who take an interest in the best world and who are capable of conceiving the idea of a future improved

9: 449

^a *in unserm Privatbesten*.

condition, that the gradual approach of human nature to its purpose is possible. Every now and then many a ruler still looks upon his people as, so to speak, merely a part of the realm of nature, and directs his attention merely to their propagation. At most the ruler then further demands skillfulness, but merely in order to be able to better use his subjects for his purposes. Admittedly, at first private individuals must also have nature's purpose before their eyes, but they must furthermore reflect especially on the development of humanity, and see to it that humanity becomes not merely skillful but also moral and, what is most difficult of all, they must try to bring posterity further than they themselves have gone.

In his education the human being must therefore 1) be *disciplined*. To discipline means to seek to prevent animality from doing damage to humanity, both in the individual and in society. Discipline is therefore merely the taming of savagery.

2) The human being must be *cultivated*. Culture includes instruction and teaching. It is the procurement of skillfulness. The latter is the possession of a faculty which is sufficient for the carrying out of whatever purpose. Thus skillfulness determines no ends at all, but leaves this to the later circumstances.

Some kinds of skillfulness are good in all cases, for example reading and writing; others only for some purposes, for example music, which makes us popular with others. Because of the multitude of purposes, skillfulness becomes, as it were, infinite.

3) It must be seen that the human being becomes *prudent*^a also, well suited for human society, popular, and influential. This requires a certain form of culture, which is called *civilizing*.^b Its prerequisites are manners, good behavior and a certain prudence in virtue of which one is able to use all human beings for one's own final purposes. This form of culture conforms to the changeable taste of each age. Thus just a few decades ago ceremonies were still loved in social intercourse.

4) One must also pay attention to *moralization*.^c The human being should not merely be skilled for all sorts of ends, but should also acquire the disposition to choose nothing but good ends. Good ends are those which are necessarily approved by everyone and which can be the simultaneous ends of everyone.

The human being can either be merely trained, conditioned, mechanically taught, or actually enlightened. One trains dogs and horses, and one can also train human beings. (The German word "*dressieren*" comes

^a *klug* – also "clever."

^b *Zivilisierung*.

^c *Moralisierung*.

from the English "*to dress*".⁷ Thus it is also the "*Dresskammer*," the place where the preacher changes his clothes, and not "*Trostkammer*."⁸

But to have trained one's children is not enough, rather, what really matters is that they learn *to think*. This aims at principles from which all actions arise. Thus we see that in a true education there is a great deal to be done. In private education, however, it usually still happens that the fourth, most important point is little observed. For children are mainly educated in such a manner that their moralization is left up to the preacher. But how immensely important it is that children are taught from youth to detest vice, not merely on the ground that God has forbidden it, but rather because it is detestable in itself! Otherwise they easily get the idea that they could always practice vice and that it would after all be quite permitted if only God had not forbidden it, and that God can easily make an exception for once. God is the holiest being and wills only that which is good, and demands that we should practice virtue because of its own inner worth and not because He demands it.

We live in a time of disciplinary training, culture, and civilization, but not by any means in a time of moralization. Under the present conditions of human beings one can say that the happiness of states grows simultaneously with the misery of human beings. And there is still the question whether we would not be happier in a raw state, without all this culture, than we are in our present condition. For how can one make human beings happy, if one does not make them moral and wise? Otherwise, the quantity of evil is not diminished.

Experimental schools must be established before normal schools can be established. Education and instruction must not be merely mechanical but must be based on principles. But neither must education be merely through rational argument, rather it must still be mechanical in a certain way. In Austria there were for the most part only normal schools, established according to a plan against which much was said with reason,⁸ and which could be reproached especially for being blindly mechanical. All other schools had to follow these schools, and people who had not been in these schools were even refused promotions. Such regulations show how much the government concerns itself with this matter, and surely nothing good can possibly thrive under such coercion.

It is even commonly imagined that experiments in education are not necessary, and that one can already judge according to reason whether something will be good or bad. But this is very mistaken, and experience teaches that our experiments often show quite different effects from the ones expected. One sees therefore that since experiments matter, no one generation can present a complete plan of education. The only experimental school which to an extent made a beginning in establishing a course was the Dessau Institute.⁹ We must let it keep this glory regardless

of the many mistakes of which one could accuse it (mistakes found in all conclusions that come from experiments) – viz., that new experiments are always required. It was in a certain sense the only school in which teachers had the freedom to work according to their own methods and plans, and where they were in contact with each other as well as with all scholars in Germany.

9:452 Education includes *care* and *formation*. Formation is 1) *negative*, viz., the discipline which merely prevents errors; 2) *positive*, viz., instruction and guidance, and insofar forms a part of culture. *Guidance* is direction in the exercise of that which one has learned. Thus arises the difference between the *instructor*,^a who is merely a teacher, and the *tutor*,^b who is a guide. The former educates merely for the school, the latter for life.

The first stage¹⁰ in the pupil's development is that in which he must show obsequiousness and passive obedience; in the other he is allowed to make use of reflection and of his freedom, though under laws. In the first there is a mechanical, in the other a moral coercion.

Education is either *private* or *public*. The latter concerns only instruction, and this can always remain public. The practice of the precepts is left to the former. A complete public education is one which unites both instruction and moral formation. Its purpose is the promotion of a good private education. A school in which this happens is called an educational institute. There cannot be many such institutes, and the number of pupils in them cannot be large, because they are very expensive, and their mere set-up already requires a great deal of money. Things stand with them as with poorhouses and hospitals. The buildings which are required for them, the salaries of the directors, supervisors, and servants, already take away half of the money appropriated, and it is certain that if this money were sent to the poor in their houses they would be much better provided for. That is why it is difficult for children other than only those of rich people to attend such institutes.

The purpose of such public institutes is the perfection of domestic education. If only the parents or others who assist them in the education were well educated, then the expenditure for the public institutes could cease. Experiments should be made and individuals formed in them, and thus a good domestic education shall arise out of them.

Either the parents take care of the private education themselves, or, since they sometimes do not have the time, capacity, or perhaps even the desire for it, other persons who are paid assistants take care of it.

9:453 With education by means of these assistants one finds the very difficult

circumstance that the authority is divided between the parents and these tutors. The child is supposed to follow the tutor's precepts and then again to follow the parents' fads. In such an education it is necessary that the parents hand over their entire authority to the tutor.

But to what extent might private education have an advantage over public education or vice versa? In general, it appears that public education is more advantageous than domestic, not only as regards skillfulness but also with respect to the character of a citizen. Quite often, domestic education not only frequently brings forth family mistakes but also reproduces them.

How long then should education last? Until the time that nature herself has designed^a the human being to lead himself; until the sexual instinct has developed in him; until he can become a father himself and is himself meant to educate: until approximately the sixteenth year. After this time auxiliary means of culture no doubt can still be used and a hidden discipline exercised, but no more education proper takes place.

The obsequiousness of the pupil is either *positive*, when he must do what is prescribed to him, because he cannot himself judge, and the mere capacity of imitation still continues in him; or *negative*, when he must do what others want if he wants others to do some favor for him in return. With the first, he may come in for punishment; with the second, others may not do what he wants. In the latter case, although he can already think for himself, he is nevertheless dependent for his pleasure.

One of the biggest problems of education is how one can unite submission under lawful constraint with the capacity to use one's freedom. For constraint is necessary. How do I cultivate freedom under constraint? I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom, and I shall at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. Without this everything is a mere mechanism, and the pupil who is released from education does not know how to use his freedom. He must feel early the inevitable resistance of society, in order to get to know the difficulty of supporting himself, of being deprived and of acquiring – in a word: of being independent.

Here the following must be observed: 1) From earliest childhood the child must be allowed to be free in all matters (except in those where it might injure himself, as, for example, when it grabs an open knife), although not in such a manner that it is in the way of others' freedom; as, for example, if it screams or is merry in too loud a way, it already burdens others. 2) The child must be shown that it can only reach its goals by letting others also reach theirs, for example, that it will not be pleased if it does not do what one wants it to do, that it should learn, etc.

9:454

^a *Informator*
^b *Hofmeister*

^a *hat bestimmt* – also “has determined.”

3) One must prove to it that restraint is put on it in order that it be led to the use of its own freedom, that it is cultivated so that it may one day be free, that is, so that it need not depend on the care of others. This third point is the last to be grasped by the child. For with children the consideration only comes late, that, for example, later in life they will have to support themselves. They think that it will always be as it is in the parents' house, that they will receive food and drink without having to be responsible for it. Without such treatment children (especially children of rich parents and sons of princes) remain children throughout their entire lives, just like the inhabitants of Tahiti. Here public education has its obvious advantages, because by means of it one learns both to measure one's powers, one learns restrictions^a through the rights of others. Here no one enjoys any advantages, because one feels resistance everywhere, and because one can only make oneself noticed by distinguishing oneself through merit. Public education provides the best model of the future citizen.

But here another difficulty must be considered, which consists in the anticipation of sexual knowledge, in order to prevent vice even before the onset of manhood. However, this will be dealt with further below.

9:455

TREATISE^{II}

Pedagogy or the doctrine of education is either *physical* or *practical*. *Physical* education is the education part which the human being has in common with animals, or maintenance. *Practical* or *moral* education is the education by which the human being is to be formed so that he can live as a freely acting being. (We call *practical* everything which has a relation to freedom.) Practical education is education towards personality, the education of a freely acting being who can support itself and be a member of society, but who can have an inner value for itself.

Accordingly, practical education consists of: 1) *scholastic-mechanical* formation with regard to skillfulness, which is therefore *didactic* (the job of the instructor), 2) *pragmatic* formation with regard to prudence (the task of the tutor), 3) *moral* formation with regard to ethics.

The human being needs *scholastic* formation or instruction in order to become skillful for the attainment of all of his ends. It gives him value in relation to himself as an individual. But by means of formation towards prudence he is formed into a citizen, thus receiving public value. There he learns not only how to direct civil society for his purposes, but also how to fit in with civil society. Finally, through *moral* formation he receives value in view of the entire human race.

^a Einschränkungen.

Scholastic formation is the earliest and the first. For all prudence presupposes skillfulness. Prudence is the faculty of using one's skillfulness effectively. Moral formation, in so far as it is based on principles which the human being should comprehend himself, comes last; but in so far as it is based on common human understanding, it must be observed right from the start and already with physical education. For otherwise, mistakes easily take root against which all educational art afterwards labors in vain. In view of skillfulness and prudence everything must correspond to the age of the student. Being childishly skillful, childishly prudent and good-natured, rather than cunning in a manly way, suits the child as little as for a grown-up to have a childish mind.

OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION¹²

9:456

Even though he who undertakes an education as tutor does not receive the children under his supervision early enough that he can also attend to their physical education, nevertheless it is useful to know all that is necessary to observe in education from beginning to end. Even though as tutor one may only be dealing with older children, it may well happen that new children are born in the house. And if one conducts oneself well one is always entitled to be a confidant of the parents and to be consulted about the physical education of their children as well. Besides, one is often the only scholar in the house. Therefore an acquaintance with this subject is also necessary for a tutor.

Physical education is actually only maintenance, either by means of parents or wet-nurses or attendants. The food which nature definitely has intended for children is the mother's milk. That the child soaks up dispositions with it – as the saying goes: "You have already soaked up that with your mother's milk" – is a mere prejudice. It is most beneficial to the mother and the child if the mother breast-feeds it herself. But here also exceptions occur in extreme cases due to circumstances of bad health. Formerly it was believed that the first milk given by the mother after birth, which is whey, was harmful to the child, and that the mother had first to remove it before the child could be breast-fed. But Rousseau¹³ first drew the attention of physicians to the question whether this first milk might not also be good for the child, since nature has arranged nothing in vain. And indeed it has been found that the refuse which is found with newborn children, which the physicians call meconium, is best removed by this milk, and that it is therefore highly beneficial to children.

The question has been raised whether one could not feed the child equally well with animal milk. Human milk is very different from animal milk. The milk of all animals who eat grass and live on vegetables curdles very soon if some acid is added to it, for example, tartaric acid, citric acid, or particularly the acid from calves' stomachs, which is called rennet or

9:457

rennin. But human milk does not curdle at all. However, if the mothers or wet-nurses eat only a vegetarian diet for several days, then their milk curdles just like cow's milk, etc.; but if they then return to eating meat for a little while, the milk is exactly as good as it was before. From this it has been concluded that it is best and most beneficial to the child if mothers or wet-nurses eat meat during the time that they breast-feed. For when children throw up the milk, one sees that it is curdled. The acid in children's stomachs must therefore promote the curdling of milk even more than all other acids, because human milk cannot be brought to curdle in any other way. So how much worse it would be if the child were given milk which curdles by itself! That it does not merely depend on this can be seen in other nations. The Tungus,¹⁴ for example, eat almost nothing but meat and are strong and healthy people. But all such peoples live short lives, and a large, grown-up boy who does not appear to be light can be lifted up with modest effort. The Swedes, however, and especially the nations in India eat almost no meat, and yet there the people are being very well brought up. It seems, therefore, that it depends simply on the flourishing of the wet-nurse, and that food is best, which best agrees with her.

The question arises here as to how the child is to be fed once the mother's milk stops. For some time all sorts of paps have been tried. But it is not good to feed the child with such food from the beginning. In particular one should observe not to give children anything piquant, such as wine, spice, salt, etc. But it is certainly strange that children have such a strong desire for all of these things! The reason is that they provide a stimulus and an animation to their as yet dull sensations which is agreeable to them. Admittedly, children in Russia receive brandy from their mothers, who themselves are assiduous brandy drinkers, and yet one notes that the Russians are healthy, strong people. Certainly those who endure this must have a good bodily constitution, but many also die from it who otherwise could have been saved. For such early stimulation of the nerves produces many disorders. One must even guard children against foods or drinks that are too warm for them, for these also cause weakness.

It should be noted further that children must not be kept too warm, for their blood is already much warmer than that of adults. The blood temperature in children is 110 degrees Fahrenheit and the blood temperature of adults only 96 degrees. The child suffocates in heat in which older people feel quite comfortable. Getting used to cool temperatures makes human beings strong, anyhow. And it is also not good for adults to dress and to cover themselves up too warmly and to become too accustomed to drinks that are too warm. That is why the child should receive a cool and hard bed. Cold baths are good too. No stimulant may be allowed to arouse the child's hunger; rather hunger must always be

9: 458

the result of activity and occupation. The child, however, must not be allowed to become accustomed to anything to such an extent that it becomes a necessity to it. Even as regards what is good, one must not turn everything into a habit for it through artifice.

Swaddling is not found at all among crude peoples. The savage nations in America, for example, make pits in the earth for their young children, scatter them with the dust of decayed trees, and cover them with leaves so that the urine and uncleanliness of the children are absorbed and the children lie dry. But beyond that they allow them the free use of their limbs. It is also merely for our own comfort that we swaddle children like mummies, so that we do not need to watch that the children do not get deformed, which nevertheless often happens with swaddling. It also makes the children themselves fearful, and they thus fall into a kind of despair, since they cannot use their limbs at all. And then it is thought that their cries can be stopped simply by calling to them. Just let a grown human being be wrapped up and then see whether he does not also scream and fall into anxiety and despair.

In general it should be observed that the first stage of education must be merely negative, i.e., one should not add some new provision to that of nature, but merely leave nature undisturbed. The only art permitted in the educational process is that of hardening. – This is another reason why swaddling should be rejected. However, if one wants to observe some precaution, the most advisable thing is a kind of box which is covered with straps on top. The Italians use it and call it *arucio*. The child always remains in this box and is also positioned to be breast-fed in it. By means of this, the mother is also prevented from squeezing the child to death, if she should fall asleep at night during nursing. Many of our children die in this manner. This precaution is therefore better than swaddling, because the children here have more freedom and deformation is prevented; whereas children often become deformed by swaddling itself.

Another custom in the first stage of education is *rocking*. The easiest way of doing this is the way some peasants do it. They hang the cradle by a rope from a beam, and they only have to give the cradle a push in order for it to swing by itself from one side to the other. But rocking is not good at all. For swinging back and forth is harmful to the child. It is seen even in grown-ups that swinging induces vomiting and dizziness. One thereby wants to anaesthetize the child so that it does not cry. But crying is beneficial for children. As soon as they come out of the womb, where they have enjoyed no air, they take their first breath. The flow of the blood is thereby changed and produces a painful sensation in them. But by crying the child develops the inner parts and channels of its body all the more. To come immediately to the child's assistance when it cries, to sing something to it, etc., as is the custom of wet-nurses, is very harmful.

This is usually the first undoing of the child, for if it sees that everyone rallies at its cries, then it repeats its cries more often.

9: 460

It can no doubt¹⁵ be said with truth that the children of the common people are being spoiled much more than the children of high-ranking families. For the common people play with their children, like monkeys do. They sing to them, hug and kiss them, and dance with them. They think they are doing something good to the child if they run over and play with it, etc., as soon as it cries. But this only makes them cry more often. If, on the other hand, one does not care about their cries, they finally stop. For no creature enjoys a futile task. If children are accustomed to having all of their whims fulfilled, then afterwards the breaking of the will comes too late. If one lets them cry, then they will grow weary of it by themselves. But if all of their whims are fulfilled in early youth, their heart and their morals are thereby spoiled.

To be sure the child does not yet have any concept of morals, but its natural disposition is thereby spoiled in such a way that afterwards very strict punishment must be applied in order to repair that which has been spoiled. Later, when one tries to cure them of having someone always hasten to them on demand, these children when crying express such great a rage as only grown-ups are capable of, except that they lack the power to act upon it. For so long they needed only to call, and everything came to them; they ruled entirely despotically. When this rule now stops, they are quite naturally irritated. For even grown-up human beings who have been in possession of power for some time find it very difficult to wean themselves suddenly from it.

9: 461

At first,¹⁶ for about the first three months, children cannot see properly. It is true that they have the sensation of light, but they cannot differentiate objects from one another. One can convince oneself of this if one holds up something shiny to them: they do not follow it with their eyes. Along with the development of vision is also found the ability to laugh and to cry. Now, when the child is in this state, it cries with reflection, no matter how obscure that reflection may be. It always thinks that some harm has been done to it. Rousseau says: If one hits a child which is only about six months old on the hand, it cries in the same way as if a firebrand had fallen on its hand. The child really associates with this¹⁷ the concept of an insult already. Parents usually speak a great deal about breaking the will of children. One must not break their will, unless one has not first spoiled it. The first spoiling occurs when one complies with the despotic will of children by having them get everything by their cries. It is extremely difficult to compensate for this later, and one rarely succeeds.* One can perhaps make the child be still, but it feeds on its bile and fosters its inner rage all the more. By

this means one accustoms the child to feigning and to concealed emotions. It is very strange, for example, when parents demand that children should kiss their hands after they have beaten them with a switch. That way one accustoms them to feigning and falsehood. For the switch is really not such a beautiful gift that one would call for thanks, and one can easily imagine with what sort of a heart the child will then kiss the hand.

It is customary to employ *leading-strings* and *go-carts* in order to teach children how to walk. But it is striking that one should want to teach children how to walk, as if any human being could not have walked for lack of instruction. Leading-strings are particularly harmful. A writer once complained about narrow-chestedness, which he attributed solely to leading-strings. For since a child reaches for everything and picks up everything off the ground, it presses with its chest up against the leading-string. But because the chest is still very soft, it is pressed flat and still retains this form later. Children also do not learn to walk as steadily with this means of help as when they learn it by themselves. It is best to let them crawl about on the ground, until they gradually begin to walk by themselves. As a precaution one can line the room with woollen blankets, so that they do not get splinters or fall too hard.

9: 462

It is commonly said that children fall very heavily. But apart from the fact that children cannot even fall heavily, it also does not harm them if they sometimes fall. They learn all the better how to achieve a sense of balance and how to turn so that the fall does not harm them. It is customary to place on children so-called little kids' caps,⁴ which project out so far that the child can never fall on its face. But this is just negative education, where one uses artificial tools, instead of those that the child has naturally. Here hands are the natural tools, which the child will no doubt put in front of itself when falling. The more artificial tools are used, the more dependent on tools the human being becomes.

In general it would be better if fewer tools were used at the beginning and one were to let children learn more by themselves. For then they might learn many things much more thoroughly. It is no doubt possible, for example, that the child could learn to write by itself. After all someone once invented writing, and it is not so very great an invention either. It should be enough to say, for example, to the child who wants bread: Can you draw a picture of it too? The child would then draw an oval figure. One would then have to say to it, that one does not yet know whether the picture is meant to represent bread or a stone. It would then attempt afterwards to indicate the letter B, etc. And so in time the child would invent its own alphabet, which it would afterwards only have to exchange for other signs.

* Cf. Horstig, *Should One Let children Cry?* Gotha, 1798.

9: 463

There are certain afflictions with which some children come into the world. Are there not means of correcting these defective or, as it were, bungled forms? Because of the efforts of many knowledgeable writers we know that corsets do not help here. Rather, they only aggravate the malady by hindering the circulation of the blood and the humors as well as the highly necessary expansion of the outer and inner parts of the body. If the child is left free it also exercises its body,¹⁸ and a human being who wears a corset is much weaker when he takes it off than is one who has never put it on. One could perhaps help those who are born deformed by placing more weight on the side where the muscles are stronger. But this is also very dangerous: for who can determine the exact balance? The best thing is for the child to try on its own to adopt a bodily position, even though that position may be hard on it. For machines do not achieve anything here.

All artificial devices of this kind are so much the more detrimental in that they run contrary to the end of nature in an organized, rational being, according to which it must retain the freedom to learn to use its powers. Education should only prevent children from becoming soft. But toughening up is the opposite of softness. One risks too much if one tries to accustom children to everything. The education of the Russians goes very far on this point. And, accordingly, in the course of this an unbelievable number of children die. Habit is an enjoyment or action which has become a necessity through frequent repetition of the same pleasure or action. There is nothing to which children can accustom themselves more easily, and nothing which one should therefore give to them less, than piquant things; for example, tobacco, brandy, and warm drinks. Breaking the habit later is very difficult and is connected with hardship at first, because through the repeated enjoyment a change in our bodily functions has occurred.

The more habits someone has, the less he is free and independent. It is the same with the human being as with all other animals: they always retain a certain propensity for that to which they were accustomed early. The child must therefore be prevented from getting accustomed to anything; it must not be allowed to develop any habits.

Many parents want to accustom their children to everything. But this is not good. For human nature in general, and in part also the nature of individual subjects, does not permit one to become accustomed to everything, and many children never finish learning. Parents, for example, wish that children should be able to go to bed and get up at all times, or that they should eat whenever they want them to. But if one is to endure this, a special way of life is necessary, a way of life which strengthens the body and thus also repairs that which has been spoiled. For in nature we also find many examples of periodic processes. Animals have their

set time for sleep. The human being should also accustom himself to a set time, so that the bodily functions will not be disturbed. As far as the other matter is concerned, that children should be able to eat at all times, here one probably cannot cite animals as examples. Since, for example, all grass-eating animals eat things that provide little nourishment, for them eating is an ongoing activity. But it is very beneficial to the human being if he always eats at a set time. And many parents wish that their children should be able to endure great cold, bad smells, each and every noise, and the like. But this is not at all necessary, if only the children do not accustom themselves to anything. And for this it is very helpful if one shifts the children to varying conditions.

A hard bed is much healthier than a soft one. In general a hard education is very helpful in strengthening the body. But by a hard education we understand merely the prevention of ease.¹⁹ There is no lack of remarkable examples for the confirmation of this assertion, only they are not heeded, or, better said, no one wants to heed them.

As concerns the formation of the mind, which in a certain sense can actually also be called physical, it should mainly be noted that the discipline not be slavish. Rather, the child must always feel its freedom; in such a way, however, that it not hinder the freedom of others. Therefore it must find resistance. Some parents refuse their children everything in order to exercise the patience of their children, thereby demanding more patience of the children than they themselves have. But this is cruel. Give the child as much as is useful to it, and then say to it: You have enough! But then it is also absolutely necessary that this be irrevocable. Pay no attention to the cries of the children and do not comply with them when they want to get something by screaming. But give them that which they ask for in a friendly manner, provided it is useful to them. In this way the child will also become accustomed to being frank, and since it does not annoy anybody by its crying, everyone in turn will also be friendly to it. Providence seems indeed to have given children friendly expressions so that they can win people over. In breaking their self-will nothing is more harmful than a vexatious, slavish discipline.

It is customary to say to children: "Shame on you! That is not proper!" etc. But this sort of thing should not occur in the first stage of education at all. The child does not yet have concepts of shame and propriety. It has nothing to be ashamed of and should not feel ashamed, and only becomes shy as a result. It becomes embarrassed when others look at it and seeks to hide from other people. As a result reserve and a disadvantageous concealment develop. No longer does the child dare to ask for anything, and yet it should be able to ask for everything; it conceals its disposition

9: 464

9: 465

¹⁸ *Gemächlichkeit*.

and always appears different from what it is, instead of being allowed to say everything frankly. Instead of always being with the parents, it avoids them and throws itself into the arms of the more compliant household servants.

Trifling and continually caressing are no better than such a vexatious education. This reinforces the child in its own will and makes it deceitful, and by betraying to it a weakness in the parents, robs from them necessary respect in the eyes of the child. But if it is educated in such a way that it cannot get anything by crying, then it will be free without being insolent, and modest without being shy. *Dreist* ("bold") should actually be written *dräust*, since it comes from *dräuen, droben* ("to threaten").¹⁹ A bold human being is not liked. Some men have such bold faces that one must always fear some coarseness from them, just as one can look at other faces and see instantly that they are unable to say a coarse word to anyone. One can always appear frank, provided that this is united with a certain goodness. People often say of high-ranking men that they look quite like kings. But this appearance is nothing more than a certain bold look which they have grown accustomed to from youth, because no one offered them resistance.

All of this can still be counted under negative formation. For many weaknesses of the human being frequently come about not because he has not been taught anything, but rather because he has been supplied with false impressions. Thus, for example, wet-nurses supply children with a fear of spiders, toads, etc. Children would certainly like to reach after spiders just as much as they reach after other things. But because wet-nurses, as soon as they see a spider, show their repugnance by their expressions, this has a sympathetic effect on the child. Many keep this fear throughout their entire lives and in this respect remain forever childish. For while spiders are indeed dangerous to flies, and their bite is poisonous for them, they do not harm human beings. And a toad is just as innocent an animal as a beautiful, green frog or any other animal.

9: 466

The positive part of physical education is *culture*.⁴ In this respect the human being differs from the animal. Culture consists particularly in the exercise of one's mental powers. Therefore, parents must give their children opportunity for such exercise. The first and foremost rule here is that all tools be dispensed with as far as possible. Thus leading-strings and go-carts should be done without right from the beginning, and the child should be allowed to crawl about on the ground until it learns to walk by itself, for then it will walk all the more steadily. For tools only ruin natural skill. Thus one uses a string to measure a width, but this can be managed just as well with the eye; a clock, to determine the

⁴ *Kultur.*

time, when one can do it by the position of the sun; a compass, to orient oneself in the forest, when one can also do it by noting the position of the sun during the day and that of the stars at night. One can even say that instead of using a boat to go on the water, one can swim. The famous *Franklin*²⁰ was astonished that everyone did not learn to swim, since it is so pleasant and useful. He even states an easy way in which one can learn it on one's own. Drop an egg into a brook in which you are standing on the bottom, with at least your head out of the water. Now try to seize the egg. In bending over, your feet come up, and, so that water does not come into the mouth, you will no doubt lay your head in the nape of the neck. And thus you are in the proper position necessary for swimming. Now you only need to work with the hands, and you are swimming. – It depends merely on cultivating your natural skillfulness. Often it takes instruction, often the child itself is inventive enough, or invents instruments by itself.

What should be observed in physical education, that is with respect to the body, relates either to the use of voluntary movement or to the use of the organs of sense. What is important with the former is that the child should always help itself. Strength, skillfulness, agility, and sureness are necessary for this purpose; for example, one should be able to walk on narrow footpaths, on steep heights where one faces an abyss, or on a shaky support. If a human being cannot do these things, he is not completely what he could be. Since the Dessau Philanthropic Academy²¹ has led the way here with its example, many experiments of this sort have been made with children in other institutes. It is very admirable when one reads how the Swiss already accustom themselves from youth to walk in the mountains, and how much skill they develop in this respect, so that they can walk on the narrowest footpaths with complete confidence and jump over chasms, of which they already know by eye that they will get over safely. But most people are afraid of an imaginary fall, and this fear as it were paralyses their limbs, so that for them such a walk then involves danger. This fear normally increases with age, and one finds that it is particularly common among men who work a lot with their head.

Such experiments with children are really not very dangerous. For in proportion to their strength children have a much lighter weight than other human beings, and therefore they do not fall as heavily. Furthermore their bones are not as brittle and fragile as they become with age. Children also try out their powers on their own. Thus, for instance, they are often seen climbing without any apparent purpose. Running is healthy activity and strengthens the body. Jumping, lifting, carrying, hurling, throwing at a target, wrestling, racing, and all exercises of that kind are very good. Dancing, in so far as it is like an art, seems to be too early for children proper.

9: 467

9: 468

Throwing exercises, both in throwing far and in hitting a target, also have the purpose of exercising the senses, especially the estimate by the eye. Playing ball is one of the best children's games, because it also involves running, which is healthy. In general, those games are the best which combine the exercise of skillfulness with the exercise of the senses. For example, exercising the eye in correctly judging width, size, and proportion, orienting oneself about location of places with the aid of the sun, etc. – all of these are good exercises. Of great advantage also is local imagination, by which is meant the skill to represent everything in the place where one has actually seen it; for example, the pleasure of finding one's way out of a forest by noticing the trees which one has passed by previously. So also with the *memoria localis*, for example, that one does not only know simply in which book one has read something, but also where in the book it can be found. Thus the musician has the keys in his mind, and does not need to look for them any more. The cultivation of the hearing of children is just as necessary, in order for them to know better whether something is far away or near, and on which side it is.

The children's game of blindman's buff^a was already known among the Greeks, who called it μυινδαξ.²² In general, children's games everywhere are very similar. Those which exist in Germany are also found in England, France, and so forth. They have their basis in a certain natural drive of children. In blind man's buff, for instance, it is to see how they could help themselves if they had to do without one of the senses. The spinning top is a game apart from the others; but even such children's games give grown men material for further reflection and also now and then serve as occasions for important inventions. Thus Segner²³ has written a disputation on the spinning top, and the spinning top has given an English sea captain the opportunity to invent a mirror by means of which the height of the stars can be measured aboard ship.

Children enjoy instruments that make noise; for example, little trumpets, little drums, and the like. But such things are not good, because other people are annoyed by them. However, matters would already be much better if children were to learn to cut a reed by themselves so that they could blow on it. –

Swinging is also good exercise; even grown-ups use it for health. But children need to be supervised here, because the motion can become very fast. Kite-flying is likewise an excellent game. It cultivates skillfulness, for if the kite is to rise really high, one has to see that it is in a certain position relative to the wind.

For the sake of these games the boy will deny himself other needs, and thus learn little by little to do without other things as well. Furthermore,

^a Blindekubspiel.

he will thereby become accustomed to continuous occupation. But for this very reason the games must not be mere games but games with intention and final purpose.^a For the more his body is strengthened and hardened in this way, the safer he is from the pernicious consequences of coddling. Gymnastics also should merely guide nature, and therefore must not give rise to unnatural daintiness. Discipline must come first, not instruction. However, here it should be observed that in developing their bodies one also forms the children for society. Rousseau says: "You will never develop an excellent man unless you first have a street urchin." A lively boy is more likely to become a good man than a cheeky smart aleck. The child must not be annoying in company, but it must also not ingratiate itself. In answering to the invitations of others it must be friendly without being obtrusive; candid without being foolhardy. The way to do this is not to spoil anything, not to teach the child concepts of propriety that would only make it shy and afraid of people; or, on the other hand, which give it the idea of wanting to assert itself. Nothing is more ridiculous than precocious modesty or cheeky presumption in a child. In the latter case we must let the child feel its weaknesses all the more, but not let it feel too much our superiority and domination.^b That way it may form itself through its own efforts but only as someone in society with others, in which case the world must be big enough for the child but also big enough for others.

Toby, in *Tristram Shandy*,^c says to a fly which had disturbed him for a long time, as he shows it out the window: "Go, you bad creature, the world is big enough for both me and you." And every person can make these words his motto. We must not annoy one another; the world is big enough for us all.

We come now to the culture of the soul, which in a way can also be called physical. One must, however, distinguish between nature and freedom. Giving laws to freedom is something entirely different from forming nature. The nature of the body and that of the soul agree in this, that in the formation of each of them one seeks to prevent some corruption – and that art furthermore adds something to both of them. One can therefore call the formation of the soul in a way just as physical as the formation of the body.

However, this physical formation of the mind^d is distinguished from the moral formation of the mind in that the latter aims solely at freedom; the former solely at nature. A human being can be highly cultivated in

^a Spiel mit Absicht und Endzweck.

^b Herrschaft.

^c Geist – also "soul."

9:47° physical terms, he can have a well-formed mind, but can still be poorly cultivated in moral terms, and thus be an evil creature.

Now *physical* culture must be distinguished from *practical* culture, the latter of which is either *pragmatic* or *moral*. In the latter case it is *moralization*, not *cultivation*.^a

We divide the *physical* culture of the mind into *free* and *scholastic* physical culture. The *free* one is, so to speak, only a play, by contrast the *scholastic* one is a business. The *free* one is the one which must always be observed in the pupil; in the *scholastic* one the pupil is viewed as being under constraint. One can be busy in play, this is called being busy in leisure; but one can also be busy under constraint, and this is called working.^b Scholastic formation should be work for the child, free formation should be play.

Various educational plans have been drawn up for the commendable goal of ascertaining which method in education is the best. Among other things, one has hit upon the idea to let children learn everything as if in play. In a piece in the Göttingen Magazine, *Lichtenberg*²⁵ criticizes the folly of trying to educate boys – who after all ought to be accustomed to business matters early on, since they must one day enter into business life – for everything by way of play. This is entirely counterproductive. The child should play, it should have its hours of recreation, but it must also learn to work. To be sure, the culture of its skill is as valuable as the culture of its mind, but the two kinds of culture must be practised at different times. Besides, it is already a particular misfortune for the human being that he is so much inclined to inactivity. The more a human being has been lazy, the harder it is for him to resolve to work.

In work the activity is not pleasant in itself, rather one undertakes it on account of another aim. By contrast, in play the activity is pleasant in itself without intending any further purpose. When one goes for a walk, going for a walk is itself the aim, and therefore the longer the walk is, the more pleasant it is for us. But if we go somewhere in particular, then the company which is to be found in that place or something else is the aim of our walk, and we gladly choose the shortest way. It is the same with card games. It is really remarkable to see how reasonable men often are able to sit for hours and shuffle cards. This shows that human beings do not easily cease being children. For how is that game better than the children's playing ball? It is true that adults do not exactly ride on a stick, but they ride on other hobby horses all the same.

It is of the greatest importance that children learn to work. The human being is the only animal which must work. He must first undertake

^a *Moralisierung, nicht Kultivierung.*

^b *Arbeiten.*

many preparations before he can enjoy something for his living.^a The question whether heaven would not have cared for us more kindly if it had let us find everything already prepared so that we should not need to work at all, is certainly to be answered in the negative. For the human being requires occupations,^b including those that involve a certain constraint. Just as false is the idea that if Adam and Eve had only remained in paradise they would have done nothing there but sit together, sing arcadian songs, and observe the beauty of nature. Certainly boredom would have tortured them just as much as it does other people in a similar situation.

The human being must be so occupied that he is filled with the purpose which he has before his eyes, in such a way that he is not conscious of himself at all, and the best rest for him is that which comes after work. The child must therefore be accustomed to working. And where else than at school should the inclination to work be cultivated? School is compulsory culture. It is extremely harmful if one accustoms the child to view everything as play. The child must have time to relax, but there must also be a time for it to work. Even if the child does not see immediately how this compulsion is useful, nevertheless in the future it will become aware of its great usefulness. Actually it would only seriously pamper children's nosiness if one were always to answer their question "What is this good for and what is that good for?" Education must be compulsory, but this does not mean that it must be slavish.

As concerns the free²⁶ culture of the powers of mind,^c it must be noted that it is always in progress. It really concerns the higher powers. The lower powers are always cultivated in the process, but only in relation to the higher ones; wit, for example, is cultivated in relation to the understanding. The main rule here is that no power of mind is to be cultivated separately but each in relation to the other; for example, the power of imagination is to be cultivated only for the advantage of the understanding.

The lower powers have no value in themselves; take the example of a human being who has a great memory, but no power of judgment. Someone like that is then a living lexicon. Such pack mules of Parnassus are also necessary, for even if they themselves cannot accomplish anything sensible, they still can drag along materials out of which others can bring about something good. – Wit results in pure silliness if not joined by the power of judgment. Understanding is the knowledge of the universal. The power of judgment is the application of the universal to the particular. Reason is the faculty to see the connection of the universal

^a *Unterhalt* – also, "maintenance," "support," "upkeep."

^b *Geschäfte.*

^c *Gemütskräfte.*

9: 473

with the particular. This free culture runs its course from childhood on until the time that the youth is released from all education. If a youth, for example, cites a universal rule, then one can have him cite cases from history and fables in which this rule is disguised, and passages from poets where it is already expressed, and thus give him reason to exercise his wit, his memory, and so forth.

The saying, *tantum scimus, quantum memoria tenemus*^a is certainly correct, and that is why the culture of the memory is quite necessary. All things are such that the understanding only follows upon the sensuous impressions, and the memory must retain these impressions. So it is, for example, with languages. One can either learn them by formal memorization or by social intercourse, and with living languages the latter is the best method. Learning the vocabulary is indeed necessary, but it is certainly best to have those words learned which occur in the author that one is reading just then with the youth. The youth must have its certain and fixed workload. Thus one also learns geography best by means of a certain mechanism. The memory in particular loves this mechanism, and in a lot of cases it is also very useful. Up to now no really suitable mechanism for learning history has been found; it is true that tables have been tried, but it also seems that they, too, do not work right. But history is an excellent means for exercising the understanding in judgment. Memorization is very much needed, but as a mere exercise it is useless; for example, having them memorize speeches. At most it only helps to promote boldness, and besides, declaiming is only a thing for adult men.^b * Here belong also all those things that one learns merely for a future examination or with respect to *futuram oblivionem*.^c One must occupy the memory only with those things which for us are important to remember and which have a relation to real life. The worst thing is

* Certainly there are very sensible and insightful men who appear to be incapable of declaiming; but it is certain that it is easier to remember that which one reads with the requisite expression, or at least could so read, and that the foundation for this can be laid early and successfully is proven through the newest method of reading. See Oliver, *On the Character and Worth of Educational Methods*, Leipzig, 1802; and his *Art of Teaching to Read and Spell*, Dessau, 1801. [Buchner (*The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant*, p. 18) points to the publication dates of Oliver's books as constituting clear counter-evidence to Otto Willmann's contention (*Immanuel Kant. Über Pädagogik* (Leipzig, 1873), p. 118, n. 19) that Kant did not revise his *Lectures* at all after the mid-1780s. I myself think it is likely that Kant did do further work on them after 1786–7 (the last time he taught the course). However, in the absence of Kant's own notes, I do not think these references to Oliver can be regarded as settling the matter. They could have been added by Rink – Ed.]

^a We know as much as we can remember.

^b Männer.

^c future oblivion.

9: 474

when children read novels, namely because they will use them for nothing but the entertainment they provide in the very moment of being read. Reading novels weakens the memory. For it would be ridiculous to want to remember novels and recount them to others. That is why all novels should be taken out of the hands of children. While they read them they form within the novel a new novel by developing the circumstances differently for themselves, going into raptures and sitting there thoughtlessly.²⁷

Distractions must never be tolerated, least of all at school, for they eventually produce a certain tendency in that direction, a certain habit. Even the most beautiful talents perish in one who is subject to distractions. Although children become distracted through their entertainments, nevertheless they soon compose themselves again. However, one sees them most distracted when they have bad pranks in mind, for then they ponder how they can conceal them or make good for them. Then they only hear half of everything, answer wrongly, do not know what they are reading, and so forth.

One must cultivate the memory early on, but must also cultivate the understanding in the process.

The memory is cultivated 1) by remembering the names in stories; 2) by reading and writing; but the former must be exercised with understanding and not by means of spelling the letters;^a 3) by means of languages, which children must be taught first by hearing, before they even read anything. Then a suitably constructed so-called *Orbis pictus* serves well, and one can make a beginning with botanizing, with mineralogy, and the description of nature. Sketching these objects provides the occasion for drawing and modeling, for which mathematics is needed. It is most advantageous to have the first scientific instruction be concerned with geography, mathematical as much as physical. Travel accounts, illustrated by means of engravings and maps, then lead to political geography. From the present condition of the earth's surface one then goes back to its previous condition, moving on to ancient geography, ancient history, and so forth.

In the instruction of children one must seek gradually to combine knowledge and ability. Of all the sciences mathematics appears to be the one that satisfies this final purpose best. Furthermore, knowledge and speech must be combined (eloquence, fluency, ease in talking). But the child must also learn to distinguish very well knowledge from mere opinion and belief. Thus one prepares the way for a correct understanding and a *correct taste* rather than a *fine* or *delicate taste*.^b This taste must first

^a muss aus dem Kopfe geübt werden und nicht durch das Buchstabieren.

^b einen richtigen, nicht feinen oder zarten Geschmack.

be that of the senses, particularly that of the eyes, but eventually that of ideas. –

Rules must be found in everything that is to cultivate the understanding. It is very useful also to abstract the rules so that the understanding may proceed not merely mechanically but rather with the consciousness of a rule.

9:475 It is also very good to arrange the rules in a certain formula and thus to entrust them to the memory. If we have the rule in our memory but have forgotten its application, we still shall soon find our way again. Here the question is: should the rules precede merely *in abstracto*, and should rules first be learned afterwards, when one has completed the application,^a or should rule and application go hand in hand? The latter alone is advisable. In the other case the application is very uncertain until one reaches the rules. But rules must also occasionally be arranged into classes, for one does not retain them if they do not stand in connection with one another. Thus in language instruction grammar must always precede ever so slightly.

But now we must also give a systematic concept of the entire purpose of education and the means by which it can be attained.

1) *The general culture of the powers of the mind*, as distinguished from the particular culture. It aims at skillfulness and perfection. The point is not to inform the pupil in any particular area but to strengthen his powers of mind. The general culture of the powers of the mind is

a) either *physical*. Here everything is based on exercise and discipline and the children must not know any maxims. It is *passive* for the apprentice, he must be obedient to the direction of someone else. Others think for him.

b) or *moral*. In this case it is based not on discipline but on maxims. Everything is spoiled if one tries to ground this culture on examples, threats, punishments, and so forth. Then it would be merely discipline. One must see to it that the pupil acts from his own maxims, not from habit, that he not only does the good, but that he does it because it is good. For the entire moral value of actions consists in the maxims concerning the good. Physical education differs from moral education in that the former is passive for the pupil while the latter is active. He must at all times comprehend the ground of the action and its derivation from the concepts of duty.

2) *The particular culture of the powers of the mind*. This includes the culture of the cognitive faculty, of the senses, of the imagination, of the memory, of the strength of attention and wit, in short what concerns

^a *Gebrauch*.

the *lower powers* of the understanding. Of the culture of the senses, for example that of the sense of proportion,^a we have spoken above. As concerns the culture of the imagination, the following is to be noted. Children have an exceedingly strong imagination, which does not need to be strained further and expanded by fairy tales at all. Rather it needs to be reined in and brought under rules, but all the same one must not leave the imagination entirely unoccupied.

Maps have something in them which appeals to all children, even the smallest ones. When they are weary of everything else, they still learn something when maps are used. And this is a good entertainment for children, in which their imagination cannot wander but must stick to a certain figure, as it were. One could actually begin with geography in teaching children. Figures of animals, plants, and so forth can be combined with that simultaneously; they must enliven geography. But history should rather come in at a later point.^b

As concerns the strengthening of attention, it should be noted that this must be strengthened in general. A rigid attachment of our thoughts to an object is not so much a talent as a weakness of our inner sense, which in such a case is inflexible and does not allow itself to be applied as one likes. Distraction is the enemy of all education. Memory, however, is based on attention.

But as concerns the *higher powers of understanding*, they include the culture of the understanding, of the power of judgment, and of reason. In the beginning, the understanding, too, can be formed passively, as it were, by referring to examples for the rule, or, conversely, by discerning the rule for the individual cases. The power of judgment indicates what use is to be made of the understanding. It is required in order to understand what one learns or says, and in order not to repeat things without understanding them. How many read and hear something without understanding it, even though they believe they do! This holds for images and things.^c

By means of reason one grasps grounds. But one must keep in mind that here one is talking about a reason that is still being guided. It must therefore not always want to argue,^d but one must also not present it with arguments which transcend its concepts. We are not speaking here of speculative reason, but of the reflection on that which happens, regarding its causes and effects. It is a reason which is practical in its management and arrangement.^d

The best way of cultivating the powers of the mind is to do everything that one wants to accomplish by oneself; for example, immediately to

^a *Augenmaß*.

^b *Bilder und Sachen*.

^c *räsonnieren*.

^d *Wirtschaft und Einrichtung*.

apply the grammatical rule that one has learned. One understands a map best when one can draw it oneself. The biggest aid to understanding something is to produce it. One learns most thoroughly and retains best that which one learns as it were from oneself. Only a few human beings, however, are able to do this. They are called autodidacts (*αὐτοδίδακτοι*).

In the formation of reason one must proceed Socratically. For *Socrates*, who called himself the midwife of his listeners' knowledge, gives in his dialogues, which *Plato* has preserved for us faithfully, examples of how even in the case of old people, one can bring forth a good deal from their own reason. On many matters children do not need to exercise reason. They must not reason about everything. They do not need to know the reasons for everything which is meant to make them well-educated. But as soon as duty is²⁹ concerned, then the reasons in question must be made known to them. However, in general one must see to it that one does not carry rational knowledge into them but rather extracts it from them. The Socratic method should be the rule for the catechetical method. That method is admittedly somewhat slow, and it is difficult to arrange things such that when one extracts knowledge from one child the others also learn something in the process. The mechanical-catechetical method is also good for some sciences;^a for example, in instruction in revealed religion. However, in the case of universal religion^b one must use the Socratic method. For the mechanical-catechetical method particularly recommends itself for what must be learned historically.

The formation of the feeling of pleasure³⁰ or displeasure also belongs here. It must be negative and the feeling itself must not be coddled. A tendency towards ease is worse for the human being than all evils of life. It is therefore extremely important that children learn to work from early on. If children have not already been coddled, they really love amusements which are connected with exertion, occupations for which forces^c are required. One must not make children dainty nor let them have a choice when it comes to what they enjoy. Generally mothers spoil their children in this respect and coddle them altogether. And yet one notices that the children, especially the sons, love their fathers more than their mothers. This is probably because the mothers do not let them jump around, run around and so forth at all, for fear that they might be injured. However, the father, who scolds and perhaps beats them when they have been naughty, now and then also takes them out into the field and there lets them run around very boyishly, play, and be happy.

It is thought that children can be taught patience by letting them wait a long time for something. This, however, hardly seems necessary. But

9: 478

^a *Wissenschaften*.

^b *geöffnete Religion . . . allgemeine Religion*.

^c *Kräfte* – also “powers.”

they do need patience during illnesses and so forth. Patience is twofold. It consists either in giving up all hope or in seizing new courage. The first is not necessary, provided that one always demands only what is possible, and one always needs the latter, provided that one desires only what is right. During illnesses hopelessness aggravates the situation just as much as courage can ameliorate it. And he who is still capable of summoning up courage with regard to his physical or moral condition also does not give up hope.

Children must³¹ also not be made shy. This happens especially when one shouts at them with words of scolding, and makes them feel ashamed repeatedly. Here belongs particularly the exclamation of many parents: “Shame on you!” It is not at all clear what children should actually be ashamed about when they, for example, stick their fingers in their mouths and so forth. One can say to them that this is not customary or not good manners, but one must never shout “Shame on you!” to them, except in case they are lying. Nature has given the sense of shame to the human being so that he betrays himself as soon as he lies. Hence if parents never talk to their children of shame except when they lie, the children will then keep this blush of shame with respect to lying for their entire lifetime. But when they are constantly put to shame, then this establishes a shyness which continues to stick to them irrevocably.

As already said above,³² the will of children must not be broken but merely directed in such a way that it yields to natural hindrances. In the beginning of course the child must obey blindly. It is unnatural that the child should command by its crying, and that the strong should obey a weak one. One must therefore never comply with the crying of children, even in their first years, and allow them to extort something by this means. The parents commonly err in this and afterwards try to compensate for it by refusing the children in later years everything they ask for. But it is very wrong to refuse them something without cause which they expect from the kindness of their parents, merely in order to resist them and to make them, the weaker ones, feel the superior strength of the elders.

Children are spoiled if one complies with their wills, and quite wrongly educated if one acts directly contrary to their wills and desires. The former generally happens as long as they are a plaything of the parents, especially at the time when they begin to talk. But from spoiling the child very great harm arises for its entire life. It is true that by acting contrary to the wills of the children one hinders them at the same time from showing their indignation,^d which admittedly must happen, but their inner rage is all the stronger. They have not yet learned how they should conduct themselves. – The rule which must be observed

^d *Unwillie*.

9: 479

with children from their earliest years is this: When they cry and one believes that they are being harmed, one should come to their aid, but when they cry merely from indignation, one should let them lie. And a similar procedure must also be observed unrelentingly later on. The resistance which the child finds in this case is quite natural and in fact only negative, consisting simply in not acceding to it. By contrast, many children get everything they demand from their parents merely by resorting to entreaties. If children are allowed to get everything by crying, they become malicious; but if they obtain everything by asking, they become soft. If there is thus no important reason to the contrary, one must fulfill the child's request. But if one finds a reason not to fulfill it, one must not allow oneself to be moved even by constant entreaties. Every refusal must be irrevocable. This soon has the effect that one will not need to make frequent refusals.

9:480

Suppose – and this is something that can be assumed only extremely rarely – that the child has a natural predisposition to stubbornness. Then it is best to deal with it such that if it does nothing to please us, we also do nothing to please it. – Breaking the child's will brings about a slavish way of thinking;^a but natural resistance produces docility.

Moral culture must be based on maxims, not on discipline. The latter prevents bad habits, the former forms the way of thinking. One must see to it that the child accustoms itself to act according to maxims and not according to certain incentives. Discipline leaves us only with a habit, which, after all, fades away over the years. The child should learn to act according to maxims whose fairness it itself understands. It is easy to see that this is hard to bring about in children, and that moral formation therefore also demands the most insight from the side of the parents and the teachers.

9:481

If the child, for example, lies, it must not be punished but rather met with contempt, and it must be told that in the future one will not believe it, and the like. But if a child is punished when it does something bad and rewarded when it does something good, then it does something good in order to be well off. Later when the child enters the world where things are different, where it can do something good without being rewarded and something bad without being punished, it will become a human being who cares only how it can get on well in the world and is good or bad depending on what it finds most conducive to that end. –

Maxims must originate from the human being himself. One should try to convey concepts concerning good and evil to children already early on in moral culture. If one wants to ground morality,^b one must not punish. Morality is something so holy and sublime that one must not

^a Denkungsart.^b Moralität.

degrade it and place it on the same level with discipline. The first effort in moral education is the grounding of character. Character consists in the aptitude^c of acting according to maxims. In the beginning these are school maxims and later maxims of humanity.^d In the beginning the child obeys laws. Maxims too are laws, but subjective ones; they originate from the human being's own understanding. No violation of the school law^c may go unpunished, although the punishment must always be commensurate with the violation.

If one wishes to form a character in children, it is very important to draw their attention to a certain plan in all things, certain laws, known to them, which they must follow exactly. Thus, for example, one sets for them a time for sleep, for work, for amusement, and these one must then not extend or shorten. In indifferent things one can allow children the choice of time, but what they have made their law they must afterwards always follow. – In children, however, one must form not the character of a citizen but rather that of a child.

Human beings who have not given themselves certain rules are unreliable. One often cannot figure them out, and one can never really know what they are up to. It is true that people who always act according to rules are frequently reprimanded; for example, the man who has fixed a certain time for each action according to the clock. But often such reprimanding is unjustified, and this exactness, though it looks like punctiliousness,^d is a disposition for [the formation of] a character.

To the character of a child, especially of a pupil, there belongs above all things obedience. This is twofold: first, obedience to the *absolute will* of a leader, but also, second, obedience to the will of a leader who is recognized to be *reasonable and good*. Obedience can be derived from constraint, and then it is *absolute*; or it can be derived from confidence, and then it is of the other sort. This *voluntary* obedience is very important; but the former is also extremely necessary, for it prepares the child for the fulfillment of such laws as it will in the future have to fulfill as a citizen, even though it may not like them.

9:482

Children must therefore stand under a certain law of necessity. This law, however, must be a universal one, a point that one has to observe especially in schools. The teacher must not show any predilection or preference for one child over others. For then the law ceases to be universal. As soon as the child sees that not all the others must submit to the same law, it becomes rebellious.

^a Fertigkeit. See Kant's formal definition of this concept in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 407).^b Schulmaximen, und nachher Maximen der Menschheit.^c Schulgesetz.^d Peinlichkeit.

One talks a lot about having to present things to children in such a way that they might do it from inclination. In some cases this is certainly good, but there is also a great deal which one must prescribe to them as duty. Later this is of great benefit to them for their entire lives. For when it comes to public taxes, the labors of office and in many other cases only duty, not inclination, can guide us. Even if the child is unable to understand the duty, it is nevertheless better this way. And that something is its duty as a child, it may well understand, but it will be harder for it to understand that something is its duty as a human being. If it could also understand the latter kind of duty (which, however, is only possible with advancing age), then its obedience would be still more perfect.

Every transgression of a command by a child is a lack of obedience, and this brings on punishment. Even in the case of a careless transgression of the command, punishment is not superfluous. This punishment is either *physical* or *moral*.

One punishes *morally* by harming the inclinations to be honored and loved, which are aids to morality; for example, when one makes the child feel ashamed and treats it frostily and coldly. The inclinations to be honored and loved are to be preserved as far as possible. Therefore this kind of punishment is the best, since it comes to the aid of morality; for example, if a child lies, a look of contempt is punishment enough and is the most appropriate punishment.

Physical punishment consists either in refusing what is desired, or in the infliction of punishments. The first kind is related to moral punishment and is negative. The other punishments must be used with caution, so that no *indoles servilis*^a arises. It is not good to give children rewards; as a result they become selfish and an *indoles mercennaria*^b arises.

Furthermore obedience is either that of the *child* or of the *adolescent*. The transgression of obedience is followed by punishment. This is either a really *natural* punishment, which the human being brings upon himself by his behavior – for example, that the child becomes sick when it eats too much. And these punishments are the best, for the human being experiences them throughout his entire life and not only as a child. Or, on the other hand, the punishment is *artificial*. The inclination to be respected and loved is a sure means for arranging the chastisements in such a way that they are lasting. Physical punishments must be merely supplements to the insufficiency of the moral punishments. If moral punishments do not help any more at all and one proceeds to physical punishment, this will no longer form a good character. However, at the beginning physical constraint must take the place of reflection, which is lacking in children.

^a servile disposition.

^b mercenary disposition.

Punishments which are carried out with signs of rage have the wrong effects. Children then regard them merely as consequences of someone else's affect, and they regard themselves as the objects of such an affect. In general punishments must be inflicted on children with caution, so that they may see that their final purpose is the improvement of the children. To make children express thanks when they have been punished and to make them kiss their parents' hands and so forth is foolish and makes the children slavish. If physical punishments are repeated often, children become stubborn, and if parents punish their children because of obstinacy, then this only makes them all the more obstinate. – Besides, stubborn people are by no means the worst, rather they often yield easily to kind remonstrances.

The obedience of the adolescent is different from the obedience of the child. It consists in submission to the rules of duty. To do something from duty means to obey reason. To talk to children about duty is futile labor. In the end they regard duty as something the transgression of which is followed by the rod. The child could be led by means of mere instincts, but as soon as it grows up the concept of duty must step in. Neither must shame be used with children, rather it should first be used in the years of adolescence. For shame can only occur when the concept of honor has already taken root.

A second principal feature in the grounding of character in children is truthfulness. It is the fundamental trait and what is essential in a character. A human being who lies has no character at all, and if he has anything good in him, this is merely due to his temperament. Some children have a propensity towards lying, which quite often is to be derived from a lively imagination. It is the father's business to see to it that the children break this habit. For the mothers usually regard it as a matter of no or merely slight significance; indeed, they often find in it proof of the excellent talents and abilities of their children, with which they flatter themselves. Now this is the place to make use of the feeling of shame, for in this case the child understands it well. The blush of shame betrays us when we lie, but is not always proof of it. For we often blush over the shamelessness with which someone else accuses us of wrongdoing. Under no circumstances must one try to force the truth from children by means of punishments, except when their lie results in some immediate damage;^a and then they are to be punished on account of this damage. The withdrawal of respect is the only appropriate punishment for lying.³³

Punishments may also be divided into *negative* and *positive* punishments, the first of which may take place with laziness or immorality; for example, with lies, noncompliance, and quarrelsomeness.^b The positive

9: 484

9: 485

punishments, however, are for indignation. But above all things one must beware never to bear grudges against children.

A third feature in the character of a child must be *sociability*.^a The child must maintain friendships with others and not remain by itself all the time. Some teachers, it is true, are opposed to these friendships in schools; but this is very wrong. Children should prepare themselves for the sweetest enjoyment of life. However, teachers must not prefer one child over another because of its talents but only because of its character, for otherwise resentment develops, which is contrary to friendship.

Children must be openhearted too, and as bright^b as the sun in their expressions. The cheerful heart^c alone is capable of rejoicing in the good. A religion which makes the human being gloomy is false; for he must serve God with a cheerful heart and not out of constraint. The cheerful heart must not always be held strictly under the constraints of the school, for in that case it will soon be suppressed. When it has freedom, it recovers again. This purpose is well served by certain games, in which the child has freedom and where it tries always to outdo others. Then the soul brightens up again.

Many people think that the years of their youth were the best and most pleasant of their lives. But this is hardly so. They are the most arduous years, because one is under strict discipline, can seldom have a real friend, and even more seldom can have freedom. Already Horace says: *Multa tulit fecitque puer, sudavit et alsit.*^d –

Children must be taught only those things that are suitable to their age. Some parents are pleased when their children can talk in a precocious manner at an early age. But usually nothing comes such children. A child must only be intelligent in the manner of a child. It must not blindly ape everything. But a child that has precocious moral sayings^e is totally beyond what its years call for, and it apes others. It should have only the understanding of a child and should not appear in public too early. Such a child will never become a man of insights and of brightened understanding. It is just as insufferable when a child already wants to keep up with all the latest fashions; for example, to have its hair dressed, wear ruffled cuffs, or even to carry a snuffbox. It acquires an affected nature, which does not suit a child. Civilized society is a burden to it, and in the

^a *Geselligkeit*.

^b *heiter* – also “cheerful.”

^c *das fröhliche Herz*.

^d Trans.: The boy has endured and done much, he has sweated and he has frozen. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 413.

^e *Sittensprüchen* – also “aphorisms,” “adages,” “axioms.”

end it lacks entirely the uprightness^a of a man. And for this very reason one must counteract its vanity early on, or, better put, not give it occasion to become vain. But children become vain when one chatters to them quite early about how beautiful they are, how well this or that finery becomes them, or when such finery is promised to them and given to them as a reward. Finery is not suitable for children. They must receive their neat and simple clothing only as a bare necessity. But the parents also must attach no value to these things, not look at themselves in the mirror, for here as everywhere example is all-powerful and reinforces or destroys good teaching.

9: 486

OF PRACTICAL EDUCATION³⁴

Practical education includes 1) skill, 2) worldly prudence and 3) morality.^b As concerns *skill*, one must see that it is thorough and not superficial. One must not assume the appearance of knowing things that later one cannot bring about. In skill there must be thoroughness, which must gradually become a habit in the way of thinking. It is the essential thing for the character of a man. Skill is necessary for talent.

As concerns *worldly prudence*, it consists in the art of using our skillfulness effectively, that is, of how to use human beings for one's purposes. For this various things are needed. Strictly speaking, it is the last thing attained by the human being, but in terms of its worth it occupies the second rank.

If the child is to be given over to worldly prudence, then it must be able to conceal itself and make itself impenetrable, but at the same time be able to scrutinize the other person. It must conceal itself particularly in regard to its character. The art of external appearance is propriety.^c And one must possess this art. To scrutinize others is difficult, but it is necessary to know this art well while making oneself impenetrable. This includes dissimulation,^d that is, holding back one's faults, and the previously mentioned external appearance.^e Dissimulation is not always hypocrisy,^f and can sometimes be allowed, but it borders very closely on dishonesty.^g Dissimulation is a desperate means. It is part of worldly prudence not to suddenly fly into a rage; but one must also not be too indolent. Thus one must not be vehement, but yet upright.^b Being

^a *das Wackere*.

^b 1) *Geschicklichkeit*, 2) *Weltklugheit*, 3) *Sittlichkeit*.

^c *Anstand*.

^d *Dissimulieren*.

^e *äußere Schein* – “Schein” can also be rendered as “semblance” or “illusion.”

^f *Verstellung*.

^g *Unlauterkeit* – also “disingenuousness”; literally, “impurity.”

^b *nicht heftig, aber doch wacker*.

9:487

upright is quite different from being vehement. An *upright man (strenuus)* is one who takes pleasure in willing.^a This is a part of the moderation of affect.^b Worldly prudence is a matter of temperament.

Morality is a matter of character. *Sustine et abstine^c* is the preparation for a wise moderation. If one wants to form a good character, one must first clear away the passions. In regard to his inclinations the human being must learn not to let his inclinations become passions. Rather, he must learn to do without something when it is refused to him. *Sustine* means endure and accustom yourself to enduring.

Courage and inclination are required if one wants to learn to do without something. One must become accustomed to refusals, opposition, and so forth.

Temperament includes sympathy.^d Children must be prevented from any yearning, languishing sympathizing.^e Sympathizing is actually sensitivity; it agrees only with a character that is sensitive.^f It is still different from compassion^g and is an evil which consists merely in bemoaning a thing. One should give children some pocket money with which they could help the needy, and then one would see whether they are compassionate or not. But if they are always only generous with their parents' money, compassion drops out.³⁵

The saying *festina lente^b* indicates a perpetual activity, where one must hurry in order to learn a great deal – that is, *festina*. But one must also learn thoroughly, and thus take time with everything – that is, *lente*. The question now arises, whether it is preferable to have a great range of knowledge, or only a smaller one, but one which is thorough. It is better to know little, but to know this little thoroughly, than to know a lot and know it superficially, for in the latter case the shallowness of this knowledge eventually shows. But the child of course does not know in which circumstances it will need this or that knowledge, and therefore it is best that it know, thoroughly something of everything. Otherwise it will deceive and dazzle others with its superficially learned knowledge.

Finally there is the grounding of character. This consists in the firm resolution of willing to do something, and then also in the actual performance of it. *Vir propositi tenaxⁱ* says Horace, and this is a good character! For example, if I have promised something to someone, then I must

^a der Lust zum Wollen hat.

^b Affekt.

^c endure and sustain.

^d Zum Temperamente gehört Sympathie.

^e Teilnebmung.

^f Empfindsamkeit . . . empfindsam.

^g Mitleid.

^h hurry with leisure.

ⁱ Trans.: A man firm in his resolutions. Horace, *Carmina* iii. 31.

9:488

indeed keep it, even if it were to bring me harm. For a man who resolves to do something but who does not do it cannot trust himself any longer. For example, if someone resolves always to get up early in order to study, or to do this or that, or in order to take a walk, and then during the spring excuses himself, stating that it is still too cold in the morning, and it could do him harm; while in the summer he states that one can sleep so well and that sleep is pleasant to him, and thus always from one day to the next puts off his resolution – then in the end he does not trust himself any more.

That which is contrary to morals^a forms an exception to such resolutions. In the case of an evil human being the character is very bad, and is already called stubbornness. Yet we like it when he carries out his resolutions and is steadfast, although it would be better if he showed the same persistence in good things.

Not much can be thought of someone who always puts off the execution of his resolutions. The so-called future conversion is of this sort. For the human being who has always led a depraved life and wants to be converted in an instant cannot possibly get there, for it would be nothing short of a miracle for him to become in an instant the same as someone who has conducted himself well during his entire life and always thought upright thoughts. For the same reason there is nothing to be expected from pilgrimages, castigations, and fasting; for it is not possible to conceive how pilgrimages and other customs can help make an honest man out of a depraved one on the spot.

How can there be uprightness and improvement,^b if one fasts by day and enjoys so much more at night, or imposes a penance to one's body, which can contribute nothing to the transformation^c of the soul?

In order to ground a moral character in children, we must note the following:

One must teach them the duties that they have to fulfill as much as possible by examples and orders. The duties which a child has to perform are after all only ordinary duties to itself and to others. These duties must therefore be drawn from the nature of things. Therefore we have to consider more closely:

a) duties to oneself. These do not consist in buying fine clothes for oneself, having splendid meals and so forth, although everything must be clean. Nor do they consist in trying to satisfy one's desires and inclinations, for on the contrary one must be very moderate and temperate. Rather they consist in the human being having a certain dignity within

^a Moral.

^b Rechtschaffenheit und Besserung.

^c Veränderung.

himself which ennobles him before all creatures, and it his duty not to deny this dignity of humanity in his own person.

9:489 But we deny the dignity of humanity when we, for example, take to drinking, commit unnatural sins, practice all kinds of immoderation, and so forth, all of which degrade the human being far below the animals. Further, when a human being grovels before others, always making compliments, in order – as he believes – to ingratiate himself by such undignified behavior, then this is also contrary to the dignity of humanity.

The dignity of the human being could also be made perceptible already to the child with regard to itself; for example, in cases of uncleanness, which after all is unbecoming for humanity. But the child can indeed also degrade itself below the dignity of humanity through lying, since the child is already able to think and to communicate its thoughts to others. Lying makes the human being an object of universal contempt and is a means of robbing him of the respect and credibility for himself which everyone should have.

b) duties to others. Reverence and respect for the rights of human beings^a must be instilled into the child at a very early age, and one must carefully see to it that the child puts these into practice. For example, if a child meets another, poorer child and haughtily pushes it out of the way or away from itself, gives it a blow and so forth, then one must not say: "Don't do that, it hurts the other one. You should have pity! It is a poor child," and so forth. Rather one must treat it just as haughtily and noticeably, because its behavior was contrary to the rights of humanity. But children do not yet really have any generosity. One can, for example, infer this from the following fact: when parents tell their child to hand over half of its piece of bread and butter to another child, but without receiving that much more from the parents later, then either it does not obey at all, or very seldom and unwillingly. Besides, one cannot say much about generosity to a child anyway, since it has nothing yet in its power.^b

9:490 Many writers, such as *Crugott*,³⁶ have entirely overlooked or incorrectly explained the chapter of morals which contains the doctrine of duties to oneself. But the duty to oneself consists, as already said, in preserving the dignity of humanity in one's own person. The human being reprimands himself when he has the idea of humanity before his eyes. He has an original in his idea with which he compares himself. When he grows older, when the inclination towards the other sex begins to stir him, then is the critical point in time in which only the dignity of the human being is able to restrain the youth. But one must give the

youth pointers early on as to how he must guard himself against this or that.

In our schools something is almost universally lacking, something which would nevertheless greatly promote the formation of uprightness in children, namely a catechism of right.^a³⁷ It would have to contain cases which would be popular, which occur in ordinary life, and which would always naturally raise the question whether something is right or not. For example, if someone who should pay his creditor today is touched through the sight of someone in need and gives him the sum which he owes and should now pay – is this right or not? No! It is not right, for I must be free if I want to perform charitable acts. And when I give money to the poor man, I perform a meritorious deed; but when I pay my debt, I perform an obligatory deed.^b Further, whether a white lie^c should be permitted? No! There is not one conceivable case in which it would be excusable, and least of all before children, who would then look upon each tiny thing as such an emergency situation and often allow themselves to tell lies. If there were such a book already, then one could set aside an hour daily with much benefit, teaching children to know and to take to heart the rights of humanity,^d this apple of God's eye on earth.

As concerns the obligation of beneficence,^e it is only an imperfect obligation.³⁸ One must not so much soften the hearts of children in order for them to be affected by the fate of others, but rather make them upright. The child should not be full of feeling but rather full of the idea of duty. Many people, indeed, become hard-hearted because, having formerly been compassionate, they often found themselves deceived. It is useless to try to make the meritorious nature of actions understandable to a child. Clergymen often make the mistake of representing acts of beneficence as something meritorious. Putting aside the fact that with respect to God we can do no more than our obligation, it is also only our duty to do good to the poor. For the inequality of the wealth of human beings comes only from accidental circumstances. Thus if I possess wealth, I owe it only to the seizing of these circumstances, which has turned out well either for me or my predecessor, but the regard for the whole still remains the same.³⁹

Envy^f is aroused when one points out to a child to value itself according to the value of others. Instead the child should value itself according to the concepts of its own reason. That is why humility is actually nothing

9:491

^a *ein Katechismus des Rechts.*

^b *ein verdienstliches Werk . . . ein schuldiges Werk.*

^c *Notlüge.*

^d *das Recht der Menschen.*

^e *Wohltun.*

^f *Neid.*

^a *das Recht der Menschen.*

^b *weil es noch Nichts in seiner Gewalt hat.*

else than a comparison of one's worth with moral perfection. Thus the Christian religion, for instance, does not so much preach humility as make the human being humble because he must compare himself to the highest model of perfection. It is quite wrong to let humility consist in valuing oneself less than others. – “See how such and such child behaves!” and so forth. An exclamation of this kind produces a quite ignoble way of thinking. When the human being values his worth according to others, he seeks either to raise himself above others or to diminish the value of the other one. The latter, however, is envy. One then always tries only to impute a wrong to the other one. For if he were not there, then one also could not be compared with him, and so one would be the best. The inappropriate spirit of emulation merely stirs up envy. The case in which emulation could be of some use would be to convince someone of the feasibility of a thing; for example, if I demand of a child that a certain lesson^a be learned and show the child that others can do it.

9: 492

One must in no way allow one child to shame another. One must seek to avoid all pride^b which is grounded on the advantages of good fortune. But at the same time one must seek to establish frankness^c in children. Frankness is a modest confidence in oneself. By means of it the human being is placed in a position to display all of his talents in a proper way. It is to be distinguished completely from impertinence,^d which consists in indifference toward the judgment of others.

All desires^e of the human being are either formal (freedom and capacity)^f or material (related to an object) – the latter being desires of delusion or of pleasure;^g or, finally, they relate to the mere continuation of both as elements of happiness.^h

Desires of the first kind are ambition, lust for power, and greed;ⁱ desires of the second kind are the pleasures of sex (lust), of things (luxurious living), or of society (taste in entertainment);^j Desires of the third kind, finally, are love of life, of health, and of ease (freedom from care concerning the future).

^a Pensus.

^b Stolz.

^c Freimütigkeit – also “candor.”

^d Dummdreistigkeit.

^e Begierden.

^f Vermögen – also “faculty,” “power,” “ability.”

^g Begierden des Wahns oder des Genusses.

^h Glückseligkeit.

ⁱ Ehrsucht, Herrschaftsucht, und Habsucht – perhaps also “the manias for honor, dominance, and possession.” See also Kant's related discussion in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7: 271–4).

^j (Wollust) . . . (Wohlleben) . . . (Geschmack an Unterhaltung).

But the vices are those of malice, or of baseness, or of narrow-mindedness.^a To the first kind belong envy, thanklessness, and joy in someone else's misfortune;^b to those of the second kind belong injustice, unfaithfulness (deceitfulness), dissoluteness in the squandering of goods as well as of health (intemperance)^c and honor. Vices of the third kind are unkindness, stinginess, and indolence (effeminacy).^d

The virtues are either virtues of *merit* or merely of *obligation* or *innocence*.^e To the first kind belong magnanimity (in self-conquest regarding revenge as well as ease and greed), beneficence, and self-mastery;^f to the second kind belong uprightness, decency, and peaceableness;^g to the third kind, finally, belong honesty, modesty, and frugality.^h

Now we come to the question whether the human being is by nature morally good or evil.⁴⁰ He is neither of the two because by nature he is not a moral being at all; he only becomes one when his reason raises itself to the concepts of duty and of law. However, one can say that originally he has impulsesⁱ to all vices in himself, for he has inclinations and instincts which incite him, although reason drives him in the opposite direction. Therefore he can only become good by means of virtue, that is, by self-constraint;^j although without impulses he can be innocent.

Vices arise, for the most part, from the civilized state doing violence to nature, and yet it is our own vocation^k as human beings to emerge from our crude^l state of nature as animals. Perfect art becomes nature again.

Everything in education depends on establishing the right principles throughout and making them comprehensible and acceptable to children. Children must learn to substitute detesting things because they are disgusting and absurd for abhorrence out of hatred; they must learn to have inner aversion^m replace the external aversion to human beings or to divine punishment,⁴¹ to have self-estimation and inner worth replace the opinions of human beings, to have the inner value of actions and deeds replace words and emotions, understanding replace feeling,

9: 493

^a der Bosheit oder der Niederträchtigkeit oder der Eingeschränktheit.

^b Neid, Undankbarkeit und Schadenfreude.

^c Ungerechtigkeit, Untreue (Falschheit), Lüderlichkeit . . . (Unmäßigkeit).

^d Lieblosigkeit, Kargheit, Trägheit (Weichlichkeit).

^e Tugenden des Verdienstes, oder bloß der Schuldigkeit, oder der Unschuld.

^f Großmut . . . Wohlhärtigkeit, Selbstbeherrschung.

^g Redlichkeit, Ansständigkeit und Friedfertigkeit.

^h Ehrlichkeit, Sittsamkeit und Genügsamkeit.

ⁱ Anreize.

^j Selbstzwang.

^k Bestimmung – also “destiny.”

^l rob.

^m Abscheu.

and joy and piety with good humor replace morose, timid, and gloomy devotion.

But above all things one must also guard children from ever overestimating *merita fortunae*.^a

As concerns the education of children with a view to religion, the first question is whether it is feasible to teach religious concepts to children at an early age. There has been a great deal of controversy over this point in pedagogy.^b Religious concepts always presuppose some theology. Now could the young, who do not know the world, do not know themselves, be taught some theology? Could the young, who do not yet know duty, be in a position to comprehend an immediate duty to God? This much is certain, that if it were feasible that children should witness no acts of veneration towards the highest being, never even hear the name of God, it might be the proper order of things to guide them first to the ends and to that which benefits the human being, to sharpen their power of judgment, to instruct them in the order and beauty of the works of nature, then to add a wider knowledge of the structure of the universe, and only then to reveal to them the concept of a highest being, a lawgiver.^c But this is not possible in our present situation, and if one wanted to teach them something about God only at a late stage, and they nevertheless heard and witnessed so-called services to Him, then this would produce either indifference or perverted concepts in them; for example, a fear of God's power. But since it is to be feared that these ideas might settle down in children's fantasy, one must in order to avoid this seek to teach them religious concepts at an early age. However, this must not be memory work, mere imitation and solely mimicry work; rather the path which one chooses must always be in conformity with nature. Even without having abstract concepts of duty, of obligations, or good or bad conduct, children will understand that there is a law of duty, that it is not ease, usefulness, and the like which should determine them, but rather something universal which is not dependent on the whims of human beings. However, the teacher must also produce this concept for himself.

9: 494

At first everything must be attributed to nature, but later nature itself must be attributed to God; how, for example, at first everything is oriented toward the preservation of the species^d and their balance, but at the same time from a wider perspective everything is also oriented towards the human being, so that he may make himself happy.

^a good fortune.

^b *Pädagogik*.

^c *Gesetzgeber*.

^d *Arten*.

The concept of God might first best be made clear by analogy with that of the father under whose care we are. In the process one can then point out with great advantage the unity of humankind as that of a family.

But what then is religion? Religion is the law in us, in so far as it receives emphasis from a lawgiver and judge above us; it is morals applied to the knowledge of God. If religion is not combined with morality, then it becomes nothing more than currying favor. Singing praises, prayers, and going to church should only give the human being new strength, new courage for improvement, or they should be the expression of a heart inspired by the idea of duty. They are only preparations for good works, but not good works themselves, and one cannot please the highest being otherwise than by becoming a better human being.⁴²

With a child one must first begin with the law that it has in itself. The human being is contemptible to himself when he is vicious. This is grounded in the human being himself, and is not so merely because God has forbidden evil. For it is not necessary that the lawgiver also at the same time be the author^a of the law. Thus a prince can forbid stealing in his land, and yet he could not be declared the author of the prohibition of theft. From this the human being learns to understand that his good conduct alone makes him worthy of happiness. The divine law must appear at the same time as a law of nature, for it is not arbitrary. That is why to all morality^b there belongs religion.

But one must not begin with theology. A religion which is founded merely on theology can never contain anything moral. In such a religion one will have only fear on the one hand and intentions and dispositions geared toward reward on the other, resulting merely in a superstitious cult. Morality must therefore come first, theology then follow, and this is what is called religion.

The law within us is called conscience.^c⁴³ Properly speaking, conscience is the application^d of our actions to this law. The reproaches of conscience will be without effect if one does not think of it as the representative of God, who has erected a sublime seat above us but also a judge's seat within us. If religion is not added to moral conscientiousness,^e the latter has no effect. Religion without moral conscientiousness is a superstitious worship. People want to serve God when they, for example, praise Him, and extol His power and wisdom, without thinking how they might fulfill the divine laws, yes, without even once knowing and inquiring into His power, wisdom, and so forth. These praises are

9: 495

^a *Urheber*.

^b *Moralität*.

^c *Gewissen*.

^d *Applikation*.

^e *Gewissenhaftigkeit*.

an opiate for the conscience of such people and a cushion on which it is supposed to sleep peacefully.

Children cannot grasp all religious concepts, but nevertheless there are some that one must teach them; however, these must just be more negative than positive. – To have children rattle off formulas is of no use and produces only a perverted concept of piety. True worship of God consists in acting according to God's will, and this one must teach to children. One must see to it that the name of God is not so often misused, by children as well as by oneself. If one uses it in congratulations, even with pious intent, this is just as much an abuse. The concept of God should fill man with reverence^a each time His name is pronounced, and he should therefore use it seldom and never frivolously. The child must learn to feel reverence before God, as the lord of life and of the whole world; further, as the provider^b for human beings, and thirdly and finally as their judge. It is said that *Newton* always stopped for a while and meditated when he uttered God's name.

By means of a unified elucidation of the concepts of God and of duty the child learns all the better to respect the divine provision^c for creatures, and will thus be protected from the propensity toward destruction and cruelty which expresses itself in so many ways in the torture of small animals. At the same time, one should also instruct the youth to discover the good in evil; for example, beasts of prey and insects are models of cleanliness and of industry.^d Evil human beings awaken us to the law. Birds who hunt worms are protectors of the garden, and so forth.

9: 496

One must therefore teach some concepts of the highest being to children, so that, when they see others praying and so forth, they may know to whom and why such is being done. But these concepts must be only few in number and, as said before, be merely negative. Moreover, one must begin to teach them to children already from early youth, but always see to it that they do not value human beings according to their religious observances, for in spite of the diversity of religions there is nevertheless unity of religion everywhere.

In concluding we shall now add some remarks here which should be observed particularly by the youth as he enters the years of early manhood. At this time the young man^e begins to make certain distinctions which formerly he did not make. Namely, *first of all*, the distinction of sex. Nature has spread a certain veil of secrecy over this, as though it were a thing which is not entirely proper to the human being and merely an

^a Ehrfurcht.

^b Vorsorger.

^c Vorsorge.

^d Fleiß.

^e Jungling.

animal need in him. But nature has sought to unite this matter with every possible kind of morality. Even the wild nations behave with a kind of shame and reserve in this matter. Children now and then put inquisitive questions to grownups about it; for example: "Where do children come from?" But they let themselves be easily satisfied when one either gives them unreasonable answers which do not mean anything, or when one rebuffs them with the answer that this is a child's question.

The development of these inclinations in the young man is mechanical and, as is the case with all instincts, they develop without even having^a an object. It is thus impossible to keep the young man in uncertainty here and in the innocence which is connected with it. But silence only makes things go from bad to worse. One sees this in the education of our ancestors. In the education of more recent times it is correctly assumed that one must speak openly, clearly, and decidedly with the young man about it. This is admittedly a delicate point, because one does not like to look at it as an object of public conversation. But everything turns out well if one speaks about it with dignified seriousness and by addressing the youth's inclinations.

The thirteenth or fourteenth year is usually the time when the inclination toward sex develops itself in the young man (if it occurs earlier, it would have to be because children have been seduced and spoiled through bad examples). At that point, their power of judgment is also already developed, and nature has prepared them at this time so that one can speak to them about these things.

Nothing weakens the mind as well as the body of the human being more than the kind of lust which is directed towards oneself, and it is entirely contrary to the nature of the human being. But this lust also must not be concealed from the young man. It must be placed before him in all its atrocity, he must be told that he thereby makes himself useless for the reproduction of the species,^b that through it the bodily powers are ruined the most, that it brings on premature old age and that his mind will suffer a great deal in the process, and so forth.

One can escape from the impulses to this lust through continuous occupation, by not devoting more time to bed and sleep than is necessary. By means of these constant occupations, one must put the thoughts about it out of one's mind. For even if the object only remains in the imagination, it still corrodes the vital power.^c If one directs one's inclination towards the other sex, one always still finds some resistance, but if one directs it towards oneself, then one can satisfy it at any time. The physical effect is extremely harmful, but the consequences as regards

^a kennen.

^b Geschlecht.

^c Lebenskraft.

9: 497

9:498

morality are far worse yet. Here one transgresses the boundaries of nature, and inclination rages without arrest because no real satisfaction^a takes place. Teachers of grown youths have raised the question whether it is allowable for a young man to get involved with the other sex. If one of the two must be chosen, then the latter is certainly better. In the former case he acts contrary to nature, but here he does not. Nature has called him to manhood as soon as he comes of age, and therefore also to reproduce his species; but the needs which the human being necessarily has in a civilized state^b are such that at this stage he cannot always already educate his children. He thus violates the civil order.^c Therefore it is best, indeed, it is a duty, that the young man wait until he is capable of regular marriage. He then acts not only as a good human being, but also as a good citizen.

The young man should learn early to foster a decent respect for the other sex, to earn its respect through activity which is free from vice, and thus to strive after the high prize of a happy marriage.

A second difference which the young man begins to make around the time he enters society consists in the knowledge of the differences of classes^d and the inequality of human beings. As a child he must not be allowed to notice these things. One must not even allow him to give orders to the servants. If he sees that the parents give orders to the servants, one can if need be say to him: "We give them bread, and in return for it they obey us; you do not do this, and therefore they need not obey you." Children know nothing of these differences if parents merely do not teach them this delusion. One must show the young man that the inequality of human beings is an institution which has arisen because one man has tried to obtain advantages over another. The awareness^e of the equality of human beings in the face of civic inequality can be imparted to him little by little.

9:499

One must see to it that the young man values himself absolutely and not according to others. The high esteem of others in matters which do not make up the worth of the human being at all is vanity.^f Further, one must also stress to him conscientiousness^g in all things, and here as everywhere not merely to appear so but to strive to be so. One must emphasize to him that he must absolutely not let a carefully considered resolution become an empty resolution; it is better to make no resolution

^a Befriedigung.

^b kultivierter Staat.

^c bürgerliche Ordnung.

^d Stände – also "estates," "social groups."

^e Bewußtsein.

^f Eitelkeit.

^g Gewissenhaftigkeit.

and leave the matter in doubt. – He must also be taught contentedness^a with external circumstances and endurance^b in working: *sustine et abstine*; as well as moderation^c in pleasures. If one does not merely demand pleasures but also wants to work patiently one will become a useful member of the commonwealth^d and protect oneself from boredom.

Further, one must stress cheerfulness and good humor^e to the young man. Cheerfulness of heart arises from having nothing to reproach oneself for. One must also stress even-temperedness.^f Through practice one can bring oneself to always be able to be a cheerful member^g of society. –

One must also exhort him to look upon many a thing always as a duty. An action must be valued by me not because it agrees with my inclination but because I fulfill my duty through it. –

One must stress to him philanthropy towards others and then also cosmopolitan dispositions.^b In our soul there is something that makes us take an interest 1) in our own self, 2) in others with whom we have grown up, and then also 3) an interest in the best for the worldⁱ must come to pass. One must make children familiar with this interest so that they may warm their souls with it. They must rejoice at the best for the world even if it is not to the advantage of their fatherland or to their own gain. –

Further one must emphasize to the young man that he should place little value on the enjoyment of the amusements^j of life. The childish fear of death will then cease. One must point out to the young man that the enjoyment does not deliver what the prospect promised. –

Finally, one must also stress to him the necessity of settling accounts with himself each day, so that at the end of his life he is able to estimate the value of his life.

^a Genügsamkeit.

^b Duldsamkeit.

^c Genügsamkeit.

^d gemeinses Wesen.

^e Fröhlichkeit . . . und gute Laune.

^f Gleichheit der Laune.

^g aufgeräumter Teilnehmer.

^h Menschenliebe gegen andere, und dann auch . . . weltbürgerliche Gesinnungen.

ⁱ das Weltbeste – in the sense of "the highest good in the world."

^j Ergötzlichkeiten.

Editorial notes

General introduction

- 1 For related discussion, see *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*, edited by Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- 2 The double volume (25.1, 25.2) of the Academy Edition entitled *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, edited by Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1997) contains seven complete sets of different anthropology lecture notes from the years 1772–89, along with brief selections from several others. A forthcoming volume in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* will contain major selections from the Brandt/Stark volume (*Lectures on Anthropology*, edited by Robert B. Louden and Allen W. Wood).
- 3 Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Kritische Wälder* (1769), in *Herders Sämtliche Werke*, edited by Bernhard Suphan (Berlin: Weidemann, 1878), vol. iv, pp. 175–6. This passage is cited by both John T. Goldthwait in his Introduction to *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 8, and by Vinicius de Figueiredo on the back cover of his Portuguese translation of Kant's *Observations [Observações sobre o sentimento do belo e do sublime]*, 2nd edn. (Campinas, Brazil: Papirus Editora, 2000).
- 4 Slight miscalculation there! Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals* (*Metaphysik der Sitten*) did not appear until 1797 – nearly thirty years later. For discussion, see *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*, edited by Mark Timmons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
- 5 Goethe to Schiller, February 18, 1795, in *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe*, edited by Emil Staiger (Frankfurt: Insel, 1977), vol. i, p. 86. However, Schiller in his reply bemoans Kant's empirical orientation: "the exposition is merely anthropological, and one learns nothing from it about the ultimate principles of the beautiful" (Schiller to Goethe, February 19, 1795; in Staiger, *Der Briefwechsel*, p. 87). Goethe was much more critical of Kant's later *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. In another letter to Schiller he laments what he claims is the book's pervasive melancholic tone: "Kant's *Anthropology* is a very valuable book for me, and will be even more so in the future if I enjoy it in repeatedly smaller doses; for in its entirety, as it stands, it is not refreshing. From this point of view the human being always appears in a pathological condition . . ." (December 19, 1798; in Staiger, vol. ii, p. 718). See also Schiller's reply, on pp. 719–20.

- 6 See, e.g., Ehregott Andreas Christoph Wasianski, *Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren* (1804); in *Immanuel Kant: Ein Lebensbild nach Darstellungen der Zeitgenossen Borowski, Jachmann, Wasianski*, 2nd edn, edited by Hermann Schwarz (Halle: Hugo Peter, 1907), p. 274.
- 7 Peter Gay, "The Enlightenment as Medicine and as Cure," in *The Age of Enlightenment. Studies Presented to Theodore Besterman*, edited by W. H. Barber et al. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1967), pp. 375–86, at pp. 375, 380. See also Martin L. Davis, *Identity or History: Marcus Herz and the End of Enlightenment* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995), esp. ch. 3 ("A Born Medical Practitioner": Marcus Herz and the vocation of medicine").
- 8 For discussion, see Hans-Jürgen Schings, "Der philosophische Arzt. Anthropologie, Melancholie und Literatur im 18.Jahrhundert," pp. 11–40 in *Melancholie und Aufklärung* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1977); and ch. 6 ("Constituting the Discourse of Anthropology: The 'Philosophical Physicians'") in John H. Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
- 9 Julien Offray de La Mettrie, *Man A Machine and Man a Plant*, translated by Richard A. Watson and Maya Rybalka (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), p. 29. *L'homme machine* was suppressed by many governments after its initial publication, and La Mettrie successfully sought refuge at the court of Frederick the Great, where he spent the last three years of his life. In his elegy for La Mettrie, Frederick states: "He was born to be a public speaker and philosopher, but an even more precious gift of nature was his pure soul and kind heart. All those who are not impressed by the pious insults of theologians lament in La Mettrie the loss of an honest man and a physician rich in knowledge" [*Friedrich der Große und die Philosophie: Texte und Dokumente*, edited by Bernhard Taureck (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1986), p. 55].
- 10 Herz's review appeared in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* 20 (1773): 25–51.
- 11 Max Scheler, *Schriften zur Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1994), p. 159 [from *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1928)]. Scheler (who died shortly after completing the rough, fragmentary draft of *Man's Place in Nature*) was one of the key figures associated with twentieth-century German philosophical anthropology. Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), translated by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) is dedicated "to the memory of Max Scheler" (pp. iv, xxii – see also Heidegger's discussion, "The Idea of a Philosophical Anthropology," esp. p. 216). Other important voices in this tradition include Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen.
- 12 Arthur O. Lovejoy, "Kant and Evolution," in *Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859*, edited by Bentley Glass, Owsei Temkin, and William L. Straus Jr. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959), p. 188. See also Phillip R. Sloan, "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species," *The British Journal for the History of Science* 12 (1979): 109–53.
- 13 Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Achieving Our Humanity: The Idea of the Postracial Future* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 100. Similarly, Robert Bernasconi, in "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism," writes: "Kant's view was that . . . Whites and Blacks have a common parentage in an original pair,

- which just happened on his account to be White” [*Philosophers on Race*, edited by Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 156]. For a more nuanced discussion, see Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race”, forthcoming in *The Philosophical Quarterly*.
- 14 Kant also speaks of people who commit horrendous crimes or are given to degrading vices as having renounced their humanity and destroyed their worth as human beings. E.g., the person who has become a drunkard is “like a mere animal, not to be treated as a human being” (*Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 427; cf. 423, 425) – though at the same time, he also holds that “a use of wine bordering on intoxication” is justifiable if it promotes conversation at a dinner party (6: 428; cf. *Anth* 7: 170–2, 279–82). However, we are still obligated to treat such people – indeed, *all* human beings – with equal dignity and respect. “I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being; I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it” (6: 463). Similarly, even when Kant questions (wrongly, as I argue below – see n. 20) why certain peoples exist at all, he still maintains that we must treat them with the respect they are owed as human beings. When it comes to basic moral status, “the language of true reason is humble. All human beings are equal” (*Moralphilosophie* *Collins* 27: 462; cf. 4: 434–5, 6: 434–5).
- 15 Denis Diderot, *Supplément au Voyage de Bougainville*, in *Political Writings*, translated and edited by John Hope Mason and Robert Wokler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 40; cf. 73.
- 16 See Allen W. Wood, *Kant’s Ethical Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 300.
- 17 Other essays by Kant which are also relevant to his philosophy of history include the following: *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (1784), *On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice* (1793), *Toward Perpetual Peace* (1795) (translations of each are available in *Practical Philosophy*); *The End of all Things* (1794), *An old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?* [= Part 2 of *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798)]. The latter two texts are available in *Religion and Rational Theology*. Kant’s discussion of nature as a teleological system in §§ 83–4 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790) also includes one of his key discussions in the philosophy of history.
- 18 Immanuel Kant, *On History*, edited by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. vii. Similarly, Emil L. Fackenheim, in his essay “Kant’s Concept of History,” observes that “few treat it [viz., Kant’s philosophy of history] seriously, for it seems unconnected, and indeed incompatible with the main body of his thought” [*Kant-Studien* 48 (1957): 381].
- 19 Commentators disagree as to whether Kant limits history to a story of “external” progress (improvements in visible cultural, political, and legal institutions) or whether it also includes “inner” progress (the positive development of the attitudes and dispositions of moral agents). Defenders of the former interpretation include Otfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*, translated by Marshall Farrier (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 194 and Wolfgang Kersting, *Wohlgeordnete Freiheit: Immanuel Kants*

- Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), pp. 84–5. For defenses of the latter view, see, e.g., Fritz Medicus, “Zu Kants Philosophie der Geschichte mit besonderer Beziehung auf K. Lamprecht,” *Kant-Studien* 4 (1900): 66; R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 32; and Manfred Riedel, “Einleitung,” in Kant, *Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1974), pp. 10–11. The external/internal progress debate also links up with a related dispute concerning Kant’s view of moral agency. Are moral agents timeless and entirely autonomous, uncaused by anything apart from their noumenal selves? Or are they subject to moral improvement through education and historical progress?
- 20 On this view of what constitutes culture, it becomes very difficult to understand Kant’s insistence (discussed earlier) that certain peoples are “incapable of culture.” For it seems obvious that all peoples possess the aptitude for “any ends in general.” At the same time, if one accepts this minimalist definition of culture as Kant’s own considered view on the matter (and the 1790 publication date of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is a good reason to do so), there is now plenty of room within his progressivist account of history for strong cultural pluralism, and no reason to fear that what he envisaged was the eventual domination of one specific kind of culture over all others. [See, for instance, his *Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke’s Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian Dictionary* (1800), contained in the present volume, where he emphasizes that helping to preserve “the still unmixed language of a very old tribe of people that is now restricted to a small area and, as it were, isolated . . . is in itself already of great worth” (8: 443).] What remains, however, is his own apparent inability to recognize the cultural achievements of other peoples.
- 21 Condorcet, *The Nature and Purpose of Public Instruction* (1791), in *Condorcet: Selected Writings*, edited by Keith Michael Baker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1976), p. 114.
- 22 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976; reprint edn., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981) IV.ii.9. Cf. Wolfgang Kersting, who calls Kant’s interpretation of nature “the sister of Smith’s invisible hand and the forerunner of the Hegelian cunning of reason” (*Wohlgeordnete Freiheit*, p. 85).
- 23 Other texts relevant to education include Kant’s *Announcements of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–66* (available in the volume entitled *Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770*), and the “Methodenlehre” sections of both the second *Critique* (5: 149–63) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 475–85). Additionally, there are brief discussions on pedagogy in several of his logic and anthropology lectures (e.g., *Logik Pölitz* 24: 599–602, *Logik Dohna-Wundlacken* 24: 779–84; *Friedländer* 25: 722–8). A good source book here is Kant, *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Pädagogik und ihrer Begründung*, edited by Hans-Hermann Groothoff, 2nd edn. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982).
- 24 Basedow, *Philanthropisches Archiv* 1 (1776), p. 15; as cited by Michael Niedermeier in “Campe als Direktor des Dessauer Philanthropins,” in *Visionäre*

- Lebensklugheit: Joachim Heinrich Campe in seiner Zeit* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), p. 46, n.7.
- 25 This Introduction borrows and builds on a number of points made in Robert B. Louden, *Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Thanks also to Günter Zöller, Claudia Schmidt, and Allen Wood for insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft.

Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime

- 1 Domitian was the emperor of Rome from 81 to 96 CE. According to Suetonius, “[a]t the beginning of his reign he used to spend hours in seclusion every day, doing nothing but catch[ing] flies and stab[bing] them with a keenly sharpened stylus”; *The Lives of the Caesars*, tr. J. C. Rolfe, rev. edn. London: 1930, Book VIII, volume II, p. 345.
- 2 Pierre Bayle says of Kepler, “[w]e may place him among those authors, who have said, that they valued a production of a mind above a kingdom”; article Kepler, in *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle*, tr. Pierre Des Maizeaux, 2nd edn. London: 1736, vol. III, pp. 659–60. The article on Kepler is not included in the modern volume of selections from Bayle edited by Richard Popkin (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1991).
- 3 The sublime, and the contrast between the beautiful and the sublime, were a constant theme in European letters after the republication of the ancient treatise *Peri Hypsous*, falsely attributed to the rhetorician Dionysius Cassius Longinus (c. 213–73 CE); it was translated into English as early as 1652 and, famously, into French by Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux as *Traité du Sublime* (Paris: 1674). The most famous work in the eighteenth century on the beautiful and the sublime was by Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful* (London: 1757, second edition: 1759). Burke’s book became known in Germany immediately through the 1758 review by Moses Mendelssohn, “Philosophische Untersuchung des Ursprungs unserer Ideen vom Erhabenen und Schönen,” *Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften*, vol. 3, Part 2. Kant would cite Burke several times in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, notably in the General Remark following § 29 (AA 5: 277).
- 4 Virtually all of Book I of *Paradise Lost* offers a graphic description of the imagined terrors of Hell. Some sample lines are:

The dismal situation waste and wild,
A dungeon horrible, on all sides round
As one great furnace flamed, yet from those flames
No light, but rather darkness visible
Served only to discover sights of woe,
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all; but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning sulphur unconsumed:

- Such place eternal justice had prepared
For those rebellious, here their prison ordained
In utter darkness, and their portion set
As far removed from God and light of heaven
As from the centre thrice to the utmost pole.
(*Paradise Lost*, Book I, lines 60–74; from *John Milton*, edited by Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 357.)
- 5 Presumably Kant has in mind the description of Elysium that Virgil gives in the *Aeneid*, Book IV, beginning at line 853:
- His duty to the goddess done, they came
To places of delight, to green park land,
Where souls take ease amid the Blessed Groves.
Wider expanses of high air endow
Each vista with a wealth of light . . .
Within a fragrant laurel grove, where Po
Sprang up and took his course to the world above,
The broad stream flowing on amid the forest.
This was the company of those who suffered
Wounds in battle for their country; those
Who in their lives were holy men and chaste
Or worthy of Phoebus in prophetic song;
Or those who better life, by finding out
New truths and skills; . . .
. . . ‘None of us
Has one fixed home. We walk in shady groves
And bed on riverbanks and occupy
Green meadows fresh with streams . . .’
- (Virgil, *The Aeneid*, tr. Robert Fitzgerald. New York, Random House: 1981, Book IV, lines 853–903, pp. 182–3.)
- 6 Hera requested Aphrodite to help her reconcile the feuding Greeks and Trojans:
- “But if words of mine could lure them back to love,
back to bed, to lock in each other’s arms once more . . .
they would call me their honored, loving friend forever.”
Aphrodite, smiling her everlasting smile, replied,
“Impossible – worse, it’s *wrong* to deny your warm request,
since you are the one who lies in the arms of mighty Zeus.”
With that she loosed from her breasts the breastband, pierced and alluring, with every kind of enchantment woven through it . . . There is the heat of Love, the pulsing rush of Longing, the lover’s whisper, irresistible – magic to make the sanest man go mad. And thrusting it into Hera’s outstretched hands, she breathed her name in a throbbing, rising voice: “Here now, take this band, put it between your breasts – ravishing open-work, and the world lies in its weaving!” (Homer, *The Iliad*, translated by Robert Fagles. New York, Viking: 1990, Book Fourteen, lines 251–66, pp. 376–7.)

- 7 The example comes from the *Bremisches Magazin zur Ausbreitung der Wissenschaften und Künste und Tugend. Von einigen Liebhabern derselben aus den englischen Monatschriften gesammelt und herausgegeben* ('Bremen Magazine for the Propagation of the Sciences and the Arts and Virtue. Collected and edited from the English monthlies by some lovers of the former'), vol. 4 (1761): p. 539.
- 8 D. Friedrich Hasselquist, *Reise nach Palästina in den Jahren 1749–1762* (Journey to Palestine in the Years 1749–1762). Rostock: 1762, pp. 82–94.
- 9 Kant refers to both the pyramids and St. Peter's in the course of his explication of the mathematical sublime in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 26, AA 5: 252.
- 10 This sentence anticipates Kant's later account of dependent judgments of beauty; see *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 16, AA 5: 230.
- 11 Albrecht von Haller, *Über die Ewigkeit* (1736).
- 12 Kant attributes this statement to Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of Great Britain.
- 13 Achilles hated Agamemnon for having taken the girl Briseis from him, and refused to join in the fight against Troy for the recovery of Helen, when, after all, Agamemnon already had Briseis. Agamemnon sent ambassadors with gifts to recruit Achilles, but Achilles replied "I hate that man like very Gates of Death,/ who says one thing but hides another in his heart." Homer, *The Iliad*, Book 9, lines 378–9 (Fagles, p. 262).
- 14 Jonas Hanway, *Herrn Jonas Hanways zuverlässige Beschreibung. Nebst einer unpartheyischen Histoire des grossen Eroberers Nadir Kuli oder Kuli Chams.* (Mr. Jonas Hanway's reliable description. Together with an impartial history of the great Conqueror Nadir Kuli or Kuli Chams.) (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1754), Part II, p. 396.
- 15 William Hogarth (1697–1764), British painter and engraver, artist of such famous series as *The Rake's Progress*, and author of *The Analysis of Beauty: Written with a view of fixing the fluctuating Ideas of Taste*. London: J. Reeves, 1753.
- 16 Heraclitus of Ephesus, fl. ca. 500–480 BCE. "The legend of the 'weeping philosopher' is late and based on a combination of a Platonic joke, Heraclitus's theory of flux, and a misunderstanding of Theophrastus's word 'melancholia,' which originally meant 'impulsiveness.'" Michael C. Stokes, "Heraclitus of Ephesus," in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan, 1967, vol. III, pp. 477–81, at p. 477. For the standard work on Heraclitus, see Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- 17 The argument that virtue depends on principles rather than feeling anticipates Kant's mature moral philosophy; the present reference to the special dignity of human nature should be compared to Kant's statement in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Section II, AA 4: 435.
- 18 Kant continued to discuss the moral significance of the traditional doctrine of the four temperaments in his anthropology lectures, beginning with his earliest lectures in 1772–3 (see *Anthropologie Collins*, AA 25: 219–26) and

- continuing through his published handbook *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), Part II, AA 7: 288–91.
- 19 Kant here seems to be referring to characters from Molière, where Alceste appears in the *Misanthrope* and Adraste in *Le Sicilien ou L'Amour Peintre*. He is not quoting from the plays, but is interpreting Molière's characters.
- 20 Here Kant alludes to the speech by Chremes in the Act 1, scene 1 of Terence's *Self-Tormentor*, "I am a human being; I am interested in everything human"; *The Complete Roman Drama*, ed. George E. Duckworth (New York: Random House, 1942), vol. II, p. 199.
- 21 This strange word, much the same in English as in German, is, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, of "unknown origin." It means "confused language, meaningless talk, nonsense," and is found in a 1653 translation of Rabelais as well as in the *Spectator*, number 275 (January 15, 1711/12), where Addison fancifully describes an imaginary "dissection of a beau's head, and of a coquette's heart." The skull of the former "was filled with a kind of spungy substance, which the French anatomists call galimatias, and the English, nonsense." *The Spectator*, ed. A. Chalmers. Boston: Little, Brown, vol. 4 (1869): p. 223.
- 22 Here Kant refers to Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) and to Sir Charles Grandison in Samuel Richardson's novel of the same name (1754), "a gentleman of high character and fine appearance" who has rendered great services to others rather than simply seeking his own survival.
- 23 Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis, or Cato the Younger (95–46 BCE), Roman senator and statesman, was an opponent of Julius Caesar's imperial ambitions. "It is said of Cato that even from his infancy, in his speech, his countenance, and all his childish pastimes, he discovered an inflexible temper, unmoved by any passion, and firm in everything"; Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, translated by John Dryden, revised by Arthur Hugh Clough. New York: The Modern Library, n.d., p. 918. Cato achieved immortality when he committed suicide in order to stir the Romans of Utica to resistance against Caesar. "And a little after, the people of Utica flocked thither, crying out with one voice, he was their benefactor and their saviour, the only free and only undefeated man" (p. 959). Kant also refers to Cato in considering whether there are any circumstances in which suicide is not a violation of duty to ourselves; see *Moralphilosophie Collins*, AA 27: 370–1.
- 24 The Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c. 50–130 CE), was famed for his "great sweetness, as well as personal simplicity," and "lived in a house with a rush mat, a simple pallet, and an earthenware lamp (after the iron one was stolen)"; Philip P. Hallie, "Epictetus," in Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 1.
- 25 Here Kant refers to Charles XII of Sweden (1682–1718, reigned 1697–1718), under whom Sweden reached the height of its power, but whose death during the Northern War and Sweden's ensuing defeat in 1721 cost Sweden the rank of a great European power that it had held since the role of Gustavus Adolphus in the Thirty Years' War. Voltaire published a biography of Charles XII.
- 26 Differences between the sexes would remain a constant theme in Kant's anthropology, from his first lectures in 1772–3 (*Anthropologie Collins*, 25:

- 234–8) to his final handbook (*Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, AA 7: 303–10).
- 27 Anna Dacier, née Lefevre (1654–1720), wife of the philologist André Dacier, translated the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* into French, as well as other classics in both Greek and Latin.
- 28 Gabrielle Émilie la Tonnelier de Breteuil, marquise du Châtelet-Lomont (1706–49), a mathematician and physicist, and Voltaire's companion at Cirey for the last fifteen years of her life. Kant alludes to the debate over living forces between her and Cartesians such as Jean Jacques d'Ortous de Mairan (1678–1771), who wrote a “Lettre à Madame du Chastelet sur la question des forces vives” (Letter to Madame du Châtelet on the question of living forces) (Paris, 1741), in his earliest work, *Thoughts on the True Evaluation of Living Forces* (1747), § 33, AA 1: 45.
- 29 In his famous theory of vortices, Descartes claimed that “all the bodies in the universe are composed of one and the same matter, which is divisible into indefinitely many parts, and is in fact divided into a large number of parts which move in different directions and have a sort of circular motion”; *The Principles of Philosophy* (1644), Part Three, § 46; in the French edition, he added that he would use the word “vortices” “to refer to all matter which revolves in this way around each of the centers.” See *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. 1, pp. 256–7.
- 30 Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757), a popularizer of the new science, wrote *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (Dialogue on the plurality of the worlds) (Paris, 1686), presented as a conversation among women on astronomy.
- 31 Francesco, Conte Algarotti (1712–64), an Italian who spent some years at the court of Frederick the Great, wrote *Newtonianismo per le Dame* (1736), translated into all the major European languages (including English in 1737 and French in 1741), as well as a well-known essay on opera (1755).
- 32 *The Spectator*, Number 6 (Wednesday, March 7, 1710/11): “When modesty ceases to be the chief ornament of one sex, and integrity of the other, society is upon a wrong basis, and we shall be ever after without rules to guide our judgment in what is really becoming and ornamental” (by Richard Steele); *The Spectator*, ed. A. Chalmers, vol. 1, p. 131.
- 33 Ninon de Lenclos (1616–1705), a lover of many including La Rochefoucauld, left the young Voltaire a bequest to buy books.
- 34 Marchese Giovanni Monaldeschi (d. 1657), equerry for Queen Christina of Sweden, was assassinated at her orders after she had abdicated the Swedish throne and was living in France.
- 35 Lucretia, traditionally the wife of Tarquinius Collatinus, one of the founders of the Roman republic and consul in 509 BCE, was violated by Sextus, son of Tarquinius Superbus; after telling her husband, she took her own life. This incident resulted in a popular rising led by Junius Brutus, also traditionally regarded as a consul in 509 BCE, and the expulsion of the Tarquins. The legend of Lucretia was a favorite in later literature, such as Shakespeare's 1594 poem “The Rape of Lucrece,” and painting.

- 36 “Every nation has ideas of beauty peculiar to itself; and every individual has his own notions and taste concerning that quality. These peculiarities probably originate from the first agreeable impressions we receive of certain objects; and therefore depend more upon chance and habit than upon difference of constitution”; Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, *Natural History, General and Particular*, tr. William Smellie, ed. William Wood, 20 vols. London: 1812, vol. III, p. 203.
- 37 Simonides (c. 556–468 BCE), lyric and elegiac poet, particularly famous for his encomia and dirges during the period of the Peloponnesian wars. The authenticity of many apothegms attributed to him is dubious. See M. Boas, *De Epigrammatis Simonideis* (1905).
- 38 Kant would later argue for the equality of man and woman within marriage, at least with regard to economic rights as well as sexual rights, in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Doctrine of Right, § 24–6, AA 6: 277–80.
- 39 Discussion of national characters was a standard part of Kant's lectures on anthropology. Beginning with his first lectures in 1772–3, we find sections on the “Taste of different nations” as well as “On national character” (*Anthropologie Collins*, AA 25: 201–4, 232–4); his handbook *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* includes the section “On the Character of Nations”; Part II, Section C, AA 7: 311–20.
- 40 According to Goldthwait, “The San Benito was a scapular, a loose, sleeveless monastic garment introduced by St. Benedict. That worn by confessed heretics was yellow and was decorated with flames and figures of devils.”
- 41 For each of these, Kant has provided both a Germanic and a Latinate word, both of which can be translated by the same (Latinate) word in English. Thus he writes: “*Leichtgläubigkeit* (Credulity), *Aberglaube* (Superstition), *Schwärmerei* (Fanaticism), und *Gleichgültigkeit* (Indifferentism).”
- 42 In the essay “Of National Characters,” Hume wrote: “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up among us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.” David Hume, *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 213n.
- 43 In Greek mythology, Jason was the leader of the Argonauts who sought the Golden Fleece; the chief source is Apollonius Rhodius (third century BCE) of Alexandria, author of the *Argonautica*, the great epic of the Alexandrian period. Attakullaculla was a Cherokee chieftain, brought to England in 1730

- by Sir Alexander Cuming, who later was a leader and peacemaker and saved the life of an English captain. See “Attakullaculla,” *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 30 (Washington, 1907), Part 1, p. 115. (Goldthwait)
- 44 Jean Baptiste Labat (1663–1738), *Voyage du père Labat aux îles de l’Amérique* (Haye, 1724), Volume II, p. 54.
- 45 Ernst Cassirer’s edition substitutes “unnatural” here (*Immanuel Kants Werke*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1922, vol. II, p. 299) as does the *Werkausgabe* by Wilhelm Weischedel. Only “unnatural” makes a plausible contrast with the “ancient simplicity of nature” to which Kant compares it.

Introduction to Essay on the maladies of the head

- 1 The German original is to be found in AA 2:489. The translation is by Claudia Schmidt.
- 2 *Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kants* (1804), reprinted in *Immanuel Kant. Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen. Die Biographien von L. E. Borowski, R. B. Jacobmann und A. Ch. Wasianski*, edited by Felix Groß. Darmstadt 1974, pp. 1–115, here p. 31.

Essay on the maladies of the head

- 1 From the Greek for “study of proper names.”
- 2 Latinized name of Christoph Schlüssel (1537–1612), a famous mathematician who was involved in the institution of the Gregorian calendar.
- 3 Nickname of *Heracles*; the reference is to Heracles’s stay with the Lydian princess Omphale, who made him wear women’s clothes.
- 4 Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365–360 to c. 275–270 BC), founder of Greek skepticism. The anecdote can be found in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Doctrines of the Eminent Philosophers*, IX, 68.
- 5 Pyrrhus (319–272 BC), king of Epirus, who campaigned extensively but never won a lasting victory.
- 6 Nero Claudius Caesar (37–68), Roman Emperor.
- 7 A reference to the eschatological vision of the four realms or monarchies preceding the divine governance of world in the prophet Daniel (Dan. 7.15–27).
- 8 Athenian statesman and soldier (5th century BC) with a reputation for honesty among his contemporaries.
- 9 Stoic philosopher (c. 55 – c. 135), who had grown up as a slave.
- 10 French-Swiss philosopher (1712–78), who was very much at odds with academic philosophy and education, as represented preeminently by the University of Paris, known as the Sorbonne.
- 11 A Dutch tailor and merchant (1509–36), who became the leader of the short-lived anabaptist kingdom in Munster, Westphalia.
- 12 Jean Terrasson (1670–1750), French classicist and philosopher. Member of the Académie française.
- 13 See *Der Arzt. Eine medicinische Wochenschrift*, Part VI. Hamburg 1761. The journal was authored and edited by Johann August Unzer of Altona near Hamburg. The contributions to which Kant refers are: “Vom Zusammenhang des Verstandes mit der Verdauung” (Of the connection of the

- understanding with digestion) (in the 150th issue); “Beweis, dass alle Arten des Unsinns durch die Verbesserung der Verdauung curirt werden müssen” (Proof that all kinds of mental deficiency must be cured by the improvement of the digestion) (in the 151st issue); “Derselbe Beweis insbesondere von einigen hitzigen Deliris” (The same proof in particular of some feverish deliria) (in the 152nd issue).
- 14 Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), whose satirical poetics *Peri bathou or Anti-Sublime*, containing the idea referred to by Kant, had been published in a German translation in 1733.

Introduction to Of the different races of human beings

- 1 In 1801 and 1802 two competing publications of Kant’s lectures on physical geography appeared. See AA 9: 151–436 for the text and AA 9: 510–12 for a discussion of the editorial controversy.
- 2 The four other invitational writings, which date from the summer semesters of 1757 and 1758 and the winter semesters of 1759/60 and 1765/66, respectively, are: *Magister Immanuel Kant’s Design and Announcement of a Course On Physical Geography together with the Appendix of a Short Consideration On the Question: Whether the Western Winds in Our Regions Are Humid Because They Pass Over a Large Ocean* (AA 2: 1–12); *Magister Immanuel Kant’s New Doctrinal Concept of Motion and Rest and the Consequences Attached to It in the First Principles of Natural Science, By Which At Once His Lectures in this Semester Are Announced* (AA 2: 13–25; the reference to the lectures on physical geography is on AA 2: 25); *Attempt Of Some Considerations On Optimisms by Magister Immanuel Kant, By Which He At Once Announces His Lectures For the Imminent Semester* (AA 2: 27–35; the reference to the lectures on physical geography is on AA 2: 35); and *Magister Immanuel Kant’s Note On the Institution of His Lectures in the Winter Semester of 1765–1766* (AA 2: 303–13; the reference to the lectures on physical geography is on AA 2: 312f.).
- 3 Leipzig 1777. Kant’s essay is in Part Two, pp. 125–64.
- 4 Due to the politically sensitive nature of the central topic of these essays and also due to Kant’s repeated regrettable conflation of descriptive and analytic statements with evaluative and even pejorative judgments about different ethnic groups to be found in these essays, Kant’s theory of the natural history of the human species has not found the sustained scholarly attention it deserves in terms of its philosophical content and its contributions to the history and philosophy of science. A notable recent exception to this practice is Raphaël Lagier, *Les races humaines selon Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004). For a discussion of Kant’s theory in the context of modern biology, see Annette Barkhaus, “Kants Konstruktion des Begriffs der Rasse und seine Hierarchisierung der Rassen,” in *Biologisches Zentralblatt* 113 (1994), 197–203.
- 5 See AA 9: 514–23. While the Academy edition presents the variants of the first edition of the essay somewhat inconveniently in a separate appendix, the following edition of Kant’s works lists the variants at the bottom of the text of the essay: Immanuel Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, edited by Wilhelm Weisschedel. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1968, vol. XI, pp. 11–30.

Of the different races of human beings

- 1 Georges Louis Leclerc Conte de Buffon (1707–88). French investigator of nature. For the statement of the rule cited by Kant see his *Histoire naturelle: Histoire de l'âne*, ed. C. S. Sonnini. Paris 1808, vol. xxii, 279ff.
- 2 Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759). French philosopher, biologist and mathematician, who took part in an expedition to Lappland in 1736–7. From 1746 on he was President of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. The reference is to his *Système de la nature* (System of Nature), thesis 56, in *Oeuvres*. Lyons 1756, vol. II, 159.
- 3 Carsten Niebuhr (1733–1815). Travelled through Arabia as geographer of a Danish expedition, of which he was the sole survivor. He published *Beschreibung von Arabien* (Description of Arabia) in 1772 and *Reisebeschreibung nach Arabien und die angrenzenden Länder* (Description of a Voyage to Arabia and the Neighboring Countries) in 1774–8.
- 4 David C. Cranz (1723–77). Accompanied as a scribe Count Zinzendorf on various voyages. As a result of his one-year sojourn in Greenland he published *Historie von Grönland* (History of Greenland). Leipzig 1765.
- 5 Greek historian, the “father of historiography” (5th century BC); the reference is to *Histories*, Book IV, chapter 23.
- 6 Joseph de Guignes (1721–1800). French orientalist. See his *Histoire générale des Huns* (General History of the Huns). Paris 1756, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 16ff.
- 7 Edward Ives (died 1786). English ship’s doctor and voyager. See *A Voyage from England to India in the Year 1754... Also a Journey from Persia to England by an Unusual Route*. 1773; German translation Leipzig 1774–5, Part 2, first author’s appendix.
- 8 Philippe Buache (1700–73). French geographer, author of *Atlas physique* (1753), known for his studies of the surface structures of the earth. On the introduction of the concept of plateau, see his *Essai de géographie physique* (Essay in Physical Geography), in *Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences*, Année 1753, p. 404.

Essays regarding the Philanthropinum

- 1 Three issues of the *Philanthropin Archives* appeared in 1776.
- 2 Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723–90) founded the Philanthropinum in 1774, under the patronage of Prince Friedrich Franz Leopold III of Anhalt-Dessau. Other schools modeled on it appeared later in Switzerland and Germany. For more on Kant’s relation to Basedow and the Philanthropinum, see letters #98–100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 118, 123, 125, and 129 in volume 10 of the Academy edition. For instance, Kant concludes his letter to Basedow of June 19, 1776 (#110) by noting: “I hope only that all is well with you, who have become so important to the world, and with the institution you have founded, deserving the gratitude of all posterity” (10: 194).
- 3 The full title runs: *Something for Cosmopolitans to Read, to Think About, and to Do. With Regard to a Philanthropinum or Pedagogical Seminar founded in Anhalt-Dessau of an entirely new Kind, which Should Have Already Been Old. A Petition with Respect to Parents, Students, and Those Who Believe in the Necessity of Practical Good Works, to Benefactors Void of a Pedagogy of Skilled Genius, and*

Statesmen whose Monarchs Permit them to Do Something Else besides Ideas of Finance and Militia. At the Least, on the Occasion of Some Discourses Drafted or Summed Up by Job. Bernb. Basedow, Caretaker of the Philanthropinum in Dessau. Leipzig, 1775.

- 4 From May 13 to 15 a public examination of the Philanthropinum students took place. In the first issue of the *Archives*, Basedow invited the public to attend.
- 5 *Königsbergische Zeitung*, March 25, 1776.
- 6 I.e., the gift of Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau.
- 7 Karl Ehregott Mangelsdorf (1748–1802), born in Dresden, received *Magister* degree in 1770, worked as teacher at the Dessau Philanthropinum Institute until 1777, appointed professor of rhetoric and history at Königsberg in 1782, died in Königsberg. In 1777 Mangelsdorf published his *First Word to the Public concerning the royal Danish Prof. Basedow* (Leipzig). The Institute responded with its own text, *To the Public, concerning Mangelsdorf’s Defamatory Text against the Dessau Educational Institute and Prof. Basedow* (Dessau, 1777). Mangelsdorf followed with a *Second Word* in the same year.
- 8 The issue was published on March 13, 1777, and presents the “Announcement of a Monthly Review of Pedagogical Content, which shall begin with the next Easter Quarter (*Osterquartal*).” It is undersigned “The Dessau Educational Institute,” and serves repeatedly as a discussion topic for Kant’s presentation.
- 9 Edited by Johann Bernhard Basedow and Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746–1818). Dessau 1777–9.
- 10 Anton Friedrich Büsching (1724–93), senior commissioner (*Oberconsistorialrath*) – Kant uses the abbreviation “O. C. R.”) and director of the Gray Cloister Gymnasium in Berlin, edited the periodical “Weekly Reports of New Maps, Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Books and Writings,” 1773–87. See vol. 4 (1776), p. 131.

Introduction to A note to physicians

- 1 See AA 8: 464, where there is talk of “the Note together with Fothergill’s essay.”

A note to physicians

- 1 Alex Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo and Parts Adjacent*. London 1756.
- 2 John Fothergill (1712–80), a well-known London physician.
- 3 The friend is Kant’s former student, Christian Jacob Kraus. In the original publication Kant’s text was followed by the German translation of a text by John Fothergill, dated 6 December 1775, from *Gentleman’s Magazine*, February 1776, in which the course of the epidemic of influenza in London 1775 and the efforts made to cure it are described in meticulous detail. Fothergill notes the speed of the epidemic’s spread in London and the comparatively low number of people who died as result of it. He further relates the situation in the countryside (Cheshire) over the summer of that year, noting the meteorological conditions (steady temperatures,

steady low-grade rainfall) and similar symptoms in country animals, especially horses and dogs. In conclusion, Fothergill asks country doctors to report the time of year during which the disease occurred in their vicinity and to indicate any differences in symptoms and treatment from the ones he described.

Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim

- 1 The passage referred to is the following, whose author was Kant's colleague and follower Johann Schultz: "A favorite idea of Professor Kant is that the final end of humankind is the attainment of the most perfect political constitution, and he wishes that a philosophical historiographer would undertake to provide us in this respect with a history of humanity, and to show how far humanity has approached this final end in different ages, or how far removed it has been from it, and what is still to be done for its attainment" (AA 8: 468).
- 2 "Il n'est rien si dissociable et sociable que l'homme: l'un par son vice, l'autre par sa nature." Michel Eyquem de Montaigne, "De la solitude," *Essais*, ed. André Tournon. Paris: Imprimerie nationale Éditions, 1998, 1: 388. "There is nothing more unsociable than Man, and nothing more sociable: unsociable by his vice, sociable by his nature," "Of Solitude," *The Complete Essays*, tr. M. A. Screech. London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 267.
- 3 The "Amphyctyony" (from "amphictions" = dwellers around) was an ancient Greek association, active between the sixth and fourth centuries BC and formed originally for the protection of certain religious shrines (most prominently, the oracle of Apollo at Delphi). The league met twice annually at Delphi and Thermopylae, and carried on three successful wars in the name of religion between 600 and 346. It did also aim at establishing peace among Greek states, but the last of its so-called "sacred wars," in 339–338, was merely a pretext for Philip to establish Macedonian hegemony over the other Greek states.
- 4 See Hume, "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," *Essays Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Green and Grose. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1875, 1: 414.

Review of J. G. Herder's *Ideas for the philosophy of the history of humanity*

- 1 Herder's *Ideas* will be cited from the original edition, which Kant used, whenever Kant cites such pages, but then also, in an endnote, from *Herders sämmtliche Werke*, ed. B. Suphan, Berlin: Weidmann, 1881–1913 by volume: page. Where Kant provides no citation, only the latter edition will be cited, in an endnote, as "Herder," followed by volume: page. It must be kept in mind, however, that Kant's quotations are frequently inexact, or even inaccurate, and he often cobbles together quotations gleaned from several pages, separating them one from another with dashes.
- 2 Herder, 13: 19.
- 3 Herder, 13: 19–20.
- 4 Cf. Herder, 13: 22–3. Kant's quotations here are often mere paraphrases. In the passage from which Kant quotes here, Herder does not speak of any

- "dissolutions and revolutions" of one creature into another through which human beings came about.
- 5 Herder, 13: 25.
 - 6 Cf. Herder, 13: 29. This last (somewhat enigmatic) phrase is Kant's invention, and is not found in Herder.
 - 7 This is again a loose summary, based on Herder, 13: 33–46.
 - 8 Again, this is a patchwork summary, taken from Herder, 13: 65–70.
 - 9 Herder, 13: 71.
 - 10 Herder, 13: 78.
 - 11 Herder, 13: 112–13.
 - 12 Herder, 13: 114.
 - 13 Herder, 13: 117.
 - 14 Herder, 13: 129–45, again a loose patchwork of quotations.
 - 15 Herder, 13: 146.
 - 16 Herder, 13: 151.
 - 17 Cf. Herder, 13: 151–64.
 - 18 Herder, 13: 167.
 - 19 Cf. Herder, 13: 167–70.
 - 20 Herder, 13: 170.
 - 21 Herder, 13: 172.
 - 22 "Epigenesis" is the theory that each individual living thing grows from a separate germ or seed, arising from one of its parents or their union; it is contrasted with the theory of "preformation," according to which the living thing exists wholly in one of these prior to their union. See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 167, and *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, AA 5: 412–24. Herder is claiming a continuity of all organic forces on the ground that no germ can be either ultimately preformed or properly speaking the result of epigenesis.
 - 23 Cf. Herder, 13: 172–4.
 - 24 Herder, 13: 174.
 - 25 Herder, 13: 176.
 - 26 Cf. Herder, 13: 180–1.
 - 27 Cf. Herder, 13: 182–5.
 - 28 Herder, 13: 192.
 - 29 Herder, 13: 199–201.
 - 30 "Palingenesis" refers to any sort of transmigration of the soul from one bodily form to another. It was sometimes used to refer to metamorphosis (as in the case of insects or amphibians), but also to refer to the doctrine of "metempsychosis," reincarnation or transmigration of souls. Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 683/B 711; Leibniz, *Monadology* §§ 72–4; and Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* §704.
 - 31 Herder, 13: 102.
 - 32 See above, AA 8: 54. The wording and emphasis are slightly different in this occurrence of the quoted passage. Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 164.
 - 33 Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 165.
 - 34 Cf. *Teutscher Merkur* (February, 1785), p. 166.

- 35 Carsten Niebuhr (1728–1815), Sydney Parkinson (1745?–71), James Cook (1728–79), Georg Hjersting Höst (1734–94) and Johann Gottlieb Georgi (1738–1802) were eighteenth-century travellers and explorers.
- 36 Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann (1743–1815).
- 37 Herder, 13: 251.
- 38 Cf. Herder, 13: 265–7.
- 39 Herder, 13: 270.
- 40 The “horae” in Greek mythology were the seasons, daughters of Zeus and the Titaness Themis, who summons the gods to their banquets (and is also by some accounts supposed to be the mother of Prometheus); the horae were generally numbered three rather than four (spring, summer, and winter), and were thought to be attendants on the gods at their assemblies.
- 41 Herder, 13: 270.
- 42 Herder, 13: 290.
- 43 Herder, 13: 342; the proposition Herder is inclined to censure as blasphemous is, of course, the Second Proposition of Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA 8: 18).
- 44 “Evolution” in Kant’s day was another name for the system of “preformation,” which is contrasted with the system of “epigenesis,” favored by both Kant and Herder. See above, note 22.
- 45 Herder, 13: 435.
- 46 This “easy but evil proposition” is of course Kant’s own proposition in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (AA 8: 23).
- 47 Herder 13: 383.
- 48 Herder, 13: 341.
- 49 Herder, 13: 342.
- 50 Herder, 13: 345–6. Ibn Rushd (Latin transliteration: “Averroes”) (1126–1198) was an influential Islamic philosopher and commentator on Aristotle active in Moorish Spain. His Aristotle commentaries arrived in Western Europe in the early thirteenth century, about the same time as the *libri naturales* of Aristotle (the *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, and other works on natural science). Herder does not explain what makes Kant’s view “Averroistic.” Herder may have had in mind Averroes’s interpretation of the “passive intellect” in Aristotle, which involved a religiously heterodox belief in collective (but not individual) immortality. This view made Averroes an object of persecution by his fellow Muslims, and was also a source of resistance in Christian Europe to Averroes’s version of Aristotelianism. Kant’s view that there are collective natural ends in history which are not the ends of individuals may have seemed to Herder a denial of the dignity of individuals which is comparable to that involved in Averroes’s denial of individual immortality. But the sudden, creative thirteenth-century reception of Aristotle in the West, fateful to all philosophy and science since then, would have been unthinkable without Averroes’s brilliant commentaries on the *libri naturales*. Averroes is therefore one of the greatest enlighteners in the history of philosophy.

Introduction to Determination of the concept of a human race

- 1 Due to the politically sensitive nature of the central topic of these essays and also due to Kant’s repeated regrettable conflation of descriptive and analytic statements with evaluative and even pejorative judgments about different ethnic groups to be found in them, Kant’s theory of the natural history of the human species has not found the sustained scholarly attention it deserves in terms of its philosophical content and its contributions to the history and philosophy of science. A notable recent exception to this practice is Raphaël Lagier, *Les races humaines selon Kant*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004. For a discussion of Kant’s theory in the context of modern biology, see Annette Barkhaus, “Kants Konstruktion des Begriffs der Rasse und seine Hierarchisierung der Rassen,” in *Biologisches Zentralblatt* 113 (1994), 197–203.

Determination of the concept of a human race

- 1 Abbé Demanet, former French missionary in the Senegal, who had travelled extensively in that part of Africa and who after his return to France published *Nouvelle histoire de l’Afrique enrichie de cartes et d’observations astronomiques et géographiques* (New History of Africa Enriched With Astronomical and Geographical Maps and Observations), a German translation of which appeared under the title, *Neue Geschichte des französischen Afrika* in 1778. The reference in question is to be found in vol. I, Preface, pp. 18ff. and vol. II, pp. 155ff. of the German translation.
- 2 Philip Carteret (1733–96), British rear admiral and geographical explorer, who discovered several South Sea islands on his voyage around the world in 1766–9. His travel account appeared in German translation under the title, *Captain Carteret’s Fahrt um die Welt von 1766–69* (Captain Carteret’s Voyage Around the World from 1766–9), in *Historischer Bericht von den sämmtlichen, durch Engländer geschehenen Reisen um die Welt*. Translated from English, 3 vols., Leipzig 1776 (Historical Report of All Voyages Around the World Undertaken by Englishmen). The citation from Carteret in the following sentence of Kant’s text, however, is not to be found in that translation. Moreover, on p. 67 of the translation, Carteret attributes to the inhabitants of Free Will Island a copper rather than a yellow skin color. This had been pointed out to Kant by his critic, Georg Forster in an essay entitled ‘Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen’ (Something Further on the Human Races). For Kant’s response, see Kant’s essay *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy*, contained in the present volume (especially AA 8: 177).
- 3 Peter Simon Pallas (1741–1811), German physician and investigator of nature, who, as a member of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, undertook extensive travels into the Asian parts of the Russian empire (1768–74) and the Crimea (1793–4). Author of *Reisen durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reiches in den Jahren 1768–74* (Voyages Through Various Provinces of the Russian Empire in the Years 1768–74), 3 vols., 1771–6. Part 1 of his *Sammlung historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (Collection of Historical News About the Mongolian Peoples) appeared in St. Petersburg in 1776.

- 4 According to the chemical theory of Stahl, phlogiston is the material that causes processes of burning.
- 5 James Lind (1716–94), English physician. The work that Kant has in mind is *An Essay On Diseases Incidental to Europeans in Hot Climates*, London 1768. It went through six editions and also appeared in a German translation (Riga and Leipzig 1773 and later).
- 6 Abbé Felice Fontana (1730–1803), Italian investigator of nature. *Recherche sur la nature de l'air déphlogistique et de l'air nutritive* (Research on the Nature of Dephlogistised Air and Nutrient Air). Paris 1776.
- 7 Count Marsiglio Landriani, Italian investigator of nature, died in Vienna in 1815. Author of *Ricerche fisiche intorno all salubrità dell'aria* (Physical Investigations On the Healthiness of the Air), Milan 1775; German translation Basle 1778.

Conjectural beginning of human history

- 1 “And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden: and there put the man he had formed” (*Genesis* 2: 8).
- 2 “And Adam gave names to all the cattle, and to the fowl of the air and to every beast of the field” (*Genesis* 2: 20).
- 3 “[16] And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; [17] but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for on the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die” (*Genesis* 2: 16–17).
- 4 “[2] And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: [3] But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die” (*Genesis* 3: 2–3).
- 5 Kant's interpretation of the voice of God as that of animal instinct rather than of morality is perhaps unusual, but it is surely not unprecedented in the interpretation of the *Genesis* story: compare the commentary of the thirteenth-century commentator Rabbi Moshe ben Nachman (or “Ramban”): “Man's original nature was such that he did whatever was proper to him to do naturally, just as heaven and all their hosts do, faithful workers whose work is truth, and in whose deeds there is no love or hatred. Now it was the fruit of this tree that gave rise to will and desire, that those who ate it should choose a thing or its opposite, for good or evil . . . After he ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, he possessed the power of choice; he could now willingly do evil or good to himself or others.” *Ramban's Commentary on the Torah* (*Genesis*), tr. C. B. Chavel. New York: Shilo, 1971, pp. 72–3.
- 6 “And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat” (*Genesis* 3: 6).
- 7 “Now the serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?” (*Genesis* 3: 1).

- 8 “And the eyes of both of them were opened, . . .” (*Genesis* 3: 7).
- 9 “and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons” (*Genesis* 3: 7).
- 10 “[13] And the Lord God said unto the woman, What is this that thou hast done? And the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat. [14] And the Lord God said unto the serpent, Because thou has done this, thou art cursed above all cattle and above every beast of the field; upon thy belly shalt thou go, and dust shalt thou eat all the days of thy life; [15] And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head and thou shalt bruise his heel; [16] Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children; and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee; [17] And unto Adam he said, Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; [18] Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee: and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; [19] In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return” (*Genesis* 3: 13–19).
- 11 “And Adam called his wife's name ‘Eve’: because she was the mother of all living” (*Genesis* 3: 20). In Hebrew, “Eve” can be read etymologically as meaning “life-giver”.
- 12 “Unto Adam also and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skins, and cloathed them” (*Genesis* 3: 21).
- 13 “And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil; and now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat and live forever . . .” (*Genesis* 3: 22)
- 14 “Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken” (*Genesis* 3: 23).
- 15 “So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden Cherubims and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life” (*Genesis* 3: 24).
- 16 Compare: “All things come good from the hand of the author of things; all things degenerate between the hands of men” (Rousseau, *Emile* (1762), *Oeuvres complètes*. Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. Paris: Gallimard, 1969, 4: 245).
- 17 Rousseau, *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (1750), *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. III; *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754), *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. III.
- 18 Rousseau, *Emile, ou l'éducation* (1762), *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. IV; *Du contrat social* (1762), *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. III.
- 19 “And [Eve] again bare [Cain's] brother Abel, and Abel was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground” (*Genesis* 4: 2).
- 20 “And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof; and the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering” (*Genesis* 4: 4).
- 21 “And Cain talked with Abel his brother; and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother and slew him” (*Genesis* 4: 8).

- 22 “And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord and dwelt in the land of Nod, on the east of Eden” (*Genesis* 4: 16).
- 23 “And Adah bare Jabal; he was the father of such as dwell in tents and of such as have cattle” (*Genesis* 4: 20).
- 24 “[21] And his brother’s name was Jubal: he was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ. [22] And Zillah, she also bare Tubal-cain, an instructor of every artificer of brass and iron; and the sister of Tubal-cain was Naamah” (*Genesis* 4: 21–2).
- 25 “[23] And Lamech said unto his wives, Adah and Zillah, Hear my voice; ye wives of Lamech, hearken unto my speech; for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt. [24] If Cain shall be avenged sevenfold, truly Lamech seventy and sevenfold” (*Genesis* 4: 23–4).
- 26 “There were giants of the earth in those days; and also after that when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children to them, the same became mighty men which were of old, men of renown” (*Genesis* 6: 4).
- 27 “That the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair; and they took them wives of them all which they chose” (*Genesis* 6: 2).
- 28 “And God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually” (*Genesis* 6: 5).
- 29 “And behold I, even I, do bring a flood of waters upon the earth to destroy all flesh, wherein is the breath of life, from under heaven: and every thing that is in the earth shall die” (*Genesis* 6: 17).
- 30 “[12] And God looked upon the earth, and behold it was corrupt, for all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth. [13] And God said unto Noah, The end of all flesh is come before me; for the earth is filled with violence through them; and behold, I will destroy them with the earth” (*Genesis* 6: 12–13).

*Introduction to Some Remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s *Examination of Mendelssohn’s Morning hours**

- 1 Moses Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes. Der Briefwechsel Mendelssohn – Kant*, edited by Dominique Bourel. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1979, p. 5.
- 2 The ensuing controversy, known as the “pantheism dispute,” is described and documented in *Die Hauptscriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn*, edited by Heinrich Scholz. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1916.
- 3 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 583ff/B 61ff.
- 4 See Jakob’s letter to Kant from 26 March 1786 in AA 10: 435–8 (no. 264); Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, edited by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 245–9.
- 5 See Kant’s letter to Jakob from 26 May 1786 in AA 10: 450f. (no. 273). The passage in Mendelssohn’s *Morning Hours* is on pp. 115f. of the original edition, in Section vii. of the Preliminary Cognition (*Vorerkenntnis*), dealing with the dispute between the idealist and the dualist. See Mendelssohn, *Morgenstunden*, pp. 68f. In his letter to Kant from 17 July 1786 (AA 10:

- 458–62; no. 276), Jakob provided Kant with an excerpt of the passage in *Morning Hours*.
- 6 English translation in Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 7–18.

*Some Remarks on Ludwig Heinrich Jakob’s *Examination of Mendelssohn’s Morning hours**

- 1 The reference is to the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* (Berlin Monthly), the main publication organ of the German late Enlightenment. In the July 1783 issue, 7th piece, pp. 4–11, Mendelssohn had published *Über Freiheit und Notwendigkeit* (On Freedom and Necessity).

Introduction to On the philosophers’ medicine of the body

- 1 Erich Adickes, who first edited the text in its Latin original in the Academy edition, also considered the end of Kant’s second term as Rector on 4 October 1788 as a possible date for its public delivery (AA 15: 939). Reinhard Brandt has recently argued that Adickes’s reason for giving the alternative date is not convincing. See Reinhard Brandt, “Immanuel Kant: ‘Über die Heilung des Körpers, soweit sie Sache der Philosophen ist.’ Und: Woran starb Mendelssohn?” *Kant-Studien* 90 (1999), pp. 354–66, here pp. 354f., note 3.
- 2 First published in *Kant’s Latin Writings. Translations, Commentaries and Notes*, edited by Lewis White Beck. New York/Berne/Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1988, pp. 185–94. A small number of errors and inaccuracies identified by the translator and by the editor have been corrected in the present edition.
- 3 See AA 15: 464.
- 4 See AA 15: 939 note to line 3.

On the philosophers’ medicine of the body

- 1 On Kant’s formulation of the Latin title, see the Editor’s Introduction to this work.
- 2 Kant is paraphrasing Juvenal *Satire* x.356 (Loeb xci, 219).
- 3 Kant is quoting from Horace *Satire* i, vii.2–3 (Loeb cxciv, 91).
- 4 The Latin equivalent of the “enormonta” (“hormonta” in an alternative textual tradition) or “what animates the organism,” according to Hippocrates, *Epidemics* l. 6 s. 8.
- 5 J. Reicke, who first published this text in the late nineteenth century, has *ridet* (smiles), the Academy Edition has *videt* (sees). The remainder of the parenthetical remark is a hexameter from Claudius Claudianus, *Panegyris de Fl. Malii Theodori consulatu* 210 (Loeb cxxxvi, 355).
- 6 Kant is quoting from Terence, *Eunuchus* 411 (Loeb xxii, 277).
- 7 Kant is quoting from Horace *Satire* ii, ii, 77–9 (Loeb cxciv, 143).
- 8 The “learned men” who got the frail and retiring Mendelssohn involved in disputes, and on some views thereby contributed to his death, were first the

- Swiss theologian and writer, Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), and then the German philosopher, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743–1819).
- 9 The second alternative in this sentence has been added to the original text in order to render the subsequent text intelligible.
 - 10 Friedrich Hoffmann (1660–1742), professor of medicine in Halle, for a while personal physician of the Prussian king. *Philosophia corporis humani vivi et sani* (Philosophy of the Living and Healthy Human Body; 1740).
 - 11 Georg Ernst Stahl (1660–1734), professor of medicine in Halle, later personal physician of the Prussian king. *Theoria medica vera* (True Medical Theory; 1708).
 - 12 Since no pertinent letter by the humanist, Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523), to his fellow humanist, Erasmus of Rotterdam (1465/1466–1536), could be located, the Academy Edition surmises that the phrase was noted by Kant as a reminder to himself of a matter not related to the surrounding text but referring to the recent publication of a previously unpublished letter by Hutten to Erasmus.
 - 13 Kant is quoting Horace *Epistularum* II, i, 86–7 (Loeb cxciv, 405).
 - 14 According to the Academy Edition, the English doctor is not, as J. Reicke thought, J. Brown, but rather J. Johnstone, who in 1771 published an “Essay on the Use of the Ganglions of the Nerves,” which in 1787 was translated into German (under the title *Versuch über den Nutzen der Nervenknoten*).
 - 15 Kant did, in fact, write these rules, in the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (AA 7: 276ff.), which is contained in the present volume.
 - 16 See note 7.
 - 17 In Greek mythology, the son of Earth and Heaven and the father of Prometheus.
 - 18 In Kant’s manuscript this sentence is in Latin. On Kant’s objection to scrutinizing the *involuntary* course of our thoughts and feelings, see his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (AA 7: 133–4 and 161–2), which is contained in the present volume.

Introduction to On the use of teleological principles in philosophy

- 1 Due to the politically sensitive nature of the central topic of these essays and also due to Kant’s repeated regrettable conflation of descriptive and analytic statements with evaluative and even pejorative judgments about different ethnic groups to be found in them, Kant’s theory of the natural history of the human species has not found the sustained scholarly attention it deserves in terms of its philosophical content and its contributions to the history and philosophy of science. A notable recent exception to this practice is Raphaël Lagier, *Les races humaines selon Kant* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004). For a discussion of Kant’s theory in the context of modern biology, see Annette Barkhaus, “Kants Konstruktion des Begriffs der Rasse und seine Hierarchisierung der Rassen,” in *Biologisches Zentralblatt* 113 (1994), 197–203.
- 2 Johann Erich Biester was the editor of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, in which Kant’s second essay on the topic had appeared. Forster’s essay has the form and tone of a letter to Biester.

- 3 For a modern edition of Forster’s essay, see Georg Forster, *Werke in vier Bänden*, edited by Georg Steiner (Leipzig: Aufbau Verlag, 1978), vol. II, pp. 71–101. There is no English translation available.
- 4 See Reinhold’s letter to Kant from 12 October 1787 (AA 10: 497–500; no. 305). Subsequent to their serialized publication in *Teutscher Merkur*, of which Reinhold was the co-editor, Reinhold’s *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* appeared in book form in 1790, with a second volume following in 1792. For an English translation, see Karl Leonhard Reinhold, *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*, edited by Karl Ameriks and translated by James C. Hebbeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 5 In his letter to Kant from 12 October 1787 (AA 10: 500; Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, edited by Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, pp. 264–8)) Reinhold cited Kant’s assertion to be found in a footnote to the Preface of *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science* (1786) that the deduction of the categories was a supererogatory task (AA 4: 474 note) and confronted this statement with Kant’s declaration in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the deduction of the categories was “an unavoidable necessity” (A 88/B 121). Kant addresses this problem at the very end of *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* (AA 8: 184).
- 6 See AA 7: 357–485; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, edited and translated by Paul Guyer, translated by Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 213–346.
- 7 The Academy edition takes Kant in his initial statement, in which he mentions two “astute examinations,” both published in the *Teutscher Merkur*, of “two of his attempts,” to be referring to his two works, *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* and *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, and then finds it difficult to align the brief discussion of Reinhold’s *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* at the end of the essay with this earlier passage (see AA 8: 488; explanatory notes to p. 160, lines 9f. and p. 160, lines 12f.). The appearance of a confusion on Kant’s part disappears, when one takes Kant’s initial mention of a second examination of one of his “attempts” to refer to Reinhold’s *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* and identifies the attempt in question as the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This reading has the additional advantage of being consistent with Kant’s immediately following statement of having been understood “beyond all expectation” in this second examination of one of his attempts.

On the use of teleological principles in philosophy

- 1 “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race” (1785), contained in the present volume.
- 2 Kant is referring to *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* (1785) and *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (1786), contained in the present volume, both of which first appeared in *Teutscher Merkur* (German Mercury). The two examinations of Kant’s work in question are Georg Forster’s essay *Noch etwas über die Menschenrassen* (Something Further About the Human Races) and Karl Leonhard Reinhold’s *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie* (Letters on the Kantian Philosophy). For further details, see the introduction to the respective works in the present volume.

- 3 The Swedish botanist Carl von Linné (1707–78) based his classificatory system of plants on properties of the plants' pollinating organs.
- 4 Kant gives a brief account and criticism of Linné's theory of the earth in § 77 of his *Physical Geography* (9: 302f.). "Linné's hypothesis" is also mentioned in Kant's *Sketch and Announcement of a Course in Physical Geography* (1757) (2: 8). According to Linné, the earth's lands originated from a single created mountainous island, to which the ocean added further landmass over many years.
- 5 Lawrence Sterne's novel, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy Gentleman* (1759–62), had appeared in a German translation by J. J. Bode in 1776. The reference is to the "Slawkenbergii fabella" at the beginning of Book Four.
- 6 A. A. C. Shaftesbury (1671–1713), English philosopher and writer. Kant seems to be citing from memory. The Academy edition conjectures that the corresponding passage is at the beginning of the "Essay on the freedom of wit and humor" in Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, which it cites in an English edition of 1790.
- 7 George Louis Leclerc, Count Buffon (1707–88), French investigator of nature. His *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière* (General and Particular Natural History) appeared from 1749 on and was concluded posthumously in 1804, comprising 44 volumes. The reference in question is to be found in vol. III, book 1, p. 112 of the German translation (1756).
- 8 Samuel Thomas Soemmerring (1755–1830), German physician, anatomist, and natural philosopher, with important works on the nervous system and the anatomy of the brain. His work, *Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer* (*On the Corporeal Difference of the Negro from the European*), appeared in 1785 and was dedicated to Georg Forster. Kant's remarks on Soemmerring's work, *On the Organ of the Soul*, which were incorporated into that work, are included in the present volume.
- 9 Soemmerring had referred to a work by D. Schott entitled, *Treatise on the Synochus Atrabiliosa which Raged at Senegal* (1783).
- 10 James Lind (1716–1794), English physician. Author of *An essay on Diseases incidental to Europeans in hot climates* (1768 and five further editions; first German translation 1773).
- 11 The German publication, *Beiträge zur Völker und Länderkunde* (Contributions to the Study of Peoples and Countries), ed. M. C. Sprengel, Part 5 (1786), 267–92, contains an essay in German "Notes on Ramsay's work on the treatment of the Negro slaves in the West Indies," which refers critically to the work of James Ramsay, former pastor on the island St. Kitts, entitled, "Essay on the treatment and conversion of African slaves in the British Sugar Colonies" (published in English 1783).
- 12 W. Marsden (1754–1836), English explorer of the languages and cultures of the Polynesian peoples, author of a *History of Sumatra* (1783). The German essay in *Contributions to the Study of Peoples and Countries*, ed. M. C. Sprengel, Part 6 (1786), 193ff. translates into English as: "Of the Redjangs on Sumatra according to Marsden's history of this island, third and final installment."
- 13 Don Antonio de Ulloa (1716–95), high-ranking Spanish naval officer and scholar, who took part in scientific expeditions to South America, especially Peru, about which he published several books.

- 14 An excerpt in German of Thomas Forrester's account of his voyage to New Guinea and the Molukkian Islands appeared in *Ebeling's Neue Sammlung von Reisebeschreibungen* (Ebeling's New Collection of Travel Descriptions), Part 3 (1782), pp. 1ff.; the reference in question is to p. 83.
 - 15 In "Determination of the Concept of a Human Race" Kant had referred to *Captain Carteret's Voyage Around the World of 1766–69*, which had appeared in a German translation in 1776, as containing evidence for the South Sea islanders being whites. But Carteret's work does not contain any passage supporting Kant's conclusion. This had been pointed out to him in G. Forster's essay "Something Further About the Human Races," where the latter also states that, according to Carteret, the skin color of the South Sea islanders is copper.
 - 16 Oberconsistorialrath (Church Superintendent) Anton Friedrich Büsching (1724–93), Director of an ecclesiastical high school in Berlin, had published a review of Kant's essay *Determination of the Concept of a Human Race* in the *Wöchentliche Nachrichten* (Weekly News), of which he was the editor (13th year, no. 44, p. 358).
 - 17 Charles Bonnet (1720–93), Swiss scientist and philosopher. The idea of an affinity of all living beings is carried through in his *Contemplation de la Nature* (Contemplation of Nature), 2 vols. (1764–5).
 - 18 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), famous German scientist. Kant's reference is to § 7 of Section 1, not of the Preface, of his *Handbuch der Naturgeschichte* (Handbook of Natural History) (1779).
 - 19 Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), German Jewish philosopher. His rationalist views in natural theology in general and his theological teleology in particular are developed in *Abhandlung über die Evidenz in metaphysischen Wissenschaften* (1764) – translated as *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences* in Moses Mendelssohn, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 251–306, esp. pp. 279–94 (Third Section: On the evidence in the first principles of natural theology) – and in *Morgenstunden oder Vorlesungen über das Dasein Gottes* (Morning Hours or Lectures on the Existence of God; 1785), Sections XIff.
 - 20 *Neue Leipziger gelehrte Zeitungen auf das Jahr 1787* (New Leipzig Learned Journal on the Year 1787), 94th piece, pp. 1489–92. The objection addressed by Kant is to be found on pp. 1491f.
 - 21 The passages in question are to be found in *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 3 and B 5.
 - 22 See AA 4: 474 note, Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, edited and translated by Michael Friedman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 10–12 note.
- Introduction to From Soemmerring's On the organ of the soul*
- i The spelling of Soemmerring's name follows AA 12: 30 as well as recent scholarship; variant historical spellings include "Sömmerring" (title page of *On the Organ of the Soul*), "Sömmering" (Immanuel Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1968, vol. 11, p. 253) and "Soemering" (AA 13: 679, Index to Kant's Correspondence).

- 2 Königsberg: Nicolovius. The title page also indicates *Mit Kupfern* (with copperplates).
- 3 AA 12: 30, no. 671; Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, edited by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge 1999, pp. 500f.
- 4 AA 12: 31–5.
- 5 AA 12: 38–40; no. 677.
- 6 AA 12: 41f.; no. 679; Kant, *Correspondence*, p. 501.
- 7 AA 12: 41f.; translated by Arnulf Zweig.
- 8 AA 5: 357–485; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and translated by Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 213–346.
- 9 AA 7: 1–116; Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 237–327.

From Soemmering's *On the organ of the soul*

- 1 The title of the piece is not Kant's but is chosen here to reflect the first publication of the text as an appendix to Soemmering's *On the Organ of the Soul*.
- 2 A reference to Descartes's doctrine of the pineal gland. See *Passions of the Soul*, part 1, article xxxff.; *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 339ff.
- 3 Descartes calls "material ideas" the bodily states corresponding to mental representations.
- 4 Leonhard Euler (1707–83), Swiss Mathematician and physicist.
- 5 Albrecht von Haller (1708–77), Swiss scientist and poet. Soemmering had quoted Haller's *Elementa physiologiae corporis humanae* (1762).

Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view

- 1 See, e.g., Descartes's *Passions of the Soul* (1649), Art. 42. See also the drafts of Kant's letter to Samuel Thomas Soemmering of August 10, 1795 (13: 398–412) as well as Kant's essay, *From Soemmering's On the Organ of the Soul* (pp. 219–26 in this volume).
- 2 Samuel Richardson, 1689–1761: English writer whose epistolary novels include *Pamela; or Virtue Rewarded* (1740) and *Clarissa, or, the History of a Young Lady* (7 vols., 1747–8). Jean-Baptiste Poquelin Molière, 1622–73: French playwright, author of the comedies *Tartuffe* (1664) and *The Misanthrope* (1666).
- 3 The distinction between *persons* and *things* is also fundamental to Kant's ethics. However, in the ethical writings it is not self-consciousness *per se* but moral personality that is emphasized. See, e.g., *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* 4: 428, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (MdS) 6: 223–4. See also MdS 6: 443, for a qualification of the above remark concerning human beings' treatment of animals.

- 4 Trans.: Even if all fathers are this way, I am not this way. Peter Abelard (1079–1144), French philosopher, logician, and theologian.
- 5 Antoinette Bourgignon (1616–80), Flemish Christian mystic, adherent of Quietism. Blaise Pascal (1623–62), noted French scientist-mathematician and religious philosopher. Pascal's primary philosophical work is the *Pensées* (1670), in which he presents his famous "wager" for God's existence (fragment 418).
- 6 Albrecht von Haller (1708–77), Swiss scientist and writer, appointed professor of anatomy, medicine, and botany at the University of Göttingen in 1736. See Haller's *Tagebuch seiner Beobachtungen über Schriftsteller und über sich selbst*, ed. J. G. Heinzmann (Bern, 1787), vol. II, pp. 219ff. Gottfried Leß (1736–97), professor of theology at Göttingen.
- 7 Anticyra was a coastal city on the Gulf of Corinth, in Phocis. The medicinal plant hellebore – alleged to cure madness – grew there. See Horace, *Satires* II 3, 166; *De arte poetica* 360. Külpé surmises that Kant borrowed the allusion from an article in the *Deutsche Merkur* 2 (1784) entitled "Über das Reisen und jemand, der nach Anticyra reisen sollte" (p. 151).
- 8 See John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1689), II.i. 9, 18–19. Note: *Vorstellung* is translated as "representation." But Locke, of course, uses the term "idea."
- 9 Joseph Addison (1672–1719), English essayist, poet, and statesman. See the *Spectator* 132 (August 1, 1711), p. 198.
- 10 1 John 5: 3. See also *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* 6: 179n.
- 11 Trans.: gasping in vain; occupied with many things, but accomplishing nothing. *Phaedrus*, *Fabulae* 2. 5.
- 12 *Sinnenschein*. Throughout this section and the next, the word *Schein* is used a great deal. I have translated it consistently as *illusion*, in part because Kant also uses other terms such as *Täuschung* and *Illusion* as stand-ins for it that translate unambiguously into "illusion," and also because other translators in the Cambridge Kant Edition render it this way. However, *Schein* can also mean "semblance, appearance, pretense, show." These multiple meanings should be kept in mind, particularly in §14, where Kant discusses moral *Schein*. His point there is that although moral *Schein* should not be confused with true virtue, it is an external semblance of it that will eventually become the real thing.
- 13 Anton Raphael Mengs (1728–79), German historical and portrait painter, author of *Gedanken über die Schönheit und über den Geschmack in der Malerei* (Zürich, 1774). The painting referred to is most likely Raphael's "School of Athens." Külpé, in his note on Mengs, remarks that he was unable to locate Kant's citation in any of Mengs's writings.
- 14 Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–71), French materialist philosopher. See his *De l'esprit* (1759), Essay 1, Ch. 2.
- 15 The Gassnerists were followers of Johann J. Gassner (1727–79), a Catholic priest in Switzerland who allegedly healed diseases by exorcism of the devil. The mesmerists were named after Franz Mesmer (1734–1815), an Austrian physician who sought to treat disease through animal magnetism, an early therapeutic application of hypnotism.

- 16 Gregor suggests, and I concur, that Kant has in mind here the duty to cultivate one's natural talents. See, e.g., *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 444 ff., where Kant discusses "A human being's duty to himself to develop and increase his **natural perfection**, that is, for a pragmatic purpose."
- 17 Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), English writer, author of *Gulliver's Travels* (1726). See his *A Tale of a Tub* (1704), ed. A. C. Guthkelch and D. Nichol Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), Preface, p. 40.
- 18 See *Nicomachean Ethics* ix.10 1171a15–17 and *Eudemian Ethics* vii.12 1145b20: "He who has many friends has no friend." See also Diogenes Laertius 5.1.21. Kant repeats this (mis)quotation in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 470 and in several other versions of his anthropology lectures – e.g., *Collins* 25: 106, *Parow* 25: 330, *Menschenkunde* 25: 933.
- 19 Swift, *Tale of a Tub*, sec. 2, p. 78. Külpe, in his note, refers to the following German translation: *Satyrische und ernsthafte Schriften von Dr. Swift*, trans. Heinrich Waser, vol. 3, 2nd edn. (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1759), p. 86.
- 20 Johann Peter Hofstede (1716–1803), Dutch theologian. See his book, *Des Herrn Marmonrels herausgegebener Belisar beurtheilt...* (Leipzig, 1769), ch. 23, which provoked a lively controversy. E.g., Külpe, in his note, refers also to a response by Kant's later opponent Johann August Eberhard (1738–1809) – *Neue Apologie des Sokrates* (Berlin and Stettin, 1772).
- 21 Tobacco smoking was only mildly popular in Kant's day. According to Vorländer, the first German cigar factory was founded in Hamburg in 1788, but had only modest sales at first. However, Kant himself smoked a daily pipe of tobacco with his breakfast tea, and "it is reported that the bowls of his pipes increased considerably in size as the years went on" [Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 222].
- 22 Henry Fielding (1707–54), English novelist and dramatist, author of *Tom Thumb* (1730). *Jonathan Wild* (1743 – Kant misquotes the title), the history of a superman of crime, has been called the most sustained piece of irony in English. Johann Aloys Blumauer (1755–98), author of *Die Abenteuer des frommen Helden Äneas* (Vienna, 1783–6). "Clarissa" refers to a book by English novelist Samuel Richardson (1689–1761) – i.e., *Clarissa, or, the History of a Young Lady* (7 vols., 1747–8).
- 23 Kant is referring to Henry Fielding's book, *The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling* (1749).
- 24 Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533–92), French essayist, author of the *Essais* (1595). This statement is missing in *H*, and is not quite to be found in the *Essays*. However, in Bk II, ch. 13 ("Of Judging of the Death of Others"), Montaigne does cite approvingly Epicharmus's remark that "It is not death, but dying that I fear" [*The Complete Essays of Montaigne*, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 461]. See also Bk I, ch. 19 ("That our Happiness must not be Judged until after our Death").
- 25 See Horace, *Carmina* 3.21.11–12: "Narratur et prisci Catonis saepe mero caluisse virtus" [trans.: The virtue of even old Cato is said to have been inspired by wine]. However, to judge from similar passages in other versions of the anthropology lectures, Kant probably has not Horace but Seneca

- in mind here. See *Parow* 25: 296, *Pillau* 25: 750, *Menschenkunde* 25: 942, *Mrongovius* 25: 1252. See also *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 428. Horace wrote about Cato the Elder; Seneca about Cato the Younger. Cf. Seneca, *De Tranquillitate Animi* xv 11: "et Cato vino laxabat animum, curis publicis fatigatum" [trans.: Cato used to relax his mind with wine, when it was worn out with public concerns].
- 26 Cf. Tacitus, *Germania* 22. This remark also occurs in many other versions of the anthropology lectures. See *Parow* 25: 295–6, *Pillau* 25: 749, *Menschenkunde* 25: 942, *Mrongovius* 25: 1252.
- 27 Külpe draws attention here to a similar remark in Rousseau's *Héloïse* (Book I, Letter 23).
- 28 David Hume, *Principles of Morals*, sec. 4: "I hate a drinking companion, says the Greek proverb, who never forgets. The follies of the last debauch should be buried in eternal oblivion, in order to give full scope to the follies of the next."
- 29 *Spectator* 77.
- 30 Around 1775, the Prince of Palagonia, Ferdinando Francesco Gravina Agliata, began construction of a villa at Bageria (Sicily) that attracted much attention because of its strange statues. See, e.g., Goethe, *Italienische Reise*, entry of April 9, 1787.
- 31 See Helvétius, *De l'esprit* (1758), I. 2. Kant uses this same example in his 1764 work, *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (2: 265–6).
- 32 Christian Friedrich Michaelis (1754–1804), professor and personal physician in Kassel, Germany. See his "Tollheit aus Mitleidenschaft," in *Medizinisch-praktische Bibliothek* (Göttingen, 1785), vol. 1, sec. 1, pp. 114–17.
- 33 Shakespeare, *The First Part of King Henry the Fourth*, II, iv. (Actually, Falstaff eventually managed to make eleven out of two.)
- 34 Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau (1676–1747), i.e., Leopold I. The commoner was Annelise Föse, a pharmacist's daughter. They were married in 1698.
- 35 Külpe surmises that Kant obtained this information from an article in the *Hamburgisches Magazin* xix (1757) – "Abhandlung von einer versteinerten Stadt in der Landschaft Tripoli in Afrika" (pp. 631–53).
- 36 Ludovico Ariosto (1474–1533), Italian epic and lyric poet. Cardinal Este's remark appears in several different biographies of Ariosto.
- 37 Carl von Linné (1707–78), Swedish botanist and taxonomist, originator of the modern scientific classification of plants and animals, author of *Systema naturae* (1735). ("Linnaeus" is a Latinized version of "Linné.")
- 38 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), Italian philosopher and humanist. Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484–1558), Italian philologist and physician who settled in France; father of Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540–1609), French classical scholar. Angelo Poliziano (1454–94), Italian poet, philologist, and humanist. Antonio Magliabecchi (1633–1714), Italian librarian and book-collector.
- 39 See Plato, *Phaedrus* 275a.
- 40 Observers who have been initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries. See Plato, *Symposium* 210a ff., *Phaedrus* 250c.

- 41 I.e., the custom, which seems to have been popular from the second to sixteenth centuries AD, of predicting the future by opening at random a volume of Virgil and taking as an omen of coming events the first line on which the eyes fell.
- 42 Many ancient authors refer to the Sibylline prophecies. Kant seems to be referring to the story that Tarquinius Priscus's collection of them (to be consulted only at the command of the Senate) was lost in the burning of the Capitol in 83 BC. See, e.g., Dionysius Halicarnassensis 4.62.1–6; Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 13.88; Lactantius, *Divinae Institutiones* I.6.10–11; Servius, *Aen.* 6. 72.
- 43 Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688–1772), Swedish scientist, religious teacher, and mystic. His religious system is largely incorporated in the Church of the New Jerusalem, founded some years after his death, and his followers are called Swedenborgians. Kant's early work, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766 – 2: 315–73), focuses primarily on Swedenborg's religious visions and alleged supernatural powers. While it is predominantly skeptical in tone, occasional moments of admiration are also evident in it. See also Kant's letter to Charlotte von Knobloch of August 10, 1763 (10: 43–8).
- 44 Boring clams, which can bore deeply into mud, wood, and even hard rock.
- 45 The climacteric year (*Stufenjahr, annus climacterius*) was based on periods of seven and nine years; the forty-ninth year (7×7), the eighty-first year (9×9), and above all the sixty-third year (7×9) were regarded as the most important. Külpe refers readers to a text by A. Joseph Testa – *Bemerkungen über die periodischen Veränderungen und Erscheinungen im kranken und gesunden Zustande des menschlichen Körpers* (Leipzig, 1790), ch. 6. See also Kant's letter to A. J. Penzel of August 12, 1777 (12: 362 ff.) and *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 7: 62–3 n.
- 46 See Daniel 9: 24: “Seventy weeks are marked out for your people and your holy city; then rebellion shall be stopped, sin brought to an end, inequity expiated, everlasting right ushered in, vision and prophecy sealed, and the Most Holy Place anointed.”
- 47 The quotation comes not from Juvenal, but from Persius III, 78 f. Trans.: “What I know is enough for me. Therefore I do not worry about being Arcesilas and wretched philosophers like Solon.” Arcesilas was Head of the Academy in the middle of the third century BC. Solon (c. 639–559 BC) was an Athenian statesman and poet.
- 48 Kant has quoted from Voltaire's epic poem on Henry IV, *La Henriade* (1718), Verse 31. (Missing in H.)
- 49 Christina (1626–89), queen of Sweden (1632–54), daughter and successor of Gustavus II. Descartes was one of a number of scholars and artists invited to her court – he died there on February 11, 1650. See Johann Arckenholz, *Historische Merkwürdigkeiten die Königin Christina von Schweden betreffend* (1751–60), 4 vols., translated into German by Johann Friedrich Reifstein, esp. Appendix to vol. II, pp. 73ff: “Die Nebenstunden oder Lehrsätze und Denksprüche der Königin C. v. S.” See also Kant, *Menschenkunde* 25: 108.
- 50 John Wilmot, 2nd Earl of Rochester (1647–80), *The Works of the Earl of Rochester* (London: printed for Edmund Curll, 1707): “Here lies our

- Sovereign Lord the King,/ Whose Word no Man rely'd on;/ Who never said a foolish thing,/ Nor ever did a wise one” (p. 156).
- 51 Kant repeats these maxims for enlightened reasoning elsewhere as well. See, e.g., *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 294, *Jäsche Logic* 9: 57.
- 52 Melancholia: *Grillenkrankheit*, mental derangement: *gestörtes Gemüt*. As Gregor notes in her translation (n. 21, pp. 200–1) Kant's use of psychiatric terms presents multiple difficulties to the translator. His classification scheme does not map on well to contemporary psychiatric terminology (which itself is not steady), many of the terms he uses are obsolete, do not have precise English equivalents, etc. In several cases, I have followed Gregor's practice of applying the older Latin terms that were still in common use in the late eighteenth century (terms with which Kant was familiar), and then adding his own German equivalents in parentheses. In thinking about these matters I have also benefited from discussions with Claudia Schmidt.
- 53 House cricket: *Hausgrille*. Kant's wordplay in this section does not come out well in translation. Literally, *Grillenkrankheit* (which I have rendered as *melancholia*) would be *cricket-disease*, and *Grillenfänger* (which I have rendered as *melancholic*) would be *cricket-catcher*. And one meaning of *Grille* (translated as *whim*) is *cricket*, in the sense of “hearing a cricket sound in one's head.”
- 54 Laurence Sterne (1713–68), English author, born in Ireland. See his *Tristram Shandy* (1760), vol. 1, ch. 7.
- 55 Christoph Clavius, 1537–1612, German astronomer and mathematician. Clavius entered the Jesuit order in 1555 and studied at Coimbra and Rome. In 1582 his proposed reform of the calendar was adopted by Pope Gregory XIII. Clavius is also mentioned in Kant's 1764 *Essay on the Maladies of the Mind* (II: 260). See also Collins 25: 133, Parow 25: 342, and Mrongovius 25: 1314.
- 56 Not Hume but rather Helvétius, in his *De l'esprit* (III, 16). See also *Menschenkunde* 25: 1044.
- 57 Adam Smith (1723–90), Scottish economist and professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. See *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London, 1776), II.III.36. Why does Kant say “(wise!) sumptuary laws,” and why does he accuse Smith of speaking improperly? Is he being ironic? Is the text corrupt? Did he misunderstand Smith? Smith and Kant generally share a commitment to anti-paternalism. (The words “without exception” in the quotation were added in A1, A2.)
- 58 Külpe refers to the anonymously published *Lebensbeschreibung Voltaires*, translated from the French (Nuremberg, 1787), p. 42.
- 59 Abraham Gotthelf Kästner (1719–1800), professor of mathematics at Göttingen University and satirical author. See his *Einige Vorlesungen* (Altenburg, 1768), p. 102. Kant repeats this remark in many other versions of his anthropology lectures – e.g., Collins 25: 134, Parow 25: 343, *Menschenkunde* 25: 965, Mrongovius 25: 1264.
- 60 I.e., at 7: 202, beginning of § 45.
- 61 See n. 53, above, on *Grillenkrankheit* and *Grille*.

- 62 Christian August Hausen (1693–1745), professor of mathematics at Leipzig. See also *Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 208.
- 63 Jan Baptist Helmont (1578–1664), Flemish physician, chemist, and physicist. Külpe notes that his experiment is mentioned in Sprengel, *Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte der Arzneykunde* (8th edn. 1827), Part iv, p. 302. Wolfsbane or monkshood (*Aconitum napellus*) is a poisonous plant whose dried leaves and roots yield aconite.
- 64 James Harrington (1611–77), English political writer. In his *Commonwealth of Oceana* (1656) he described a utopian society in which political authority rested entirely with the landed gentry. Külpe reports that when Harrington fell into a delirium as a result of an overdose of guaiacum he claimed that his animal spirits evaporated in the form of birds, flies, and crickets.
- 65 See also *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* 2: 211 and *Mrongovius* 25: 1264, where Kant attributes the remark to Cromwell. Brandt draws attention to the following passage from Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*: “To a CROMWELL, perhaps, or a DE RETZ, discretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr Swift calls it” (Sec. vi).
- 66 Georges Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707–88), French naturalist, author of the 44-volume *Histoire Naturelle* (1749–1804). Kant's theory of race owes a serious debt to Buffon. See, e.g., his discussion of “Buffon's rule” in *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* (2: 429).
- 67 Nicolas Charles Joseph de la Flourie Trublet (1697–1770), in his *Essais sur divers sujets de littérature et de morale* (1754). Kant also mentions Trublet in several other versions of his anthropology lectures. See *Collins* 25: 136, 153; *Parow* 25: 344, 388; *Menschenkunde* 25: 963.
- 68 The full title runs: *Peri Bathous s. Anti-Sublime. Das ist: D. Swifts neueste Dichtkunst, oder Kunst, in der Poesie zu kriechen*. Translated from English into German, Leipzig 1733. Dowdell argues that the author was actually Alexander Pope: “On March 8, 1728, appeared *The Last Volume* of the *Miscellanies* of Pope and Swift. The most important piece included in the collection was Pope's prose essay, ‘*Peri Bathous, Or the Art of Sinking in Poetry*’” (Robert Kilburn Root, *The Poetical Career of Alexander Pope* [Princeton University Press, 1938], p. 128).
- 69 Samuel Butler (1612–80), English poet and satirist. *Hudibras*, published in three parts (1663, 1664, 1678), was a satire directed against the Puritans. See also *Parow* 25: 345, *Pillau* 25: 762, *Menschenkunde* 25: 967, 994, *Mrongovius* 25: 1268–9.
- 70 Edward Young (1684–1765), English poet and dramatist. See *The Universal Passion* (1725–7), a collection of seven satires. Kant also refers to Young in several versions of his anthropology lectures – see *Parow* 25: 399, *Friedländer* 25: 517, 575, *Menschenkunde* 25: 967, 1117, *Mrongovius* 25: 1265, 1341, 1391.
- 71 Samuel Johnson (1709–84), English author, wrote a biography of the poet Edmund Waller (1606–87). But this anecdote appears in James Boswell's (1740–95) famous work, *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791). Külpe locates the passage in an edition published in 1859, vol. 3, pp. 47f.
- 72 Johnson's most famous work was his *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755), the first comprehensive lexicographical work on English ever undertaken.

- 73 Francis Bacon, Lord of Verulam (1561–1626), English philosopher, essayist, and statesman. His *Novum Organum* (1620) spells out an inductive method that strongly influenced modern science.
- 74 In 1669 an alchemist in Hamburg named Henig Brand obtained phosphorus by distilling concentrated urine; naming it “cold fire.”
- 75 For related discussion, see Kant's discussion of genius in the *Critique of Judgment* 5: 307–20, 344.
- 76 Christoph Heinrich Heinecke (1721–25), named the child of Lübeck, caused a great sensation because of the early development of his mind, particularly his extraordinary memory. Jean Philippe Baratier (1721–40), born in Schwabach. At age five he could already speak three languages, at age eight he could understand the Bible in the original Hebrew and Greek. But he acquired a senile appearance early on, and was already dead before the age of twenty.
- 77 See also Kant's famous definition of enlightenment in the opening sentence of *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* 8: 35, and *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 294.
- 78 Intended is Count Pietro Verri (not Veri) (1728–99), author of *Meditazione sulla felicità* (Milan, 1763), translated into German by the Göttingen philosophy professor Christoph Meiners under the title *Gedanken über die Natur des Vergnügens* (Leipzig, 1777). The sayings paraphrased by Kant are located on pp. 34–7 of the German translation (Brandt) but are missing in H.
- 79 See Kant's earlier elaboration at 7: 164.
- 80 Külpe surmises that Kant obtained this remark either from *Lettres de Mr. l'Abbé Le Blanc* (1751), 1: 259 [German edition: *Briefe über die Engländer* (1770), 1: 204 f.] or from Alberti, *Briefe über die Engländer* (2nd edn., 1774), 1: 329–38.
- 81 See Book III: **On the Faculty of Desire**.
- 82 See also *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* 2: 246 n. 2.
- 83 See 7: 165. (I repeat added in A2.)
- 84 See § 20, above. (“as has . . . above” added in A2.)
- 85 Milton: see Book II of *Paradise Lost*. Thersites is described in Homer's *Iliad* as being
the ugliest man who came beneath Ion. He was
bandy-legged and went lame of one foot, with shoulders
stooped and drawn together over his chest, and above this
his skull went up to a point with the wool grown sparsely upon it.
Beyond all others Achilleus hated him, and Odysseus.
- 2.2 16–20, trans. Richmond Lattimore (University of Chicago Press, 1951).
- 86 See also Kant's more extensive discussion of the sublime in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 244–80.
- 87 See also *Critique of the Power of Judgment* § 26, 5: 253.
- 88 See also Kant's discussion of the “virtues of social intercourse” in the *Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 473–4, and *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 267.
- 89 Hugh Blair (1718–1800), *Lectures on Rhetoric* (London, 1783); translated into German by Karl Gottfried Schreiter, *Vorlesungen über Rhetorik und schöne Wissenschaften* (Leipzig, 1785–89), 4 vols. However, the phrase “prose run

- mad” is not used here. Külpe suggests Kant’s source was the *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, being the prologue to the satires of Pope, line 188: “It is not poetry, but prose run mad.” See also *Reflexion* 1485, 15: 703, *Busolt* 25: 1466, and *Dobna* 25: 1541.
- 90 Xenia – in Greek, presents to guests or strangers. In German literature, a kind of satirical epigram first introduced by Schiller and Goethe.
- 91 See also Kant’s definitions of the faculty of desire in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 211 and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 178 n.
- 92 See also Kant’s discussion in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 407–8 and in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Part III (7: 95–116).
- 93 See also *Parow* 25: 416–17 and *Menschenkunde* 25: 1122–3.
- 94 See the remark on phlegm near the beginning of §74 (“as I have said” added in A2).
- 95 John Brown (1735–88), English physician, author of *Elementa Medicinae* (1780). Brown held that the essence of the living organism consists in excitability, and called an excess of excitability the state of sthenia, and a lack of excitability the state of asthenia.
- 96 Charles XII (1682–1718), King of Sweden, was defeated by the Russians. See Voltaire, *Histoire de Charles XII*. In Voltaire’s entry on “Characters” in his *Dictionary*, he remarks: “Charles XII in his illness on the way to Bender was no longer the same man; he was tractable as a child.”
- 97 Kant, following philologists of the time, derives the word “hallucinate” from the Latin word *allex* (the big toe) instead of the Greek *alaomai* (to wander or roam about). This derivation is no longer accepted.
- 98 See also Kant’s discussion of virtue as fortitude in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 380, as well as his remarks about bravery as moral strength at 6: 405.
- 99 Kant does discuss suicide as a moral question elsewhere. See, e.g., *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 422–4 and *Collins Moralphilosophie* 27: 342, 346, 369–75, 391, 394, 1427–8.
- 100 I.e., Frederick the Great (1712–86), King of Prussia (1740–86). Külpe refers readers to A. F. Büsching, *Charakter Friedrichs des zweyten*, 2nd edn. (1789), p. 431, where the author states that Frederick carried poison with him during the Seven Years War (1756–63).
- 101 Jean Marie Roland de la Platière (1734–93), French revolutionary. Roland rose to power with the Girondists and became minister of the interior in 1792. King Louis XVI dismissed him in July, 1792, but he was restored to office after the overthrow of the monarchy in August, 1792. Accused of royalism in 1793, he resigned and fled Paris. When he learned that his wife (Marie-Jeanne Roland, also a well-known French revolutionary and Girondist) had been executed, he committed suicide on November 15, 1793 by falling upon his sword and piercing his heart.
- 102 Pierre Terrail, Seigneur de Bayard (c. 1474–1524), French military hero, exhibited bravery and genius as a commander in the Italian Wars, and died in the battle of Sessa.
- 103 “Of Impudence and Modesty,” in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987), pp. 553f.

- 104 See also Kant’s footnote at the beginning of §29, where he refers to his own experience with seasickness.
- 105 Abbé Jean Terrasson (1670–1750), French author. Brandt locates the anecdote in Johann Christoph Gottsched, ed., *Des Abts Terrassons Philosophie, nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse, auf alle Gegenstände des Geistes und der Sitten* (1756), pp. 45–6. Kant mentions Terrasson in a variety of texts – see, e.g., *Friedländer* 25: 540, *Collins* 25: 27, 136, *Parow* 25: 344, *Mrongovius* 25: 1350, *Critique of Pure Reason* A xix, *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* 2: 269. Külpe conjectures that Kant has Helvétius in mind – see *De l’Esprit* III.6–8.
- 106 Külpe conjectures that Kant has Helvétius in mind – see *De l’Esprit* III.6–8.
- 107 Springfedern. The source of the remark is not known. See also Kant’s *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* 2: 267.
- 108 Alexander Pope (1688–1744), *Essay on Man*, Epistle 2, line 108: “Reason the card, but Passion is the gale.” Kant probably used Brockes’ German translation (1740) for this quotation.
- 109 A Siberian ethnic group. See also *Lectures on Physical Geography* 9: 401–2.
- 110 See also Kant’s discussion of arrogance and “pride proper” (*animus elatus*) in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 465–6.
- 111 The reference is uncertain. Külpe suggests that Kant may be referring to Demetrius of Phalerum (345?–283 BC). Brandt, following Adickes, thinks that Demetrius Poliorcetes, King of Macedon (336–283 BC) is intended. See also *Reflexionen* 536 (15: 235) and 1448 (15: 632), and Polybius 18.54.
- 112 Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield (1694–1773), English statesman and author. Chesterfield’s literary fame rests primarily upon his letters to his illegitimate son, Philip Stanhope (first published in 1774). Kant refers to Chesterfield in other works as well – e.g., *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 428, *Busolt* 25: 1482–3, 1529, *Menschenkunde* 25: 1088, 1152, *Pillau* 25: 776, *Zusätze* 25: 1540, 1543, 1551.
- 113 See also Kant’s discussions of the meaning of “humanity” in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 355 and in *The Metaphysics of Morals* 6: 456–7.
- 114 The terms “person,” “sex,” “people,” and “species” all appear in the singular here as well as in later section titles (7: 285, 303, 311, 321). But the intended meaning of the second and third terms seems to be plural rather than singular.
- 115 Adherents of the first group considered the humors as the starting point of diseases; adherents of the second group, nerves. C. L. Hoffmann (1721–1807) was the chief representative of Humoral-pathology; W. C. Cullen (1712–90), of Nerves-pathology.
- 116 The *Dobna* version of the anthropology lectures contains the full proverb: *Noscitur ex socio, qui non cognoscitur ex se* (p. 314). Trans.: He who cannot be characterized by his own merits can be characterized by the company he keeps. See also *Parow* 25: 393, *Mrongovius* 25: 1390, *Reflexion* 7187, 19: 267.
- 117 “These two heterogeneous things” refers to body and soul. But as Gregor notes, the sentence as a whole is difficult to follow.
- 118 Giambattista Porta (1540–1615), author of *De Humana Physiognomia* (1580), in which human faces are explained by means of animal faces. See also *Reflexion* 918, 15: 403–5.

- 119 Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801), Swiss theologian and mystic. He wrote several books on metaphysics, but is remembered chiefly for his work on physiognomy. See also Lavater's letter to Kant of April 8, 1774 and Kant's two replies (10: 165–6, 175–80).
- 120 Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz (1743–1812), editor of the journal *Literatur und Völkerkunde* from 1782 to 1791. In vol. 4 (1784): 857–60 of this journal there appears an article entitled “Ein Scherlein zur Physiognomik” (signed with the initials “M.Y.”), which Külpe surmises is the source of Kant's remark. (See esp. p. 859.)
- 121 Paul Pellisson-Fontanier (1624–93), French philosopher and member of the Academy in Paris. The remark was made by Madame de Sévigné.
- 122 The Kalmyks, a semi-nomadic branch of the Oirat Mongols, migrated from Chinese Turkistan to the steppe west of the mouth of the Volga river in the mid-seventeenth century. Petrus Camper (1722–89), Dutch anatomist and naturalist, author of *On the Natural Difference of Facial Features* (Berlin, 1792). See also *Anth* 7: 322; *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 304, 428; *The Conflict of the Faculties* 7: 89; *Zusätze* 25: 1552. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752–1840), German anatomist and naturalist, professor of medicine at Göttingen, author of *Manual of Natural History* (Göttingen, 1779). See *Critique of the Power of Judgment* 5: 424; *The Conflict of the Faculties* 7: 89. In his letter to Blumenbach of August 5, 1790, Kant writes: “I have found much instruction in your writings” (11: 185).
- 123 Christoph Friedrich Nicolai (1733–1811), writer, publisher, and merchant in Berlin; one of the *Populärphilosophen* and founding editor of the journal, *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. See his *Beschreibung einer Reise durch Deutschland und die Schweiz im Jahre 1781*, vol. vi, pp. 544, 752f. See also *Zusätze* 25: 1549, 1556.
- 124 The German physician is Johann Friedrich Grimm (1737–1821). See his *Bemerkungen eines Reisenden durch Deutschland, Frankreich, England, und Holland in Briefen* (Altenburg, 1775), p. 334. See also *Friedländer* 25: 668, *Pillau* 25: 828, *Menschenkunde* 25: 1180–1, *Mrongovius* 25: 1307, 1384, 1402. The actor is James Quin (1693–1766), who worked in England. See also *Friedländer* 25: 672.
- 125 Alexander Pope (1688–1744), *Moral Essays*, Epistle 2, lines 209–10. See also *Menschenkunde* 25: 1190. Kant refers to Pope many times in transcriptions of his anthropology lectures – see *Collins* 25: 121, 137, 190, 202; *Parow* 25: 345, 399, 455; *Friedländer* 25: 527; *Menschenkunde* 25: 1059, 1178; *Mrongovius* 25: 1232, 1265, 1378.
- 126 Concerning the *cicisbeo* or *cavaliere servente*, Külpe refers readers to Samuel Sharp, *Letters from Italy* 1765–66 (London, 1767), pp. 18ff., 73 ff., 257; and to *Neues Hamburgisches Magazin* 2 (1767), pp. 249 ff.: “Einige Briefe über Italien und über die Sitten und Gewohnheiten dieses Landes von Samuel Sharp,” pp. 255 f., 263 ff. See also *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th edn., s.v. “cicisbeo”: “The cicisbeo was the professional gallant of a married woman, who attended her at all public entertainments, it being considered unfashionable for the husband to be the escort.”

- 127 The author of the text (which was originally published in Italian) is Paolo Sarpi (1552–1623). Külpe reports that he could not locate Kant's citation after searching through the eight-volume Latin translation.
- 128 See also Maria Charlotta Jacobi's letter to Kant of June 12, 1762 (10: 39); *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* 2: 229–30; *Reflexion* 1299, 15: 572.
- 129 John Milton (1608–74), English poet. Külpe, referring to a book by Alfred Stern [*Milton und seine Zeit* (1879), Part II, Book IV, pp. 12, 196], claims that the following anecdote is false.
- 130 In the opening sentence of his essay, “Of Love and Marriage,” Hume writes: “I know not whence it proceeds, that women are so apt to take amiss every thing which is said in disparagement of the married state; and always consider a satire upon matrimony a satire upon themselves” (in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller [Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987], p. 557). See also *Reflexion* 1283, 15: 565, *Parow* 25: 458, *Menschenkunde* 25: 1193, *Mrongovius* 25: 1393.
- 131 Hume, in his essay “Of National Characters,” writes: “The ENGLISH, of any people in the universe, have the least of a national character; unless this very singularity may pass for such” (in *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller [Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1987], p. 207). See also *Friedländer* 25: 630, *Pillau* 25: 832, *Mrongovius* 25: 1398, *Reflexion* 1113, 15: 496.
- 132 As Brandt notes, here Kant is describing the character of the French in light of the French Revolution, which began in 1789. See also Kant's more supportive remarks about the revolution (and public reaction to it) in *The Conflict of the Faculties* 7: 85–6.
- 133 Kant spells the name “Scharp” – Külpe corrects it to “Sharp”, referring readers to Dr. Samuel Sharp. See *Neues Hamburgisches Magazin* 2 (1767), pp. 259, 261. Sharp is called a “splenetic” doctor in *Das deutsche Museum* 1 (1786), p. 387.
- 134 In Bk III, ch. 8 of *The Social Contract*, Rousseau writes: “In Madrid, they have superb reception rooms, but no windows that close and their bedrooms are like rat holes” [trans. Maurice Cranston (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 128]. Rousseau makes these remarks with reference to the Spaniards, but Kant applies them to the Italians. See also *Mrongovius* 25: 1405.
- 135 Dowdell notes that “two-headed” refers to the Vatican as one government and the Quirinal as the other.
- 136 William Robertson (1721–93), Scottish churchman and historian, author of *History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary and King James VI* (1759) and other works. The exact source of Kant's citation is uncertain.
- 137 James Boswell (1740–95), Scottish writer, author of the *The Life of Samuel Johnson* (1791). See p. 290 of the 1769 German translation of Boswell's *Account of Corsica, the Journal of a Tour to that Island, and Memoirs of Pascal Paoli* (1768, Glasgow and London). See also *Parow* 25: 431, *Mrongovius* 25: 1408.
- 138 The Caloyers are Greek Catholic monks belonging to the Order of St. Basil. Külpe lists the following remark from Jacob Friedrich von Bielfeld, *Erste Grundlinien der allgemeinen Gelehrsamkeit III* (1767), as Kant's source:

- "In this church [i.e., the Greek] there are . . . monks (of the Order of St. Basil) who are called Caloyers, and who wear a black dress almost like the Benedictines" (p. 252).
- ¹³⁹ Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), *Über das Kantisches Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte* (Göttingen, 1796). In his Preface, Girtanner notes that his book is an explanation of Kant's ideas and a commentary on them. Girtanner was named Privy Councilor of Saxe-Meiningen (a duchy in Thuringia) in 1793.
- ¹⁴⁰ Pietro Moscati (1739–1824), Italian physician and natural scientist. See also Kant, *Review of Moscati's Work Of the Corporeal Essential Differences Between the Structure of Animals and Humans* 2: 421–5, contained in the present volume.
- ¹⁴¹ The text is unclear here. Külpe suggests that "to walk on two feet" be added after "destined." Gregor inserts "to walk upright or on all fours" in square brackets after "destined." Vorländer and Brandt, whom I have followed, suggest that "for this" (*dazu*) seems to be missing after "destined."
- ¹⁴² Külpe refers readers here to a book by Christian Friedrich Ludwig, *Grunderiss der Naturgeschichte der Menschenspecies* (Outline of the Natural History of the Human Species) (Leipzig, 1796). In section 2 ("Von den besonderen Unterschieden zwischen dem Menschen und den menschenähnlichsten Affen"), Ludwig discusses the views of Linné (Linnaeus), Camper, and Moscati as well.
- ¹⁴³ See Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1750).
- ¹⁴⁴ Archimedes (287–212 BC), Greek mathematician, physicist, and inventor; Isaac Newton (1642–1727), English natural philosopher and mathematician; Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743–94), French chemist and physicist, guillotined during the Reign of Terror.
- ¹⁴⁵ Presumably, the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1750), the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1754), and *Julie, ou la Nouvelle Héloïse* (1761).
- ¹⁴⁶ Timon of Athens, a famous misanthrope, was a semi-legendary character. Momus is the god of blame or censure. See, e.g., Plato, *Republic* 487a; Hesiod, *Theogony* 214.

Postscript to Christian Gottlieb Mielcke's *Lithuanian-German and German-Lithuanian dictionary*

- ¹ Kant is referring to the last of the three prefaces of Mielcke's *Dictionary*, written by Christoph Friedrich Heilsberg. See the Editor's Introduction to this work by Kant.
- ² Hans Erich Thunmann (1746–78), Professor of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Halle. Anton Friedrich Büsching (1724–93), geographer, Protestant church official and school director in Berlin, published a geographical weekly review (*Büschings Wöchentliche Nachrichten von neuen Landkarten*), in which he had written about the recently deceased Thunmann in the first issue of 1779.

Introduction to Lectures on pedagogy

- ¹ Immanuel Kant's *sämtliche Werke*, eds. Karl Rosenkranz and Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert (Leipzig, 1838–9), 9: xvi.

- ² Immanuel Kant's *sämtliche Werke*, 9: xvi. See also Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden*, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), 12: 818.
- Lectures on pedagogy*
- ¹ See also Kant's discussion in *Conjectural Beginning of Human History* (8: 109–23) and *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (8: 17–31).
- ² See also Kant's discussion "On the Character of the Species" in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7: 321–33).
- ³ For related discussion, see "On the Inclination to Freedom as a Passion" in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7: 268).
- ⁴ See also "In What Order Alone can Progress toward the Better be Expected?" – *The Conflict of the Faculties* (7: 92–3).
- ⁵ Otto Willmann, in his edition of the text (*Über Pädagogik* [Leipzig, 1873]), places this sentence after the following one ("Two . . . idea.") In Natorp's view, this is "perhaps correct."
- ⁶ Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723–90) founded the Dessau Philanthropinum in 1774 under the patronage of Prince Friedrich Franz Leopold III of Anhalt-Dessau. For further discussion, see Kant's two short *Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum* (2: 445–52), also in the present volume.
- ⁷ Kant's etymology is incorrect. According to Grimm, "dressieren" comes from the Latin "directus," to prepare, make ready, dress.
- ⁸ The first normal school was established in Vienna in 1771. The plan which Kant criticizes was put forward by Abbot Felbiger in 1774.
- ⁹ See n. 6, above. The Institute closed in 1793, but the fact that Kant speaks in the past tense here does not necessarily mean that this passage was written after 1793. Rink, in preparing the text for publication in 1803, may simply have changed an "is" to a "was."
- ¹⁰ Vogt moves this paragraph down to 9: 453, inserting it right before the paragraph beginning "The obsequiousness of the pupil. . . ."
- ¹¹ This heading as well as later ones were probably added by Rink.
- ¹² See note 11.
- ¹³ In Book I of his *Emile*, Rousseau writes: "But I do not know whether one ought not to pay a bit more attention to the age of the milk as well as to its quality. New milk is completely serous. It must be almost a laxative in order to purge the remains of the meconium, thickened in the intestines of the child who has just been born. Little by little the milk gains consistency and provides a solider food for the child who has become stronger to digest it. It is surely not for nothing that in the females of every species nature changes the milk's consistency according to the age of the nursling" (trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), pp. 56–7).
- ¹⁴ A Siberian ethnic group, closely related to the Manchus, the Tungus are subdivided into the Evenki and the Lamut. See also *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7: 269).
- ¹⁵ Vogt moves this paragraph and the following one down to 9: 465, placing them after the paragraph beginning "Trifling and continually caressing. . . ."
- ¹⁶ Vogt moves this paragraph down to 9: 465, placing it after the paragraph beginning "As concerns the formation of the mind. . . ."

- 17 At this point Rink's text reads "hier (here)" – Natorp has instead written "hiermit (with this)."
- 18 In Rink's text, "its body" is italicized (*gesperrt*). Natorp regards this as "without foundation."
- 19 These etymologies (as is often the case with Kant's etymological speculations) are false.
- 20 Benjamin Franklin (1706–90), American statesman, inventor, and author. See Franklin's letter to Oliver Neave on the art of swimming (no date) in *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Albert Henry Smyth (New York: Macmillan, 1907), vol. v, pp. 546–50.
- 21 Viz., the institute founded by Basedow in 1774. See also notes 6 and 9, above.
- 22 See Pollux, *Onomasticon* ix, 110, 113. (Note: In the Academy edition, the author's name is misspelled "Pallax" (9: 571).)
- 23 Johann Andreas von Segner (1704–77), German physicist and mathematician, professor at Jena, Halle, and Göttingen. See his *Pressiones quas fila etc.*, Göttingen, 1735.
- 24 *The Life and Opinions of Tristam Shandy*, by Laurence Sterne (1713–68).
- 25 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–99), German physicist and satirist; professor at Göttingen. See Lichtenberg's "Antwort auf das Sendschreiben eines Ungenannten," *Göttingisches Magazin* 3.4, p. 589. In his letter to Carl Friedrich Stäudlin of December 4, 1794, Kant writes: "give my warmest thanks to your excellent Privy councillor Lichtenberg; his clear head, upright way of thinking and unsurpassable humor can accomplish more in the struggle against the evil of a miserable religious tyranny than others accomplish with their rational arguments" (11: 534).
- 26 Vogt omits the word "free" here.
- 27 For related discussion, see Kant's letter of March, 1790 to Ludwig Ernst Borowski (11: 141–3) and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (7: 185, 208).
- 28 For related discussion, see the section on physical geography in Kant's *Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765–1766* (2: 312–13) and the Introduction to his *Lectures on Physical Geography* (9: 156–65). Kant held lectures on physical geography for forty years, from 1756 to 1796.
- 29 Natorp suggests "duties are . . ." here.
- 30 Vogt moves this paragraph and the following to 9: 465, placing them after the paragraph (which he also moved – see note 15, above) beginning "To be sure. . . ."
- 31 Vogt moves this paragraph to 9: 465, placing it as a footnote at the end of the paragraph beginning "It is customary to say to children. . . ."
- 32 Vogt moves this paragraph as well as the next two up to 9: 465, placing them before the paragraph beginning "All of this can still be counted. . . ."
- 33 For related discussion, see "On Lying" in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 429–31) and *On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy* (8: 425–30).
- 34 See note 11, above.
- 35 See also Kant's more positive discussion of sympathetic feeling in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 456–8).

- 36 Crugott (1725–90), German theologian. See his *Predigten* (Breslau, 1790). The third sermon is entitled: "Von dem moralischen Beyspiel Christi in Ansehung der mittelbar positiven Tugend oder die Pflichten gegen sich selbst" (p. 94). See also Kant's discussion of duties to oneself in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 417–20).
- 37 See also Kant's discussion of a moral catechism in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 477–85).
- 38 See Kant's discussion of perfect and imperfect duties in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 390–91) and in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (4: 421–24). Imperfect obligations require us to adopt broad ends rather than to perform specific actions.
- 39 See also Kant's remarks on beneficence in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 452–4) and his critique of supererogation in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (5: 84, 155, 158).
- 40 See also Kant's discussion of radical evil in Part One of *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (6: 18–53).
- 41 Natorp suggests "fear of divine punishment" here.
- 42 See also Kant's discussion in Parts Two and Three of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (6: 57–147) and his letter to Johann Casper Lavater of 28 April 1775 (10: 175–80).
- 43 See also Kant's discussion of conscience in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (6: 400–1, 438–41).

Glossary

Note: An effort has been made to achieve consistency in rendering Kant's vocabulary and terminology into English across the writings contained in this volume of the Cambridge Edition. In a small number of cases, a German word contained in the glossary has been translated with more than one English word.

GERMAN—ENGLISH

<i>Abartung</i>	subspecies	<i>anerbende</i>	hereditable
<i>Aberwitz</i>	craziness	<i>Anerkennung</i>	recognition
<i>abenteurlich</i>	adventurous	<i>angeboren</i>	inborn, native
<i>aberwitzig</i>	crazy	<i>angenehm</i>	agreeable
<i>abgeschmackt</i>	insipid	<i>angelegt</i>	predisposed
<i>Abhandlung</i>	treatise	<i>angemessen</i>	suitable
<i>abhängig</i>	dependent	<i>Angemessenheit</i>	suitability
<i>Abkömmling</i>	descendant	<i>Angewohnheit</i>	habit
<i>Ableitung</i>	derivation	<i>Anlage</i>	predisposition
<i>Absicht</i>	aim, intention	<i>anmaßen</i>	to presume
<i>absonderlich</i>	separate	<i>Anmaßung</i>	presumption
<i>Absonderung</i>	secretion, separation	<i>anmutig</i>	charming
<i>Abstamm</i>	phyletic origination	<i>Anordnung</i>	arrangement
<i>Abstammung</i>	phyletic origin	<i>Anschauung</i>	intuition
<i>Abweichung</i>	deviation	<i>Anschein</i>	semblance
<i>abweisen</i>	to dismiss	<i>Anständigkeit</i>	decency
<i>Achtung</i>	esteem	<i>Anstand</i>	propriety
<i>Ähnlichkeit</i>	similarity	<i>Ansteckung</i>	contagion, infection
<i>Affekt</i>	affect	<i>Anstrengung</i>	exertion
<i>affizieren</i>	to affect	<i>Antrieb</i>	impetus, impulse
<i>Akzidenz</i>	accident	<i>Anzeige</i>	indication
<i>allgemein</i>	general, universal	<i>Anziehung</i>	attraction
<i>Amerikaner</i>	American	<i>Anziehungskraft</i>	attractive force
<i>anarten</i>	to adapt	<i>Arbeit</i>	labor
<i>Anartung</i>	adaptation	<i>Armseligkeit</i>	paltriness
		<i>Art</i>	species (in biological contexts); otherwise, kind
		<i>artig</i>	polite
		<i>Arzt</i>	physician
		<i>Aufgabe</i>	task
		<i>aufgeblasen</i>	inflated
		<i>aufgeklärt</i>	enlightened
		<i>aufheben</i>	to suspend
		<i>Aufklärung</i>	enlightenment
		<i>ausarten</i>	to degenerate
		<i>Ausartung</i>	degeneration
		<i>Ausbeute</i>	yield
		<i>Ausdruck</i>	expression
		<i>Ausdünstung</i>	evaporation, perspiration
		<i>ausgeartet</i>	degenerated
		<i>äußerer</i>	external
		<i>Ausstattung</i>	endowment
		<i>Auswanderung</i>	emigration
		<i>Auswicklung</i>	unfolding

<i>Bastard</i>	bastard
<i>Bastarderzeugung</i>	bastard generation
<i>Bau</i>	built
<i>Bedenklichkeit</i>	doubtfulness, scruple
<i>bedingt</i>	conditioned
<i>Bedingung</i>	condition
<i>Bedürfnis</i>	need
<i>beförderlich</i>	serviceable
<i>Befremdung</i>	puzzlement
<i>Befugnis</i>	warrant
<i>Begebenheit</i>	occurrence
<i>Begehrungsvermögen</i>	faculty of desire
<i>Begierde</i>	desire
<i>begreiflich</i>	comprehensible
<i>Begriff</i>	concept, conception
<i>beharrlich</i>	persistent
<i>Beharrlichkeit</i>	persistence
<i>Behauptung</i>	assertion
<i>beilegen</i>	to settle (a dispute)
<i>Belehrung</i>	teaching
<i>Benennung</i>	appellation
<i>beobachten</i>	to observe
<i>bequem</i>	indolent
<i>Beschaffenheit</i>	quality, condition
<i>Beschäftigung</i>	occupation
<i>Beschreibung</i>	description
<i>besonderer</i>	particular
<i>Besorgnis</i>	concern
<i>bestimmen</i>	to determine
<i>bestimmt</i>	destined, determinate
<i>Bestimmung</i>	(in teleological contexts) vocation; destiny (if so indicated in a linguistic footnote); otherwise, determination
<i>Bestimmungsgrund</i>	ground of determination
<i>Betrachtung</i>	consideration
<i>Bevölkerung</i>	population
<i>bewegende Kraft</i>	moving power
<i>Beweglichkeit</i>	movability
<i>Bewegung</i>	movement, motive
<i>Bewegungsgrund</i>	motivation
<i>Beweisart</i>	method of proof
<i>beweisen</i>	to demonstrate, to prove
<i>bezeichnen</i>	to designate

<i>Bild</i>	image
<i>bilden</i>	to form
<i>Bildung</i>	formation
<i>Bildungstrieb</i>	formative drive
<i>billig</i>	fair
<i>Blendung</i>	blend
<i>Blendlingsart</i>	hybrid kind
<i>Blödsinnigkeit</i>	imbecility
<i>blödsinnig</i>	idiotic
<i>blond</i>	blonde
<i>Blutumlauf</i>	circulation of the blood
<i>Boden</i>	soil
<i>Böse, das</i>	evil
<i>Bosheit</i>	malice
<i>brauchbar</i>	useful
<i>brünett</i>	brunette
<i>Bürger</i>	citizen
<i>bürgerlich</i>	civil
<i>Charakter</i>	character
<i>charakteristisch</i>	characteristic
<i>darstellen</i>	to present
<i>Darstellung</i>	presentation
<i>Dauerhaftigkeit</i>	endurance
<i>Denkungsart</i>	mode of thinking, way of thinking
<i>Ding</i>	thing
<i>Ding an sich (selbst)</i>	thing in itself
<i>Dreistigkeit</i>	audacity, insolence
<i>dumm</i>	stupid
<i>Dummheit</i>	stupidity
<i>Dummköpfigkeit</i>	idiocy
<i>Dummkopf</i>	idiot
<i>echt</i>	authentic
<i>Ehrbegierde</i>	ambition
<i>Ehrliebe</i>	love of honor
<i>Eigenschaft</i>	property
<i>Eigennutz</i>	self-interest
<i>eigentlich</i>	really
<i>Eigentümlichkeit</i>	peculiarity
<i>Einbildung</i>	imagination
<i>Einbildungskraft</i>	power of the imagination

Glossary

<i>Eindruck</i>	impression
<i>Einfalt</i>	simplicity
<i>Einfaltspinsel</i>	simpleton
<i>eingeartet</i>	adapted
<i>eingeplant</i>	implanted
<i>Eingriff</i>	intervention
<i>einheimisch</i>	indigenous
<i>Einbelligkeit</i>	unanimity
<i>Einschränkung</i>	restriction
<i>einsehen</i>	to comprehend
<i>Einsicht</i>	insight
<i>Einteilung</i>	division
<i>Eintracht</i>	concord
<i>Einwurf</i>	objection
<i>einzig</i>	single
<i>eitel</i>	vain
<i>Elementarbegriff</i>	elementary concept
<i>Elternstamm</i>	parental phylum
<i>empfinden</i>	to feel
<i>Empfindlichkeit</i>	sensitivity (<i>see also Empfindsamkeit and Reizbarkeit</i>)
<i>Empfindsamkeit</i>	sensitivity (<i>see also Empfindlichkeit and Reizbarkeit</i>)
<i>Empfindung</i>	sentiment, sensation
<i>empirisch</i>	empirical
<i>Emsigkeit</i>	industry
<i>Endursache</i>	final cause
<i>Enthusiasmus</i>	enthusiasm
<i>entspringen</i>	to originate
<i>entwickeln</i>	to develop
<i>Entwicklung</i>	development
<i>Entwurf</i>	project
<i>Epidemie</i>	epidemic
<i>Erbeigenschaft</i>	hereditary property
<i>erblich</i>	hereditary
<i>erdenken</i>	to concoct
<i>erdichten</i>	to make up
<i>erdichtet</i>	fictitious
<i>Erdichtung</i>	fiction
<i>Erdrevolution</i>	revolution of the earth
<i>Erdstrich</i>	region of the earth
<i>Ereignis</i>	incidence
<i>Erfahrenheit</i>	experiencedness
<i>Erfahrung</i>	experience
<i>Erfahrungsbegriß</i>	empirical concept
<i>Erfahrungsurteil</i>	judgment of experience

Glossary

<i>Ergötzlichkeit</i>	delight
<i>Erbaltung</i>	preservation
<i>Erinnerung</i>	recollection
<i>Erinnerungsvermögen</i>	faculty of recollection
<i>erkennen</i>	to recognize
<i>Erkenntnis</i>	cognition
<i>Erkenntnisart</i>	mode of cognition
<i>Erkenntniskraft</i>	power of cognition
<i>Erklärungsart</i>	mode of explanation
<i>Erklärungsgrund</i>	ground of explanation
<i>erloschen</i>	extinct
<i>Erscheinung</i>	appearance
<i>ersetzen</i>	to compensate
<i>Erzählung</i>	narrative
<i>Erziehung</i>	education
<i>Experiment</i>	experiment
<i>Exposition</i>	exposition
<i>Fähigkeit</i>	capacity
<i>Familenschlag</i>	family sort
<i>Fanatiker</i>	fanatic
<i>Farbenleiter</i>	color scale
<i>Faulheit</i>	laziness
<i>feiner Verstand</i>	refined understanding
<i>Fertigkeit</i>	skill, aptitude
<i>Forderung</i>	demand
<i>fortpflanzen</i>	to propagate
<i>Fortpflanzung</i>	propagation
<i>Fortzeugung</i>	procreation
<i>Freiheit</i>	freedom
<i>fremd</i>	foreign
<i>Fremder</i>	foreigner
<i>Fröhlichkeit</i>	cheerfulness
<i>fruchtbar</i>	fertile
<i>furchtbar</i>	formidable
<i>Fürsorge</i>	care
<i>Ganzes</i>	whole
<i>Gattung</i>	species (in biological contexts); otherwise, genus
<i>Gebiet</i>	domain
<i>Gebrechen</i>	frailty
<i>Gedächtnis</i>	memory
<i>Gefülligkeit</i>	complaisance
<i>Gefäß</i>	vessel

<i>Gefühl</i>	feeling
<i>Gegengrund</i>	counterargument
<i>Gegenstand</i>	object
<i>Gegenwirkung</i>	counter-effect
<i>gehörig</i>	properly
<i>Geist</i>	intelligence, mind, spirit
<i>Geiz</i>	greediness
<i>Gelegenheitsursache</i>	occasioning cause
<i>Gemäßlichkeit</i>	ease
<i>gemeines Wesen</i>	commonwealth
<i>Gemeinschaft</i>	community
<i>gemein</i>	common
<i>gemeinschaftlich</i>	common
<i>Gemüt</i>	mind
<i>Gemütsart</i>	cast of mind
<i>Gemütsbeschaffenheit</i>	mental condition
<i>Gemütseigenschaft</i>	quality of mind
<i>Gemütsverfassung</i>	frame of mind
<i>Gemütszustand</i>	mental state
<i>Genie</i>	genius
<i>genießen</i>	to enjoy
<i>Genuß</i>	enjoyment
<i>Genügsamkeit</i>	contentment
<i>Gerechtigkeit</i>	justice
<i>Geringschätzung</i>	disdain
<i>gescheit</i>	shrewd
<i>Geschichte</i>	history
<i>Geschicklichkeit</i>	skill, skillfulness
<i>Geschlecht</i>	sex, kind
<i>Geschöpf</i>	creature
<i>Geselligkeit</i>	sociability
<i>Gesellschaft</i>	society
<i>Gesetz</i>	law
<i>gesetzlos</i>	lawless
<i>Gesichtsbildung</i>	facial formation
<i>Gesinnung</i>	disposition
<i>gesittet</i>	civilized, well-mannered
<i>Gestalt</i>	shape, figure
<i>gestaltet</i>	shaped
<i>gestörtes Gemüt</i>	disturbed mind
<i>gesunder Verstand</i>	sound understanding
<i>Gewalt</i>	authority
<i>gewaltsam</i>	violent

<i>Gewerbe</i>	trade
<i>Gewißheit</i>	certainty
<i>gewöhnlich</i>	ordinary
<i>Glaube</i>	belief
<i>gleichartig</i>	homogeneous, uniform
<i>Gleichförmigkeit</i>	uniformity
<i>Gleichheit</i>	equality
<i>Glück</i>	(good) fortune
<i>Glückseligkeit</i>	happiness
<i>Grausen</i>	dread
<i>Grenze</i>	boundary
<i>Grille</i>	whim
<i>Grillenfänger</i>	crank
<i>Größe</i>	size
<i>Groll</i>	rancor
<i>Grund</i>	reason, ground
<i>Grundkraft</i>	basic power
<i>Gründlichkeit</i>	thoroughness
<i>Grundsatz</i>	principle
<i>Gültigkeit</i>	validity
<i>Gut</i>	good
<i>Gutartigkeit</i>	good-naturedness
<i>Habsucht</i>	avarice
<i>Halbrasse</i>	half-race
<i>Halbschlag</i>	half-breed
<i>halbschlächtig</i>	half-breed
<i>Handel</i>	commerce
<i>Handlung</i>	action
<i>Handwerk</i>	raft
<i>Hang</i>	propensity
<i>Hauptsatz</i>	main proposition
<i>Hautbeschaffenheit</i>	constitution of the skin
<i>Hautfarbe</i>	skin color
<i>Herrschsucht</i>	thirst for power
<i>hervorbringen</i>	to produce
<i>Himmelstrich</i>	region
<i>Hirngespinst</i>	phantom
<i>hoch</i>	high
<i>Hochmut</i>	arrogance, haughtiness
<i>hochmütig</i>	arrogant
<i>hochschätzen</i>	esteem
<i>Holz</i>	wood

Glossary

<i>Idee</i>	idea
<i>individuell</i>	individual
<i>Kargheit</i>	parsimony
<i>Keim</i>	germ
<i>Kennzeichen</i>	mark
<i>Klasse</i>	class
<i>Klassenunterschied</i>	classificatory difference
<i>klassifisch</i>	classificatory
<i>klug</i>	clever, prudent
<i>Knochenbau</i>	bone structure
<i>Kopf</i>	head
<i>körperlich</i>	corporeal
<i>korrespondieren</i>	to correspond
<i>kosmologisch</i>	cosmological
<i>Kraft</i>	force (in physical contexts, such as attractive, moving or repulsive force); otherwise, power
<i>Krankheit</i>	malady
<i>Kriecherei</i>	slavishness
<i>Kritik</i>	critique
<i>Kühnheit</i>	audacity
<i>Kultur</i>	culture
<i>Kunst</i>	art
<i>Künstelei</i>	artifice
<i>Kunststück</i>	feat
<i>Kunstwerk</i>	work of art
<i>Landanbauer</i>	farmer
<i>Lähmung</i>	paralysis
<i>läppisch</i>	silly
<i>Laster</i>	vice
<i>Laune</i>	mood
<i>Leben</i>	life
<i>Lebensart</i>	way of life
<i>Lebenskraft</i>	life power, vital force
<i>leidend</i>	passive
<i>Leidenschaft</i>	passion
<i>Leitfaden</i>	guiding thread
<i>Leute</i>	people
<i>Lokalität</i>	locality
<i>Lokalschöpfung</i>	local creation
<i>Lokalzeugung</i>	local generation
<i>Lust</i>	pleasure
<i>Lustigkeit</i>	jollity

Glossary

<i>Macht</i>	might
<i>mächtig</i>	powerful
<i>Mann</i>	man
<i>Mannigfaltiges</i>	manifold
<i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i>	manifoldness
<i>Mäßigkeit</i>	moderation
<i>Materie</i>	matter
<i>Meinung</i>	opinion
<i>melancholisch</i>	melancholic (<i>see also schwermüdig</i>)
<i>Mensch</i>	human being
<i>Menschengattung</i>	human species
<i>Menschengeschlecht</i>	humankind
<i>Menschenrasse</i>	human race
<i>Menschenstamm</i>	human phylum
<i>Menschheit</i>	humanity
<i>menschliches Geschlecht</i>	humankind
<i>merkwürdig</i>	noteworthy
<i>Metaphysik</i>	metaphysics
<i>Mißgeburt</i>	deformity
<i>Mißbelligkeit</i>	dissension
<i>mißlich</i>	awkward
<i>Mißverständ</i>	misunderstanding
<i>Mitleiden</i>	sympathy
<i>Mittel</i>	means
<i>Mittelfarbe</i>	intermediary color
<i>Mittelschlag</i>	intermediary sort
<i>Modell</i>	model
<i>Moral</i>	morality
<i>moralisch</i>	moral
<i>Moralisierung</i>	moralization
<i>Mühe</i>	effort
<i>Mut</i>	courage
<i>mutmaßlich</i>	conjectural
<i>Mutmaßung</i>	conjecture
<i>nachbarten</i>	take after
<i>Nachartung</i>	regeneration
<i>Nachkommenschaft</i>	progeny
<i>Nachrichten</i>	news
<i>Nahrung</i>	nutrition
<i>Narrheit</i>	foolishness
<i>Nationalcharakter</i>	national character
<i>Natur</i>	nature
<i>Naturabsicht</i>	aim of nature

Glossary

<i>Naturalist</i>	naturalist
<i>Naturanlage</i>	natural predisposition
<i>Naturbeschreibung</i>	description of nature
<i>Naturcharakter</i>	natural character
<i>Naturding</i>	natural thing, thing in nature
<i>Natureinrichtung</i>	arrangement of nature
<i>Natureinteilung</i>	natural division
<i>Naturell</i>	natural disposition, natural aptitude
<i>Naturforscher</i>	investigator of nature
<i>Naturforschung</i>	investigation of nature
<i>Naturgeschichte</i>	natural history
<i>Naturkenntnis</i>	cognition of nature
<i>Naturkette</i>	chain of nature
<i>Naturlehre</i>	doctrine of nature
<i>natürlich</i>	natural
<i>Naturnotwendigkeit</i>	natural necessity
<i>Naturrevolution</i>	revolution of nature
<i>Natursystem</i>	natural system
<i>Naturzustand</i>	state of nature
<i>Naturuntersuchung</i>	examination of nature
<i>Naturwissenschaft</i>	natural science
<i>Naturzweck</i>	natural purpose
<i>Neger</i>	Negro
<i>Neigung</i>	inclination
<i>niederschlagen</i>	to precipitate
<i>niedrig</i>	low
<i>Not</i>	need
<i>notwendig</i>	necessary
<i>Nüchternheit</i>	sobriety
<i>Nutzen</i>	utility
<i>Objekt</i>	object
<i>objektiv</i>	objective
<i>Obnmacht</i>	impotency
<i>Organisation</i>	organization
<i>organisieren</i>	to organize
<i>organisiertes Wesen</i>	organized being
<i>Original</i>	original, the
<i>Originalität</i>	originality
<i>pathologisch</i>	pathological
<i>Pest</i>	plague
<i>Pflanzenreich</i>	vegetable kingdom

Glossary

<i>Pflanzschule</i>	nursery
<i>Pflicht</i>	duty
<i>Phantast</i>	fantast
<i>Phantasterei</i>	fantastic mania
<i>physisch</i>	physical
<i>praktisch</i>	practical
<i>Praxis</i>	practice
<i>Prinzip</i>	principle
<i>Problem</i>	problem
<i>Produkt</i>	product
<i>Proportion</i>	proportion
<i>Prüfung</i>	examination
<i>Qualität</i>	quality
<i>räsonnieren</i>	to argue, to wrangle
<i>Raserei</i>	raving
<i>Rasse</i>	race
<i>Rassencharakter</i>	racial character
<i>Rassenunterschied</i>	difference of the races, racial difference
<i>Realität</i>	reality
<i>Recht</i>	right
<i>Rechtfertigung</i>	justification
<i>Rechtmäßigkeit</i>	legitimacy
<i>rechtschaffen</i>	righteous
<i>Rechtschaffenheit</i>	integrity
<i>Regel</i>	rule
<i>Regierung</i>	government
<i>Regung</i>	emotion (<i>see also Rührung</i>)
<i>Reibe</i>	series
<i>rein</i>	pure
<i>Reiz</i>	thrill, charm
<i>Reizbarkeit</i>	sensitivity (<i>see also Empfindlichkeit</i> and <i>Empfindsamkeit</i>)
<i>reizen</i>	to irritate, to charm
<i>richtig</i>	correct
<i>rob</i>	crude
<i>Robigkeit</i>	crudity
<i>romanhaft</i>	fictitious
<i>romantisch</i>	fictitious
<i>Rube</i>	tranquility
<i>rüblich</i>	praiseworthy
<i>rübben</i>	to move, to touch

Glossary

<i>Rührung</i>	emotion (<i>see also Regung</i>)
<i>Sache</i>	matter (if in the sense of subject matter); otherwise, thing
<i>Satz</i>	proposition
<i>Schamhaftigkeit</i>	sense of shame
<i>scharfsinnig</i>	astute
<i>Schattenriß</i>	silhouette
<i>Schein</i>	semblance, illusion, appearance, glimmer
<i>Schelmerei</i>	roguey
<i>Schlag</i>	sort
<i>Schminke</i>	varnish
<i>schön</i>	beautiful, fair
<i>Schöne, das</i>	the beautiful
<i>schöne Geschlecht, das</i>	the fair sex
<i>Schranke</i>	limit
<i>Schulsystem</i>	school system
<i>Schwachheit</i>	weakness
<i>schwammig</i>	spongy
<i>Schwärmer</i>	enthusiast
<i>Schwärmerie</i>	enthusiasm, fanaticism
<i>schwärmerisch</i>	enthusiastic
<i>Schwärze</i>	blackness
<i>Schwarzer</i>	black
<i>Schwermut</i>	melancholy (<i>see also Webmut</i>)
<i>schwermüdig</i>	melancholic
<i>Selbsthilfe</i>	self-help
<i>Selbstschätzung</i>	self-esteem
<i>Seligkeit</i>	blessedness
<i>Seuche</i>	pestilence
<i>Sicherheit</i>	security
<i>Sinnenwerkzeug</i>	sensory organ
<i>sinn leer</i>	meaningless
<i>sinnlich</i>	sensible
<i>Sinnliche, das</i>	the sensible
<i>Sitten</i>	morals
<i>sittlich</i>	ethical
<i>sittsam</i>	decent
<i>Sitz</i>	residence
<i>sonderbar</i>	odd
<i>Spezies</i>	kind (in biological contexts); otherwise, species
<i>Spielart</i>	strain
<i>Staat</i>	state
<i>Staatskörper</i>	body politic
<i>Stamm</i>	<i>phylum</i> , tribe

Glossary

<i>Stammbildung</i>	phylectic formation
<i>Stammgattung</i>	phylectic species
<i>Stand</i>	estate, class
<i>Statur</i>	stature
<i>Stoff</i>	material
<i>Stolz</i>	pride
<i>Störung</i>	disturbance
<i>Streit</i>	conflict
<i>Streitfrage</i>	disputed question
<i>Streitigkeit</i>	quarrel
<i>Stufe</i>	level
<i>stumpf</i>	dull
<i>stumpfer Kopf</i>	dull mind
<i>subjektiv</i>	subjective
<i>System</i>	system
<i>Tat</i>	deed
<i>Tapferkeit</i>	bravery
<i>Tatsache</i>	fact
<i>tauglich</i>	fit
<i>Tauglichkeit</i>	fitness
<i>Täuschung</i>	illusion
<i>Teilchen</i>	particle
<i>Teleologie</i>	teleology
<i>theoretisch</i>	theoretical
<i>Tiergattung</i>	animal species, species of animal
<i>Tierheit</i>	animality
<i>Titel</i>	title
<i>Tobsucht</i>	frenzy
<i>Tobsichtiger</i>	frantic, the
<i>toll</i>	mad
<i>Tor</i>	fool
<i>Torheit</i>	folly
<i>Trägheit</i>	indolence
<i>Treue</i>	loyalty
<i>Trieb</i>	drive
<i>Triebfeder</i>	incentive
<i>Tropf</i>	nanny
<i>Tüchtigkeit</i>	excellence
<i>Tugend</i>	virtue
<i>Übel</i>	ill
<i>überflüssig</i>	superfluous
<i>Übung</i>	practice

Glossary

<i>Umfang</i>	extent	<i>vereinigen</i>	to unite
<i>Umgang</i>	intercourse	<i>Vereinigung</i>	union
<i>Umstand</i>	circumstance	<i>verewigen</i>	to perpetuate
<i>Umwandlung</i>	transformation	<i>Verfassung</i>	constitution
<i>Unähnlichkeit</i>	dissimilarity	<i>Vergleichung</i>	comparison
<i>unausbleiblich</i>	unfailingly	<i>Vergnügen</i>	pleasure, gratification
<i>uneigennützig</i>	disinterested	<i>Verhältnis</i>	relation
<i>Uneinigkeit</i>	disunion	<i>verkehrt</i>	reversed
<i>unempfindlich</i>	insensitive	<i>Verkehrtheit</i>	reversal
<i>unergründlich</i>	unfathomable	<i>Verknüpfung</i>	connection
<i>unerschöpflich</i>	inexhaustible	<i>vermeintlich</i>	putative
<i>unfähig</i>	incapable	<i>Vermengung</i>	intermingling, mingling
<i>ungläubig</i>	incredulous	<i>Vermischung</i>	mixing
<i>Unlust</i>	displeasure	<i>Vermögen</i>	faculty
<i>Unmündigkeit</i>	immaturity	<i>vermuten</i>	to surmise
<i>Unordnung</i>	disorder	<i>Vermutung</i>	surmise
<i>Unpaßlichkeit</i>	indisposition	<i>Vernunft</i>	reason
<i>unproportioniert</i>	disproportionate	<i>Vernünftelei</i>	subtlety
<i>unrichtig</i>	incorrect	<i>Vernunftgebrauch</i>	use of reason
<i>Unsinn</i>	dementedness	<i>vernünftig</i>	rational
<i>unsinnig</i>	demented	<i>Vernunfturteil</i>	judgment of reason
<i>Unsinnigkeit</i>	ementia	<i>Verpflanzung</i>	transplanting
<i>Unterhaltung</i>	conversation	<i>Verrückter</i>	deranged person
<i>Unterricht</i>	instruction	<i>Verrückung</i>	derangement
<i>Unterscheidungsgrund</i>	ground of distinction	<i>verschieden</i>	different
<i>Untersuchung</i>	investigation	<i>Verschiedenheit</i>	diversity
<i>unumgänglich</i>	indispensable	<i>Verstand</i>	understanding
<i>Unvertragsamkeit</i>	incompatibility	<i>Verstandesfähigkeit</i>	capacity of the understanding
<i>Unzulänglichkeit</i>	insufficiency	<i>Verstandeskraft</i>	power of the understanding
<i>Urkunde</i>	document	<i>Verständlichkeit</i>	intelligibility
<i>Ursache</i>	cause	<i>Versuch</i>	essay
<i>ursprünglich</i>	original	<i>versuchen</i>	to attempt
<i>Urteilstkraft</i>	power of judgment	<i>Veruneinigung</i>	disunion
<i>Varietät</i>	variety	<i>Verwandtschaft</i>	affinity
<i>Vaterland</i>	home country	<i>Verzückung</i>	rapture
<i>veränderlich</i>	alterable	<i>Visionär</i>	visionary
<i>Veränderung</i>	alteration	<i>Volk</i>	people; nation (if so indicated in a linguistic footnote)
<i>verbastert</i>	bastardized	<i>Völkchen</i>	small people
<i>Verbindlichkeit</i>	obligation	<i>Volkscharakter</i>	ethnic character
<i>Verblendung</i>	delusion	<i>Volksschlag</i>	ethnic sort
<i>Verbreitung</i>	expansion	<i>Vollkommenheit</i>	perfection
<i>Verderben</i>	corruption	<i>vollständig</i>	complete
<i>Verdruss</i>	vexation	<i>Vollständigkeit</i>	completeness
		<i>vorausbestimmt</i>	predetermined

Glossary

Glossary

<i>voraussehen</i>	to foresee
<i>Voraussetzung</i>	presupposition
<i>Vorbegriff</i>	preliminary concept
<i>Vorkehrung</i>	provision
<i>vornehm</i>	noble
<i>vorsätzlich</i>	intentionally
<i>Vorsatz</i>	resolution
<i>Vorsorge</i>	foresight
<i>Vorstellungart</i>	mode of representation
<i>Vorstellungskraft der Welt</i>	power of representing the world
<i>Vorwurf</i>	accusation
<i>Wahn</i>	delusion
<i>Wahnsinn</i>	dementia
<i>Wahnsinniger</i>	demented person
<i>Wahnwitz</i>	insanity
<i>Wahrnehmung</i>	perception
<i>Wahrscheinlichkeit</i>	probability
<i>Wahrzeichen</i>	hallmark
<i>Wald</i>	forest
<i>Wehmut</i>	melancholy (<i>see also Schermut</i>)
<i>Weißer</i>	white
<i>Welt</i>	world
<i>Weltbeste</i>	best of the world, best for the world, highest good in the world
<i>Weltkennnis</i>	knowledge of the world
<i>Weltstrich</i>	region of the world
<i>Weltteil</i>	part of the world
<i>Weltweisheit</i>	philosophy
<i>Werk</i>	work
<i>Wert</i>	worth
<i>Wesen</i>	being; essence
<i>wichtig</i>	important
<i>widersinnig</i>	nonsensical
<i>Widerspruch</i>	contradiction
<i>Widerstand</i>	resistance
<i>Wilder</i>	savage, the
<i>Wille</i>	will
<i>wirken</i>	to operate
<i>wirkende Ursache</i>	efficient cause
<i>wirklich</i>	actual
<i>Wirklichkeit</i>	actuality
<i>Wirkung</i>	effect

Glossary

<i>wissen</i>	to know
<i>Wissenschaft</i>	science
<i>Witz</i>	wit
<i>Wohlfahrt</i>	welfare
<i>Wohlgefallen</i>	satisfaction
<i>Wohlwollen</i>	benevolence
<i>Wohnsitz</i>	habitat
<i>Wollust</i>	sensuality
<i>wollüstig</i>	sensual
<i>Wortstreit</i>	dispute over words
<i>Wortstreitigkeit</i>	quarrel over words
<i>wunderlich</i>	strange
<i>wundersam</i>	strange
<i>Wut</i>	rage
<i>Zeitschrift</i>	journal
<i>Zeugung</i>	generation
<i>Zeugungskraft</i>	generative power
<i>Zeugungsvermögen</i>	generative faculty
<i>Ziel</i>	goal
<i>Zufall</i>	chance
<i>zufällig</i>	contingent
<i>Zufriedenheit</i>	contentment
<i>Zug</i>	trait
<i>zumuten</i>	to intimate
<i>Zurückstoßung</i>	repulsion
<i>Zurückstoßungskraft</i>	repulsive force
<i>zusammenhängend</i>	coherent
<i>Zustand</i>	state
<i>Zwang</i>	constrain
<i>Zweck</i>	end
<i>zwecklos</i>	purposeless
<i>Zwecklosigkeit</i>	purposelessness
<i>zweckmäßig</i>	purposive
<i>Zweckmäßige, das</i>	purposive character
<i>Zweckmäßigkeit</i>	purposiveness
<i>Zwietracht</i>	discord

ENGLISH — GERMAN

accident	<i>Akzidenz</i>
action	<i>Handlung</i>
accusation	<i>Vorwurf</i>
actual	<i>wirklich</i>

actuality	<i>Wirklichkeit</i>
adapted	<i>eingeartet</i>
adaptation	<i>Anartung</i>
adapt, to	<i>anarten</i>
adventurous	<i>abenteuerlich</i>
affect	<i>Affekt</i>
affect, to	<i>affizieren</i>
affinity	<i>Verwandtschaft</i>
agreeable	<i>angenehm</i>
aim	<i>Absicht</i>
aim of nature	<i>Naturabsicht</i>
alterable	<i>veränderlich</i>
alteration	<i>Veränderung</i>
ambition	<i>Ehrbegierde</i>
ementia	<i>Unsinnigkeit</i>
American, the	<i>Amerikaner</i>
animality	<i>Tierheit</i>
animal species	<i>Tiergattung</i>
appearance	<i>Erscheinung, Schein</i>
appellation	<i>Benennung</i>
aptitude	<i>Fertigkeit (see also skill)</i>
argue, to	<i>räsonnieren (see also wrangle, to)</i>
arrangement	<i>Anordnung</i>
arrangement of nature	<i>Natureinrichtung</i>
arrogance	<i>Hochmut</i>
arrogant	<i>hochmütig</i>
art	<i>Kunst</i>
artifice	<i>Künstelei</i>
assertion	<i>Behauptung</i>
astute	<i>scharfsinnig</i>
attempt	<i>versuchen</i>
attraction	<i>Anziehung</i>
attractive force	<i>Anziehungskraft</i>
audacity	<i>Kühnheit, Dreistigkeit</i>
authentic	<i>echt</i>
authority	<i>Gewalt</i>
avarice	<i>Habsucht</i>
awkward	<i>mißlich</i>
basic power	<i>Grundkraft</i>
bastard	<i>Bastard</i>
bastard generation	<i>Bastarderzeugung</i>

bastardized	<i>verbaster</i>
bearing	<i>Anstand</i>
beautiful	<i>schön (see also fair)</i>
being, the	<i>Wesen</i>
belief	<i>Glaube</i>
benevolence	<i>Wohlwollen</i>
best for the world, best of the world	<i>Weltbeste (see also highest good in the world)</i>
black, the	<i>Schwarzer</i>
blackness	<i>Schwärze</i>
blend	<i>Blending</i>
blessedness	<i>Seligkeit</i>
blonde	<i>blond</i>
body politic	<i>Staatskörper</i>
bone structure	<i>Knochenbau</i>
boundary	<i>Grenze</i>
bravery	<i>Tapferkeit</i>
brunette	<i>brunette</i>
built	<i>Bau</i>
capacity	<i>Fähigkeit</i>
capacity of the understanding	<i>Verstandesfähigkeit</i>
care	<i>Fürsorge</i>
cast of mind	<i>Gemütsart</i>
cause	<i>Ursache</i>
certainty	<i>Gewißheit</i>
chain of nature	<i>Naturkette</i>
chance	<i>Zufall</i>
character	<i>Charakter</i>
characteristic	<i>charakteristisch</i>
charm	<i>Reiz</i>
charm, to	<i>reizen</i>
charming	<i>anmutig</i>
cheerfulness	<i>Fröhlichkeit</i>
circulation of the blood	<i>Blutumlauf</i>
circumstance	<i>Umstand</i>
citizen	<i>Bürger</i>
civil	<i>bürgerlich</i>
civilized	<i>gesittet</i>
class	<i>Klasse, Stand (see also estate)</i>
classificatory	<i>klassifisch</i>

Glossary

classificatory difference	<i>Klassenunterschied</i>
clever	<i>klug</i>
cognition	<i>Erkenntnis</i>
cognition of nature	<i>Naturkenntnis</i>
cognize, to	<i>erkennen</i>
coherent	<i>zusammenhängend</i>
color scale	<i>Farbenleiter</i>
commerce	<i>Handel</i>
common	<i>gemeinschaftlich, gemein</i>
commonwealth	<i>gemeines Wesen</i>
community	<i>Gemeinschaft; gemeinses Wesen</i> (if so indicated in a linguistic footnote)
comparison	<i>Vergleichung</i>
compensate, to	<i>ersetzen</i>
complaisance	<i>Gefälligkeit</i>
complete	<i>vollständig</i>
completeness	<i>Vollständigkeit</i>
comprehend, to	<i>einsehen</i>
comprehensible	<i>begreiflich</i>
concept	<i>Begriff</i>
conception	<i>Begriff</i>
concern	<i>Besorgnis</i>
concoct, to	<i>erdenken</i>
concord	<i>Eintracht</i>
condition	<i>Bedingung</i>
conditioned	<i>bedingt</i>
conflict	<i>Streit</i>
conjectural	<i>mutmaßlich</i>
conjecture	<i>Mutmaßung</i>
connection	<i>Verknüpfung</i>
consideration	<i>Betrachtung</i>
constitution	<i>Verfassung, Beschaffenheit</i>
constitution of mind	<i>Gemütsbeschaffenheit</i>
constitution of the skin	<i>Hautbeschaffenheit</i>
constraint	<i>Zwang</i>
contagion	<i>Ansteckung</i>
contentment	<i>Genügsamkeit, Zufriedenheit</i>
contingent	<i>zufällig</i>
contradiction	<i>Widerspruch</i>
conversation	<i>Unterhaltung</i>
counterargument	<i>Gegengrund</i>
corporeal	<i>körperlich</i>

Glossary

correct	<i>richtig</i>
correspond, to	<i>korrespondieren</i>
corruption	<i>Verderben</i>
cosmological	<i>kosmologisch</i>
counter-effect	<i>Gegenwirkung</i>
courage	<i>Mut</i>
craft	<i>Handwerk</i>
crank	<i>Grillenfänger</i>
craziness	<i>Aberwitz</i>
crazy	<i>aberwitzig</i>
creature	<i>Geschöpf</i>
critique	<i>Kritik</i>
crude	<i>rob</i>
crudity	<i>Robigkeit</i>
culture	<i>Kultur</i>
decent	<i>sittsam</i>
decency	<i>Anständigkeit</i>
deed	<i>Tat</i>
deformity	<i>Mißgeburt</i>
degenerate, to	<i>ausarten</i>
degenerated	<i>ausgeartet</i>
degeneration	<i>Ausartung</i>
dejection	<i>Schwermut, Melancholie</i>
delight	<i>Ergötzlichkeit</i>
delusion	<i>Wahn, Verblendung</i>
demand	<i>Forderung</i>
demeanor	<i>Anstand</i>
demented	<i>unsinnig</i>
dementedness	<i>Unsinn</i>
demented person	<i>Wahnsinniger</i>
dementia	<i>Wahnsinn</i>
demonstrate, to	<i>beweisen</i>
dependent	<i>abhängig</i>
deranged person	<i>Verrückter</i>
derangement	<i>Verrückung</i>
derivation	<i>Ableitung</i>
descendant	<i>Abkömmling</i>
description	<i>Beschreibung</i>
description of nature	<i>Naturbeschreibung</i>
designate, to	<i>bezeichnen</i>
desire	<i>Begierde</i>
destined	<i>bestimmt</i>
destiny	<i>Bestimmung</i> (see also vocation)

determinate	<i>bestimmt</i>
determination	<i>Bestimmung</i>
determine, to	<i>bestimmen</i>
develop, to	<i>entwickeln</i>
development	<i>Entwicklung</i>
deviation	<i>Abweichung</i>
difference of the races	<i>Rassenunterschied</i>
different	<i>verschieden</i>
discord	<i>Zwietracht</i>
disdain	<i>Geringschätzung</i>
disinterested	<i>uneigenennützig</i>
dismiss, to	<i>abweisen</i>
disorder	<i>Unordnung</i>
displeasure	<i>Unlust</i>
disposition	<i>Gesinnung</i>
disproportionate	<i>unproportioniert</i>
dispute over words	<i>Wortstreit</i>
disputed question	<i>Streitfrage</i>
dissension	<i>Mißbelligkeit</i>
dissimilarity	<i>Unähnlichkeit</i>
disturbance	<i>Störung</i>
disturbed mind	<i>gestörtes Gemüt</i>
disunion	<i>Veruneinigung</i>
diversity	<i>Verschiedenheit</i>
division	<i>Einteilung</i>
doctrine of nature	<i>Naturlehre</i>
document	<i>Urkunde</i>
domain	<i>Gebiet</i>
doubtfulness	<i>Bedenklichkeit</i>
dread	<i>Grausen</i>
drive	<i>Trieb</i>
dull	<i>stumpf</i>
dull mind	<i>stumpfer Kopf</i>
duty	<i>Pflicht</i>
ease	<i>Gemälichkeit</i>
education	<i>Erziehung</i>
effect	<i>Wirkung</i>
efficient cause	<i>wirkende Ursache</i>
effort	<i>Mühe</i>
elementary concept	<i>Elementarbegriff</i>
emigration	<i>Auswanderung</i>
emotion	<i>Regung, Rührung</i>

empirical	<i>empirisch</i>
empirical concept	<i>Erfahrungs begriff</i>
end	<i>Zweck</i>
endowment	<i>Ausstattung</i>
endurance	<i>Dauerhaftigkeit</i>
enjoy, to	<i>genießen</i>
enjoyment	<i>Genuß</i>
enlightened	<i>aufgeklärt</i>
enlightenment	<i>Aufklärung</i>
enthusiasm	<i>Enthusiasmus (see also fanaticism)</i>
enthusiast	<i>Schwärmer</i>
enthusiastic	<i>schwärm erisch</i>
epidemic	<i>Epidemie</i>
equality	<i>Gleichheit</i>
essay	<i>Versuch</i>
essence	<i>Wesen</i>
estate	<i>Klasse (see also class)</i>
esteem	<i>Achtung</i>
esteem, to	<i>bochschätzen</i>
ethical	<i>sittlich</i>
ethnic character	<i>Volkscharakter</i>
ethnic sort	<i>Volks schlag</i>
evaporation	<i>Ausdünung</i>
evil, the	<i>Böse</i>
examination	<i>Prüfung</i>
examination of nature	<i>Naturuntersuchung</i>
excellence	<i>Tüchtigkeit</i>
exertion	<i>Anstrengung</i>
expansion	<i>Verbreitung</i>
experience	<i>Erfahrung</i>
experiencedness	<i>Erfahrenheit</i>
experiment	<i>Experiment</i>
exposition	<i>Exposition</i>
expression	<i>Ausdruck</i>
extent	<i>Umfang</i>
external	<i>äußerer</i>
extinct	<i>erloschen</i>
facial formation	<i>Gesichtsbildung</i>
fact	<i>Tatsache</i>
faculty	<i>Vermögen</i>
faculty of desire	<i>Begehrungsvermögen</i>
faculty of recollection	<i>Erinnerungsvermögen</i>

Glossary

fair	<i>billig, schön (see also beautiful)</i>
fair sex	<i>schönes Geschlecht</i>
family sort	<i>Familienschlag</i>
fanatic, the	<i>Fanatiker</i>
fanaticism	<i>Schwärmerei (see also enthusiasm)</i>
fantast	<i>Phantast</i>
fantastic mania	<i>Phantasterei</i>
farmer	<i>Landanbauer</i>
feat	<i>Kunststück</i>
feel, to	<i>empfinden</i>
feeling	<i>Gefühl</i>
fertile	<i>fruchtbar</i>
fiction	<i>Erdichtung</i>
fictitious	<i>erdichtet, romanhaft, romanisch</i>
figure	<i>Gestalt (see also shape)</i>
final cause	<i>Endursache</i>
fit	<i>tauglich</i>
fitness	<i>Tauglichkeit</i>
folly	<i>Törheit</i>
fool	<i>Tor</i>
foolishness	<i>Narrheit</i>
force	<i>Kraft (in physical contexts, such as attractive, moving or repulsive force)</i>
foreign	<i>fremd</i>
foreigner	<i>Fremder</i>
foresee	<i>voraussehen</i>
foresight	<i>Vorsorge</i>
forest	<i>Wald</i>
form, to	<i>bilden</i>
formation	<i>Bildung</i>
formative drive	<i>Bildungstrieb</i>
formidable	<i>furchtbar</i>
fortune (good)	<i>Glück</i>
frailty	<i>Gebrechen</i>
frame of mind	<i>Gemütsverfassung</i>
freedom	<i>Freiheit</i>
frantic, the	<i>Tobsüchtiger</i>
frenzy	<i>Tobsucht</i>
general	<i>allgemein</i>
generation	<i>Zeugung, Generation</i>
generative faculty	<i>Zeugungsvermögen</i>
generative power	<i>Zeugungskraft</i>
genius	<i>Genie</i>

Glossary

germ	<i>Keim</i>
glimmer	<i>Schein</i>
goal	<i>Ziel</i>
good	<i>Gut</i>
good-naturedness	<i>Gutartigkeit</i>
government	<i>Regierung</i>
gratification	<i>Vergnügen</i>
greediness	<i>Geiz</i>
ground	<i>Grund</i>
ground of determination	<i>Bestimmungsgrund</i>
ground of distinction	<i>Unterscheidungsgrund</i>
ground of explanation	<i>Erklärungsgrund</i>
guiding thread	<i>Leitfaden</i>
habit	<i>Angewohnheit</i>
habitat	<i>Wohnsitz</i>
half-breed	<i>Halbschlag, halbschlächtig</i>
half-race	<i>Halbrasse</i>
hallmark	<i>Wahrzeichen</i>
happiness	<i>Glückseligkeit</i>
haughtiness	<i>Hochmut</i>
head	<i>Kopf</i>
hereditary	<i>erblich</i>
hereditary property	<i>Erbeigenschaft</i>
hereditable	<i>anerbend</i>
high	<i>hoch</i>
highest good in the world	<i>Weltbeste (see also best for the world, best of the world)</i>
history	<i>Geschichte, Historie</i>
home country	<i>Vaterland</i>
homogeneous	<i>gleichartig</i>
human being	<i>Mensch</i>
humanity	<i>Menschheit</i>
humankind	<i>menschliches Geschlecht, Menschengeschlecht</i>
human phylum	<i>Menschenstamm</i>
human race	<i>Menschenrasse</i>
human species	<i>Menschengattung</i>
hybrid	<i>Blending</i>
hybrid kind	<i>Blendlingsart</i>
idea	<i>Idee</i>
idiocy	<i>Dummköpfigkeit</i>
idiot	<i>Dummkopf</i>

Glossary

idiotic	<i>blödsinnig</i>
ill	<i>Übel</i>
illusion	<i>Schein, Täuschung</i> (<i>see also</i> semblance)
image	<i>Bild</i>
imagination	<i>Einbildung</i>
imbecility	<i>Blödsinnigkeit</i>
immaturity	<i>Unmündigkeit</i>
impetus	<i>Antrieb</i>
implanted	<i>eingepflanzt</i>
important	<i>wichtig</i>
impotency	<i>Ohnmacht</i>
impression	<i>Eindruck</i>
impulse	<i>Antrieb</i>
inborn	<i>angeboren</i>
incapable	<i>unfähig</i>
incentive	<i>Triebfeder</i>
inclination	<i>Neigung</i>
incidence	<i>Ereignis</i>
incompatibility	<i>Unvertraglichkeit</i>
incorrect	<i>unrichtig</i>
incredulous	<i>ungläubig</i>
indication	<i>Anzeige</i>
indigenous	<i>einheimisch</i>
indispensable	<i>unumgänglich</i>
indisposition	<i>Unpäßlichkeit</i>
individual	<i>individuell</i>
indolence	<i>Trägheit</i>
indolent	<i>bequem</i>
industry	<i>Emsigkeit</i>
inexhaustible	<i>unerschöpflich</i>
infection	<i>Ansteckung</i>
inflated	<i>aufgeblasen</i>
insanity	<i>Wahnwitz</i>
insensitive	<i>unempfindlich</i>
insight	<i>Einsicht</i>
insipid	<i>abgeschmackt</i>
insolence	<i>Dreistigkeit</i>
integrity	<i>Rechtschaffenheit</i>
instruction	<i>Unterricht</i>
insufficiency	<i>Unzulänglichkeit</i>
integrity	<i>Rechtschaffenheit</i>
intellect	<i>Verstand</i> (<i>see also</i> understanding)
intelligence	<i>Geist</i> (<i>see also</i> mind, spirit)

Glossary

intelligibility	<i>Verständlichkeit</i>
intention	<i>Absicht</i>
intentionally	<i>vorsätzlich</i>
intercourse	<i>Umgang</i>
intermediary color	<i>Mittelfarbe</i>
intermediary sort	<i>Mittelschlag</i>
intermingling	<i>Vermengung</i>
intervention	<i>Eingriff</i>
intimate, to	<i>zumuten</i>
intuition	<i>Anschauung</i>
investigation	<i>Untersuchung</i>
investigation of nature	<i>Naturforschung</i>
investigator	<i>Naturforscher</i>
investigator of nature	
irritate, to	<i>reizen</i>
jollity	<i>Lustigkeit</i>
journal	<i>Zeitschrift</i>
judgment of	<i>Erfahrungsurteil</i>
experience	
judgment of reason	<i>Vernunfturteil</i>
justice	<i>Gerechtigkeit</i>
justification	<i>Rechtfertigung</i>
kind	<i>Spezies</i> (in biological contexts); <i>Art, Geschlecht</i>
know, to	<i>wissen</i>
labor	<i>Arbeit</i>
law	<i>Gesetz</i>
lawless	<i>gesetzlos</i>
laziness	<i>Faulheit</i>
legitimacy	<i>Rechtmäßigkeit</i>
level	<i>Stufe</i>
life	<i>Leben</i>
life power	<i>Lebenskraft</i>
limit	<i>Schranke</i>
local creation	<i>Lokalschöpfung</i>
local generation	<i>Lokalzeugung</i>
locality	<i>Lokalität</i>
love of honor	<i>Ehrliebe</i>
low	<i>niedrig</i>
loyalty	<i>Treue</i>

Glossary

mad	<i>toll</i>
main proposition	<i>Hauptsatz</i>
make up, to	<i>erdichten</i>
malady	<i>Krankheit</i>
malice	<i>Bosheit</i>
man	<i>Mann</i>
manifold	<i>Mannigfaltiges</i>
manifoldness	<i>Mannigfaltigkeit</i>
mark	<i>Kennzeichen</i>
material	<i>Stoff</i>
matter	<i>Materie, Sache</i>
meaningless	<i>sinnleer</i>
means	<i>Mittel</i>
melancholic	<i>melancholisch, schwermüdig</i>
melancholy	<i>Schwermut, Wehmut</i>
memory	<i>Gedächtnis</i>
mental condition	<i>Gemütsbeschaffenheit</i>
mental state	<i>Gemützustand</i>
metaphysics	<i>Metaphysik</i>
method of proof	<i>Beweisart</i>
might	<i>Macht</i>
mind	<i>Geist, Gemüt (see also intelligence, spirit)</i>
mingling	<i>Vermengung</i>
misunderstanding	<i>Mißverständ</i>
mixing	<i>Vermischung</i>
moderation	<i>Mäßigkeit</i>
mode of cognition	<i>Erkenntnisart</i>
mode of explanation	<i>Erklärungsart</i>
mode of representation	<i>Vorstellungsart</i>
mode of thinking	<i>Denkungsart</i>
model	<i>Modell</i>
mood	<i>Laune</i>
moral	<i>moralisch</i>
morality	<i>Moral</i>
moralization	<i>Moralisierung</i>
morals	<i>Sitten</i>
motivation	<i>Bewegungsgrund</i>
movability	<i>Beweglichkeit</i>
move, to	<i>röhren</i>
movement	<i>Bewegung, Motiv</i>
moving power	<i>bewegende Kraft</i>

Glossary

narrative	<i>Erzählung</i>
nation	<i>Nation, Volk</i> (if so indicated in a linguistic footnote)
national character	<i>Nationalcharakter</i>
native	<i>angeboren</i>
natural	<i>natürlich</i>
natural aptitude	<i>Naturell</i>
natural character	<i>Naturcharakter</i>
natural disposition	<i>Naturell</i>
natural division	<i>Natureinteilung</i>
natural history	<i>Naturgeschichte</i>
natural necessity	<i>Naturnotwendigkeit</i>
natural purpose	<i>Naturzweck</i>
natural	<i>Naturanlage</i>
predisposition	
natural science	<i>Naturwissenschaft</i>
natural system	<i>Natursystem</i>
natural thing	<i>Naturding</i>
naturalist	<i>Naturalist</i>
nature	<i>Natur</i>
necessary	<i>notwendig</i>
need	<i>Bedürfnis, Not</i>
Negro	<i>Neger</i>
news	<i>Nachrichten</i>
ninny	<i>Tropf</i>
noble	<i>vornehm</i>
nonsensical	<i>widersinnig</i>
noteworthy	<i>merkwürdig</i>
nursery	<i>Pflanzschule</i>
nutrition	<i>Nahrung</i>
object	<i>Objekt, Gegenstand</i>
objection	<i>Einwurf</i>
objective	<i>objektiv</i>
obligation	<i>Verbindlichkeit</i>
observe, to	<i>beobachten</i>
occasioning cause	<i>Gelegenheitsursache</i>
occupation	<i>Beschäftigung</i>
occurrence	<i>Begebenheit</i>
odd	<i>sonderbar</i>
operate, to	<i>wirken</i>
opinion	<i>Meinung</i>
ordinary	<i>gewöhnlich</i>

Glossary

organization	<i>Organisation</i>
organize, to	<i>organisieren</i>
organized being	<i>organisiertes Wesen</i>
original, the	<i>Original</i>
original	<i>ursprünglich</i>
originality	<i>Originalität</i>
originate, to	<i>entspringen</i>
paltriness	<i>Armseligkeit</i>
paralysis	<i>Lähmung</i>
parental phylum	<i>Elternstamm</i>
parsimony	<i>Kargheit</i>
particle	<i>Teilchen</i>
particular	<i>besonderer</i>
part of the world	<i>Weltteil</i>
party	<i>Gesellschaft</i>
passion	<i>Leidenschaft</i>
passive	<i>leidend</i>
pathological	<i>pathologisch</i>
peculiarity	<i>Eigentümlichkeit</i>
people	<i>Leute, Volk</i>
people, small	<i>Völkchen</i>
perception	<i>Wahrnehmung</i>
perfection	<i>Vollkommenheit</i>
persistence	<i>Beharrlichkeit</i>
persistent	<i>beharrlich</i>
perpetuate, to	<i>verewigen</i>
perspiration	<i>Ausdünstung</i>
pestilence	<i>Seuche</i>
phantom	<i>Hirngespinst</i>
philosophy	<i>Philosophie, Weltweisheit</i>
phyletic formation	<i>Stammbildung</i>
phyletic origin	<i>Abstammung</i>
phyletic origination	<i>Abstamm</i>
phyletic species	<i>Stammgattung</i>
phylum	<i>Stamm</i>
physical	<i>physisch</i>
physician	<i>Arzt</i>
plague	<i>Pest</i>
pleasure	<i>Vergnügen, Lust</i>
polite	<i>artig</i>
population	<i>Bevölkerung</i>
power	<i>Kraft</i>
power of judgment	<i>Urteilskraft</i>

Glossary

power of cognition	<i>Erkenntniskraft</i>
power of	<i>Vorstellungskraft der Welt</i>
representing the world	
power of the	<i>Einbildungskraft</i>
imagination	
power of the	<i>Verstandeskraft</i>
understanding	
powerful	<i>mächtig</i>
practical	<i>praktisch</i>
practice	<i>Praxis, Übung</i>
praiseworthy	<i>rübsmäßig</i>
precipitate, to	<i>niederschlagen</i>
predetermined	<i>vorausbestimmt</i>
predisposed	<i>angelegt</i>
predisposition	<i>Anlage</i>
preliminary concept	<i>Vorbeigriff</i>
present, to	<i>darstellen</i>
presentation	<i>Darstellung</i>
preservation	<i>Erhaltung</i>
presume, to	<i>sich anmaßen</i>
presumption	<i>Anmaßung</i>
presupposition	<i>Voraussetzung</i>
pride	<i>Stolz</i>
principle	<i>Prinzip, Grundsatz</i>
probability	<i>Wahrscheinlichkeit</i>
problem	<i>Problem</i>
procreation	<i>Fortzeugung</i>
produce	<i>hervorbringen</i>
product	<i>Produkt</i>
progeny	<i>Nachkommenschaft</i>
project	<i>Entwurf</i>
propagate, to	<i>fortpflanzen</i>
propagation	<i>Fortpflanzung</i>
propensity	<i>Hang</i>
properly	<i>gehörig</i>
property	<i>Eigenschaft</i>
proportion	<i>Proportion</i>
proposition	<i>Satz</i>
propriety	<i>Anstand</i>
prove, to	<i>beweisen</i>
provision	<i>Vorkehrung</i>
prudent	<i>klug (see also clever)</i>
pure	<i>rein</i>
purposeless	<i>zwecklos</i>

Glossary

purposelessness	<i>Zwecklosigkeit</i>
purposive	<i>zweckmäßig</i>
purposive character	<i>das Zweckmäßige</i>
purposiveness	<i>Zweckmäßigkeit</i>
putative	<i>vermeintlich</i>
puzzlement	<i>Befremdung</i>
quality	<i>Beschaffenheit, Qualität</i>
quarrel	<i>Streitigkeit</i>
quarrel over words	<i>Wortstreitigkeit</i>
race	<i>Rasse</i>
racial character	<i>Rassenscharakter</i>
racial difference	<i>Rassenunterschied</i>
rage	<i>Wut</i>
rancor	<i>Groll</i>
rapture	<i>Verzückung</i>
rational	<i>vernünftig</i>
raving	<i>Raserei</i>
reality	<i>Realität</i>
really	<i>eigentlich</i>
reason	<i>Vernunft, Grund</i>
recognition	<i>Anerkennung</i>
recollection	<i>Erinnerung</i>
refined understanding	<i>feiner Verstand</i>
regeneration	<i>Nachartung</i>
region	<i>Himmelsstrich</i>
region of the earth	<i>Erdstrich</i>
region of the world	<i>Weltstrich</i>
relation	<i>Verhältnis</i>
remedy	<i>Heilmittel</i>
repulsion	<i>Zurückstoßung</i>
repulsive force	<i>Zurückstoßungskraft</i>
residence	<i>Sitz</i>
resistance	<i>Widerstand</i>
resolution	<i>Vorsatz</i>
restriction	<i>Einschränkung</i>
reversal	<i>Verkehrtheit</i>
reversed	<i>verkehrt</i>
revolution of nature	<i>Naturrevolution</i>
revolution of the earth	<i>Erdrevolution</i>
right	<i>Recht</i>
righteous	<i>rechtschaffen</i>

Glossary

roguey	<i>Schelmerei</i>
rule	<i>Regel</i>
satisfaction	<i>Wohlgefallen</i>
savage	<i>Wilder</i>
school system	<i>Schulsystem</i>
science	<i>Wissenschaft</i>
scruple	<i>Bedenklichkeit</i>
secretion	<i>Absonderung</i>
security	<i>Sicherheit</i>
self-esteem	<i>Selbstschätzung</i>
self-help	<i>Selbsthilfe</i>
self-interest	<i>Eigennutz</i>
semblance	<i>Anschein, Schein</i>
sensation	<i>Empfindung (see also sentiment)</i>
sense of shame	<i>Schamhaftigkeit</i>
sensible	<i>sinnlich</i>
sensible, the	<i>das Sinnliche</i>
sensory organ	<i>Sinnenwerkzeug</i>
sensitivity	<i>Empfindlichkeit, Empfindsamkeit, Reizbarkeit</i>
sensual	<i>wollüstig</i>
sensuality	<i>Wollust</i>
sentiment	<i>Empfindung (see also sensation)</i>
separate	<i>absonderlich</i>
separation	<i>Absonderung</i>
series	<i>Reihe</i>
serviceable	<i>beförderlich</i>
settle, to (a dispute)	<i>beilegen</i>
sex	<i>Geschlecht</i>
shape	<i>Gestalt (see also figure)</i>
shaped	<i>gestaltet</i>
shrewd	<i>gescheit</i>
silly	<i>läppisch</i>
similarity	<i>Ähnlichkeit</i>
simpleton	<i>Einfaltspinsel</i>
simplicity	<i>Einfalt</i>
size	<i>Größe</i>
skill	<i>Fertigkeit, Geschicklichkeit (see also aptitude)</i>
skillfulness	<i>Geschicklichkeit</i>
skin color	<i>Hautfarbe</i>
slavishness	<i>Kriecherei</i>
silhouette	<i>Schattenriß</i>
single	<i>einzig</i>

Glossary

sobriety	<i>Nüchternheit</i>	trait	<i>Zug</i>
sociability	<i>Geselligkeit</i>	tranquility	<i>Rube</i>
society	<i>Gesellschaft</i>	transformation	<i>Umwandlung</i>
soil	<i>Boden</i>	transplanting	<i>Verpflanzung</i>
sort	<i>Schlag</i>	treatise	<i>Abhandlung</i>
sound understanding	<i>gesunder Verstand</i>	tribe	<i>Stamm</i>
species	<i>Gattung</i> (in biological contexts); elsewhere, <i>Art</i>		
species of animals	<i>Tiergattung</i>	unanimity	<i>Einhelligkeit</i>
spirit	<i>Geist</i> (see also intelligence, mind)	understanding	<i>Verstand</i>
spongy	<i>schwammig</i>	unfailingly	<i>unausbleiblich</i>
state	<i>Zustand, Staat</i>	unfathomable	<i>unergründlich</i>
state of nature	<i>Naturstand</i>	unfolding	<i>Auswicklung</i>
stature	<i>Statur</i>	uniform	<i>gleichartig</i>
strain	<i>Spielart</i>	uniformity	<i>Gleichförmigkeit</i>
strange	<i>wunderlich, wundersam</i>	union	<i>Vereinigung</i>
stupid	<i>dumm</i>	unite, to	<i>vereinigen</i>
stupidity	<i>Dummheit</i>	universal	<i>allgemein</i>
subjective	<i>subjektiv</i>	use of reason	<i>Vernunftgebrauch</i>
subsidiary phylum	<i>Abstamm</i>	useful	<i>brauchbar</i>
subspecies	<i>Abartung</i>	utility	<i>Nutzen</i>
suitability	<i>Angemessenheit</i>		
suitable	<i>angemessen</i>	vain	<i>eitel</i>
superfluous	<i>überflüssig</i>	validity	<i>Gültigkeit</i>
surmise, to	<i>vermuten, Vermutung</i>	variation	<i>Abartung</i>
suspend	<i>aufheben</i>	variety	<i>Varietät</i>
subtlety	<i>Vernünftleit</i>	varnish	<i>Schminke</i>
sympathy	<i>Mitleiden</i>	vegetable kingdom	<i>Pflanzenreich</i>
system	<i>System</i>	vessel	<i>Gefäß</i>
		vexation	<i>Verdruss</i>
take after, to	<i>nacharten</i>	vice	<i>Laster</i>
task	<i>Aufgabe</i>	vital force	<i>Lebenskraft</i>
teaching	<i>Belehrung</i>	violent	<i>gewaltsam</i>
teleology	<i>Teleologie</i>	virtue	<i>Tugend</i>
theoretical	<i>theoretisch</i>	visionary	<i>Visionär</i>
thing	<i>Ding, Sache</i>	vital force	<i>Lebenskraft</i> (see also life power)
thing in itself	<i>Ding an sich (selbst)</i>	vocation	<i>Bestimmung</i>
thing in nature	<i>Naturding</i>		
thirst of power	<i>Herrschsucht</i>	warrant	<i>Befugnis</i>
thoroughness	<i>Gründlichkeit</i>	way of thinking	<i>Denkungsart</i>
thrill	<i>Reiz</i>	way of life	<i>Lebensart</i>
title	<i>Titel</i>	weakness	<i>Schwachheit</i>
touch, to	<i>rühren</i>	welfare	<i>Wohlfahrt</i>
trade	<i>Gewerbe</i>	well-mannered	<i>gesittet</i> (see also civilized)

Glossary

whim	<i>Grille</i>
white, the	<i>Weißen</i>
whole	<i>Ganzes</i>
will	<i>Wille</i>
wit	<i>Witz</i>
wood	<i>Holz</i>
work	<i>Werk</i>
work of art	<i>Kunstwerk</i>
world	<i>Welt</i>
worth	<i>Wert</i>
wrangle, to	<i>räsonnieren</i> (<i>see also</i> argue, to)
yield	<i>Ausbeute</i>

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The bibliography is divided into two parts. The first part lists for each work by Kant contained in the present volume the editions that appeared during Kant's lifetime and the translations into English, French, Italian, Spanish, and German (in the case of the work that originally appeared in Latin) that have appeared in publication. The second part lists for each of the works by Kant contained in the present volume scholarly publications in English, German, French, Italian, and Spanish, focusing on recent work and on books. Articles are listed in those cases where a particular topic or work has been mainly addressed in that form.

Each part of the bibliography is organized by the titles of the works by Kant contained in the present volume and arranged chronologically within the listing for a given work or group of works. This facilitates ascertaining the extent and development of editorial work and other research undertaken on a particular work or group of works by Kant contained in the present volume.

In the primary bibliography, works that carry a title that is original with Kant are listed without Kant's name, while his name is supplied for works that bear a title not original with Kant.

PART ONE: EDITIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime

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Index

Abelard, Peter 241
Abraham 302
absent-mindedness 294, 313, 314
abstinence 421
abstraction 242–3, 249, 259, 318; faculty of 243
Abyssinia 206
academies 443
Achilles 27
action; human 108; virtuous 43
acumen 308
adaptation 202, 210; half-breed 203, 204
Addison, Joseph 250
adolescent, obedience of 471
Adraste 34
Aesop 49
affect 184, 186, 189, 288, 313, 325, 338, 354, 397; lack of 354; *see also* passion
affection 244, 340, 403
affection 30; universal 31
affinity 132, 286
Africa 59, 87, 96, 146, 206, 211; Black 206
agreeable 46
agreeable, the 333, 356
agriculture 171
air, constitution of the 106
albino 149
Alceste 34
Alexander 68
Algarotti, Francesco Conte 41
ambition 367
amentia 74
America 88, 92, 96, 210, 211, 212; North 60, 158
American, the 88, 89, 95, 139, 148, 157, 204; derivation of the 92; natural disposition of the 92; original 157
amusement 336–8
analogy 131, 134
anarchy 426
anatomy 205
anger 354, 357, 359, 362

animal 79, 108, 109, 155, 156, 165, 167, 169, 203, 369, 422, 437, 444; brute 187; family of 201; four-footed 80; have no passions 367; mind of the 186; non-rational 203; organization of the 209; representations in 247; species of 111
animality 115, 437, 444
antagonism 114; in society 111
anthropologist 239
anthropology 97, 400, 406; and metaphysics 242, 255–6; from a pragmatic point of view 231–3; indirectly pragmatic; in distinction to physical geography; in distinction to psychology 272; physiological 247, 286, 385; pragmatic 280, 297, 349, 420
antiquities, Roman 412
antiquity 274
anxiety 295, 357
apathy 184, 355
appearance 150, 181, 255, 258; sensory 258; *see also* deception and illusion
apperception 255; pure 254, 272; pure and empirical 245; spontaneity of 251
appetite 270, 365, 380; *see also* desire
apprehension 239, 249, 254
aptitude, natural 384, 408; *see also* germ and predisposition
Arabia 96, 97, 206, 211
Arab, the 47, 58, 206, 290, 302, 370, 379
archaeology of nature 301, 418
Arcesilaus 304
Archenzholz, Johann Wilhelm von 394
Archimedes 421
architecture 61
Ariosto, Ludovico 290
Aristides 73
Aristotle 264
Armenian, the 415; copper-red 147
arrogance 310, 316, 373; *see also* pride
art 62, 113, 115, 116, 420; beautiful 349, 351; mnemonic 293; of pretence 244; of

writing 293; perfect 316; plastic 347; poetic 350; works of 216
artist 284, 329, 351; Greek 394
Asia 87, 88, 92, 148, 212
assimilation, law of 124
association, law of; of representations 286, 291, 325
astonishment 363
astrology 296, 301
astronomy 301
Athenian, the 86
Attakakullakulla 60
attention 242, 243, 249, 272, 274, 314, 464; strengthening of 464–5
audacity 359, 362
autodidacts 331
Avar, the 154
avarice 69, 387; *see also* mania for possession
Bacon, Francis 328
balls 353
Baltic sea 106
Baratier, Jean Philippe 331
barbarian, the 61, 119
barbarism 426; revolutionary 421
Baretti, Joseph 327
Basedow, Johann Bernhard 100, 103, 443
Bavaria 399
Bayard (Terrail, Pierre) 361
Bayle, Pierre 24
beautiful 26; ethically 43
beautiful, the 24, 25, 26–39, 44, 52; character of 40; charms of 33; qualities of 26–39
beauty 342, 345, 352, 395; taste for 166
being; human, *see* human being; supreme 178
beneficence, obligation of 477
benevolence 33
bewitchment (of the senses) 262
biographies 233
birds, singing of 438
black, the 60, 61
Blair, Hugh 351
blend, the 86
blind people 271, 278
blood 91, 97; animal 94; vengeance 372
Blumauer, Johann Aloys 273
Blumenbach, Johann Friedrich 396
blushing 301
body 184–91; animal 90, 150; discipline of 185; organic 90; regime of the 188
Boetian 86
book-learning 332
books, *see also* freedom of the press and novels; of chivalry 364; of women 404; prohibition of 324
boredom 263, 335
Boswell, James 327, 413, 414
botany 463
boundary 191
Bourignon, Antoinette 245, 273
brain 76, 223; organs of the 225; water in the 225; water of the 225
bravery 358; *see also* courage
Brown, John 357
Buache, Philippe 96
Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc de 47, 84, 203, 326
buffoonery 316, 317; *see also* fool; hospital 320
Bull, John 399
Büsch, Johann Georg 409
Büsching, Anton Friedrich 104, 213, 432
Butler, Samuel 327, 339
cameos 394
Camper, Petrus 396, 417
Canada 61
candor 244, 362
capability, national
capacity 168
Cape White 96
care 437, 446
Caribbean 89; black 149
Caribs 294, 336
caricature 282, 391, 397; of human heads 394
Carteret, Philip 146, 212
catechism, of right 477
category 218
Cato 37, 281
causality, law of 90, 295
cause; concept of 196; efficient 195; final 195, 214, 217; occasioning 90, 96; physical-mechanical 90; producing 90; universal natural 109
ceremony 57, 260
change (of sensations) 274, 275
character 203, 384, 429, 469, 474; as the way of thinking 389, 390; ethnic 87; grounding of 392, 474; individual 202; intelligible 419; moral, in children 475–6; national 52–62, 88; of the child 469, 471, 472; of the peoples 407, 415; of the person 384, 399; of the races 415, 416; of the sexes 399, 407; of the species 416, 429; purposive 156; sensible 420
Charles II, King of England 305
Charles XII, King of Sweden 38, 358, 391
charm, moral 48
charming 46
Chastelet, Marquise de 41
chemistry 287, 300
Chesterfield, Earl of 378

child 239, 343, 364, 369, 421, 423
 chiliasm 116
 China 93, 106, 173
 Chinese, the 59, 88, 92, 148, 154, 355, 396
 choleric temperament 33, 35, 36, 385, 387, 388
 chronology 297; Judeo-Christian 302
 Christina, Queen of Sweden 305
 cicisbeism 403
 citizen 169
 citizenship 469
 civilization 422, 444
 civil legislation 425
 class 84; human being 152; of the blacks 147; of the copper-reds 147; of the whites 147; of the yellows 147
 Clavius, Christoph 66, 311
 clergymen 281, 307, 313, 315, 373, 392
 climate 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 126, 136, 137, 138, 157, 159, 203, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 212; intermediary 149, 152, 154
 coarseness 306
 coercion 112
 cognition 181, 251; *a priori* 255; faculty of 178; power of 74, 76; symbolic and discursive 299; theoretical 196
 color, of the skin 151, 207, 211; *see also* race
 Columbus, Christopher 328
 comedy 26
 commercial spirit 408, 410, 415
 commonplaces 293
 common sense 250, 280, 321; *see also* understanding, sound
 commonwealth 114, 115, 172
 community 224; climatic 137
 compassion 32, 355
 complaisance 30, 31, 35, 51, 56
 compliment 264, 305
 composition (artistic) 284
 composure, of the mind 354, 358, 362
 concept 246, 249, 254, 278, 299, 305; common 65
 conceitedness 47, 56
 concord 417
 concupiscence 165
 condition; universal cosmopolitan 118
 conjecture 94, 163, 164, 178, 203
 conscience 481–2
 consciousness 254; of oneself 225, 240; pure and applied 255; unity of 249
 constitution; civil 112, 114, 119, 422, 423, 426; English 407, 412; German 414; state 116, 426
 constraint 447, 460
 contemplative life 58

contentment 338
 contradiction 273
 contrast 273–4; principle of 341
 conversation 189, 260, 286, 313, 378–9; language of 408; taste for 409
 Cook, James 136, 401
 coquetry 401
 Correggio, Antonio Allegri 262
 cosmopolitan society 427, 429
 courage 358–61, 407, 474; *see also* bravery
 court jester 366
 cowardice 358, 360, 376
 coxcomb 317, 323
 craftiness 305, 307, 312
 crank 28, 35
 Cranz, David C. 91
 craziness 75
 creation; local 85, 94, 204; realm of 131
 creature; animal 168; four-footed 80; moral 167; nature of a 156; organic 90; rational 109, 113; rational and moral 140
 credulity 57
 Creole 146
 cretin 317
 critique 178, 179
 Cromwell, Oliver 26, 404
 crossing the eyes 397–8
 crude state 437, 438, 441
 Crugott 476
 crying 357, 437, 451–2; *see also* weeping; after birth 369; in women 400
 cultivation 171, 339, 402, 460; of taste 394
 culture 111, 113, 115, 116, 117, 140, 167, 171, 173, 174, 352, 377, 378, 381, 418, 421, 422, 423, 439, 444, 445, 456; arts of 419; compulsory 461; feelings that belong to 402; historical 423; human 140; moral 423, 468; of memory 423; of the mind 263, 461–2, 464–5; of the senses 465; of the soul 459; progress of 400, 417
 curiosity 274
 cynicism 248, 382
 Dacier, Mme 41
 D'Alembert, Jean Le Rond 55
 dance 378
 dandy 28
 Dauria 96
 deaf people 267, 270, 271, 300
 death 174, 277, 339, 398; apparent 276, 277; fear of 278, 318, 360–1
 debauchery 352
 decency, moral
 deception 261, 264; *see also* appearance and illusion of the senses 262
 degeneration 85, 90, 199
 Deity 140
 delirious raving 319
 delusion 71, 320, 375–6
 Demanet, Abbé 146
 dementia 70, 74, 75, 309, 320, 355
 Demetrius of Phalerum 376
 demigurge 148, 427
 derangement 70, 71, 320
 Descartes, René 41, 223, 231, 286
 Desguignes (Joseph de Guignes) 92
 desire 75, 185, 353, 367, 478; *see also* appetite, animal 166
 despotism 172, 173, 426
 despot; religious 428
 destiny 90, 97
 development 110, 111, 112, 115, 441–2
 devotee, religious 399
 difference; classificatory 146, 152; hereditary 147; racial 155
 dignity 29, 39
 dinner party 378
 Diogenes of Sinope 390
 discipline 438, 444, 455, 459, 464, 468
 discord 417
 discovering 328
 disgust 263, 352
 disgusting, the 44
 displeasure 23
 disposition, *see also* germ and predisposition; morally good 116; natural 86, 93, 211; original 201
 dissimulation 233, 473
 dissoluteness 405
 distraction 313, 366
 disturbed mind 69
 divination 296–7
 division; chemical 224; of space 224
 dizziness 277, 280, 288, 365
 doctor 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189
 dogmatism 178
 domestic peace 400
 domestic warfare 400
 Domitian 23
 Don Ulloa 210
 dozen 302
 drama (versus comedy) 365
 dream 70, 297–8
 drive; natural 50, 165; sexual 46, 47
 drunkenness 276–7; *see also* intoxication
 duelling 359, 361
 duplicity 376
 Dutch 158
 Dutch, the 56, 396
 duty 259, 470, 471, 480, 482, 485; and inclination 470; and instinct 471; commands of 359, 361; law of 419; of

children 475; to oneself 475–7; to others 476; satisfaction subject to 347; thought of 241
 ease 244
 eccentricity 348, 366, 390
 ecstasy 277
 education 231, 418, 420, 437–42, 444, 446, 447, 464; as an art; by parents and princes 442–3; hard 455; moral 330, 422; negative and positive 438, 456–7, 464, 473; of the human race 423; physical and practical (or moral) 448, 456–7, 464, 473; plan of 440, 442, 445; private and public 446–7, 448; secret of 62; should follow nature 454
 educational institute 100
 effect 116
 egoism 240–2
 egoist; aesthetic 241; logical 240–1; moral 241; egoistic language 242
 Egypt 190, 206
 elegance 353
 eloquence (of women) 402
 end 168, 195, 202, 216, 217, 305, 417; *see also* means; determination of 195; doctrine of pure 217; final 299, 372, 380, 422; means to 370; natural 195; of freedom 216, 217; of nature 216, 402, 424; of reason 308; of true happiness 377; practically pure 217; principle of 205
 England 53, 58, 408
 English, the 52, 57, 331, 337, 343, 355, 401, 407; character of 409
 Englishman 52, 55, 56
 enjoyment 247, 264, 266, 276, 279, 333, 337, 339, 356, 367; in public 402; of a moral happiness 377; of loathsome things 288; possession without 374; social 378
 enlightenment 110, 111, 117, 119, 299
 enthusiasm 178, 243, 258, 272, 282, 295, 299, 309, 356, 370, 389, 409
 enthusiast 73
 envy 477–8
 ephemeral writings 336
 Epictetus 38, 73
 Epicurus 276, 338
 epidemic 106
 epigenesis 129
 equality 168; political 291; principle of 116
 Erasmus, Desiderius 187, 508
 eros 345
 erudition 331
 Escimo 91

esprit 329, 409
 eternity 29
 ethics 448, 474
 Europe 106; northern 206
 European, the 60, 91; Northern 95
 even-tempered 338
 evil 169, 441, 443, 468, 481, 482;
 knowledge of 140
 evolution, system of 139
 example 440, 464, 475
 execution 361
 exercise 464
 existence, animal 110
 experience 132, 134, 151, 155, 181, 197,
 213, 239, 245, 251–5, 272, 441;
 judgment of 74; sense 254
 experiment 151, 154, 207; in education
 439, 445–6
 explanation; mode of 214; pragmatic 292;
 teleological grounds of 205; teleological
 mode of 205
 face; human 201; structure of
 393
 facial expressions 394, 397, 412
 faculty 109, 166; cognitive 251, 256, 303;
 conflict of the 222; disagreement of the
 223; human 151; of desire 353, 367; of
 foresight 291; of memory 291; of
 recollection 73; of using signs 298–303;
 productive 284
 fall (as a moral term) 169
 family 85, 167; kind 415–6; sort 86,
 148
 fanatic 73, 188
 fanaticism 57, 58
 fandango 411
 fantast 28, 35, 71
 fantasy 278, 284, 289, 290; *see also*
 imagination, power of the
 fashion 326; taste in
 father 406
 fear 277, 358, 362, 456; in woman's nature
 402
 feeling 38, 307; beautiful 52; crude 48; fine
 41, 57, 59, 62; moral 32, 35, 42, 47, 62,
 419; noble 28; of the beautiful for the
 beautiful 24; of the sublime for the
 sublime 24; sensuous 24; species of 32;
 universal moral 31
 femininity 357, 364, 400
 fetus 80
 feudal system 242
 Fielding, Henry 273, 275,
 335
 figure; pretty 47; syllogistic 29
 Finns, the 91
 flatterers 373

folly 427; *see also* fool
 Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier
 de 41
 food
 fool 29, 68, 312, 316, 366; *see also* buffoon,
 folly, in fashion 348; inflated 69; silly
 69
 foolishness 66, 68, 75, 348, 427
 foolish person 67, 69
 fop 28, 50, 317; old 28, 35
 force; effective 181; generative 155;
 genetic 137, 139; moving 180; spiritual
 131; vital 188, 222
 forgetfulness 293
 form; aesthetic 344; *a priori* 349; human
 282; natural 203; purposive 204
 formalities (social) 259, 387
 formation 129, 437, 438, 446, 456;
 American 88; Kalmuckian 88, 91, 92;
 Kalmuckian facial 91; moral 446; of the
 feeling of pleasure and displeasure; of
 the mind 455; original 95; physical (of
 the mind) 459; phyletic 96; pragmatic
 448; scholastic 449
 Forrester, Thomas 212
 Forster, Georg 197, 204, 205, 206, 207,
 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215
 fortune-telling 296
 Fothergill, John 106
 frailty, human 29
 France 53, 146, 409
 Franklin, Benjamin 457
 Frederick William II, King of Prussia
 428
 free choice 256
 freedom 112, 113, 114, 117, 128, 172, 173,
 179, 217, 231, 369–71, 422, 438, 446,
 447, 455, 459; and law 425; barbaric
 115; brute 114; civil 117; condition of
 108; damage to 368; end of 216, 217;
 external 135; from passions 184; history
 of 163, 169; human 118; inclination of
 369; inner 135, 338; in the play of the
 power of imagination 344; in thinking
 135; lawless 115; of religion 117; of the
 mind 344; of the others 117; of the
 people 291; of the power of choice 419;
 of the press 240; of thought 326; of the
 will 108, 110; spirit of 409; unbound
 114; under external law 112; wild 112;
 without rules 119
 French, the 52, 331, 355; character of
 French language 407
 Frenchman 52, 54, 55, 56, 57
 friendship 26, 34, 264, 391
 fright 357, 358
furor poeticus 296, 309
 future, expectation of the 167

habit 233, 259, 261, 285, 352, 384,
 454
 hairsplitting 308
 half-breed 85, 154, 155
 half-races 87
 Haller, Albrecht 26, 225, 245
 happiness 110, 420, 421, 426; moral 377;
 of life 49

Harrington, James 324
 Hasselquist, D. Friedrich 25
 hatred 354, 371–2, 401
 haughtiness 56
 Hausen, Christian August 319
 head; dull 66; frailties of 65, 66, 69;
 maladies of the 65, 76; reversedness of
 the 73
 hearing 266, 271, 279
 Hearne, Samuel 400
 heart 65; frailties of 65; maladies of the 65,
 76
 Heidegger (Heydeger), Johann Jacob
 396, 397
 Heinecke, Christian Heinrich 331
 Helmont, Jan Baptist 322
 Helvétius, Claude Adrien 262, 288
 Heraclitus 30
 Herder, Johann Gottfried 124–42
 hereditary 85, 86, 87, 147, 149, 151, 152,
 158, 175, 186, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205,
 211, 213, 215; difference 147;
 necessarily 148, 149, 156; property 152;
 quality 148; unfailingly 148, 149, 150,
 151, 153–9
 heredity 148, 149, 151, 155; necessity of
 the 152; unfailing 153, 154, 156;
 unfailing nature of the 155
 Herodotus 91
 Hindustan 48, 93, 96, 97, 211
 Hippocrates
 history 108, 109, 116, 118, 119, 120, 133,
 462, 465; conjectural 163–75; Greek
 118; human 163–75; natural 134, 154,
 155, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204; of
 human action 163; of humankind 119;
 of the human being 134; philosophical
 120; universal 108–20; universal world
 118; word 198; world 119
 hobbyhorse 310
 Hoffman, Friedrich 186
 Hofstede, Johann Peter 264
 Hogarth, William 29
 Holberg, Ludvig von 69
 Holland 52
 Homer 24, 27, 29, 299
 homesickness 288
 honest 311
 honesty 412
 honor; feeling for 32; love of 39,
 359
 hope 356
 Horace 189, 350, 393, 472,
 474
 Horstig, Carl 452
 Höst, Georg Hjersting 136
 hot temper 362
 Hottentot, the 206

human being 42, 79, 80, 97, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 145, 146, 149, 152, 153, 154, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 186, 187, 188, 200, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210, 212, 216, 225; adult 79; and education 439, 441; as an animal 80; as natural being and as rational being 384; as rational animal 417; civil; dignity 393, 476; in general 26; intelligent 216; kinds of 60; knowledge of 231; language 128; natural 79; organic 204, 216; organized 214; races of 84–7; rational 111, 168; two sexes 40; universal natural history of the 139; versus animal 437, 438, 444, 449, 456

humanity 32, 112, 113, 115, 116, 157, 168, 378–82, 437–40, 444; epochs of 141; history of; idea of 442; philosophical history of 133; philosophy of the history of 124–42; powers of 86; predispositions in 116; pure 422; respect for 173; vocation of 438, 440–3

humankind 30, 93, 116, 117, 136, 137, 172, 173, 187; generations of 142; history of 119

human understanding; sound 250, 280; *see also* common sense

Hume, David 59, 179, 282, 283, 311, 362, 396, 405, 407

humility 477

Hungarians, the 88, 91

Huns, the 87

husband 388, 397, 401, 405, 406; as natural curator of woman 315

Hutten, Ulrich von 187

hybrid, the 158

hypochondria 72, 288, 290, 339; *see also* melancholy

hypothesis 150

I (as subject of thought)

Iapetus 190

idea 216, 283, 299, 306, 349, 379, 440, 443; material 223

ideal, of pure practical reason 299

idiocy 66, 317

idiot 66

idol 299

idolatry 59

Iliad 27

illusion 71, 261; *see also* appearance and deception; beautiful 264; of inner sense 272; permissible moral 263; sensory 261

imagination 185, 186, 202, 464; *see also* fantasy; human 151; force of 186; local 458; power of the 124, 137, 150, 163,

165, 166, 168, 184, 245, 265, 278, 287, 288, 291, 313, 329, 344, 349–50, 413

imbecility 66, 69

imitation, spirit of 52

imitator (in moral matters) 390

immaturity; in distinction to nonage 315; of children 315; of scholars 316; of spendthrifts 316; of the people 315; of women 315; self-incurred 333

impulse 24, 32, 39

incentive 33; natural 112

inclination 23, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 47, 48, 51, 57, 67, 68, 71, 112, 165, 166, 168; animal 113; of freedom 369; of sex 369; sexual 45, 48, 50, 51; to good living and virtue 378; toward sex 483–4

inconstancy 69

India 190

Indian, the 59, 93, 94, 95, 148, 157, 204, 209, 355; in Tahiti 401; of America 359; yellow 147, 211

indifference 338

indifferentism 57, 58

individual 109, 131, 138; *see also* species

indolence; propensity of 111

inequality, among human beings 170, 172

influence, mechanical and chemical 269

influenza 106

innate 186

insania 309, 310, 320

insanity 70, 74, 75

inspirations 272, 310, 324, 351, 413

instinct 110, 127, 165, 166, 289, 304, 365, 367, 370, 437, 439; go-cart of 168; natural 109; sexual 166, 289, 421, 447

instruction 437, 438, 444, 446, 459

intellect 24

intellectuality 251

intelligence 437

intention 186

interest 196; subjugation of private to public 424

interpretation, symbolic and literal 299

intoxication 280; *see also* drunkenness

intuition 249; *a priori* 254; empirical 246, 265, 278; outer 226

inventing 328

Italian, the 52, 54, 57, 331, 355; character of 412

Italy 403

Ives, Edward 93

James I, King of England 390

Japan 396

Jason 60

Japanese, the 59

Java 158

jealousy 335, 401, 403

Jesus 260, 302

Jews 281, 312

Job 404

Johnson, Samuel 327

joy 356; bitter 340

Judaism 260

judgment; aesthetic 344; deranged 320; power of 66, 174, 293, 306, 325, 332, 461, 465; practical 66

jurists 240

Juvenal 304

Kabugl 89

Kaffir, the 146, 154, 206

kakerlak 149

Kalmuckians, the 92

Kant, Immanuel; as a boy 298; at a dinner table 303; *Critique of Practical Reason* 217; *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science* 180, 218; seasickness on a voyage from Pillau to Königsberg 280

Kanter, Johann Jakob 460

Kästner, Abraham Gotthelf

Kepler, Johannes 24, 109

Keyserling, Countess Charlotte Amalie von 364

kind 84, 85, 131, 151, 152, 200, 201, 204, 205; human 59; hybrid 149

Kines 68

kingdom, animal 84

Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb 29

knowledge 41; innate 110; of the world 231; sexual 448

Königsberg 232, 280

Labat, Father 61

lady 273, 331, 349, 378; *see also* wife, woman; language of 409

language 137, 267, 300, 432, 433, 462; German 56; philosophical 138; poetical 138

Laplanders, the 88, 91

laughing, laughter 357, 366, 381

Lavater, Johann Caspar 394, 398

Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent 421

law 191, 438, 481–2; digests (presented in pictures) 292; mechanical 89; of equilibrium 115; of necessary half-breed generation 149; of refined humanity 381; practical 195; pure doctrine of 222; pure moral 381

layperson 307, 315

laziness 376

leading-strings 453

learning to think 445

legislation 61

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm von 251, 331

Leibniz-Wolffian school 251

Lenclos, Ninon 44

Leonardo da Vinci 329

Leopold I, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau

Less, Gottfried 245

Leyden, John of 73

Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph 460

life 97, 174, 295, 321, 342, 361; civilized 174; love of 377; marital 51; pastoral 171; preservation of 90; public 185; shortness of 173; source of 90

light 267

Linné, Carl von 197, 292, 417

Lithuanian, Prussian

Little Bukhara 96

location 225

Locke, John 246

logic, in distinction to psychology 246

logician 65

London 106

longing 353

loquacity (of women) 400

lotteries 341, 376, 412; *see also* game

love 264, 275, 289, 322, 335, 371, 374, 377, 403; conjugal 406; falling in 289, 322, 355, 403; familiar 51; of life 377; physical 367; platonic 49; sexual 126, 247, 377; versus being in love 367

lover 262, 335, 366

Lucretia 44

Lucretius 290, 341, 369

lunatic asylums 288, 320

lust 483–4

luxury 352

Lycurgus 60

lying 289, 428, 468, 471

madness 66, 243, 309–10, 322, 355

Magliabecchi, Antonio 293

maiden; Circassian 47; Georgian 47

maintenance 437, 448

Malayan, the 154

malice 377, 427, 479

maliciousness 391

man 40–51, 357, 364, 396, 400; in distinction to woman 399; shrewd 68; taste of 47; wise 68; young 275, 340

manhood, years of early 482–5

manifold, hereditary 156

Mangeldorf, Karl Ehregott 103

mania 309; fantastic 71, 72; for domination 372, 373; for honor 372, 373; for possession; *see also* avarice 372, 374

manners 347, 378, 381, 398, 418

Marmontel, Jean François 264

marriage 290, 322, 401, 402, 405; married people 289, 322

masculinity 364

matter, organized 224
 mathematics 240, 463
 Maupertuis, Pierre-Louis Moreau de 86
 maxim 150, 408, 464, 468; of reason 150
 means 168; *see also* end
 medicine 188, 191, 318; art of 186;
 forensic 319; veterinary
 melancholic 33, 34
 melancholic, the 74
 melancholy 33, 245, 309, 317, 319, 386; *see also* hypochondria
 memory 305, 461–4, 465
 Mendelssohn, Moses 178–81, 185, 189, 216
 Mengs, Raphael 262
 mental derangement 309, 317; hereditary 322
 mental illness 272, 309, 317, 354
 merchants 312
 Mesmer, Franz
 Mestizo 89; red 149; yellow 149
 metaphysician 223, 225
 metaphysics 132, 133, 181, 195, 214, 215, 222, 226, 255
 method; mechanical-catechetical 466; Socratic 466
 Michaelis, Christian Friedrich 288
 milk 449–50
 Milton, John 24, 29, 345, 404
 mind 184–91, 272; capacity of 59; cast of 45, 47, 51; diet of the 77; disease of 185; disturbance of the 75, 76; good 308; human 186, 189; limited 250, 311; low 311; motion of the 186; powers of 461–2, 464–5; sound 186; universal 331; weak 311
 mineralogy 463
 mixture, of different tribes 411, 415
 mob 407
 modesty 45, 264; *see also* propriety; of women 402
 Molière (pseud. for Jean-Baptiste Poquelin) 233
 Monaldeschi, Marchese Giovanni 44
 monarchy 425
 money 372, 374, 375
 Mongolia 96
 Mongolian, the 154; people 139
 Mongols, the 87
 monk 61
 monotony 274
 monstrous, the 346
 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem de 278
 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat 55
 mood, sudden change of 318
 Moor 146

morality 307, 338, 340, 347, 384, 386, 421, 441, 468; and religion 307; idea of 116; in distinction to psychology 341, 360
 moralization 420, 422, 444, 460
 morals 61, 62, 217; resemblance of 116
 Mordaunt, Lord 337
 Moscati, Peter 79, 417
 mothers 239, 406
 motion, faculty of 222
 motivation 32, 34, 36
 movement, voluntary 457–9
 Muhammad 73
 Mulatto 89, 149
 muse 49
 music 42, 267, 284, 313, 347, 350, 351, 378, 444; dinner 381
 musical ear 271, 279
 musician 247, 351
 mysticism; regarding numbers 303
 mystics 248
naïveté 244
 nation 53, 57, 108, 119, 120, 138, 407; African 136; cultured 142; Dutch 53, 114; enlightened 119; finely formed 136; history of 126; political history of 119; Roman 119; Spanish 53
 national spirit 58
 Nature 87, 89, 91, 94, 147, 156, 157
 nature 46, 97, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 127, 133, 137, 195, 447, 451, 454, 459, 479, 480; aim of 48, 109, 114, 118; analogy of 131; arrangement of 203, 204, 205; description of 97, 155, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 213; doctrine of 132; end of 45, 48, 117, 167, 216; explanation of 217; generation of 201; germ of 113; guardianship of 168; history of 97, 169; human 23, 28, 31, 32, 34, 39, 41, 59, 67, 73, 111, 116, 117, 439; investigation of 205; justification of 119; lawful 109; law of 199; metaphysical investigation of 196; moral 39; mother's womb of 168; of the human being 163; order of 46, 174; organic 150; original 151; originary model of 151; philosophy of 163; physical investigation of 196; plan of 109, 116; power of 150, 197; purposive 197; rational 112; realm of 119, 131; revolution of 210; spiritual 132; state of 75; teleological doctrine of 109; universal 132; universal laws of 108; wisdom of 417, 424
 nausea 269
 necessity; natural 179
 Negro 59, 86, 88, 89, 93, 139, 146, 147, 148, 155, 197, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212; Creoles 158; head of 205
 Nero 68, 361
 nerves, faculty of the 225
 New Guinea 87
 news 380
 newspapers 313, 380
 Newton, Isaac 41, 109, 331, 421, 482
 new world 60
 Nicolai, Christoph Friedrich 399
 Niebuhr, Carsten 136
 night (and day, effect of) 290
 nightmares 298
 ninny 67
 nonsense 279
 norm (aesthetic) 395
 novels 233, 335, 350, 463; *see also* books; reading of 294, 314
 novelty 352; in fashion 348; in presentation of a concept 350
 Nubia 96
 obedience 446, 469–71
 object, determination of 196
 obscenity 45
 obscurity, studied 248
 Olivier, Ferdinand 462
 opium 322, 358
 orator 349
 oratory 61
 order, social 13, 113
 organ; common sense 225; sensory 222, 223; vital 186
 organization 131, 132, 133, 134, 216, 224; dynamical 224; mechanical 224; origin of 214
 Orient 60
 origin, phyletic 85, 92, 155, 200, 211, 212
 originality 328; *see also* genius, spirit
 origination, phyletic 158, 199, 201, 207
 Orpheus 299
 Ossian 299
 Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 29
 Pacific 88, 212
 pain 333–4; as incentive of activity 334, 338; pleasing (sweet sorrow) 340
 painters; of ideas 351; of nature 351
 painting 42, 350, 351
 Palagonia, Prince 285
 palingenesis 131
 Papuan, the 154, 212
 paradise 168
 paradox 241
 parents 437, 440, 442, 454, 455, 472
 Parkinson, Sydney 136
 Pascal, Blaise 245, 273
 passion 67, 68, 184, 262, 288, 353–5, 367–76; *see also* affect
 path; teleological 195; theoretical 195
 patience 261, 360, 466; as a feminine virtue 359
 peace 114; lasting 427
 pedantry 249; German 414
 pedagogy 442, 448
 Pelisson-Fontanier, Paul 396
 peninsula, Indian 87–8, 93, 147
 people 407–15; character of 407–15; migration of 432; primitive 203
 perception 151, 239; faculty of 222; immediate 266; mediate 266; power of 165
 perfection 110, 169; ethical 40; of the human being 49, 417
 Persia 96, 97, 190
 Persian, the 47, 59
 Persius 244
 person 419; arrogant 68; foolish 67, 69; greedy 69
 personality 448
 Philanthropinum in Dessau 445, 457
 philosopher 77, 109, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 223, 380, 388, 392, 408
 philosophy 29, 116, 135, 191; speculative 132; transcendental 217
 phlegm 385, 412; in the good sense 354; in the moral sense 356
 phlegmatic 33, 37
 phlogiston 156
 phylum 84, 85, 86, 91, 152, 156, 157, 159, 199, 200, 204, 205, 214; common 153, 203; different 152; first human 155; human 155, 158, 159, 211; of the species 199; original 151, 152, 200, 202, 204; parental 155; single 152; single first 152; unity of the 153, 156
 physician 66, 77, 106, 223
 physics 195, 214
 physiognomy 393; moral 427; national 399
 physiologist 223
 physiology 138; in distinction from psychology 391 133
 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 293
 planets; rational beings on other 427; reading the 296
 Plato 378, 466
 Platonic school 251
 Plautus 407
 play 461; of images 344; of nature 399; of sensibility 344, 349
 play(s) (dramatic performance) 233, 283, 335
 pleasure 23; mental 269; sensuous 333–4
 pleasure and displeasure 265, 333–50, 356, 384
 pluralism (in contrast to egoism) 241

poet 256, 296, 349–52, 392; has no character 407
poetic license 351
poetry 61, 257, 349–52
Poland 408, 414
politeness 264, 407
Politianus, Angelus 293
politics 222
polygamy 400
polyhistorians 293, 331
pomp 56, 349, 387
Pope, Alexander 252, 316, 368, 374, 401
popularity; falsely named 250
population 204
Porta, Baptista 394
Portuguese, the 158
power 172; basic 215, 216; generative 84, 85, 86, 90, 96, 150, 151, 152, 203; human cognitive 187; of thinking and sensing 136; sexual 405
powerlessness, feeling of 364
pragmatic 97
prediction 296
predisposition 90, 109, 111, 112, 151, 152, 158, 163, 173, 201, 202, 203, 204, 208, 210; *see also* aptitude, natural and germ; created 150; in humanity 116; mental 139; moral 417, 419; natural 89, 90, 91, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 139, 151, 210, 384; original 108, 118, 140, 155, 208, 214; pragmatic 417, 418; technical 417
premonition 295
presence; dynamic 226; local 223, 225; virtual 223
price (in distinction from worth) 390
pride 56, 322, 478; *see also* arrogance
primer, illustrated 292
principle 39, 145, 151; morally practical 391; of action 445; practical 111, 389; pure practical 217; teleological 195–218
private sense, logical 324
prodigy 331
profile, Greek 394
profundity 248, 327
progenies 199
progress 169
proof, method of 178
propagation, common law of 84
propensity 367; *see also* tendency
property, hereditary 152
prophesying 296
prophet 297, 299
propriety 264, 362; *see also* modesty; German 413, 414
proverb 327
providence 29, 119, 173, 208, 441

prudence 308, 316, 338, 372, 444, 448; maxim of 372; worldly 473
psychology 97, 251, 290, 319; *see also* sense, interior; in distinction from anthropology; in distinction from logic 251; in distinction from morality 341, 360; in distinction from physiology 385
Ptolemaic system 302
pupil 437
punishment 354, 447, 452, 464, 469, 470–2
pure 218
purism 248
purposelessness 115
purposiveness 115, 157, 169, 201, 205
pyramids, Egyptian 25
Pyrrho 68
Pyrrhus 68
quality; hereditary 148; male 41; moral 45; national 57
quarrel; over things 179; over words 179
Quin, James 399
rabble 349, 407
race 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 95, 96, 139, 199, 200, 201, 203, 210, 211, 212, 232, 415–6; *see also* subspecies; actual 95; American 88; character of 154; concept of a 153, 154, 199, 203; difference of the 97, 156, 202, 207; differentiation of 207; division of the 153; evil 428; generation of the 158; Hindu or Hundustani 87; Hindustani 87, 88; human 93, 94, 95, 145–59; Hunnish 88; Hunnish (Mongolian or Kalmuckian) 87; Indian 96, 97; Kalmuckian 88; manifoldness of the 96; mixed or incipient 87; Negro 87, 96, 97, 156; occasioning cause of 96; of human being 84; origin of 89–95; peculiarity of 156
rancor 362, 371
rational 110
rationalizing 307, 332
reality 181
reason 65, 71, 109, 110, 111, 127, 128, 133, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 178, 185, 196, 214, 216, 304, 306, 331–2, 347, 355, 418, 461, 465, 466, 471; claim of 196; germ of 80; guidance of 168; guideline of 109; human 133, 178, 197, 204, 215; limits of 151; maxim of 150; pure 178, 179, 195; pure practical 195, 367, 371; speculative, practical 217; technically-practical 372; use of 134, 150, 152, 188
receptivity 246, 251, 255
reflection 246, 249, 254
regeneration 85, 203; half-breed 201
Reinhold, Carl Leonhard 218; *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* 217
relation, external 180
religion 57, 58, 62, 190, 299, 306, 307, 399, 423, 428, 480–2; Christian 191; freedom of 117; of fetishes 59
repentance 339
representations 246–51; distinctness of 246, 248, 251; indistinctness of 248, 251; inner (internal) 257, 268; mathematical and dynamical 287; obscure 247; outer (external) 257, 268
reproduction 287, 322, 402, 416
republic 426
respect, universal 31
revolution 115, 118, 119, 125; needed in schools 102
reward 468
rhetoric 257, 349–52
rhyme 351
Richardson, Samuel 233
ridiculous 44
right 112; civil; human 141; of the stronger 400; of the weak 315, 400; public 113; universal human
Robertson, William 413
Robinson 37
rocking 451–2
Roland de la Platière, Jean-Marie 361
Roman, the 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 73, 79, 114, 116, 169, 412, 418, 421, 422, 428, 438, 449, 452, 459; *Emile* 169; *Social Contract* 169
rule 304, 464; conformity to the 395
Russia 408, 414
Russians 401
sagacity
Sagramoso, Count 364
Sahara 96
salts 268, 271
sanguine temperament 33, 35, 260, 385, 386
satisfaction; aesthetic 347–8; moral 340
savage, the 60, 114, 115, 116; Canadian 60
savagery 369, 438–44
Scaliger, Julius Caesar 293, 331
scholars 249, 316, 421
scholastic 62
school 97, 438, 446, 461, 463, 469, 477; and experts 448; Austrian 445; experimental and normal 445–6; rigor 329
Schwarz, Berthold 329
science 62, 97, 116, 250, 352, 420; boundaries of 198; natural 150, 213, 214
Scottish Highlanders 295
sculpture 61, 350, 351
seasickness 280, 365
security, civil 172
Segner, Johann Andreas von 458
self, absolute 225
self-esteem 45, 110
self-interest 31, 32, 38, 39
self-observation 243–6
self-torment 319
Senegambia 95, 96, 146
sensation 71, 165, 256, 265, 272–3, 275, 339; common place of 222; organic 265; vital 265
sense; inner 180, 223, 225, 245, 251, 255, 258, 272; interior 265; *see also* psychology; of smell 165; outer 225; vital 269
senses, the; do not command 257; do not confuse 257; do not deceive 258; five 265, 279; object of the 181; of perception 269; of pleasure 269; subjective and objective 265–6
sensibility 251; apology for 256–9; in contrast to understanding 251–6
sensible, boundaries of the 178
sensitivity 269; of woman 404
sensuality 32
sentiment 23, 24, 33, 38, 45, 46, 47, 51; active 62; crude 38; fine 37, 47; moral 32, 48; national 58; of the beautiful 33; of the sublime 33; sympathetic 27
sentimentality 339; of man 404
separatists 281
sermon 274, 286, 292
seven, mystical importance of 302
sex 166, 167, 264, 287, 364, 399–407; character of 399–407; distinction of 482–3; fair 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 55; female 315, 374, 396, 400; male 40, 42, 43, 44, 264, 315, 374, 396; masculine 50; noble 40, 43
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of 201
Shakespeare, William 289
shame 32, 362, 455, 467, 471, 478; sense of 45
shape, human 95
Sharp, Samuel 410
shyness 358, 362, 467
sight 267
signs 298–303; arbitrary 300; miraculous 302; natural; prognostic 301
silhouettes 394
silliness 311

similarity 132
 Simonides 50
 simple-mindedness 244, 316
 simpleton 67, 311
 simplicity 326; roguish 339; seeming 363
 six nations 60
 skill 259, 308, 338; artistic 350
 skillfulness 353, 444, 457, 458
 skin 92, 93, 94; color 147–9, 152; Negro 157; organization of the 157, 205
 sleep 276, 285, 297–8
 smell 268, 279
 Smith, Adam 315
 smoking 271, 335
 sociability 166, 172, 378, 472; unsociable 111
 society 167, 171, 191, 448; civil 112; cosmopolitan 427, 429; refined 45
 Socrates 250, 258, 264, 310, 355, 404, 466
 Soemmerring, Samuel Thomas 205
 solemnity 411
 Solon
 somnambulism 297
 Sonnerat, Pierre
 sort 85, 87, 95; family 202, 203; human 94, 200; intermediary 149, 152, 154; white human 206
 soul 24, 131, 180, 272, 321, 385; beautiful 345; goodness of 345, 391; greatness of 345, 391; human 132; immortality of our 29; location 225; organ of the 224; physician of 354; power of the 76; seat of the 72, 222, 223; strength of 345, 391
 South Sea Islander 146
 Spain 58, 148, 206, 408
 Spaniard 52, 53, 54, 57, 355; character of 411
 space 180
 species 84, 85, 89, 95, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 138, 140, 142, 150, 151, 153, 168, 169, 173, 200, 201; *see also* individual; animal 85, 146; character of 148, 416–29; division of the 153; essence of the 150; four races of the human 87; human 87–9, 90, 94, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 139, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 158, 171, 200, 201, 203, 210, 437, 441; humanity as moral; natural 84, 85, 213; nominal 155; of animal 132; one 136; original 132; physical 84; phyletic 95, 152; phylum of 199; preservation of 151, 424; real 155; school 84, 213; unity of the 84, 155; vocation of the human 169
 speculation, abstract 41
 Spinoza, Baruch 178
 spirit 329, 349–50; *see also* genius and originality; commercial 408, 411, 415
 spirituality 272
 spontaneity 246, 255
 Stahl, Georg Ernst 186
 state 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120; body 118; combination of 116; Greek 119; security 116; three forms of 426
 Sterne, Laurence 310, 311, 339
 stimulus 166
 Stoic, school 355
 stout-heartedness 358
 St. Petersburg 106
 St. Peter's in Rome 25
 St. Pierre, Abbé de 114
 strain 85, 86
 strength, moral 259
 stupidity 69, 311, 316
 subject; concept of the 180; individual 108
 sublime 26; terrifyingly 27
 sublime, the 24, 25, 26–39, 40, 44, 52, 265, 345, 346, 351, 412; emotions of 33; glittering 52; magnificent 25; moral expression of 46; noble 25; qualities of 26–39; terrifying 24, 28
 sublimity 50
 subordinates 307
 subspecies 85, 86, 90, 95, 199, 200, 201, 208; *see also* race
 suicide 318, 360
 Sulla, Lucius Cornelius 391
 supersensible, the 178, 363
 superstition 57, 263, 310, 312, 332
 support 437
 surprise 346, 363
 swaddling 451
 Swede, the 146
 Swedenborg, Emanuel 299
 Swift, Jonathan 77, 264, 327
 Swiss 288
 symbols 282, 299–300
 sympathy 31, 33, 474; feeling of 30; moral 32, 35
 system 158, 204; natural 84; school 84
 tact, logical 250
 Tahiti 86, 88, 142, 448
 talent 325, 350
 taste 36, 51, 52, 463; adventurous 53; aesthetic 241, 342–5, 393; as external advancement of morality 347–8; coarse 46; fine 23, 38, 47; formation of 244; in art 349–52; in fashion; of the wife 51; organ of 165; perverted 42; refined 48; social 379
 teacher 446
 teleology; natural 217; pure practical 217
 temperament 385; division of 33
 tendency; *see also* propensity; to be deceived 264; to evil 420, 427

Terence 226
 Terrasson, Abbé Jean 75, 366
 theology 190, 480
 theory 195
 thing in itself 180, 181, 255
 thinkers, three commands for thinking 251, 300; for oneself 308, 333
 thirteen as unlucky number 302
 thoroughness 473
 thought 280, 380; form and content of 251; mode of 110, 111, 116, 150, 167, 217
 thread, of discourse 284
 Thunmann, Hans Erich 432
 Tibet 93; Great Lama of 29
 Tibetan, the 139
 time 58, 254, 272, 291, 334
 timidity 358, 362
 Timon 427
 titles 414
 tobacco 271, 335
 topics 293
 touch 266
 tragedy 26
 training 438, 444, 445
 transplanting 208
 travel 232
 travel books 232
 Trinity, the 321
 Trublet, Nicolas Charles Joseph de la Flouie 326
 truthfulness 393, 471
 tutor 446, 448
 Turkey 286, 408, 414
 Turks 47, 358, 408, 415
 ugliness 345, 393, 397
 unconsciousness 277
 understanding 26, 38, 65, 67, 181, 216, 247, 250–1, 287, 303–7, 326, 332, 345, 461–5; beautiful 41, 46; capacity of the 66, 67; deep 41; disturbance of the 73; doctors of the 65; of the man 51; power of the 73; refined 75; sound 75, 314, 324
 union, civil 112, 118
 universe, magnitude of 29
 unreason 321, 323
 unselfish 26
 unsociability 111, 112, 113, 114
 vanity 56, 348
 vapors, of women 340
 variation 89, 95, 97
 variety 85, 86, 201, 202, 203; family or ethnic 201; of peoples 408
 vengeance, desire for ventriloquists 262
 Verri, Count Pietro 334
 verse 351, 413
vesania 309, 321
 vice 27, 31, 479; *see also* virtue; Virgil 27, 29
 virtue 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 65, 259, 261, 263, 264, 377, 381, 392, 479; *see also* vice; adopted 31; beautiful 43; feminine 404; genuine 31; masculine 404; principles of 30, 36; simulacrum of 32; strength of 359; universal rules of 30
 visionary 73, 278, 309, 318
 vital force 188, 334
 vocation 134, 140, 167, 171; human 125
 Voltaire (pseud. for François-Marie Arouet) 94, 317, 327
 voluptuousness 165
 Waller, Edmund 327
 war 13, 16, 115, 164, 172–3
 water 224, 225
 weakness 134; mental 71
 weeping 357, 364; *see also* crying
 well-being; physical 426; rational 426
 West Prussia 106
 wet-nurses 449
 white, the 86, 94, 147, 159; class of 148; race of 87
 widow 340, 364, 401, 406
 wife 316, 363, 388; *see also* lady and woman
 will 67, 186, 195, 216; breaking the 452, 467–8; freedom of the 108, 110; free 108; human 106; united 114
 windbags 389
 wisdom 109, 110, 115, 119, 169, 307–8, 342, 372, 393; philosophical 42
 wit 26, 66, 74, 308, 311, 325, 352, 380, 387, 461, 464, 465; caustic 352, 387; humorous 326; mother 250; nimble 365; productive 325, 326–8; school 250; witty people 292; witty saying 326
 witches 262
 woman 40–51, 264, 281, 290, 313, 317, 320, 327, 380, 397, 399–407; *see also* lady and wife; external charms of 46; immature in civil matters 315; moral feeling of 50; over-mature 315; scholarly 404; silly 44; virtue of 43
 womankind 402
 work 460–1; the best way of enjoying life 335
 world 97; history 233; knowledge of 97; rational citizens of 108
 worth, inner 390
 writing 444, 453
 Xanthippe
xenia 352
 Young, Edward 327