

1. [9 Points]

- (a) [3 Points] In a stable marriage instance, if a man M and a woman W each put each other at the top of their respective preference lists, then M must be paired with W in every stable pairing.

True. For the sake of contradiction, let there be a stable pairing of two men and two women defined as: M paired with W' , and W paired with M' . This pairing forms a rogue couple, namely, (M, W) .

- (b) [3 Points] In a stable marriage instance with at least two men and two women, if man M and woman W put each other at the bottom of their respective preference lists, then M cannot be paired with W in any stable pairing.

Take a stable marriage instance to be defined by the following tables, where A, B, C stand for 3 men, and 1, 2, 3, stand for 3 women.

Men preference:	A	1	2	3	Women Preference:	1	C	B	A
	B	2	3	1		2	B	A	C
	C	1	3	2		3	B	C	A

In this case there is a stable pairing: $\{(B, 2), (C, 1), (A, 3)\}$, where A and 3 both put each other at the bottom of their respective preference lists, and they still ended up in a stable pairing together.

- (c) [3 Points] For every $n \geq 2$, there exists a stable marriage instance with n men and n women that has an unstable pairing in which every unmatched man-woman pair is a rogue couple.

Let the following tables describe a preference list for a marriage instance,

Men preference:	A	1	2	3	Women Preference:	1	A	C	B
	B	2	3	1		2	B	A	C
	C	3	1	2		3	B	C	A

A pairing where each unmatched-pair is a rogue couple can be described by: $\{(A, 3), (B, 1), (C, 2)\}$. Observing that this case can be constructed for $n = 3$, it can be shown that pairing structure will hold for the general case, $n \geq 2$. For any instance of the form:

Men's preference list:	M_1	\cdots	W_1	Women's preference list:	W_1	\cdots	M_1
	M_2	\cdots	W_2		W_2	\cdots	M_2
	\vdots	\ddots	\vdots		\vdots	\ddots	\vdots
	M_n	\cdots	W_n		W_n	\cdots	M_n

There exists a pairing $\{(M_1, W_1), (M_2, W_2), \dots, (M_n, W_n)\}$, where each unpaired couple is rogue.