Does Policy Framing Impact Support for Progressive Policies?*

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Abstract: Polling shows that progressive policies garner considerable support, but a dramatic disconnect exists between their apparent support and political success. This debate has gained a renewed vigor following the 2020 election, but is not yet well studied. Current scholarship focuses mainly on ideology and electoral outcomes rather than specific policy preferences and voters' sensitivity to policy messaging. When policies concern economic redistribution, we hypothesize that class may be a moderating influence. To investigate we use a survey experiment examining support for Medicare for All and a COVID-19 relief bill in response to an economic policy framing and a policy framing focused on social impact. Generally, we find little interaction between class and support for these policies in both treatments, with party identification acting as the strongest predictor of policy support. We find a significant interaction between class and support for a social impact framing of a COVID-19 relief bill, however. These findings match findings in the literature that suggest the effects of policy framing depends significantly on voters' political beliefs and a deeper cognitive assessment only occurs in environments where partisan cues are less prominent.

1. Introduction

Clinching the presidency from an incumbent, bringing control of the Senate down to runoff elections, and securing a house majority seemed on paper to be a conclusive victory for the Democratic Party in the 2020 election, if not the electoral blowout that many Democrats had hoped for. But their apparent victory was moderated by a loss of over half the party's House seats, and on a caucus call just two days after the election members exchanged heated words over what many perceived as a bitter loss. "If we are classifying Tuesday as a success . . . we will get f—ing torn apart in 2022," bemoaned freshman representative Abigail Spanberger. She argued that a failure in party messaging left members vulnerable to attacks, continuing

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that members of Congress "are supposed to talk about things in the way where we mean what we're talking about. Because while people think it doesn't matter, it does matter. And we lost good members because of it."[1]

Others, such as freshman representative and House Progressive Caucus co-chair Pramila Jayapal, disagreed. Jayapal argued that House losses were confined to areas where President Donald Trump remained popular and were a reflection of support for the president.[2] Instead, Jayapal suggested, President-elect Joseph Robinette Biden Jr.'s victory was proof that messages focused on how progressive ideas, such as "Medicare for All" and aggressively curbing climate change, would substantially improve constituents' lives could produce strong turnout and electoral success.

The disagreement on policy framing between activists and moderates within the Democratic Party is not a new one. In recent memory, the 2016 Democratic primary between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton was described by the New York Times as "an epochal battle over their vastly different visions for the Democratic Party," and the modern debate on the electability of progressives traces its roots back to the unequivocal electoral defeat suffered by George McGovern in 1972. If progressive policies truly enjoy the wide levels of support that some polling[3] indicates, the disparity between their support and their electoral success suggests a failure of progressive messaging that deserves careful research.

Political persuasion lies at the center of a vast scholarship. "It is literally the stuff of politics," write Mutz, Sniderman and Brody (1996). Perhaps less charitably, Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991) conceptualize persuasion as advocacy efforts designed to deliberately manipulate policy preferences in decision makers, particularly voters. A broad literature conceives of voters as uninformed and ideologically inconsistent, with narrow cognitive attention and selective information processing (Campbell et al. 1980; Converse 1964; Lenz 2013; March 1978; Miller and Stokes 1963; Norman 1976; Simon 1979). Additionally, Lau, Smith, and

[1] https://wjla.com/news/local/house-democrats-blame-losses-on-polls-message-even-trump-11-06-2020

[2] https://www.npr.org/2020/11/13/934459470/progressive-and-moderate-democrats-clash-on-policies-heading-into-2021

[3] https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2019/

Fisk suggest that voter's issue preferences are an endogenous function of prior political beliefs and the number and type of policy interpretations the voter has been exposed to. When a voter is presented with competing policy explanations, the voter is forced to undergo a deeper level of information processing in which relevant political beliefs become salient and have a particularly pronounced role in policy evaluations.

In this way, we expect identity, and the role it plays on the formation of political beliefs, to guide voters' evaluation of policy presentation. Research suggests that while voters may hold many different identities which coexist at the same time, their class identity originates in a confluence of attitudes and may be a particularly important influence on the formation of political perspectives (Devine 1992; Evans and Kelley 2004, Lamont (1992); Lamont 2009; Stuber 2006). Additionally, there is strong evidence of class voting (Brady, Sosnaud and Frenk 2009; Heath 2009; Manza and Brooks 1999), though a notable paucity of work examining the role class plays in policy evaluation. Additionally, the vast majority of scholarship on political persuasion remains theoretical, despite the potential multitude of practical applications.

In this paper we address both shortcomings of the literature and investigate the role of class and support for economically redistributive policies. Specifically, we are intrigued by perceptions of increasing support among Democrats for wide-reaching redistributive programs while the party simultaneously relies on a coalition increasingly composed of suburban, highly-educated, and wealthy voters for electoral success. Wide-reaching policies such as Medicare for All, the Green New Deal, and virus relief involve significant increases in government spending intended to disproportionately benefit those earning lower incomes, rather than the high-income voters migrating into the Democratic Party. To offset the cost of these programs, particularly Medicare for All and the Green New Deal, tax increases are generally included in the legislation. Such programs have earned increasing salience, if not popularity, within this Democratic electorate By fairly simple logic, one may expect lower support for such redistributive policies among the wealthier contingent of Democratic vot-

ers, and greater support among working class voters, but in many cases, this dynamic is not immediately clear. We would like to investigate the extent to which distributive policy preferences of Democratic and Republican voters differ with class identity. To do so, we build on the literature, which remains largely theoretical, through a survey experiment in an attempt to untangle any potential causal effects of class on voters' policy preferences.

In both treatments, we mostly fail to find a significant interaction between class and support for both Medicare for All and a COVID-19 relief bill, though we do observe a significant interaction between class and support for a social impact framing of a COVID-19 relief bill. Rather, we find that party identification acts as the strongest predictor of policy support. While these findings do not fit our original hypotheses, they mesh with previous literature that suggests that policy framing effects are only prominent in low-information environments, policies with few competing framings, or cases where partisan cues are less prominent. We end the paper by discussing potential causes for our findings and exploring areas for future research.

2. Theory

Literature on the intersection between ideology and electoral success largely is split between two different paradigms: the institutional lens, which uses election data as a measure of electoral success, and the behavioral lens, which relies largely on survey data to explain voter beliefs and behaviors. The first generally can be said to conclude that legislative candidates who are considered more moderate on the ideological spectrum garner stronger electoral support, and that legislative candidates who are considered to be ideological extremists often face an electoral penalty (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 2002; Erickson 1971; Hall 2015; Hall and Thompson 2018). By using votes as a measure for support and studying concrete electoral outcomes, the institutional approach is able to draw decisive conclusions about electoral winners. By using aggregate behavioral

data, however, the institutional approach potentially suffers from the ecological fallacy and cannot convincingly reach a sound conclusion about the voter behaviors driving election outcomes. The institutional approach consequently offers insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about the mechanisms which engender these results. To address these shortcomings we can turn instead to the behavioral lens, as its use of survey data provides stronger evidence as to individual behavior. Somewhat troublingly, this literature suggests by and large that voters are ideologically inconsistent and often ill-informed (Broockman 2016; Campbell 1960; Campbell et al. 1980; Converse 1964; Lenz 2013; Miller and Stokes 1963). But these findings, too, are limited in their generalizability; extrapolating survey data to actual elections is subject to concerns of external validity. It may certainly be true that survey respondents are ideologically inconsistent in their survey responses, but this literature fails to provide a robust explanation as to how the electorate processes ideological information, and resultantly voter behavior in the voting booth may not fully reflect the findings of this behavioral lens.

Lau, Smith and Fiske (1991) put forth a compelling explanation on the cognitive effectiveness of policy presentation. Voters are cognitively limited decision makers that act on selective information processing (March 1978; Norman 1976; Simon 1979). As a result, voters' decision making relies largely on previous information stored in their memory. To do so, voters utilize knowledge structures, called "schemata," built off prior experience that the processing and interpretation of new information as well as the recall of information from memory (Crocker, Fiske and Taylor 1984; Lau and Sears 1986). Lau, Smith, and Fiske suggest that when voters are only aware of one one interpretation about a policy proposal, the interpretation will have a significant impact on their evaluations of the proposal and their general political beliefs will not. In the presence of competing policy proposal interpretations, the voter faces increased cognitive demands to make sense of the situation and must rely on a more complex strategy to process this information. In this situation, Lau, Smith, and Fiske argue that relevant political beliefs will have a strong, systematic impact

on the voter's policy preference evaluation. Specifically, they treat issue preferences as endogenous political beliefs that arise as a function of prior experiences, political cognitive constructs (e.g. party identification) and the policy interpretations to which the voter has been exposed. Resultantly, their theory implies that politicians can attempt to manipulate voters' issue positions by controlling the policy interpretations voters are exposed to. This implication is supported by "explanation of votes" theory (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989) in which politicians report that it is the explanation of their issue positions that matters more than the actual issue positions themselves, as they attempt to highlight sets of beliefs that bring voters into agreement with the politician's issue positions. These findings also stand as a potential reconciliation to literature that finds voters do not express support for candidates based on ideological proximity (Tausanovitch et al. 2015) and portrays voters as ideologically inconsistent (Lenz 2013).

Crucially, these findings suggest that political beliefs moderate the extent to which voters are sensitive to policy framing. The study of ideology of American partisans is fairly well-established, especially as it relates to representation of constituencies in Congress. Bartels (2018) finds a dynamic in which in the age of Donald Trump, Republicans are unified on matters of cultural conservatism and divided on the role of government, which is something as a proxy for economic conservatism, while Democrats are unified in support of an activist government and divided over cultural issues. Maks-Solomon and Rigby (2020) turn to the class-based cleavages present within this dynamic, finding that rich and poor Democrats disagree on social issues and largely agree on economic ones, while rich and poor Republicans disagree more on economic issues and agree on social ones. They then relate that relationship to the finding that both parties tend to over represent their richer members. Lax, Phillips and Zelizer (2019) also comment on this relationship, finding that 'affluent influence' is overstated and overshadowed by effects of partisanship. More directly relating to public opinion surveys, Pew Research has asked voters whether they think Democratic and Republican politicians and their policies' favor the wealthy, the middle class, or the poor (Pew, 2012). Otherwise,

much of the discussion on this matter, particularly as it relates to recent primary elections, is found in news pieces and partisan think tank papers.

3. Hypothesis

We have one broad hypothesis and several sub-hypotheses that will help us answer our research question. Our broad hypothesis is that class identity affects views on policies concerning economic redistribution. We theorize that the nature of redistributive policies makes class a salient identity to voters. One sub-hypothesis is, then, that wealthier individuals are more receptive to social or cultural policy messaging than less wealthy voters. Conversely, we think that individuals who identify as lower class will be more receptive to economic policy messaging. Regarding issue importance to voters, we hypothesize that in some cases, social issues may be more important to wealthier individuals. We do recognize that one could reasonably argue that for wealthier voters of either party, economic issues will be more salient. Those individuals may feel they have more 'stake' or interest in taxation and economic outcomes. At the same time, one could make a similar argument about poorer individuals, since they may be most 'at the mercy of' economic changes, particularly in distributive policies as livelihoods are less certain. Hence we do expect social issues to be relatively more salient for wealthier individuals, particularly Democrats. Wealthier individuals are more secure financially, and wealthier Democrats may stand to benefit economically from more fiscally conservative policies than those espoused by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. We also expect that social policy framings will garner less support among wealthier Republicans than among wealthier Democrats. Pursuing these questions should help us conceptualize how individuals form opinions on class-related policies.

Regarding support for redistributive policies, applying our broader hypotheses leads us to expect class identity to guide voters' sensitivity to policy framings of Medicare for All and a COVID-19 relief bill. We hypothesize that wealthier voters will respond more favorably

to a policy given a socio cultural reason than they do if given an economic reason. Again, we think this may be more pronounced for Democrats. Conversely, we hypothesize that less wealthy respondents will favor policies given economic reasons rather than social ones. This outcome could suggest that among some wealthy individuals, support for redistributive economic policies originates from views on social justice rather than perception of economic self-interest. As a bonus, these policy questions should also create a sense of aggregate support for these policies along the axis of wealth regardless of the effect of reasoning. Ideally, we could explain variation in responses based on wealth through the findings from our survey experiment.

4. Data and Methods

Our means of investigating this issue is a novel survey experiment in an online poll conducted in the weeks prior to the 2020 United States Presidential Election. The poll surveyed 1,215 American adults on October 25, 2020. 1,208 passed attention check questions and the others were removed from our analysis. Our sample was provided by Lucid Holdings, LLC, and respondents were sampled through Qualtrics, an online surveying platform. We achieve national representativeness through the use of post-stratification weights. The survey included several questions concerning the 2020 election and a number of sections concerning salient issues in Political Science that we do not visit in this paper. Of those sections, we ask six questions about class, parties, and support for particular policies. The focus of this paper is the survey experiment created with our policy questions on Medicare for All and COVID-19 Relief.

We will provide exact question wording in the Appendix, but we ask for self-reported social class and a series of questions concerning how the Democratic and Republican parties represent Americans of different social classes. Our self-reported class question asks "If you were asked to use one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong

in?" It offers the answers "Upper class," "Upper-middle class," "Middle class," "Working class," and "Lower class." We also attempt to discern the salience of economic versus cultural issues for respondents by asking what one issue is most important in a given set of issues. The final two questions comprise our survey experiments about Medicare for All and a COVID-19 relief package. We take Medicare for All to mean a national health insurance plan in which all Americans are enrolled and we take COVID-19 relief to mean a general bill to provide Americans economic and social relief from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was ongoing at the time of this survey.[4]

Both of our survey experiments propose a policy to respondents, then ask whether respondents would support the policies described. Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of three groups for each experiment: about one third saw a control treatment simply defining Medicare For All and asking whether the respondent would support the policy, one third received an additional sentence focused on the economic costs and savings of the policy, and one third received an additional sentence focused on the social and racial impacts of the policy. In doing so, we hoped to demonstrate the efficacy of economic messaging and social messaging for redistributive policies, both on the general population and with the particular subgroups of interest. For wording of vignette treatments, see Table 1. From these results, we perform two linear regressions, one on support for Medicare for All and one on support for a COVID-19 relief bill.

To design our regression models, we made several choices in recoding and inclusion of variables. We add controls from race, education, gender, and self-reported class. Race is coded as a four-level factor, identifying respondents as "White", "Hispanic", "Black", or "Other". Education is an eight-level factor, with values "Some high school or less", "High school graduate", "Other post high school vocational training", "Completed some college, but no degree", "Associate's degree", "Bachelor's degree", "Master's or professional degree", and "Doctorate degree". Gender is coded as Male or Female. Self-reported class has the five

[4]And, of course, the COVID-19 pandemic is very much ongoing at the time this paper was written!

levels discussed above. We use self-reported class in this regression in order to investigate the role of class identity rather than simple family income. Our intention for this experiment is to investigate the role of class identity, rather than monetary income. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of respondents to our survey reported being "middle" or "working" class, and interestingly respondents reporting as "upper class" did not seem to earn more money than those calling themselves "upper middle class." This fits with Sosnaud, Brady and Frenk (2013)'s findings that Americans tend to identify as middle class, even when they are not. We considered either combining the "lower" and "working" class categories into one or combining "upper-middle" and "upper," but decided against it. "Lower" and "working" class did seem to have a substantial income difference, and we are most interested in class identity. Nonetheless, we do find that self-reported class matches well with self-reported household income; as respondents report higher levels of class, they tend to consistently make more money. We will provide results for an alternative regression that uses household income instead of self-reported class in the Appendix.

5. Results

We will present two pieces of analysis. First, we will briefly discuss the results and shortcomings of our issue salience question. Second we will discuss the results of our survey experiment and the broader relationship between class and social and economic messaging.

The results of our issue salience question are interesting in their own right but inconclusive as a means to test the salience of social and economic issues of respondents of different classes. We found that healthcare was by far the most of the issues given, with 33 percent reporting it as their most important. However, its importance was consistent across class except for the "upper" classes, with its small sample size. We will discuss the issue of sample size in our discussion section. We additionally attempted to sort our issues into "social" and "economic" buckets, with the environment, race and discrimination, abortion, free speech, and gay rights

as our social issues. At a glance it appears that with higher class, respondents prioritize social issues less. A linear regression run with the same controls as our survey experiment, however, reveals that the relationship is not statistically significant. We hypothesized that social issues would be more salient for wealthier voters. This question did not yield a significant result confirming or rejecting that.

The baseline results for our survey experiment are shown in Table 1. Given the control or either treatment, Medicare for All is quite popular and Covid Relief is extremely popular. Our treatments seem to have little effect on aggregate support figures, except for a decline in support for covid relief among those given the social treatment. However, we perform a linear regression to investigate the significance of class to our treatments.

In Table 3, our results appear in two sections that cover each experimental design, starting with Medicare For All. We add controls for self-reported class, party, race, gender, and education, finding race and gender insignificant in both experiments. We use self-reported class in this regression in order to investigate the role of class identity rather than simple family income, which we investigate later. Nonetheless, this regression also shows that both of our treatments are not statistically significant for both experiments. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the partisanship of a respondent is by far the most predictive variable in both. We can only speculate about the significance of education on Medicare for All support–perhaps those who are most educated are more likely to have quality employer provided health insurance or are simply more likely to recognize our vignette as a partisan proposal.

We also include the interaction term of class and both of our treatments in the regression in order to test whether the effect of either treatment depends on class. The class x treatment interaction term is only significant for the social treatment on our covid relief experiment. This suggests that class only has a significant effect on covid support when given the social treatment. That effect may look like what we show in Figure 4 where we plot self-reported class against support for covid relief when given the control versus the social treatment. Figure 4b shows the same relationship with self-reported class replaced with family income.

At lower incomes and for those who identify as "lower" or "working" class, respondents were significantly more likely to approve of covid relief given the control rather than the social treatment. For example, 94 $\pm$ 3.5 percent of individuals reporting "lower class" report supporting covid relief given the control and only 80 $\pm$ 3.4 percent support it given the social control. For the "working class" those numbers are 96 percent and 86 percent, but the differences do not exist in the wealthier classes. For the COVID economic treatment and for the Medicare for All social treatment, no significant differences exist with the control, and for the Medicare for All economic treatment there are differences but no relationship is evident from the chart or from the regression.

Why might the interaction term only be significant for the COVID social treatment? Aside from concerns with our methodology that we will discuss below, it seems from Figure 4a that the control gains support among poorer respondents while the social treatment does not. We can only speculate as to why that may be. Perhaps the COVID control implies the inclusion of economic relief such as the extension of stimulus checks, which may be particularly appealing to poorer respondents, while the social treatment specifically mentions other aspects such as a "national testing plan" and "support [of] vulnerable communities." The economic treatment tracking closely to the COVID control may support this idea.

5.1 Discussion and Limitations

Overall, we cannot say that our findings confirm our hypothesis that wealthier individuals are more receptive of social or cultural messaging than those who are less wealthy. We found only one instance of class impacting the effect of a social treatment in our survey experiment and even there, it is not clear that wealthier individuals were responding more favorably to a social treatment, or that poorer individuals were simply responding poorly to it. Otherwise, the clearest, and least surprising, finding that our regression shows is that partisanship is, by far, the greatest predictor of support for either COVID-19 relief or for Medicare for All. Though we did not use the names "Medicare for All" or "CARES Act," the partisan cues

associated with both may overpower personal financial interest to an extent for which we did not account. Nonetheless, we are not completely convinced that there is no relationship between class and social versus economic messaging, and we can note some aspects of our study that may have prevented us from achieving more conclusive results.

One limitation may be the particularities of Medicare for All and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented us from achieving coherent results. Medicare for All has a fairly direct relationship to redistribution of wealth–the government increasing taxes and paying for healthcare is inherently redistributive–while the COVID-19 relief bill is simultaneously helping those less well off and attempting to relieve and solve a national catastrophe. As a result, the favorability of COVID-19 relief may not interact with class identity in the same way as other redistributive policies. Perhaps attempting this experiment with policies such as a Green New Deal or debt-free college would provide more coherent results. Similarly, it is also possible that our treatments were either too weak or at least ineffectual primed social and economic views. It is a difficult task to form a social or an economic treatment that is palatable to conservatives and to liberals. This difficulty may have resulted in awkward wording and our vignettes likely retain something of a liberal bias. Perhaps we could rectify this issue by forming one experiment targeted at Democrats and one at Republicans, but this would require a larger sample size.

Sample size may be another limitation of this study, given the smaller number of respondents available to us when splitting our sample. Splitting our sample in three to provide a control, an economic, and a social treatment already limits the number of individuals receiving each to just around n = 400. At certain class divisions there is a very low number of cases to compare, making statistical significance difficult to achieve. Dividing by party or using income rather than class to examine the sample can thus yield outliers and inconclusive results where with a larger sample, we may have discovered more evidence in support of our hypothesis. There may also be issues with using self-reported social class rather than reported income, though we did find that except for the difference between upper and

upper-middle class respondents, our class scale closely matched our income scale.

6. Conclusion

We hypothesize that class would moderate a respondent's support for policies involving economic redistribution and performed a novel survey experiment to investigate the impact of different treatments describing Medicare for All and COVID-19 relief on the relationship between class and support for those policies. In our results, however, we did not find conclusive evidence to support this idea. We did find limited evidence that individuals identifying with lower social classes are less responsive to social messaging around a COVID-19 relief bill, one of our two presented policies. Largely, however, the weight of partisanship dominated the decision making of our respondents. We believe a relationship between class and messaging on redistributive policies may exist but is moderated by partisanship. These findings are fairly consistent with previous scholarship that suggests that policy framing effects are most impactful in low-information environments and in cases where partisan cues are less obvious. Additionally, our findings suggest a number of potential future studies to investigate what link exists between class identity and messaging within partisan effects. Nonetheless, it seems that in a deeply partisan and tumultuous moment, the interplay of class, social issues, and the distribution of wealth in American politics will only continue to grow in importance.

Table 1: Base-Level Results of Survey Experiment

M4A treatment	No	Yes
Control	0.28	0.72
Economic	0.29	0.71
Social	0.29	0.69

Covid treatment	No	Yes
Control	0.09	0.91
Economic	0.11	0.89
Social	0.15	0.85

Table 3: Regression Demonstrating Treatment Effects by Class

	Medicare For All (M4A)	COVID Relief
	(1)	(2)
Constant	2.527***	1.956**
	(0.598)	(0.792)
Economic Treatment	−0.560	0.017
	(0.600)	(0.818)
Social Treatment	0.358	0.803
	(0.602)	(0.778)
Class	0.117	0.371*
	(0.130)	(0.190)
Party ID	−0.330***	−0.242***
	(0.031)	(0.043)
Race	0.111	−0.060
	(0.071)	(0.092)
Gender	−0.169	0.104
	(0.139)	(0.188)
Education	−0.111**	0.042
	(0.048)	(0.065)
Economic Treatment x Class	0.144	−0.071
	(0.177)	(0.254)
Social Treatment x Class	−0.178	−0.406*
	(0.175)	(0.239)
N	1,208	1,207
Log Likelihood	−655.822	−408.184
AIC	1,331.643	836.367

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 4: Alternative Regression Demonstrating Treatment Effects by Income

	Medicare For All (M4A)	COVID Relief
	(1)	(2)
Constant	2.901***	3.444***
	(0.402)	(0.553)
Economic Treatment	0.120	−0.089
	(0.265)	(0.399)
Social Treatment	−0.138	−0.779**
	(0.261)	(0.375)
Income	0.009	−0.035
	(0.017)	(0.025)
Party ID	−0.334***	−0.244***
	(0.031)	(0.043)
Race	0.102	−0.073
	(0.072)	(0.093)
Gender	−0.154	0.093
	(0.139)	(0.189)
Education	−0.124**	0.054
	(0.050)	(0.068)
Economic Treatment x Class	−0.026	−0.007
	(0.023)	(0.032)
Social Treatment x Class	−0.012	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.031)
N	1,208	1,207
Log Likelihood	−657.867	−408.916
AIC	1,335.734	837.831

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Figure 1a: Covid control (green) vs social treatment (purple)

Figure 1b: Covid control (green) vs economic treatment (red)

Figure 2a: M4A control (green) vs social treatment (purple)

Figure 2b: M4A control (green) vs economic treatment (red)



Figure 3a: Covid control (green) vs social treatment (purple)



Figure 3b: Covid control (green) vs economic treatment (red)



Figure 4a: M4A control (green) vs social treatment (purple)



Figure 4b: M4A control (green) vs economic treatment (red)



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