
Elections in the Developing World (POLS490R)

Fall 2021

Location: Callaway Center S101

Hours: Fridays 2:30-5:30pm

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Description

Elections have the potential to increase public officials' accountability and responsiveness to citizens' demands. Yet, in many countries where leaders are popularly elected, objective measures of their performance, as well as the citizens' perception about the quality of government, suggest that these benefits are not being realized. In this course, we study why this is the case. We focus on developing countries drawing on examples from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The course is divided into four modules. The first starts with an overview of the differences between elections in industrialized countries and developing ones. We continue with a module on the accountability-enhancing role of elections. The third deals with common forms of electoral manipulation observed in the developing world. Finally, the last module touches on how the international community promotes democracy, the effects of these interventions, and the challenges faced by election monitors.

Learning goals

At the end of the semester, students will understand the main substantive questions driving the electoral politics scholarship. They will also use this knowledge to develop a policy paper. This exercise aims for students to experience how academic research in political science can inform the solution of real-world problems. Although our focus will be on substantive questions driving the literature on electoral politics, we will also spend some time understanding the empirical challenges that researchers face when inferring causal relationships from the data. Because of this, students will be able to reinforce what they learned in their research design classes in an applied setting.

Prerequisites

- POLS 208 Political Science Methods

The articles that we will read often involve testing causal claims, and researchers use various techniques to that end. Because of this, some of the readings are technical. In the first session of the semester, I will briefly overview the most common techniques employed in the articles. In this

presentation, I will focus on the interpretation of statistical results and the justification for using specific techniques. This introduction would assume you have taken POLS 208. You are expected to identify the main substantive arguments of all the assigned readings, to interpret their main results, *and* to have a basic understanding of why a particular methodology is used.

Grading

- 30% Presentations: Starting from the second session, students will be responsible for presenting articles in class. The 20-minute presentations should address the central question of the article, methodology, findings, and conclusions. If you have trouble understanding any part of the article or want to discuss other aspects of your presentation, please come to my office hours before your scheduled presentation.
- 30% Participation: You must come to class prepared to talk. At the end of each presentation, we will have a discussion session. In principle, I expect participation to be voluntary, but I reserve the right to call on students to ask them questions. For each session, I will assign each student a participation score that will take the value of 0, 1, or 2. A score of 0 is given to someone who did not contribute to the class discussion. I assign a score of 1 to students whose participation reflects a basic understanding of the theoretical arguments and methodology of the article. A score of 2 is given to someone who, in addition to having a basic understanding of the readings, promoted further discussion, was able to establish connections with other class readings or provided informed criticism. You can drop the two lowest participation scores at the end of the semester to calculate your grade. If I have accepted a justification for absence, the participation score for that day will not count for the total either.
- 15% Policy paper (first draft): before Fall break, students will submit a short document (maximum five pages) that identifies a societal problem related to elections. The paper should include a discussion of why this is an important problem for society and an overview of academic articles (from political science or economics academic journals, policy papers, or working papers from multilateral organizations) or books on this problem or related issues. Finally, students should propose and describe some solutions (maximum 3) to the problem based on their literature study.
- 25% Policy paper (final draft): the day the final exam is scheduled by the registrar, students will submit the final draft of the policy paper (maximum length of fifteen pages). I expect students to give a detailed description of the problem (list the agents involved and the incentives that drive their actions), a discussion on the causes of the problem, propose one solution (new policy or elimination of an old one), compare their proposal with other alternatives (why is the proposal better than the alternatives), and discuss the direct or indirect evidence that supports their claims. If there is no evidence, students should describe how their proposal could be evaluated (What data is required? What analysis should be carried out with such data?). It is also important to address the feasibility of the proposal focusing on potential implementation challenges.

Additional policies

- This course embraces a multiplicity of ideas and perspectives. In our classroom we also respect people from all backgrounds and recognize the differences among ourselves, including racial

and ethnic identities, religious practices, and gender expressions. These are some guidelines for engagement:

- You are here to learn, so be open to consider new ideas or those that challenge your preconceptions
 - Listen respectfully, without interrupting
 - Criticize ideas, not individuals
 - Avoid blame and speculation. Support your argument with evidence
- Our class sessions will all be audio visually recorded for students in the class to refer back to the information, and for enrolled students who are unable to attend live. Lectures and other classroom presentations presented through video conferencing and other materials posted on Canvas are for the sole purpose of educating the students enrolled in the course. The release of such information (including but not limited to directly sharing, screen capturing, or recording content) is strictly prohibited, unless the instructor states otherwise. Doing so without the permission of the instructor will be considered an Honor Code violation and may also be a violation of other state and federal laws, such as the Copyright Act.
 - I expect students to attend all sessions. Having said this, some students might be sick or will face other situations that will not allow them to attend class. If that is the case, understand that I will be flexible about attendance (see above). Please make sure to email me so that we can discuss your individual circumstances. If there are circumstances that prevent you from attending class in person, I will provide recordings of our discussions and will offer the possibility to join our conversations via Zoom. Please also contact me via email if you are in quarantine.
 - It is one of my goals to provide an inclusive learning environment. The Department of Accessibility Services (DAS) works with students who have disabilities to provide reasonable accommodations. It is the student's responsibility to request accommodations by registering with the DAS (<http://accessibility.emory.edu/students/>). Accommodations cannot be retroactively applied. Students need to contact DAS and inform me as early as possible in the semester to discuss their implementation plan. For additional information about accessibility and accommodations, please get in touch with the Department of Accessibility Services at (404) 727-9877 or accessibility@emory.edu.
 - The honor code is in effect throughout the semester. Students should familiarize themselves with the honor code, which can be found at this link:
<http://catalog.college.emory.edu/academic/policies-regulations/honor-code.html>

Instructor responsibilities

- I selected readings to offer a review of the most active areas in this literature, plus a few foundational pieces. The choice of papers also reflects a desire to expose students to multiple methodologies used by political scientists.
- I will carefully review each of the required readings before our session to explain any substantive or technical question students might have. Students should take advantage of office hours

to clarify these doubts, especially if they are presenting in the next session. If my office hours are not compatible with a student's schedule, I will do my best to accommodate particular circumstances.

- If a student needs to communicate with me outside of regular class hours, please send me an email. I respond to emails in less than 48 hours (most likely within a day).
- I am committed to giving students information about their performance in the course promptly. I usually take one week after you have turned in a paper to grade it. If I am taking longer, please remind me about this commitment.

Outline

(*) Denotes an optional reading.

- Session 1 (8/27). Introduction and Overview of Statistical Techniques
 - Angrist, Joshua and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2014. *Mastering Metrics. The Path from Cause to Effect*. Chapter 1 and 2 (Appendixes are optional).
- Session 2 (09/03). Elections in Developing Democracies
 - Banerjee, Abhijit, and Esther Duflo, 2011. *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*. Public Affairs. (Policies, Politics, Chapter 10)
 - Collier, Paul. 2009. *War, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper Collins. Introduction and Chapter 1 and 2.
 - Schmitter, Philippe C. and Terry Lynn Karl. 1996. “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” in Larry Diamond and Marc. F. Plattner (eds.) *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Session 3 (09/10). Accountability I
 - Achen, Christopher and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do not Produce Responsive Government* Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
 - Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types vs. Sanctioning Poor Performance” in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.) *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Session 4 (09/17). Accountability II
 - Boas, Taylor C. , F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Marcus André Melo. 2019 “Norms versus Action: Why Voters Fail to Sanction Malfeasance in Brazil” *American Journal of Political Science*, 63 (2) 385–400.
 - McMillan, John and Pablo Zoido. 2004. “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(4) 69–92.
- Session 5 (09/24). Clientelism and Vote Buying

- Wang, Chin-Shou and Charles Kurzman. 2007. “The Logistics: How to Buy Votes,” in Frederic C. Schaffer (ed.) *Elections For Sale. The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 3-23.
- Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin” *World Politics*, 55 399–422.
- *Auyero, Javier. 2000. “The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Etnographic Account” *Latin American Research Review* 35(3) 55-81.
- *Keefer, Philip. 2007. “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4) 804–821.
- No class 10/01
- Session 6 (10/08). Campaign Finance
 - Cammett Melani, Lucas M. Novaes, and Guadalupe Tuñón “Special Interest Trade-offs: How Restricting Money in Politics Helps Church-backed Candidates” Working paper UCSD.
 - Boas Taylor, F. Daniel Hidalgo and Neal P. Richardson. 2014. “The Spoils of Victory: Campaign Donations and Government Contracts in Brazil” *Journal of Politics* 76 (2).
 - *Gulzar, Saad, Rueda, Miguel R., and Nelson Ruiz. Forthcoming, “Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics?” *American Journal of Political Science*
- Session 7 (10/15). Ballot design. *First draft policy paper is due*
 - Moehler, Devra, and Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz. 2016. “Eyes on the ballot: Priming Effects and Ethnic Voting in the Developing World.” *Electoral Studies* 42: 99-113
 - Gulzar Saad, Tom Robinson, and Nelson Ruiz. Forthcoming. “How Campaigns Respond to Ballot Position: A New Mechanism for Order Effects” *Journal of Politics*
- Session 8 (10/22). Violence and Elections
 - Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos. “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence From Colombia” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(1) 5-44.
 - Blattman, Christopher. 2009. “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda” *American Political Science Review* 103 (2) 231–247.
 - Kuhn, Patrick M. 2015. “Do Contentious Elections Trigger Violence?.” Contentious Elections. Routledge. 103-124.
 - *Brancati, Dawn and Jack L. Snyder. 2011. “Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3) 469–492.

- *Fafchamps, Marcel and Pedro Vicente. 2013. “Political Violence and Social Networks: Experimental Evidence From a Nigerian Election” *Journal of Development Economics* 101 27–48.
- Session 9 (10/29). Ethnic Politics
 - Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What is Ethnicity and Does it Matter?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 397–424.
 - Dunning Thad, Janhavi Nilekani. 2013. “Ethnic Quotas and Political Mobilization: Caste, Parties, and Distribution in Indian Village Councils” *American Political Science Review* 107 (1) 35–56
 - Posner, Daniel. 2004. “The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi” *American Political Science Review* 98 (4) 529–545.
 - *Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. “Counting Heads: a Theory of Elite Behavior in Patronage Democracies” in Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (eds.) *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 - *Posner, Daniel. 2005. Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 and 5.
- Session 10 (11/5). Electoral Effects of Manipulation
 - Buchanan, James and Gordon Tullock. “The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy.” Liberty Fund. Ch 18.
 - Ofosu, George K. 2019. “Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?” *American Political Science Review* 113(4):963–979.
 - Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 9.
 - *Vicente, Pedro. 2014. “Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence From a Field Experiment in West Africa” *The Economic Journal* 124 (574) F356–F387
 - *Zucco, Cesar. 2013. “When Payouts Pay Off: Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior in Brazil 2002-10” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4) 810–822.
- Session 11 (11/12). Democracy Promotion and Election Monitoring I
 - Berger, Daniel, Alejandro Corvalan, William Easterly, Shanker Satyanath. 2013. “Do Superpowers Have Short and Long Term Consequences For Democracy?”, *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 41, (1) 22-34.
 - Collier, Paul. 2009. *War, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: Harper Collins. Chapters 8 and 9.
 - Hyde, Susan D. 2011. *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

- *Kelley, Judith. 2012. “International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States” *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 203-222.
- No class (11/19)
- Session 12 (12/3). Democracy Promotion and Election Monitoring II
 - Ascencio, Sergio J., and Miguel R. Rueda. 2019. “Partisan Poll Watchers and Electoral Manipulation.” *American Political Science Review* 113(3): 727-742.
 - Kelley, Judith. 2012. *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 3, 4, and 7.