

Demonstrating and Mitigating a Message Integrity Attack (MAC Forgery)

(Optional/Bonus Assignment)

Course: Data Integrity and Authentication

Weight: 10 points

Estimated Time Required: 2-3 days

Team: exactly **THREE** members

Submission Form: <https://forms.office.com/r/J3gpafSnFk>

Submission Deadline: Friday 16th May, 11:59 pm

Discussions will take place in the order of form responses. The first discussion slot is on Saturday, May 10th, from 2:00 to 3:00 pm for group 1 and from 4:00 to 5:00 pm for group 2. Additional discussion slots will be available on Saturday, May 17th, during lecture time.

Assignment Overview

In this assignment, you will demonstrate a **Message Authentication Code (MAC) forgery attack** against an insecure implementation of a MAC scheme and propose effective mitigations. You will analyze:

- why the attack works,
- demonstrate it practically, and
- show how stronger cryptographic practices prevent such vulnerabilities.

The attack focus will be Length Extension Attack on constructions like naive hash-based MACs (e.g., $\text{MAC} = \text{hash}(\text{secret} || \text{message})$).

Assignment Tasks

1. Background Study (1–2 pages):
 - a. What is a MAC and its purpose in data integrity/authentication?
 - b. How does a length extension attack work in hash functions like MD5/SHA1?
 - c. Why is $\text{MAC} = \text{hash}(\text{secret} || \text{message})$ insecure?
2. Demonstration of the Attack (Code + Documentation):
 - a. Intercept a valid (message, MAC) pair.
 - b. Perform a length extension attack to append new data to the message.
 - c. Generate a valid MAC for the extended message **without knowing the secret key**.
 - d. Demonstrate that the server accepts your forged message+MAC as valid.
3. Mitigation and Defense (Code + Explanation write-up)
 - a. Modify the system to use HMAC properly.
 - b. Demonstrate that your previous attack fails against this secure implementation.
 - c. Explain why HMAC mitigates this attack in 1–2 pages.

Deliverables:

1. Background write-up (PDF)
2. Attack demonstration (Python code + README.md)
3. Mitigated secure implementation (Python code)
4. Mitigation write-up

Starter Code:

```
## `server.py`

import hashlib

SECRET_KEY = b'supersecretkey' # Unknown to attacker

def generate_mac(message: bytes) -> str:
    return hashlib.md5(SECRET_KEY + message).hexdigest()

def verify(message: bytes, mac: str) -> bool:
    expected_mac = generate_mac(message)
    return mac == expected_mac

def main():
    # Example message
    message = b"amount=100&to=alice"
    mac = generate_mac(message)

    print("=== Server Simulation ===")
    print(f"Original message: {message.decode()}")
    print(f"MAC: {mac}")
    print("\n--- Verifying legitimate message ---")
    if verify(message, mac):
        print("MAC verified successfully. Message is authentic.\n")

    # Simulated attacker-forged message
    forged_message = b"amount=100&to=alice" + b"&admin=true"
    forged_mac = mac # Attacker provides same MAC (initially)

    print("--- Verifying forged message ---")
    if verify(forged_message, forged_mac):
        print("MAC verified successfully (unexpected).")
    else:
        print("MAC verification failed (as expected).")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
```

```
## `client.py` (Attacker script)
```

```
import sys
```

```
def perform_attack():
```

```
    # TODO: Your attack code goes here
```

```
    # You have intercepted: message and its mac
```

```
    intercepted_message = b"amount=100&to=alice"
```

```
    intercepted_mac = "..." # From server.py output
```

```
    # Your goal: append data and compute valid forged MAC
```

```
    data_to_append = b"&admin=true"
```

```
    forged_message = b"" # Replace with your forged message
```

```
    forged_mac = "" # Replace with your forged MAC
```

```
    print("Forged message:", forged_message)
```

```
    print("Forged MAC:", forged_mac)
```

```
if __name__ == "__main__":
```

```
    perform_attack()
```

Next, use the **verify(message: bytes, mac: str)** method from server.py to confirm that the malicious MAC is valid, even without knowing the secret key

Modify the server.py file to mitigate the attack