Reduction of Key Sizes on Rainbow-like Multivariate Signature Schemes

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Outline

- Context
 - Motivation
 - Multivariate cryptography
- Research object
 - Related works
 - Hypothesis
 - Rainbow signature scheme
- Our proposal
 - Open problems
 - Preliminary results
- Chronology

Context

- Guarantee authenticity of messages sent digitally
- Security of digital signature schemes is based on problems from number theory
 - Integer factorization, discrete logarithm
- ► There exist quantum algorithms [Sho97] that solve such problems efficiently
- Post-quantum cryptography aims to create cryptosystems based on problems immune to quantum speed-ups

Motivation

- ► Foreshadowing of quantum computers
- Several active branches of post-quantum cryptography based on distinct mathematical structures
- Standardization calls by institutions such as NIST, IRTF and ETSI
- We focus on cryptosystems that are built upon the difficulty of solving systems of equations

Multivariate cryptography


- Cryptography based on systems of multivariate equations over finite fields
- Bipolar construction, with central trapdoor:

▶ Focus on signatures $(m \le n)$: fast operations, small signatures and large keys, compared to current schemes

Research object

- ► Focus on the Rainbow signature scheme [DS05], currently on Round 2 of the NIST standardization process
- Easy description, good balance between signature and key sizes
- Keys are one to two orders of magnitude greater than conventional ones (RSA at 512 bytes, ECDSA at 256 bits)
- Generalized version of Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar [KPG99]

Related works



Works in blue optimise public keys, while red ones reduce private keys. Asterisks denote reparametrized works and crosses denote broken schemes.

Hypothesis

- ➤ To the best of our knowledge, works have reduced either private or public keys, but not both
- Current methods to reduce keys are not compatible between themselves

Can both reductions be achieved simultaneously?

Preliminaries

- Parameters are a finite field \mathbb{F}_q , integers u, n such that $u \le n$ and $0 < v_1 < \cdots < v_u < v_{u+1} = n$
- ▶ For $1 \le \ell \le u$, set vinegar variables $V_\ell = \{1, \dots, v_\ell\}$ and oil variables $O_\ell = \{v_\ell + 1, \dots, v_{\ell+1}\}$
- Define vector spaces spanned by quadratic Oil-Vinegar polynomials


$$P_{\ell} = \sum_{i,j \in V_{\ell}} \alpha_{ij} x_i x_j + \sum_{i \in V_{\ell}, j \in O_{\ell}} \beta_{ij} x_i x_j + \sum_{i \in V_{\ell} \cup O_{\ell}} \gamma_i x_i + \delta,$$
$$\alpha_{ij}, \beta_{ij}, \gamma_i, \delta \in \mathbb{F}_q$$

Key generation

- ▶ Let $m = n v_1$ and $o_\ell = v_{\ell+1} v_\ell$
- ▶ Randomly pick two affine transformations $\mathcal{L}_1: \mathbb{F}_q^m \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ and $\mathcal{L}_2: \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$
- $lackbox{ Central map is a function } \mathcal{C}: \mathbb{F}_q^n
 ightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$
 - ▶ A total of o_{ℓ} polynomials and respective coefficients are randomly chosen from each P_{ℓ}
- ▶ Private key is the 3-uple $(\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{L}_2)$, public key is the composition $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{L}_1 \circ \mathcal{C} \circ \mathcal{L}_2$


Inversion of the central map

- Vinegar variables of a layer are exactly the oil and vinegar variables from the previous layer
- This enables the inversion of each Oil-Vinegar layer recursively
- ▶ With u = 2, the initial configuration of C is



Inversion of the central map

 \triangleright Randomly choose variables in V_1 and substitute them



Solve linear o_1 equations in the first layer to obtain V_2 (if possible), and then solve the remaining o_2 equations

Signature generation

- ► Consider a cryptographic hash function \mathcal{H} and a message M, and compute the digest $\mathbf{h} = \mathcal{H}(M)$
- With possession of the private key, obtain the value $x = \mathcal{L}_1^{-1}(h)$
- ► Generate the pre-image of x under the central map, $y = C^{-1}(x)$, as per the operations above
- lacktriangle Compute the final signature $\mathbf{z} = \mathcal{L}_2^{-1}(\mathbf{y})$

Signature verification

- ▶ Obtain **h** from the message *M*
- ightharpoonup With possession of the public key, compute $\mathbf{h}'=\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{z})$
- ▶ The signature is valid if h = h', and invalid otherwise

Our proposal

- Introduction of structures in the private key may be undesired
- Recall that, to invert the central map, vinegar variables are chosen randomly every time a preimage is computed
- ► If these variables are changed less often, or fixed, they simplify the central map matrix representation
- ▶ Indeed, the central map may be stored in a linearized fashion, and regenerated only occasionally

Our proposal

- ightharpoonup We propose to fix the V_1 variables throughout the central map
- ▶ A possible implementation of this method is to use a PRNG to regenerate C every time it is needed
- ► The linear relations described in CyclicRainbow [PBB10b] are another way to obtain the original central map
- ► The EUF-CMA variant described in [DCP+17] provides a salt that can be modified instead of vinegar variables

Our proposal

- lackbox Only variables in V_1 are fixed, since V_2 and beyond need the digest to be calculated
- Strategy is not hindered by current cryptanalytic methods, since the choice of parameters does not change
- ► General framework for every Rainbow-like scheme
- Can be applied on top of variants that reduce the public key, confirming our hypothesis

Open problems

- Given multiple signatures created with the same set of vinegar variables, is it possible to unveil information about the private key?
- Does every signature needs its own set of vinegar variables or is the cost of regenerating the central map amortized?
- ▶ Is it possible to create a constant-time implementation with this strategy?
- ▶ Do there exist parameter sets which optimize the private key size?


Preliminary results [ZBC19]

Security	n	m	$ \mathcal{K}_{Pr} $	$ \mathcal{K}^{\eta}_{ extit{Pr}} $	Difference
80	43	26	19208	5914	-69.21%
100	69	43	75440	23193	-69.26%
128	79	43	103704	22110	-78.68%
192	131	68	440638	71773	-83.71%
256	178	93	1086971	164721	−84.85 %

Preliminary results [ZBC19]

Security	Variant	$ \mathcal{K}_{Pr} $	$ \mathcal{K}^{\eta}_{\mathit{Pr}} $	$ \mathcal{K}_{Pu} $	Difference
80	Classic			25740	-28.76%
	Cyclic	19546	6524	10618	-62.15%
	LRS2			9789	-63.98%
100	Classic			60390	-31.60%
	Cyclic	46131	12474	22246	-67.41%
	LRS2			20662	-68.89%
128	Classic			139320	-32.78%
	Cyclic	105006	24924	48411	-69.98%
	LRS2			45547	-71.16%

Chronology



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