

# Jay's Bank Application Penetration Testing Report

# **Business Confidential**

Date: June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024 Project: DC-001

Version 1.0

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### **Confidentiality Statement**

This document is the exclusive property of Jay's Bank and SafeGuard Solutions. This document contains proprietary and confidential information regarding the penetration testing of Jay's Bank application. Duplication, redistribution, or use, in whole or in part, in any form, requires the consent of SafeGuard Solutions. SafeGuard Solutions may share this document with relevant stakeholders under non-disclosure agreements to demonstrate compliance and findings of the penetration test.

#### **Disclaimer**

Penetration testing is an evaluation conducted at a specific point in time. The findings and recommendations provided only reflect the conditions and information gathered during the assessment period and may not reflect changes or modifications that occur thereafter. Due to time constraints, this evaluation may not encompass all existing security controls. SafeGuard Solutions prioritizes identifying the most vulnerable security controls that could be exploited by attackers. Therefore, we recommend similar evaluations be conducted periodically, at least once a year, by internal or third-party assessors to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of security controls.

### **Contact Information**

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#### **Assessment Overview**

From May 28<sup>th</sup>, 2024 to June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024, SafeGuard Solutions engaged Jay's Bank Application to evaluate the security posture of its infrastructure compared to current industry best practices that included an internal network penetration test.

Phases of penetration testing activities include the following:

- Planning Customer goals are gathered and rules of engagement obtained.
- Discovery Perform scanning and enumeration to identify potential vulnerabilities, weak areas, and exploits.
- Exploit Perform attack based on vulnerabilities found at discovery process.
- Reporting Document all found vulnerabilities and exploits, failed attempts, and company strengths and weaknesses.

# **Assessment Components**

#### **Internal Penetration Test**

An internal penetration test emulates the role of an attacker from inside the network. An engineer will scan the network to identify potential host vulnerabilities and perform common and advanced internal network attacks, such as: finding website's ports and endpoints, finding services that being used inside the website, OS discovery, et cetera. Then exploit weakness that already been found such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is an attack where malicious scripts are injected into trusted websites. These scripts run in the user's browser and can steal data or hijack sessions. Types include Stored, Reflected, and DOM-based XSS. Prevention includes using Content Security Policy (CSP), output encoding, and input validation. And Broken Access Control is a security vulnerability that occurs when an application fails to properly implement access controls, allowing users to potentially gain unauthorized access to resources or functions they should not have access to. This can happen when the application fails to validate or enforce user roles and permissions correctly.

# **Finding Severity Ratings**

The following table defines levels of severity and corresponding CVSS score range that are used throughout the document to assess vulnerability and risk impact.

Severity	CVSS V3 Score Range	Definitio n
Critical	9.0-10.0	Exploitation is straightforward and usually results in system-level compromise. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch immediately.
High	7.0-8.9	Exploitation is more difficult but could cause elevated privileges and potentially a loss of data or downtime. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch as soon as possible.
Moderate	4.0-6.9	Vulnerabilities exist but are not exploitable or require extra steps such as social engineering. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch after high-priority issues have been resolved.
Low	0.1-3.9	Vulnerabilities are non-exploitable but would reduce an organization's attack surface. It is advised to form a plan of action and patch during the next maintenance window.
Information al	N/A	No vulnerability exists. Additional information is provided regarding items noticed during testing, strong controls, and additional documentation.

### **Risk Factors**

Risk is measured by two factors: Likelihood and Impact:

#### Likelihood

Likelihood measures the potential of a vulnerability being exploited. Ratings are given based on the difficulty of the attack, the available tools, attacker skill level, and client environment.

#### **Impact**

Impact measures the potential vulnerability's effect on operations, including confidentiality, integrity, and availability of client systems and/or data, reputational harm, and financial loss.

## Scope

Assessmen t	Detail s
Internal Penetration Test	• 167.172.75.216
	All application functions
	User account mechanism and authentication
	Web interface and API
	<ul> <li>Database interaction and data handling processes</li> </ul>

## **Scope Exclusions**

Jay's Bank forbid some attacks during testing, here is the detail:

- It is not allowed to carry out attacks that can damage the data or application infrastructure.
- It is not allowed to exploit vulnerabilities that can provide access to the server (e.g., RCE, privilege escalation).
- Avoid DoS/DDoS attacks that can disrupt the availability of application services.

#### **Client Allowances**

Jay's Bank did not provide CyberShield any forms of allowances.

## **Executive Summary**

CyberShield evaluated Jay's Bank's internal security posture through penetration testing from May 28<sup>nd</sup>, 2024 to June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2024. The following sections provide a high-level overview of vulnerabilities discovered, successful and unsuccessful attempts, and strengths and weaknesses.

#### **Scoping and Time Limitations**

Scoping during the engagement did not permit denial of service or social engineering across all testing components.

Time limitations were in place for testing. Internal network penetration testing was permitted for five (5) business days.

#### **Testing Summary**

First pentester use Gobuster to search for endpoint that used by the application. The result is there are many endpoints such as, /register, /login, /dashboard, /profile. By testing the application, pentester found major vulnerability that can be exploited, such as xss attack and Broken Access Control.

# **Vulnerability Summary & Report Card**

The following tables illustrate the vulnerabilities found by impact and recommended remediations:

# Internal Penetration Test Findings

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Critical	High	Moderat e	Low	Information al

Finding	Severity	Recommendation
Vulnerable to XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)	High	Securing the application involves implementing a "deny by default" approach for all resources except public ones, along with enforcing access control mechanisms consistently throughout the application, including minimizing Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) usage. Access controls should be modeled to enforce record ownership, not assuming users can freely create, read, update, or delete any record, while unique business limits should be enforced by domain models.  Measures such as disabling web server directory listing, removing file metadata and backup files from web roots, logging access control failures, and alerting administrators when necessary, are crucial.  Additionally, API and controller access should be rate-limited to

		mitigate harm from automated attack tools, and session identifiers should be invalidated on the server post-logout, favoring short-lived JWT tokens to minimize attacker opportunities, with adherence to OAuth standards for revoking access in the case of longer-lived JWTs.
Vulnerable to Broken Access Control	High	Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software. Phase: Architecture and Design. Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.  Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality.  Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

# **Internal Penetration Test Findings**

## Vulnerable to XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)

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Description:	Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.
Impact:	High
System:	167.172.75.216/dashboard
References:	OWASP 2021 A05 Security Misconfiguration

### **Broken Access Control**

Description:	A Broken Access Control vulnerability allows an attacker to craft user input which can cause Active Job to deserialize it using Globalld and give them access to information that they should not have.
Impact:	High
System:	167.172.75.216/change_password
References:	CWE-284: Improper Access Control CVE-2018-16476

# **Exploitation Proof of Concept**

### **Vulnerable to XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)**

- Create new username that consist of html tag and javascript alert function.




Figure 1: Make a new user from /register endpoint

- Then login with newly created username and password.




Figure 2: Login to user dashboard

- Fill the profile section with information needed and then click update




Figure 3: Fill necessary information to access application's features

- Go back into /dashboard endpoint, there the script will be executed and will show alert that contain host location




Figure 4: Script are executed

#### **Vulnerable to Broken Access Control**

- First open Burp Suite turn on the intercept and open the browser
- Then pentester create new user with its own password like below.




Figure 5: Make a new user from /register endpoint

Then make another one




Figure 6: Make a new user from /register endpoint

- Login using the first account




Figure 6: Login with first account

- Fill the profile section with information needed and then click update




Figure 7: Fill necessary information to access application's features

- Change the password and click forward and in the left panel change username to the second account username




Figure 8: Change the password

- Logout




Figure 8: Logout

- Try to login to second account with the last password we update




Figure 9: Login to second account




Figure 10: Login success