## Abstract

In the literature of analytic philosophy, trust is often viewed as a three-place relation between trustor, trustee, and the domain of trust. The analysis is unsatisfactory if such a relationship is derivative of other forms of trust and the analysis has only succeeded in explaining a particular branch of what trust means without touching the roots. Annette Baier, for example, considers a climate of trust, with all the moral perils of intimacy, explanatorily superior to contract-based, rational trust between non-intimate equals in modern Western philosophy.  
  
In this paper, I provide an account in which the traditional trust relationship investigated in analytic philosophy is derivative. Based on Heidegger's fundamental ontology, humans are constitutively hermeneutic. This means that trust relationships between humans are explanatorily subordinated to trust relationships between readers and texts rather than the other way around, as traditional accounts suggest. This reversal has a significant impact not only on our analysis of trust, but also on moral theory, personal identity, and scientific method.