Subordinating Trust to Text: A Hermeneutic Reversal  
*for blind review*  
  
1 Introduction  
  
Trust is a lubricant for human cooperation and wellbeing. Arguably, so is suspicion. Trust and suspicion are also features of the way in which human readers interact with texts. The traditional assumption is that trust and suspicion in textual interpretation (or hermeneutics) are derivative of trust relationships and interactions among humans. I am going to argue for the opposite claim: trust and suspicion, as they are experienced and put to use in human communities, have their origin in our ability to read, interpret, and understand texts.  
  
This origin is genealogical in nature. The genealogy of a concept (for example, Hume’s genealogy of justice, Nietzsche’s genealogy of truth and morality, Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge and the soul) is an explanation of the historical roots of that concept, when the motivational force for behaviour linked to the concept depends on its acceptance as a metaphysically ordained, not historically grown, concept with intrinsic, not instrumental, motivating powers. (For Hume, consult *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 3, Part 2, Sections 1 and 2; for Nietzsche, consult *On the Genealogy of Morality*; for Foucault, see Foucault, 1977; for more recent literature on genealogies see Geuss, 2001, and Williams, 2004; for an attempt at a genealogy of trust see Faulkner, 2007.)  
  
To illustrate what I mean I will make special reference to a debate in the philosophy of personal identity. The debate centres around the role of narrative in the constitution of a person. Marya Schechtman defends what she calls the narrative self-constitution view, where sentient beings who are persons (as opposed to sentient beings who are not persons) constitute their personhood by forming an autobiographical narrative (see chapter 5 in Schechtman, 2007).  
  
According to Schechtman, persons engage in moral agency, compensation, self-concern, and survival in different ways than mere sentient beings. A self-constituting narrative furnishes the coherence and persistence in time required for these activities. There are further requirements for this narrative: it is a conventional, linear narrative which is articulated, and it stands in a proper relation to the stories that are being told about the person constituting themselves in their social environment. Schechtman recognizes that the strength of her thesis invites opposition and qualifies some of these requirements to address problems. Deficiencies in passing the tests of whether or not a sentient being constitutes themselves by forming a narrative do not automatically rob the individual of personhood but only attenuate the sense in which they are persons.  
  
I will call this view the narrativist view. There are similar views (with different emphasis) in Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Charles Taylor (1985), Stanley Hauerwas (1985), Paul Ricoeur (1995), Richard Kearney (1996), and others. The opposing view is the view of anti-narrativists, here represented by Galen Strawson (2004).  
  
Galen Strawson formulates two theses, the descriptive and the prescriptive narrativity thesis, rejecting both. The first thesis is psychological and states that human beings ordinarily experience their lives in narrative fashion. The second thesis is ethical and states that in order to have a good life (speaking in terms of both morality and happiness), a human being will have a narrative to understand such a life. Strawson provides his own experience as a counterexample to the descriptive claim:

I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative with form, or indeed as a narrative without form. Absolutely none. Nor do I have any great or special interest in my past. Nor do I have a great deal of concern for my future. (433)

Strawson cites Jean-Paul Sartre, the Earl of Shaftesbury, and the Stoic philosophers for philosophical support; Henry James, V.S. Pritchett, and Stendhal for literary support. Neither narrativists nor anti-narrativists address the pivotal role of trust and hermeneutics in the debate. I want to show that the controversy over narrativity and personhood embeds seamlessly in a much larger philosophical debate.  
  
The hermeneutic tradition has been asking questions about the interpretation of texts and the role of trust for a long time. More importantly, hermeneutic thinkers have always sought to extend interpretive approaches from texts to entities that are not prima facie texts. Wilhelm Dilthey, for example, uses hermeneutics to give an account of historical consciousness. What happens in history becomes the text for an extended hermeneutics.  
  
In the 20th century, Martin Heidegger makes a similar move and extends hermeneutics to ‘Dasein,’ being which becomes concerned about itself. For Heidegger, the question of being is a primary question and cannot be subordinated, for example, to a scientific approach. Hermeneutics, the ability of humans to understand texts, becomes the proper way to understand being—again, hermeneutics has been extended from texts to be applied to something which is not a prima facie text. However, the extension is not coincidental. The primacy of the question of being requires that human beings are constitutively hermeneutic in their understanding of themselves and the world in which they live. Texts are not an afterthought.  
  
Similarly, I am going to claim that whether we place trust or suspicion in texts is not an afterthought to the question of trust. With Heidegger, I believe that humans primarily meet the givenness of their own being (‘primarily’ means that they cannot address this confrontation with a device that is derivative of it, such as scientific method or technology) and depend in this meeting on a particular gift that they have: the gift of interpreting and understanding texts. This gift is not derivative of being, but constitutive of it. Therefore, whether I trust or not depends on the kind of trust and suspicion I place in texts; it depends on my interpretive stance.  
  
To understand Heidegger, it is important to realize that the text for the hermeneutics of his fundamental ontology is not an object. Interpretation is not a transitive activity. Robert Holub explains that “rather, understanding is grasped as our way of being-in-the-world, as the fundamental way we exist prior to any cognition or intellectual activity. Ontological hermeneutics thus replaces the question of understanding as knowledge about the world with the question of being-in-the-world” (Holub, 1991, 52).  
  
A debate where a similar dynamic takes place is the debate over the foundations of moral responsibility. Sartre defends in “Existentialism is a Humanism” the existentialist account of moral responsibility where ‘man fashions himself’ and embraces moral values by radical choice without reference to an external source for these values (such as would be provided by God’s commandments, Kantian rationality, or realist moral properties of the world). In his paper “What Is Human Agency?” Charles Taylor sets himself in opposition to Sartre’s program by pointing to our relationship with texts and language as the source of our moral responsibility:

This is what is impossible in the theory of radical choice. The agent of radical choice would at the moment of choice have ex hypothesi no horizon of evaluation. He would be utterly without identity. He would be a kind of extensionless point, a pure leap into the void. But such a thing is an impossibility, or rather could only be the description of the most terrible mental alienation. (Taylor, 1985, 35)

Taylor continues to point to articulation, self-interpretation, and a rich language as corresponding to the ability to assume moral agency. The problem with existentialism is that it evaluates weakly (just as utilitarianism does, the other moral theory that Taylor attacks) and uses radical choice in order to establish some type of moral foundationalism. Hermeneutics, by contrast, provides us with an account that affords us moral responsibility without foundationalism and without alienation from the traditions, the language, and the community that surround us.  
  
It is not surprising that Taylor is also a proponent of the narrativist thesis, claiming that narrative coherence is necessary for moral agency. There is a strong connection between the theory of moral responsibility and the theory of personal identity via hermeneutic theory. This hermeneutic theory is often characterized by either a fundamental hermeneutics of trust (as is often true for narrativist theories, but also for certain moral theories) or a fundamental hermeneutics of distrust or suspicion (as is often true for anti-narrativists and poststructuralists).  
  
It was Ricoeur who introduced the distinction between a hermeneutics of the sacred (or of trust) and a hermeneutics of suspicion (see Ricoeur, 1970). Ricoeur’s examples for a hermeneutics of trust are Rudolf Bultmann and Hans-Georg Gadamer; his examples for a hermeneutics of suspicion are Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. The contrast is also supposed to help mediate in the famous controversy between Jürgen Habermas and Gadamer (see Ricoeur, 1973).  
  
Even though Taylor’s paper is vigorously anti-existentialist, Taylor and Sartre agree on a hermeneutics of trust. Sartre needs trustworthiness and reliability of interpretation for his concept of authenticity. The existentialist moral agent has the following three aligned: moral values, the articulation of these values in language, and their implementation in action. The hermeneutic transition between these spheres is considered trustworthy.  
  
Taylor needs a hermeneutics of trust because even though particular narratives may be in need of re-evaluation, at bottom it is language, culture, and tradition which form the basis of the moral life, and therefore the good life. They also form the basis from which those narratives which are deficient can be criticized, and they ultimately need to be trusted. In the following section, I am going to provide a brief sketch of the poststructuralist counterpoint to these accounts.  
  
2 Poststructuralism: Trust and Text  
  
Poststructuralist philosophy has identified sources of suspicion in interpretation. Michel Foucault, for example, has described how all interpretation takes place in a field of micro-dominations so that power cannot be filtered out from the practice of hermeneutics but determines the subjectivity of the subject. Terms such as truth, knowledge, sex, and madness are not metaphysical objects of understanding but constitute themselves in the exercise of power.  
  
One essay in Jacques Derrida’s book *Of Grammatology*, “From/Of the Supplement to the Source: The Theory of Writing” (see Derrida, 1976), traces the direction of the argument for writing the way I am tracing it for trust. While there is a theory (in Derrida, Rousseau’s theory) which locates in writing the absence of immediacy, simplicity, explicit and direct representation; there is a theory of trust which locates in modern contract-based trust relationships the absence of moral responsibility and social cohesion. The idea is that writing is derivative of forthright speech and therefore degenerative. Trust in pure text as exemplified by the relationship between a reader and a personally unknown author, just as trust in institutions, the government, or a spouse based on a prenuptial agreement, is derivative of more natural mutual trust relationships in the family and among friends, and therefore degenerative.  
  
Derrida argues that, by contrast, it is writing—as it supplants, plays, and introduces transference, the distance between signifier and signified—which reveals to us (although not in a revelatory fashion) that there is a supplement at the source and that the string of signification never ends. Similarly, and leaning on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, I argue that the natural trust relationships which come to mind as primordial—the mother-child bond, the trust between friends or lovers—are derivative and obscure that trust is a cognitive attitude based on our ability to read, interpret, and understand texts.  
  
Let us say a first reaction to this thesis is

No way, it is too obvious that there is trust between non-human mammals, and therefore cultural forms of trust must conceptually depend on their natural ancestors!

This reaction is no different from the incredulity that first meets Derrida’s thesis about writing and Heidegger’s thesis about being. Heidegger’s point is precisely that anthropology is not based on the evolutionary ancestry of humans but instead on the human singularity that one’s consciousness becomes a matter of concern to oneself. The way to answer primary questions about oneself, and issues of trust are surely among them, is to realize that from the beginning, metaphysically and epistemologically, our being is interpretive so that the starting point of investigation is hermeneutic rather than scientific, mathematical, or technological.  
  
To complete a poststructuralist triad after Foucault and Derrida, I want to refer to Roland Barthes’ idea of the death of the author (see Barthes, 1994). Trust in analytic philosophy is almost always conceptualized as an attitude toward another person, often in a three-place relation with respect to that which I trust the other person to implement (Jeff trusts the babysitter to take care of the child while he is gone). If trust is based on our ability to read, interpret, and understand texts, the trust relationship we entertain is intimately related to authorship. In a naive analysis, whether I trust a text or not is mainly bound up with the question of whether or not I trust the author (to tell me the truth, or to tell me something worthwhile).  
  
As Heidegger calls into question the text as an object of interpretation, Barthes calls into question the author as a subject of interpretation: not as if the author had never been there—Barthes acknowledges the genealogical roots of interpretation and pronounces the author not non-existent, but dead. It is historical developments, the erosion of “God and his hypostases—reason, science, law” (169), that have led to readers now facing in texts the product of a modern scriptor, not the product of an author. Language calls into question origins, and writing is the imitation of a gesture which is always anterior, never original. The scriptor produces the text in the here and now, and the multiplicity of the text’s production is focused on the reader. The text is a “tissue of quotations drawn from innumerable centres of culture” (168) and, aligned with my argument for trust in interpersonal relationships being derivative of trust in text, “life never does more than imitate the book” (169).  
  
To many philosophers, the lines of argument in poststructuralist writing are obscure and difficult to parse. I want to summarize briefly what I mean to take away from this short excursion in analytic fashion. Social life depends in large measure on trust. For an analysis of trust, it is relevant to examine the proper relationship between interpersonal trust (which most of us consider to be primary) and more cultural forms of trust, such as trust in the meaning of a poem, the promises of a contract, or the benevolence of a government (which most of us consider to be derivative).  
  
Both Heidegger and Derrida stimulate us to consider the possibility of reversing the explanatory direction. The more cultured forms (poetry, writing, hermeneutics) may explanatorily precede what we consider to be more immediate and natural (prose, straightforward signification between signs and the objects to which they refer, scientific explanations).  
  
One problem with the traditional explanatory direction is that it does not provide a plausible account how subjectivity is constituted by power relationships in human communities. Marxism seeks to address this by assigning explanatory primacy to macro-domination structures (class), whereas Foucault seeks to address it by assigning explanatory primacy to fields of micro-domination. Again, the explanatory direction is reversed. Whereas traditional explanations derive answers to questions of power from eternally established forms such as Cartesian subjectivity, Kantian reason, Enlightenment scientific method, or simply the truth and morality of realism (“you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free,” John 8:32), Marx and Foucault define subjectivity (and with it, truth, knowledge, morality, and so forth) on the basis of power in social relations.  
  
Foucault has written extensively about how sources of power cannot be identified because they are diffuse over the field of micro-dominations. Derrida has written extensively about how the process of signification is iterative without revealing anything but other signs. Barthes infers the death of the author and calls upon interpretation to disentangle the text, not decipher it; to range over the text, not pierce it (169).  
  
It is worth remembering that one of the questions we are trying to address is the controversy between narrativists and anti-narrativists. Much like Dilthey has applied hermeneutics to historical consciousness, Heidegger has applied hermeneutics to Dasein, and scientific method has applied hermeneutics to nature (more about this in the next section), narrativists have applied hermeneutics to biography in order to secure an account of personal identity.  
  
The controversy is at bottom about trust: is there a narrative (perhaps an elusive one) about my life, or the community with which I identify, which I can trust? Or must I live in constant suspicion of narrative coherence which vitiates my authenticity and embroils me in revisionism, excessive self-concern, and dissimulation (Strawson in “Against Narrativity”)?  
  
In the next section, I will try to address this question by bringing trust and hermeneutics together in another step that I am calling ‘die Lesbarkeit der Welt’ (the legibility of the world), borrowing a term from the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg (see Blumenberg, 1986). Blumenberg noticed the dependence of science on nature’s willingness to let itself be read like a text (for example as mathematics in physics, or as DNA in biology). The intelligibility of the world rests on its legibility (‘Lesbarkeit’).  
  
3 Die Lesbarkeit der Welt  
  
Evolutionary theory comes up short explaining why humans are so frivolously good at reading and mathematics. Perhaps the question is being asked the wrong way around. Scientific theories, such as evolutionary theory, testify to our expertise of translating the world into a text. We are particularly good at this translation, not necessarily at knowing what the case is for the world that surrounds us. Once a feature of the world cannot be read and interpreted like a text, our epistemological apparatus sputters and halts.  
  
Over time, groups of humans develop a competence for reading and creating texts that make sense to them. They are a product of making the world ‘lesbar,’ ‘legible.’ Legibility becomes coextensive with intelligibility. Epistemology is not a passive identification of features of the world, but the production, dissemination, and interpretation of texts.  
  
If the origin of this movement can be successfully masked, if a community assembles which mistakes its hermeneutics for objective-reality-corresponding inquiry, then social tension is reduced. This reduction cements power relations in favour of those who are competent at reading—where reading is the ability to turn the world into a text by sleight of hand without the audience noticing.  
  
The resurrection story in the New Testament is a text. In the Easter service of a fundamentalist church the emphasis may be on the objective reality of the resurrection, to which the text testifies. The scientific theory of the genetic code is also a text with perhaps also a problematic relationship to objective reality. If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail: the hereditary features of living creatures and the explanations for how these creatures have developed is encoded in a text because texts are what we understand.  
  
People (and animals) turn into information-processing units, either cognitively or genetically, so that what we have revealed about the world matches our interpretive advantage. That we are so good at reading and mathematics would not be so remarkable if reading and mathematics did not turn out to be so dominant when it comes to understanding and explaining the world. The better question may therefore be whether reading and mathematics really are so important when it comes to understanding the world, or whether we have made it the centre of our pre-Copernican world because we are so good at it.  
  
Consider relativity theory and quantum mechanics: masterpieces of mathematical textifying the world and its phenomena. Faintly analogous to the Sunday morning crowd listening to the parson’s sermon about eyewitnesses, folded up linens, and a two thousand pound rock barring the entrance to the tomb, the scientific crowd sits and listens attentively to the hermeneutics of mathematical models and takes them to be a description of the lived-in world instead of a hermeneutic performance.  
  
Philosophers who investigate scientific method are wary of these analogies and want to establish a demarcation between scientific and magical thinking. Predictive power, formal methods, the possibility of descending into the details of a research program may privilege science over other knowledge acquisition regimes. Another defining feature of science is its rejection of narrative as an argumentative device: even though scientists may from time to time (in popular media or in a grant application) try to spin a narrative, the ideal scientific theory does not rely on narrative features for making its case.  
  
This may tempt the philosopher of science to pose the independence of the scientific method from hermeneutics. In order to understand, however, a human being needs a text, because humans are constitutively hermeneutic and not derivatively hermeneutic. Where such a text is not available, a translation into text is required, such as the translation of biological information processing into DNA sequences or the translation of particle physics into mathematical formulae.  
  
I want to take this analysis further: not only any account of scientific method, but also any account of moral responsibility and personal identity depends on whether the dependence relationship goes from the explanandum (moral responsibility, personal identity) to the reading and interpretation of texts or the other way around. If moral responsibility, personal identity, and scientific method depend on an explanatorily prior account of hermeneutics, the question of trust and suspicion in hermeneutics gains decisive significance for any philosophical account of moral responsibility, personal identity, or scientific method.  
  
For example, a hermeneutics of trust may inspire a moral philosopher to find existentialist moral theory with its emphasis on authenticity plausible; alternatively, she may consider a narrativist approach which is likely to make her sympathetic to Aristotelian moral theory. If, however, her leaning is towards a hermeneutics of suspicion, she will be more at home in the moral theories of Marx, Nietzsche, and the poststructuralists. The next section once more considers the narrativism versus anti-narrativism controversy in the philosophy of personal identity and demonstrates the significance of the question of trust once it is assumed that any account of personal identity is derivative of the underlying hermeneutics.  
  
4 Trust, Suspicion, and Narrative  
  
A narrative enables me to look at my life as a coherent whole and creates persistence conditions for my personal identity. Chairs and planets persist as physical objects, while personal identity requires both identity over time and consciousness of dynamic change within persistence. A narrative may be able to accommodate these diverse requirements.  
  
A narrative also enables me to obfuscate tensions in my life that I (subconsciously) find otherwise irresolvable. My intellect may not be powerful enough to manage the complexity needed to render a coherent and explanatory account of relevant features (moral, material, psychological) of my existence. A narrative may offer simplicity even if frayed edges linger and cognitive dissonance threatens.  
  
In terms of what I accept to be explanatory in my life, a narrative also helps me to fend off an invasive scientific anthropology. There is a sense in which narrativists and anti-narrativists talk past each other. The former assume a hermeneutics of trust and largely engage with what they consider a hyperextension of the domain of science. The latter (the anti-narrativists) predominantly criticize narrativists on the basis of a hermeneutics of suspicion.  
  
Science, like narrativism, is based on a hermeneutics of trust: the properties of the world can be transparently communicated in a hypothesis composed of scientific terminology. Science, however, can be self-undermining by taking the subject of science (a moral agent with a consciousness and possible spiritual aspirations) and by denuding it as a scientific object of its subjectivity (consider, for example, Paul Churchland’s eliminativism about propositional attitudes in Churchland, 1981, or Thomas Metzinger’s abolition of the self in Metzinger, 2009). Narrativists offer as a solution to the dilemma of scientific overreach the construction of subjectivity on the basis of a concept that is decidedly outside the domain of science: literary narratives.  
  
A narrative, however, as much as it may be able to lend coherence to a dynamically lived life in time, manipulates, falsifies, and dissembles. The problem of narrative revealed by suspicion then opens the door to the question why we should pursue the type of coherence that narrativists advocate. Epicureans, with their preference for static katastematic pleasures over time- dependent kinetic pleasures (see Behrendt, 2007, 139), seek to put together an internally consistent anti-narrativist account.  
  
While it is often implicitly questions of trust and suspicion that divide narrativists and anti-narrativists, I want to address another aspect of trust originating in Annette Baier’s work that also clarifies the debate: the climate of trust. Baier criticizes how generations of male philosophers (in a chapter entitled “The Moral Perils of Intimacy” she characterizes them as “a group of gays, misogynists, clerics, and puritan bachelors,” 2012, 151) have viewed trust primarily in terms of relations between rational non-intimate equals (see Baier, 1986, 246).

Women cannot now, any more than they could when oppressed, ignore that part of morality and those forms of trust which cannot easily be forced into the liberal and particularly the contractarian mold. Men may but women cannot see morality as essentially a matter of keeping to the minimal moral traffic rules, designed to restrict close encounters between autonomous persons to self-chosen ones. Such a conception presupposes both an equality of power and a natural separateness from others, which is alien to women’s experience of life and morality. For those most of whose daily dealings are with the less powerful or the more powerful, a moral code designed for those equal in power will be at best nonfunctional, at worst an offensive pretense of equality as a substitute for its actuality. (Baier, 1986, 249)

Therefore, instead of an analysis of trust in interpersonal relationships without power differential, Baier emphasizes the importance of a climate of trust. This climate, which incorporates power dynamics, multilateralism, intimacy, and cooperation, may very well enact what subsequently gives rise to suspicion.  
  
Trust behaves dynamically: first it is established, then it unfolds its creative potential, finally it congeals and obscures a path forward (another not dissimilar dynamic interpretation of fidelity and betrayal can be found in Jacques Derrida’s “Following Theory,” see Derrida, 2004). Trust breeds suspicion, its inevitable companion, reflecting the hermeneutic circle between understanding, misunderstanding, and deception. When a text is interpreted, the trusting reader can be betrayed. The possibility of betrayal is, according to Baier, the discriminating test for trust—if I rely on another person for X, then not-X is disappointing, but not a betrayal; if I trust another person for X, then not-X is a betrayal.  
  
There are two forms of betrayal, which are probably two ends of a spectrum which allow for scaled versions in between. For the first form of betrayal, the author of the text has ulterior motives and intentionally misleads the reader with false information. For the second form of betrayal, a hermeneutic tradition has created a climate of trust to which in some sense both the author and the reader fall prey. A subset of charlatans, perhaps the more dangerous ones, believe in the efficacy of their snake oil. Trust privileges the position of the author, and the reader must break it in order to escape an otherwise inescapable Matthew effect where more and more semiotic power (determining the meaning of terms and their significance) accrues to the haves, while the havenots in semiotic poverty find themselves not just sidelined but without a vocabulary to express themselves.  
  
Philip Pettit has given a compelling description of trust as social pressure applied to the trustee by the trustor (see Pettit, 1995). What he calls the ‘cunning of trust’ underlines the suspicion that trust legitimately evokes in those who are subject to its climate—not only for those who trust and may find themselves betrayed, but also for those who find themselves at the receiving end of trust.  
  
Trust is not genetically programmed into humans by game theory and replicator dynamics, illustrated for example by the predator inspection performed by sticklebacks or guppies with their conspecifics. Evolutionary theory, if it is of any help in answering the question of trust, knows of genetic drift where a species acquires an incredible talent on a very narrow domain and thrives on it. Something like this is going on for humans, and one candidate for what this talent may be is hermeneutics, an ability to produce, read, interpret, and understand texts.  
  
The understanding of texts, however, comes invariably with a possibility of miscommunicating, misleading, and misunderstanding, and so the trust that is projected from the text to the producer of the text, the trustee, is constitutively coupled with suspicion. The hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of suspicion, finally, create the conditions for scientific method, moral agency, and personal identity; and the role of narrative in all of these fields will remain both central and problematic.  
  
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