

reflections on the Aristotelian concept of *praxis*. Hence, my text is a call for more distinctions and thereby more distinction in our thinking.

It is my claim, then, that it is both possible and desirable to do action research as *praxis*-research in ways that transcend “intervening”, “collaborating”, “interacting”, and “applying” mainstream research methods and scientific theory, as a dialectical “*Aufhebung*” of these terms and practices. A dialectical “*Aufhebung*” of something is not the same as simply leaving the transcended something behind, deconstructing, cancelling, and abandoning it. *Aufhebung* means transcending, retaining, transforming, and improving at the same time, literally; to raise something to a new level, mainly by recontextualising it. This can be done by rethinking these terms within a comprehended *praxis*-research framework.

Several forms of what is often termed “practitioner”, “native”, or “insider” research: where the tasks of knowledge generation and research are done by people from within the different vocations, professions, organizations, and practical pursuits themselves, seem to be on the trail of *praxis*-research, but often with insufficient philosophical reflection and sometimes apparently reducing the task of action research to problem solving and improving practice, without explicit and clear theoretical ambitions (McNiff & Whitehead, 2011). *Praxis*-research may require practitioner-research. But, still, not all forms of practitioner research qualify as *praxis*-research, as when practitioners merely apply conventional research methods (observing the behaviour of others, reading documents, and asking questions). Practitioner-research may be necessary but still not sufficient for *praxis*-research. As I have tried to clarify elsewhere, even *within* what might be called informed Aristotelian *praxis*-research there are important differences which, although there is no space for it here, need to be addressed.<sup>4</sup> My presentation here may

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<sup>4</sup> My own reconstruction of Aristotle differs from the most current “applied” way of presenting Aristotle on knowing by separating *epistēmē* from *téchne* and *phronēsis* (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; Toulmin, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 2001; Schwandt, 2002; Ramírez, 1995; Dunne, 1993; Polkinghorne, 2004). The separation is usually done in order to emphasize *phronēsis* as an independent alternative to *epistēmē* and *téchne*, or to “science” and “technology”. *Phronēsis* is seen as deliberation connected to *praxis*, interpreted as approximately our everyday activities, contrasted to science and technique. Often, rhetoric is also mustered as the deliberative rationality most appropriate for