

Project6 Google Password Checkup 验 证

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1 实验任务

Project 6: Google Password Checkup 验证

来自刘巍然老师的报告 google password checkup,参考论文 https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/723.pdf 的 section 3.1 ,也即 Figure 2 中展示的协议,尝试实现该协议,(编程语言不限)。

协议实现 2

根据链接里的 pdf, 协议的流程如下图:

DDH-based Private Intersection-Sum Protocol

• Inputs:

- Both parties: A group $\mathcal G$ of prime order, and an identifier space $\mathcal U$. A hash function $\mathsf H:\mathcal U\to\mathcal G$, modeled as a random oracle, that maps identifiers to random elements of $\mathcal G$. $\mathsf P_1:$ Set $V=\{v_i\}_{i=1}^{m_1},$ where $v_i\in\mathcal U$. $\mathsf P_2:$ Set of pairs $W=\{(w_i,t_i)\}_{i=1}^{m_2},$ with $w_i\in\mathcal U$, $t_i\in\mathbb Z^+$.

Setup:

- Each P_i chooses a random private exponent k_i in the group \mathcal{G} . P_2 generates a fresh key-pair $(pk,sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{AGen}(\lambda)$ for the additive homomorphic encryption scheme and sends the public key pkwith P1.

Round 1 (P_1):

- 1) For each element v_i in its set, P_1 applies the hash function and then exponentiates it using its key k_1 , thus computing $H(v_i)^{k_1}$ 2) P_1 sends $\{H(v_i)^{k_1}\}_{i=1}^m$ to Party 2 in shuffled order.
- Round 2 (P_2):

 - For each element H(v_i)^{k₁} received from P₁ in the previous step, P₂ exponentiates it using its key k₂, computing H(v_i)^{k₁k₂}.
 P₂ sends Z = {H(v_i)^{k₁k₂}}^{m₁} to P₁ in shuffled order.
 For each item (w_j, t_j) in its input set, P₂ applies the hash function to the first element of the pair and exponentiates it using key k₂. It encrypts the second element of the pair using the key pk for the additive homomorphic encryption key. It thus computes the pair. H(w_j)^{k₂} and AEnc (t_j).
 P₂ sends the set {(H(w_j)^{k₂}, AEnc(t_j))}^{m₂} to P₁ in shuffled order.

Round 3 (P_1) :

- 1) For each item $(H(w_j)^{k_2}, AEnc(t_j))$ received from P_2 in Round 2 Step 4, P_1 exponentiates the first member of the pair using k_1 , thus computing $(H(w_j)^{k_1k_2}, AEnc(t_j))$.
- 2) P_1 computes the intersection set J:

$$J=\{j:\mathsf{H}(w_j)^{k_1k_2}\in Z\}$$

where Z is the set received from P1 in Round 1.

For all items in the intersection, P₁ homomorphically adds the associated ciphertexts, and computes a ciphertext encrypting the intersection-sum S_J :

$$\mathsf{AEnc}(pk,S_J) = \mathsf{ASum}\left(\{\mathsf{AEnc}(t_j)\}_{j \in J}\right) = \mathsf{AEnc}\left(\sum_{j \in J} t_j\right)$$

 P_1 then randomizes the ciphertext using ARefresh and sends it to P_2 .

Output (P₂): P₂ decrypts the ciphertext received in Round 3 using the secret key sk to recover the intersection-sum S_J .

Figure 2: Π_{DDH}: Our deployed DDH-based Private Intersection-Sum protocol.

图 1 协议流程

具体而言, 我们可以:

输入

• 双方输入:

- 一个素数阶群 \mathcal{G} 和一个标识符空间 \mathcal{U} 。
- 哈希函数 $H: U \to G$ (建模为随机预言机),将标识符映射到群 G 的随 机元素。
- P_1 的输入: 集合 $V = \{v_i\}_{i=1}^{m_1}$, 其中 $v_i \in \mathcal{U}$ 。
- P_2 的输入: 集合 $W = \{(w_i, t_i)\}_{i=1}^{m_2}$,其中 $w_i \in \mathcal{U}$, $t_i \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ 。

初始化

• P_1 为群 G 中的每个元素选择一个随机私钥指数 k_i 。

 P₂ 为加法同态加密方案生成新密钥对 (pk, sk) ← AGen(λ), 并将公钥 pk 发 送给 P₁。

第一轮 (P1)

- 1. 对集合中的每个元素 v_i , P_1 先应用哈希函数,再用私钥 k_1 进行指数运算, 计算 $H(v_i)^{k_1}$ 。
- 2. P_1 将 $\{H(v_i)^{k_1}\}_{i=1}^{m_1}$ 以乱序方式发送给 P_2 。

第二轮 (P2)

- 1. 对从 P_1 收到的每个元素 $H(v_i)^{k_1}$, P_2 用私钥 k_2 进行指数运算, 计算 $H(v_i)^{k_1k_2}$ 。
- 2. P_2 将 $Z = \{H(v_i)^{k_1 k_2}\}_{i=1}^{m_1}$ 以乱序方式发送给 P_1 。
- 3. 对输入集合中的每个项 (w_j, t_j) , P_2 对第一项 w_j 应用哈希函数并用私钥 k_2 进行指数运算,得到 $H(w_j)^{k_2}$; 对第二项 t_j 用公钥 pk 进行加法同态加密,得到 $AEnc(t_j)$ 。
- 4. P_2 将集合 $\{(H(w_i)^{k_2}, AEnc(t_i))\}_{i=1}^{m_2}$ 以乱序方式发送给 P_1 。

第三轮 (P1)

- 1. 对从 P_2 收到的每对 $(H(w_j)^{k_2}, AEnc(t_j))$, P_1 用私钥 k_1 对第一项进行指数运算,得到 $(H(w_j)^{k_1k_2}, AEnc(t_j))$ 。
- 2. P₁ 计算交集集合 *J*:

$$J = \{j : \mathsf{H}(w_j)^{k_1 k_2} \in Z\}$$

其中 Z 是从 P_2 收到的集合。

3. 对交集中的所有项、 P_1 同态地累加关联的密文、计算加密的交集和 S_J :

$$\mathsf{AEnc}(pk,S_J) = \mathsf{ASum}\left((\mathsf{AEnc}(t_j))_{j \in J}\right) = \mathsf{AEnc}\left(\sum_{j \in J} t_j\right)$$

然后使用 ARefresh 随机化密文并发送给 P₂。

输出 (P2)

 P_2 用私钥 sk 解密密文,得到交集和 S_J 。

基于以上内容, 我们定义两个类作为主体:

```
1
    class Party1:
 2
        def __init__(self, V, curve):
 3
            self.V = V
 4
            self.curve = curve
            self.k1 = random.randint(1, curve.field.n - 1)
            self.Z_tuples = None
 6
 7
            self.intersection_set = set()
 8
 9
        def round1_send(self):
10
            points = []
11
            for v in self.V:
12
                p = H_to_G(v, self.curve)
13
                p1 = self.k1 * p
14
                points.append(p1)
15
            random.shuffle(points)
16
            return points
17
18
        def round3_receive(self, encrypted_pairs):
19
            Z_set = set(self.Z_tuples)
20
            sum_enc = None
21
            for (point_k2, enc_t) in encrypted_pairs:
22
                val = self.k1 * point_k2
23
                val_tuple = point_to_tuple(val)
24
                if val_tuple in Z_set:
25
                    self.intersection_set.add(val_tuple)
26
                    if sum_enc is None:
27
                         sum_enc = enc_t
28
                    else:
29
                         sum_enc = ECCElGamal.add_ciphertexts(sum_enc, enc_t)
30
            return sum_enc
31
32
33
   class Party2:
34
        def __init__(self, W, curve):
35
            self.W = W
36
            self.curve = curve
37
            self.k2 = random.randint(1, curve.field.n - 1)
38
            self.elgamal = ECCElGamal(curve)
39
```

```
40
        def round2_receive_and_send(self, points_k1):
41
            Z = []
42
            for p in points_k1:
43
                Z.append(self.k2 * p)
44
            random.shuffle(Z)
45
46
            pairs = []
47
            for (w, t) in self.W:
48
                p = H_to_G(w, self.curve)
49
                p_k2 = self.k2 * p
50
                enc_t = self.elgamal.encrypt(t)
51
                pairs.append((p_k2, enc_t))
52
            random.shuffle(pairs)
53
            return Z, pairs
54
55
        def round3_decrypt(self, sum_enc):
56
            return self.elgamal.decrypt(sum_enc)
```

由于这个协议是基于 DDH 的, 所以我们定义相关的工具函数如下:

```
1
2
   # 工具函数
3
   # -----
4
 5
   def H_to_G(msg, curve):
       11 11 11
 6
       哈希字符串到曲线点
 8
9
       h = sha256(msg.encode()).digest()
10
       scalar = int.from_bytes(h, 'big') % curve.field.n
11
       point = scalar * curve.g
12
       return point
13
14
   def point_to_tuple(point):
15
       return (point.x, point.y)
16
17
   def tuple_to_point(tpl, curve):
18
       return curve.Point(tpl[0], tpl[1])
19
20
   def encode_int_to_point(m, curve):
       .....
21
22
       简单映射: m * G
23
       注意: m必须小于曲线阶
24
       11 11 11
```

```
25
       return m * curve.g
26
27
   def decode_point_to_int(point, curve):
28
29
       简单暴力搜索解码, 只能小权重用
       11 11 11
30
31
       # 小权重时可用暴力搜索解码
32
       for i in range(10000):
33
          if i * curve.g == point:
34
              return i
35
       raise ValueError("无法解码该点为整数")
36
37
   # -----
38
   # ECC-ElGamal 加密/解密
   # -----
39
40
41
   class ECCElGamal:
42
       def __init__(self, curve):
43
           self.curve = curve
44
           self.priv = random.randint(1, curve.field.n - 1)
45
           self.pub = self.priv * curve.g
46
47
       def encrypt(self, m):
           11 11 11
48
49
          m是整数, 先编码成点, 再加密
50
           返回 (C1, C2), 两个椭圆曲线点
51
52
           M = encode_int_to_point(m, self.curve)
53
           k = random.randint(1, self.curve.field.n - 1)
54
           C1 = k * self.curve.g
55
           C2 = M + k * self.pub
56
           return (C1, C2)
57
58
       def decrypt(self, C):
           11 11 11
59
60
           C = (C1, C2)
61
           解密得到点M, 再解码成整数
62
63
          C1, C2 = C
64
           S = self.priv * C1
           M = C2 - S
65
66
           m = decode_point_to_int(M, self.curve)
67
          return m
```

在 main 函数中, 我们定义相关参数:

```
curve = registry.get_curve('secp256r1')
 1
 2
3
       V = ["alice", "bob", "carol", "dave"]
       W = [("bob", 3), ("carol", 5), ("eve", 2), ("frank", 1)]
 4
 5
 6
       P1 = Party1(V, curve)
 7
       P2 = Party2(W, curve)
 8
 9
       round1_msg = P1.round1_send()
10
       Z_points, pairs = P2.round2_receive_and_send(round1_msg)
11
       P1.Z_tuples = set(point_to_tuple(p) for p in Z_points)
12
       sum_enc = P1.round3_receive(pairs)
13
       intersection_sum = P2.round3_decrypt(sum_enc)
14
15
       print(f"Intersection sum = {intersection_sum}") # 预期: 8
```

按照期望应当输出8,我们查看结果:

(base) zhangchi@zhangchi-virtual-machine:~/桌面\$ python3 p6.py
Intersection sum = 8

图 2 结果

可以看到结果符合预期。